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As the Vietnamese marched through the streets of Ho Chi Minh City celebrating the tenth anniversary of the fall of Saigon, dozens of Soviet ships were—and still are— visiting Vietnamese ports daily (inset). During the past ten years, the Soviet Union has supported Vietnam in hopes of using that country as both a political and a military counterweight to China—and as a forward base in its global competition with the United States.
The Soviet Union is closely involved with China and Japan because of geographical proximity. Yet, geographical and cultural distances have separated the Soviet Union and Southeast Asia until fairly recently. Accordingly, Soviet interests and activity in the region have been limited and late.
Some analysts trace the beginnings of Soviet interest to the Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolay Aleksandrovich Bulganin tours in 1955. If this is true, then the timing may be especially significant, because Khrushchev’s expectations of Sino-Soviet difficulties also date to this time.
The Soviet Union’s recent involvement in Southeast Asia, however, is designed to establish the Soviet Union firmly as both a European and an Asian power. It may also be the result of the relatively enduring strategic and tactical balance in Western Europe as well as the Soviets’ virtual exclusion from any prominent role in the current search for peace in the Middle East. They see the possibilities inherent in extending their influence to a region ripe with political and economic potential.
Soviet Policy in Southeast Asia: During the past decade, the countries of East Asia rose to occupy a prominent role in global affairs. Many now have regularly recorded annual growth rates of more than 10% based on the strength of their trade-oriented economies. Also, they have cast off their colonial heritage and have begun to assert themselves, both regionally and internationally. Although Northeast Asia figures prominently in U. S. security concerns that are primarily centered around the Korean Peninsula, the newly emergent countries of Southeast Asia have tried to avoid the appearance of having too close a security relationship with the United States. However, a prominent and accepted exception remains the qualified U. S. nonalignment with the Philippines. Nevertheless, given the economic difficulties that have crippled Eastern-bloc growth, particularly in Poland, during the past decade, East Asia’s export economies offer valuable rewards.
The U. S. defeat in Indochina, and the regional disengagement that followed, heightened Soviet interest W Southeast Asia. Beginning with the Nixon (Guam) Doctrine, typified by President Jimmy Carter’s intention to withdraw U. S. troops from Korea, the enunciation of a “swing strategy,” diverting U. S. Pacific forces to the Indian Ocean or the North Atlantic in the event of crises in those parts of the world, and Thailand’s 1976 decision to close all U. S. bases there, the credibility of the United States having an active commitment to regional security was called into question.
However, the U. S. defeat should not be viewed as the cause of the dynamics that enabled Soviet power to enter Southeast Asia. The power vacuum created by the fall of Vietnam in 1975 left Vietnam, China, and the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) jockeying with each other to fill the newly created void. Vietnam’s December 1978 invasion of Kampuchea and the overthrow of the Chinese-supported Khmer Rouge placed Hanoi on an inevitable collision course with Beijing.
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A Chinese armed trawler keeps a watchful eye on the Soviet aircraft carrier Minsk in the China Sea, knowing that the Soviets’ most immediate concern in Southeast Asia is to contain China’s regional influence.
Despite China’s support of the Vietnamese revolution— “we are as close as lips and teeth”—Vietnam’s possession of the world’s fifth-largest army and its power-projecting capability in Indochina brought to the surface geopolitical tensions that had plagued Sino-Vietnamese relations for centuries. Who was to play the dominant role in Indochina—China or Vietnam? It is little wonder that the Vietnamese turned to the Soviet Union for assistance.
Hanoi’s 1975 victory need not have resulted in an expansion of Soviet influence, even though Soviet aid to Vietnam that year was triple that of China’s. Not only was China still committed to the successful progress of Vietnamese communism, but other countervailing forces intended the prevention of any additional (and, therefore, unwelcome) Soviet and Chinese influence. The ASEAN countries, despite their anticommunist beliefs, made a number of conciliatory political and economic gestures throughout 1976-77. In their view, the implications of a communist victory in Vietnam were at least counterbalanced by the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of a superpower.
In the years immediately following Saigon’s fall, ASEAN was willing to share the benefits of trade, economic and technical aid, and regional diplomatic support with a new neighbor desperately in need of assistance. In addition, ASEAN’s leaders hoped to gain Vietnam’s support for ASEAN’s Zone of Peace, Friendship, and Neutrality. This plan was announced in 1971 and was intended to exclude all superpower involvement in Southeast Asia.
Recent studies have also suggested that in 1976-77 the Carter administration made several tentative moves toward normalizing relations with Vietnam. However, a number of factors—not the least of which was Carter’s developing interest in improving relations with China— undermined the budding rapprochement.
