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It has been more than 40 years since the last naval engagement large enough to be called a fleet action—the Battle of Leyte Gulf was fought in October 1944. However, in recent years, the Soviet Union has built a blue-water navy. And while all sane men pray that there will never be a need for another naval engagement, it may be prudent to contemplate the possible nature of engagements between future fleets, and the types of weapons that would be useful.
Before and during World War II, naval engagements were almost always fought near land, where the opposing fleets located each other during some other operation and in a restricted passage. It now appears that satellite reconnaissance and other intelligence sources will provide future fleet commanders with complete data on the location and composition of the opposing fleet. Though there will always be some degree of confusion owing to decoys, merchant vessels, and communications problems, future fleet commanders may be fortunate enough to plan their attacks with reasonably reliable data. If this is even partially true, it would be a great tactical advantage to have aircraft and missile systems that could out-range the enemy. In short, it would be nice to hit him before he could hit you.
There is much to be said for aircraft that can launch antishipping missiles. For one thing, aircraft can do other things when there is no fleet engagement in prospect. In fact, our aircraft have done other things for more than 40 years. Fighters have been used for fighter sweeps, escort, combat air patrol, and as deck-launched interceptors. Attack aircraft have been used for strikes against land targets, armed reconnaissance, interdiction, close air support, surface surveillance, aerial mining, and as aerial tankers. It is difficult to conceive of pure missile systems that would provide such flexibility.
There is room for honest disagreement on the amount of data that will be available from satellite and other reconnaissance systems. However, it must be assumed that ships will continue to present large radar targets, and are normally good infrared targets. They also put distinctive sound signatures into the water, and they must radiate frequently to control their own aircraft and other forces. It is much more difficult to apply “stealth” techniques to ships than to aircraft because of
the ships’ large signatures and their relatively slow speeds. For example, if the position of a ship is determined, she will be within, perhaps, 15 nautical miles of that location 30 minutes later; an aircraft can move hundreds of miles in a halfhour.
This reasoning suggests that it may be difficult to hide ships. Defensively, it will probably be more productive to introduce confusion and false targets with decoys, electronic devices, augmented signatures on small ships, and by ship formations and tactics that appear random to enemy sensors.
Most modern sensor systems operate at electromagnetic frequencies approaching line-of-sight propagation. This includes radar, very-high-frequency and ultrahigh-frequency radio, and the associated countermeasures. Thus, we need to be familiar with the approximate radar line- of-sight range from various antenna altitudes. Of course, ducting can affect predicted ranges—especially at low antenna heights—but knowing the expected values is useful.
Assuming that each side will employ decoys and other means of generating false targets, there is a need to bring some type of control system within line-of- sight range of the potential target ships. Line-of-sight range is defined as the distance to the radar horizon from various antenna heights (or altitudes). One frequently used approximation is: R = 1.24VH, where R = range in nautical miles and H = antenna height in feet.
Typical values are:
H (ft) | R (nm) |
100 | 12.4 |
1,000 | 39.2 |
10,000 | 124.0 |
20,000 | 175.4 |
30,000 | 214.8 |
35,000* | 232.0* |
40,000 | 248.0 |
50,000 | 277.3 |
60,000 | 303.7 |
70,000 | 328.1 |
*In the following discussion, the line-of-sight from 35,000 feet is rounded to 230 nautical miles. |
reach line-of-sight range l
get ships. Future air-launctieo sS
For example, an airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft at 35,000 feet can see the radar horizon out to about 230 nautical miles. If a surface radar target is
It is
large, it can be detected at that ran=e'|jne. also the limiting range for reliable , of-sight communications and data^ fer with the parent ship. (Of course^l or can be transferred by another airc ^ by a satellite as a relay station ) (()
wise, the AEW aircraft is in posit'0” detect electronic radiations from s
,urft>ce
vessels within about 230 nautica Although AEW aircraft normally ^ not made much use of passive dt £' capabilities, future AEW aircraft s^r be equipped to exploit this type °*s(aCk Consider line-of-sight from the ,000 feet ,s The P'1, 230 nautt^
,o perf"
pilot’s point of view at 35,OW load of antishipping missiles. 1 ^
needs to get within about 230 n miles of his assigned targets the following functions: t with3
► Confirm the presence of a targe few sweeps of his own radar. t „0pic
i elects
countermeasures to degrade the
► Be in position to use various ^
ship’s defensive systems.
iSjleS
- Be in position to track his ovvn ,jg up' en route to their targets and Pr°v dated target data to his missiles-^ fl^p
- Receive and record data from ^^pt missiles—possibly damage ass jn a information from the later missl '
salvo.
► Confirm enemy target ships radiations.
from
the'r
fund"
ion«
Taken together, the preceding ”
show that several advantages aC° c[,ing attacking pilot if he can delay aoy,sjgh' his missiles until he is within line
range.
