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Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf met with Naval Institute staff members Paul Stillwell, Mark Gatlin, and Fred Rainbow in the admiral’s office to discuss surface warfare issues. The Navy’s leading surface warrior welcomed the opportunity to share his views with the members of his professional society. The record of this discussion follows.
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°ceedings: How does the emerging s obal maritime strategy affect your [?sP°nsibiIities as the Deputy Chief of aval Operations [DCNO] for Surface Warfare [OP-03]?
dmiral Metcalf: My basic responsi- “y is to develop programs to support k at strategy. This is nothing new ecause surface warfare for years has een, in my judgment, the pillar of ^ a^tirne strategy. The significant (oVel°Pment in surface warfare relative ° maritime strategy is that surface arfare ships are now becoming truly a aJ°r offensive arm of the Navy. It’s 1 that they’re replacing the aircraft ttter, because as long as you need to tons of ordnance on target, the air- att carrier and her air wing will be e best means to do that. However, jjC cniise missile, Tomahawk and arPoon simply are changing the whole ay We surface warriors think, and s changing the equation of naval "'arfare,
blow, quite frankly, many surface s-arfare officers don’t understand the jl^tttftcance of this change—most of us cn t- We’ve been in a defensive th°Uch for years. We and the rest of nu Navy have felt that our principal a- e Was one of defense—defending the rcraft carrier, the main offensive $uh ' of the Navy. Our role was anti- fe Marine warfare, antiair warfare, de- Dhv11® carr'er battle groups and amU 'bious forces, and providing for • val gunfire support. Except for the ’ these defensive roles have become a kind of mindset. We have several generations of naval officers who think of our particular contribution to naval warfare in terms of defense. That’s a bunch of malarkey. Ever since the Tomahawk and the Harpoon were developed, the Surface Navy has had the capability to project multiple threats to the Soviet Union. That’s the big change.
Of course, this fits into the maritime strategy, which asks: How do we put pressure on the Soviets? How do we organize ourselves so we’ll never go to war? The maritime strategy is a deterrent strategy. And if deterrence fails and a war results—how are we going to win? How are we going to prevent it from escalating? That’s the strategy. Clearly, the Surface Navy has a prime role, and, as our strategies and capabilities develop, that role will steadily increase.
Proceedings: You mentioned a shortage of understanding. How do you, as OP-03, foster an understanding in the surface warfare community of this offensive role?
Admiral Metcalf: Every time I speak. I’m doing it right now. I go around and make speeches. I speak at the War College; I speak to surface warfare officers and enlisted professionals ashore and afloat; I go to wardrooms and chiefs’ quarters, I do those things.
I’ll tell you what’s really happening. I have officers coming to OP-03 from
the fleet who see themselves and call themselves surface warriors. The surface warfare officer community is getting the idea that they’re warriors. If you read Surface Warfare Magazine, you’ll see up and coming warriors.
We have a new logo that talks to the up, out, and down challenge of surface warfare. I use this idea in my pitch to midshipmen. I point out that the most intellectually challenging part of today’s Navy is surface warfare. What must the young surface officer deal with? He’s got to cope with the hemisphere up to at least 100,000 feet, or if you include space—and I think you should—you’re up 200 to 300 miles. And you’re out to 1,000 miles, where the Soviets are at the outer limits of their ability to attack our forces at sea. That’s an enormous battle space in which the surface warfare officer must learn to fight. All right, that’s the up and out. Then there’s the down—the Soviet “Alfa” nuclear-powered attack submarine has a very deep-diving ability. So the surface warfare officer, whatever his ship, has got to have some idea of what it’s all about—up, out, and down.
We are on the threshold, with Aegis and with Tomahawk, of a new era in weapons systems. How do you fight these new systems and their weapons? It’s an enormous intellectual challenge that is proving to be very difficult to come to grips with. Aegis is revolutionary—not evolutionary. We don’t know yet how to fully exploit it.
Now, when I say we don’t know how to use it, I mean we continue to think in the conventional [defensive] sense. We’re using Aegis as an extension of how we did business before. Aegis just boggles the mind. I recently received a message from [Vice Admiral] Hank Mustin [Commander Second Fleet] about a recent readiness exercise in which he states that he just continues to be amazed at the capability of Aegis. It’s a very incredible system, and it’s just in time, I might add. But it’s offensive. It’s not defense, damn it all, it’s offense. That’s what Aegis is, and what the Surface Navy is all about.
Proceedings: Then you may have an easier time with the young surface warriors coming up as opposed to the people who’ve been around five to 15 years and lived with the defensive mindset.
Admiral Metcalf: Oh, yes. But fortunately, we’ve also got pros like Hank Mustin, who understand these things and are out there raising hell and taking names. We’ve got some young guys and senior people who really understand what this business is all about. I am encouraged because I see it all the time.
Proceedings: Is there a follow-on major combatant to the Aegis cruiser? Possibly a strike cruiser or something else?
