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Bureaucracy at War: U. S. Performance in the Vietnam Conflict
Robert W. Komer. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986. 174 pp. $20.85 ($18.76).'
Reviewed by Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., U. S. Army (Retired)
Edward Luttwak has been called the John McEnroe of the strategic set, but surely Robert W. Komer is a better candidate for that title. As those naval officers who have withstood his attacks on maritime strategy can attest, no one can equal his combination of insight and invective.
And insight and invective—this time, about Vietnam war strategy—is what his Bureaucracy at War is all about. An updated and revised version of his 1972 RAND Corporation report, “Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U. S./GVN [Government of South Vietnam] Performance in Vietnam,” it addresses one of the great voids in military strategic thinking.
In recent years, thanks in large measure to the Naval War College’s early 1970s rediscovery of the classic military theorists, the operational dimension of strategy has received widespread attention. And, thanks to the late Admiral Henry Eccles and others, the logistic dimension of strategy has not been neglected. Oxford Professor Michael Howard has even resurrected strategy’s social and psychological dimensions. But what has not received sufficient emphasis in our staff and war college curricula is one of the most important dimensions of all— the bureaucratic dimension of strategy.
Henry Kissinger once commented that there are two parts to implementing a new proposal. The easy part (and the one people usually worry about most) is getting approval. The hard part is energizing the bureaucracy. Komer found that out in 1967 when, after receiving President Lyndon Johnson’s approval to implement his theories on pacification, he was sent to Vietnam to put his theories into operation. With a program known as CORDS (Civil Operations and Rural Development Support), Komer changed the thrust of the war. Under his leadership and that of his successor, William E. Colby (who wrote the foreword to this book), the
CORDS program was an enormous success. As even former Viet Cong leaders now attest, by the early 1970s, the United States and South Vietnam had won the guerrilla war.
Bureaucracy at War is Komer’s account of why it took so long to mount this successful campaign against the Viet Cong, and about the bureaucratic obstacles he had to surmount, both in Saigon and in Washington, D. C. It is a landmark work on the institutional impediments awaiting any new and innovative program that challenges the conventional wisdom.
Still, if his pacification campaign was so successful—and it was—why didn’t we win the war? Sadly, mesmerized by counterinsurgency, Komer is as blind to the need for conventional military forces to isolate South Vietnam from North Vietnamese conventional attack as his “bureaucrats” were to the need to neutralize the Viet Cone in the villages.
Both wars needed to be f°u? ^ won. CORDS was a success. jjy the successes were rendered irrelevan ^ tanks, heavy artillery, and 20-pluS se lar divisions of the North Vietn Army as they rolled across ^outconClu- nam’s borders in their final and c sive 1975 blitzkrieg. .y/ctt
But don’t just read Bureaucracy as history. As Ambassador Colby e ,,jS sizes in his introduction, this b j 0f not only a critique of the past but ^ useful lessons for the future. je5i Achilles’ heel of so many fine \es- their execution, it points up valua ^ sons of organizations and control-
Colonel Summers, an infantry veteran
aiiu viuuaui wais, is ihjw uic The™
spondent for U. S. News & World Report- 0- of On Strategy (Presidio Press, 1982) an_ fQftafifij nam War Almanac (Facts on File, 1986), e ^ ^ili' held the General Douglas MacArthur Chai tarv Research at the Armv War College
The CORDS pacification campaign that offset Viet Cong influence in tbe lages also had to surmount the bureaucracy of war.
and Vietnam wars, is now the senior mi
litary
138
Proceedings / Septel
FronTL0^ M°dern Strategy:
Age achlavelli to the Nuclear
peter Parpt cj.
Press iqoJ „ “or- Princeton University '$40 5(Y) u ' 942 PP- Bib. Ind. $45.00 ' ’ hardcover, $12.95 ($11.65) paper.
C'ausewitz; Philosopher of War
^chusterrr'4ir0u1' ^ew ^rk: Simon &
Ind. so q OUchstone Books, 1986. 432 pp.
^ ^ Paper.
