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“And I Was There”: Pearl arbor and Midway—Breaking the Secrets
C^mnEdwin T- Layton, USN (Ret.), with
Co! i °ger Pineau’ USNR (Ret-)> and John C S e, New York: William Morrow and
An’ *nC'’ ^96 PP- Ulus. Notes. Ind.
PPen. Maps. $19.95 ($17.95).
£*** by Commander Thomas B. e t> U. S. Navy (Retired)
» *D00^’S title is ambiguous. tere” is meant to be naval headquar- at Pearl Harbor, where Rear Admiral win T. Layton served as the Pacific eet intelligence officer under Admiral terw11^ Kimmel and Admiral Chesty 'o ■ Nimitz before and during World II. After the victory, Layton had e nted to say things about his view of 0Jjnts’ and when hitherto classified rec- (os eventually were opened, he decided bo SPea^ Publicly. The product was this tig ’ written with substantial contribu- ns from retired Navy Captain Roger ^au and John Costello. a .umiral Layton’s perspective was “us ** them”—the field squabbling ton Washington- and within Washing- int i|t^e bureaucratic wrangling among dtgence organizations. The wrangling creSt PerPetual. In his recent book, Se- Mifn- an<^ democracy (Houghton— s,a *n. 1985), retired Navy Admiral lio nsPle,d Turner paints the Central Intel- ^ et)Ce Agency and the National Security tof"cV as adversaries. Similarily, Lay- earP escr*^es the confrontations 35 years lig ler between the Office of Naval Intel- nee (ONI) and the fiffice of Naval uununications (ONC). c>all aut^or has scores to settle, espe- t^lose whom he believed had gjg, Pe°ple he liked and respected. His CorrfeS ’ntdude the influential brothers 1( gttander John R. and Captain Joseph Kin ^man> officers on Admiral Ernest J. aitiif S Sta^ resPons>ble for naval com- djjri ICat*°n intelligence from Washington /\(j*he tense prelude to Midway. tnanlra* Layton contends that the Red- gar, 8ave King bad advice and disre- ffje contrary analyses from Layton’s and colleague Captain Joe Roche-
fort, Admiral Nimitz’s code-breaking wizard at station Hypo in Pearl. History was to prove that Rochefort indeed had been smarter and had a better assessment of Japanese intentions; Layton asserts that the Redmans later ruined Rochefort in retaliation. And there are others on Layton’s list. Layton assails Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, Admiral Harold R. “Betty” Stark’s war plans officer, for his disastrous miscalculation of Japan’s intentions—he had emasculated ONI and ONC and had relied too heavily on his own mistaken intuition. The author is intensely bitter, and his defense of Admiral Kimmel is most profound.
But, Admiral Layton was not in Washington among the people he criticizes. He saw them from afar, through correspondence or word of mouth. Nor, obviously, was he with the Japanese as they made their plans and moves. Consequently, Layton was not omnipresent, as the title suggests, when things happened at places other than Pearl Harbor. That is not to say that the research, which relies on documentary evidence, is necessarily faulty or the conclusions less than credible, especially when they can be attributed to such an authority as Captain Pineau. It is just that this book is actually several books in one—sections on prewar code breaking and espionage are especially intriguing— and, thus, is quite long and occasionally experiences unsettling lapses in continuity and consistency.
Although Admiral Layton covers new ground, his revelations fall short of being “incredible,” as touted by the dust jacket. And I Was There will not lead to a drastic revision of history, but, nevertheless, it allowed Layton to get things off his chest. The book will appeal to the intelligence buff, explaining how codes were broken, and it will be a fine research source. The efforts of the many good people who put considerable effort into this book have not been wasted. Above all, And / Was There is a memorial to the energy, perseverence, and persistence of the Navy’s often fractious intelligence specialists, who did so much to help the United States win the war. The book is also a memorial to Layton, who suffered
a fatal stroke in April 1984 as the manuscript was nearing completion.
