The debate simmers. In a special report to Congress, the commanders of the unified and specified commands, the service chiefs, and the JCS chairman—pictured
■joined the SecDef and the service secretaries to answer 32 questions on the issue of JCS reorganization.
The Insiders’ Views
By Lieutenant Sam J. Tangredi, U. S. Navy
The Congress is continuing its detailed review of the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and of the Department of Defense (DoD) as a whole begun in 1982 when General David C. Jones, former Chairman of the JCS, made his proposals for change. The most revealing manifestation of the congressional review is a special report to Congress, dated 5 March 1985, compiled by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) in response to the Fiscal Year 1985 Appropriations Bill which asked questions of current defense decision makers on the issue of JCS reorganization.
The sum of these responses provides a valuable assessment of the organization and operation of DoD as seen by those who now are charged with the nation’s defense. An analysis of these responses does much to place the differences between the current and past serving defense officials in perspective, and leads to general conclusions toward the proper operation of the nation’s defense establishment and to informed judgments on proposed changes to it.
Questions and Answers: The major thrust of the questions posed by Congress relates to issues involving four themes that have recurred throughout the reorganization debate:
► The adequacy of the unification of the four services within DoD
► The efficacy of JCS advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President
► The logic of the current chain of command and the ability of the commanders in chief (CinCs) to influence the DoD and service resource allocation process ► The divided responsibility between the military departments superintending the forces and the chain of command providing for their employment
While respondents were not asked to comment on all the issues that have been raised in this debate, the mosaic of answers to this series of questions indicates a pattern of agreement: (1) DoD does not require a radical legislative change to correct inefficiencies, but is proceeding smartly within current legislative authority toward a greater integration of effort; (2) good relationships and communications among the principals are much more effective than organizational changes in providing for efficiency and unification; (3) military advice to the President and, indeed, the efficient operation of the DoD rely primarily on the abilities of the advisors and operators, and not so much on the procedures of the organization.
On this position, Chairman of the JCS General John W. Vessey clearly points out that organization and procedures are not the keys to wise defense decision making; rather it is the wise defense decision maker. When asked about JCS Joint Staff procedures and advice to the President and the Secretary of Defense, General Vessey responds: ‘“Procedures’ don’t produce the advice: people produce the advice. . . . When they don’t [produce the best advice], it is not a question of procedures, it is a question of their wisdom.”
Likewise, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral James D. Watkins summarizes the view of the incumbent chiefs regarding the need for major legislative changes: ”, . . the best and sole solution to [the problems of the joint staff] can only come from those who must live and work within the system.”
Views of the Secretary of Defense: When questioned about additional improvements in the DoD effort to promote the ‘‘concept of unification,” Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger identifies congressional restrictions as the major roadblock to a series of initiatives he has undertaken to promote consolidation and centralization. Pointing out that integration of the services’ operations is one of the primary roles of the SecDef, he urges that Congress refrain from enacting proposed legislation that would require formal congressional approval of organizational or functional consolidations involving the military departments.
Secretary Weinberger also believes that changes within the structure of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) should be evolutionary and responsive to the direct needs of the Secretary of Defense if the overarching principle of civilian control is to be preserved. He cites the frequency and scope of personal communications between the President and the Secretary of Defense and the joint military leadership as the most important factor to the successful use of military advice by the National Command Authorities (NCA).
He argues that the expansion of these communications is one of the most significant efforts and major improvements of the current administration. For example, he has established the JCS Chairman as the spokesman for the CinCs for resource allocation, and he has instituted the practice of inviting the CinCs to make personal appearances before the Defense Resources Board at least twice yearly. Secretary Weinberger is convinced that enhancing the CinCs’ role in the planning, programming, and budgeting system in this way is but one example where improvements can be made without resorting to legislative change.
Secretary Weinberger’s philosophy on the use of his advisers and staffs is revealing: the responsibility of the staff of the OSD is to allow the SecDef to preserve effective civilian control of the military. Thus, OSD would appear to have a “complementary, not competing role” with the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (OJCS). Since the OSD staff is responsible to the SecDef alone, it should be the SecDef who is most able to make reasonable judgments on the size and composition of the OSD staff; and Secretary Weinber- §cr finds “it . . . inconsistent with the concept of civilian control [for Congress] to expand the responsibili- bes of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at ihe expense of the Secretary of Defense.” Secretary Weinberger supports the present relationships between the service secretaries and the service chiefs. In his v>ew, the staffs of the service secretaries are integral to the maintenance of civilian oversight and control in the development of forces by the military departments, but are not responsible for the day-to-day operational control that is the purview of the JCS in accordance with *he guidance from the SecDef. States Mr. Weinberger:
“I do not believe the staffs of the Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs should be integrated. If we are going to have Service Secretaries and expect them to remain effective in exerting civilian control, they must have separate staffs, dedicated to providing them with analytical support and executive assistance. Otherwise, the Service Secretaries would be reduced to mere figureheads, with no independent capability for arriving at individual, informed opinions on Service issues.”
