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order.
The ASW problem will become more
fiscal contraints, already hampering the listing new construction programs, drastically impede the 1986-1995
In a NATO war, Spanish naval doc- ne envisions comprehensive ASW operations along the Balearics—Gibraltar trait—Canaries axis effected by subma- Jtnes and frigates equipped with helicop- ers. Other principal operations include m'nesweeping, -hunting, and -laying to Sa eguard Allied shipping and hamper enemy movements into and out of the Mediterranean.
8R^nS potential NATO role for the AV-equipped Principe de Asturias, is in c°njunction with the Infanteria de Ma- rirta (Spanish Marines). Amphibious andings are anticipated to defend rapidly gainst threats to the Canary and Balearic ^ ands and Spain’s two territories on the °rth African coast, Ceuta and Melilla. °Wever, ASW operations will be the ^°st likely, but in the event of AEW and AW support for the carrier group(s), the earchwater-equipped SH-3Ds will be needed. If Spain’s naval forces do not °Perate too far from shore, adequate early yarning and combat air protection can e Provided by its land-based air, partiCularly the 72 EF-18 Hornets now on
an A AW problem as the Soviet and ,d World submarine-launched antiship Jjruise missile (ASCM) threats increase. SU Spamsh Navy’s existing Standard M-l and Sea Sparrow missile systems, n’y marginally capable of meeting the Current Soviet threat, will have to be uploaded by better AAW systems—guns, and-held missiles, perhaps an exporters design—to defeat future ASCM reats to surface forces from enemy sub- arines, surface combatants, and air- raft- Across the Mediterranean, Libya is <,n example of a potential enemy threat to Pain, as exemplified in a December . threat by Libyan leader Colonel u ammar Qaddafi that “any state i^hich is related or integrated with NATO . er>tering a zone of hell and destruc- n>” which cannot be dismissed lightly given Libyan use of naval mines in the Gulf of Suez and the Red Sea earlier that year.11
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger cited in March 1983 the growing Soviet threat to NATO and other Western European countries as reason enough for Spain to maintain its ties with NATO. Moreover, he stated that Spanish defense interests would be served best by increased integration into the Alliance’s military command.12 Although there remains some dissent within the Spanish armed forces, since 1982 the military— especially the Navy—has become much more supportive of NATO. Commenting on the fact that since 1953 the Spanish Navy has been training its officers with technical assistance from the United States, using U. S. ships and weapons, and gradually assimilating NATO doctrines, standards, procedures, tactics, and levels of training, one Spanish naval officer has stated that, unlike the Spanish Army:
“. . . it would be quite possible to integrate the Spanish Navy into the NATO force structure immediately. Its efficiency and level of training are at least on par with those of other Western navies, as has been demonstrated during exercises and in the course of operations organized in collaboration with NATO navies.”13
Until Spain presented its petition to NATO in November 1981, only a few contacts with the Alliance existed. Spanish naval forces occasionally participated in NATO exercises; NATO authorities at times invited Spanish observers to Southern Region maneuvers. Spain’s closest linkage to NATO had been through its defense relationship with the United States. Since June 1982, the scope of Spain’s dealings with its NATO allies has increased significantly. Spain’s foreign and defense ministers regularly attend NATO meetings, while Spanish delegates routinely take part in the deliberations within NATO’s numerous committees. More contacts between Spain’s defense industry and those of its NATO partners on such projects as the European Fighter Aircraft, Germany’s Lince main battle tank, France’s Agosta submarines, the Roland “Euro-missile” air defense system, NATO’s replacement frigate, Britain’s Searchwater radars and Stingray torpedo, and U. S. F/A-18 aircraft, will serve to increase the momentum toward greater participation in Alliance issues. This should provide the foundation for the complete military integration of Spain into NATO. With the membership referendum submitted to the Spanish people, March 1986 promises to be a pivotal time for the future course of the Spanish Navy as an integral element in the defense of the Free World.
lThe Economist, 10 November 19S4, p. 14. 2Quoted in William L. Heiberg, The Sixteenth Nation: Spain's Role in NATO (Washington, D. C.: National Defense University Press, 1983), p. 25.
3Aviation Week & Space Technology, 14 September 1981, p. 26.
4Washington Post, 8 May 1985, p. A27.
