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Editor’s Note: This is the final part of a three-part review feature highlighting the Soviet military perspective of the Falklands Conflict based on accounts published in Soviet naval and military journals since June 1982. Part /, published in November, addressed maritime operations. Part II, featured in December, discussed logistics: the mobile rear and the air and missile war. (Footnotes in the three sections are numbered consecutively.)
Electronic Warfare
The Soviet military press has analyzed thoroughly the relatively intense electronic warfare (EW) of air-ship combat during the brief war in the South Atlantic. The Soviets learned, according to Rear Admiral-Engineer G. Popov, writing in Morskoy Sbornik in November 1982, that the country whose armed forces prevail in the electronic spectrum will have a significant advantage in the next war. Admiral Popov was not
As the Soviet story goes, metallic chaff saved HMS Hermes from an air-to-surface missile hit, but led to the loss of the Atlantic Conveyor and her 15 helicopters, four miles away. The Soviet lesson learned: All ships need to be capable of self defense.
writing just about the Falklands Campaign, but about experience from other recent local wars as well.
The January 1983 Morskoy Sbornik published the authoritative Soviet treatment of electronic warfare in the South Atlantic. This article, written by the team of Captain First Rank B. Rodionov, Captain Second Rank Y. E. Nikitin, and N. Novichkov, is a detailed study of the defensive and offensive role of electronic measures used by British surface ships and explains in detail both passive and active electronic warfare measures, concentrating on the use of chaff decoy clouds.
One of the major lessons of the war—the vulnerability of surface ships to low-flying missile and aircraft attack—has been mentioned. Captain Rodionov and Novichkov collaborated on the study of the Exocet attack on HMS Sheffield and conclude that the attack was successful because the Sheffield's air defense radars were turned off to prevent their interfering with the ship’s satellite communications link with London. The lesson, again, is that all on-board electronic systems must be compatible, including radars, signal equipment, and weapons control systems. Admiral Popov strongly argues this same point in his article, mentioning that modern ships are virtually saturated with electronic systems, presumably referring to both Soviet and Western ships. His entire essay is concerned with proper personnel training to ensure the total integration of all combat intelligence processing and combat decision making systems. Though he never mentions the Falklands, the implicit lesson of the Sheffield incident is
f. Q
apparent.
The Rodionov article also discusses other lessons which may have future applications. Following the Exocet attack, the British intensified their state of readiness, and made extensive use of the passive air defense technique that had proved successful for HMS Plymouth. Henceforth, ships under missile attack and not armed with antimissile missiles would fire canisters of metallic chaff, which would form a large cloud 500 meters or more away from the ship. (The distance varies depending on wind direction and ship's speed.) The cloud ordinarily would form a decoy target whose area was larger than that of the ship, thus causing the missiles’ radar seekers to home in on the larger decoy target.
The use of chaff by ships screening HMS Hermes saved the carrier from an air-to-surface missile hit on 25 May. However, as a result, writes Captain Rodionov, the Exocet missile, which was diverted from its intended target by the chaff cloud, locked onto the next closest target (four miles away) with the greatest reflection among the mass of chaff interference, the Atlantic Conveyor, a containership carrying about 15 helicopters.70 The implicit lesson in the loss of the Atlantic Conveyor is that all ships, whether combatant or otherwise, need to be equipped with self-defense capabilities. This view is corroborated by Colonel V. Sokolov’s discussion of British plans to outfit commercial ships with air defense missiles.
Captain Rodionov points out that electronic warfare techniques pose problems for attack aircraft and ships alike. Whenever Argentine aircraft approached for a missile attack or bombing run, they had to be extremely selective in using their radars lest they be detected by the British. In the attack on the Sheffield, a Neptune reconnaissance aircraft vectored the Super Etendards to the target so that the attacking aircraft did not have to use their own radars. With their radars again turned off in the attack on the Hermes, they were guided by target data from a shore-based AN/TPS-43 radar.71 However, in both cases, as soon as the Argentine pilots switched on their radars, they were detected by the British, forcing the pilots to launch their Exocets from long range and then run for their lives.
Captain Rodionov also identifies another problem for antiship missiles: once launched, they are susceptible to being jammed. Exocets have a built-in, home-on-jam system which will permit the missiles to lock onto the jamming station and destroy it, barring any other interference. The problem is that British aircraft have on-board jammers which can draw Exocets away from their intended targets. To solve this problem, Captain Rodionov suggests that the operating time for home-on-jam systems be cut to the minimum to avert locking onto the wrong (decoy) target.72
By Major Ralph M. Bruner, U. S. Army
Captain Rodionov also briefly touches on several other electronic warfare lessons:
^ He considers it both possible and necessary to increase both the sensitivity of electronic intelligence equipment and the power of jamming equipment.