On the issue of the operational chain of command, Secretary Weinberger maintains that the current chain is clear, and the JCS members do not have, nor should they have, independent command authority. From this Perspective, the phrase “through the JCS,” used in fisting DoD directives to describe the flow of operational direction from the President and SecDef to the OinCs, represents both the abilities of the JCS members to provide strategic direction of the forces in accordance with the guidance of the NCA and to convert National policy and objectives into military terms readily understandable by the CinCs.
Secretary Weinberger maintains that personal communications among the President, SecDef, and the joint military leadership make for the most effective use of military advice by the National Command Authorities.
Views of the JCS Chairman and of the Joint Chiefs: Certainly, among the most prevalent questions about DoD in general and the JCS system in particular is whether the members of the JCS are able to place the national interests above those of their particular services. General Vessey strongly asserts that they can and do. States General Vessey, “I am not the only uniformed officer in Washington who views issues from a perspective independent of a single Service. ... all the members of the JCS (and the Joint Staff) are to view national security issues beyond that of a single Service. ... In my observation, except in very rare instances, this has been done.” In the chairman’s view, the ability of each of the service chiefs/JCS members to “hang Service loyalties and prejudices on the hat rack outside the JCS meeting room ... is a matter that must be considered by the Secretary of Defense and the President in selecting the Service Chiefs. ’
“Dual-hatting” of the service chiefs as JCS members is one of the major strengths of the current system. General Vessey maintains that,
“the knowledge which each Chief brings to the JCS about his particular Service is an important contribution to his ability to function as a member of the JCS; (and) the knowledge he takes from his duties as a member of the JCS to his job as Service Chief is very useful to him in performing his job as Chief of his Service. To perform their duties, the JCS must have a thorough understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the Services. I know of no one who should be able to provide that knowledge better than the respective Service Chiefs.”
The service chiefs agree that the concept of the “dual-hatting” of the service chief as a member of the JCS is not the liability many critics suggest. As Admiral Watkins points out, through “advisory and deliberative involvement with the other Joint Chiefs of Staff, each Service Chiefs overall knowledge and capability to enhance his individual Service’s readiness, effectiveness and efficiency are directly improved.” It is this situation, according to the CNO, that “provides the vital link that integrates joint strategic deliberations and planning with the training, equipping and readiness of forces to execute the strategy.” The law makes it clear: the primary duty of each JCS member is his duty as a member of the JCS, and continuity in the service chief function is provided by a vice chief in each of the services able to act with full authority in his absence. This view is shared by General Charles A. Gabriel, Air Force Chief of Staff, who sees no better alternative to link joint strategy, service programs, and the policy directives of the civilian leadership.
General John A. Wickham, Army Chief of Staff, believes,
“Separating the roles of Service Chiefs and the JCS would be a mistake ... all too often we assume that a conflict of interest exists . . . such is usually not the case. The fact that the issues facing the JCS are viewed in the light of the national interest does not mean that those same issues are not viewed by the Army in the same manner. On those occasions when the Army’s particular interests or views did not coincide entirely with what I believed, as a member of the JCS, to be in the national interest,
I have been quite willing to alter our Service position.”
The law established a joint staff as the corporate staff of the JCS to help the chiefs perform their joint duties. The effectiveness of this corporate staff has also been the source of questions. General Vessey maintains that significant improvements in the effectiveness of the staff have been made with the current body of chiefs. The service chiefs agree with General Vessey that the quest for “more efficient” Joint Staff “procedures” is secondary to that for more experienced, better-trained Joint Staff officers. The quality of officers assigned to the Joint Staff is currently high and the development of modem training courses will improve performance among the Joint Staff. By combining strict attention to the DoD requirement for significant joint service experience for promotion to flag/general rank with the new legislative authority of the Chairman of the JCS to select Joint Staff officers, the chairman sees a continuing future improvement in the joint staff product, obviating congressionally mandated organization changes beyond those previously proposed by the JCS. General Vessey states, “It is not a question of organization, it is a question of selecting, training and guiding the right people.” Correspondingly, neither the chairman nor any other current member of the JCS sees a need for a separate “General Staff” organization dedicated solely to the use of the chairman, particularly if such an organization were to be manned by officers with only staff experience but not the wisdom brought by continuous and direct operational experience.
One congressional question implies that JCS positions are “pre-negotiated,” suggesting that such advice does not allow for the presentation of alternative viewpoints, thereby preventing consideration of the complete range of options. In the view of the service chiefs, such is not the case. The ease with which alternative viewpoints or elaborative information can be presented, partly because of the close personal communications among the Chiefs, the President, and Secretary Weinberger, is demonstrated in the statements of Admiral Watkins: “Since SecDef is in almost daily contact with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and with the JCS at least once a week, he can effectively gain any additional data he desires regarding recommendations provided by the JCS.”