U- S'^ap.ain Paul R. Schratz, a'-v (Retired)
Maker^ 7ears’ Edward Mead Earle’s Uttiveroj, ^°dern Strategy (Princeton classic cy,, reSS’ *943) ranked as the
'hoi
unforeseen reasons, the planned chapter on theorists of naval strategy failed of completion at a date too late either to find a replacement or to take up the slack in related chapters—in his words, a “most regrettable episode.” I agree and can only conclude that this book, valuable in so many ways, must await a second edition to find its full utility.
Quite a different story entirely is Raymond Aron’s book, Clausewitz: Philosopher of War. Aron, a leading French scholar in the field of war and policy for more than 40 years, regarded this, his last book, as his finest intellectual effort. A painstaking Clausewitz scholar, he brings a new interpretation to the life and theories of the great master.
The latter sections of the book offer a refreshingly new and brilliant analysis of the Clausewitz doctrines with respect to revolution, his profound influence on Nikolai Lenin and Mao Tse-tung, and an especially useful chapter on deterrence— “The ‘Deterrence Cheque’”—including some sharply critical comments on the pet theories of several U. S. nuclear strategists. Far from having been made obsolete by nuclear weapons, Clausewitz’s teachings emerge more relevant than ever. In the nuclear era, only limited wars are sensible. Nuclear wars are for deterrence only: “nothing prevents the West from appreciating that its political goals require neither the use of nuclear weapons nor the physical destruction of the enemy.”
The essential tie of political ends to military means runs throughout the book, but understanding will not always come easy, nor is the book for the casual reader. Any reader should have at hand a copy of the Paret-Howard translation of Clausewitz’s On War to aid his interpretation. Many sections will require rereading to gain a clear understanding. The problem is complicated in the English translation by the lack of sympathy of the translators. The two-volume French original has been reduced by half, omitting references and extensive scholarly notes. The translation is frequently awkward, reflecting unfamiliarity with the subject matter, and is further marred by repetitive grammatical errors. The serious student should not be dissuaded, however. Aron’s brilliance shines through regardless of the language barrier—and who ever said mining gold was easy?
uses the term strategy carelessly—to cover national or domestic policy, field tactics, planning, doctrine, or decision making.
Still more serious problems emerge for the seafaring reader. Professor Crowl’s excellent essay is limited editorially to pre-1914. Hence, there is no discussion of Mahan and his impact on 20th century maritime war. The chapter, “German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare, 1914-1945” by Michael Geyer and Matloff’s chapter on allied strategy in World War II fail to mention the Battle of the Atlantic—neither the U-Boat which twice brought Britain to the edge of starvation nor the German High Seas Fleet and its challenge to British naval mastery. “American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War,” by D. Clayton James, fails to mention the role of the U. S. submarine force in the Pacific strategy; the Central Pacific carrier offensive merits only a few casual sentences.
If the reader hopes to find carrier air power and limited war strategy in the Korean or Vietnam actions, the relevant chapter is “Voices From the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists,” by David Maclsaac. Maclsaac is a fine scholar, a former Naval War College faculty member, and a good theorist of air power. He examines conventional (that is tactical) air power primarily in Indochina, but except for one offhand reference, “including naval and marine corps air,” the treatment is entirely Air Force.
Alternatively, Field Marshall Michael Carver’s essay, “Conventional Warfare in the Nuclear Age,” covers NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) strategy, the Middle East, and South Asian wars without reference to a maritime component. Only in the Falklands episode do we learn of the sea dimension.
A major consideration today is the question of a continental or maritime strategy for the NATO alliance, discussed in scores of recent articles and books. Yet here we find that the entire section on Sea and Air War from the earlier Earle edition has been omitted. No reference is made to British geopolitician Sir Halford J. Mackinder, to geopolitics, or to continental war.
How can it happen that in a major study such as this, Admiral Chester Nim- itz appears only casually and Admirals William F. Halsey and Raymond A. Spruance do not even make the index? Ironically, Paret is the Raymond A. Spruance professor of International History at Stanford University.
In response to my inquiry, Professor Paret disclaims a “conspiracy of silence” against maritime strategy. For wholly
collection of
„ — essays on military
Way 'Wq . ‘he half dozen attempts under none has t0 uPdate (hat volume,
than peter peen more highly anticipated
'ught.
