Is That All There Is?

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Do non-carrier surface warships have any strategic significance? To listen to discussions of maritime strategy and naval force structure in the public arena, one would think that the only general-purpose naval forces with strategic significance in their own right are carrier-launched aircraft and nuclear-powered attack sub­marines, and that surface combatants are simply integral parts of larger, carrier-dominated structures. Reminiscent of Peggy Lee’s song, “Is that all there is?”: Are surface combatants simply supporting players, or do they have a larger strategic role?

Force Structure: The Navy’s current force structure objective of a “600-ship Navy” is shorthand for a bal­anced force programmed to include: 15 deployable carrier battle groups, four battleship surface action groups, 100 nuclear-powered attack submarines, ballistic missile sub­marines, Marine amphibious force (MAF) plus Marine amphibious brigade (MAB) assault echelon lift, 100-110 frigates, 31 mine countermeasures ships, and support ships to match.

President Ronald Reagan has personally endorsed the 600-ship goal on several occasions. With the unflagging stewardship of Chiefs of Naval Operations Admirals Thomas Hayward and James D. Watkins and Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, coupled with strong congressional support, the 600-ship Navy will be a reality by 1989.

Although the 600-ship Navy has been topical for the past five years, it is neither a new concept nor a new force structure objective. It was bom in the mid-1970s as U. S. involvement in the Vietnam War came to an end, and a large but obsolescent force required replacement. As former-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo Zumwalt noted in his memoirs, “. . .to build an adequate force for the 1980s would require a seriously reduced naval capabil­ity in the early mid-1970s.”¹ Admiral Zumwalt decom­missioned large numbers of older ships and proposed a “high-low mix” plan which would have resulted in a Navy of approximately 770 ships. By the end of his tour in 1974, he recommended a revised force structure of 600 ships because of increasing technological capability and continued fiscal constraints. This was one of the first nu­merical benchmarks for the 600-ship Navy.

Each of Admiral Zumwalt’s successors has endorsed the 600-ship goal. While this number has remained con­stant, the composition of the 600-ship objective has var­ied. Most of the attention has been focused on the numbers of carriers and, to a lesser extent, on the numbers and types of submarines. Yet, approximately 75% of the 600- ship objective consists of noncarrier, nonsubmarine ships-

Since the bulk of the 600-ship Navy will be surface ships, questions concerning their strategic importance are not trivial. What is the intended employment of these ships? Will they be employed to maximum advantage? Will their employment correspond in importance to their proportion of the fleet? The maritime strategy is one source for the answers to these questions.

The Maritime Strategy: The strategy describes the use of naval forces across the spectrum of conflict, but its focus is on countering the Soviets in global, conventional war." In such a war, the maritime strategy suggests that naval forces would move forward as early as possible to take decisive, offensive action to neutralize the Soviet Navy and pressure the Soviet flanks. This strategy envi­sions the Soviet fleet being neutralized mostly by attack submarines and carrier-based aviation. The principal role for surface combatants in this task lies in providing de­fense for aircraft carriers.

Strikes on the Soviet flanks would be effected by carrier aircraft and U. S. Marines. There would still be no central role for surface combatants other than providing escort for the carriers and naval gunfire support and lift for the Ma* rines. While these are vital roles, they are clearly support­ing roles. Is that all there is? Must surface warships be relegated to a supporting, though vital, role?

Strategic Usefulness Across the Spectrum: There >^s something else for surface combatants, for two principal reasons. The first is a technological reason. Today’s Toro-

F

Surface combatants are more than supporting players in a submarine- and carrier-dominated Navy. They are front-line elements of a violent peace strategy which requires them to protect a host of U. S. interests—from ensuring the freedom to navigate littoral waters to maintaining a presence off foreign shores, as the USS Thorn (DD-988) demonstrates as she passes through the Strait of Magellan en route to the Beagle Channel.

ahawk/Harpoon-armed cruisers and destroyers possess an unprecedented offensive antiship and land-attack capabil­ity. In addition, modem battleships and amphibious war­fare ships with vertical or short takeoff and landing (V/ STOL) aircraft are not simply linear extensions of past capabilities and experience. They represent different war­fighting capabilities that provide new possibilities for force employment, which are not fully developed in a car­rier-dominated strategy.

The second, more fundamental reason why there is “something else” for surface ships has to do with the almost exclusive focus of current strategic thinking on glo­bal war with the Soviet Union. Today’s forces are sized, capabilities assessed, and weapon systems designed to meet this contingency. Most tactical thinking and employ­ment planning are done within this strategic context.

While global war is the most demanding and important contingency for which U. S. forces must prepare, it is the least likely, largely because of our preparation for it. The many operations short of global war, such as peacetime deployments, crises of varying magnitudes, and small wars, are much more likely. They are important of them­selves and as points of escalation control along possible paths to global war. As Admiral Watkins has said, we live in an era of “violent peace,” and the Navy contributes to deterrence and to the protection of U. S. interests at all levels of the spectrum of violence.