5Captain Ramon Jaudenes Agacino, Spanish Navy, “Spain and NATO,” International Defense Review, May 1982, p. 550.
6lbid. See also: Vincente Blay Biosca, “Defending the Strait of Gibraltar: Spain’s Role is Vital,” International Defense Review, September 1985, pp. 1399ff.
7Christian Science Monitor, 7 June 1982, p. 28. *The Economist, 12 December 1981, p. 47. 9Biosca, op.cit., p. 1405.
10Ibid.; see also: “Spain’s Budget Details,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 13 April 1985, p. 615; Ministeriode Defensa, Datos y Cifras 1985 (Servicio Publicaci- ones de la DRISDE, 1985), pp. 9-11; Jane’s Fighting Ships, 1984 -85, pp. 424ff.
“Statement of Colonel Qaddafi at a news conference held immediately after conferring with Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez. Washington Post, 21 December 1984, p. A19.
x2Washington Post, 25 March 1983, p. A9. 13Agacino, op.cit., p. 549.
Dr. Truver is head of the Naval and Maritime Policy Department at Information Spectrum, Inc. This Professional Note is adapted from his paper, “Spain’s Role in NATO: The Trans-Atlantic Dimension,” presented at the Seminario Internacionale sobre la Posi- cion de Espaha dentro de la Alianza Atlantica, hosted by the lnstituto de Cuestiones Internacionales of Madrid on 7-8 November 1985. Dr. Truver writes frequently for the Proceedings, and is the author of an article published in the 1985 Naval Review, “Mines of August: An International Whodunit.”
^Since the early 1970s, the orientation Australian defense policy has under- ^ ne a major change. Prior to that period, e Australian security policy had been : e °f forward defense, that is, protect® Australia from as far away from the
h
homeland as possible and in conjunction with British and U. S. forces. Australian ground and air forces were stationed in Singapore and Malaysia and naval units regularly deployed to Southeast Asian waters. However, with the failure of the
U. S. military approach to the war in Indochina, the enunciation of the Guam Doctrine by President Richard M. Nixon, the passage of the War Powers Resolution by the U. S. Congress, and the announced withdrawal of British forces from the Far East and Indian Ocean, the pillars upon which post-war Australian defense had been built seemed to be crumbling.
Australian defense planners interpreted these changes in the regional balance of power and the growing uncertainty of likely allied military assistance in a crisis as conditions requiring Australia to change its defense strategy toward developing a capability to protect Australian territory and interests without depending so heavily on allied assistance. Forward defense was to give way to continental defense. Moreover, the catchword “selfreliance” began to appear in government statements on defense. Although the Labor government of Gough Whitlam (1972-75) is generally given credit for initiating these fundamental changes in defense policy, the Australian Department of Defence began to call for a reassessment of defense orientation before Whitlam came into office.1
In hindsight, it is arguable whether the U. S. commitment to Australian security has been significantly altered by the Nixon Doctrine or the U. S. withdrawal of ground forces from Southeast Asia.2 However, it is in Australia’s vital interest to be able to deploy military forces capable of operating without allied assistance in certain circumstances. It is conceivable that certain scenarios could develop whereby overt U. S. military assistance could either be counterproductive or result in expanding the conflict to involve extraregional actors. Force development policy within the Australian Defence Force (ADF) since the early 1970s has stressed, therefore, creating the capacity to operate independently of allied formations. Australian officials now acknowledge that although Australia is still committed to the Western alliance, the ADF must have the capability to respond alone to events in the southwestern Pacific.