Commander Buell has written biographies of Admirals Ernest J. King and Raymond A., Spruance and has contributed to the Proceedings for the past 20 years. Commander Buell also served on the Naval Institute’s Editorial Board. He is now an engineering manager at the Honeywell Military Avionics Division in Minneapolis.
HThe Easter Offensive: The Last American Advisors, Vietnam,
1972
Col. G. H. Turley, USMCR (Ret.). Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1985. 344 pp. Illus. Notes. Ind. Maps. Append. $ 18.95 ($15.16).
Reviewed by Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., U. S. Army (Retired)
If there was ever a classic description of what Karl von Clausewitz meant by “friction” (what today we might call “Murphy’s Law”), Marine Colonel Gerald H. Turley’s The Easter Offensive has to be it. While visiting South Vietnamese Marine battalions deployed along the Demilitarized Zone in March 1972, then- Lieutenant Colonel Turley suddenly found himself caught in the North Vietnamese Eastertide Offensive. Before he knew it, Turley, a staff officer recently returned to Vietnam, had replaced an Army major as the operations advisor to the South Vietnamese Army’s Third Infantry Division and soon became the senior advisor to the entire division. His introspective account of the events and the conflicting emotions these events triggered make this book more than just a history; they make it what Clausewitz would have called a manual through which future leaders who have never “seen the elephant” (now the majority of our officer corps) might learn about war.
What these leaders would learn, among other things, is the need for flexibility in battle, because the battlefield is eminently unpredictable. Turley’s reflections of the anarchy of the battlefield— radio antennas blown away by enemy artillery barrages, misunderstood and misinterpreted messages, unreasonable
orders issued by out-of-touch staff officers safely positioned in the rear, seemingly competent officers who collapse under the strain of combat, bad weather that prohibits close air support at critical moments—are reminders that friction is still with us, especially in this age of modem technology.
Clausewitz’s warning delivered a century and a half ago still applies:
“The good general must know fric-
The Easter Offensive is a manual for learning about war for future leaders who have never “seen the elephant”—bunker positions at Quang Tri City in 1972, below.
tion in order to overcome it whenever possible and in order not to expect a standard of achievement in his operations which this very friction makes impossible.”
The Easter Offensive not only provides an excellent opportunity for those who have never experienced war firsthand to “know friction” but also to find out how—with courage, will, and determination—friction can be overcome.
If there is one discrepancy in Turley’s book, it is the title. The attack on Quang Tri in I Corps, although described at length in bone-chilling detail, was only one part of the Easter Offensive, which also included North Vietnamese regular army multidivisional attacks on Kontum in II Corps and An Loc in III Corps. Even Colonel Turley’s description of events in I Corps is somewhat misleading, because he concentrates almost exclusively on the initial South Vietnamese defeats there. He does acknowledge that later South Vietnam successfully counterattacked and recaptured the city of Quang Tn. “but,” he concludes, “that’s another story.”
For those not familiar with that “other story,” the Easter Offensive was a major North Vietnamese miscalculation, one that would cost them the loss of an estimated 100,000 soldiers and most of their tanks and artillery. It also cost General Vo Nguyen Giap his job, and it would be three years before his successor-"' General Van Tien Dung—would try again to score a knockout punch.
Overall, however, Colonel Turley has provided much more than just a battlefield description. He has provided a cautionary tale for all soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines, reminding them that without warning, and upon a moments notice, the terrible demands of battlefiel leadership may be thrust upon them. 0°e way to prepare for that eventuality ist0 read The Easter Offensive.
Brotherhood of Arms: General Dynamics and the Business of Defending America
Jacob Goodwin. New York: Times Books, 1985. 419 pp. Illus. Notes. Ind. $18.95- ($17.05).
