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Plant,
this
ar>d expected to displace more than 65,000
tons
ttext^°V*e*S w*^ soon own world’s fier Conventi°nal takeoff and landing car- wj-y when its new carrier goes to sea. thread lmPress>ve5 this carrier isn’t a major a Co *° the U. S. Navy’s big flattops, but Py of the all-purpose Nimitz could be.
IJ ^lng out of the sprawling Nikolayev shipyards in -I,e Sea l°oms the formidable shape and
ba^bonructUre of a class of warship that has been the Po\ver ^ ,°* U- S. Navy’s capability of projecting an§led c] ashore and at sea since 1941. Replete with an S'°n Dla £C^’ cataPuhs, arresting gear, a nuclear propula>rcraft"' neW conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) NaVy \v\KtTler will provide the ever-expanding Soviet CredenCe . 311 °^ensive punch. This capability will lend ’ag gj0b ,° Ibe linkage between the Soviet Navy’s evolv- the doctrine and its worldwide national interests: naval fbr1 to provide theatre air defense of its own “vitap»eS whHe projecting power in Third World areas ItnbUe i 1Ilterest to the hegemonic Soviet state. aas with a sense of naval deja vu, the United States 0PeratiOr^SjSec^ a Perplexing assimilation of U. S. naval Serial „a tactics and platforms into the evolving Soviet °Perationn ConcePt of combat at sea. From amphibious a'rcraft cS’ -° Ur,derway replenishment, and now to CTOL SaHce asmers' the Soviet Navy is continuing its renais- ^ake its §l°hal naval power by taking concrete steps to ^r°rn (be0rces at sea both sustainable and survivable. ^°viet f] ' N- force planning perspective, this sort of C°unterjntery only serves to complicate the problem of Whiie fb^C unPrecedented Soviet naval buildup. navy to m 6 Soviets continue to design and build their eet long-range global objectives, the battle over tW the large-deck carrier versus the small-deck carrier rages on unabated in the United States. Military reformists argue that, because of naval warfare’s changing nature, it is imperative that our naval air arm’s offensive capability be diversified over smaller, supposedly more cost-effective, and, therefore, more numerous platforms throughout the fleet:
“It is essential that we begin to reduce our dependence on the large-deck carrier. The national interests of the United States call for a global maritime strategy which, in turn, requires flexible and diversified naval forces with offensive power. If we forego this diversification and continue to depend almost entirely on the large- deck aircraft carrier, we are selling out our maritime defense for the future.”1
Some reformists have taken the argument to the extreme, citing Soviet tactical doctrine as hard evidence that the capital ship of the future is not the large-deck aircraft carrier—or even the small-deck carrier—but the nuclear- powered attack submarine. Conversely, the traditionalists argue that the large-deck aircraft carrier is the sole difference between our offensive naval capability and that of the Soviet Union. They factor the need for carriers down to the fundamental principle that without control of the airspace over the battle zone, the uncertainties and risks on the surface are unacceptable to the field or fleet commander.2 Armed with combat-tested (World War II, Korea, Vietnam) and mishap-tested (Enterprise [CVN- 65], Forrestal [CV-59]) facts and figures, they contend that the large-deck carrier is designed not for “bigness,” but for survivability and for an offensive striking power capable of taking the fight to the enemy—and winning. To the carrier battle group commander, the decisive issue is air superiority: “the sine qua non for area control.”3 Armed with these facts and seeing where the line is drawn between contending advocates in the ‘ ‘great carrier debate,” what can U. S. force planners see as viable alternatives—within the constraints of competition for scarce
What about carrier survivability in a nuclear war-at-s£ scenario? Some argue that because the Soviets carry nU clear weapons on all types of warships, they have alrea ; made the decision to use them: ‘ ‘They carry them becau^ they plan to use them. We carry them only in case might have to use them.”6 These opponents of big-c311^ construction also point out that when we concentrate primary naval offensive striking power into 15 cam hulls we are playing into the Soviets’ hands.7 But whie remains obvious that no ship can survive a direct hit tr a nuclear weapon, it is safe to assume that, because their high degree of maneuverability and the known cit lar error probabilities and yields of Soviet delivery terns, carriers can survive in a theatre nuclear warfare vironment. Nevertheless, it is equally safe to assume the tactical commander will have to consider that ^oUL surviving, [the carrier] would be out of action for 3 1 after a nuclear near miss.”8 . s