Admiral Metcalf: No, if you’re defining “follow-on” as the bureaucratic pieces of paper we run along with, called five-year plans. But in my judgment, we will see ships of this type when we learn how to use the cruise missile and when we develop its capa-
. . there is no profession, including medicine, in which the incumbent is required to have more knowledge than in going to sea as a surface warfare professional today.” bility by both increasing its accuracy and weight of metal ordnance delivered. Warfare is ordnance on target— nothing else. When you don’t want to fight people, the threat of ordnance on target is a deterrent. Part of deterrence is to develop the mindset in your potential adversary that if necessary you’re going to put ordnance on target, and that you have the capability to do so, thus denying him what he would like to do.
So the strike cruiser will come and have her day when she can deliver significant ordnance on target. I believe that as we continue to improve our weapons, we’ll develop for Tomahawk a better conventional warhead than we have right now. We will develop cruise missile ordnance which we know will be effective and which the Soviets will understand to be effective. Actually, they understand now. Why do you think they want to get rid of cruise missiles? They understand this business perhaps better than we do. They look ahead. They have a better idea of what a strike cruiser with a VLS, vertical launching system, can do. The VLS is a subset of this revolution that’s going on at sea, because the weapon in the VLS can be the Tomahawk. We have acquired the capacity to store missiles in a vertical fashion. We must now improve our capability to get accurate targeting information to them. We need more capable nuclear warheads. When we have those improvements, that’s when the strike cruiser will be viable. Lots of people theorize about such a ship, but first we must develop these additional capabilities.
Proceedings: Doesn’t the Soviet Navy already have a strike cruiser in its Kirov?
Admiral Metcalf: Oh, yes. You see, the Soviet Navy has a different mission. With our offensive weapons at sea, they remain in a defensive crouch. Today the strike cruiser Kirov, without air cover, is not going to last very long. She really isn’t. However, we believe the Kirov AAW defenses are getting better and better. If the Soviets put very effective AAW weapons on the Kirov, she will become a tough ship to take out. So to keep the Kirov in a defensive role we’ve got to maintain the capability to make sure the Kirov cannot go where we cannot get to her. Even today I don’t think we should take on the Kirov with aviation assets because the possible cost is not worth it. You should take on the Kirov with a submarine or a surface action group. It would be stupid to lose a bloody airplane, putting her out of action. We have a stand-off weapon; let the Tomahawks in there. Our attack aircraft have better targets to strike.
Proceedings: Would you compare the carrier battle groups’ roles with those of surface action groups?
Admiral Metcalf: The carrier has the one advantage over other types of weapons at sea—her air wing can bring enormous ordnance to bear at long range. So when you want to bring a significant weight of ordnance to the enemy from a distance, the carrier is the weapon of choice and will be for years to come.
Now, in peacetime, a surface action group has enormous potential. In particular, there is nothing like a battleship. Battleships get people’s attention- Most of the world understands what comes out of the barrel of a gun— again it’s a deterrent, and that’s what the Navy is all about. Remember, when we talk of real offense and actual ordnance on target, we are talking about failure.
Proceedings: How do you feel about the return of the battleships? Is it a success? Beyond the battleships, what’s the future of naval gunfire support?
Admiral Metcalf: As long as there is a Marine Corps, there will be a future for gunfire support. The battleship is clearly the weapon of choice for a Marine or anybody else faced with the necessity to take out something that’s heavily defended with a lot of concrete, armor, and all the rest. The battleship is very good at doing that. Her 16-inch guns are a very, very accurate weapon- In testifying before Congress I started to get niggled about this issue of accuracy. I had with me a picture of the latest test of the battleship guns which had just obliterated the target. In the middle of the target area I drew the outline of the Capitol of the United States, and said, “Okay, if you had been there, this is what would have happened.” So it’s a very, very accurate weapon within its effective range- The battleship certainly holds Cuba at risk. It can be used in cases where Third World countries have sophisticated AAW defenses—Beirut was an example—where you simply don’t want to risk the man in a cockpit. The 16-inch projectile will do the job.
Proceedings: But don’t you have a problem with that if you don’t have an air spotter?
Admiral Metcalf: Usually you can get
spotting if you need it. If the position
the
margin. You have to get a real
that
seems to have been on the margin,
°f the target is accurately known, naval gunfire can be effective. I disagree W|th the conventional wisdom that you necessarily need a helicopter to spot or “tat it needs to be over the target where it’s going to get shot down.
Proceedings: Do you foresee applica- hons for employing high-endurance remotely piloted vehicles with the surface forces?
Admiral Metcalf: My problem is that re in an area where the subject is classified. Let me just say that I think here is a place for remotely piloted Vehicles. Technology is progressing so Wat perhaps we will be able to get a ecent payload and range out of an Payload and cost have always een the bottom line of this issue.