S,ra* p3ret s new Makers of Modern thor nf u are‘ ‘s a top-notch scholar.
-ate ^ excellent Cto and, ?rd University Press, 1976)
author
Staie
a top-notch scholar, excellent Clausewitz and the
translator k*'chael Howard, editor and Urtte, q ° ‘he superb Clausewitz vol- Eress, (Princeton University
rehirth of • ’ wh'ch generated a major niarkeh i mteres‘ 'n the old master and a ‘he War rnJ‘rovernent in the curricula of The 28 p8eS- ■
vary wid | Says 'n this new collection s‘ance pC ^ ,'n hterary quality and sub-
'“‘‘on ir,ar,?!s "Napoleon and the Revo- in War”
SuPeri
and “Clausewitz” are
Alfred every resPect- Philip Crowl’c ‘orian>., hayer Mahan: The Naval His- ^Ussel] vu rehreshingly new and useful
> Its '
f lSseU Wei„i ,
,rom t. C1gley s “American Strategy
^ot'd \y. ^fpnnings through the First Strategy 3r’ Maurice Matloff s “Allied Uwre,lc‘n Europe, 1939-1945,” and l-irstTC Freedman’s chapter, “The R'sts” a Generations of Nuclear Strate- Muding ® Uniformly excellent. The concern „ ,e^ecti°ns on Strategy in the aM pe,: and Future
‘he Washington, D. C
Felix C iKUtUre” by Gordon CraiS
ar°ugho"< * ■ ert deserves wide reading
Uicy.
As
utakin
g establishment.
‘he treat ®enera* commentary, however, ,, en‘'s historical rather than stra-
tei
etc.
hdilt a^erf tbe earlier Earle edition PtofeSSj0rind a Mad of scholars, military
r4ret
and policymakers, the
^“‘ribut110n ‘s history oriented: of 26 ‘‘'■litary °ff.’ are historians, three are and few° hcers, none is a policymaker, fists, -j, “tcrit being classified as strate- Nakjn„ e imitation is evident in “The a°‘eezza t> • ^°V‘e‘ Strategy” by Con- yelop thpR,Ce’ which fails either to de- °n both t1413''!01’ influence of Clausewitz l‘lenti0n enmism (and Maoism) or to oviet maritime strategy. Rice
Captain Schratz graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in 1939 and established a distinguished record in the submarine force. With a PhD from Ohio State University, he is widely recognized as a writer on foreign policy and national security affairs. He retired as a professor at Georgetown University in 1981.
*edi.
mgs /
September 1986
141
Books of Interest
By Lieutenant Commander Thomas J. Cutler, U. S. Navy
i event: almost ove Cove:
■eep
*aUa in 1 rx u&,u 10 oreaK me a "y vvith a fj 42' Welding historical t fates the !-Cllona' cast of characters, ■■dsi „r Ury and tension of war at 1 m°ving love story.
In,
pending China
^85. 264*nn NmW ^ork; Oxford University Press, With d- PP Notes'lnd'$24-95 <$22-45)- lory, ideolUSS*°nS °n Nina’s geography, his- ■yzes chin°?y’ and institutions, this book ana- Speciai atf3 S. de^ense policy and capabilities. 0 Chineseentl°n 'S £'ven t0 the eight incidents •hose invn|armeC* act‘on s'nce 1949, including fte Soviet Vn^' ^orea’ Vietnam, Tibet, and Filina defe a n'on' Such questions as how ■° °ther o' S 'tse^an9 how ■■ acts *n relation "'ell-dor-,, reat Powers are answered in this
UOcumented work.
'''Hitt Ueh'!. ^<>n*rontntion: American- kaymond 3 l0ns B'°m Nixon to Reagan
®r°°kinEs1in5arthoff- Washington, DC: The
(J3j bution, 1985 I J47 pp Notes. Ind Ganhoff hardcover, $16.95 ($15.25) papet
e'gn Policy ^n'or fellow in the Brookings For ^assador h tud'es Program and a retired am CaHs a "’rp Wrllten what Library Journo Personaljtjp a^e analysis [that] treats whelrnin„ r,S’ and concepts in almos
'ng the LUQfas/inatingdetail----------- ” —
"■Story, ®4 period of Soviet-Americ.
