This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
y Norman Polmar, Editor, The Ships and Aircraft of the U. S. Fleet
targets, and make fire control calculations.1 When conceived several years ago, there were to be three versions of SUBACS: the Basic version and an improved A version for the SSN-688 class, and the B version that could be fitted in the last of the SSN-688s and (in the “B- prime” sub-variant) in the SSN-21 class.
The SSN-21 is the new attack submarine proposed for the 21st century, hence the designation. Compared to the SSN- 688, the SSN-21 is envisioned to be larger (maximum submerged displacement of 9,150 tons) and faster, and will have more torpedo tubes (eight of 30-inch diameter) and more weapons (about 50). Improved sonars—including the wide- aperture array and advanced towed array—
ta t06 °* U. S. Navy’s most impor- d„n ’an(l, currently, most controversial, subC 0Pmer|t ProSrams >s SUBACS—the Na m,ar’ne advanced combat system, sub aUt^or't'es tend to agree that U. S. su niar'ne sonar/fire control systems are Ea l 'or to those in Soviet submarines, p 1986, Secretary of Defense Cas- ^nberger told Congress that SUB- for • W|P Htaiitain our [submarine] targetS C<^e 'n undersea detection and
suh'annet^ P°r installation in the later d marines of the Los Angeles (SSN-688) 21. S |‘lnd the subsequent Seawolf (SSN- pUtgc ass> SUBACS hardware and com- acor .so^twarc can exploit advanced sens°fs to analyze data, identify
____________ ^ ^ WORLD (WILLIAM LUPIEN, ARTIST)
coupled with the SUBACS would place U. S. Navy attack submarines an estimated five to ten years ahead of their Soviet contemporaries when the first SSN-21 goes to sea in 1995-96.
Both the SSN-21 and SUBACS have encountered shoal waters. The SSN-21 has been criticized for anticipated high costs and for not meeting the capability goals set by the internal Navy study team, Group Tango. Navy spokesmen have indicated that the lead ship of the SSN-21 design could cost up to $2 billion; beginning with the fifth ship, the follow-on units could cost at least $1 billion each. Navy research and development costs associated with the SSN-21 are expected to total more than $2 billion in addition to certain S6W reactor costs paid by the Department of Energy.
SUBACS has suffered development, cost, and management problems. IBM was awarded the original contract to develop and produce SUBACS, with the intention of placing the Basic variant in attack submarines beginning with the SSN-751, authorized in fiscal year 1983, and the later B variant in the SSN-760 (fiscal year 1986) and later submarines. However, several problems quickly surfaced: The planned optical data bus— using fiber-optic technology to transmit data—encountered difficulties, causing a redesign effort to employ more-conventional electronic technology. Next, there were difficulties in producing the multilayer computer circuit boards for SUB- ACS. And, there were management problems, both on the part of IBM and
The technology to be used in the Seawolf (SSN-21) could be up to ten years ahead of her Soviet contemporaries when commissioned in the mid-1990s—if current development and cost problems with the SSN-21 and SUBACS are resolved.
IV,
0ceedings / April 1986
109
Table 1 U. S. Attack Submarine Construction
Fiscal Year
1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 |
Actual | Actual | Actual | Plan | Plan | Plan | Plan | Plan | Plan |
SSN-688 class 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 1 |
|
SSN-21 class |
|
|
|
| 1 |
| 2 | 3 |
with the assumption that the existing - 575) will have been stricken by the time marine is completed.
2See Norman Polmar, “The Submarine
the ne*
the Navy. All of these problems threatened to delay SUB ACS, while increasing costs—so far, $140 million more than original estimates, according to government statements.
Two review boards were convened by the Navy to examine the problems, leading to a restructuring of the program. First and foremost, SUBACS promised advances in combat effectiveness that are needed in the fleet. Second, the AN/ BQQ-5 sonar system, which was installed in the earlier SSN-688s, was unsuitable for the later SSN-688 and the SSN-21 submarines. The long lead time for BQQ-5 components, changes in the submarine configuration, and, in the SSN-21 class, the opportunities offered by the wide aperture array mean that a new sonar/fire control system is mandatory for U. S. submarine programs.
The restructuring of SUBACS provides a two-track program. The basic variant—now designated AN/BSY-1—is still being developed by IBM and will be provided in the SSN-751. In January 1986, the Navy and IBM signed a new contract for the development and production of seven BSY-1 systems with a price cap of $1.3 billion. The contract forces IBM to pay for late deliveries of equipment, including shipyard costs.