Mounting Vietnamese-Kampuchean border tensions and deteriorating Sino-Vietnamese relations, on the other hand, created closer security ties between Vietnam and the Soviet Union. Although the invasion did not take place until December 1978, overt Sino-Vietnamese strains began to surface as early as April of that year. Beijing accused Hanoi of persecuting northern Vietnam’s ethnic Chinese minority (Hoa) and diverted a large portion of project aid to help resettle displaced Hoa who had moved to southern China.
Until this time, Vietnam had resisted Soviet efforts to upgrade its observer status in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) to full membership and to obtain a mutual friendship treaty. Hanoi had also refused the Soviets rights to the U. S.-built bases at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang. Counteraccusation followed accusation, and Vietnam moved inexorably closer to the Soviet Union. In June 1978, Vietnam joined COMECON. China then immediately withdrew all technicians and stopped work on all projects in Vietnam. As the intensity of border frictions with Kampuchea heightened, Hanoi’s leaders saw a strengthening of an anti-Vietnam axis between China and Kampuchea.
The Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Peace and Friendship was signed on 3 November 1978. It pledged the two par' ties, in case of attack or threat against the other, to “consult with each other with a view to eliminating the threat and to “take appropriate and effective measures to safeguard peace and security of the two countries.” Emboldened by the assurance of Soviet support, the Vietname^ invaded Kampuchea. In February 1979, China responds with its “lesson” against Vietnam. Interestingly, the Soviets appeared to take the Chinese action with surprising calm because of the facility with which the Vietnam^6 administered their own lesson to the invading Chinese- Since 1979, Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang have becon)6 full-fledged Soviet operations centers—important cogs in the growing power of the Soviet Pacific Fleet. .
The acquisition of these bases has expanded the Sovl Union’s operational naval reach by 2,000 nautical miles- Since 1975, the Soviets have made considerable progress in developing a credible Pacific Ocean naval presence. 1975, the Soviet Pacific Fleet comprised 71 principal face ships, 263 support vessels, and 100 submarines, 40° which were nuclear-powered fleet ballistic missile subm'
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(SSBNs) or nuclear-powered attack submarines 1 Ns). As of 1985, the Soviet Pacific Fleet swelled to ^",cv c'ass carr'ers> 439 surface combatants, and 134 SU marines, 31 of which were SSBNs. Fifteen vessels now regularly call at Cam Ranh Bay, and up to 30 have een rePorted. The naval base supports nuclear submarine Pens as well as an 8,500-ton floating dry dock. In addi- 10n, Soviet squadrons of both Tu-142 “Bear” long-range reconnaissance and targeting aircraft and Tu-16 “Badger” ombers operate from these locations.
Soviet ships and planes are now positioned to threaten •rot only China, but also all of ASEAN’s capitals; the thpCca’ Lombok, and Makassar straits; U. S. bases in e Philippines; and northern Australia. The Soviet pres- nee is menacing, especially considering the importance the South China Sea’s sea-lanes to the health of the est s economies. Soviet armed forces now have the Cleans to display both a conventional and nuclear regional Presence, as well as the ability to support regional commu- n*st insurgencies.
The Soviet Union has also increased its presence in ortheast Asia. The Soviets have expanded their facilities ladivostok and Petropavlosk and hastened construc- IOn of military installations in the Kuriles. One need only ^member t^e ill-fated KAL-007 airliner to realize the J^Portance the Soviets place on the security of their Far astern installations.
Finally, ideology is a complex factor which influences e perception of Soviet interests in Southeast Asia. Re- I dless of how seriously the men in the Kremlin take the nguage of Marxism-Leninism theory, the very use of at language channels Soviet assessments of the world . Uati°n and of possible Soviet opportunities. In this w, Soviet pronouncements that “peace, equality, and °Peration” require the “overcoming of various influ- Ces imperialism and great hegemony—directed Bainst the nations of Southeast Asia” fit an ideological Lame work.
obWi'h the fall of Cambodia and Saigon in 1975, many b| ervers, including a number outside the communist bloC’ Ferce*ve(i imperialism as having sustained a mortal w T ^*e defeat, with its overtones of retreat and $iv’>neSS’ was t0 liave been the start of a new “progres- ® era among the new nations of Southeast Asia, pit.0Wever’ a different sort of ideological conflict arose, the 'h ^ r'V3^ cornmunist doctrines against one another. At tor' Cart ^ino-Vietnamese split, in addition to his- Ca^ Problems, is the question of whether the United Soufh °r ^ov'et Union presents the greater threat to tjc - east Asian security and independence. China, in par- withar’ v'ews the Soviet Union’s Asian military might ej considerable apprehension. Beijing’s post-1975 for- 'hrea[,0*'C^ FaS ^een lar8ely directed toward reducing that
Ca,Fro- Moscow’s perspective, the prospects for ideologi- 'smT°^re?S *n Southeast Asia are not promising. Marx- Chi r fn'msm’s credibility has been severely shaken by ^ivn,a s Problems with Vietnam and the Soviet Union.