Reviewed by Thomas B. Allen
People once exorcised evil spirits w'i^ bell, book, and candle. Today, Pe°?,y who seek to cleanse the Pentagon usua ; just try the bell, using clarion headlu1 and television teasers. The explanat0i book and the illuminating candle rafe’ follow. Two books, however, have be summoned forth by the recent bells tn ^ tolled tales of overpriced hammers at* ashtrays. One book, Heavy Losses (sun tied “The Dangerous Decline of Ana® can Defense”), is opinionated and ang '
tl^H ?^er’ Brotherhood of Arms (subti- ea General Dynamics and the Business of Defending America”), is coolly °cused on one contractor’s defense role. Both books cite President Dwight D. ■senhower’s warning about the potential Power of the military-industrial complex, ^mes Coates and Michael Kilian, vet- jfanChicago Tribune writers, say that e military-industrial complex “has Proved every bit as dangerous to AmeriCa s best interest as Eisenhower so sternly _ arned.” Jacob Goodwin, a former De- ense Week reporter, writes, “The poten- a bor a disastrous rise of misplaced Power that Eisenhower recognized has ^°t been fully realized.” Which book is ght? The answer is not as important as j e Process used in finding it out. In order ° understand almost anything that hap- P®ns in the Pentagon, the subject must be Udied at length. Newspaper stories and ev>sion news snippets just are not en°ugh.
Goodwin needs a book to explain how (jUnfral Dynamics (GD) became the na- °n s most important defense contractor. IQ i|races GD’s corporate pedigree to the n century, explores weapons procurement problems in U. S. wars, and takes e reader through the sometimes fasci- ^mg, sometimes stultifying details of t °~ern weapons procurement. Goodwin acks weapon systems through the ysteni-—from gleam-in-the-eye “re- rement” and “mission analysis” pars to “concept validation,” develop- ^nt engineering, operational testing, u full-scale production.
Along the way, the reader meets the versaries who push and pull the weap- q s trough the system: GD chairman tLav*^ S. Lewis dueling with Secretary of if Navy John F. Lehman, Jr., over sub- vianne cost overruns; P. Takis Veliotis, ^ nolic general manager of GD’s Elec- aC. oat shipbuilding yard, squaring off Th'nst Navy Admiral Hyman Rickover. its6 ^avy_GD confrontation saga reaches tireC*'maX wben Rickover is forced to re- u6 by Lehman and Veliotis is kicked bvia*rs to an executive vice presidency both W'S' ^be book gives credence to the Wh ITlen'out deal that had been rumored Sj en Rickover and Veliotis exited almost tie U'taneousIy- “There was an aware- Lewis told the author, “that we 1 had to do our part.”
]0 j* Heavy Losses, Coates and Kilian Ujj,. Mostly at the military side of the ^o-'l^'industrial complex, and they do the *^e niucb °f what they have seen. To and*11’ t^le Navy has “ancient battleships Arm lncBcctual aircraft carriers”; the 'vh' r, <rebes t0° much on helicopters, ch ‘have proved a very weak link” in
combat; and the Air Force avoids the vital mission of tactical air support in favor of the more glamorous mission of strategic bombing.
Coates and Kilian suggest that soldiers would not be as dependent upon helicopters if the Army were given control of fixed-wing tactical aircraft. Their other recommendations: reinstating the peacetime draft; establishing a chairman of the Joint Chiefs who is “the supreme uniformed military commander”; and transferring weapons testing from military project officers to an independent Pentagon testing agency.
In a chapter given over to military reformers, the authors reiterate the oft-told tales about the vulnerability of the Aegis cruiser and the advance warning and control system (AWACS) airplane and about the failings of the M-l main battle tank and the cancelled Sergeant York division air defense (DIVAD) antiaircraft gun. Nor do they make news with their discovery that the armed services often “compete with each other instead of the enemy,” and that interservice rivalry has spawned overlapping space programs and uncoordinated nuclear warfare plans. But, by assembling in one place several case histories of interservice rivalry, Coates and Kilian have given critics a testament for the continuing debates over defense. Just how complicated those debates can be is shown by this book, which simultaneously supports John Lehman’s crusade for a bigger Navy and the antibattleship warriors of the military reform
The military-industrial complex and the people—like Admiral H. G. Rickover—who drive it are the targets of a new wave of military books.
movement. Defense debates will no longer be simply between doves and hawks. One new bird, the authors note, is the “cheap hawk” that pounces on waste.
