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The Contras snaking their way across the ground in a training exercise seem to be a long way from their goal of overthrowing the Sandinistas. Yet such insurgencies, terrorism, and other aspects of low-intensity warfare should be recognized as capable of eroding a nation’s will to resist.
admitting governmental inability to agree upon tal national objectives
fundamen'
For many Americans, any clear distinction between war and peace in the world is rapidly deteriorating. Since 1967, 32 countries have experienced some form of guerrilla warfare or insurgency. During the first three years of this decade, international terrorism increased at an annual rate of approximately 30%—twice the rate of increase in the 1970s. In addition, the United States has used its military forces for political reinforcement some 262 times between 1945 and 1982. With the use of force without war an almost daily occurrence for the United States in the international political environment, all those concerned with national security must wrestle with the problem of how to deal with it.
Most Americans’ view of conflict is incompatible with actuality, largely because the United States is geographically isolated from most world conflicts. In addition, U. S. force structures have been developed to deter and, if necessary, to wage conventional and nuclear war. Therefore, most U. S. military members still focus primarily on the upper two-thirds of the spectrum of conflict.
We have been frustrated, because we have failed to learn from our experience in Vietnam. We have turned our backs in bitterness on this chapter in history, which Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Noel C. Koch, calls the least studied war in U. S. history.
U. S. naivete concerning the use of national power has also contributed to this frustration. Most Americans think of military power and diplomacy as two distinct alternatives for resolving conflict in international politics. This misunderstanding of the use of national power is indicative of our geographically isolated attitudes. National power consists of diplomacy, military power, economic power, and informational services, all of which must be used together or very little will be accomplished. But what is the correct measure of use for each of these political instruments in any given situation?
The Political-Military Relationship: The greatest responsibility in conflict rests with political leadership. It must not only determine when it will use military power in a conflict, but it must also set clear political objectives to guide the military. These political objectives should be based on a national strategy. This Clausewitzian principle seems basic, but it has not always been followed. In a national strategy review conducted in the 1970s, the National Security Council (NSC) offered a variety of military force aggregations for presidential consideration, while
no1
• but ah0
only has long-term consequences for a nation ^ causes an oscillating effect in foreign policy,. ^clirS in to be more reactive than active. When conflict °L ,(|ca| international politics, it is difficult to determine P yj. objectives for the conflict without a national strater,rjC;ins etnam is an example; in the late 1960s, most A111 ^
were asking, “Why are we in Vietnam?” Structuraning nesses in the NSC and the decline of the policy P anj staff at the State Department during the Eisenho Kennedy years resulted in the erosion of coi'npre‘^je reintegrated, long-term policy planning. ^ef^!rs, and sponse” became the guideline in international at a’ ’ ^ the long-term was given less consideration. Vie n never part of a well-designed national strategy- and As then-Secretary of Defense Robert McNam ^ ^ Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated, the purpo^^ 0f United States being in Vietnam was to stop the a communism in Southeast Asia. While certainly purpose, it was nevertheless not part of a coherent strategy based on well-assessed national interests- QlIs tion, the political objective of Vietnam, if not am jj^uSj to most Americans, held little significance for t*1^ca) ot>' the paramount importance of a well-defined pm1 only®
Failure to determine a coherent national strategy
jective in conflict has, in many cases, been paid service.
The nature of the political objective determines flict’s intensity and the necessary degree of milita. creaSeS to be used. As the political objective in conflict to in magnitude, it becomes easier for military lea e pol® adopt strategic military objectives that support t ns cal objective. In any war, declared or undeclare ’ tjofl strategic military objectives translate into the des jy. of enemy forces and the occupation of enemy te micd Another prerequisite to the achievement of the P ypjs objective is the breaking of the enemy’s will toresltjve can be accomplished by military means, but the o is somewhat political in nature. The subordinatt°^p|jCt. nation’s will to another’s is inherent in every ^ of
World War II, which reflects most Americans 0f
war, illustrates the correlation between the magnl^e£lns- the political objective and the intensity of mil't^ ^tes1 This war’s political objectives reflect those °f the S p na' magnitude; the Axis powers sought the conques^( py tions while the Allies sought to stop this c0,nC,trategic totally defeating Japan and Germany. Each side ss - ctive militon, i ,1 „^iitiral OPT ^,
the c°n
,vvef
military objectives were equal to the political __ and supported the achievement. Both sides S0Ugnf struction of enemy forces and the occupation c^ N terrain. If these two strategic military objectives c■ y’s accomplished, it was assumed the erosion of the e will to resist would follow.