Opia claims to ideological orthodoxy have diluted devel- 8 World enthusiasm for Marxism-Leninism’s messi-
anic promises. Furthermore, Vietnam’s hegemonic designs in Indochina, the plight of Vietnam’s boat people, and the Khmer Rouge’s crimes against humanity have shown regional observers a side of communism that would have been dismissed as imperialist propaganda only ten years ago.
It is no coincidence that once-strong communist parties in Thailand and Malaysia have all but disappeared from local prominence. Nor can Moscow find great ideological comfort in East Asia’s growing, healthy economies, or governments that have gained greater domestic legitimacy and respect. Currently, therefore, the sources of the Soviet Union’s conduct in Southeast Asia are founded more in realpolitik than in ideology.
Soviet Objectives in Southeast Asia: Although the Soviet leadership may have found ideological comfort in Hanoi s 1975 victory, leadership’s realism has also fostered a hard-headed definition of Soviet interests in the area. It is doubtful that the Soviets have a detailed master plan regarding Southeast Asia or beyond. The Soviet Union is much more likely, particularly in the near term, to take advantage of opportunities that may emerge or, more importantly perhaps, that they may create. From this perspective, Soviet policy in Southeast Asia revolves around the Soviets view of the region more as a means to their advantage than a particular end in itself. The Soviet outlook for the region may evolve differently with lengthened involvement and deepened commitment in the area. Currently, however, there are three Soviet objectives in Southeast Asia.
First, the most immediate Soviet interest in this area is Southeast Asia
the containment of China’s regional influence. Unlike the Soviets’ concern regarding the strength of the United States, their fears of China seem to be the result of a complex constellation of ethnic and cultural factors which have long influenced the Soviet psyche, and which manifest themselves emotionally as much as logically. The characteristic inconsistency between a strong Soviet sense of insecurity on the one hand and pride in strength on the other is particularly evident in Soviet methods of dealing with the Pacific rim countries from Japan to Vietnam. Thus, although China may be the only power to pose any kind of threat to the Soviet Union’s immediate borders, Moscow’s nuclear and conventional superiority offers more than ample deterrence to Chinese attack, and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.
The possible use of Vietnam as both a political and military counterweight to China is among the primary attractions for Soviet planners in Asia. The naval facilities are particularly important. They offer the Soviet Union the opportunity to outflank China’s navy, which is dramatically inferior to the Soviets’, thus removing any potential battle to an arena where technological advantage—in contrast to manpower advantage—will be especially decisive.
The presence of Vietnamese troops in Laos and Kampuchea, as well as the Soviet Navy ships at Cam Ranh Bay, is only one side of Moscow’s approach. Fearing an anti-Soviet, Sino-American coalition in Southeast Asia, Moscow has been pursuing normalization talks with Beijing since Leonid Brezhnev’s Tashkent speech in October 1982. This policy has been maintained throughout the series of leadership changes that has plagued the Soviet Union since 1982. Whether or not the Soviet policy has been successful is debatable; nonetheless, Beijing no longer condemns only the Soviet Union’s “socialist imperialism,” but “global imperialism” in general.
Moscow has also recently become active in Southeast Asian diplomacy. Since 1979, ASEAN has been in the diplomatic forefront of supporting Democratic Kampuchea (DK)—a tripartite coalition comprising the deposed communist Khmer Rouge (30,000-40,000 guerrillas) and two non-communist resistance groups: the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (10,000-12,000 guerrillas) under former premier Son Sann, and the Sihanoukist National Army (5,000 men) led by former ruler Prince Norodom Sihanouk. The coalition still retains Kampuchea’s seat in the United Nations (UN), has diplomatic relations with numerous countries, and each year musters more than 100 UN delegates to support its continued presence. This sharply contrasts with the People’s Republic of Kampuchea, which is little more than a Vietnamese puppet state, and whose nominal leader Heng Samrin is himself a former member of the Khmer Rouge. Unfortunately, Democratic Kampuchea controls no Kampuchean territory and was dealt a series of severe reverses from December 1984 to April 1985, during Vietnam’s annual dry season offensive. Tragically, every major resistance base in Kampuchea was eliminated, and thousands of refugees were, once again, forced to flee helplessly into Thailand.
It is no secret that ASEAN members Indonesia and Ma
laysia fear Chinese regional dominance far more than they do Vietnam’s intentions. Indonesia is especially outspoken in its position that a secure Vietnam is a necessary firebreak to China’s territorial ambitions. Indonesia has been ASEAN’s strongest proponent for an early negotiated solution to the Kampuchean issue. They fear that continued unqualified diplomatic support for the DK coalition will not only fail to break down Vietnamese intransigence, but will also force Thailand closer to China, further straining ASEAN’s fraternal bonds. At the same time, Indonesia’s objections are muted by the knowledge that
Thailand is ASEAN’s only frontline state, is home to 120,000 Kampuchean refugees, and that they cannot depend on a sizable ASEAN military response, in the event border fighting spills too far into Thailand.
