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The SSN-21 is the latest in submarine design, having evolved from the revolutionary Albacore—the fifth in a series of design revolutions. But what comes next when it can no longer meet the threat? The answer may be in another revolution—the bottom bounce array sonar submarine.
Warships are developed to perform specific missions. The mission, or operational requirement, of a warship, in turn, is determined by operational commanders, who must have a well-balanced force to meet the challenge of current and postulated threats. Throughout the long, complicated design process, the mission must remain preeminent and control the design. “Off-the-shelf” and “traditional design standard” square pegs must be shunned when a mission-essential round hole must be filled. In a “mission-controlled” ship design, it may well be that a round peg must be developed to guarantee the best fit.
The extensive submarine construction program initiated by the Soviet Union in the 1950s has shown no signs of abatement. The large size of the Soviet submarine fleet mandates major emphasis on antisubmarine warfare (ASW) as a primary mission. To deal with this threat, Western military planners employ the multiplatform approach, with operational ASW elements designated within the airborne, surface, and subsurface forces. It has long been recognized, however, that the best ASW platform is another submarine, because the submarine can penetrate the concealing ocean depths to detect and attack the enemy.
Traditionally, in submarine balance of forces, the Soviets have enjoyed an advantage in numbers, while the Western forces have relied on quality and stealth to maintain parity. This is no longer the case. Recent qualitative gains in Soviet submarines are evidence of a change in the emphasis of Soviet strategic military planners. Among these gains, which include faster, deeper-diving, and bet ter armed submarines, noise reduction is of prime imp°r tance to the West for long-term ASW mission analysis-1 April 1983, then-Chief of Naval Operations Admits James Watkins compared Soviet Victor Ill-class nuclei' powered attack submarines to U. S. Sturgeon (SSN-63'1 class submarines in terms of operational noise signature characteristics. Future Soviet designs portend further m1 provements in silencing technology.
Although current U. S. forces are adequate to meet the current threat, the projected force balance mandates a sig' nificant improvement in our detection capabilities of a 1° noise-generating adversary to maintain the quality °ve| quantity strategic parity. The question is how best to mee this threat in the long term. The proposed answer is a mission-controlled ASW submarine—the bottom bounce array sonar submarine (BBASS).
Design Revolutions: From David Bushnell’s America11 Turtle to the preliminary design Seawolf (SSN-21) class*
there have been five “revolutionary” innovations in marine design:
- The USS Holland (SS-1), accepted by the U. S. Navy Department in 1899, used a battery to drive an electric motor while submerged and a gasoline engine to power tn ship on the surface. The Holland, with her streamline shape, single hull, and small fairwater served as the prot° type for the U. S. Navy’s first class of submarines—t-®” the Plunger (SS-2). In its first role as a naval warship* m® submarine—with its emphasis on submerged instead 0 surfaced operation and severely restricted range an speed—served as a coastal craft, fulfilling a defensive ro in the protection of the harbor facilities along the U- ^ coastline and in overseas possessions.
- The adaptation of the diesel engine for submarine use during 1907-12 provided for greater speed and endurance and marked the second major design revolution: the sea going extended range submarine. In 1916, the Schley 52)—later renamed AA-1 in 1917 and then T-l in 1920--^ became the first true seagoing submarine and, along w1
&
Table 1 Mission Controlled Designs
Submarine | Mission | Displacement (Tons) (S urfaced/S ubmerged) | Dimensions (ft) (length x beam) |
Triton (SSRN-586) | Radar Picket | 5,940/6,670 | 447 x 37 |
Halibut (SSGN-587) | Strategic Missile | 3,850/5,000 | 350 x 29.5 |
Tullibee (SSN-597) | ASW Barrier | 2,317/2,640 | 273 x 23.3 |
Skipjack (SSN-585) | Fast Attack | 3,075/3,513 | 251.7 x 31-5 |
Permit (SSN-594) | Fast Attack/ASW | 3,750/4,300 | 278.5 x 31-7 |
Sturgeon (SSN-637) | Fast Attack/ASW | 3,640/4,640 | 292.2 x 31-7 |
Los Angeles (SSN-688) | Fast Attack/ASW | 6,000/6,900 | 360 x 33 |
George Washington (SSBN-598) | Strategic Missile | 6,019/6,888 | 381.7 x 33 |
her derivatives, formed the U. S. Navy’s overseas submarine fleet in World War I.