' He predicts the creation of passive decoys capable of mov- lng at the speed of aircraft and which can be deployed by aircraft under attack.73
^ He supports the view that low-flying aircraft with their radars turned off could more or less successfully counter the electronic detection measures and self-defense systems of surface ships.
The Falkland's Conflict in Perspective
For numerous reasons, Soviet military scientists gave joint operations considerable attention in 1982, and they continue to be studied closely today. It appears that the Soviets earmarked 1982 from the outset as a year for intense study, dis- oussion, and implementation of tactical and operational methods for amphibious combat.
This observation is borne out by the appearance of a large number of amphibious warfare articles, published early in 1982 before the Falklands Conflict, in such journals as Voen- n'i Vestnik, Voenno-lstoricheskii Zhurnal, and Morskoy Sbor- n'k- In part, these articles built upon the experience gained in [he Zapad-81 exercise, and the Falklands Conflict provided a natural medium for further study of joint operations. The campaign proved to be rich in up-to-date experience from which the Soviets could learn. In the context of the 1982 Gaining plan, the Falklands Campaign was, of course, a chance occurrence, but its lessons were consciously integrated and tested later in that year.
There are several indications that this was indeed the case, he first indicator is an article by Admiral of the Soviet Fleet ''Crgei Gorshkov in the July Voenno-lstoricheskii Zhurnal, Published just after the Falklands War.74 Admiral Gorshkov’s 'heme stresses the importance of joint operations, and al- 'hough it is written in terms of World War II experience, its connection to operations in the South Atlantic is apparent. He Points out that when Soviet ground forces and naval forces ac'ed in close cooperation during World War II, successful °Perations resulted. When they acted independently, without Unified control, the results were very costly. The most strikes historical example he uses is a British one: the fall of Singapore in 1942. The Japanese fleet blockaded Singapore, out the British surrendered only after the Japanese surrounded mem on the ground. This situation is analogous to the fall of '’ort Stanley in June 1982.
Admiral Gorshkov carefully words his article to demon- s'mte the need for, and the ability of, the navy to further the (Jverall war effort, that is, to assist the ground forces in their mission. While he never subordinates the navy to the army,
® makes it clear that unified command and control and closely coordinated joint operations will be essential in future Wars. This is one lesson which he can drive home to his ground forces counterparts in the wake of the Falklands.
A second indicator that the experience gained from the mklands Conflict is being put to use was manifested in meld-82, the 25 September-1 October Warsaw Pact maneuVers m Bulgaria. This exercise was probably planned much earlier in the year in order to apply on a grand scale the theoretical lessons then under study. Nevertheless, during these maneuvers, landing techniques involving the simultaneous use of landing craft and helicopters were used for the first time.
The November 1982 Morskoy Sbornik contains an article by Admiral V. Chernavin, Chief of the Navy’s Main Staff, which serves as a final indicator of the direct influence of the Falklands Campaign on Soviet thinking.75 Admiral Cher- navin’s article is essentially an end-of-year assessment of training in the Soviet Navy, but among the lessons he stresses are amphibious assault operations, problems of electronic warfare, and the command, control, and communication questions raised by the Sheffield incident. He appears, therefore, to have generalized some of the Falklands lessons for navywide consideration.
Paralleling the study of the Falklands Conflict are articles in the Soviet press on other methods of naval power projection. The Soviets extensively analyze the organization and methods of the U. S. Marine Corps and the Rapid Deployment Force, now Central Command, as well as the command and control structure of the U. S. Navy and Marine Corps. In one article they point out that the British had to task organize the South Atlantic fleet as well as the ground forces that landed and fought in the Falklands. Without directly comparing British and U. S. command structures, the Soviets provide analysis of each and let readers draw their own conclusions. The Soviets also continue to devote substantial effort to studying how frogmen, SEAL [sea, air, and land] teams,
SAS [Special Air Service] and SBS [Special Boat Squadron] teams, and U. S. Special Forces are organized and employed. These articles are not just news reports. They are serious analytical pieces that will be used in developing Soviet means and methods and will provide lessons on enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities.
These studies, coupled with the articles discussed in this feature, form a mosaic depicting the emerging Soviet concepts for naval power projection ashore in remote regions. What is new is that the Soviets are considering such ideas in relation to ocean theaters. Their previous amphibious experience has been limited to coastal seas and enclosed seas, such as the Black Sea operations and Kurile Islands landings of World War II. Now, however, with all the means necessary for structuring an amphibious armada within their technological capability, and with their first 65,000- to 75,000-ton aircraft carrier now in sight, it would seem reasonable for the Soviets to develop a doctrine for employment of those means.
141
H'oceedings / January 1986
Though he never subordinates the navy to the army, Admiral Gorshkov believes that unified command and control and closely coordinated joint operations will be essential in future wars. This is one lesson he can drive home to his ground forces’ counterparts in the wake of the British success in the Falklands.