— —----------- --------- . jves1
On the other hand, as a nation’s political °hJeC -|jtary conflict lessen in importance, the intensity of the n ^ effort tends to decrease. Karl von Clausewitz a this thought in On War when he stated: jjjtafy
“The less intense the motives, the less will the
:d
element’s natural tendency to violence come
ide
74
Proceedings
/ NovC
niW
'her fCa* c*'rec'*ves- As a result, war will be driven fur- he m r°m 'ts natural course, the political objective will ari(j “re ar|d more at variance with the aim of ideal war, acter ^ COn^'ct willseem increasingly political in charge
?tiniUlafIn0t'0ns l^e Pu^*'c ancl t*ie military must be ■Hsjgnjfec*' ^ a political objective in conflict appears to be lend t0 'l ant’ a nati°n’s military members and its citizens hecailSee *ess committed. The fear of failing is lessened ^Parent C consequences of that failure are not readily
as the political objectives in any conflict ^ship’t'1 becomes increasingly difficult for military lead- lhem >0 a(l°pt strategic military objectives to support anipie p SorTle cases, it may be impossible. The best ex- 'nstrUm SUC^ a case occurs when the military is used as an Create Cnt ^’Pl°macy- In 1978, Idi Amin publicly hfgancjne^to stop the departure of 300 U. S. citizens from releaSea , S. objective, to influence Idi Amin to
Politica] e .^eta’ne(I Americans, was a relatively limited astatj 'Objective. A U. S. naval task force was ordered to 'hat p n °hf'he coast of East Africa. This mere suggestion Gained6 m*§ht be used caused Idi Amin to release the sought' /''nicr'cans- No strategic military objectives were 'ary h^ln 'his conflict, and it only took the threat of mili- 'tiport Ce t0 accompHsh the political objective. What is cal ]ent to n0te is that force was used to influence politi- Plicaki e. *P- Strategic military objectives were not ap- Howe ln this case.
°f ware.Ver’ when military power is used in conflicts short ’11 is usually employed as a very fine instrument of
diplomacy. Only limited political objectives are sought, and the use of force has greater political than military significance. While strategic military objectives may or may not be applicable, the use of military power in diplomacy is generally designed to influence the will of a nation or its leadership. Those who use military power in diplomacy must, therefore, be the masters of nuance.
Military power that serves as an instrument in diplomacy may be used to influence the will of a nation to achieve the following political objectives:
- Modification of an opposing nation’s policies
- Political reinforcement of a government threatened externally or from within '
- Maintenance or establishment of a balance of power
- Maintenance of peace
Exceptions to this generality do exist. Diplomatic military force may be used to achieve more tangible objectives, such as to protect and/or extract U. S. nationals abroad and to provide humanitarian assistance. These are not as common as the first set of political objectives. However, they are necessary. A great deal of political significance is attached to these kinds of objectives.
A variety of military actions may be used to influence an opposing nation’s will with regard to these political objectives. Presence, peacekeeping, demonstrations, paramilitary operations, terrorism, and insurgency all have an impact on the will of targeted nations. For example, the United States supports the Contra insurgency in Nicaragua as one means of changing that nation’s will concerning its policies in El Salvador. In Lebanon, the 1983 terrorist bombing of the Marine barracks was not merely intended to cause attrition among opposing forces.
dinRs / Novembi
er 1986
75
but also to influence U. S. national will to withdraw its forces. However, the problem with categorizing these actions under the term “low-intensity conflict” is that the term implies something short of war, which is not true.
Terrorism and Insurgency as Instruments of Foreign Policy and War: Of all potential instruments of political reinforcement—or war—terrorism has caused U. S. policymakers the greatest concern. Terrorism has been used throughout history, but its effects have become more pronounced lately, because of advances in technology. The weapons available to the terrorist have become more lethal, and societies have become more vulnerable. The fragility of extremely technical infrastructures makes dependent societies much more susceptible to the effects of terrorism. This vulnerability provides weaker nations with a greater advantage when using terrorism—a cheap, low- risk action which often proves effective for sponsoring nations.