- The German decision to begin unrestricted submarine warfare on 1 February 1917 signaled a major shift in submarine strategic philosophy. U. S. submarine designers responded with more reliable, compact, and economic propulsion systems and by enhancing the surfaced performance of submarines to increase speed. In 1941, the USS Gato (SS-212) became the forerunner of the ubiquitous “fleet boat,” which dominated the Pacific in World War II. This third design revolution marked a shift in emphasis from submerged to surfaced performance, from coastal and limited open ocean defense to far-reaching worldwide offense, and from operations with the main battle fleet to independent operational employment.1
- The devastation of the German U-boats in the World War II Battle of the Atlantic sounded the death knell for the surface-running attack submarine. The British radar technology that defeated the Type VII U-boat provided the impetus for the German technology of the high-speed, snorkelling Type XXI, completed in 1945, which could conduct all operations, including high-speed approach and attack, while submerged. The Type XXI spawned postwar imitations in all of the world’s major navies, including the British Porpoise, the French Narval, the Soviet Zulu, and the U. S. Tang (SS-563) classes. The fourth major design revolution thus marked a reemphasis on submerged characteristics at the expense of surfaced performance.
- The fifth design revolution made the transition from the “submersible surface ship” to the “true submarine” complete. The marriage of the nuclear power plant proven in the USS Nautilus (SSN-571) to the revolutionary highspeed, “tear-drop” hull form demonstrated by the USS Albacore (AGSS-569) defined the modern submarine warship.2 The result of this union was the completion of the USS Skipjack (SSN-585) in 1958.
Since the design of the Skipjack, submarine development has been essentially evolutionary with variations on a theme incorporated as necessary to fulfill a newly defined mission or counter a current or projected threat. The tear-drop hull powered by a nuclear reactor makes for a highly capable submarine in the current threat environment, as evidenced by the Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class attack submarines now in service. The versatility of this design is equally impressive, considering that strategic
U. S. NAVY (L. P
missile submarines with totally different missions can be built with relatively minor modifications to the basic hull- Is this then the final design revolution? We think not-
Mission-Controlled Designs: The amorphous threat posed by the coastal Soviet Navy at the end of World War II sparked wide controversy concerning the future role 0 the U. S. Navy in general and of the submarine’s misstep in particular. In the absence of a clear-cut mission an with limited new construction funds, the submarine community entered a period of uncertainty. Some new diesc submarine construction and conversions continued, maintaining a viable conventional force to counter the nearterm challenge of the slowly emerging Soviet submarine force. Meanwhile, a wide variety of one-of-a-kind nuclear-powered submarines were designed and built as p° tential missions were proposed for the submarine fleet o^ the future. The new nuclear submarines of this “era
of
uncertainty” were constrained by the requirements of the
we
term “mission-controlled submarine design.” (^ee Table 1.)
missions they were intended to perform, a practice
The radar picket mission was conceived late in
World
War II to stem the losses of surface ships assigned to this task. A submarine could presumably remain surfaced to conduct surveillance and to direct attacking aircraft towar enemy forces, submerging as necessary to get out harm’s way. The USS Triton (SSN-586) was designed an built to this mission specification. The extent to which t
was
mission controlled the design is evident. The Triton the only nuclear submarine built to go significantly faster
^•ssio SUr^ace t*lan when submerged.3 The radar picket enem nf a'so rc(juired a large radar antenna to locate to djp orces and an elaborate combat information center Urfle jrct intercepting fighter aircraft. To provide the vol- ^’670?f t*16Se m*ssi°n essential facilities, the Triton, at Previ °nS ^placement, was almost twice the size of any
The^ ^CS^n or c^ass under construction at that time.4 row C'on's huge radar-bearing sail and the long, nar- chara ea^eeP*n8 hull reflected a disregard for submerged task f Crist'cs- To provide enough power to operate at to be°fCC sPee^s’ the Triton was the only U. S. submarine ea^y vv'tte<? w'lh two nuclear reactors. The fact that the rjer, Warning radar picket mission was passed to the car- was |-]USCt^ a'rcraft does not mean that the Triton's design deSi„ Rather, it was a successful mission-controlled clorni . °r which the mission no longer existed. It was so any 0,LtC^ hy this mission that it could not effectively fdl derr^ Cr anc* Was hence the first nuclear submarine to be
^missioned.