The Soviets attempted to loosen the current diplomatic stalemate over Kampuchea in March 1985 when Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Kapitsa toured Indonesia and Thailand. The Soviets reportedly offered to act as guarantor in any future agreement between ASEAN and Vietnam and expressed their own willingness to take part in an international conference on Kampuchea. This Soviet demarche comes after recent signs that Sino-Soviet relations are beginning to warm up after 20 years of estrangement. At this point, however, ASEAN maintains a united front against Vietnam, despite Indonesia’s continued fears that China is increasing its influence over Thailand’s foreign policy.
Beyond the containment of China is the Soviets’ interest in strengthening their own position in Asia as well as thert overall strategic position. In their most optimistic scenarios, Soviet planners may foresee the gradual pacification of Afghanistan. Soviet presence in South Asia would then naturally act as a wedge with the point of thrust directed toward the Persian Gulf but with increasing pressure coming to bear against NATO’s Southern Flank on the one hand and against China on the other.
Soviet use of some of Vietnam’s air and port facilitieS also increases the potential threat to the sea-lanes. This Soviet finger on a “chokepoint” of such importance to t*1® free flow of resources, trade, and communication canno
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help but increase the Soviets’ position in the region and, there^ore’ he °f great interest to them. The Asian countries emselves cannot help but notice any increased Soviet Potential for the encirclement or control of Asia, particu- arIY lhe countries in Southeast Asia, most of which are n°t currently on the best of terms with Moscow.
1 hird, the Soviets have an intrinsic interest in the indi- •dual countries of the region as well as in the region as a '''Pole. Ideally, Soviet planners would like to deny the 111 ted States, Japan, and Western Europe access to resources, markets, and traditional political and strategic str°ngholds. 1° the long run, Moscow may also hope to Capitalize on the enduring historical regional fears of P*ua, thereby wooing the region into an independent or Heutral, if not overtly pro-Soviet, posture. Moscow’s re- o6nt Southeast Asian diplomacy indicates that is what the oviets are hoping to do in Indonesia. If Indonesia is SEAN’s weak link on the Kampuchean question, then esP°nsible Soviet behavior, i.e., participation in forming Kampuchean coalition government whose bias is not Pr°-Chinese (n° Khmer Rouge), would give the Soviet Hon a legitimacy and respect in the region that it has e^er had. Furthermore, the Soviets conceivably would be uhng to force Hanoi into an agreement in exchange for ®Per Soviet-ASEAN and Sino-Soviet relations and overPosition in Indochina at the expense of Vietnam’s rela- l0ns with China. The Soviets no doubt believe that they Ve greater leverage over the Vietnamese than the Viet- autese have over them.
ne country distinctly separate from the other Southeast ^ ]an economic success stories is the Philippines. During e Past five years, the Philippine Communist Party and its tn' ,tary wing, the New People’s Army (NPA), have dramatically expanded their operational strength. A number outlying provinces are currently reported to be under nao^616 °r near'comP^ete NPA control, including Minda- O’ Negros, and Samar. Although it is questionable how Vgny NPA recruits are coming from true ideological con- s*ons to the communist cause and how many are refuse f0m t*le Ph'l‘PP*nes’ growing moderate opposition, that 3Ct rema*ns that the NPA is strong enough to believe ent ^ can take its struggle to the urban areas. If the appar- ^ government involvement in the murder of Benigno viv I"0 ^ not d°om the medium-term prospects of sur- tajna f°r President Ferdinand Marcos’s regime, then cer- iDe P°htical and economic policies enacted by his governance that time might lead to a predictable end.
The Subic Bay U. S. military base, facing page, could be one of the cards that draws the United States into the political fray between Corazon Aquino, left, widow of a liberal opposition leader, and Ferdinand Marcos, shown with his wife Imelda. Nothing would please the Soviets more than to see U. S. regional prestige decline—even below post-Vietnam levels—if the United States were to become involved in a Philippine civil war.
Marcos’s two major trump cards are the U. S. military installations at Clark Field and Subic Bay. That he elects to play them with the White House seems always open to question.
The Soviets would welcome domestic unrest in the Philippines. If U. S. involvement was ever deemed necessary to either attempt to salvage the Marcos regime or simply to attempt to reestablish order if a central figure or authority is lacking, most Soviet observers would like to see what would be perceived as another U. S. descent into a quagmire. Counterinsurgency operations are not the U. S. military s forte. In Moscow’s eyes, a Philippine civil war could not help but benefit the Soviets. And if U. S. military forces become tied up in another hopeless cause, U. S. regional prestige might well decline even further than it did after the Vietnam debacle. However, up to now, there have been no indications of any overt or covert Soviet support for the NPA.