If you can make them cheap enough, y°u don’t worry about them coming ack. And, of course, an RPV with a Revision camera or high resolution camera could do the same thing as a 'Ve spotter. The objective is to get the Kfv up there and not care what happens to it. One of the things that drives aP the expense of an RPV is wanting it ack. We need to get them up there and let them go. We should build them °*rt of one-way materials and not worry ab°ut getting them back. Small RPVs are hard to hit. So yes, there clearly is a future for RPVs, and yes, they could e used for spotting.
Now, is there a future for one that ■Aw'd bring back to the surface ship? hat depends on the cost. I think it can ^ done, but I don’t know whether we "'ant to spend the money to do it. Like Wany wonderful things, this idea is on
Warfighting benefit relative to cost.
Pr
r°ceedings: Speaking of another thing "'hat do you see as the future of the advanced hull forms, especially 'A'VTH, in surface warfare?
Admiral Metcalf: When I came in ,ere as 03, I immediately looked at the uds which we were planning to use to ^Place our current FFGs, FFs, and j. uGs. I was looking to replace plat- fms with unconventional hull forms. ^f°und out that within OP-03 and the aval Sea Systems Command, we al- eady had a very serious unconven- lo°nal design effort under way. We are °°king at the three obvious ones—the j^rface effect ships, SWATH, and the ydrofoil. So we have very active stud* ongoing. We are also acting. We hope to build two T-AGOs ships in the fiscal year 1986. They were both planned to be built as monohulls. We now hope to make one a SWATH ship. As a T-AGOs ship, the SWATH configuration will be a little under 3,000 tons. Again, right now we’re planning to build SES minesweeper hunters—the MSHs.
So yes, although the Navy is rather conservative, we are getting our act together. The MSH is also going to be built out of a new material called glass- reinforced plastic, GRP, which in itself is a big advance.
When you talk about advanced hull forms, you have to recognize that you’ve got to develop the lightweight, high power propulsion systems needed to adequately power these ships. That’s why they haven’t really succeeded before. You need power, you need lightweight materials. SWATH is a great idea—except that like an airplane it is weight-sensitive. In a mono-hull, as you load, the hull goes down, but not very far before you’ve matched the new displacement—in other words, it’s the tons per inch immersion that you’re worried about. A SWATH ship with those slab sides, hey, the draft changes a lot more than a conventional hull as you load it down. A small weight addition results in a relatively large draft increase.
The real issue of weight we’ve got to work with. Ship designers must get into fiber optics. Like aviators, we in the surface warfare community must start thinking about weight. How heavy is the wiring? How heavy is the warfighting equipment we put on ships? Because these advanced hull forms are so weight-sensitive, you can’t load them the way you can conventional vessels. This has always been a problem with advanced hull forms—what you really come up against is that you can’t use today’s weapon systems because of their weight. Well, now we’re getting synthetics and materials that will allow us to reduce weight. I use fiber optics as an example. I’m pressing a program to get this technology into our ships.
I was at the Ingalls yard and asked the folks there what they were doing about weight control on the Wasp-class LHD. The LHD is an enormous ship. They said, “Why? Why should we worry about it?”
Well, we all should worry because we always want to put more and heavier weapons into our ships. We’ve got an AV-8B Harrier today, but there’s a JVX coming along. The Marines rarely
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develop anything lighter, and I suppose for good reason. We have a tradition over time of loading up our ships so we’d better start off as light as possible. Think weight, even in our biggest ships. For advanced hull forms, we’ve got to worry about weight or they will stay on the drawing board.
Proceedings: How much will the LHD be used for sea control as opposed to the traditional amphibious role?
Admiral Metcalf: You know, it is malarkey for people to worry about how we are going to use these ships. I always like to fall back, and I have said this a number of times, to the purpose of a warship: to be able to put ordnance on target. Well, right now, all we have is the AV-8B Harrier for the LHD. It’s not a very good LHD sea control weapon system to project ordnance on target. If we can solve the technological problems to allow V/STOL aircraft to carry a significant load to a reasonable distance, then the LHD will become a candidate for the sea control mission. That upsets some Marines who worry about the role of the LHD. It really doesn’t upset the thinking Marines. Thinking Marines understand that if the LHD had sea control ability, the Marines would have a vastly improved support capability.
Proceedings: By improved support capability, do you mean close air support?
Admiral Metcalf: Absolutely. Their problem is ordnance on target, too. The LHD and the AV-8B meet the Marine requirement. It could become a sea control system only if it can project power off its deck at a distance. Right now, AV-8s are pretty damn good on local area defense or local sea control, if you will. I’ve used them in an exercise, and the Brits used them down in the Falklands, but they’re still relatively short-legged. The airplane is optimized for the Marine use, which means it’s not particularly fast—it’s fat-winged. So we’ve got some work to do before we come to real LHD-based sea control weapon systems.
Proceedings: What impact, if any, did the Falklands have on the Surface Navy’s tactics, damage control, and general training?
Admiral Metcalf: In damage control there has been an enormous impact, just like it has had on the British. Our basic damage control doctrine, com- partmentation, is better than theirs, I think. In the case of the Sheffield’s loss, she went down primarily because her crew couldn’t put out the fire.