The previous example,
USingaa<!
tude of 35,000 feet, represents crafh^ value for current and future ai nilbll pecially those designed for reast)0H^ endurance. If future attack aircra supef’ employ “super-cruise” (exten crpise sonic cruise), it is probable 1 ^j|| be
altitudes of perhaps 70,000 'ct ,0f-si^{ feasible. However, the radar lme from 70,000 feet is only 328 psig*1' miles. (That is, the radar antenniJ increases as the square root ot altitude.)
Obviously, it is uw**-- , [e
preaching attack aircraft be . f tar :tother>P ched 0f
kill ap
desirable to (|ie>
missiles should have a rang® 200 nautical miles if a piIot
in
wants read
hi”-2
lease his missiles shortly a^irijng ^ line-of-sight range and con • target. where 11
Figure 1 illustrates a cas
124
ProcccdinRs
/ oct®1
,bcr1
a-
Cal mileoCraft ‘s stationed out 230 nauti- *ack. (■[', ln the direction of probable at- 'glire t e enemy attacks from the left.) jhe enCpa^ds details for a case in which Cvel as / attack pilot descends to sea '“cts (|j as his passive receiver detactic ^ aircraft on station. With tect'°n 0f’hthe enemy pilot can delay deCal rnj]e !"s flight until he is 230 nauti- ■ A det thc AEW aircraft, gainst sik^ analysis of defending [. hfiectiv - 3n attack has shown that: es Well6 'ntercepts require AEW seri nece
f UeCk-la'J VWVI
rcw.. punched interceptor systems >hiPDr0re !ke attackers launch their .,0llrse, j ® missiles. The solution, of .e direc . 0 have fighters, on station in '>r^er °n a I*0 °* lhe Pr°bable attack- di.r,gUres iSed radar picket ships- f..s,anccs • ar|d 2 allude to rather large
'ilUrg j ,n future fleet engagements. ’ an extension of the previous
concepts, shows that the opposing AEW stations will have passive detections on each other when the force centers are separated by a nominal 920 nautical miles!
It would be nice if there were some fundamental aircraft parameters that could be used to establish radius requirements for the next attack aircraft. Unfortunately, there is no simple way to ensure that our side will have greater attack radius capability than the enemy. The radius capability will evolve as other desirable parameters are established and as various compromises are worked out. However, it is easy to contemplate a required combat radius of 1,000 nautical miles if the fleet commanders have reasonable data on the opponents.
It is also easy to contemplate antishipping missiles with warheads of 500 pounds or more, because well-compart- mented ships can take considerable punishment. To destroy an enemy force of 20 ships could require six missiles per ship (120 missiles) when allowances are made for unreliable missiles, missiles shot down during their attack, and possible diversion of some missiles by false targets and/or by poor targeting. A 120- missile attack could be launched with 20-
When does the Hawkeye become the bull’s-eye? Tomorrow’s fleet engagements will be launched from such great distances that more than one AEW aircraft may be needed to be on station at the same time. Because the Soviets will develop AEW aircraft for the same purposes, we will need an air-to-air antiradiation missile to counter them. But what do we do when the Soviets develop their counter to our counter?
30 aircraft, each carrying four to six rather large missiles.
No discussion of future warfare at sea would be complete without mentioning the possible use of nuclear warheads—a well-defined use against military targets with little or no danger to civilians. It is at least possible that a losing fleet might resort to nuclear weapons to try and salvage a victory.
Nuclear depth charges would be a handy way to dispose of enemy submarines—especially if antisubmarine torpe-
125
126
it often toiped0'
is:
at
his
hav'e
en-
Proceedings
does were not effective. (Consider ^ torpedo problems that plagued ■ forces early in World War II.) 'n event, fleet commanders should an pate the possible use of nuclear wejj^|a. This suggests ship formations wit tively wide spacing. While such is consistent with various forms ot . . tion, decoys, and false targets complicates defense against ^
air missiles make it possible to < “self-escort” air-to-air missile sc0rt the next attack aircraft. (Such se nS systems were not feasible w*ienC[fa were the only air-to-air weaP°nSej0ped self-escort missile system is de nal for the next attack aircraft, a ^ a\- payload would be required in a„d ready appears to be a relatively lae complex aircraft. y[ be
Many future missile exchanges [f forward quadrant missile exchang ^ the missiles work, a friendly aircr e[1. have a significant range advantage sure that the friendly missiles st own missiles. Most fighter P‘ °vVjH be mostly ignored this, but there many cases where both aircrat killed in a missile exchange range ensure that we have a far superl0^ sys- capability in our air-to-air rn’SS'tjsfac' terns. (There will not be much s the tion with a missile system that are enemy first, but both firing a>rc ultimately killed in the exchang®^ 'n Further discussion of the Pr0,,Qt rn*5' volved in designing aircraft an siles for future fleet engager*1 ^ it beyond the scope of this artic e- aif- should be noted that the A-6 a j97l • craft first flew in 1960; the ^
