After the December 1985 massacres in the ^
Vienna airports, in which Libya was directly invo v \]jct Sixth Fleet redoubled its preparations for possible: c with states supporting worldwide terrorism. On t
Sea, there was great anticipation that the
This exchange between F/A-18 Hornet strike-fighter pilots during the closing moments of an intercept was typical of the second phase of Operations in the Vicinity of Libya (OVL-II) in February 1986. The Hornets were part of a combat air patrol (CAP) barrier set by the USS Coral Sea (CV-43) across the northern Gulf of Sidra. The MiG-23 Floggers had launched from Misratah, one of several coastal Libyan Arab Air Force (LAAF) bases on the gulf. This tense but non-shooting air war, in which large numbers of encounters occurred between U. S. Navy and LAAF fighters, was characteristic of OVL-11. Each of the other phases of Libyan operations— OVL-I, OVL-11I, and the April air strikes—had a separate, unique pattern. But one common feature of all three phases was the unpredictability of the Libyan military, which kept U. S. forces on their toes and increased the complexity of the rules of engagement (ROEs).
would make good its pledge to confront this th|CU Through late December and early January, aiicieallj intelligence specialists interpreted fresh target (0-
developed tactical concepts. This intensive planning vided the foundation for tactics employed throug11 ^ a
Libyan operations of early 1986. Planners cu*llV.^ai c3' healthy respect for the Libyan armed forces’ potcn i ^ ^ pabilities, as the Libyans had acquired large 9ualltl ^ ay- sophisticated Soviet and French hardware, and we ^ sisted by foreign technical advisors. In particu • ^
Libyans had many modern fighter aircraft and ovei ' r surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries.
,AuguSt
Proceedings /
“Six miles. Tally two. Line abreast. I’m on the inside guy.” “Roger. Tally one. I’m your low four.”
“Three miles. Floggers, Floggers. Belly check.”
“Roger, belly clear. Tally two. I’ve got the outside guy.”
fjrecie traditional U. S. Cold War rule, “Don’t fire unless the I ?°n’” made the air war somewhat complicated, for bev | f employed fighters capable of attacking from Sidr-11' V'Sua' range. The 1981 incident over the Gulf of Sul a’In which two Libyan fighters fired upon—and were the ruently sPlashed by—U. S. Navy fighters confirmed how *°^ans' unpredictability. Conversely, considering pil0tstense the situation could become, the U. S. fighter fros would have to show extraordinary discipline to keep high S 00t*n§’ once they had gained the advantage during Th'SPeed rnaneuvei’in8-
derr|CCoral Sea and the USS Saratoga (CV-60) would hrnit°nSffate ^ reso*ve hy operating below the northern 'nter °- ^r'P°h Flight Information Region (FIR)— fens? at'0na* a*rspace that Libya had claimed as an air de- Whic^r an^ north of 32° 30' north latitude—south of Libya claimed illegally as territorial seas. The car-
r°<*ec]inRs / August 1986 riers would maintain a CAP barrier between the task force and Libya 24 hours a day. The CAP would consist of at least three fighter sections and could act independently against air threats from Libya, with reinforcement from on-deck alert aircraft. Each carrier filled the barrier for about 13 hours each day and maintained alerts during the hours not scheduled for flying. In addition, surface CAP (SUCAP) of A-6s. A-7s, and F/A-18s from both carriers provided armed surveillance of the surface threat. This strong defensive posture was maintained throughout all phases of the Libyan operations.
Each fighter carried a full load of the latest versions of Sparrow radar-guided and Sidewinder heat-seeking missiles and 20-millimeter cannon. Aircraft flying SUCAP carried—depending on aircraft type—a variety of air-to- ground ordnance, including Rockeye cluster bombs, highspeed antiradiation missiles (HARMs), and Harpoon anti-
taining the barrier—such as relieving on station
performed a classic stern intercept, expecting all the to be fired upon. They easily maneuvered to the M' ■ o’clock without the MiGs’ countering the intercep
ship missiles. SUCAP F/A-18s were loaded with complete air-to-air suites, enabling them to reinforce the CAP.