Vulnerability: The argument over vulnerability ra another set of nearsighted points of view, which lose short-term validity when put into proper context. ^ question, large-deck aircraft carriers are vulnerable to tection from a variety of modem state-of-the-art re naissance platforms. Conversely, the same techno that has incredible powers of detection and discrimi” . of forces at sea is also subject to an equally sophists ^ set of countermeasures—to deceive, confuse, decoy -1
disrupt efforts to locate high-value units. For Nimitz-class carrier or a Knox (FF-1052)-class
resources? Should we scrap the concept of the large-deck carrier in deference to the smaller and supposedly more cost-effective vertical short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) carriers? Should we reduce our emphasis on the large-deck carrier in favor of diversification? Or should we diversify laterally by augmenting our large-deck carrier force with the 60,000-ton V/STOL carrier (CVV)? What about the concept of the sea control ship articulated by force planners in the early 1970s? (The concept was to deploy the large-deck carriers out of the reach of cruise missiles and replace them with 17,000-ton, low-value ships with a complement of 14 helicopters and three V/STOL aircraft that at the same time had some defensive capability.)4 Will technological breakthroughs in V/STOL aviation render CTOL flight operations obsolete?
These questions will not fade away. They raise issues of survivability, vulnerability, and cost-effectiveness that, over the years, will continue to require insightful, honest, and careful analysis to ensure that the “right” navy is being built to support our national military strategy of forward collective security.
Basing Air Power at Sea: The Issues
Survivability: The issue of survivability has become so clouded and myopic that force planners, “armchair strategists,” and even some Navy tacticians have lost sight of the fact, however unsettling, that we will lose ships (and carriers) in a global war at sea with the Soviet Union. The prospect of battle losses must be faced in either a conventional or a nuclear confrontation at sea. The solutions to this problem are not all driven by technology. Tenacity, courage, and sound judgment—essential traits of the good battle group commander in minimizing his losses while inflicting fatal damage upon his adversary—can be far better “force multipliers” than all of the amenities that modern-day technology can provide. But survivability can be designed into ships as well, as the Nimitz (CVN-68)- class supercarriers, with more than 2,000 watertight compartments, demonstrate.
The ability of Navy ships built during the past five years to absorb and dissipate energy resulting from a cruise missile or torpedo attack is well-known, but many aspects of carrier survivability remain classified. There is enough open-source information, however, to at least pose the premise that U. S. nuclear-powered carriers (CVNs) are probably the most survivable ships ever built:
“Decks and hull are of extra-strong, high-tensile steel to limit the impact of semi-armor-piercing bombs. Apart from the longitudinal bulkheads, there are twenty-three watertight transverse bulkheads . . . and ten firewall bulkheads. Foam devices for fire-fighting are very well developed, and pumping equipment is excellent, a 15° list being correctable in 20 minutes. Thirty damage-control teams are available at all times. Nimitz-c\'dss ships can withstand three times the severe pounding taken by the Essex-class aircraft carriers in 1944-45, and they can take impacts and shock waves in the same proportion. They are being equipped with Kevlar armor over vital areas during refits.”5
either frigate-
‘technology has made size a relatively unimportant rion in the art of detection.”9 Once detected, h°^ . critics argue that the huge radar cross-section create . Nimitz-class carrier makes her a certain target for ^ speed terminal guidance cruise missiles. Today s (and carriers), however, are being designed to dea that problem: ,
u'nS W3”1
“Those who want us to have small, cheap ship1\\e&- us to have ships that cannot deal with that pr° Cruise missiles, once fired, must be dealt with tn ^ sophisticated weapons systems. One either gets ^ the terminal guidance systems on the missile and ^ it think the target is elsewhere, so it will miss t . get, or one has to shoot that missile down. Ned”1' ^ of those things comes easy or comes cheap- vVe [of those technological problems] are soluble, 3 have solutions at hand.”10
. . cfd'se
The aura surrounding warship vulnerability t0 missile attack glows brighter whenever these weaP0 js- successfully used in combat. From the sinking 01 gtyx raeli destroyer Eliat in 1967 by four Soviet-m3”0 ^ by cruise missiles to the sinking of HMS Sheffield in Jg a French-made Exocet cruise missile, these comb” ^ alties have prompted analytical articles suggestidf’ “the day of the surface warship might be over.