Criticisms that the JCS members are too eager to
THE WHITE HOUSE
General Vessey and the Joint Chiefs—meeting with the President, Vice President, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Advisor—emphasize that the dual-hat nature of the existing joint system generates military advice based on operational and command experience.
reach a consensus, or are unable to reach a consensus, recur. Perhaps these criticisms stem from the political unacceptability of “bad news,” or represent a “dislike” of the advice given rather than any particular flaw in its logic. As General Vessey points out, “As in the case of all advisors who perform their duties well, the JCS from time to time have to give Secretaries of Defense advice they may not like to hear. But to be honest to the oath that they have sworn to serve the country they must do so.” Since it is difficult to separate “bad” advice from ‘‘unpopular”advice, it remains unclear to the current JCS members how reorganization can eliminate “bad” advice. Further, plausible altema- tives are not sacrificed for consensus as some critics allege. The Marine Commandant General P. X. Kelley states, “Consensus is not necessary; it is not required hy law and should not be the ultimate criterion. . . .
Full disclosure of contrary views should be heard; the current system encourages this approach. In fact, the law requires differences among the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be reported to the Secretary of Defense.”
The chairman makes it clear throughout his responses that JCS advice to the President and the Secretary of Defense should not be confused with the Joint Staff “advice” or briefings to the JCS. JCS advice is based °n the operational and command experience of the Joint Chiefs, and not solely on material provided by the Joint Staff. In addition, each JCS member/service chief has immediate access to the service-specific information that is the province of his own service staff, an advan- iage which accrues as a result of the dual-hat nature of °ur joint system.
That is not to say that the chiefs view the present ‘procedures” of the Joint Staff—procedures that assist ln the development of JCS advice—as being impervious to improvement. Admiral Watkins seeks to “ensure that our joint procedures are revised to clearly reflect lack of requirement for unanimity.” His response and toat of General Wickham imply a pending change to the current staffing procedure for Joint Staff papers.
The bottom line appears to be general support for management improvements, not sweeping organizational changes, to improve Joint Staff procedures. Such changes, according to this view, are best undertaken by the JCS members themselves and not through legisla- tton. The sole legislative change for the Joint Staff that toaintains some service chief support is the proposal to lift the 400-officer limit on the size of the Joint Staff, an artificial limitation out of accord with the broad responsibilities of the JCS. This proposal was specifically toentioned in the responses of the chairman of the Army and Air Force chiefs of staff.
Views of the Service Secretaries: The service secrecies’ responses indicate their commitment to their r°les as the executive agents to the Secretary of Defense for their particular military departments, representing “by custom and statute the fundamental concept of civilian authority” within the military departments. Each agrees that the service secretary has toe legal responsibility for organizing, manning, equipping, and training the forces, and acting as the senior Chilian counselors to the Secretary of Defense. As ICvy Secretary (SecNav) John Lehman explains, the service chiefs are advisors to the President and Secretory of Defense as the members of the JCS and they report to the service secretaries for the conduct of service activities in peacetime. Thus, in times of peace the service secretary remains the Secretary of Defense’s representative for oversight and direction. That does not mean that the service secretaries are or consider themselves part of the chain of command for military operations. States the SecNav, “Neither the Service Chief nor the Service Secretary are in the chain of operational command.” This permits the service organizations the opportunity to concentrate solely on their management and resource functions.
As in the personal relationships among the JCS members and the Secretary of Defense, a close, personal and honest relationship between each service secretary and his respective chief or chiefs appears as at least as valuable as the organizational authority. For a minimum of efficient administration, from the perspective of Secretary of the Army John Marsh, effective “communications between these two individuals is a prerequisite.”
Questioned as to the possibility of integrating the service secretariats with the military staffs of the services, the secretaries view such a move as denying them the tools for independent oversight, reducing direct civilian control from a position of “authoritative executive presence” to that of a “mere figurehead.”
Air Force Secretary Verne Orr and Mr. Marsh view the service secretariats as not only non-duplicative of the service staffs because of their oversight role and higher management level but also concentrating their manpower in functions not performed by the service staffs, such as public relations, congressional liaison, and some intelligence functions. In the SecNav’s view, substantial reductions in the service secretariats can be brought about “only if the burden of non-productive paperwork imposed by the proliferation of bureaucracy, joint staffs and congressional staffs were reduced in proportion.”
The SecNav’s response also points to the change in operational philosophy within DoD brought about by Defense Secretary Weinberger which restored the importance of the service secretaries as the executive agents:
“Secretary Weinberger brought to the Pentagon a well-established management philosophy based on ‘centralized policy formulation and decentralized . . . execution.’ He has applied this philosophy effectively. While not seeking to dismantle the centralized OSD bureaucracy that had built up since Secretary McNamara’s administration” (an administration Secretary Lehman characterizes as shifting management authority from the SecDef’s executive agents to his personal staff due to a preference for staff-oriented, rather than line-oriented management) “he returned the authority and accountability of the Service Secretaries, making them once again in fact as well as law his executive agents.”