A barrier CAP was required continuously for the duration of the Sixth Fleet’s presence in the area. This demanded on-station relief of CAP, no small task when stations were often more than 150 nautical miles from the ship. The Coral Sea launched her fighters first on a normal cycle. They would buster (“buster” is the command given to carrier pilots to proceed at best possible speed) to station to relieve the off-going CAP, who would buster back to make the last part of the carrier’s recovery cycle. This 300-plus-mile transition often took 40 minutes or more, during which the ship steamed into the wind, which delayed the respot for the next launch and thus decreased time allotted for aircraft fueling and maintenance. This created an extremely demanding environment on the flight deck—both for men and machines.
To maintain a healthy fuel reserve for potential combat situations, CAP aircraft were refueled on station by KA-6 tankers, in mid-cycle. SUCAP aircraft flew normal cycles without refueling.
Phase / (26-30 January): OVL-I was characterized by extensive preparation but not much action. Prior to the two carrier task forces moving into the central Mediterranean on 25 January, Vice Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, Commander, Sixth Fleet, met with all pilots and aircrew members of both the Coral Sea and Saratoga. His message was clear: Do the job professionally, and be ready to defend yourself and your ship—but only within the guidelines of the ROEs. Admiral Kelso warned—prophetically—that exceptional restraint might be required during close encounters with Libyan fighters.
On 14 January, a Navy EA-3 electronic reconnaissance jet on a routine mission—well north of the Tripoli FIR— was intercepted by Libyan MiG-25s. This event, combined with the weeks of preparation and Admiral Kelso’s visit, built an atmosphere of intense anticipation in the ready rooms. Pilots continued to study tactics, equipment
recognition features, and capabilities of the Libyjn Air Force and Navy. s^-
Aware of the possibility of a reaction from the Liby .
with the instruments to oppose that reaction viole ^ U. S. pilots flew CAP missions as though their
pended on it. They practiced non-tactical aspects o . - • •— data n coordination with the E-2C radar control aircra > tanking—until they became routine. On-station tllT^ jjb- used for thorough radar searches, seeking any hint 0 yan activity. But most Libyan aircraft would not too far beyond their own airspace—certainly not enough to allow the CAP aircraft to take vectors- On the morning of 26 January, a section of LAA 25 Foxbats vectored toward one of the F/A-18 CA tions. Under control of a Coral Sea E-2C, the. ^le
si* of
„ nc.^‘n8 any missiles. The intercept was executed with tlj a'ae respect for the forward-quarter firing capability of posi ■' .an fighters. The U. S. pilots employed defensive as ' 'oning and other measures to degrade that capability much as possible. After being escorted for about ten
minutes
to basi
siu?eUVer’n§—nothing approaching what might be con- 0r ?leh a'r combat. Whether they had intentionally split up niu .Sf Contact with one another is speculative, but they fj„L aave felt discomfort with two armed U. ers at their six o’clocks.
e i
the MiGs separated from each other and returned ndependently. They had displayed only limited
S. Navy
-p, . — aiA u
and |'S SUccessfnl intercept was the first contact by U. S. 'byan forces during the conflict of early 1986. It
marked
poxbat-
the first time either Hornet pilot had ever seen a files T ~mucfi *ess two MiG-25s—loaded with real mis- mem1 ae carrier air defense system worked. All its equip- and personnel functioned perfectly. The system also
y^idated
18:
the effectiveness of the intercept tactics the F/A-
would employ for the many intercepts to come.
escort periods, the E-2C’s superior surveillance capabilities enabled Navy fighters to clear confidently their own rear hemisphere from unseen interlopers.