"td analy2f>,e,lfe anc7 Confrontation recour "ens betweeS adversarial but tolerant rel """tors Jten t*lese two nuclear-muscled cor ""d ‘s thor>S ^ased on Garthoff’s experien Conv>ncinpi°U®^ documented, carefully ai "'■th im_ ^. suPPorting the interpretatio p ssive evidence.
l0lln Win
'"85, ,9j atC‘ New York: St . Martin’s Press,
This n Pp Sl2-95 ($11.65).
.. 1S novel
!"es in out Royal Navy U-class subr -r°ns of a r ^ar 11 centers around the ope re"th,” wh^1!,31^011 known as “The Fight !’f Malta in !q *°u£ht t0 break the Axis’ sii
V \Vitk 42. Mf*IHinn (iictrvrir'il oirtlipn rns'<le the *
°P Sovier 9uarium: The Making of ;
>rSuvo Py
9*6- 256VOnrr; New York: Macmillan Publist
Vic‘or Su d'$17'26 <$15-53>- !'v° Previn°r0V’ Soviet defector and authi Insid Uy kooks (Inside the Soviet /- i r'*tenast °v‘el Military Intelligence), "®s of th^r-ll1® revelation of the inner w iCnceOroa . the Soviet military in °re effPr.,niZat'on- More deadly and profc "der sUchtlVe than the KGB, the GRU w an effective cloak of secrecy
Westerners who read this book will probably know more about its existence than do the Soviets themselves. Suvorov, himself a former GRU agent, tells how, as a part of his indoctrination, he was shown a film of a disaffected GRU agent being burned alive. Suvorov was told, “The only way you will leave [the GRU] is through the chimney, so if you want to quit, quit now.” Among many other incidents, he tells of condemned prisoners being used for hand-to-hand combat training and the use of electric shock in memory training.
Intelligence: Policy and Process
Alfred C. Maurer, Marion D. Tunstall, and James M. Keagle, Editors. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985. 401 pp. $44.50 ($40.05) hardcover, $20.00 ($18.00) paper.
In 20 essays divided into two major sections, the well-qualified authors discuss “The Theory and Practice of Intelligence” and “Recurring Issues in Intelligence.” The collection explains how the intelligence process works today and how it anticipates the future. Evaluation of intelligence failures and proposed methods of improvement make this book a dynamic addition to the literature on this infrequently discussed and frequently misunderstood component of the governmental policy process.
Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam
George McT. Kahin. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986. 550 pp. Notes, lnd. Maps. $24.95 ($22.45).
One of the foremost Southeast Asian political scientists and former member of the State Department’s East Asia Advisory Committee from 1967 to 1968 has written an insightful analysis explaining the origins of U. S. involvement in Vietnam. Hailed as “an outstanding contribution” by Booklist and “highly recommended” by Library Journal, Intervention relies on Kahin’s own experiences and information gleaned from recently declassified government documents to portray the intervention process in a radically new light. A different face of Lyndon Johnson is revealed and a new interpretation of events within South Vietnam answers some old questions and raises new ones.
Latin American Political Movements
Ciaran O. Maolain. New York: Facts on File,
1985. 287 pp. Ind. $24.95 ($22.45).
Arranged alphabetically by country, this reference work provides information on approximately 700 political parties (both legal and illegal) and guerrilla movements in Latin America. The political background and constitutional framework of each country are included. In addition, the history, membership, publications, international affiliations, and various other data on each of the parties, organizations, and movements are highlighted.
5] Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers
J. R. Hill. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986. 247 pp. Bib. Notes. Ind. Append. Tables. $24.95 ($19.96).
Placing Great Britain, France, India, Brazil, and other nations in a newly defined category of “medium powers,” British Admiral J. R. Hill proposes a coherent maritime strategy that recognizes the positions of these nations as lying somewhere between the superpowers
and the virtually impotent small maritime powers. He surveys the varied aspects of naval warfare—equipment, operations, organization, and deployment—and tailors these to this new role. He sees alliances as a key factor in defining a medium power's strategy, and he predicts a future where the role of medium powers will still have a vital place. This is a thought-provoking concept that should be explored by maritime strategists, be they real or “armchair,” “super” or “medium.”