tronic systems—have been c
Still, the possibility of future ^sSj0n gagements warrants serious ,„ce&eiil about the nature of future reP £Sj and aircraft, their antishipping mlSajrcratl the method of escorting 1 e against heavily defended to]loW'fl^
With this as background, observations were reached ini a .) study
more comprehensive (unpublis based entirely on unclassifie ^ ^jil de ► Most likely, the Soviet Na^y |o°^ velop a ship-based fighter alld 3 down, shoot-down capabifi11^.^ sys multitarget fire control and to ■
her ^
/ oc‘abe
U q lail*ar to those being developed for repl ' ‘filters. This suggests that the A-6 capai!''ljnicnt should have a self-escort ment ‘>!ty anc^or that the F-14 replace- wea.LS °u^ he capable of providing all- Thjs6r escort for the A-6 replacement. altituc|mplies comPat'hle cruise speeds, as anes’ anh radius capabilities, as well for fj aPProPriate radar (or other system) father ^ & ra(^ar escort station in adverse
win b "!S° Pr°hable that AEW systems TheseC “evdoped for the Soviet Navy. ship_b S^stems could be either land- or terns I?' ®'s possible that both sys- the ne '. he developed.) This suggests roissiig6 uf°r an a>r-to-air antiradiation enemy ap cou^ he employed against EW aircraft, jamming aircraft, radiating aircraft of various types, including fighters on combat air patrol, and possibly against some radiating ship targets where the objective would be to knock out the enemy ship’s sensors rather than to heavily damage the ships.
► We need to develop compatible aircraft, missiles, and fire control systems that will allow multiple kills per aircraft in a forward quadrant missile exchange. In particular, we need high-speed missile and fighter radars with some form of electronic scan, to fully exploit multiple- target fire control and missile systems. Future fighter radar and fire control systems should be capable of providing a target count against clustered aircraft formations. (See the author’s “Dogfights of the Future” in the January 1984 Proceedings, pp. 100-104.)
In these days of budget deficits and budget cuts, launching and funding new developments will be problematic. However, it is time to set some new requirements—at least goals—for employing compatible systems in possible future fleet engagements.
Commander Weatherup, a 1940 graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy, served during World War II as a pilot in the Pacific. On 15 April 1945, while flying an F6F Hellcat from the aircraft carrier USS Independence (CVL-22), he engaged an enemy “George” fighter and sent it crashing to the ground. Its pilot was one of the Japanese Imperial Navy’s top flying aces: Ensign Shoichi Sugita, who was officially credited with downing more than 70 U. S. aircraft. Commander Weatherup retired from a major aerospace corporation as an operations analysis specialist.
S. Navy: Tactical Aircraft
frrian E°lmar, Editor, The Ships and Aircraft of the U. S. Fleet
Whijp
to 600 h he building of the U. S. fleet ^CacilineCP'0ya^e S^'PS has captured the rical aircS’significant are the tac- ric'a] ajrraPt Programs, especially the tac- carrjer ^raPt to % from the planned 15- "Pherg
®>e Cuare three important aspects of ent tactical aircraft buildup:
- The numbers are much higher than in the Carter Administration.
- Having been previously restricted to either/or choices, the sea services are now getting, essentially, their choice of tactical aircraft types.
- New models of several aircraft types are being procured.
Less clear, however, is what will happen with respect to the next generation of naval tactical aircraft—the planes that will fly from carriers in the year 2000 and beyond.
The Navy requires some 300 aircraft per year to build up to 14 carrier air wings, three Marine aircraft wings, and
Table 1 Naval Aircraft Procurement
81 | 82 | 83 | 84 | 85 | 86* | 87* | 88* | 89* | 90* | 91* |
30 | 30 | 24 | 24 | 24 | 18 | 15 | 12 | 18 | 24 | 36 |
60 | 63 | 84 | 84 | 84 | 84 | 120 | 132 | 132 | 163 | 163 |
12 | 12 | 8 | 6 | 6 | 11 | 11 | 12 | 18 | 24 | 24 |
— | 12 | 21 | 27 | 32 | 46 | 42 | 42 | 42 | 42 | 42 |
6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 |
— | — | — | — | — | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | — |
6 | 6 | 6 | 8 | 6 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 |
12 | 12 | 6 | 5 | 9 9? | 9 99 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 |
____ | 18 | 18 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | ____ | ___ | ____ | ____ |
14 | 14 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 12 | — |
— | 18 | 27 | 21 | 24 | 18 | 17 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 12 |
— | — | — | — | — | Q | 7 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 12 |
____ | ____ | ____ | — | — |
| ____ | ____ | 18 | 42 | 58 |
94 | 94 | 114 | 29 | 61 | 41 | 9 | 12 | 24 | 39 | 48 |
234 | 285 | 325 | 227 | 290 | 298 | 271 | 278 | 323 | 403 | 422 |
**Cargo and trainer types.
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