Rl°yrn Strate^tc missile attack mission for submarine em- man ent Was spawned from postwar development of Ger- stealth°C^et technology, coupled with the appeal of a enertl m°hile launch platform that could penetrate the y defenses. The intended use of nuclear warheads on able S'es °ffset the relatively low payload weight avail- that n °0ard submarines and lent credence to the notion be c erceived Soviet conventional force superiority could Regm nterhalanced by the cruise missile program. The 195qsUs.^ missile was designed and built in the early ifjeci a range of 575 nautical miles. Joining the mod- tesel-electric submarines Gray back (SSG-574),
Growler (SSG-577), Tunny (SSG-282), and Barbero (SSG-317), the nuclear-powered Halibut (SSGN-587) was designed and built to carry two of the surface-launched improved Regulus II missiles or five of the standard Regu- lus missiles, and thus fulfill the cruise missile submarine mission.5
As the first submarine designed and constructed specifically to fire missiles, Halibut's features reflect the mission-essential priority of providing a stable surfacelaunching platform. The large missile hangar faired into the bow required a high-volume submarine (5,000 tons submerged displacement) that was relatively slow (about 20 knots submerged) because of the increased drag that the hangar appendage induced. The ship was also long (350 feet) for enhanced surface stability. When the Navy withdrew the Regulus from service in 1965 in favor of the more promising submerged-launch Polaris program, the Halibut was converted to an attack submarine and eventually decommissioned in 1976. As with the Triton, this was not a design failure, but a successful mission-controlled design without a mission.
The third and final mission-controlled design to be constructed during this period was the USS Tullibee (SSN- 597), a nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarine (SSKN) whose mission was ASW in a barrier patrol scenario. The specialized ASW submarine, first authorized in the 1948 fiscal year program, would lie in wait on a barrier at a geographic choke point or across a transit route and ambush enemy forces as they attempted to penetrate. The mission-essential elements for the ASW role were extensive quieting and a large passive sonar system—both needed to ensure an acoustic advantage over enemy forces—and a small hull size to allow for production of the large numbers of submarines needed to establish effective barriers. Three small (1,000-ton, 196-foot) diesel- electric submarines were designed and built as hunter- killer submarines (SSKs) and seven fleet submarines were converted to this mission by installing large passive sonars
67
ss 1 September 1986
in their bows. These designs failed since the dependence on batteries precluded the extended on-station service necessary to fulfill the mission.
The smaller SSKs suffered from the additional problem of an inability to operate in the heavy seas endemic to the North Atlantic Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap, the postulated barrier for the Soviet Northern Fleet. The nuclear-powered Tullibee did not suffer from these limitations. Since the mission demanded quiet operation, Tullibee was fitted with a quieter drive system in lieu of the noisier conventional steam turbines, limiting her submerged speed to about 20 knots. The bow was entirely given over to the sonar, where the maximum distance from the relatively noisy machinery of the engine room could be used to improve passive sonar detection capabilities. Tullibee's small size (2,460 tons submerged) reflected an austere submarine design allowing for the economic exigency of a massive shipbuilding program.
The Tullibee was as successful as the Triton and Halibut in its mission, but its design was limited to the single demonstration prototype because of funding. In the late 1950s, the cost of the submarine shipbuilding program had risen to the extent that the budget could support the construction of only one non-ballistic missile-firing submarine class. The Thresher (SSN-593)-class fast-attack submarine was chosen since it was more versatile. In essence, the ASW barrier mission could be performed with less degradation by a Thresher-class submarine than the fast- attack hunter-killer/direct support mission could be performed by the smaller and slower Tullibee class. Thus the Thresher class—later officially called the Permit (SSN- 594) class, after the loss of the lead ship in 1963—became the progenitor of virtually all modern U. S. nuclear- powered attack submarines, and, by default, ASW barrier submarines.
The result of this decision is that the modern nuclear attack submarine is not mission-controlled but rather a compromise of numerous missions dominated by the highspeed attack submarine role. Does the U. S. Navy need a dedicated mission-controlled ASW barrier submarine? The answer lies in an evaluation of past and present ASW missions and an assessment of the ASW mission of the future.