Our ships generally have been more
. . the Surface Navy has abdicated amphibious tactical thinking to the Marines. That’s terrible. We haven’t kept up our professionalism. . . .”
robust than the British ships. We have incorporated many damage control lessons. The Falklands’ lessons were just the old ones relearned. Now we don’t have to fall back on the examples of kamikazes off Okinawa to get people’s attention; we can use the Falklands. It has given us impetus.
Quite frankly, it helped with the design of the DDG-51, the Arleigh Burke, because we want to make that a rough, tough ship—and she is going to be a rough, tough ship. She is going to be made out of steel. Can you imagine? Isn’t that wonderful? Within OP- 03, I have a very active ship survivability section, and it got a real shot-in- the-arm from the Falklands experience. Not that they weren’t doing it before. It’s just the importance of it—now people stand up and listen.
We’re going to dedicate a damage control facility at Newport, called Schonland Hall, which is going to be just for damage control. It will be the first time the Navy has had a school in a building with somebody in charge who worried and talked only about damage control. This is going to be a separate school, a separate entity, which will really bring the whole damage control program into focus.
Proceedings: Are there any tactical changes as a result of the Falklands?
Admiral Metcalf: Yes. For example, we reconfirmed that the U. S. Navy can beat the Exocet. We did have to fine tune the CIWS [close-in weapon system] a little bit so it could take on the Exocet. We know the vulnerabilities of weapons like Exocet. We know how to deal with them. I guess you’d classify that as a change in tactics. I can’t go any further than that.
Proceedings: How far do you project battleships into the future? Are they a bridge to the strike cruiser that can put ordnance on target?
Admiral Metcalf: They will become a bridge when we get a more advanced conventional warhead on the Tomahawk. The Soviets understand the Tomahawk. The battleships are now Tomahawk-capable, so in that sense they are now a bridge. A strike cruiser would have speed, to go fast into harm’s way, and endurance—battleships fill both these requirements. So, in that sense, she is a bridge. She can also take enormous punishment. The things which could sink battleships—armor-piercing bombs and armor-piercing shells—are no longer in anybody’s inventory. The battleship is pretty damn tough to put out of action.
Now, compare the battleship with the Kirov. In my judgment, the Kirov, or any modern warship, is vulnerable to what I refer to as the “mission kill.” Their weapon systems are “electronic,” and they are everywhere about the ship. A 500- or even a 100-pound fragmentation weapon placed where there are antennae and the like can really raise a ruckus with a modem warship. These ships are dependent on electronics for targeting, self-protection, and as means of getting ordnance on target. Also, electronics are very susceptible to jamming. The Soviets want to jam us and we them. When you have made a ship ineffective by whatever means, you have defeated her—■ maybe you haven’t sunk the ship, but you’ve defeated her—she’s not worth anything anymore. She’s just another hulk.
If the Kirov can’t launch her missiles or can’t target them, there’s enormous frustration for the captain. The battleship is a horse of a different color. She was built for action; she’s armored.
Her sensors are behind armor. To put the battleship out of action, you’ve got to do something major—no cheap kills for a battleship.
That’s one of the neat things about the Aegis system. It is a modem offensive system which we have built specifically to take battle damage. You have that big radar face sitting there, but it can operate, we feel, with significant damage and still keep doing its job—degrade gracefully, is the term. We expect the Soviets have built in a lot of redundancy of systems. I am sure they understand that problem as well as we do, but the Kirov can be put out of action with the kind of damage that would just call for the
Admiral Metcalf: Well, I look at it in two ways. The Soviets understand the Meaning of reserves better than we do. he Soviets have always had the strate- 8'c reserve idea. Their whole manpower base is built on having a re- terve. An adequate reserve is part of me strategic deterrent equation. A strong naval reserve is an important Part of that equation. It’s perhaps stronger than the numbers of ships involved.
The
reserves and their ships have to be
bos’n to “pipe sweepers” on a battleship.
Proceedings: How long are you plan- n'ng to keep the battleships in the fleet?
Admiral Metcalf: ’ Til they wear out. Then we’ll have to figure out how We re going to replace them with something else of the same warfighting tenacity.
Proceedings: There has been a major effort lately to get more modem combatants into the Naval Reserve. What return do you expect from the investMent in the Naval Reserve?
As far as the Surface Navy is conCerned, the reserves are absolutely esSential. When I visit their ships, I tell those bloody reserves that they’ve got to be ready, because we’re counting on mem. The Navy is going to have upwards of 50 ships, front-line ships, new Minesweepers and frigates, which will Pe operated by reserves. I think the Program makes an enormous amount of sense. They’re not a lot cheaper than tegular Navy ships. It’s a big myth that Mey’re dramatically cheaper. Like all Modem weapons, the modem warship Is expensive to operate. You’ve got to heep her electronics up, you’ve got to heep her fire control systems up,
You’ve got to keep the spares up, and You’ve got to keep the people trained.
they aren’t cheap. We cannot just tle them up to a pier and when the ^histle blows, expect them to go fight.
teady at an
times.