Both books point out that, in the words of Coates and Kilian, “a weapon system, just like a member of Congress, develops an enduring constituency.” They buttress their claim with a detailed history of the $40,000-per-round Maverick missile. The Maverick, they say, commands a large production and maintenance force, and consequently, the missile gets more Pentagon attention than a $13-per-round cannon shell.
The general public needs books like these to try to make sense of the war over defense matters. The communiques from the Pentagon, cut down to headline or television flash size, are not big enough to carry a burden of proof or the weight of an argument.
Mr. Allen, co-author of Rickover: Controversy and Genius (Simon and Schuster, 1982), and a former associate director of National Geographic books, served in the Navy during the Korean War. He has lectured on writing at the U. S. Naval Academy and teaches writing at the Writer’s Center of Washington, DC. He is currently working on Games of War, a book about the use of gaming and simulation in the development of strategy.
Besieged: The World War II Ordeal of Malta, 1940-1942
Charles A. Jellison. Hanover, NH:
University Press of New England, 1984.
288 pp. lllus. Maps. Notes. Bib. Ind.
$19.95 ($17.95).
Reviewed by Commander D. K. Hankinson, Royal Navy (Retired)
Besieged is not a naval or military history. It is a studied, somewhat journalistic, account of life and events in Malta between 1939 and 1942 and, in particular, the ordeal endured by the islanders. Much of the material is gleaned from interviews with a few of the survivors.
The siege and aerial bombardment of Malta in World War II have been fully chronicled in official histories and memoirs of participants. Professor Jellison adds little to this other than statistical details of the island and its people—their history, economy, religion, politics, and general way of life. Nor does he propound any fresh analysis of events—with one striking exception.
Jellison cites the British colonial style of government and the laxity and ineptitude of the authorities, both in London and Malta, in failing to prepare the civil population for war and in failing to provide adequate military defense against aggression. In addition, he makes a statement of historical interest: “Although no official document says as much, it is clear that sometime during the years immediately preceding the war the British government reached the decision not to defend Malta in the event of conflict with Italy.”
Bearing in mind that Malta was a valued British colony and the main base for the Mediterranean Fleet, which was the protector of Britain’s vital lifeline to the East, this is a judgment of signal importance. Much of the comment on events and disasters in the rest of the book hinges on this assumption. Unfortunately, the author produces no real evidence to support his claim, and the qualification which prefaces the statement itself suggests that this remarkable disclosure may be only conjecture.
This reviewer knew the island of Malta well from 1945 to 1960, and had many friends among the islanders from dghaisamen (boatmen) and shopkeepers to the grand families such as the Stricklands and de Traffords. Although they were often angry with the bungling ineptitude of the authorities during the early years of the war—just as those in England were when the Germans first bombed London—they nonetheless
seemed to realize that peacetime bureaucracy is no match for military aggression. The Maltese, apparently, never believed that the British had purposely neglected or abandoned them.
Yet, this is just the impression that Professor Jellison sets out to give, and he attempts to support this with quotations from interviews with selected Maltese some 35 years after the events. This type of journalism, which masquerades as history, is not only distasteful but dangerous. Historians must always be free to put forward their interpretations of events of the past; this is one of their main functions and one of the principal values of historical writing. But, at the same time, it must always be understood that such interpretation is personal opinion and not the unassailable truth.
Jellison does supply a narrative on the effects of the war on the island. The Italian bombing raids are graphically described, interlaced with copious statistics, quotations from interviews, and continued criticism of the government for having failed to provide adequate protection for the civilian population.
Although the first half of the book is uninspiring, the author shows his true worth as a descriptive writer with a telling account of the merciless bombardment by Nazi aircraft during the German offensive in January 1942. For more than three months, day and night, wave upon wave of bombers pulverized the tiny lS" land, obliterating its defenses, flattening its towns and cities, and all but crushing its people.