The Libyans appeared to be receiving accurate radar information from ground controllers about the CAP's location, because their initial vectors often headed them directly toward the closest section. As the intercept progressed, the Libyans’ ability to counter position maneuvers was limited. When the opposing sections closed to within ten miles, the U. S. pilots could often maneuver at will to arrive at a firing position behind the MiGs.
Often the Libyans would attempt to lure U. S. fighters below the Line of Death by flying lazy, predictable patterns, gradually working southward. Prior to crossing the line, the U. S. fighters would disengage and return to station. If relief on station occurred during the course of an intercept or escort evolution, oncoming CAP aircraft would relieve the off-going section while still in escort, tag-team style.
During close-up photo sessions, some of the Libyan pilots waved tentatively to the escorting U. S. pilots. But they received no response except a cold stare. Others appeared to slide down in the cockpit, as though they could keep from being shot by not exposing their upper torso through the canopy. Some made vain attempts to shake the Hornets or Tomcats off their tails. Hard oblique weaves, supersonic accelerations, and decelerations to very slow airspeeds were typical maneuvers, tried mostly by the Flogger pilots.
The greatest satisfaction for the U. S. Navy fighter pilots, other than completely dominating the Libyans, was the exposure to genuine Soviet hardware—equipment they had scrutinized for years. Confidence grew quickly in U. S. tactics and training, as well as the superior performance of U. S. high-tech equipment. They had always regarded the Israeli fighter pilots as special for their enviable combat performance against Arab air forces. But after OVL-II, flying against a similarly equipped and trained adversary, the Navy pilots understood better the reasons for the Israelis’ success.
On several occasions, Libyan air activity became heavy Area of Libyan Operations
Ir> the n
eady room, a heated review of the heads-up dis- cal | Vl^eo inspired unbridled cheers and some lively tacti- a|| ^IScussion, as the pilots debriefed the engagement. But Libv' *'1C Pfi°ts realized the gravity of the encounter. The fly j ns Were n°t going to allow U. S. military planes to reswfiat they considered their own airspace without a Cou,dn- because of their unpredictability, any intercept coiu' resufi 'n hostilities. The only course would be to q Ue with caution and always be on the defensive. yfY;nce the LAAF response began, several other Coral Ql()ai)fi Saratoga CAP sections made intercepts. The Sar- enca Usec* fi" 14 Tomcats, which—in addition to Foxbats— Fre')Uatere(l Floggers, Su-22 Fitters, and, occasionally, craft Mirage-Vs and Mirage F-ls. All Libyan air-
and LWere armed with two or more air-to-air, radar-guided neuveat'Seeking missiles. No full-blown air combat ma- Hj0rerinS emerged, but the Floggers tended to maneuver pla(,£ ^gressively than the others. Fitters were the most any ’generally flying straight and level. At no time did (j 'byan fighter attain an offensive position behind a Th - P'*ot s w'ngline.
play
flyi £ ,tash force retired northward on 30 January after ^here 'ns*^e lbe Tripoli FIR continuously for four days. “Lj Werc no attempts to cross Moammar Gadhafi’s Units’0 i^* P)eat*1 at 32°30' north latitude by air or surface SUC'C(
^c Ur'ng OVL-I. Several pilots found “action”— r,;sstufiy maneuvering against potential armed adver- tlmint' ^Ut mOSt er,fiurefi ffie hours of CAP station With enance’ heavy alert posture, and odd working hours °at even as much as a radar contact.