This may not be the most sophisticated of analoffo^aft to date no one has suggested the day of the military -|6. is over because of the surface-to-air guided Rarely does one hear a call to stop products ^ million tanks because they can be destroyed by a
with a bazooka-type weapon or by a ground-launched missile.”12 In short, no ship is 100% safe; but there are enough empirical data to show that ‘‘ships at sea are less vulnerable than land targets, and big ships are less vulnerable than small ships.”13
Cost-Effectiveness: Critics of the large-deck carrier argue that the numerous and favorable cost-effectiveness studies conducted by naval force planners are all based on the assumption that “naval warfare will not change appreciably for many years.”14 Naval warfare is indeed changing, but no faster than our (and our adversaries’) ability to adapt to advances in technology. Technology too often drives the issue of the cost-effectiveness of the large-deck carrier in the wrong direction, and causes visionary leaders and tacticians to look so far into the future that they lose sight of the tasks and threats confronting our Navy in the more immediate future.
Contrary to popular belief, construction and outfitting of large-deck aircraft carriers do not consume large percentages of the Navy’s shipbuilding budget, nor do they channel funds away from the other requirements necessary to build and sustain a truly global naval force. For example, for each fiscal year between 1962 and 1976, an average of $168 million of shipbuilding money was spent on carrier procurement. This represented only 7% of the shipbuilding money spent during the period and 1% of total Department of the Navy expenditures.15 Likewise, with the Navy’s new approach of multiyear procurement, huge savings in both costs and time are being realized in the construction of the Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) and George Washington (CVN-73). These savings manifest themselves in four specific areas: reduced set-up costs, enhanced productivity, multiple purchases of material, and reduced escalation in the cost of labor.16 Ironically, since construction of the Abraham Lincoln and George Washington began earlier than first planned, the Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) will be delivered approximately 12 months ahead of schedule.
Beyond these savings, the multi-CVN approach has had a favorable and widespread impact on the national economy . Large-scale spending for these two ships is peaking during the fiscal year 1984-87 period.17 The sheer size of the contracts guarantees far-reaching economic effects. For the Theodore Roosevelt, the Abraham Lincoln, and the George Washington, approximately 176,500 tons of structural steel will be used, as well as:
“Three million pounds of aluminum; nine million pounds of weld metal; more than 2,640 miles of electrical cable; and more than three billion electronic tubes, transistors, and diodes. Many of the more complicated items needed, moreover, require five to six years for their manufacture, testing, and delivery.”18
57
ible
si#
cap3'
or diversification but in a balanced force structure
United States and its allies in peace and if jn against hostile military attempts to deny such u^
denial and adJlto
f0rce
If a major diversification of our present carrl£etital structure is to take place, it will require a fun. shift in our maritime strategy—which, in turn, is ^
ufl'
sea
The Navy’s economic impact analysis projected that $4.5 billion is being spent with subcontractors, involving a total of 296,000 jobs. The subcontracted material for the Abraham Lincoln and George Washington has been awarded to more than 2,000 subcontractors in 43 states.19
Lessons Learned?
One way to determine the proper type and number of carriers is to study the lessons learned during past combat engagements. The Falklands Conflict presents a classic case of the conflicting opinions that are generated by individual attempts to fit the more obvious lessons learned into an already established, steadfast, and unalterable point of view. Considered by some to be a “freak of history,” the Falklands Conflict provided a unique environment for study of the difficult questions facing today’s force planners. Because of the Royal Navy’s unfortunate decline in the years prior to the conflict, Britain “for the hundredth time in her history,” had to be reminded that there is always an unexpected military threat that requires flexible defense planning.20 The lessons learned from this conflict in the areas of ship design, point defense, airborne early warning, powerful air cover, and electronic countermeasures have tended to overshadow the more pertinent force planning issue—the size of the platforms on which effective naval air power should be based.
