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tion problem, especially if the srna'*jr ships also carry long-range surface-t missiles and either cruise missile .. strike-capable aircraft. As a result, an * warfare (AAW) and antisurface wa
as well as* power projection^.
the
build
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In an age of budget cutting and costly labor, how can the Navy get the aircraft to sea that it needs to counter the Soviet Navy if Congress is unwilling to fund a new series of very expensive 90,000-ton nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs)?
Except for LAMPS (light airborne multipurpose system) helicopters, the U. S. fleet’s air assets reside on the decks of a relatively small number of superla-
Based on the Wasp (LHD-1) design, the escort carriers (or CVAs) would consolidate battle group air assets and complicate enemy target selection—for much less money than another conventional carrier.
T. FREEMAN
tive ships: the conventional takeoff and landing (CVs) and nuclear-powered carriers (CVNs). Unfortunately, they are very expensive and, in some ways, very vulnerable. The Navy needs to complement this small force with less expensive and less vulnerable—yet still effective— aircraft carriers.
The idea of deploying a mixed carrier force is not new; we learned its value in World War II. We lacked the resources to build and operate as many large, full- capability carriers as were needed to fight a two-ocean war. Small carriers proved ideal for antisubmarine warfare (ASW) support to convoys, close air support for amphibious assaults, and additional deck space for battle groups requiring specialized aircraft. A mix of large and small carriers offers the additional benefit of
compounding an adversary’s target (ASUW) capabilities sources for
would be more widely dispersed out the fleet.
The technologies needed to platform and air wing components1 ^
ship—the “CVA,” or “escort carrie'jant already exist. The ship could be a va of the new Wasp (LHD-1) c*aSS'IT space made available by eliminating, dock area could be redistributed .£S hanced command and control fact and/or additional aviation stores. 1 ,v.
craft could be based on the already e
Harrie'rXnVaCtlCal V/ST0L Jets (AV-8B turhnn s ’ multiengine, V/STOL, and ASW/airbome early warning craft (V -v)'Camer or>-board delivery air- contpr. ~~ Ospreys); and improved heli- Apacu ^H-60B Seahawks, AH-64
47d cv CH'53e Super Stallions, CH- The kn°°^s an<J their successors). c°mpleS °rt ^et'h carriers are intended to •hem Th6111 re8u^ar carriers, not replace strike air”1 EVAs will lack the long-range
and
The
control two
— iw capabilities of CV/CVNs. father ° ^pes sh°uid be deployed to- ratio, de" 3 2:1 °r 2:2 CVA:CV/CVN and Platl^Cn(1*n® °n missi°n requirements tier con °rm ava'iahility. The mixed car- increas„CCT)t wiH diversify the types and the f]eet1 c numbers of air platforms in ti°n of th Un<^ aPow for more specializa-
The cVAariier air W‘ngS- Problem f ■ concePt can solve many
C°mtnand aC'ng battle grouP ancl air win8 lystsbef CrS' bor example, some ana- Only 0ne'CAVe ^at because each carrier has age 0f | ® squadron, there is a short- other ?t, °ag"ran8e strike aircraft. The
ranged
range an u
trtoving scluadron could be added by A. if suPport missions to the to CVA.f C *'8bt-attack mission is shifted 'ssance "r'ant of .t,
St)Uadron , V-22., and the helicopter
Table 1 Comparison of Full- and Small-Deck Carriers
’ air intercept, and airborne warning
Mission | Range | CVICVN | Aircraft | CVA-VISTOL | Aircraft |
AAW | Long | Yes | F-14 | No | _ |
| Medium | Yes | F-14/F/A-18 | Limited | AV-8B |
| Short | Yes | SAMs/AAA | Yes | SAMs/AAA |
AEW | Long | Yes | E-2C | Potential | (E)V-22 |
| Medium | Yes | E-2C | Potential | (E)V-22 |
ASW | Long | Yes | S-3A | Potential | (S)V-22 |
| Medium | Yes | LAMPS | Yes | LAMPS |
| Short | Yes | Escorts | Yes | On-board System |
ASUW | Long | Yes | A-6E | Potential | Tilt-jet w/ASCM |
& Fire | Medium | Yes | F/A-18 | Potential | AV-8B w/ASCM |
Support | Short | Yes | Escorts | Yes | SLCMs/Escorts |
Logistics | Long | Yes | C-2/CS-3 | Yes | (C/K)V-22 |
| Medium | Yes | C-2/CS-3 | Potential | (C/K)V-22 |
| Short | Yes | CH-53/CH-46 | Yes | CH-53/CH-47 |
MCM | Medium Short | Yes | MH-53/Escorts | Yes | MH-53/Escorts |
Mine- | Long | Limited | A-6E | Potential | (S)V-22 |
laying | Medium | Yes | A-6E | Potential | (S)V-22 |
Note; MCM | = minecountermeasures; | SAMs = surface-to-air | missiles; AAA | = antiaircraft artillery; |
LAMPS = light airborne multipurpose system; ASCM = antiship cruise missile; SLCM = sea-launched cruise missiles
. ack squadron uses the shorter- ual-role F/A-18. A second long. acx squadron could be added by CVA ™an.y support missions to the to CVa.k.C *'8bt-attack mission is shifted naissancascd AV-8Bs, the ASW/recon- variant of^sions given to a CVA-based
'v°Uld b S re*ocaled to the CVA, there r'" Space for another A-6E squaddie CV/rVNT ...k.