Views of the CinCs: The four questions directed to the commanders in chief of the unified and specified commands concern two significant issues: (1) CinC influence in the service/DoD resource allocation process and participation in the defense-wide planning, programming and budgeting system (PPBS), and (2) CinC authority and control over forces assigned to each of their commands. Both issues have origins in the inherent division of responsibility between preparing forces on the one hand and employing them on the other. Should the CinCs’ views not be heard in developing the individual services’ Program Objective Memoranda (POM), realism in force development and the health of the Nation’s deterrent forces in the field would suffer proportionately. Under normal procedures, the CinCs were expected to make their resource requirements known to the services through their service component commanders, a process several CinCs see as being too indirect for achieving the short-term results necessary for correcting immediate resource deficiencies in their operating forces. The few exceptions to “indirect influence” are in the case of the three specified commands, all of which are Air Force major commands capable of direct service POM input, and the Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Command who is his own naval component commander.
To eliminate possible disconnects, Secretary Weinberger has made a series of changes to the PPBS in order to enhance direct CinC involvement. In addition to providing for CinC personal appearances before the Defense Resources Board, the JCS Chairman now acts as “spokesman” for the CinCs in resource allocation issues. As General Vessey points out, this role was incorporated into Title 10 by the Conference Committee in October 1984. The most recent change to the PPBS procedures include provision for the submission of a CinC priority resource list directly to the SecDef and JCS. The responses of the CinCs indicate a general agreement that these actions have significantly enhanced CinC influence in the development of Service POMs and in the final budget. While many of the Unified CinCs see an imbalance between CinC operational responsibility and control over resources, all foresee a continuing OSD and JCS effort to ameliorate this.
On the issue of authority over component commanders, particularly in light of the provisions of JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces, which details the appropriate relationships within joint commands, several CinCs see an even greater need for change. General Wallace H. Nutting, Commander in Chief,
U. S. Readiness Command, views the problem as particularly severe, interfering in his ability to prepare for his “wartime” mission of defending North America, the “strategic rear.” Others of the unified CinCs favor an even more unified system than at present, characterizing the current system as a too “federated system,” as General Nutting calls it. However, most would agree with the words of Admiral William J. Crowe, Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Command:
“We have now had considerable experience with the unified command system and ... I am not convinced that a federated system is as necessary as it once appeared. This question, however, involves a great deal more than the limited perspective of a theater commander since any change would impact heavily on the services, JCS, OSD as well as the unified commands . . . Moreover, (the CinCs) appreciate that no system will be perfect and that in the final analysis your best protection against mistakes or disaster is to have good people working the system—whatever it looks like.”
The key issue seems to be one of resources. There simply are not enough forces and support to go around, and the Secretary of Defense, the service secretaries, and the JCS members must make reasonable decisions about the allocation of resources to support our national strategy in a sensible way so as to reduce the risk to our national interests. In the words of General Vessey:
“Considering the changes that have been made in recent years, the balance is close to being correct and the movement is in the right direction. A CINC’s main business is operational business not budgeting and programming; nevertheless, the programming and budgetary process is important to the CINCs. The process produces the CINCs’ forces and supports their ability to fight. The Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary and the JCS have worked to have the views of the CINCs clearly heard. . . . The CINCs do have adequate authority to lay out their requirements to the Service Component Commanders and through them to the Services as well as authority to lay out those requirements directly to the Secretary of Defense and the JCS. There are cases in some unified commands where insufficient forces are allocated to the command in peacetime to perform the wartime missions. There are other cases whether certain missions will become more important as future threats develop.”
Conclusions: Having examined the assembled “inside views of the Defense Department officials currently in command,” both military and civilian, seven general conclusions can be made.
First, the incumbents oppose “major legislative” changes for DoD. Recognizing where inefficiencies exist and must be corrected, they believe that the system is basically sound and capable of adapting to current requirements. There appears no support for the concept of an independent “General Staff,” for an independent chairman, or a restructuring of the traditional division of labor between the military departments and the operational chain of command.
Second, good interpersonal relations between the principals are seen as the key to proper operation and effective military advice to the civilian decision makers. No organizational structure can make up for the wrong people in key jobs or for a lack of trust among decision makers.
Third, selection of good, well-trained and experienced staff personnel is the key method for improving the functions of the Joint Staff and, in turn, improving planning for joint operations. Better people, not organi-
zational changes, are viewed as critical for continued improvements.
Fourth, there is a firm commitment to the legacy of civilian control. The Secretary of Defense and the service secretariats play vital roles in the proper administration of the military departments and they ensure civilian control as required by law. Secretary Weinberger’s emphasis on renewal of the role of “executive agent” has revitalized the authority of the service secretaries.
Fifth, the service chiefs believe that the concept of
dual-hatting” is particularly important in ensuring both cooperation between the service and good, timely military advice to the NCA. They do not believe a personal conflict of interest exists between their two roles.
Sixth, while disconnects between CinC requirements und service programs may exist, the CinCs believe significant progress is being made through the efforts of the SecDef and JCS.
And finally, there is an overall view that those pushing for reform are not fully aware of the improvements made during the current administration, and are judging the organizational system as it formerly appeared, not as it is today. The question that the incumbents, those who must deal with the requirements of the present and the future, seem to ask is: “Do we want to make massive changes to a system that is already effective and is improving?”