Soviet opportunities in Southeast Asia, however, have not come easily or cheaply, even in Vietnam. Besides the Soviet support of Vietnam during the Indochina War, continuing Soviet assistance has been substantial. The Soviets reportedly contributed between $2-3 billion to Vietnam’s first Five-Year Plan (1976—80). Since that time, it is estimated that the Soviets have been giving Vietnam more than $3 million per day in assistance. Between 1979 and 1983, total military aid was estimated at $2.5 billion. In 1981, Vietnam received 90% of its food imports, 90% of its cotton, 80% of its metals, and 70% of its fertilizer from the Soviet Union. In addition, Vietnamese dependence on Soviet petroleum products is near total. Nevertheless, Moscow has given no indication that it is unwilling to continue to support Vietnamese development in exchange for base rights.
Regional and Global Dynamics: Given these interests, Moscow will have to concentrate on a series of relationships whose interaction will have a major impact in determining the future course of Southeast Asian affairs. Moscow must watch three of these relationships—two bilateral and one multilateral—with special care.
► The Soviet-Vietnamese Relationship—this relationship is a matter of convenience. By the time Vietnam made the decision to invade Kampuchea, Hanoi had isolated itself in Southeast Asia. Given the width of the Sino-Vietnam- ese split, Vietnam had little alternative other than to turn to Moscow for help in rebuilding. The Soviet Union not only hoped to gain access to Vietnam’s ports and airfields, but, more importantly, it wanted to achieve a strategic encirclement of China. The signing of the Peace and
53
e<tings / February 1986
Friendship Treaty not only presented China with the possibility of a two-front war, but it also constrained China’s ability to project its power in Indochina for the foreseeable future. The treaty also formalized Soviet access to bases from which its power could be projected into the Indian Ocean and beyond to the Persian Gulf.
Vietnam’s isolation continues. The ASEAN countries view Hanoi’s regional ambitions with hostile suspicion. The United States remains cool to Vietnamese initiatives to open diplomatic ties—efforts which are motivated as much by Vietnam’s probable long-term goal of independence from Soviet aid as by a desire to up the bidding for Soviet near-term assistance. Vietnam continues to believe that it is entitled to U. S. reconstruction aid.
The Soviets must be sensitive to the fact that Vietnam did not wage a decades-long war of liberation with the intent of having Soviet soldiers and sailors stationed on its territory. It remains to be seen how much of the denigration of the Soviet presence—“the Soviets are more heavyhanded than the Americans ever were, and with less money”—derives from American sour grapes and how much will be bom out in fact. In any case, the more Moscow invests in Vietnam, the greater the need will be to show commensurate rewards for its efforts.
► The Sino-Vietnamese Relationship—for months preceding the 17-day border incursion into Vietnam in February 1979, China had warned that it was prepared to “teach Vietnam a lesson.” Apparently, the decision to move against Vietnam militarily commanded unanimity among the Chinese politburo’s ruling circles. What were the actual “lessons” learned from the Sino-Vietnamese confrontation? More importantly, what lessons can be learned after examining the course of Sino-Vietnamese relations since then?
There were numerous military lessons for the Chinese. Most accounts agree that the venture was extremely costly and inconclusive. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) encountered local militia units and some regular troops. Yet, reports indicate that the PLA suffered World War I-style casualties while attaining World War I-style rates of advance. The invasion failed utterly in its goal to force Hanoi to shift regulars from their positions in Kampuchea to new positions in northern Vietnam, much less in its efforts to stop the Vietnamese advances. Since that time, there have been serious revisions in the PLA’s command and control structures, and in the PLA’s doctrines and training. Furthermore, under Deng Xiaoping, the PLA’s social prestige (hence, its political power) has fallen from the lofty heights it enjoyed under Mao Zedong. However, there have been other, more important, lessons.
High on the list was the credibility China gained by its willingness to employ military force when necessary to defend its interests. This lesson had an impact on Vietnam, ASEAN, and the Soviet Union. Concomitantly, Moscow’s reluctance to intervene on Vietnam’s behalf was also noted, despite the built-in excuse that China’s objectives had been loudly proclaimed to be limited. Vietnam had no guarantee that China would limit its military operations.
However, during Vietnam’s successful 1985 dry-season
offensive, the lack of a meaningful Chinese response (aside from some minor border actions) was conspicuous. Since 1979, Chinese support for an independent Kampuchea has been constant. The Chinese have remained the Khmer Rouge’s major supporter, annually providing Pol Pot’s forces with ample supplies of arms, food, medicine, and material. As negotiations have dragged out over the past five years, the Thais have drawn close to the Chinese, particularly in joint security affairs. China’s refusal to teach a second “lesson” this year was a serious loss of face for the Chinese leadership. The Chinese did not intervene despite the drubbing the coalition’s forces received either because they were unable to do so effectively, or perhaps because they are interested in signaling their desire to change the tone of their relations with the Soviets and/or the Vietnamese. China’s inaction will have repercussions in the manner with which the Vietnamese deal with both the Chinese and the Thais.