Then, beginning with fiscal year 1989 submarines, the last of the SSN-688 class and the SSN-21 class will have an improved SUBACS A/B, or Fiscal 1989 system. Contracts for the development and production of the Fiscal 1989 system will be competed for by two teams, one led by IBM and one by the newly merged RCA/General Electric organization. The IBM team includes Sperry, Hughes, Rockwell, Raytheon, and TRW. All have considerable electronics expertise—IBM having developed the AN/USY-1 advanced signal processor used in Navy acoustic systems in surface ships, submarines, and aircraft.
The RCA/General Electric team recently won a $20 million Navy contract, enabling it to compete for the Fiscal 1989 SUBACS program. This teaming brings together two giants of the defense electronics industry: RCA has considerable experience in advanced electronics and battle management from the Aegis system and other programs, and General
Electric has extensive sonar and submarine systems experience. Singer Libra- scope is on the RCA/General Electric team, bringing unequalled knowledge of submarine torpedo fire control to the project.
The Navy plans to have IBM work with RCA/General Electric until September 1986, providing full access to the development of SUBACS Basic to develop a common baseline for the next phase. The two firms will then vie for the Fiscal 1989 system. A decision for full system development of the later system is planned for January 1988, with one corporate team being the lead and the second the follower. Under this schedule, the Fiscal 1989 system will be ready by late 1992 for the last few SSN-688s and a year later for the first SSN-21.
It is envisioned that eight of the SSN- 688 class and the proposed 30 submarines of the SSN-21 class will carry the later Fiscal 1989 SUBACS system.
In a recent development, IBM is reported to have refused to turn over to the RCA/General Electric team some of the relevant documents. Also, IBM has refused to allow members of the other team into its offices, although the Navy had stipulated that 30 engineers from RCA/ General Electric could enter IBM offices for a “crash course” on the IBM system, according to press reports.
Meanwhile, the Navy has revised the preliminary SSN-21 design to provide a more effective sonar suite. Originally, the SSN-21 was to have eight torpedo tubes fitted in the bow, below a large sonar dome. The bow position for the tubes would permit torpedo launches at high speed. But co-locating the sonar dome and tubes caused concerns that acoustic interference would result when torpedoes were launched, and that the tubes would restrict downward sonar beam-forming.
Subsequently, torpedo trials were held with high-speed launches from the amid- ship torpedo tubes of one of the SSN-688 class boats, which demonstrated launches above 20 knots were feasible, although not at the higher speeds possible with bow tubes. The SSN-21 design has been revised, now with four 30-inch torpedo tubes angled out from each side. This arrangement, however, could affect the
submarine’s size, as reloading an?e tubes requires more space, and hen ship’s displacement, than straig through reloading.
But the bottom line is that the chanr^ will provide significantly improved sona performance.
A final publicized problem that a**ec the SSN-21 is the recent delay of contra awards to the General Dynamics/Elec n Boat yard in Groton, Connecticut. This >
one of two U. S. shipyards that buih'J’^ marines, the other being Newport Ne Shipbuilding in Virginia. Fraud against General Dynamics, admissions^ illegal gifts to retired Admiral H- Rickover, and other legal problems le delays in contract awards to Tiene Dynamics, including SSN-688s. t Navy is now also considering Newp News as a second or alternative sour for building Trident submarines.)
Despite these problems, both S ACS and the SSN-21 are needed.^ noted previously in these pages, h° submarine developments are contm rapidly.[1] The Los Angeles, the first 0
SSN-688 class, was commission® 1976. If the SSN-21 is authorized m 1 cal year 1989, the submarine worn be completed until 1995-96—two ^ ades after the previous class was M duced. Although there have been imP^ tant and significant improvements to SSN-688 design, a new submarine needed, and with SUBACS. _ 2l
The major problem with the SS may simply be cost and numbers, e-H dally in the constrained budget etlVI . ^ ment that is predicted for the next _ years. Secretary of the Navy John F- L man best summed up this situation-
“We have to be in so many P'a^6 simultaneously that the numbers ^ essential. If we let quality drive capability drive without any lirnl ’ jf would obviously impact numbers-^ we put every possible dem i\, ‘kind of nice’ to have in the SS then we could afford only one a ^ollt We obviously have to build a^ three a year. So we have to bm design them to cost.”[2]
110
Proceedings
/ April 1
. gsN'fi'
'The name Seawolfbas been chosen for the .r^sN" ssumntion that the existing Sea wo]
January 1986 Proceedings, pp. 128-129-
[2]Paul Bedard, “Navy, IBM Strike Sub Deal,’’ Navy News & Undersea Technology' uary 1986, p. 2.