This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
I
been
of
a massive conventional attack in Eu-
Would present NATO with a press-
early resort to nuclear arms .
In
same issue of Strategic Review,
Sba
The outcomes of modem wars have greatly influenced by the dynamics war at sea. In some cases, such as the ^Usso-Japanese War and World War II in e Pacific, war at sea was the decisive ?ct0r of the war. Adolf Hitler’s subma- campaign in the Atlantic during ^°rld War II, had it succeeded, would Ve been equally decisive in the Euro- ar> theater. Initial Soviet success in a oh Atlantic antishipping campaign °uld be an ominous portent in a NATO/ pSaw Pact conflict.
of Past two decades, since the end be U. S. monopoly of theater nuclear aPons and the emergence of the poten- b°r two-sided, tactical/theater nuclear 0r.ln Europe, it has been generally rec- fcOized that early Warsaw Pact success
rope
fae ^emrna- The alliance may have to ■ e the agonizing choice of fighting a cause, accepting the inevitable and b°r the best peace, or opening Pan!? f Box by initiating nuclear war. his dilemma is addressed in a 1983 l|,|lc'e >n the Strategic Review by Fred C. ic e,,Pndersecretary of Defense for Pol- J' To respond to conventional attack v u d deterrence fail, and to bring a con- tional war to a satisfactory end, we sst improve the ability of our forces to am themselves in combat—thus, to
aV0id f the
p Dassador Francois DeRose, a retired ^ench career diplomat, states: “In this Pi,Pect> the key task is to create the capa- the'tleS l^at can hit from the alliance, in teeyent of a crisis, the incubus of early rt to nuclear weapons in order to h, d certain defeat on the conventional
battlefield. ”2 Th •
to .?ere ls an on8°'n8’ concerted effort te.acvel°p new conventional warfare b|h n°^08'es which will be capable of (k ntlng the initial conventional attack of eff '^arsaw Pact- If the fruits of these °rts can delay the onslaught long th°U8h, the full NATO potential may b be brought to bear in the conflict, iric ° ^r'n8 these efforts to fruition, an PrQrease in the naval burden is required to mpUy establish and maintain reliable 0p uPply over the North Atlantic sea line to ^°mmunications (SLOC). According e editors of National Defense:
The U. S. Army Air Land 2000 Bate Doctrine recognizes the need to
cope with the massive attacking forces of the Warsaw Pact. Technologies to blunt the effect of those attacking forces have been frequently described in NATIONAL DEFENSE . . . Also recognized by the Army is the major problem of resupply since massive ammunition expenditures are anticipated as the new battle doctrines are implemented. . . . ”3 (Emphasis added.)
It follows that, confronted with the prospect of NATO deploying the means to thwart their plan for a quick fait accompli (and thereby transferring the nowin dilemma to the Kremlin), the Soviets will not necessarily be deterred without examining means to promptly counter or neutralize the new NATO conventional technologies. Among other things, this could result in a Soviet reallocation of naval forces in order to mount an even more concerted effort than currently envisioned against the North Atlantic SLOC. If the Soviets succeed, the improved NATO posture will not last very long. The Warsaw Pact attack will quickly rebuild its momentum, and NATO leadership may soon be confronted with its original dilemma.
NATO naval protection for shipping could be doubled. Assuming that the expected constraints on munitions production rates, ship loading rates, and immediately available shipping are not removed, the survivability of the first few convoys must be improved. This may have to be accomplished in the face of a greater Soviet submarine threat than is now anticipated.
There is, of course, ample evidence that the U. S. Navy and its NATO counterparts have long been aware of the implications of an intensive North Atlantic antishipping campaign. The lessons of World War I were relearned almost too late in World War II, but they have not since been forgotten. Antisubmarine warfare (ASW) has been a high priority since World War II. However, particularly in the U. S. Navy, programs and missions dedicated to the protection of shipping must compete for priorities and resources with other naval missions judged to be at least equally urgent and vital, posing an additional constraint on the forces dedicated to SLOC protection.