The ASW Mission: After the thwarted attempt to revitalize the ASW submarine with the construction of the Tullibee, the ASW barrier mission of the fast attack submarine became secondary to the hunter-killer/direct support functions for which the design is nominally intended. The fundamental design tradeoff for the fast attack submarine thus became one of speed versus silencing, the former for the killer and the latter for the hunter. The preponderance of speed over silencing was evident in the design of the noisy Skipjack class. The Thresher's, design restored a balance, incorporating improved silencing and a bow mounted sonar at the expense of speed (since the power plant was fixed in size by the nuclear reactor). The Sturgeon class, as evolutionary successor to the Permit class, was essentially a refinement of the original design with improved capabilities. These two major classes clearly represented a design compromise. Both speed and silencing suffered to some extent in meeting the design goals f°r each, a reflection of the duality of the mission profile-
Today, the high-speed Los Angeles-dass submarine with its long range and highly capable BQQ-5 bo*- mounted sonar system can carry out a barrier patrol assignment with a high degree of effectiveness while maintaining its fast attack role in the current and near term threat environment. Although it could provide improved detection with a concomitant reduction in maximum attainable speed, it does not need to at present. But what o the future?
Submarines are quiet today. They will be quieter tomorrow. This has been called “The Quiet Revolution.”6 The crux of the argument is that there will come a time in the not too distant future when Soviet submarine silencing will have been improved to the extent that detection by passive sonar is possible only at short ranges, if at all. ThlS is not to say that U. S. silencing technology will reman1 stagnant, for surely some improvements will be made to retain a relative acoustic advantage. But the relevance o this advantage must be questioned when considered in the context of a detection range on the order of thousands or perhaps hundreds of yards instead of tens of thousands of yards.
In an operational scenario with each submarine closing at five knots, this would provide a total of three minutes for detection, classification, localization, approach, an attack before being counterdetected. Anyone who has ever been in a submarine attack center during a passive sonar bearings only ASW operation can appreciate the impfica' tions of compressing the entire target motion analysis pr°' cedure into three minutes—it probably cannot be done-
The Quiet Revolution will inevitably render the submarine ASW mission obsolete. Knowing this, the debat1- must then focus on the necessary course of action to retain the U. S. tactical and strategic submarine warfare advantage. The profound implications of this fundamenta change in the nature of submarine warfare merits attend011 at the highest levels of the U. S. military and politico command establishments. It is vitally important that this debate be joined now in order that our national course 0 action benefit from the foresight of the country’s best md1' tary planners and thinkers. Goals must be set and a p'al1 made to reach them in the near term in light of the 10'10 20-year lead time needed for the development of a ne"' ship or a new technology or both.
In the tumultuous environment of arms control negotia' tions and military escalation, determining the best course of action for the submarine force of the future is no mean task and merits a thorough evaluation of all possibifitieS and an analysis of their long term effects. Numerous pr°' posals have been made, including everything from the design of a combat system suited to a melee or “dog fight” short-range tactical scenario to the abrogation the submarine ASW mission altogether.7 These ideas are fundamentally based on the notion that detection by pa-j' sive sonar cannot be substantially improved. The soundness of this notion depends on the assumption that the United States will continue to build submarines that have
The ^r0m current hull parameter design relationships. hence6S1^n TroPosal that follows is not so restricted and is a re06 °^cre<^ as a cure for the Quiet Revolution and not as desimecJy to deal with its effects. The justification for this det ° .rests with the need for a large area sonar to improve mus( '°n range for low noise targets. To explain why this SUb e h°ne, an overview of acoustics as it applies to arine sonar systems is important.