Proponents of a purely sea-control navy argued that “the British ‘Achilles’ Heel’ in the Falklands was not that her carriers were small, but that there were too few. They only had two of them.”21 These spokesmen contend that the U. S. Navy has placed too much fighting capability in a small number of ships (to include the large-deck carriers) and that we face the same danger that the British did in the Falklands. To the sea-control advocate, the solution is simple:
“A sea control navy, however, should be composed of large numbers of small carriers and of large numbers of even smaller ships, each with a few vertical takeoff aircraft and helicopters. This would distribute air power around the fleet and increase the probability that enough would survive to do the job. Thus, only after a maritime power like the United States designs its navy with sea control in mind can it ask what modifications need to be made in order to give that navy enough capability to project power ashore as well.”22
However, from a purely warfighting perspective, the small British carriers, with their complement of V/STOL aircraft, provided inadequate control of the airspace over the battle zone. This denied the amphibious force commander much-needed security and flexibility in the amphibious objective area, to carry out a relatively unimpeded landing and ground campaign. The implication rings through loud and clear:
“A modem carrier must be sizable enough to carry not only fighters and bombers, but also substantial electronic countermeasures to support the aircraft. The British aircraft carriers were simply too small to operate with this necessary complement of aircraft- desired platform characteristics are best obtained >n large deck carrier.”23
For U. S. naval force planners, this means that °ur^t craft carriers should be large enough to operate the altC^ (airborne early warning, fighter, electronic warfare- antisubmarine warfare) that are the essential ingredien maintaining control of the seas and the airspace ab°ve. fS battle zone. Not surprisingly, current Soviet naval wr . seem to be reaffirming this principle when they sU°? : that the Falklands Conflict demonstrated the serious tations of their own sea-based V/STOL aviation- Soviet writers appear to be using the Falklands Con ^ further justification for the .development of a CTO ^ craft carrier, particularly for use in areas where lana'°4 aircraft operations would be limited or impossible-
Recommendation
The Approach: The crux of the problem lies not in
of carrying out the objectives and goals as articuia ^ our national Maritime Strategy. Coupled with talS0f anced approach must be adherence to certain Prin^gneuiy war-at-sea and projection of power ashore: To send ^ ships to the bottom and put bombs on target, piataI1d must be designed for defense-in-depth, survivabih y-^ the innate ability to bring massive firepower to '3eafsSj0n: viewed in terms of the U. S. Navy’s primary 1131
. bythe
“[To] ensure the unimpeded use of the seasne£(j be
war this mission also includes active enemy of the use of the seas, harbors, ana a^jeto airspace. ... To achieve this the navy must be ajr project power under the sea, on the surface, in-£{s above, and over land. U. S. CV (all-purpose) c provide aircraft capable of all four. ’ ’
bly linked to our Navy’s primary role. Such a s likely for an island nation critically dependent on^ ^£y- and its lines of communication for national survi ^ 0uf ertheless, controlled and balanced diversification naval striking power is a rational and tactically c^cc approach to force planning that should continue- planners should not lose sight of the fact that 0 -veiy naval platform is versatile enough to carry out e f 0uf the myriad of operational scenarios possible 0rategy’ maritime strategy. If we are to have a truly globa (tbe
then we must plan for a naval force structure to' thal
operational commitments that flow naturally 11 strategy. The uncertainty and risk to our natio . ued10 in light of the Soviet threat must be carefully ^ c0ll#f find the right balance between what is neede fill'dII-
the threat and what is feasible from the Pr°S standpoint.