Meanwhile, Axis mastery of the sea, east and west of Malta, laid the island under total siege. As essential stocks dwindled, the people of Malta suffere appalling hardships of cold, starvation, disease, and torment until, in August 1942, the famous convoy, “Pedestal, managed to force through a handful o supply ships.
Without doubt, there is a need for a book expressing “the war experience from the Maltese point of view,” but itlS regrettable that Professor Jellison accorded scant recognition of the thousand of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and merchan seamen who gave their lives in the strug' gle to save the island. Apart from Mahese soldiers and sailors, the only fight10® men to receive mention were five Arnef[1] [2]' can pilots.
Despite its praiseworthy narrative sec tions, this is not an essential volume t° the library of any student of naval or mu tary history.
Commander Hankinson joined the Royal Navy aS^ cadet in 1942 at the age of 13. He served ®ost^L<) fleet destroyers on the Atlantic, Mediterranean,
Far East stations, commanding HMS Cambrian 1 1962-1964. Commander Hankinson was a gun[K.n specialist and passed the Royal Naval Staff Course 1962. He retired in 1966 to pursue a second career a portrait painter.
Books of Interest
By Lieutenant Commander Thomas J. Cutler, U. S. Navy
v°lved
not only the U. S. Government and its
tvam
Hit,
Hich
bu'ldii
. scale drawings and four appendices
^nierican Hostages in Iran: The Conduct °* a Crisis
p'Urrcn Christopher et al. New Haven, CT: Yale a ‘Versity Press. >985. 443 pp. Illus. Notes. Ind. ppend. $25.00 ($22.50).
Th •
in 6 inme aut*>ors this revealing book were lhV0'Ved 'n >hc negotiations for the return of pe 'A‘merican hostages from Iran in 1980-81. ornier presidential advisor George Ball writes dat >h's book “discloses fully ... the wis- >he course that was finally followed” counters “those who regularly pound their shESts anc* proclaim that the hostage crisis fo° •> ^ave been resolved by the use of Ce’. bhe book recounts the 444-day drama, ealing the complex negotiations that in ^^^oil-ridden counterpart in Iran, but in es financial and trade insights as well, ntributing factors such as the pressure from hostages’ families and the heightened e<na coverage are similarly addressed. Com- entaries by an international lawyer and a ouiinent former senator, addressing the im- ^'cations of the crisis in terms of international and foreign policy, round out the work.
Hicrican Passenger Ships: The Ocean nes and Liners 1873-1983
jJ-derick E. Emmons. Newark, DE: University of 'aware Press, 1985. 184 pp. Illus. Bib. Ind. Ppend. $38.50 ($34.65).
^ontaining descriptions and data on 74 differ- dp *teamship lines and 392 individual ships, and b°°*C *S a ^eta*'el^ compilation of historical „ CUrrent information on American passen- oce S^’PS' "bbe author restricts the field to t0an'8°‘ng. steel-hulled ships with a gross acna8e of more than 2,500 tons and berths to c°mmodate at least 50 passengers. The book cj ',lt*es information on each ship that in- lau CS.s‘ze sta>*stics, propulsion data, dates of aching and maiden voyages, periods of tt'the service, and dates of demolition, sale, S'nking. Emmons also provides black-and- offer additional data on larger ships, Well0111® yaPhS’ and ships still in service, as as color illustrations of house flags.
Charlie Mike
l9oaar<> B. Scott. New York: Ballantine Books,
„ ■ R«ion. 438 pp. Gloss. $7.95 ($7.15).