harr)COtW,C Analysis: A large area sonar array has two fun- t0 denta* Physical properties that are crucial to its ability menfeCt l<)W no'sc targets: length and the number of ele- him S -^e len§th °f the array (that is, the longest linear Wav^ns'0n) determines the length of the longest sound ab]ee t la( can be received. This is the maximum detect- qUen'Vave/ength. The longer the wave, the lower the fre- Wav s*nce long waves oscillate slowly. Since longer envir Cn^th/lower frequency waves disturb the ambient hen °nrnent less, they are not dissipated as rapidly and Can 5 Can 8° farther. This fundamental physical property ster 6 feadi|y appreciated by moving away from a loud h’nilcT t*1C *3St fhittg y°u hear are the low bass notes. By nojSe'nT a larger sonar, you can detect lower frequency q, at a greater range from the noise source, to e 6 lrnPortance of the number of elements is not as easy bas' a*n 'n terms °f fundamental physical properties. scre Ca ^’ however, an array with more hydrophones can less,ea out unwanted interfering noise better than one with this ydroPhones. In the lexicon of the sonar engineer, aaalo^P6^ *S ^nown as array gain, which is somewhat out °^°Us to the amplifier gain on a stereo. By screening nuJre °f the unwanted noise, an array with a large bett Cr hydrophones can focus on the “wanted” noise an i r ^ou move away from a noise source, it occupies reasingly smaller portion of your listening volume,
The U. S. continues to build submarines, like the SSN-21, that have evolved from the Albacore's original revolutionary teardrop hull design. The SSN-21’s sonar capability augurs well for the near-term future, but may not meet the long-term threat posed by the Quiet Revolution.
the remainder being filled with unwanted or ambient noise. Therefore, the ability to screen out unwanted noise better means that you can detect a given noise at a greater range.
The question then is how to get the greatest possible array area. Two basic approaches merit consideration: a set of towed arrays that form a large rectangular “curtain” behind the submarine and a large hull-mounted array. The towed array approach, though seemingly the more logical of the two, suffers from a number of inherent problems:
- The array geometry is inexorably linked to the maneuvering of the ship and to the currents of the surrounding ocean environment. When the submarine changes course, time must be allotted for the array to complete the turn and stabilize on the new heading. The time required for array stabilization gets longer as the length of the array increases. This inherent problem makes maneuvering to resolve bearing ambiguity a time-consuming process, hardly conducive to the desired rapid localization of target motion analysis.
- The individual elements of the towed array are not fixed rigidly in the reference frame of the towing submarine. Each individual hydrophone is free to move (with the restrictions imposed by the connecting array tether) relative to the hull and relative to all of the other hydrophones of the array. For a single line array, this imposes an inherent inaccuracy when signals from each hydrophone are processed and compared to determine the target bearing. To improve accuracy, each hydrophone would be required not only to know its own location in inertial space, but to transmit this information for processing to the shipboard electronic suite.
- Towed arrays are fragile in that they are exposed to the environment without the benefit of protective supporting structure. In addition to the danger of an overhungry and not too intelligent shark and the potential for snagging on an irregular ocean floor, towed arrays are subject to a wide variety of man-made hazards. Ill-conceived maneuvers (such as backing down) on the part of a towing submarine can result in tangling the array or severing the towing tether. Failure to take into account the proximity of a crossing deep-draft surface ship can be equally disastrous. These problems—significant with single towed array systems—would be even more difficult to manage with a group of arrays.
The hull-mounted array has none of the above disadvantages. Future large-area sonars designed for improved performance will likely favor this configuration for two basic reasons: first, mounting a sonar array on the skin of the ship minimizes hull noise effects by increasing the distance between the noise source and the array and by permitting the installation of sound isolation material between the two; and second, hull mounting provides a much larger
surface area over which sound can be detected and processed than an internally mounted sphere for the same size submarine platform. Unfortunately, hull mounting requires the investment of considerable valuable and limited real estate which must be devoted to the sonar system at the expense of other systems and functions. There are other disadvantages as well:
- The mounting of a hydrophone in a structure affixed in some manner to the pressure hull subjects the hydrophone to hull noise and vibrations. In spite of increasingly exotic sound isolation methods, it is not likely that all hull structure related noise can ever be screened from the sonar array. Therefore some degradation in the sonar’s performance must be accepted.
- Hull-mounted sonars are subject to potential damage from collisions with other objects such as piers, tugs, and the seabed. Although this need not be a problem if the hydrophone array is mounted within the envelope of the ship (as is the case with the spherical array), it is a major concern to the bonafide hull-mounted array (as is the case with the conformal array).
- Hull-mounted sonar hydrophones are much harder to replace when they become damaged or fail because of equipment malfunction. For an array embedded in sound isolation material (as is proposed in the following design study), this could be a major problem requiring provisions for installed spares to be used in the event of primary hydrophone failure.