Tli
Coef-hoice: With these planning and programming recoaints 'n mind, what should our naval force planners 0Ur, mend for the future size of our carriers and mix of clud'3tt £ ^rouP forces? Many scholars and tacticians, in- temm h Sccretary °f the Navy John Lehman, have at- ran ■to address this question by analyzing the wide- gen | Possibilities and combinations offered by the four Powe ^ accePted fundamental alternatives of basing air 60 onn31 SCa: the 90,000-ton CV/CVN; the 40,000- to P°tt sh't0n CVV; the 20’00°-to 35,000-ton V/STOL sup- 20 OnoT’ an^ the vertical-only platforms normally below One can find appealing arguments for each
and the level of today’s advanced technology, “the evidence still seems overwhelmingly in favor of the Nimitz- class carrier of 90,000 tons as the optimum size and design for putting air capability at sea.”28
For the advocate of the small-deck carrier, however, all is not lost. The Navy is pressing on with a controlled and balanced diversification of our offensive naval power by continuing to build our amphibious ships in such a way that they can double as “small-deck” carriers capable of operating V/STOL aircraft.29 The new multipurpose amphibious assault ship (LHD) under construction is a popular and welcome step toward diversification that will not
P. MASON)
ebate,” there can be no absolute answer to the 0weve whether carriers should be large or small. r’ based on commonsense inputs from the fleet
^Ore n Platforms, and the Navy would be considerably fleet exikle if all of these ships could be included in the T'herg
StPal] . are also several attractive European designs of ticUlarIvCk Carr‘ers that could do quite adequate jobs, par- ^e Vq/ ln the area of antisubmarine warfare.27 But given Artier ,|tr'es data available to both sides of the “great ?»es ~
The British gave up CTOL carriers in favor of the Invincible-class V/STOL carriers. In the South Atlantic, however, the smaller carrier had a rough time in the heavy winter seas and—operating with only one other small carrier—failed to maintain local air superiority in combat.
and Na'*1
June
dsW
!3Adm T. H. Moorer, USN (Ret), and A. J. Cottrell, “ECM in the
Proves Its Point the Hard Way,” Military Electronics!Countermeasures,
1982, pp. 48-49. d Isl^
24LCdr R. N. Papworth, USN, “Soviet Naval Reactions to the Fa Conflict,” Naval War College Review, March-April 1985, pp- 25Lehman, p. 15.
26Ibid., p. 54.
21 J. F. Lehman, Jr., “The 600-Ship Navy,” Proceedings, January 28Ibid., p. 38.
29Thomas, p. 22. . to0t
30U. S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress (Washing pp. 159-160. woodC,iffS’
3iE. B. Potter and C. W. Nimitz, Sea Power: A Naval History (Eng e NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1960). p 73"^ ‘
32E. B. Potter, Nimitz (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 197 )
37-
Commander Luti received a bachelor of arts degree in history 1 , e pi j . • • . from Say -re
-■ “ 'UUI ill Y V ‘ •■J.iiife ----------- rriers I
the EA-3B aircraft from several West Coast can ,urcr^:
• EA-°n -
as a tour in VAQ-131 flying ECM support missions in the E ents from an East Coast carrier. Commander Luti’s shore assig
Sup*1
pn-
only enhance our amphibious capability, but will also provide us with a superb platform from which to operate the next generation of V/STOL aircraft. Building toward a force of 11 LHDs is a logical and worthy goal.30
The Rationale
As noted earlier, some reformists think the capital ship of the future is not the aircraft carrier but the nuclear- powered attack submarine. This is a moot point as modem naval warfare no longer relies on the outdated concept of the capital ship but rather on a finely tuned integration of surface, subsurface, and air-capable platforms working together. Yesterday’s dreadnoughts should not be hauled out of the historical analogy graveyard for use during the perennial hunting season on large, complex, and expensive yet vital weapon systems. Likewise, those who continue the harangue that a Nimitz-class carrier cannot take and hold enemy-held territory or that a nuclear-attack submarine cannot protect a transatlantic convoy from Backfire and Badger attacks are missing the point: defeating the Soviet Union in a major conflict at sea will require a balanced, forward-deployed, and aggressive navy capable of exercising control of the seas and projecting power wherever and whenever needed.