Similar constraints on immediately available ground forces and prepositioned munitions in Europe are expected to persist. Therefore, in order to make NATO reinforcement and replacement plans viable, engaged ground forces must be able to concede vital territory only very slowly and grudgingly while exacting high casualties and losses. Whatever their strategy and tactics, they will have to maintain tremendous levels of firepower, rapidly depleting their munitions. Thus, a shipload of munitions arriving from the first North Atlantic convoy may be much more valuable than the same resupply from the second convoy a few days later. For the ground forces, an appropriate measure of the effectiveness of the North Atlantic SLOC may be—to paraphrase Confederate Cavalry General Nathan Bedford Forrest—“The fustest are the mostest.”4 If so, given the persistence of all of the constraints, it may be necessary for convoy protection forces to be allocated accordingly over time in pursuit of the same objectives.
Conditions appear to indicate a need to allocate larger percentages of available, dedicated SLOC protection forces in an initial surge, even at the expense of serious shortages soon thereafter. There are, however, diminishing returns inherent in almost any military application of “more of the same.” It may become necessary to investigate the merits of a strategy analogous to the defense-in-depth concept for carrier battle groups and introduce one or more additional and different layers of protection for the first convoys. However, in light of current plans, it may become necessary to consider the pros and cons of diverting other ASW- and, possibly, antiair warfare (AAW)-capable naval forces from their planned initial missions.
The following is a simplified, hypothetical scenario designed to illustrate the ramifications of SLOC protection:
- The U. S./NATO plan is to load, assemble, and sail ten convoys of 50 merchant ships (merships) loaded with vital cargoes at four-day intervals. The first convoy will sail on D-day +6. Each convoy will be escorted by ten dedicated surface escorts. Additional ASW protection is to be provided by other dedicated forces—ASW barriers promptly established at key choke points, and maritime patrol aircraft. The objective is to ensure that at least 80% of the 500 vital cargoes in the ten convoys reach Europe on schedule.
- A surge deployment of 40 Soviet antishipping submarines arrive in the North
and, at this level, the initial NATO cam' paign is successful.
However, the view from a heavily an continuously pressed army corps may ^ quite different. Only 68% of the ti|SJ available munitions have arrived: The required 80% rate is not achieved unt> D + 40 (sixth convoy). The more attractive delivery rates thereafter may be to° late to matter. NATO political leadership may have already been confronted 'vlt the dilemma that the lost earlier carg°f might have forestalled. In this event
Atlantic or clear choke points in time to engage the first NATO convoy. All 40 subs will be able to remain on station long enough to oppose the tenth convoy. However, NATO barriers and air operations effectively prevent further reinforcement or replacement of Soviet submarine losses.
- The broad ocean areas, NATO area ASW, and the combination of moves and countermoves results in a wide deployment of the Soviet submarines and the probability that each convoy can expect to be engaged by one-fifth of the surviving and effective submarines over the course of the convoy’s transit.
- On average, in each such engagement, the combination of submarine kills or aborts by the SLOC protection forces and the expected effectiveness of penetrating
If a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict erupts in Europe, the outcome may be determined not by firepower and tactics, but by decisions made now for protecting reinforcement and resupply ships.
submarines results in two merships lost per attempted submarine engagement. In the process, each engaging submarine suffers a 0.5 probability of being sunk, disabled, or otherwise eliminated from the campaign (e.g., exhausting its weapons after several attacks).
► Each convoy requires eight to ten days to reach its European destination. Offloading and overland transport to army corps areas takes six four to six more days. Thus, the first surviving cargoes reach their destination on D + 20.
A simplified model for calculating the losses from each 50-mership convoy follows: The initial number of threat subs (40) minus the subs eliminated in earlier engagements times the sub engagement factor (0.2) times the merships lost per engagement (2) equals merships lost. The number of subs eliminated prior to engaging a given convoy is simply 0.5 times the sum of the number of subs engaging all convoys.