Although terrorism is mistakenly regarded as a style of warfare, it is nothing more than a tactic. But when it is used to pursue limited political objectives, the use of terrorism can have strategic implications. Terrorism has enabled nations to achieve limited political objectives beyond the capability of their other means, such as the normal political process or more conventional warfare. Cuba and Libya serve as examples of nations that have achieved greater world positions than they deserve through the use and sponsorship of terrorism.
vival of the terrorist is a victory in itself. 0f a
Terrorism is not only being used as an instrunae ^ nation’s foreign policy by which it can accompli ^ ^ political objectives, but also as an important part o ^ The latter is particularly evident in wars of nationa ^ quest in the Third World. In some cases, terrorist!! j^ern
nations has a more devastating effect than in more j
i may ^
initially to weaken the will of a nation prior to the a plishment of strategic military objectives. external
Insurgency, like terrorism, may be used by an g 0f nation as an instrument of foreign policy, as in th -t js U. S. support of the Contras in Nicaragua. Howeve ’^ difficult to control an insurgency when pursuing 0 ^njted ited political objectives. One of the reasons the ^ j. States supports the Contras is to change Nicaragua^ ovef-
societies. In these environments, terrorism may
icy in El Salvador. The Contras, however,
seek the<
throw of the Nicaraguan Government. The diffen-’n^
be-
the
“The less intense the motives, the less will the military element’s natural tendency to violence coincide with political directives.
As a result, war will be driven further from its natural course, the political objective will be more and more at variance with the aim of ideal war, and the conflict will seem increasingly political in character.”
—Karl von Clausewitz
tween political objectives often creates a dilemma a„ diplomat. It is much easier for an external nation to insurgency in a war of national conquest. change
The key to solving an insurgency problem ist0^ge the political environment that causes it. Once this cy occurs, the insurgency should dissipate. If the ms is an instrument of an external power, one of two ^ could occur after successful elimination of the ca ■ s> insurgency will break down into isolated terrorist or the existing force will have to assume a more tional or guerrilla character in order to continue. j0l) Insurgency and terrorism will not totally defeat * unless the government collapses. They will only jj0n or destroy the nation’s will. The total defeat ol atoa will normally require the insurgent force to transi more conventional one in order to accomplish s ^<5 military objectives, such as the destruction of thflt military forces and the control of its territory. W insurgency in Nicaragua weakened public supp° 0p tbe Somoza Government prior to 1979, the total defea uan government required the destruction of the ^anagua-
National Guard forces and the occupation
insur"
Terrorism is not only a cheap option for weak nations; it can also be an effective and often non-attributable action for stronger nations. By using surrogates, the nation sponsoring terrorism runs no risk to prestige, little risk of retaliation, and virtually no risk of escalation. As long as the connection between the sponsoring nation and the surrogate cannot be proved, the sponsor is insulated from the cost of the act.
Terrorism has its greatest potential for eroding a nation’s will and disrupting its social order. Ruthless acts of violence designed to induce fear among the innocent result in a loss of confidence in the government’s ability to protect the good order of society. No matter what the outcome of a terrorist attack, the fact that a terrorist attack occurred implies the government’s failure to protect society. Sur
Targeting National Will: To say that terrorism’ ^ gency, and a variety of other actions are some1ef- than war is a serious mistake. Because of their p° feet on the will of a nation, terrorism and insurgen^g0f come to be used as instruments of war, as well as foreign policy. By initially using terrorism an ^.jj 0f gency, a militarily weak nation can undermine the „t an opposing nation and facilitate the later accomp11 ^ p0i- of strategic military objectives. Vietnam serves naui. gnant example. By pursuing this strategy, North ^ p,
ief'
a nation of only 19 million, was able to frustrate a power of 200 million through the conquest of Sou ^1 nam. Terrorism and insurgency, along with conv .jjd actions, were used to weaken the will of both * j N°rtl! States and South Vietnam. Once this was achieve > t|i
the
Vietnam could destroy the forces remaining m lT0j,jec' and occupy its territory, thus reaching its politic® ^’s tive—the conquest of South Vietnam. North Vie ^0 strategy for the war reflected the writings of wia ’
76
Proceedings
/ Noven,ber
Said that;
ITlnr --'v
Wl -f re§ular warfare. Whlle U. s
months.
To
VanS7 ^at terrorism, insurgency, and a than ^ other actions are something less War is a serious mistake.