Whether this policy aimed at creating a greater ADF self-reliant capability has been successful is an open question. Although modest, recent improvements in the ADF’s structure have redressed important deficiencies. Capabilities have been acquired and developed in such areas as combat support weaponry and logistic support, which have traditionally been provided by Australia’s allies. What is certain is that there are still improvements to be made. A 1984 parliamentary committee report on the ADF found weaknesses in the operational command structure, the short-term deployment capability and sustainability in combat, and the poor basis for ADF expansion. In short, the committee found Australian defense policy capable of only reacting to
Principal Support Facilities
HMAS Kuttabul, Headquarters Support, Sydney
HMAS Platypus, Submarine Base, Sydney
HMAS Albatross, Fleet Air Arm Base, Nowra
HMAS Stirling, Ship and Submarine Base, Cockburn Sound
HMAS Cairns, Patrol Boat Base, Cairns
HMAS Coonawarra, Patrol Boat Base and Communications Station, Darwin
HMAS Waterhen, Mine Warfare and Patrol Boat Base, Sydney
HMAS Moreton, Amphibious Ships Base, Brisbane
HMA Dockyard, Williamstown
HMA Dockyard, Garden Island
HMAS Harman, Communications Station, Canberra
Navy Office, Department of Defence, Canberra
Fleet Command (Comprises all operational units, headquarters, and bases) ,
Support Command (Includes non-commissioned establishments, supply elements, a some technical facilities)
Regional Areas Command (Largely administrative tasks)
Naval Reserves
Royal Australian Navy
Personnel: 16,059 regulars, 1,135 reservists with training obligations Order of Battle ____________________________ | |
First Australian Destroyer | 3 U. S. Charles F. Adams-class |
Squadron | guided missile destroyers |
Second Australian Destroyer | 4 U. S. Oliver Hazard Perry-class |
Squadron | guided missile frigates |
Third Australian Destroyer | 5 “River”-class (modified Type-12) |
Squadron | destroyer escorts |
Australian Submarine Squadron | 6 Oberon-class diesel electric patrol submarines |
Mine Countermeasures Force | 1 To/i-class (modified) minehunter |
Australian Amphibious Squadron | 1 Sir Bedivere-cXass (modified) amphibious heavy lift ship 5 heavy landing craft (1 manned by reservists) |
Patrol Boats | 15 Fremantle-class (PCF-420) large patrol craft 6 Attack-class large patrol craft (manned by reservists) |
Fleet Support | 1 destroyer tender (fleet flagship) 1 Success (modified French Durance-c\&s> fleet replenishment ship |
Survey and Oceanographic | 4 hydrographic research ships |
Training Squadron | 1 Daring-class destroyer 1 training and logistic support (roll-on-roll-off) ship Fleet Air Arm |
HS-817 Squadron (ASW) | 8 Sea King Mk 50/50A ASW helicopters |
HC-723 Squadron (Utility | 6 AS 350B Squirrel helicopters |
and Training) | 4 UH-1B Iroquois helicopters 3 Bell 206B helicopters |
HU-816 Squadron (Utility) | 10 Wessex 31B helicopters |
On Order: 2 modified FFG-7 frigates, 2 inshore minehunter catamarans, Harpoon su | |
face-to-surface missile and Phalanx antiaircraft systems, 8 SH-60B Se° | |
hawk LAMPs/ASW helicopters, 4 survey launches Organization ____________________________ . |
®xternal events vis-a-vis controlling ustralia’s environment.3 Nowhere are these ADF shortcomings So eyident than in the present structure of e Royal Australian Navy (RAN). While noticeable gains have been realized in the a ance of the RAN’s structure in recent years- a review of the present and proposed future order of battle reveals a dis- urbing trend which will have significant '^Plications on efforts to achieve greater e ''reliance. Not only have Australian 8°vernment policies over the past 15 years been ineffective in improving the CaPability of the RAN’s strike element to operate independently of allied support, ,ut future outlook demonstrates that e degree of reliance on Australia’s al- !es can only increase. Indeed, a greater egree of dependence in some areas will occur. The reasons for this trend are re- ated to three factors: the size of the RAN surface combatant force, certain inherent 'Uiitations in the newly acquired Oliver azard Perry (FFG-7)-class guided- HUssile frigates, and the lack of fixed- 'Vlng and helicopter air support for fleet re9uirements.