► The Great Power Triangle in Southeast Asia—the general trend of Soviet policy in Southeast Asia can be measured in terms of Sino-Soviet-American competition. However, there are certain characteristics of the current great power alignment that suggest the “correlation of forces”—to use a Marxist term—is in a transitory phase.
There may be some truth to the Soviets’ perception that their own “window of vulnerability” will widen as China gains strength. China is still perceived as somewhat backward and as needing time before presenting an objective threat to Soviet interests. The underlying psychological fears of Chinese intentions remain. Thus, as pacific as it may appear, China’s declarations that its current efforts are intended to make it a powerful, strong, and prosperous socialist country portend serious competition for the Soviet Union in Asia.
The United States, the Soviet Union’s only global competitor, has been pressing its regional friends and allies to share the costs of Asia’s defense. The problems associated with deployment of an Indian Ocean task force underscore the fact that U. S. military forces are insufficient to defend, simultaneously, U. S. interests worldwide. Moreover, the need for increased regional participation in security matters has been made inescapable by the Soviet military buildup. Japan and ASEAN are today far more aware of a Soviet threat to East Asian stability than they ever have been.
Japan, the Soviet Union’s historic competitor in East Asia, has become increasingly involved in regional security affairs. Ten years ago, the joint military exercises and active cooperation between the United States and JapaU that are rapidly becoming the norm would have been it*1' possible because of Japanese domestic opposition. Desp|te the bitter memories that still linger in Southeast Asia ft0111 Japan’s “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,” Ja' pan’s Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone has agreed to a program of “comprehensive security” with the Unite States. Furthermore, Japan has pledged itself to building a Self-Defense Force—the only kind of military force itlS allowed according to the terms of its antiwar constitution with an operational radius of 1,000 nautical miles.
The Soviets have also been concerned about the p°sSl
been
conveniently resolved, the textile problem threatens
bilities of a Sino-American entente. The spectre of China allied with the United States in an anti-Soviet coalition has aunted the Soviet leadership since President Carter normalized relations with China in 1978. Although these ears seemed to be borne out in the late 1970s and early 980s when Chinese leaders routinely spoke of the dangers of “socialist hegemonism” as the world’s greatest hreat to international peace, in actuality, the Sino-American relationship has been marked by a number of divisions. The question of U. S. arms sales to Taiwan has been a persistent irritant that has occasionally led to bitter exchanges between the two countries. The 17 August 1982 0lnt Communique temporarily “resolved” the problem, ut other problems almost certainly lie in the future.
More recently, U. S.-China trade frictions have sur- aced because of the quotas the United States is imposing °a Chinese textile exports to the United States and because mU. S. restrictions on nuclear plant and equipment sales y U. S. companies. Although the latter issue has just
become the next focal point for possible Sino-American ^agreement.
Nevertheless, the Sino-American normalization process as proceeded on a relatively smooth course when one considers the fundamental differences between the two countries. In security affairs, both Washington and Beijing Perceive advantages through cooperation with the other, acb country has sent its Defense Minister to the other, •though nothing has yet been finalized, China has repeat- ®oly expressed interest in purchasing certain advanced • S. weapons systems. The United States has no doubt Sained valuable intelligence about the dispositions of the 0viet Union’s forces in Afghanistan, Vietnam, and Siberia from cooperative Chinese sources.
Recently, in China’s relations with the United States a°d the Soviet Union, the Chinese have attempted to appear more equidistant in relations with the superpowers.
: ^be same time that Washington has been receiving more c^hcNm for its policies in Central America and the Mid- e East, Beijing has begun expanding its limited ties with oscow. However, the importance of this gradual thaw in •no-Soviet relations should not be overestimated. The mese are still vociferous in their opposition to the So- vlet Presence in Afghanistan and Vietnam. The Chinese 16VV toe Soviets as the greatest long-term threat to their m^c and stability. It is only natural that China’s current T^ers are interested in improving the Soviet relationship, th 11 C*°eS n0t ta^e away fr°m toe fact that both China and <j 6 United States have a congruent interest in limiting the viet Union’s Asian influence. As China’s leaders con- thgUe l° Preoccupied with domestic economic recovery, Sino-American relationship will probably improve. aff6 States has too much that the Chinese cannot
WiM^ t0 *8n°re. This does not mean that the two countries rj , c°nsider entering into even an informal alliance. The s and costs to China are too great.