The significance that the Falklands Campaign holds for the Soviets is in demonstrating how such amphibious operations should be executed far from friendly shores, and in highlighting the planning considerations which must be taken into account in a modern environment. In short, the British put together what the Soviets see as a textbook case operation: the large proportion of British naval forces employed, their ability to concentrate in an ocean theater far from home, their successful system of air defense, and their conduct of an amphibious landing which was nearly perfect on its first day all demonstrate the standard of excellence for modem naval force employment. Hence, the Falklands Campaign may well be the catalyst for developing a modem Soviet amphibious warfare doctrine in the ocean theater of war.
Conclusions: From the standpoint of Soviet military science, three broad observations may be drawn from the Falklands Conflict.
- First, On Development of the Soviet Navy: The conflict was a small, local war with specific circumstances. Generalizing the lessons of the war, though possible, must be done with care. Nonetheless, the war included the most significant and intense naval and amphibious engagements in 40 years, and it is therefore appropriate that lessons in these areas be given broad application. Changes in Soviet naval force structure, procedures, and ship design will result from studies of the Falklands campaign.
- Second, On Assessing the Enemy’s Capabilities: As the Soviets point out, the combat activity of the Argentines, except for their air force, was aimless, indecisive, and even passive. Therefore, Soviets reserve judgment on the British ground forces’ performance because the British encountered no serious resistance. British naval forces provided adequate air defense by the end of the conflict, but Soviets reserve judgment on their surface-to-surface combat capability. Naval aviation Sea Harriers were capable, given the circumstances, but the British lacked long-range interceptors.
- Third, On Quantity Versus Quality: The West thinks of the Soviets as being very concerned about combat ratios between themselves and their opponents. In the case of the Falklands, numbers of men and equipment made less of a difference than the capabilities of the men and systems and how these were employed. In the search for greater capabilities, the Soviets will continue to seek technological solutions, yet they will not likely alter their outlook on numbers either, because they rely on numbers for strategic defense. The changes we can anticipate will be in tactics and procedures, as the Soviets attempt to make the most from British experience in local wars.
Finally, from the Soviet standpoint there are five major lessons of the war:
- At sea, nuclear-powered submarines have unqualified preeminence among offensive naval weapons. Aircraft carriers are important in the battle for air superiority, but only in specific ocean theaters of maritime combat where land-based aircraft cannot do the job effectively.
- In amphibious operations, reconnaissance-diversionary teams are highly effective, along with offensive operations at night and the use of multiple means of landing to increase tempos in the assault.
- Commercial ships have wartime usefulness. In this area, the Soviets lead significantly the United States in ship numbers and may increase the enviable versatility of their commercial fleet by constructing Arapaho-design flight decks.
- In the air, certain World War 11-vintage attack techniques are effective. Perhaps conventional air-dropped torpedoes may make a brief comeback, but what the Soviets really have in mind are attacks by large numbers of aircraft with many sophisticated sea-skimming missiles like Exocet, which would be capable of saturating the air defenses of ships. In addition, British successes with vertical take-off or landing aircraft have caused the Soviets to review their own vertical take-off or landing program. The imperative for providing continuous airborne early warning surveillance to detect low-flying aircraft has also received attention.
- Finally, in the field of electronic warfare, passive air defense systems work. As Captain Rodionov’s article shows, the Soviets have begun to study ways of overcoming such systems. The Sheffield incident has taught them the need to integrate all electronic systems on board ships in order to be fully compatible and functional under the worst conditions.
6yRAdm-Eng. G. Popov, Doctor of Technical Sciences. Professor, “The Role of Electronic Systems in the Activities of Naval Forces,” Morskoy Sbornik, No. 11-82, p. 76.
’“Rodionov and Novichkov, op. cit.. pp. 79-80. (In contrast, the Argentines deny that they were attacking HMS Hermes and insist that Atlantic Conveyor was the intended target; Royal Navy Rear Admiral '‘Sandy'’ Woodward, First Officer First Flotilla, attributes the loss of the ship to the decision to sail her closer to the beachhead to provide faster support to the commandos.)
'"Ibid., p. 79.
12lbid„ p. 80.
^Ibid.. p. 82.
74Adm. S. Gorshkov, “Soviet Art of Warfare in the Great Patriotic War," Voenno-lstoricheskii Zhurnal. No. 7-82, pp. 10-18. (Translated in JPRS 82543, No. 7, July 82.)
75Adm. V. Chemavin, chief of Main Staff of the navy, Flero of the Soviet Union, "A High Level of Training is the Foundation of Combat Readiness,’’ Morskoy Sbornik, No. 11-82, pp. 10-17.
Major Bruner served a tour in the U. S. Army's infantry division in Korea and is presently the Deputy Inpsector General of the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) at Fort Lewis, Washington. He is a graduate of Coronado’s landing force staff planning course, and is a Soviet foreign area specialist concentrating on foreign policy and the use of military power as an instrument of policy.