ron uii ^___
Switch^ Ey^CVN without losing the The on]v 'ttCr ' capability of the F/A-18. T-3a wi(*a«>n not to replace the aging
Th;
the
1 with Probl
a V/STOL turboprop is speed cni rnay well be resolved by
earl ‘“ay wen oe resoivea oy ll'ent 0f st Century through develop-
H,
h,
'ofan
tilt-wing V/STOL, twin-
leed b0(i.a!rcrab (Grumman and Lock- Payload • HVe ProPosed concepts). The *Te S_3a ana range differences between oVeand the V-22 are not too large to and deck016' Payoff's added hangar 'A-|gssPace for more F-14s, A-6s, f°ttld be' anc* E'2Cs. Eventually, E-2Cs Teeing ereplaced with V/STOL aircraft, \''Ss’°ns n? m°re sPace- Figure 1 shows V/ST0, ,at can be shifted to the CVA- In the P atf0rm-
Asj
'ik,
•an
e'y to
*** °f a major European or . lct, convoy escort forces are
Without |C stretched too thin, especially ^>uld nrf,°nf'ran8c air cover; CVAs a,tleshinVlC^e tE's support. Similarly,
lent S^rPace action groups and inde
ed, ^ _
^ttld ben ^'^rAlestroyer squadrons
>i0tl "! U great|y front CVA multi-
Pr°biem fUPPOrt- In a11 three cases, the ScacinS a potential enemy attack- units becomes significantly
more complex if a CVA is present. In addition to enhanced convoy, squadron, or task force defense, these forces would now have a significant air capability without weakening carrier battle groups.
If requirements for the various V/STOL aircraft and the CVA are forcefully stated now, there is time to develop existing technologies to satisfy them. By selecting the missions listed in Table 1, the near-term need for faster V/STOL aircraft is reduced. Conventional aircraft performing these missions have cruising speeds well below Mach 0.8. With the continuing development of both turbofan and turboprop V/STOL aircraft, the introduction of the ski-jump launch platform, and the decreasing size and weight of many electronic systems, it is conceivable that tilt-wing or vectored-thrust V/STOL aircraft will be able to successfully replace both helicopters and conventional, fixed-wing aircraft in many roles. Our NATO allies and possibly Japan might be interested in cooperating in the development and/or production.
Carrying large payloads at high speeds, especially in a hostile environment that imposes heavy airframe stress and demands extremely responsive maneuverability, is impossible for current V/STOL aircraft. V/STOL technology cannot provide effective successors for interceptors such as the F-14, long-range attack aircraft such as the A-6, and multirole strike fighters such as the F/A-18. Thus, the large deck carrier must remain the heart of the battle group well beyond 2000.
But beyond 2010, long-term require
ments for greater surface combatant speed and agility, plus the increasing need to reduce visible/radar/sonar signatures, will gradually force the development of smaller, unconventional carriers. These future-generation, air-capable ships, which may begin to appear before the middle of the next century, will require combat-capable supersonic V/STOL aircraft for strike and antiair warfare missions. The CVA-V/STOL concept is the next step in that direction. But the development of V/STOL aircraft and CVAs should avoid driving technology, operational doctrine, and tactics too rapidly.
Continued resistance to non-rotary wing V/STOL aviation in the fleet will ultimately prove as futile as post-World War I resistance to carrier-based fighters and bombers. Such resistance will eventually be snapped, either by financial pressures or by the growing threat to large, conventional carriers. Carrier air power is an indispensable tool for an island power like the United States. However, we cannot let our desire for a dozen or more superlative conventional takeoff and landing, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers cloud our perception of the value and necessity of developing other fleet air power platforms.
Captain Daskal is an electronic warfare analyst with TECHPLAN Corporation of Arlington, Virginia, specializing in operational requirement and program analysis of air and electronic warfare systems and command, control, and communications countermeasures concepts. He is an intelligence applications officer in the Air Force Reserve.
lngs /
October 1986
53