from the issue of greater burden-sharing among no S. allies, however, is the fact that the United States is Ser* Anally giving the Pacific Basin the attention it dees- U. S.-Asian trade has exceeded U. S.-European
Economic Community (EEC) trade for far longer than a decade. In 1984, U. S. trade with the Pacific Basin, which accounts for 30% of all U. S. trade, surpassed U. S. trade with the European continent as a whole. Japan is our second largest trading partner after Canada. Americans have always looked west when seeking new opportunities, and our efforts to promote greater Pacific Basin economic and military cooperation are but the latest example of that trait. By ignoring the Pacific, the United States ignores its future. The degree to which European ministers have become alarmed that the United States is following a proPacific tilt away from NATO and the EEC is evidence enough that the U. S. Government has finally begun dealing with Pacific issues on a more equitable basis.
When this vigorous respect for the region’s economic potential is coupled with President Ronald Reagan’s commitment to restore the U. S. defense capability, the Pacific Basin s central importance in U. S. strategy is unmistak-
able. At the same time that the Reagan administration has abandoned the ill-conceived “swing strategy ” of its predecessor, it has undertaken an ambitious naval building program with a view to a global maritime strategy (i.e., maritime superiority).
Nowhere is the efficacy of this policy more clearly illustrated than in Southeast Asia. The Soviets’ naval buildup in the Pacific, particularly their high-profile presence in Vietnamese bases, is a strategic threat to all of East Asia. In case of a European conflict, the United States cannot assume Southeast Asian security will remain assured if the U. S. Pacific fleets are to be considered as reserve forces for the North Atlantic or Persian Gulf.
From 1980 to the present, the U. S. Navy has increased from 479 ships to 545. From now until 1989, 142 more ships will be added. Approximately one-half of this new construction has been and will be based on the Pacific. The Pacific Fleet’s strength has recently been augmented by the USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70), Los Angeles (SSN- 688)-class SSNs, Spruance (DD-963)-class destroyers, Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigates, and by four new Ohio (SSBN-726)-class SSBNs. Nearly 70% of the U. S. Pacific forces’ aircraft are considered advanced, whereas, in 1980, the figure was only 20%. Current U. S. strength in the Pacific amounts to 220 ships.
The superpower competition for influence in Southeast Asia is intense. While U. S.-Sino relations counter many Soviet initiatives, the Soviets attempt—with visits like Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Kapitsa’s (arms folded before him, opposite page) to Indonesia and Thailand—to make inroads with the members of ASEAN.
Building plans, however, cannot immediately undo the balance of power shift that took place during the previous decade. Although the Soviet Union does not possess regional military superiority, it clearly possesses a Pacific force that makes it a Pacific power that cannot be ignored. Global and regional influence, however, is not built solely upon military might. While the Soviets have been unsuccessful in their political and economic ventures in the newly emerging countries of the Pacific Basin, there have been several recent events that could, if unchecked, give the Soviet Union the kind of advantage it needs to tip the regional balance decisively.
These events could compensate for many U. S. economic successes, but cannot in any way be linked to direct Soviet instigation. The first of these is obviously the problems in the Philippines. The other is the recent decision by New Zealand’s electorate banning port calls by U. S. ships armed with nuclear weapons, thereby potentially undermining the Australian-New Zealand-U. S. pact. Soviet strategic planners can only be reassured by these events as the future maintenance of East Asia’s security becomes all the more problematic.
There is little evidence that “quadralateralism”—the anti-Soviet cooperation of the United States, China, Japan, and Western Europe—will ever be manifest in formal terms. China, with genuine concerns for its own security along the border it shares with the Soviet Union, is particularly sensitive to the negative ramifications which could arise should the Soviet Union perceive itself to be threatened by Western underwriting of Chinese development, especially in the military sector. Thus, while sometimes speaking jokingly about not feeding chocolates to the polar bear, no country is more careful than China not to put the polar bear in a comer.
The central role that China and Japan play in calculating Soviet Southeast Asian policy only serves to underscore the fact that at least at the present time Soviet priorities in Northeast Asia will almost certainly continue to have a major impact on Soviet objectives in Southeast Asia, especially as linkages develop throughout the Asian region-
Implications for U. S. Policy: Although Asia’s “correlation of forces’’ is in transition, when examining the calculus of Soviet and U. S. strengths in East Asia, it Is apparent that the United States holds a number of distinct advantages that compensate for the Soviets’ numerical advantages in hardware and strategic windfalls. If the United States is to retain its strategic initiative, it must attend to five issues.