'Ve’re training the reserves in the ''My we expect them to fight. Reserve hips have been going out for years Mid doing things which they would do !f they go to war, such as operations in he Atlantic looking for Soviet subma- Mies. In times of heightened tension, he reserve ship would go out there and tee the regular units for carrier battle 8r°up roles. The reserves have our Minesweeping capability from A to Z.
The reserves are beginning to understand and say, “Hey, fellow, there ain’t nothing but us. We can’t say to the active Navy, ‘Come bail me out.’ We’ve got it.”
I have a superb reserve unit right here in OP-03, OPNAV. I meet with them periodically. This Saturday, I’ll get my reserve unit together, and we’ll do our thing.
There are many accomplishments that we don’t give our naval reserves credit for. On the Second Fleet staff, I had two reserve units: one that supported my NATO hat, and the other that supported my national hat—the Second Fleet hat. In many ways, they have a hard time keeping up. Modem warfare isn’t easy. To be ready the reserves have got to work hard and stay with it.
In the past several years I’ve seen a significant improvement in our surface warfare reserves. Our biggest problem right now is retention of key skills, the same problem we have in the active force. How do we keep good people? These ships need experienced professionals to make them go. We’re working on it. I think that part of the problem in the reserves is the legacy of the past. You don’t change old habits very rapidly. We’ve simply got to get the reserves to understand their essential place in the deterrent fabric of the U. S. Navy, and that’s a challenge.
Proceedings: Speaking of the numbered fleets, do you see a resurgence of dedicated flagships?
Admiral Metcalf: I don’t think we can fight at sea without dedicated flagships. But what do I see? I see a long, uphill battle.
In my own experience, in Grenada and as the Second Fleet commander, I ran two significant operations in which if I had not been on the scene, the outcome of both clearly would have been different. So that says that we better have the commander in charge on the scene. In a conflict with the Soviets that means a numbered fleet commander. I don’t think that, if we put a battle force of two or three carriers to sea against the Soviets, that we’ll turn it over to a senior two-star. That’s a bunch of blarney. You’re going to have a three-star there. He’s got to be properly supported with both communications and timely intelligence. He needs a trained staff that understands the dynamics of modem warfare, particularly the electronic aspects of it. That enormous up, out, and down battle space which I described does not have the horizon as its limit, or even the horizon plus a couple of hundred miles. The Soviets may have a cruise missile submarine, perhaps only 50 miles away from a force, but he may be getting his targeting information from thousands of miles away.
In other words, modem warfare at sea is very, very complex and the operation of a complex battle force is something that we’re just beginning to understand. It takes more thinking and more planning. The most critical time is in the first 25 seconds of the fight; you’ve got to have it planned; you’ve got to have people who understand what it’s all about. To me that says an afloat commander should have the proper staff and ship to support him.
Proceedings: Is there any consideration of reactivating the Salem and Des Moines for that role?
Admiral Metcalf: We’ve priced them out, but the problem is that it is considered to be one of those things “on the margin,” fiscally. I think we ought to bring the ships back as flagships.
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We’re going to use the smaller guided missile cruisers that we have now, but they’re very limited in space. The fleet commander at sea must have ships that provide space for radios, for planning, and space to think.
An enormous amount of information in this modem day and age comes from everywhere to the commander. He has to work through the problem, and be able to act when he doesn’t get any information. He may lose all communications with Washington and God knows where else—and then he’s sitting there, with only his own experience, his staff, and his organic information. He may have some very difficult tactical and strategic decisions. We should not require these decisions to be made by those who are actually fighting the force, the battle group commander. The battle group commanders are responsible for “how” to fight. The numbered fleet commander is responsible for “what” the force is to do. He also is responsible back up the line to the theater commanders, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Command Authority.
You’ve got to have a synergism of command, which, in my judgment, isn’t very well understood today. It’s difficult. I saw it in Grenada, where more than 60% of my time was spent not dealing with what was happening on the island. 1 was dealing with the chain of command, keeping them informed, answering their questions.
Proceedings: In the Surface Navy, you seem to be moving toward a concept of specialization. What are the goals of this program, and are you concerned that it will lead to COs who have less overall experience with their ships’ capabilities?
Admiral Metcalf: I don’t agree with you that we are heading toward a concept of specialization. There has been a correct perception in the past that a surface warfare officer is a generalist. My view is, we can’t have single skill professionals, officers who only understand engineering or only understand weapons, or only understand ASW. That, to me, would be specialization. We do need surface warriors who have spent more time in one particular skill, perhaps at the detriment of others, but to be a successful commander at sea, the warrior has got to understand his ship. That means he’s got to understand weapons, engineering, communications, and what makes the whole thing go, or he’s not going to be a successful commander at sea. He’s going to get caught short in battle. The CO is responsible for making the ship fight as a weapon system, and that weapon system depends on the three basic functional skills—operations, weapons, and engineering. I honestly believe that there is no profession, including medicine, in which the incumbent is required to have more knowledge than in going to sea as a surface warfare professional today. You have lives in your hands and your judgments and use of your intellect, training, and experience are vital.