The Military Life of Frederick the Great
Christopher Duffy. New York: Atheneum, 1986. 407 pp. Illus. Bib. Ind. Maps. $25.00 ($22.50).
Frederick the Great's military career, recognized by many scholars as second only to Na-
hX*
""tin
'8S1 SePtember 1986
143
previously characterized Euro- and sought to systematize
ernment t? 3S ^ ^ systematized his gov- tenturv th *S 'S t*le ^'rst book tn more than a soldier 31 Stud'es the military career of this uler-monarch.
Noi
..............................
vendome'pand Claude Vi|lers. New York: The (S45.00). rCSS’ 1985' 208 PP- IHus. Bib. $50.00
PP in.. 'TV1* 1>ew York: Macmillan, 1986.
lllus- Maps. $19.95 ($17.95).
>dVtn 200 front
pages of the Pacific Stars
are reproduced in this yietnarn rUntin§ t*le maj°r events of the ar- From the ominous, yet little-
which p °"aparte’s' 's studied in this book, ^oritativ* !sflers Weekly calls a “lucid, au- of Prus 6 108raphy,” This renowned King 'n'varfa'a reco§n'zed the impending changes that bro^K111* deve*°Ped tactics and strategies Reiyjn„ h 1 neW efficiency to the battlefield, ary tact- eavi,y upon artillery and diversion- vers th=,Su 6 shunned the parade-like
SJF '
fttandie: Queen of the Seas
Charles Offrey, Francois
The iUxu
tiade this^' 3rt’ ce^eh>rities, and history that thagnificp ^Pectacular ocean liner unique are Nearly ann u portrayed in words and pictures 'n this lar 'f *ustrations in all—112 in color) hyg0ne ^e't°nnat book. The lavish days of a m°de of (and an aP hut vanished Pages . ransportation are recaptured in these toils, stee S°h '.nc*uded are the fascinating de- °f the gj.^ ,*n mystery and wartime intrigue, at ship’s ignominious demise.
Pacific Sta
Pages rs and Stripes: Vietnam Front
S^- Editor. New Mi
and St, noticed, story headlined “Annamese Gird for Battle in Indo-China” in October 1945 to the huge headline “It’s Over” in May 1975, this 30-year odyssey is revealed in the words and pictures of the newspaper that served the armed forces throughout those decades.
The Years of MacArthur: Triumph & Disaster, 1945-1964 (Volume 3)
D. Clayton James. Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1985. 848 pp. lllus. Bib. Notes. Ind. Maps. Append. $29.45 ($26.50).
In this third and final volume, James brings his massive biography to a close. General Douglas MacArthur is seen here as the supreme ruler of a conquered Japan, as the brilliant strategist of Inchon, as the commander fired by his president, and as an old soldier “fading away.” Steven Ambrose, author of Eisenhower & Berlin, Nineteen Forty-Five (W. W. Norton & Co. Inc., 1967), writes of this book, “Biography simply doesn’t get any better than this.”
Other Titles of Interest__________
Exploring Underwater Photography
John Christopher Fine. Medford, NJ: Plexus Publishing, 1986. 174 pp. Photos. Gloss. Ind. $16.95 ($15.25).
Gulf Security and the Iran-Iraq War
Thomas Naff, Editor. Washington, DC: The National Defense University Press, 1985. 193 pp. Tables. Fig. Maps. Ind. $4.25. (Order directly from: Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402.)
Hirohito: The War Years
Paul Manning. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1986. 255 pp. Photos. Append. Ind. $16.45 ($14.80).
Offshore: A North Sea Journey
A. Alvarez. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1986. 191 pp. Photos. Maps. $15.45
($13.90).
The Soviet Airborne Experience: Research Survey No. 4
LCol. David M. Glantz. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1985. 211 pp. Maps. Tables. Bib. $10.00. (Order directly from: Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402.)
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8s /
September 1986
145