0[^er8eant David Grady lay hidden with five r 'angers among the fiddlehead ferns. eV all wore camouflage fatigues, and their
faces were painted green. Grady pressed himself closer to the dark earth, squinting to hide the whites of his eyes as seven North Vietnamese regulars approached.” So begins this fastpaced novel of the Vietnam War. Scott, who was an officer with the 173rd Airborne and 75th Rangers, writes, “I wrote Charlie Mike for the men and women who served and those who waited and supported at home. . . . Their sacrifice in youth, tears, pain, and blood will not be forgotten.” The characters are men and women, Vietnamese and American, ally and enemy. The story is exciting, heart-rending, and thought-provoking.
Kennedy in Vietnam: American Vietnam Policy 1960-1963
William J. Rust and the editors of U. S. News Books. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1985. 252 pp. Illus. Notes. Ind. Append. $15.95.
Derived from interviews with virtually all of the living principals and from many recently declassified documents, this book examines the role that President Kennedy’s administration played in America’s involvement in Vietnam. It begins with a look at Kennedy’s views on Vietnam before he became President, then reviews not only America’s Vietnam policy prior to the Kennedy election, but the crucial influence of the Bay of Pigs debacle upon Kennedy’s subsequent foreign policy. The influence of the complex and often conflicting recommendations from his advisors is recounted and analyzed. Kennedy’s political relationship with South Vietnam’s President Diem and the Kennedy administration’s involvement in the coup that ousted him are also carefully reconstructed. Former President Richard M. Nixon writes that Kennedy in Vietnam is “an indispensable source for those studying the Vietnam era.”
Lyndon Johnson’s Dual War: Vietnam and the Press
Kathleen J. Turner. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1985. 358 pp. Bib. Notes. Ind. $25.00 ($22.50).
This treatise draws extensively on primary documents from the Johnson Library, and analyzes the connection between President Johnson’s difficult relationship with the press and his ultimate political demise. Johnson’s withdrawal from the 1968 presidential race, Turner argues, “stemmed as much from his inability to communicate effectively through the press as from the Vietnam conflict itself.” Reviewing his relations with the press prior to Vietnam, Turner uncovers some other factors which contributed to the communications breakdown. She also reveals the pitfalls inherent to the “rhetoric of limited war” and reviews presidential-press relations in general, concluding that they are “an uneasy blend of the symbiotic and the adversarial.”
Machine Cryptography and Modern Cryptanalysis
Cipher A. Deavours and Louis Knih. Dedham,
MA: Artech House, 1985. 259 pp. Illus. Ind. Append. Tables. $56.00 ($50.40).
Describing many of the cryptographic machines that have been used since the 1920s, this book attempts to shed light into what the authors call the “tremendous ‘black hole’ in the literature on the subject.” Some of those machines’ codes have been solved, and the authors describe how the process is accomplished. Although teleprinter ciphers and voice scramblers are not covered because of the paucity of unclassified material available in these two areas, the discussion of the machines that played vital roles in World War II—both because of their successes and their failures— and which continue to exist even today, is richly detailed.
Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family
Shirley Christian. New York: Random House,
1985. 338 pp. Notes. Ind. Append. $19.95 ($17.95).
Through personal interviews, documentary
research, and her own experiences as a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist in Central America, Ms. Christian details the fall of Somoza, the subsequent rise of the Sandinistas, and the continuing conflicts between Contras and Sandinistas, East and West. The author highlights not only the events in Central America but the responses in Washington, providing an analytical look at both the Carter and Reagan policies in the region. “The United States,” Ms. Christian writes, “should not allow itself to fall into the trap of having to accept, in an area as closely tied to us as Central America, either a repressive right-wing dictatorship because it is not threatening to U. S. national security or a repressive left-wing dictatorship in exchange for commitments not to overthrow a neighboring government or acquire MiGs.” New York magazine recommends Nicaragua as “must reading, especially since the question of what to do about Nicaragua will be with us for years.”
EE PBY: The Catalina Flying Boat
Roscoe Creed. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985. 351 pp. Ulus. Notes. Bib. Ind. Append. $21.95 ($17.56).