Irrespective of the problems facing the it is, unquestionably, better balanced today than it was 20 years ago. 'nee the late 1960s, a destroyer tender, w° destroyer escorts, four guided- ^ssile frigates, a squadron of subma- Pues, two classes of patrol boats, a heavy anding ship, six landing craft, and a Ptyriad of training and oceanographic uips among other vessels have been in- P'duced into the RAN’s inventory. At Present, two follow-on guided-missile Pgates are being constructed in Austra- . a. a new fleet replenishment ship has st been commissioned, a new class of Prnarines is being selected, and a new rpe of inshore minehunting vessel is nder construction. Thus, in a general nsc, progress has been made to im- r°ve the overall operational capability of he RAN.
n, ^ct’ while the fleet has undergone a j uysical transformation, Australia’s mar- Uie security requirements have changed s 'veil. Prior to the latter 1970s,
Australia s primary security concern was the stability of the Southeast Asian region. The security of its maritime environment had been ensured either by allied naval forces in the region, or simply by the lack of a threat. As a party to the Rad- ford-Collins allied control and protection of shipping agreement, Australian maritime strategy, until the 1970s, essentially protected merchant shipping and stressed antisubmarine warfare (ASW) operations, which some critics have claimed has created an imbalanced force.4
Since the dramatic increase in the Soviet Navy’s presence in the Far East and the establishment of a presence in the Indian Ocean, and in light of the decrease in the presence of allied maritime forces, Canberra has been forced to reassess the
The Royal Australian Navy’s major problem is one of numbers—too few ASW helicopters, destroyers, and patrol submarines chasing too many different missions in two oceans.
defense requirements of its adjacent oceans. Consequently, the RAN and the maritime units of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) now have the task of guarding the approaches to Australia and policing that country’s 19,300-kilometer coastline.
To add to this, the Australian Federal Government established a 200-nautical- mile Australian Fisheries Zone in 1978. Since Australia has no civil coast guard,
pendent force. If this conclusion is f cepted, then a large and groWi percentage of the RAN’s future destroy^ force will need to operate alongside m° capable warships. In turn, if these minicapable warships are not acquired by m Australian government, then the will be forced to look to allied navies 0 support in certain important areas.
The final problem in the force develop ment outlook for the RAN is maritime al
rier HMAS Melbourne. Two mo later, it also decided to withdraw from
,nths
ser-
the ADF is responsible for civil as well as military surveillance of the waters surrounding Australia. Clearly, the general trend in Australian defence policy is to emphasize maritime security in force development and orientation. Considering the great expanses of the Southwest Pacific and Eastern Indian oceans, this is no easy task.
Regarding these specific problems, the principal limitation facing the RAN is that it is unable to expand rapidly enough to meet a perceived threat. Because of the long lead times associated with sophisticated and expensive naval forces and in light of the progressively shorter warning times given to governments concerning developing threats, the RAN must be prepared to go into combat essentially as is.5 Given its required roles—offensive operations, sea denial, and protection of sea lines of communication and merchant shipping—it is doubtful that the RAN would be able to successfully carry out these roles, especially should a high intensity, multi-theater conflict develop.6
The problem is simply one of numbers. In the late 1960s, studies on Australian maritime defense requirements found that the RAN needed at least 17 destroyers to carry out its assigned roles.7 This is considerably more than the present fleet of 13 destroyers, which now operates in a more challenging maritime environment.
The deficiency in the size of the RAN also is reflected in another arena. As a member of the Radford-Collins agreement mentioned previously, Australia is required to provide forces to protect Western shipping in its “area of maritime responsibility.” Australia’s region of responsibility extends from south of the equator to Antarctica and from approximately the middle of the Indian Ocean, 60° east, into the Tasman Sea, 160° west.8 Australia is obligated by this agreement to provide command and control facilities as well as naval units and aircraft to provide adequate protection for merchant shipping transiting its area of responsibility.
Considering the distances involved, the RAN destroyer force would be hard- pressed to provide convoy escorts and pursue its other operational roles at the- same time and in a high-intensity conflict. Moreover, the Radford-Collins agreement, in effect, requires the RAN to deploy two fleets, one in the Pacific and the other in the Indian Ocean. This is made difficult because the RAN has only one purpose-built fleet tanker for replenishment at sea missions, although the 1978 opening of HMAS Stirling, the first Royal Australian naval base in Western Australia, has improved its ability to de
ploy units to the Indian Ocean. The RAN’s six British Oberon-class patrol submarines cannot by themselves make up for the lack of surface combatants. Although capable of offensive and sea denial missions, submarines operating without surface support are not capable of sea control and protection of shipping.9
Interestingly, the 1984 parliamentary committee report on the ADF sidestepped the problem of effectively protecting merchant shipping by stating that “it does not necessarily follow that all
routes should be protected for all levels of conflict.” The report suggested that because of Australia’s “strategic isolation,” a strategy of evasive routing could be instituted to provide protection for merchant shipping.10 In the short term, this policy may prove successful, however there are a number of weaknesses which are inherent in diversifying trade routes. The principal drawback of this approach is that it imposes added time at sea and consequently increases the time merchant ships are vulnerable to threat. As stated by former Chief of Australian Naval Staff Vice Admiral James Willis, evasive routing is not a panacea and its effectiveness is short lived."