Pi
(j, U (12-15 February): OVL-II gave nearly all the cepts Nayy f'ghter pilots an opportunity to perform inter- pr0)(S °n Libyan MiGs. During this four-day period, ap- ear,iemately encounters were recorded. As they had ing £r’ Americans dominated this tactical scenario, gain- ^an offensive position on virtually every intercept. keeU a fi*1^ coordination with the E-2C allowed fighters to Was ,.ra?k °l the overall air picture, not just that which 'mited to their own radars. During extended MiG
“hi-
tdl"«s< August 1986
45
The Libyan responses to U. S. Navy operations were ineffective: its missile boats—a Nanuchka burns after being attacked by carrier aircraft—were driven from the sea, and its aircraft made few threatening moves under the watchful eyes of U. S. pilots—here, an F/A-18 Hornet escorts an Su-22 Fitter.
enough to warrant reinforcement of the standard defensive CAP barrier. Taking a vector off the catapult, alert pilots often found themselves intercepting inbound MiGs quite soon after launch, while still completing combat checks and coordinating with the E-2C. In this multiple target arena, correlation between E-2C contacts and on-board radar contacts was essential to ensure that the object of the intercept was truly an adversary and not another U. S. Navy fighter.
Only once did LAAF fighters approach the carriers’ positions. Several Foxbats overflew the Coral Sea, but with Hornets escorting them they displayed no threatening intentions.
The LAAF normally maintained one Soviet-made 11-76 Candid on station throughout OVL-II. This large transport aircraft flew an east-west pattern along the FIR’s northern boundary, in what appeared to be a maritime reconnaissance role. An F/A-18 or A-7 escorted this C-141 clone throughout his monotonous observation mission.
The LAAF’s night operations were extremely limited. On the rare occasions when the Libyans launched their fighters after dark, they never ventured far from their lighted airfields. The Candid was the only Libyan aircraft intercepted at night.
OVL-II ended as abruptly as it started. The task force discontinued flight operations south of the FIR on 15 February. The U. S. forces had once again refrained from crossing the Line of Death.
Phase III (23-29 March): The objectives of OVL-III, also known as Freedom of Navigation Operations, were to sail and fly U. S. naval forces in international waters and
airspace in the Gulf of Sidra, south of the Line o This set the stage for confrontation. Gad aa;r. vociferously proclaimed that any Sixth Fleet vesse craft passing south of the line would be fired up •
The USS America (CV-66) battle group had join ^ Coral Sea and Saratoga in mid-March, making 1 gut Fleet more powerful than it had been in several yea ' cg. data link, voice communications, and other routine F^^ dures, now second nature to the Coral SealSaratoga^ had to be relearned to accommodate the America. ^fS
was unfamiliar with the Libyan theater. Many °L-lCjent. believed that two carrier battle groups were su As it steamed into the south central Mediterranea huge task force had its three carriers dispersed in ^ west line along the northern edge of the Tripoli F ^cQrts 150 nautical miles north of the Line of Death. taSjc were deployed in a defensive formation around surface force for air, surface, and submarine protection. A- ^
action group (SAG), led by the USS Ticonderoga 47), was poised to cross the line. dnig^1
The America conducted flight operations from to noon, the Saratoga from noon to midnight, ^ Coral Sea from 0530 to 1830 each day. Theseu^urs^ were somewhat fluid. The object was to cover all ^ya especially concentrating on daylight, the time when was most likely to respond.
Throughout OVL-III, LAAF reaction was
practie
fied
tha1
nonexistent. The Libyans appeared to be satis— showing any hostile intent toward the U. S. Navy would prove immediately fatal. , cr0sS
On the morning of 24 March, the SAG steanie ^52 the line, supported by CAP and SUCAP aircraft- ^ ^ local time, the Libyans fired two SA-5 SAMs0 southernmost CAP—F/A-18s from the Coral Se ■ missiles, wide misses shot at extreme range- ^ launched from the new site at Sirte on the souther coast. At least two—possibly four—more missi e fired that day, all misses.