From their perspective, the view from the inside, the answer is “No.”
Lieutenant Tangredi a 1978 graduate of the Naval Academy, served his initial assignment as main propulsion assistant in the USS Paul (FF-1080). Selected to the Carrier Readiness Improvement Program, he served as boilers/propulsion services officer in the USS Ranger (CV-61). He was appointed as a junior officer intern to the Joint Staff, serving in the Program Budget Analysis Division, J-5, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, where he was first exposed to the reorganization issue. He is currently studying for a master’s degree in National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School.
JCS Reports_____________________
Reviewed by Vice Admiral John T. Hayward, U. S. Navy (Retired)
Toward A More Effective Defense: The Final Report of the CSIS Defense Organization Project
Philip A. Odeen, Chairman, Washington, DC: Center ^0r Strategic and International Studies, 1985. 67 pp.
Annexes.
Report of the CNO Select Panel: Reorganization °f the National Security Organization
Admiral R. L. J. Long, U. S. Navy (Retired) Chairman, Washington, DC: U. S. Navy, 1985. 436 pp. (typescript) Annexes.
During his first term, President Ronald Reagan enjoyed widespread support for his efforts to restore our country’s military strength after years °f neglect. That support is now waning. There are jnany reasons why this is so. One is a loss in the pub- *c s confidence that the current defense organization Can effectively manage its many resources. This has led to a wave of proposed reforms to get the defense orga- n,zation back on track.
One comprehensive program designed to address this Very complex and expansive issue is offered in Toward a More Effective Defense: The Final Report of the SIS Defense Organization Project. Sponsored by The Renter of Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Georgetown University, this report represents the resuits of an 18-month effort by nearly 70 individuals who have had careers in the defense establishment or Congress. The report’s specific recommendations can be grouped into three areas: defense planning and military advice, resource allocation and congressional oversight, and program evaluation.
While not specifically stated to be a response to the CSIS report, Report of the CNO Select Panel: Reorganization of the National Security Organization examines the defense reorganization debate and the many proposals for changes in the defense organization. Commissioned by the Chief of Naval Operations, the panel was composed of five retired flag officers: Admiral Robert L. J. Long, U. S. Navy (Retired), chairman; Admiral Bobby R. Inman, U. S. Navy (Retired); Vice Admiral Frank W. Vannoy, U. S. Navy (Retired); Rear Admiral Samuel H. Parker, U. S. Navy (Retired); and Brigadier General James H. Hittle, U. S. Marine Corps (Retired). Organized in two parts, the first contains the panel’s conclusions and recommendations; the second records the panel’s positions on key issues raised in public commentary and recent congressional hearings.
Two annexes provide amplifying background on the statutory structure of the national security organization and the current public commentary and legislative actions related to the reorganization issue.
Because of the point (CSIS)-counterpoint (Navy) character of these reports, I will review the highlights of the CSIS report first and attempt to offer insights into some of the proposals for changes.
The CSIS report is divided into four main parts. The first deals with the joint military structures in existence and makes the case that stronger joint military organizations are required to develop the cross-service perspective necessary to properly integrate the different services’ elements for a coordinated approach to military missions. Although the study gets wrapped around the axle on so-called “cumbersome” staffing procedures, there exists much more cross-service advice on the use of our armed forces than is alleged in this report. The report’s description of the procedures of the Joint Staff is exaggerated and often not factual. The statement that service members of the Joint Staff are judged by how effectively they have represented their service is not true. One finds merit in Admiral Tom Moorer’s comments, contained in the report’s endnote, “ . . . assignment of good people, both civilian and military, and a clear-cut designation of authority, responsibility, and accountability will ensure the best performance, rather than periodic reorganizations.”
A central theme of this report is the recommendation to amend the National Security Act to make the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the principal military adviser to the President, the Secretary of Defense (Sec- Def), and the National Security Council, replacing the corporate Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in that role. This is offered as the solution to the problems the CSIS report sees with the JCS. Many arguments can be made that such a change would be wrong for the United States. Nothing currently prevents the JCS Chairman from giving an opinion not tied to the perspective of any service. Cross-service perspective is obtained by listening to the chiefs of the services, weighing the arguments, and coming to a decision.
Behind this recommendation seems to be the idea that a Chief of General Staff is the answer to all our problems, although the study does not say it specifically. The Army lost this debate in 1947, and ever since the Unification Act, various groups have pushed this solution. If we had a general staff, we would have a group of military men who were staff officers working their entire careers in the joint planning area for the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS. Undoubtedly, the result would be a separate corps with its own distinguishing service device.
The model for this organization, the German General Staff, left a lot to be desired. The General Staff’s complete lack of appreciation for what Germany could do at sea is well established. Our own history shows clearly how some very brilliant generals have been unable to appreciate the whole spectrum of warfare. Prior to the Korean War and the successful Inchon landing, General Omar Bradley, in his role as chairman, testified before Congress that there would never be another amphibious operation.