One of the most versatile aircraft in the history of aviation, the PBY Catalina saw service as both a civilian and military aircraft and was used in bomber, patrol, reconnaissance, and rescue missions during World War II. It was flown by pilots from more than 20 nations for more than 40 years. This book traces the history of that aircraft from the first PBYs that flew in 1935 to the 90 or so remaining today. The coverage is both meticulous and readable, and several appendices provide line drawings and relevant data on types, numbers, dates, and uses. Navy Captain Richard C. Knott, author of The American Flying Boat (Naval Institute Press, 1979), writes, “This is the complete story of the incomparable Catalina with emphasis on the word complete.”
Soviet Merchant Ships
Ambrose Greenway. Dobbs Ferry, NY: Sheridan House, 1985. 264 pp. Illus. Ind. $23.00 ($20.70).
In this fifth edition, Greenway catalogues
- Soviet merchant vessels exceeding
- tons each for easy recognition while providing important data. Information on tonnage, dimensions, propulsion plants, builders, and delivery dates is presented for each class, and the names of individual ships within each class are listed. A discussion of vessel types and a transliteration table of the Cyrillic alphabet are included in the introduction.
Because the Japanese military tradition did not recognize surrender as an alternative in combat, the Japanese had not devised an organized system for keeping prisoners of war (POWs)- But in World War II, the Japanese found themselves in custody of the largest number o American POWs—some 24,000—ever to be captured. Surrender and Survival is the story of how those prisoners were treated by the lap" anese, why they were so treated, and how they fared under the circumstances. It is an amazingly objective account considering that the author’s father was one of those who did not survive the ordeal. Only three of five American POWs did survive their imprisonmentFilling a void in the recorded history of Won War II, this well-researched book will be welcomed by scholars and general readers alike-
The Theory and Practice of Seamanship
Graham Danton. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985. 522 pp. Illus. Ind. $39.95 ($35.95).
This is the ninth edition of a book first written in 1962 by British Extra Master Mariner Gra ham Danton. It has been updated to include the latest information on: what to do if stranded, collisions, the “sailing” factor of large dis abled tankers, and survival in extreme cold-1 addition, it continues to provide detailed c°v erage of shiphandling, damage control, tow ing, and drydocking. Although the book 1 “aimed primarily at officers and cadets study^ ing for British Certificates of Competency, should prove a worthy reference work for a mariners.
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^ Thread of Deceit: Espionage Myths of World War II
w§e' ^est- New York: Random House, 1985. pP- Ulus. Bib. Notes. Ind. $16.45 ($14.80).
p ^as Been long theorized that President ranklin D. Roosevelt had prior knowledge of e ahack on Pearl Harbor. This unknown and "!any other mysteries of World War II are ex- ^t°^ec* 'n A Thread of Deceit, a controversial u y that challenges the previous works of ,Uch notables as John Toland, who wrote In- ;am> (Doubleday, 1982), and William Steven- °n’ au,hor of A Man Called Intrepid (Har- r°Urt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1976). Using tecently declassified documents and the assistance of participating intelligence officers and ^8ents, West has written a book that the British onchester Evening News describes as “far °re gripping than any story by Frederick ForSyth or John Le Carre.”
Sijigr Titles of Interest_______________
Another Six-Hundred: A History of “Sstroyer Division 59 and Other destroyers in World War II
Daniel Mullin. Mt. Pleasant, SC: J. Daniel u lin, 1984. 315 pp. Illus. Charts. Maps. re°r A pend. Ind. $10.00 paper. (Order di- ^ct|y from: J. Daniel Mullin, 1105 Whitehall r> Mt. Pleasant, SC 29464.)
Bibliography on Soviet Intelligence and security Services
Raymond G. Rocca and John J. Dziak. Boul- *r, CO: Westview Press, 1985. 203 pp. Append- Chan. Ind. $16.00 ($14.40).