crit' '^a^ demonstrated hostile intent, satisfying ROE Co^a f°r clearance to fire. That evening, a Libyan La West attante~class missile patrol boat sortied toward the pro. J'11s^ips of the task force and was sunk—as she ap- aR ^ *ler m‘ssde’s striking range—by a Harpoon and eye bred by an A-6 SUCAP from the America. The by ss'te was successfully struck by HARMs, delivered ni0rniCtl°nS ^arato8a A-7s, twice that night. By early
a ^-6s from the Coral Sea and Saratoga had sunk
ve , let"built Nanuchka-class missile corvette and se- y damaged a second, using Rockeye and Harpoon. March1^'31^ Allowing the first SAM firings on 24 A ’ ^e atmosphere on board the ship had changed. res Previous jocularity was replaced by firm resolve to p-d violently to the Libyan action. In the cockpits, beep2 UfeS d‘d not change much, because the pilots had thereready and waiting for hostilities since January. But hosf,.Was a new sense of urgency. During this period of tyoiji!Ies> they knew that any Libyan target encountered cent .fa*r game. Having recently seen so many targets SgDreaIn their gunsights, a trigger squeeze was all that t^ated a fighter pilot from a MiG-killer. tbr0 ,tas^ force maintained an offensive CAP posture tbe i . out the next four days, often stationed well below limit'T f~^eath. Several missions probed to the 12-mile ' bUCAP sections patrolled inside the Line of Death in support of the SAG. But none of these aircraft or ships met any additional response from the Libyans, other than an occasional electronic emission from one or more SAM sites. These emissions were of short duration, an obvious and successful attempt to keep them from once again being struck by HARMs. After the shooting started on 24 March, no Libyan military aircraft were seen to venture more than a few miles from the beach. The heavily reinforced CAP never had an intercept opportunity after the first day.
The operation ended with the entire task force retiring northward on 29 March, having amply demonstrated U.S. resolve to exercise navigational rights in international waters and airspace claimed by Libya.
Phase IV (10-18 April): On 9 April, the Coral Sea was in port and her crew was enjoying liberty in Malaga, on the southern coast of Spain. After more than six months on deployment, they were pleased with their work and ready to start home. The ship got under way early the next day, but the initial heading was eastward. The captain announced that the Coral Sea's stay in the Mediterranean theater had been officially extended—an action precipitated by recent terrorist killings of Americans in a Berlin disco and on a TWA airliner.
Preparations for returning to the United States were put
whip
DESTROYED MI-8/HIP
DESTROYED
MIG-23/FLOGGER
The aerial photographs of the Benina airfield, taken on 15 April, show the damage inflicted by the U.S. raid. The ground-level photograph provides a different view of the same results.
**d,n8s / August 1986
The
Lampedusa, nothing of substance ever materialized task force remained in place until 18 April.
not
the
Enterprise (CVN-65), retaining a second carrier ^ Mediterranean as a deterrent to further terrorist a backed by the Gadhafi regime.
ion*
into reverse. The ship began rearming, bringing the EA-6B squadron back on board, requalifying pilots in day and night carrier landings, and refueling and resupplying. Aircrews continued their contingency planning, paying particular attention to selected Libyan targets. Aircraft maintenance and ordnance crews worked feverishly.
With the Saratoga's battle group already retired from the theater, the Coral Sea and America were to concentrate on different Libyan targets, while sharing fleet defense responsibilities. The Coral Sea was to strike the Benina airfield outside Benghazi on the eastern side of the Gulf of Sidra. This would include the full support package for the Benghazi area, including antiaircraft suppression and fighter cover. The America would strike targets in downtown Benghazi, completing an all-Navy evolution in the eastern gulf. The America also would provide suppression and fighter support for the U. S. Air Force strike on Tripoli. The plan reached its final stages a few days prior to the target time of 0200 local on 15 April.
Although the go-ahead from Commander Sixth Fleet did not reach the ships until hours before takeoff times, the participants seemed to sense that this one was a “go.” Their enthusiastic anticipation was dulled significantly when word of recent media releases in the United States reached the ready rooms. These broadcasts listed target areas and proposed target times which coincided almost exactly with the actual missions. Many believed chances for success without significant losses had been seriously jeopardized, since a major tactical feature of the strikes was the element of surprise. There was talk of postponing everything until whoever was compromising this vital information could be throttled. Aircrews whose missions would involve flying within enemy SAM envelopes were particularly alarmed by this breach of security.