The report criticizes the “Joint Strategic Planning Document” for its failure to consider resources and leaving all the priority decisions to the Secretary of Defense. In fact, this document defines the scope of the threat to the United States and what force would be required to meet the threat. The Secretary of Defense, with the Secretary of State and the President, must make the prioritization decisions Nothing that the Joint Staff or the JCS does will change this fact. The report also recommends that there should be a separate budget to cover the in-theater operational costs of the unified and specified commands. This recommendation demonstrates a lack of understanding of the complexities of the environment in the actual preparation of the budget. None of the subheads of the Five-Year Defense Plan are matched with actual appropriation subheads that Congress appropriates for the Department of Defense (DoD) and the services. Since former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara’s time and the start of this process, these differences have existed. Congress is not about to reorganize its committee structure and the way the appropriations are now headed to do anything like this recommendation. In addition, such a change would place a tremendous burden on the unified and specified commanders which they are not equipped to handle.
The idea of the readiness budget is not bad. How to implement it is the problem. It covers the whole spectrum of defense, from beans to bullets, and is hard to put into one appropriation. It would be possible to have a sum of money put into a contingency part of the operations and maintenance appropriation, but the question would be how long it would last under the yearly budget process. Not long, would be my guess.
The study goes to great lengths to say that none of the recommended actions made undermine the principle of civilian control of the military. The proposed reorganization chart for the DoD has an Assistant Secretary for NATO and the North Atlantic and then has one for the rest of the world, reflecting the report’s European orientation. While Europe is a very small part of the world and the total interests of the United States, approximately 50 cents of every dollar we spend on defense goes to our European commitment. Harold Brown s feelings about us making the Navy a transport service to resupply our NATO allies is an example of this thinking. The report’s proposed reorganization drops logistics by establishing an Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. It also deletes the International Security Assistant Secretary, but has a Director of Test and Evaluation, which recognizes that Congress has so dictated that there be such an office. It now takes more than nine years to bring a system into the operating forces. Once again, another person is being added in the chain who can say no, but his yes does not mean the system will reach the fleet or the field.
Part II focuses on the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The discussion of mission orientation and the assignment of this task to the Undersecretary for Policy is not a very good solution to the problem as it is stated. The report makes the case for having someone in the SecDef’s office responsible for the armed services’ three major missions—defined as nuclear deterrence, North Atlantic and European defense, and projection of U. S. military power to defend U. S. in-
terests in other parts of the globe. It says his office should include an assistant secretary for each of these three major missions. This recommendation has two major flaws. First, it is too much of a task to expect this undersecretary to perform. Second, once again, it would add to the bureaucracy.
There also is a recommendation for an Undersecretary of Defense with broad oversight responsibilities for functions related to the readiness and sustainability of the operational forces, which appears to be the report’s solution to addressing the logistics area. He is supposed to have the ability and authority to ensure balanced trade-offs between the requirements for readiness and sustainability and consideration of force structure expansion and modernization. This is a monumental task and impacts across the entire defense budget and is practically an impossible task for such a person at that level.
The closing of this part of the report strongly recommends that DoD and the services cut their staffs. The proposals made to reorganize do not give one much of a feeling as to the DoD’s and services’ ability to make these cuts.
Part III is devoted to congressional defense oversight. It identifies three major problems with the existing situation—work overload, redundant review procedures, and excessive attention to short-term issues. The report recommends two fixes: first, shifting the defense budget to a biennial cycle; second, reestablishing the division of labor between the defense-authorizing and defense-appropriating committees.
The gray territory that exists between the authorization function and the appropriation will exist as long as Congress plays politics with the actual content of the procurement side of the defense budget. There are numerous instances where Congress has dictated what will be bought by the services for no other reason than the politics of the home district of the relevant congressman. The political dynamics of the situation are well known. The CS1S report’s pious hope is that DoD and Congress can get together and agree to develop a cooperative approach to do away with the problem.
This is wishful thinking.
Part IV of this report deals with force development and acquisition. It addresses the two major processes the SecDef has to help him integrate the plans, programs, and budgets of the individual military departments. They are: the planning, programming, and bud-
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Now Penn Ship's unusual capability in the desigh' f|( construction and conversion of containerships and roll'of11 geting system (PPBS) and the major system acquisition process. The PPBS was brought into DoD by Secretary McNamara. As of now, no five-year plan has even come close to being accomplished. Most of the hard decisions are put off until the later years, and then never made. The report accurately states that the planning” part of this has been neglected. There is a disconnect between national strategic objectives and this Process for guiding any program development. The on|y exception to this would be in the deterrence area. Jhis defect in the system will not be corrected by giv- lng the chore to the already overburdened new Undersecretary for Policy. The actual programming and budgeting part of this problem suffers from the fact that there is no relationship between the categories employed in DoD and the appropriations enacted by Congress. The programs are developed in terms of missions, such as the strategic nuclear forces, tactical a|rcraft, or air lift, in contrast to the appropriation subheads of military personnel, operations and maintenance, and procurement. It is most difficult to translate between programs and budgets.