So the challenge is how to point people toward a successful command. I’m asked this question quite often by people who want to be engineers, and they say, “Gee, how am I going to be a good deck commander?” Well, I say, “What you’ve got to do in addition to being an engineer, is when you are a lieutenant, you must become a qualified tactical action officer [TAO]. You must learn to fight your ship. When you’ve gone through that course, you know something about how to fight the ship.” We’re requiring all surface warriors when they go to department head school to become qualified TAOs. All right, that’s one point in a professional career; that’s the lieutenant level. There are similar examples in all grades.
Most surface warriors will command a conventional ship as a commander. These officers will be warfare specialists—i.e., surface warriors—first, then ops officers, weapons officers, or engineer officers or whatever their subspecialty is second. That’s the way it’s got to work.
The area that needs the most attention in terms of specialization and emphasis is ASW. ASW is an art, more so than AAW is. AAW emphasizes the proper use of equipment. There’s an art form to ASW, because you can’t see the son-of-a-gun down there; you feel for him. The basic challenge has not changed much since World War I when we used a roll of toilet paper and a gong to find submarines. We had to outthink them then and we still do.
If a surface ship finds a submarine, with the weapons we have today, there is little excuse if that submarine isn’t sunk. But it takes experience. To find submarines in the first place is tough, but once found, the CO who does not understand his art may not get them.
Well, submariners won’t agree with me because in exercise play they continue to get away. But that’s because we haven’t got enough artists out there in the business of ASW. As a Second Fleet commander, I found it was very spotty whether or not our ships’ COs really understood the weapon systems they were dealing with—particularly passive systems. The passive tails [tactical towed array sonars] are just getting out into the fleet. Our job, and my challenge as leader of the surface community, is how to develop more ASW artists. We’ve got good equipment. We don’t use it as well as we should.
Quite frankly, it’s a result of our training methods, and the employment of people skilled in this very difficult aspect of warfare. It’s hard, it’s tedious, and you can’t see the targets on your “I have officers coming to OP-03 from the fleet who see themselves and call themselves surface warriors. The surface warfare officer community is getting the idea that they’re warriors.” radar scope. It’s fog down there, and it’s a very difficult threat to deal with.
No, I don’t like the word specialization. I would rather use professionalization. People have got to become more professional. For example, it means that we’ve got to be good in amphibious warfare. The amphibs issue is classic. We’ve been forcing people out of amphibs who don’t want to and vice versa. We’ve got some superb amphibious warriors. There are guys who go into the amphibs and want to stay with their new ships and we yank them out again because we want everybody to be well-rounded. But I want to establish real pros in the amphibious game, too. In many ways, the Surface Navy has abdicated amphibious tactical thinking to the Marines. That’s terrible. We haven’t kept up our professionalism, and we really haven’t influenced the
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amphibious tactics from the ship to the shore the way we should have. We are changing that.
Proceedings: How big of an effect hoes passive sonar have in cutting through that fog you described?
Admiral Metcalf: I think that passive sonar will be most useful for perhaps a decade. By then the Soviets are going to get quiet. Our submarines are quiet, ^hy can’t they make theirs quiet?
Eventually, the Soviets will build a new submarine force that’s quiet. By that time, we should have an answer to that problem. Everyone has to learn how to go fast and be quiet. Now, a submarine is quiet only when it’s not going very fast. When it’s not going Wry fastj can jt (j0 anything? After all, We get a mission kill if we can keep a submarine from getting in a position to do something to us. If he has to be uoisy to get to a position to attack then We may detect him passively—he’s got a Problem. If our ships go fast, we’re going to force him to go fast. It’s a tactical decision for both the hunter and the hunted. Once again this is an art f°rm. So, yes, the passive capability is Very important.
Proceedings: There used to be more surface combatant command opportunity for lieutenants and lieutenant commanders. Is it possible that there can °e more in the future than there are now?
Admiral Metcalf: Yes. The new MHSs ^ going to be commanded by young ■eutenant commanders, and the MCMs by junior commanders. In other words, there will be more ships like the PHMs to command and that’s going to be a Marvelous opportunity. But historically, 'n peacetime, we put our money into ships that take a long time to build— the larger ships. And it simply takes t'nie and experience to learn how to feally fight these ships. So the tendency will be to get more experienced People into the command. But we have me historical example of World War II, ^hen those who commanded the ships efore the war tended to be senior peoPle who had been on them for a while. °ut we went to war, and zap, fighting ^ame down to the more junior people. wdl that happen if we have a conflict again—who knows? Who knows how °ng such a conflict will last? It takes t'me to become an ASW artist or to Understand how to operate an Aegis
ship effectively. We are building more complex, capable, and bigger ships, which take experience to fight and command. So although command opportunity for junior officers appears to be reduced, the MHSs and the MCMs are increasing opportunities, and there will be many more of them.