Ph* TousB" The U. S. Special Forces Jsical Conditioning Program
p°m Fitzgerald, New York: St. Martin’s ($qSS’ 163 pp. Photos. Tables. $10.95
Gorbachev: A Biography
l^omas G. Butson. New York: Stein and Day, 170 pp. Bib. Notes. Ind. $14.95 '*13.45)
Production to Satellite Oceanography
A. Maul. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Pub- p ers, 1985. 606 pp. Illus. Charts. Prob. n°tos. Gloss. Ind. $80.00 ($72.00).
Moscow Rules
^ Moss. New York: Villard Books, 85- Fiction. 389 pp. $16.45 ($14.80).
lS85°nj ^'e Man Behind the Legend
tOuT'11 Blumenson. New York: William Mor- . and Co., Inc., 1985. 320 pp. Photos. aps- Bib. Ind. $17.95 ($16.15).
Robert Capa: Photographs of Five Wars
Prnell Capa and Richard Whelan, Editors. « * York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985. 242 pp. 35 °0 ($31.50).
Jk
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Unlettered certificates are $3.00 each, and custom-lettered certificates are $6.50 each. Write and ask about our special discounts offered on orders of 25 or more.
[ET Check the commemorative certificate(s) you wish to order. When ordering custom-lettered certificates, please fill in requested information.
□ Neptune — 11" x 14", for crossing the equator
Ship
Date
Longitude
- Neptune Subpoena — 8V2" x W2"
- Arctic Circle (“Blue Nose”) — 11" x 14", for crossing the Arctic Circle
Ship ----------------------------------------------------------- --- Date_______________
- Golden Dragon — 11" x 14", for crossing the 180th Meridian
Ship----------------------------------------------------------------- Date______________
.Longitude
.Latitude .
□ Recommissioning — 16" x 20", commemorating the recommissioning of a ship $hiP___ Date Recommissioned
- Plank Owner — 11" x 14", commemorating the commissioning of a ship, installation, or squadron
ShiP------------------------------------------------------------------ Date Commissioned ________________________
- Golden Shellback — 11" x 14", for crossing the equator at the 180th Meridian
Ship
Date .
.Longitude
- Round the World — 16" x 20", for going around the world
®h,P------------------------------------- —-— _______________ Start Date .
- Icelandic Domain (“Bless”) — 11" x 14", for service in Iceland
Ship-------------------------------------------------------------- From _______
.Finish Date .To
Please send me: 9uantity
Unlettered certificates, ______________
Custom-lettered certificates,__________
Neptune subpoenas, _______________
Total
□ Check here if earned during Coast Guard service.
__________ @ $3.00=
__________ @ $6.50 =
__________ @ .50 =
Subtotal MD residents add 5% tax Postage and handling TOTAL ENCLOSED
$1.00
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Name for shipping, if different
Address
City State Zip
Please allow 4-6 weeks for delivery.
Mail this form (or facsimile) with check or money order to: Certificate Service, U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, MD 21402
I have often wondered if they saw the same thing that Admiral Rickover and I saw. Absolutely nothing!
Clifford F. Westerby
BOOK ORDER SERVICE
Prices enclosed by parentheses indicate the discounted price for USN1 members. Members may order most books of other publishers through the Naval Institute at a 10% discount off list price. (Prices quoted in this column are subject to change and will be reflected in our billing.) Please allow for delays when ordering non-Naval Institute titles. When air mail or other special handling is requested, actual postage and handling cost will be billed to the member. Books marked E0 are Naval Institute Press Books. Books marked H are Naval Institute Book Selections. For further information about these books (H,U1), call customer service at (301) 224-3378. For information on the other books, ask for the special book order clerk at ext. 31. Use the order form provided in this section.
________________________________ What Did He See?--------------------------------
I was on watch when the admiral made his inspection. As with any admiral, he had several other officers escorting him.
After he inspected my area, he led the group away and started down the ladder to the next level. When he was eye level with the deck, he paused and looked intently at something. He glanced up at me, winked, and looked over his shoulder with a frown.
As each member of his party became eye level with the deck, they peered intently, looked over their shoulder, and nodded as though they had also seen what the admiral had seen.
Signature