Considering the advantages and disadvantages for the towed array and the hull-mounted array, the hull array |s better. A large area hull-mounted low-frequency sonar is achievable with 1980s technology. Further gains are required only to enhance hydrophone performance so as to improve the detectability of the sonar system. The installation of a conceptual large area sonar (CLAS) array on a submarine designed specifically for this purpose (mission- controlled) would improve performance and ensure the U. S. qualitative advantage against the future threat. This proposed mission-controlled submarine is the BBASS-
A Mission-Controlled AS1V Submarine: The BBASS was designed from the keel up to perform the ASW mission against an ultra-quiet adversary postulated as the long-term threat. It is mission-controlled. The single absolute design constraint was the ability to mount a sonar array on the hull with a projected area of at least 20,000 square feet and a sound dampening baffle of at least three feet of water or equivalent sound insulating material. ItlS revolutionary.
The basic hull form of all U. S. submarines up to and including the SSN-21 design has evolved from the Al~ bacore. The original teardrop shape has been appended, expanded, lengthened, and joined as necessary to meet a new or modified mission requirement. This has proven successful in the past and augurs well for the near-term future. But there is a limit. As Descartes observes in his Discourse on the Method, “buildings which a single architect has planned and executed are more elegant and commodious than those which several have attempted to improve, by making old walls serve for purposes for which they were not originally built.” The “old walls” of the current submarine hull form will simply not support the new CLAS array mission requirement.
The design details of the BBASS feasibility study are tangential to the core argument, considering a large area sonar to counter the Quiet Revolution. The basic design parameters that resulted from this study are pertinent, however, in that they demonstrate that the design can he built within reasonable bounds of anticipated technological developments.
The BBASS’s length (190 feet) and beam (160 feet) are set by the fact that a circle with an area of 20,000 square feet has a diameter of 160 feet. The extra 30 feet in lenglh is alloted to permit engineering plant hull penetrations without interrupting the continuity of the array. The keel to deck height (57 feet) is mandated by the need to provide adequate buoyancy to float the overall displacement (11,180 tons) and to allow for a three-foot water baffle behind the array to minimize hull noise effects.
With a reserve buoyancy of ten percent, the draft of the BBASS with all main ballast tanks blown is 43.7 feet, too deep for access to most of available port resources. An auxiliary ballast system is provided to dewater adequate enclosed volume to lower the draft to an acceptable 32 feet.
The hull envelope volume needed to install the CLA$ array (21,434 tons or 750,190 cubic feet) is almost twice the volume needed to support the weight of the submarine
(11,1801
anj S'de Vlew °f the pressure hull is shown in Figure 1 cated°n hStS ^our '3as*c dements. A large centrally lo- §ene t £re containing the reactor compartment, diesel Centric °f r°0rn’ an^ battery space is surrounded by a con- engir|C t0ro'd wbich contains the remaining operational, whi ,eerin8’ and habitability spaces. Two cones (one of Provid *S S^0wnl extend from the aft end of the toroid to shafts %uUPPort an(l alignment for the two propulsion tures se^ecti°n °f these unique pressure hull struc- envelW3S mai7cfated by the internal geometry of the hull a^y °Pe’ W^'c^ was in turn determined by the sonar
jn a|je traditional ring stiffened cylinder hull sections used volumrCCent su'3marine designs did not provide adequate ^ainh li t^le necessary buoyancy. The two toroidal hull inr„'jSt tanhs are shown above and below the pressure
toroid
theref t0nS °r cubic feet). The BBASS design is
l°Pe h^n t*<>U^,'C ^ul'etl with a relatively thin outer enve- hull U i SUPP°rting arraY and a thick inner pressure in sh^ °S'ng l*16 required ever-buoyant volume. This is rine ||rP.contrast to the evolutionary, single-hulled subma- esigns derived from the Albacore.