Conclusion
The sights and sounds emanating from the flight deck of the first operational Soviet CTOL aircraft carrier will no doubt be faintly reminiscent of the growing pains we experienced with our fledgling flattops in the 1920s and 1930s. The Soviet Navy’s new chief, Admiral Vladimir N. Cher- navin, is well aware that the U. S. Navy has experienced more than 60 years of carrier construction, operation, and combat to reach its current level of expertise and sophistication in carrier warfare. Will the Soviet naval leadership, over the next 50 years, become as adept as the United States at carrier warfare? How will their carrier force structure evolve? Will the sequential progression from the Moskva class, to the Kiev class, and now to the new CTOL-class carrier eventually be carried out to its next logical step: the construction of an all-purpose carrier rivaling our Nimitz class?
It is conceivable that future generations of U. S. naval officers will one day be faced with a threat similar to the one posed by the carrier-dominant forces of the Japanese Imperial Navy at the battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942. A momentary look at those two fateful days, during the first carrier-against-carrier battle in history—in which all combat losses were inflicted from the air and none of the opposing ships ever came within sight of each other—may help put the future Soviet threat in perspective.31 Even more ominous may be the latter-day reconstruction of the tense moment for Admiral Jack Fletcher and his staff as they huddled in the flag plot spaces of the USS Yorktown (CV-5) and waited for the news over the radio of the results of the first dive bombing attack on the Japanese carrier forces.
The voice of then-Lieutenant Commander Robert
ff
Dixon, the commanding officer of the SBD squadron 0 the USS Lexington (CV-2), came over the air loud aI^ clear, emotionally describing the sinking of the carr Shoho: “Scratch one flattop! Dixon to carrier. Scratch °n* flattop!”32 The implication is ominous. In a confrontah0 at sea in the next century with the world’s next Cl carrier-capable navy, Commander Dixon’s triump 3 declaration could conceivably be repeated—this time I different carrier aviator in a much different langua& j “Izglazhivayetye odna avianosets!” does not lose any its dramatic impact in the translation.
*LCdr T. Wood Parker, Jr., USN, “Paradigms, Conventional Wisdom Warfare,” Proceedings, April 1983, pp. 30-35. .
2Adm T. B. Hayward, USN, ‘‘Thank God for Sitting Ducks,” Proceeding > 1982, pp. 23-25.
3Ibid., p. 23. vnrkTW
“Adm E. R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN (Ret), On Watch (New York: The New to<
Book Company, 1976) pp. 75-76. <, fjava>
!Jean Labayle-Couhat, Combat Fleets of the World (Annapolis, MD: U- 1 Institute Press, 1986) p. 600. July
6Capt G. O’Rourke, USN (Ret), “CVN’s Forever! Forever?” Proceeding ■ 1982, pp. 20 -26.
7Ibid., p. 25. Hi||S and
8John F. Lehman, Jr., Aircraft Carriers: The Real Choices (Beverly London: Sage Publications, 1978) p. 43.
’Hayward, p. 24. Rationale."
10V. C. Thomas, Jr., “The Case for the CVN’s I: A Common Sense Sea Power, June 1982, p. 20. apo^er'
nE. L. Prina, “The Case for the CVN’s II: The Debate in Congress, e June 1982, p. 27.
,2Ibid., p. 27.
13Thomas, p. 20.
14Parker, p. 35.
15Lehman, p. 46.
16Thomas, p. 19.
,7Ibid.
18Ibid., p. 16.
19Ibid., p. 19. dD>nd<>n:
20M. Hastings and S. Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands (New York an W. W. Norton and Company, 1983) p. 322. ds
21 Adm S. Turner, USN (Ret), “The Unobvious Lessons of the Falk an Proceedings, April 1983, p. 55 " Ibid., pp. 55-56.
1986a P-
,985).
Tb«
Citadel and a master’s degree in international relations fronl jSs: gina College. He has had a tour in VQ-1 flying electronicreC0
missions in
tl3V
included a tour at the Naval Academy as Flag Lieutenant to j dcp^ tendent. A graduate of the Naval War College, he is curren y ment head in VAQ-135, a fleet EA-6B squadron.