Proceedings: Would you consider putting some of the very best lieutenant commanders in command of frigates?
Admiral Metcalf: No, 1 wouldn’t. The problem is more complex than early command opportunity. We have tried it; Admiral Zumwalt tried it. It’s both a religious and an experience issue.
I don’t think it proved wise to put our best young warriors into early command positions. After early command what are they going to do next? Skip command as a commander?
The surface warfare professional is under pressures, such as long deployments, while trying to develop his skills. It takes time. It takes a lot of time to understand weapons systems, to become the ASW artist or the AAW pro; to really understand how to fight a ship. We’re also dealing with nuclear weapons. So we must ask, “Well, what do we want? What kind of officer do we want commanding those ships?” Generally, we want an officer who’s been around a while because he’s more experienced with complex systems.
I had the opportunity for early command, so 1 understand both the pitfalls and the rewards. But I was commanding a simple ship well within my experience and competence. I would like to have lieutenant commanders command LSTs, for instance, because in that kind of a ship you’ve got to be prepared to go in harm’s way. And on LSTs, it’s not all that complicated.
Proceedings: The LHAs and the LHDs are currently alternating command between surface warriors and aviators. Is there any possibility of a surface line officer commanding a carrier?
Admiral Metcalf: No. It’s an issue of law to begin with, and besides I’m not in favor of it. Proponents obviously have to go through me, as the head of the surface community, to argue about it. It’s not worth it. We’ve got more important things to do.
I like to put this issue in simple terms: An aviator should pay the U. S. Navy to fly off aircraft carriers in the daytime. They have the best machinery, and it’s good fun. But there isn’t
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enough money in the world to fly off the damn things at night. Yet, we still have to tell an aviator to go off into a foggy night and do very dangerous things. Naval aviation is a tough business, although we make it as safe as we can by practice. It takes an aviator in command who has done it himself to tell the pilot to take off into the black of night with a pitching deck. The strength of the U. S. Navy’s carrier aviation is that it not only can deliver ordnance, but it can deliver it in all kinds of weather and in the middle of the night. The Soviets can’t do that. Even the U. S. Air Force, to a limited extent, can’t do that. They don’t have a weapon system that works around the clock in the crummy, lousy weather. Modem warfare still revolves around the fundamental issue of leadership. People fly airplanes. The captain of that damn carrier has got to be able to make very difficult decisions as to when that weapon system is going to be used and in all kinds of weather. Pilots must have confidence in those decisions. Most of the time it’s easy, but at other times the CO must make difficult command decisions which frankly I don’t think surface warriors can make. “Well,” the argument goes, “he’d have an ops officer who would be doing that for him.” I’ve heard all those bloody arguments. Blarney! I don’t go along with them.
Now, when it comes to command, of how the aircraft are employed as part of the battle force, in my judgment, the surface warrior is as good as an aviator. It has been demonstrated time and time again. Sometimes we’re better at the use of the aircraft carrier, because a former carrier skipper, now a battle group commander, pays too much attention to the mechanics of running the aircraft carrier, and may not understand how to work her as part of a battle force. Most do, and carrier group commanders have gotten a lot better because of the pressure of first rate surface officers who also ride on the carriers as warfare commanders. We’re a better, stronger Navy, and naval aviation is better and stronger because of the leadership provided by all sorts of people. But to have surface warriors command carriers, hell, no.
Proceedings: With strategic sealift being elevated to a major role in the Navy, are we going to have enough escorts to get the sealift ships there?
Admiral Metcalf: That’s where the reserves come in. If you look at it only from the perspective of convoys, I would say no. But, the strategic sealift, for God’s sake, is a drop in the bucket. The larger issue is, are we going to be able to protect the hundreds of ships which are required to cross the Atlantic? Do we have them? Do they exist in the Free World? That’s a larger issue than getting a couple of strategic sealift convoys across.
Yes, we can get strategic sealift across, and I think we can do it by fighting smart. There are certain tactical things that will help, but once again, it is ordnance on target and in ASW it takes lots of ordnance. The real problem is we may not have enough ships to escort, not whether we can get them there or not. I’m worried about the U. S. Merchant Marine. The U. S. Merchant Marine is and has been in serious decline.
If we had a more viable Merchant Marine program for building and repairing ships in our private yards, we’d be in much better shape. Right now the Navy is about the only customer of the American shipbuilding industry for repairs and building. It’s a terrible situation for our country to be in because the Navy alone can’t support a national maritime posture. In peacetime, Ingalls,
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Bath, Todd, Electric Boat, and Newport News could provide all the ships we need if we tasked them to their full capacity. So we’ve got these very fine organizations, but we’re not building enough ships to keep the maritime work force skilled. That is the real thing that we worry about.