lions f u concentric, around the upper and lower por- the C] a? cen,ral sphere. Figure 2 shows the locations of to t|le ^ array and the auxiliary ballast tanks in addition thickn emergency and normal draft lines. Pressure hull depth fS WaS *3asecl on a maximum operational design ity ^’^00 feet and on the future anticipated availabil- Powe i or an anally strong alternative material, a max3nt requirements of 40,000 shaft horsepower for m0de,T1Um sPeecl of 25 knots were determined by scale Tech i, ,CSt'n8 conducted at the Massachusetts Institute of The° °gy (MIT) Towing Tank, design COnc*us'on °f ihe design team was that the BBASS and c WaS Peas'ble with the caveat that several structural analv ntnd system details would require more in-depth stages 'f ^ese analyses are currently in the planning ment at°MlTeSiS W°r^ ^cean Engineering Depart-
^yXnT°nX: ^ *arge hull-mounted sonar array is neces- an in dture submarine designs to counter the threat of abroo reas*n§ly quiet adversary. The only alternative is an tems8ai!on °f the ASW mission for mobile shipborne sys- °thCr, l?e EBASS design is a possible answer. There are tion ' ^Ut before dismissing the proposed design revolu- a«i»!?0!Mrd- we must consider what would result from Parab? ev°'ul‘°n. To mount a sonar with a capability com- lntior,2 t0 dlC 20,000-square foot CLAS array on an evo- snhm ar^ 4°'foot diameter cylindrical hull would require a arine about 1,000 feet long.
Regardless of the course of action taken, the time for debate is today because the time for design and construction is tomorrow or perhaps the day after. Therefore, we ask, “Revolution or Evolution?” and join the debate for the future of submarine warfare.
'A. I. McKee, “Recent Submarine Design Practices and Problems,” SNAME Transactions, Vol. 67, 1959, pp. 623-52.
2E. S. Arentzen and P. Mandel, “Naval Architectural Aspects of Submarine Design,” SNAME Transactions, Vol. 68, 1960, pp. 622-92.
■’Norman Friedman, Submarine Design and Development (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984), p. 36.
4Capt. John Moore, RN (Ret.), Editor, Jane’s Fighting Ships, 1984-1985 (London: Jane’s Publishing Co. Limited, 1984).
5lbid.
6LCdr Ralph E. Chatham, USN, “A Quiet Revolution,” Proceedings, January 1984, pp. 41-46.
1Ibid.; Richard Pariscau, “How Silent the Silent Service?” Proceedings, July 1983, pp. 40-44.
Captain Jackson retired in 1969 after 34 years in the Navy. During that service, he had many assignments in the design, development, and construction of submarines. He was one of the first officers to be assigned to the nuclear power program, and was the design project officer for the preliminary and contract design of the first Polaris submarines. As the senior on site inspector of the Scorpion (SSN-589), Search Phase Two, Captain Jackson received the Meritorious Service Medal. The Legion of Merit with Gold Star were presented to him in recognition of his contributions to the Naval Submarine Service. Since retirement, he has been an independent consulting engineer in deep ocean work and a senior guest lecturer at MIT.
Commander Needham is currently assigned as the repair officer of USS Hunley (AS-31) in Holy Loch, Scotland. He graduated magna cum laude in Mechanical Engineering from Duke University. Selected for the Nuclear Power Program, Commander Needham served as a division officer on board the USS Grayling (SSN-646), as the production training assistant officer at the MARF Prototype Reactor in New York and as blue crew engineer of the USS Nathan Hate (SSBN-623), where he completed the requirements to be designated qualified for command of submarines. Following line transfer to the EDO Community in 1981. he completed a tour as nuclear repair officer (Code 310) at Norfolk Naval Shipyard, and earned a Master of Science in materials science and an ocean engineer degree at MIT. His awards include the Meritorious Service Medal, Navy Commendation Medal, Navy Achievement Medal, Spear Foundation Award, and the Vice Admiral C. R. Bryan Award. Commander Needham also holds a Master of Arts degree in business management from Central Michigan University.
Lieutenant Sigman is currently assigned as a ship superintendent at Charleston Naval Shipyard, South Carolina. He received a regular commission through NROTC at the University of Kansas, where he graduated with honors in Mechanical Engineering. He has served on board the USS Shark (SSN-591), where he became qualified in submarines. Following transfer to the EDO Community in 1983, he earned a Master of Science in mechanical engineering and an ocean engineer degree at MIT.
_Huh?
Captain Donald D. MacGregor, U. S. Navy, took command of a transport ship in 1944 after having had command of a submarine. While the transport was on a shakedown cruise off the West Coast, the officer of the deck messenger woke Captain MacGregor to report a bogey bearing 030°, range ten miles. Still only half awake, the Captain made a quick decision:
“Tell the Officer of the Deck to take her down to 200 feet.”
Robert J. Tepper