► The ASEAN countries have stressed that their association is not military but economic, social, and cultural. By cooperating with and supporting the efforts of ASEAN- the United States can promote the economic, social, and cultural conditions which ASEAN leaders say is best to defuse threats of internal insurgency or external pressure- Particularly in the Philippines, U. S. military supplies of logistics may be necessary. It is essential, however, tha U. S. assistance be given with an eye to actual needs- For example, counterinsurgency training and an army equipped to fight in guerrilla or unconventional warfaN
stations will be useful as will be a military force Quipped with highly sophisticated hardware for special
^ The United States cannot afford to offer the impression— ®>ther by what it says or does or by what it does not say or 0 that it does not regard its Asian allies and friends and a*tendant commitments as anything but of the highest importance and priority. The Asian countries are, by their u,tural heritage, prone to taking long-term historical VleWs of international relations they believe flow from in- eitsely personal relationships. The U. S. setback in Viet- ^artl, the changed relationship with Taiwan, and the proposed withdrawals of U. S. military forces from Korea ere once perceived as evidence of a fundamental U. S. ck of moral will and ability to implement a consistent sian policy. This situation has changed. The integrity of e Th S. presence in Asia is unassailable. To the extent at the situation in Southeast Asia is integrally united Ph the situation in Northeast Asia, the United States a V.st ta^e sPec'ai care to maintain a stable Asian policy— i t0 *mPlement it despite changes in presidential admin- y lotions or congressional majorities. cae Soviet military buildup in Southeast Asia has been ttntered by a gradual enhancement of U. S. regional ^length. However, overly rapid deployment of U. S. rerCes may cause tensions to escalate unnecessarily or a gional arms race to occur, thereby destabilizing a region f ere the Soviets might still be benefited by shifts away Ca111 the status quo. At the same time, the United States to r to surrender the strategic advantage accruing oseow should its encampment in Vietnam prove long- ^ W an^ efftcacious.
abl As*an countries will become increasingly
sjj e.to defend themselves, particularly if defense burden- t|j !?®. ^ecomes a reality, it may well be in the interest of ‘inn n*tec^ States not to pressure them into a position of ^pendent independence.” The ramifications of that gi0rse might become largely incompatible with U. S. rea an(J global interests. Today’s economic exigencies
must not be allowed to spawn tomorrow’s military ones. The balance of power in Northeast Asia will inevitably affect the ones in Southeast Asia and vice versa; the continuing emergence of China will make these links evermore important.
► Finally, and most importantly, the United States must resolve itself to maintaining its strategic advantage in East Asia. Although U. S.-Pacific Basin ties are in the ascendant, the necessity of maintaining Asian security interests will be challenged by the price of real commitment—both political and financial. Approaching the 11th anniversary of the U. S. pullout in Indochina—a humiliation primarily orchestrated by a weak-kneed Congress—perhaps a renewed sense of realism exists regarding the dangers posed by the erosion in the military balance with Moscow. However, congressional handling of the Nicaraguan matter and Commandante Daniel Ortega is not an encouraging sign. Increasing strains placed on Asian allies will mandate that the U. S. military presence can never again be allowed to weaken. A strong, highly capable naval force in the Pacific is a budgetary imperative.
Admiral William Crowe’s transition from Commander- in-Chief Pacific Forces to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff is yet another signal of the administration’s attention to the Pacific’s needs. Admiral Crowe will be a skillful advocate to Congress that Pacific stability, support of our friends in the region, and defense of our interests will not come simply through honorable intentions. He will be an able spokesman for force readiness to meet crises and sustained operations anywhere in the Pacific.
There are few constants in the East Asian strategic equation. Only 15 years ago, China was the mortal enemy of the United States. What appraisal can be made of relations with Vietnam, the Philippines, or even China in the next decade? What is clear, however, is the Soviet interest in increased military power through support for terrorism, insurgency, and overt aggression. Soviet ambitions in Northeast and Southeast Asia cannot continue unchecked.
Vital inroads now being made by the Soviets in Southeast Asia will require the very best the United States can muster in terms of military strength, persistence, and sensitivity. The time has come to face the many dangers posed by the Soviets. The looming concern is whether or not Congress will act before appalling events force our hand to either get in on the act or pull out.
Commander Fitzgerald was commissioned into the Naval Reserve in 1967 and assigned to Underwater Demolition Team Eleven and later to Seal Team Two. He also performed duty as a UDT/Seal Training instructor. As a Platoon Commander, he served in Vietnam, and, in 1974, he was assigned to the U. S. Embassy in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, as the Assistant U. S. Naval Attache. He was one of the last Americans to leave Cambodia in 1975. He is currently assigned to Naval Security and Investigations Command in Washington, D. C. as Reserve Officer-in-Charge of the Anti-Terrorism Alert Center. He served as associate staff for Senators Jake Gam (R-UT) and Gordon Humphrey (R-NH) to the U. S. Senate Committee on Armed Services until 1980. He is currently President of Fitzgerald Associates, Inc., a political and public affairs consulting firm specializing in defense, trade, and international security affairs. He is a frequent writer on defense and foreign policy matters and is a member of the Washington Independent Writers corps.