With regard to the three destroyer squadrons in the RAN, a review of the ships in service reveals a force of proven ship classes and weapon systems. At present, the force includes three U. S.- designed and built Charles F. Adams (DDG-2)-class guided-missile destroyers and four FFG-7s, and five Australian- built “River”-class ASW frigates. Government approval has been given for the Australian construction of two additional frigates based on the general design of the FFG-7, and the keel for the first was laid on 12 July 1985. Modernization on the DDGs was begun in September 1985, and will include, among other things, incorporation of the Harpoon surface-to-
surface missile system. Three of the fiye surviving destroyer escorts have recently undergone a modernization phase and are planned to be paid-off by the mid-1990s.
Some Australian commentators have raised concerns over the choice of the FFG-7 and the proposal to construct follow-on copies as the replacement class for the destroyer escorts. Although it 1S admittedly a fine ship, criticism has focused on whether the FFG-7 is appr°Pr1' ate for the RAN’s destroyer requirements, especially in light of the desire to create a greater self-reliant capability • the RAN. For instance, critics point ou that since the FFG-7 has only one propd ler shaft, the design is vulnerable. Fur ther, they stress that smaller warship classes are unable to carry modern, long-range, multi-target radar systcnlS which would be required in a high-inten sity combat environment.12
At the heart of these and other crib cisms over the choice of the FFG-7, hoV ever, is the expectation that these war ships would be unable to operate indepen dently of more sophisticated warships ’ a modem wartime conflict. In short, > acquisition of the FFG-7 has not apPreC1 ably helped the RAN to deploy an hide
- ’s ac-
wing
support for the fleet. In March 1983, 1 Australian government announced would not replace the aging aircraft c
“U,U1“ ucc.ucuic, wm.u.u.. ,
vice the fixed-wing aircraft in the '
Respite
We Sen H-
^'r Arm. The reasons for this, given by Wen-Minister for Defence Gordon Wholes, echoed a Parliamentary committee report tabled in 1982, and were based on the recommendations of the Defence Structure Committee presented to the former government in November 1982.13 ^•though an organic fixed-wing air capacity was deemed desirable, in light of ne prevailing defense budgetary limita- |'°ns, the parliamentary committee found u difficult to justify the high cost of a ^Placement ship. Consequently, the kAAF has been given the responsibility ‘o Provide fixed-wing air support for the fleet.
Ax a result of the Australian government's decisions, the RAN will have less fexibility in its future operations. In ferrns of offensive strike, the RAAF can Provide air cover for the fleet, but this is Wiited to a range of 500 miles and even then for only limited periods.14 This situation will improve with the introduction °f the F/A-18 Hornet into the RAAF’s lnventory as well as the planned conver- X'on of the existing fleet of four Boeing 7p^-338Cs to tankers. In any event, the KAAF must now contribute a larger pro- P°rtion of its already limited flying hours at)d training to fleet requirements.
The most significant loss to the RAN ^fh the retirement of the Melbourne has been the RAN’s inability to send to sea its ^ea King Mk 50 helicopters which have 8uPplied the navy with its medium-range AS\V. These helicopters have an impres- 8lVe ASW capability, which include a "fOO-mile range. The Sea Kings also pro- v'de direction for the RAN’s Ikara ASW Jjussile system once the missiles are fired r°m a surface vessel. This deficiency ^dl be mitigated with the introduction of ®|ght recently ordered Sea Hawk LAMPS 'hght airborne multipurpose system) pSW helicopters, which are to operate fr°m the FFG-7s.