The report discusses the evaluation of programs, which it says is lacking under the present system. Its
criticisms of the management systems employed by the DoD are valid, and the system can be much improved. It is a fact that the U. S. Government’s accounting system operates on an obligational basis. How can it be changed? The accrual basis still requires the obligational accounting. When one considers the variety of the programs the Defense Department procures and then looks at the spending rate as a function of years, one sees the problem. As an example, the shipbuilding appropriation spends about ten cents on the dollar in the first year of the contract. Operations and the maintenance appropriation spends a dollar on a dollar that is appropriated; for research, development, test and evaluation, Navy spends about 59 cents on a dollar appropriated. It appears DoD would have to do both the accrual and obligational accounting. The present system can be improved, and the report makes a valid point.
The CSIS report lists three basic problems with the DoD’s acquisition process: (1) an inadequate planning and selection process, (2) instability in programs and budgets, (3) the lack of market incentives throughout the process. The report suggests that the DoD should define the links between national strategy and specific acquisitions.
g|Pb ships is being used by the Navy to convert two containerships to T-AKR fast logistics ships.
C0wbile most shipyards would have to undertake a 9sh ersion such as this in the water, we bring the ship stre°re’ e|iminating all problems of alignment, structural crgn9th and stability and allowing us the freedom to bring fle)(,es to work on the ship from both sides and greater % in scheduling the conversion tasks.
to take on the U.S. Navy.
This is an almost impossible task given the uncertainties in our national strategy. It is done to a certain extent in the deterrence area, but generally not across the board. We do know we will fight on the sea and the land and in the air. We do know the odds are that we will have to be able to project our power across the sea. We do not know when and where. The above general statement about the tasks the services will have to perform pretty much covers the spectrum of the weapon systems required. We do not have a priority list of what might be required, and some of the tasks depend on several different weapon systems working perfectly. The criticism that the services develop weapons independently, each according to its own sense of national priorities, has been around a long time. But who knows best what it takes to fight at sea? We know basically what capability we must have for our national security. Does Harold Brown, a theoretical physicist, or McNamara know better than the people who will have to fight?
There are many examples of where the services have made combined weapon efforts successfully. One is in the air-to-air missile area. The Sparrow AIM-7 missile and the Sidewinder AIM-9L missile are common to all our air arms. The statement that many weapons are procured without a definitive relationship to overall national strategic objectives and priorities is not valid criticism of the system. Overcentralization can stifle the real competition, which is innovative and technical in nature. The classic example is the Sidewinder. If we had listened to the centralized dictum about this system it would never have been built. Here it is some 30 years later, improved and one of the best air-to-air weapon systems in the world.
The estimating of the costs of weapon systems is a most difficult task. This is particularly so where there is development involved. Estimating high-technology systems involves enormous uncertainties. One of the big problems is that neither DoD nor the services are in a position to write good engineering specifications nor do they require adequate documentation from the contractor on the item being built. This whole discussion in the CSIS report adds little to the solution of the problems associated with the acquisition process. Let me introduce an example of one of the best programs that solved the problem they discussed. Secretary Seaman of the Air Force began the prototype program between the F-16 Fighting Falcon and the F-17. This was to obtain the best fighter the state of the art could produce at the time. The contracts were awarded to General Dynamics and Northrop. Both companies were told the general parameters of the aircraft that were desired. No one wrote a specific requirement. The companies proceeded, and they then had a fly off between them. The F-16 won the competition. While one of the finest fighters in the world today and the first U. S. fighter to have a fly-by-wire control system, it never would have been accepted by the requirements bureaucracy.
One hears little of this successful approach to the development of a weapon system. Secretary Seaman
deserves a great deal of credit for this program. Compare it to the disastrous tactical fighter experimental TFX program of the McNamara regime. There are ways to do such things cost-effectively. Real competition will bring forth technical progress and innovation, not hampered by some usually too complex operational requirement. It is not true that the DoD always awards the contract to the lowest bidder, for it must consider all factors, like reliability and maintainability, in the selection process.
The report’s conclusions on the program and budget instability situation—i.e., detailed reviews create too many opportunities for legislative micro-management; there are too many new program starts, the cost of which are too often underestimated; research and development are too frequently revised—are all too true. There are so many people involved in this process that it is not an easy problem to solve. The long-range investment plan recommended could be used as a planning tool, but its weakness stems from the inherent inaccuracies of the projections of the cost of major weapon systems. The recommendation to baseline systems is a good one. There has to be better control in the acquisition process of the changes made during the program in the specifications and operational parameters.
The report’s statements on competition—e.g., “once the selection for initial development is complete, the rest of the program ... is normally conducted in a sole-source environment”—are essentially true. However, the situation is not as simple as the report makes it appear. As an example, take something as complex and expensive as the Phoenix missile. This weapon requires complicated production tooling and assets that run into millions of dollars. If you do not have numbers to produce it economically, it does not make sense to go to a second source. One would go to a second source if it were necessary to make sure the failure of one plant would not stop all production. If you had adequate documentation you could put it out for bid and get some competition if you could qualify the second source. While everyone agrees we should have competition in the acquisition process, second sourcing does not necessarily mean a system would be cheaper in overall cost. There is no substitute for hardware, which is what we want. It is more expensive in some systems to have prototype hardware, but in the majority of cases, it will pay off.