War muan in/er'or force waging a ruthless and protracted to niorSt ac^'eve political power before it can adapt itself naiT> as 1 ^ *eadership perceived the conflict in Viet- ted ess ^lan total war, the North Vietnamese commit- ^'etnam’'e*VeS t0 war' helping to maintain South to theS Sovereignty, the United States sought to signal COniniuCOrnrnUn*St^-bloc nations that further advances of tive di(jniSrn Would not be tolerated. This political objec- V'etna n0t See^ l^e elimination of the threat to South Essentj , and h limited the military effort accordingly, the 0n, the ground war was confined to the south, and Action Strate8'c military objective sought was the de- Vie(nar^,°^enemy ^orces *n this area. By contrast, North hide, S P°i'tical objective was of far greater magni- of thise^ore’ its military effort matched the magnitude of win P°htical objective and sought the destruction both tertito ^ °f enemy forces, and the occupation of enemy
United shC ^'etnam War a low-intensity conflict? The ParrieSetates Wa8ed it as one. However, the North Viet- The r^lewe(l it as a full-fledged war. eXartipleCent ^robing of Libya serves as another clear *° target °v! *10w t^le United States used its military power tyth an . ae wih of an opposing nation in conflict. Faced attach lacreasing number of Libyan-sponsored terrorist Political ^ea8an Administration sought two limited ship of °hjectives: to demonstrate that further sponsored (0err°rist operations would be increasingly costly °f terr0C°nv'nce Moammar Gadhafi to discontinue his use °rder t0'Srn as an instrument of Libyan foreign policy. In ehtarv accornplish these political objectives, the U. S. °Peratj adoPted targets associated with Libyan terrorist ^i??ivn,S’ SUch as the command and control facility at ar*d the'li ^arrachs, the terrorist facilities at Benghazi, Tfipoij. ■ ^ transport aircraft on the military side of the ‘ties. NairP0rt, all known to support Libyan terrorist activ- tane0Usavy ^'6Es and Air Force F- Ills conducted simul- causin„ !Uns on the five targets selected, hitting all and
, 'VhJheraVy damage° ‘he ar or not these military actions have contributed t‘ves j Ccorriplishment of the established political objec- Eave l, ^et to be seen. However, these actions seem to sP°na a Potent effect on Gadhafi. Known Libyan- Past terrorism has decreased significantly during the
cw tnr.r..u„
Totcesy Implications: It is far more likely that military %ns he used in actions that support foreign policy When an 'n §eneral war-
shoq 0j. Using military power either in war or conflicts WaL the United States must be able to determine
clearly its own political objectives as well as those of its opponent. The political objectives adopted must be in keeping with U. S. interests as defined in a national strategy. The responsibility for determining clear objectives and sound strategy rests with the NSC. This organization must be capable of effectively coordinating the policy efforts of both the State and Defense departments as well as others.
U. S. political objectives should be evaluated against the opposing nation’s in order to assess the military effort necessary. The United States may have to adopt political objectives of increased magnitude and proportionate strategic military objectives when confronting an opposing nation with great political objectives, When used in conflicts short of war, the military must recognize that it is an instrument of foreign policy and accomplish the required objectives within the established parameters, using political sensitivity. In any case, however, the relationship between military and political leadership may well be much closer in conflicts short of war than in war itself.
Military leadership must determine the means necessary to accomplish the military objective. However, no one military capability should become tied to actions short of war, despite the arguments of those who advocate low- intensity conflict as the sole purview of special operations forces. Of note is the fact that the F-l 11. a nuclear delivery means, was used to counteract Libyan terrorism. Limiting the means will limit the response. Effective military action as an instrument of diplomacy will require that the military be capable of protecting or attacking a wide variety of targets that might influence national will. Military forces must also be capable of physically closing with and destroying opposing forces. While this statement might seem simplistic, it is more difficult in conflicts short of war. In war, a military may rely on a wider array of supporting arms to destroy opposing forces.
In conflicts short of war, it is more difficult to use artillery and close-air support to destroy the terrorist and insurgent. In most cases, the only way to do so is to close physically with these forces. In conflicts short of war, it may be necessary to employ military force in a more precise manner.
We should never assume that the use of terrorism, insurgency, or any other action is something less than war. These actions may be an important part of war, being used to weaken the will of a nation. When involved in such a war, political leadership must ensure the will of its own nation is protected. The solution to protecting a nation against the effects of terrorism and insurgency lies in mobilizing and galvanizing the nation’s will against them.
Major Linn graduated from VMI in 1973 with a bachelor of arts degree in history. He served as a platoon commander during the evacuation of Saigon and Phnom Penh, ds a recon company commander, with the Marine Barracks in Puerto Rico, and as an operations officer with the 9th MAB. He is a graduate of the Amphibious Warfare School, where he served as an instructor in terrorism counteraction and counterinsurgency. He is currently serving in the service plans division at Headquarters, Marine Corps. He has been previously published in the Murine Corps Gazette and Defense and Foreign AJfairs.
'nSs /
November 1986
77