their sophistication, however,
---- „wks cannot completely replace
ije lost capability of the Sea Kings.15 ^ertain problems have also been identi- lied concerning coordination with the RAAF’s P-3C long-range maritime patrol aircraft, upon which the RAN must now depend more heavily. The RAN claims that because it does not have control over tasking the P-3Cs, their effectiveness for navy requirements is limited.16 Moreover, the size of the P-3C fleet, 20 aircraft, of which on average 14 are operationally available at any one time, is criticized for not being large enough for the expanded ASW roles these aircraft must now play. Before additional aircraft could be considered, however, the present problems with maintaining adequate crews for the existing force must be solved.17
In general, it is unclear whether a country the size of Australia, with its limited resource base, can aspire to create a modem, self-reliant defense force. By this, it is not implied that Australia is incapable of providing the necessary forces to defend its requirements. If the domestic political condition existed, resources could be mobilized to vastly increase the size of the ADF, as was the case in World Wars I and II. The problem foreseen is rather one of weapons acquisition and subsequent follow-on support.
Because it is a member of the Western alliance, Australia has committed itself to maintain a defense force which is interoperable with allied forces. By numerous multilateral agreements and arrangements (for example, the ABC A Navies Field Z and the AUSCANZUKUS Naval Communications Board), the RAN has been able to maintain a high degree of interoperability with allied navies.18 The negative aspect of this policy has been that the RAN must equip itself with ships and weapon systems which are similar to those of its allies.
Since Australia’s Western allies’ principal orientation is toward developing a capacity to fight a war in the Western European/North Atlantic high-intensity theater, the RAN must acquire the same level of combat sophistication to contribute to an allied joint force and to be able
With the retirement of the carrier Melbourne, the Royal Australian Navy must depend on Royal Australian Air Force F/A-18s for air cover and P-3Cs for long- and medium- range ASW.
to operate alongside allied units.
Australia does possess an industrial sector capable of manufacturing some modem defense equipment. Weapon systems purchased from abroad are often maintained and modernized by Australian industry. Yet, despite the present capability of Australian industry, the sector itself is too small to provide the necessary research and development and to manufacture all the equipment required by the ADF. Even when in-country modernizations take place, key essential components are imported. Once the RAN procures a modem warship like the FFG-7, for example, it not only becomes dependent on Western suppliers for missiles, tor- pedos, spares, etc., but also for new, updated, state-of-the-art systems for modernization. Because of the small size of the RAN, modernization programs themselves are often left to the supplier nation to develop.
Thus, a paradox exists: in attempting to create a self-reliant defense force along Western standards, which is qualitatively superior to the defense forces of Southeast Asian nations, a dependence is created in the area of support and supply. Although the RAN has been able to achieve relative parity with allied navies, it has been at the cost of becoming reliant on overseas suppliers.
The force development trends of the RAN, therefore, do not appear to provide the Australian government with a selfreliant fleet that is capable of independent operations in distant areas or in high- intensity combat environments. Considering the high costs which would be required for the development of such a navy and in light of the prevailing domestic political consensus not to dramatically increase defense outlays, there is very little chance that these trends are likely to change.
Self-reliance is not a goal which any defense force can implement in short order. In the case of the RAN and under existing domestic conditions, the effort to develop a more independent navy must be recognized as a long term aim, and even then, attainable only in certain areas of naval warfare. To date, successive Australian cabinets have found the costs of a self-reliant navy beyond the means of defense budgets and the government’s own political mandate.
‘Australia. Department of Defence. Australian Defence Review (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1972), p. 11.
2Thomas-Durell Young, “The Nixon Doctrine and the War Powers Resolution Revisited,” New Zealand International Review, July-August 1985. Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 6-9.
Australia. Parliament. Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence. The Australian Defence Force: its Structure and Capabilities (Canberra: Australian
Government Publishing Service, 1984), pp. 72-88. 4See Desmond Ball’s testimony before the Australian Parliament’s Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Subcommittee on the Pacific Basin. Australian-United States Relations—Transcript of Evidence (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1982), pp. 97-98.
5I. M. Speedy, “Mobilization of the Navy,’’ Problems of Mobilization in Defence of Australia, edited by Desmond Ball and J. O. Langtry (Manuka, ACT:
Phoenix Defence Publications, 1980), p. 67.
^The Australian Defence Force, p. 42.
Australia. Parliament. The Place of Major Surface Vessels in the RAN’s Force Structure with Specia Reference to the FFG-7, Basic Paper (Canberra. Department of the Parliamentary Library, 14 Apr* 1978), pp. 6 and 15.