The planning and briefing stages of the strike were extremely thorough. Although complex, the plan allowed each pilot and naval flight officer to concentrate on a single task, rather than having one aircraft perform several missions.
The Coral Sea made a high-speed transit through the Strait of Messina just before sunset on 14 April. She evidently stood right past the surprised Soviet tattletale destroyer on station east of Sicily, for the Soviet intelligence collector was unable to catch up until the following day. As the carrier ran for the launch position, the flight deck was active with the final respot and arming of the “go birds.” Each aircraft received a complete systems check prior to crew man-up.
The launch sequence went like clockwork. More than 30 fixed-wing aircraft were catapulted into a black, moonless night. Only one aircraft aborted because of a system malfunction, and it was replaced. Radio communication and other electronic emissions were tightly controlled, to preclude early detection of the strike force. While A-6 bombers rendezvoused and proceeded toward their targets at the Benina airfield, F/A-18 HARM shooters, EA-6Bs with fighter escorts, and CAP aircraft proceeded independently along their assigned routes. All movements were monitored by two E-2Cs, ready to control the fighter effort if any LAAF aircraft challenged the strike group.
A few minutes prior to target time, HARM shooters jammers launched their devastating attack on the L -^ air defense system, in coordination with the arrival bombers in the target vicinity. As they approache ^ target area, A-6 crews noted with pleasure the s in * runway lights at Benina, which provided a visual ® ,
for the bombing runs. They saw the incoming HA orange cones of destruction, smothering SAM S1 their paths. SAMs that were launched created a se tional effect in the night sky, but none guided effectlV f After the first two runs, the airfield was on fire. The a- six A-6s across the airfield noted several airplanes o ^ ramp below burning furiously. As the Intruders race the ocean and safety, they could see the giant bomb ex sions of the America's A-6s on target near the city- ^ An F/A-18 CAP witnessed the light show, waltin^n 0f pectantly just outside the SAM envelopes for any su ^ fighter opposition. But for all the warnings they n j ceived, the Libyans appeared only moderately PrePa ^ They did not launch a single aircraft in defense Benghazi area. Hor-
Last to leave the target area were two rescue ca te nets, on station just offshore to defend and to coor the rescue of any downed aircrews. Their job flS
moot with the final “feet wet” call from the bom c ^ they streaked outbound from the beach. The Horne - view of Benghazi was a skyline ablaze with sec ^ fires from the downtown areas, backdropped by a ‘ aj glow from fires burning at the airfield which was se miles inland. nj2|1t
For most of the returning carrier aviators, the oneajtjng recovery operation was the largest of its kind. ^W^ntrol their turns at the deck, pilots monitored the tighter c net to see what response the strike had elicited *r0 jo0) Libyans. Many expected the force’s CAP, now on > ^
to encounter a plethora of MiGs once dawn appr°a ^ But even though a few MiGs were launched, there never an organized reaction.
The two battle groups again formed force north of the Tripoli FIR, awaiting either a response or further tasking from national comm a thorities. Although the Libyans appeared to be rea y n(j of counterattack after a fumbled strike on the Italian is1
h'lS *'
Conclusion: The importance of the Libyan area uf diminished. The Coral Sea, having participated in a Libyan operations, was relieved in early May by 111
. 1974.
Commander Stumpf graduated from the Naval Academy >n 19761° served as a light attack pilot on the USS Saratoga (CV-60) LlStral'°n 1979. From 1979-81, he was an exchange pilot with the Roya aS an Navy, flying A-4s from HMAS Melbourne. Commander StumP ^ [,aS F-18 pilot with VFA-125 in Lemoore (1981-84). Since 19 ’ tj, ~
been with VFA-132 on the USS Coral Sea (CV-43), first as op officer and currently as maintenance officer.