If the proposed CSIS program were implemented, how the services accomplish their missions would change significantly.
Done for the Chief of Naval Operations, the Navy report reviews the many changes that have been made to the National Security Organization and the Defense Department since the original National Security Act of 1947. It is immediately clear that the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, adopted during President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s second term, exerted the greatest influence for change. In effect, it made the Secretary of Defense the most powerful nonelected official in the
government since it gave him the most influential voice in the appointment of the chiefs of the services as well as the powerful unified commanders.
The Navy report essentially endorses the present system of the JCS. Its recommendations differ little from previous Navy positions. For example, it strongly opposes the proposal to designate the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as a statutory member of the National Security Council. The Navy has long argued against the continual upgrading or strengthening of the powers of the chairman. The Navy report opposes other changes advocated, such as making the chairman the principal military adviser to the President. It objects to inserting the chairman between the unified and specified commanders. The report supports strengthening the unified and specified commanders’ positions with reference to resource allocation and programming in the budget process and addresses their role in the decision-making process having to do with the attainment and maintenance of readiness and sustainability of their component forces.
The Navy report examines closely the DoD and the assignment of functions in the Defense Secretary’s office and his staff. It indicates that functions within the statutory purview of the joint chiefs are not now being performed by the joint chiefs, although the report fails to identify the specific functions.
The biggest weakness of this report is its failure to describe how the JCS function now, because many people discussing this matter have no idea just how it operates. It is generally assumed by those people who do not know how the Joint Staff operates that all decisions have to be by consensus and one always gets the least common denominator approach. This is not so.
Both studies miss a very basic point about the DoD. There are two chains in DoD: the money chain and the policy-strategy chain. The two meet too seldom. The money chain goes from the SecDef to the service secretaries and thus to the various functions of the services.
It does not meet the strategy-policy chain in the course of normal events. The strategy-policy chain goes from the SecDef to the JCS as well as the unified and specified commanders. The chairman and the corporate joint chiefs as such have practically no funds. It follows if the joint chiefs agree on a course of action they can, as service chiefs, have the money to implement it.
Those who favor double-hatting the joint chiefs fail to emphasize this strength of the organization. I suggested at the seminar on the military reform proposals at West Point two years ago that if the goal was to have the Chairman of the JCS make the military decisions, all that was required was to change the law so the money chain would pass through his hands. The response was immediate, strong, and negative: supposedly such an action would do away with civilian control of the military.
While the Navy report does not address all the issues that the CSIS report covers and is in conflict with many of the positions taken in that report, the two reports do agree on some positions. Both make a case that the service secretaries have too many assistants. These people have exerted more influence on operational requirements than their experience and positions merit.
Surprisingly, neither report goes into a real weakness in the system: the preparation of the operational requirements. This is an area where a great deal of the arguments for reorganization originate. The Secretary of the Navy took a step in the right direction to reduce the bureaucracy when he recently abolished the Office of the Chief of Naval Material. It is difficult to find out who is in charge of the various new weapons in the Navy. The weapons problem is a very difficult one because many various vehicles involved have their own interface requirements. The acquisition of a weapon which can be employed by several vehicles is usually the result of an evolutionary process which involves compromises that often penalize the weapon’s performance in certain applications. The classic example is the Harpoon missile. It was designed to meet a requirement for a standoff weapon for the P-3 against surfaced missile-launching submarines. Weight requirements for this application resulted in a missile warhead that is inadequate for many surface-to-surface applications.
Both reports also recommend having a biennial defense budget, which seems to have a great deal of merit.
These detailed studies contain a lot of material that deals with the problems we have in the U. S. national security and DoD organizations. I am not convinced that either report has arrived at workable solutions to some of the problems described. Both contain some good ideas, but mostly one finds wishful thinking about such things as changing the workings of Congress and their staffs. If these efforts lead to reducing the overall bureaucracy, however, they will have done well.
In conclusion, I quote some of the observations that the former Chairman of the JCS General David Jones made on U. S. military history. He states there is “a disconcerting pattern: (1) Unpreparedness at the onset of each new crisis or war; (2) initial failures; (3) reorganizing while fighting; (4) building our defenses as we crank up our industrial base; (5) prevailing by wearing the enemy down—by being bigger, not smarter.”
I do not believe these studies will lead to the correction of the pattern of events outlined here. This does not mean we should not seek to reform the national security organization. And while these studies may err in their proposals, much good can come from examining in detail our problems. The increasing complexity and the problem of training people in the modem tools of war make it mandatory that we recognize the next war will be one for which we will not have the time to prepare.
Admiral Hayward was graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in 1930 and served in numerous fleet, research and development, and OpNav billets in addition to being the President of the Naval War College. From 1968 to 1973, he was Vice President of General Dynamics, and now is a management and technical consultant.