8Des Ball, Editor, “The Security Relationship Be tween Australia and New Zealand,” The AN7A Connection (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985), P- '
The Bay-class Minehunter Catamaran
The mining of the Red Sea in the summer of 1984 once again dramatized the effectiveness of mine warfare. As a weapon of general war or terrorism, mines are cheap, easy to deploy, and can have a major impact on merchant shipping. Indeed, the mere claim of a mining can be almost as effective as the actual act itself.
It is little wonder then that states which have weak maritime forces often opt for large mine inventories. Considering how effective the “unsophisticated” mines deployed in the Red Sea were and the difficulty Western navies had in detecting them, the prospect of countering the modem mine capability in which the Eastern bloc has long excelled must seem daunting to Western naval planners.
In both World Wars I and II, more ships were lost to mines than to any other weapon. With the development of “smart” and “active” mines in recent years, effective mine countermeasures (MCM) require a sophisticated and modem capability.
The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) is close to testing the first of two prototypes of a new class of MCM vessel to counter such threats to maritime security. Since the mid-1970s, the RAN has been experimenting with a small, low-cost, purpose- built minehunter to counter inshore mining. The result of this research and development is the Bay-class minehunter catamaran. These vessels are designed to carry out MCM operations in harbors, approaches, estuaries, and comparatively shallow waters. The design incorporates a novel concept for an MCM vessel: a catamaran hull which is made of glass reinforced plastic (GRP).
The catamaran hull was chosen to provide a stable, large deck area. The hulls also produce a very maneuverable vessel, which is required for successful minehunting operations. As the power plants have a wide dispersion in relation to the beam, it is reported that this vessel will have excellent 360° maneuverability. Most importantly, the catamaran design allows for essential machinery to be placed high up in the vessel. Thus, the machinery has added protection against underwater shocks, and acoustic and magnetic signatures are low.
The GRP hulls are of sandwich construction 60-mm. thick and are covered internally and externally with seven layers of resin-impregnated glass cloth. A foam construction was chosen for the hull because of the poor availability and quality of specialized woods in Australia and the increased maintenance wood hulls require. Its low acoustic emanations and non-magnetic properties make GRP attractive for MCM operations. Moreover, GRP is simple to construct and relatively inexpensive.
The Bay-class catamaran employs modularization in the design of the principal ship systems, including the essential elements of the sonar, the propulsion system, and the mine disposal system. The operations room is containerized to facilitate rapid replacement or removal should a system fail or if an alternate role is required. The operations room contains the
Displacement:
Length:
Beam:
Draft:
Speed:
Complement:
Sonar:
Disposal Unit: Propulsion Machinery:
Builder:
sonar display, the tactical data system, the precision navigation system, and the operational console for the mine disposa unit. Once located, mines are destroyed or rendered safe by placing an explosive charge next to the mine, carried down by one of the two recoverable submersible vehicles.
The Bay class carries a complement o 14 crew members, and provisions are pre-prepared, reducing space, equip" ment, and staff requirements. The ship ts capable of carrying divers, but not as a regular part of the crew.
Presently, two prototype vessels. Rushcutter and Shoalwater, are being constructed at Carrington Slipways m Tomago, New South Wales. Testing lS scheduled to take place by late 1986. The vessels’ slow development is explain^ by the novel nature of the GRP hulls an the catamaran design. Further, this is the first time a minehunter has been designe and built in Australia.
The Bay class has been designed spe cifically for Australian MCM missions and design requirements. It is not the an
170 metric tons (full load)
28 meters (W.L.)
31 meters (O.A.)
9 meters (O.A.)
3 meters (each hull)
2 meters 10 knots
14 (2 officers; 3 senior sailors; 9 junior sailors) Hull mounted Krupp Atlas-Elektronik DSQS-11 2 Societe ECA 38 remote-controlled systems with 2 PAP-104 wire-guided vehicles 2 diesel generator sets 2 propulsion steering units 2 hydraulic transmission systems 2 hydraulic steering systems Carrington Slipways Pty., Ltd. (Fibreglass Division), Tomago, Australia
Bay-class Minehunter Catamaran
Characteristics