Proceedings: What can you say about the role of surface warriors and unconventional warfare—SEAL teams, fast attack craft, and so on?
Admiral Metcalf: I think there’s a terrific role for our SEALs because they do things that can’t be done any other way. But it’s hard. You have to train them rigorously and properly equip them. Once again, they are part of that deterrent fabric; it fits in the maritime strategy. The SEALs can get ordnance on target, get a mission kill, and break up enemy command and control. So they definitely have a place in the surface warfare business.
SEALs are macho guys and a little bit crazy (I tell them this all the time, so if this finds its way into print, they won’t be surprised). But why do they have to be this way? Because they have one of the toughest missions. So much depends on the individual, his personal physical skills and endurance. They’re very often out there by themselves. They’ve got to be highly trained. They’ve got to be given the best possible equipment. Sitting on a ship—compared to a SEAL you’re in a fur-lined foxhole. But when you’re a SEAL you’re out there with a very tough, personally dangerous mission that’s got to be done.
Proceedings: How do you deal with the perception by some that aviators and submariners have more clout than surface warriors?
Admiral Metcalf: I just tell them they’re full of it. One of the problems is that we’ve been in a defensive role for years. With weapons that can only go to 40 miles, your role is going to be defensive. We have been out on the screen for years, and now we as a community seem to have a difficult time saying, “I’m on the cutting edge of what the Navy’s all about: ordnance on target.” But now that we have ordnance that does the job, and we are demonstrating tactical acumen; times are changing.
Another thing I want to talk about in this general context is the Surface Warfare Officers School (SWOS) up in Newport. We are making SWOS into what I call a center of excellence.
Every single surface warrior is going to go there at least once in his career, probably two, three, or four times. We are upgrading the courses. We are sending our best people there as instructors. Right now on the staff we have I believe eight post-command commanders; the best we can find. We sent Ray Taylor up there as a captain, and he left as a flag officer. The officer who’s running the school right now is recognized by the community as a tactician and a leader in our community. We’re making it a center of officer training excellence.
An aviator said to me, “Hey, this school is almost as good as test pilot school.” I think we’re getting there when we get comments like that. It is a performance school. You get tested, you get looked at, you get kicked in the ass.
SOSMRC [Senior Officer Ship Material Readiness Course] represents excellence in engineering training. The CNO approved moving that course from Idaho Falls to Newport in order to get together in one place our premier instructors and the people who will command surface ships. I’m going to put good training equipment up there. We are going to build the kind of institution where people will want to return because they want to find out what’s going on. It is very, very important for the Surface Warfare profession.
Proceedings: What agency within the surface warfare community are you using to stimulate and foster imaginative thinking?
Admiral Metcalf: This place right here.
Proceedings: Do you want it at other levels, too?
Admiral Metcalf: Yes, but you have to start at the top. I believe in the top- down approach. I have commanders who are energetic. I get out and talk to sailors: I expect my senior officers to get out and do the same sort of thing. I personally try to see every CO as he goes through SOSMRC. The key is, “You are what you think you are.”
We have to make the surface warriors understand that they have good gear, but they’ve got to work hard at their profession. There isn’t any other way to do it. Things don’t happen just because you want them to happen.
Proceedings: In preparing for this interview, we discovered that you have been a member of the Naval Institute for 33 consecutive years.
Admiral Metcalf: How about that.
Proceedings: It’s a very nice thing to find. Why have you been a member for so many years?
Admiral Metcalf: I joined the Naval Institute shortly after I graduated from the Academy. I enjoy the magazine.
It’s had its ups and downs. Even when it had its downs, I stuck with it. Some things at the Naval Institute are very good and some are trivial, but you provide a forum for people who aren’t necessarily the greatest literary experts. That’s very important. I even send subscriptions to schools and things like that. I had other people become members. I had my father join the Institute. So it’s part of our thinking process as naval professionals, and it ought to be. And it ought to have room for people to write articles that may be trivial.
Proceedings: How could the Proceedings better serve the interests of sea service professionals?
Admiral Metcalf: I think it serves a need right now. If we didn’t have it, we’d invent it. You guys go out there, swing the broom around, and hit something every once in a while, and that’s good. You have impact. Even your advertisers, I think, have impact. The Naval Review issue, from the leadership perspective, is very important.
You provide pages for the Stan Turners to write; guys like him get little to say in official publications. I don’t necessarily agree with many of the views expressed in the Proceedings, but I think that you provide the forum for divergent perspectives. You provide the vehicle for the younger officer to get out, swing around, and do his thing.
You get people mad. What the hell.
You want to get both senior and junior officers contributing to the Proceedings. You probably have controversial things submitted which should have been published but weren’t because of the narrow tightrope you’ve got to walk between the hierarchy and the readers. The Navy is basically conservative. I think you’re doing a pretty good job of walking that difficult tightrope between the outlandish and what might not be outlandish. That’s tough, but the Proceedings has done it.