The results are shown in Table 1.
Thus, the initial SLOC objective to ensure the survival of 80% of the first 500 vital cargoes is essentially met, the Soviet submarine threat has been decimated,
the
dramatic reduction of the submarine threat may have become academic. Ifs0, a much more useful objective would have been one which achieved the opP°sltL pattern—87.6% survivability of the hf> convoy and 68% of the tenth.
Assuming this alternative survival pat tern could be achieved, the results an shown by the dashed line in Figure ’ which compares them with those ot m baseline example on the solid curve. 1 ^ shaded area represents the gains achieve by the alternative, and the hatched are represents the losses. Since both achi® the same 79% of the 500 cargoes, the t'u areas are equal.
on D + 56
C()0 further simplify, if we assume each thev°y is identically loaded and assign v., tlrst convoy a total combat support ten 6’ t*le uPPer solid line in Figure 2 brents the maximum achievable com- iQ.^Upport value of the campaign (i.e., ^ . survivability of the 500 merships). Selndicated, the lower solid curve reprein th combat support value achieved cUrv6 baseline example and the dashed e the value if the alternative pattern °U'd be achieved.
g . gain, the shaded area represents the hat u the alternative pattern and the the
gains in combat support value
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Ov<
Table 1 Results of a Hypothetical, Initial SLOC Campaign
Departs U. S. | Threat | Soviet Submarines Engaging | Eliminated | Merships Lost Arriving | Arrival at Corps Area | % Arrivin | |
D + 6 | 40 | 8 | 4 | 16.0 | 34.0 | D + 20 | 68 |
D + 10 | 36 | 7.2 | 3.6 | 14.4 | 35.6 | D + 24 | 71.2 |
D + 14 | 32.4 | 6.5 | 3.2 | 13.0 | 37.0 | D + 28 | 74.0 |
D + 18 | 29.2 | 5.8 | 2.9 | 11.7 | 38.3 | D + 32 | 76.6 |
D + 22 | 26.2 | 5.3 | 2.6 | 10.5 | 39.5 | D + 36 | 79.0 |
D + 26 | 23.6 | 4.7 | 2.4 | 9.4 | 40.6 | D + 40 | 81.2 |
D + 30 | 21.2 | 4.2 | 2.1 | 8.5 | 41.5 | D + 44 | 83.0 |
D + 34 | 19.1 | 3.8 | 1.9 | 7.6 | 42.4 | D + 48 | 84.8 |
D + 38 | 17.2 | 3.4 | 1.7 | 6.9 | 43.1 | D + 52 | 86.2 |
D + 42 | 15.5 | 3.1 | 1.6 | 6.2 | 43.8 | D + 56 | 87.6 |
|
| Totals | 26.0 | 104.2 | 395.8 |
|
|
erall Vital Cargoes Delivered = 79%
t.^0Wever, as indicated earlier, given r f t.'me dynamics of the land war, their aJj*’Ve values to a beleaguered NATO may ke markedly unequal. Some (je10n of the nature of the potentially tj Creasing combat support value over the6 Can be gained by observing that, in dynamic scenario assumed, the com- support utility of each arriving incre- j nt bes in its contribution to maintain- for Projected viability of engaged h Ces- This helps to ensure that the ar- d . °f the next increment is not aca- ut'c. If an increment of arriving sup- is t IS sufficient> one of its contributions s ,0 reduce the threat to be addressed by sequent increments, bus, continuing the example, it is Urarily assumed that the combat sup- cVa*ue of a unit of safely arriving vital ](. decreases by a constant factor of th 0 f°r each scheduled date of arrival at vm COrPs area- Thus, the relative combat in ik *^endcal units of cargo loaded be convoys are:
1st Convoy = 1.0 on D + 20 ^d Convoy = 0.9 on D + 24 3rd Convoy =0.81 on D + 28 lQth Convoy = (0.9)9 = 0.387
ii?tcbed area the losses. Now, however,
achieved by the alternative are greater than the losses. If the arbitrary assumption of 10% degradation is accurate, the ratio of the areas under the two curves would be a quantitative measure of the relative combat support values of achieving the two objectives. If so, the alternative would produce a net gain of only about 5.5% total combat support value over that of the baseline example. A more meaningful measure can be derived from the observation that the total value of the upper 100% survivability curve is an absolute upper bound and that the requirements for success in the campaign will, of necessity, be somewhat less.
This leads to a comparison of the percentages of the maximum potential combat support value lost in the SLOC for each of the two patterns. In this example, the baseline would lose 23% and the alternative 19%. Thus, the combat support potential lost by the alternative would be about 22% less than that lost by the baseline. Depending on how narrow NATO ground force viability margins may be at this critical stage and where in time they may lie, this difference could be decisive. If the objective were to be 80% of potential combat support value, rather than 80% of the first 500 ships, the alternative would succeed and the baseline pattern would not.
Whatever the relative combat support values of various patterns of cargo deliveries, the figure and the example serve to highlight three important observations:
- To the extent that the level and the shape of the required pattern of combat support value can be determined, the best SLOC delivery pattern closely matches or, if possible, exceeds the requirement by a constant margin.
- As mentioned earlier, the assumed size of the initial Soviet submarine threat and the onset of diminishing marginal returns
Figure 1: Alternative Survivability Patterns of Convoys
100 r
I
20 -
0 -------------------------------- ■---------------------- 1------------------------ 1
D-DAY D + 20 D + 40 D + 60
Date of arrival in corps areas
10
D-DAY D + 20 D + 40 D + 60
Date of arrival in corps areas
•>?
retifip®
ysis from the University of Maryland. Before re in 1969, he commanded the USS Sailfish (SS* -
and was executive officer of the USS Hunky 31), an instructor of ordnance and gunnery
(A$*
itl*
off"11'
from simply surging increased levels of dedicated SLOC protection forces may combine to make it impossible to achieve the high survivability rates required for the first convoys. For example, achieving an objective of 87.6% survivability for the first convoy would require that no more than six of the 50 merships in the first convoy would be lost to a pre-deployed and dedicated force of 40 Soviet submarines. That is, the submarines would have to be reduced to an effectiveness level less than 40% of that assumed in the baseline example. This may be too great a challenge for even a surge effort of dedicated SLOC protection forces.
► Given the implied need, diversion of other ASW-capable naval forces could produce more significant gains. If they could be deployed to create another layer (offensive or defensive) in a broad defense-in-depth posture, they might achieve much higher marginal gains in overall force effectiveness. In addition, whenever and however they might be so employed, their contribution would be a clear plus without accepting much less than nominal levels of SLOC protection later in the campaign. The implied tradeoff for so allocating these forces must be considered by the higher decision levels of NATO, where the potential gains in initial delivery rates of munitions to NATO ground forces must be balanced against other NATO losses which might result from the delay or degradation of the performance of NATO naval forces in other initial naval missions.
Prime candidates for such contingencies are the versatile Atlantic Fleet carrier battle groups (CVBGs). In their normal configuration, they provide several layers of ASW protection. Given advance planning, it may be possible to initially deploy them in the western and mid-ocean shipping lanes with even greater ASW capability. For example, upon deployment, the aircraft complement could be made up of predominantly ASW aircraft (plus the necessary level of AAW interceptors). The normal aircraft complement could be restored by ferrying the attack aircraft when required. Similarly, the initial ready weapon loads of the group would be predominantly ASW weapons.
So configured, and with their high sustained speeds and wide area coverage, carrier battle groups could create and sustain “sanitized” moving havens in wide transit lanes for the initial convoys. European ASW forces could protect the lane terminals. At the juncture, the CVBGs could be reconfigured and released to prosecute other missions. Soviet submarines in or near the transit lanes would be faced with the choice of either slipping or fighting through the wide swath of the CVBG, or of attempting high-speed (and noisy) “end-arounds.” These high-speed attempts would increase their susceptibility to both area ASW (sound surveillance system and P-3C Orion aircraft) and the long-range detection and prosecution resources of the convoy escorts. This potential synergism might serve to sustain very high marginal gains from an accompanying surge allocation of the dedicated SLOC protection forces.
Such drastic diversions of the prime conventional striking arms of the U. S. Navy in the early stages of the war could be considered not only unwise, but unnecessary. This does not preclude consideration of more modest temporary force shifts, such as initially diverting direct support nuclear-powered attack subs (SSNs) and/or Spruance (DD-963)-class escorts from carrier battle groups to augment or supplement SLOC protection forces. The SSNs, for example, could be very successful in direct support of convoys, similar to what they provide for the carrier battle group.
It can be argued, and has probably been convincingly shown, that however great the need may be, this is not the most efficient employment of a carrier battle group or its constituents. However, what if the initial situation were to develop 10 the extent that higher NATO councils were convinced that such drastic actions were required for survival of the alliance ground forces in Europe? This could re suit in hastily conceived, ill-timed, and’ perhaps, ineffective diversions of ad hot naval forces to the SLOC protection mjs sion, as was sometimes the case with tn Murmansk convoys in World War II- In any event, it will be national an alliance priorities that ultimately deier mine the early allocations of naval forceS in a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict in rope. The ponderous nature of the NA> decision-making process and the like hood of preoccupation with the land earn paign indicate that it would be wise r° the U. S. and NATO navies to anticipattj the problem and initiate evaluations 0 such contingencies. This might help en sure that the manner, timing, and degre of involving such options will have bene fited from experienced naval judgme and planning.
'Fred Charles Ikle, "Strategic Principles of the gan Administration,” Strategic Review, Fall 1 pp. 13-18.
"Francois DeRose, “NATO’s Perils—and OpP^ nities,” Strategic Review, Fall 1983, pp. 19'-. Qf highlighted Editors’ insert in “Autoloading. P" j the Battlefield of the Future,” Paul C. Cornett" Allan Morrison, National Defense, October 19° • 25. , jQ
4After the Civil War, General Forrest was aske ^ describe his method of warfare. He replied t*1 ,
tried to “get there first with the most men.” R°£ .. Spiller, ed., Dictionary of American Military phy, Volume 1 (Westport, Connecticut: Green^ Press, 1984), pp. 339-340.
def
A previous contributor to Proceedings, Comm3^^ Ortlieb graduated from the Naval Acade
and has a master’s degree in economics/defense
Academy, and deputy director of the strategic o ^ sive systems division in OpNav. He is now a sc systems analyst with Science Applications, InC-' McLean, Virginia.
Prepare To Come About
By Captain John Bonds, U. S. Navy
Soon the surface navy may add a spectacular ship—the Sea Witch—to its ranks, one which represents the epitome of American seamanship. It will be presented to the nation by a group dedicated to preserving our maritime heritage.
The clipper ship Sea Witch was one of the most famous of the early clippers. She set many records, some which stand to this day. She was the first to break 100 days from New York to San Francisco around the horn and her record of 75 days from China to New York under sail has never been broken, even by the much larger ships which followed her.
Melbourne Smith, naval architect and maritime historian, has been the key element in the recreation of several traditional ships, such as the Pride of Baltimore, Californian, and Spirit of Massa
chusetts, all sponsored by a city or sta j Each shows the flag of her sponsor, 3 offers sailtraining for young Pe°; . These successes prompted the quest “Why not a ship representing the en nation?” Hence, the Sea Witch Pr°J was born. ^
Funding for the construction ot ship will come from corporate and t vidual sponsors; pledges are well un