Surface combatants possess flexibility and usefulness which can be applied across the spectrum of naval opera­tions, ranging from violent peace through global war. Therein lies the unique strategic significance of surface warfare. Surface combatants have been and will continue to be central players in a range of peacetime and crisis usages where carriers and submarines either have no role or are inappropriate. In a global war, modem surface com­batant capabilities offer new possibilities for force em­ployment beyond the usual escort and transport duties, and can provide greater flexibility in carrier and submarine tasking.

We need now to review where surface ships fit in a strategy for violent peace and how that differs from a glo­bal war strategy.

Violent Peace Strategy: Peacetime strategy differs from global war strategy in several important ways. First, while wartime strategy focuses on countering overt Soviet ag­gression, peacetime strategy objectives are more diffuse and perhaps best characterized as furthering an ill-defined set of U. S. interests, of which countering the Soviets is only part, although a very important part. In a number of these interests, surface combatants play key roles. These interests include the following:

► Ensuring U. S. access to oceans and sea-lanes, and pro­tecting transit rights in littoral waters. Surface ships rou­tinely conduct “freedom of navigation” transits to protect these rights and to establish the customary usage which forms an important part of international law. These are low-visibility operations, but extremely important in an era of expanding seaward claims by littoral nations. They are made more important by the fact the United States did

U. S. NAVY (TERRY C. MlTCHEL¹¹

not ratify the Law of the Sea agreements.

• Providing U. S. access to foreign markets and re­sources. An obvious example is the key role of the U. S’ Middle East Force, where a small group of surface com­batants has for many years demonstrated U. S. commit' ment to protecting a vital resource flow.
• Providing a visible display of U. S. interest in a gi^ven nation or region and of U. S. commitment to protect its interests and citizens. One example is the routine presence of U. S. surface combatants in the Eastern Mediterranean, and warships operating in sight of coastlines in crises- Another example is the increased presence of surface com' batants along the Caribbean littoral in recent years.

A second way in which a violent peace strategy diffe^fS from wartime strategy is in the connection among ends (objectives), means (forces), and setting. In wartime- strategy relates fixed means to given objectives in a fixed international setting. In peacetime, however, strategy treats ends, means, and setting all as variable, and p^r0' vides a framework for influencing or bringing about changes in them, as well as relating one to the others-

Shaping the international setting, therefore, is an imp°^r' tant part of peacetime strategy. In general, the United States desires a stable international setting which promote^s the trade and economic development necessary for ecO' nomic survival and compatible with democratic forms of government. In a more specifically military context, th^e international configuration of alliances and friendships'^s an important element in regional stability, as well as in th^e long-term competition between the United States and th⁶ Soviet Union. The Soviets include this configuration & their estimate, at the grand strategic level, of the “correla­tion of forces.” And the more favorable the global setting is to the United States, the more likely the Soviets are to be deterred from military action. The global alliance/co^a' lition/friendship configuration is probably second only ^t0 the nuclear threat in deterring war with the Soviet UnioU-

Surface combatants play key roles in shaping the inter­national setting, promoting stability, and building ^a°d

^maintaining alliances and coalitions, through, for exam­ple, port visits and through training and exercises with foreign naval forces.

While port visits often may be primarily for upkeep or ^crew morale, they are also essential to building and main­taining alliances and friendships. The fact that a sovereign nation allows a U. S. warship to visit its ports is a signifi­cant political statement, especially in an era of new nona- ngnment trends. The ongoing negotiations for a port visit ^ln China are an excellent case in point. Port visits can be an important symbol of the state of relations between na- ^tlons, of U. S. commitment, and of the military power ^which backs up that commitment. Surface warships are usually the chosen instrument for politically significant Port visits, because they can go where carriers and subma- ^r,nes cannot, because they are visibly impressive, and be­cause they are of a scale appropriate to the occasion.

Training and exercises with foreign naval forces provide strong military-to-military relations which are important uilding blocks in U. S. relations with friendly nations. °!^nt exercises are a key feature of these relations. Surface Pips are often the best vehicle for such exercises because ”cy can be non-intrusive and they can permit military ^e|utionships to be as discreet or as visible as the host ^nation chooses; they come in a variety of shapes and sizes impropriate to the scale of exercise; and they are likely to ^ave more in common with local naval forces than carriers or submarines. Unitas, the U. S. Navy’s annual series of exercises with Latin American navies, is but one example. Our readiness to operate with a multitude of friendly and allied navies is a significant factor in the global “correla­tion of forces” and is key in deterring both regional and global war.

A third way in which violent peace strategy differs from wartime strategy is in the considerations which drive force employment. In crises and small wars, political and diplo­matic considerations dominate purely military ones. Forces sent to the scene must be appropriate to the level of U. S. interest and commitment, as well as to the specific military task or situation.

In the approximately 200 crises to which naval forces have responded since World War II, approximately 45% did not involve an aircraft carrier.³ Further, when carriers are used, they are most often sent to the general area of the crisis, while surface combatants most often serve on the front line.⁴ Submarines do not play a comparable role in crises, since their key wartime asset of invisibility renders them unsuited for the overt, political requirements for vio­lent peace.

Surface ships are ideally suited to crisis response tasks because of their broad range of capabilities. They may discharge a host of missions, e.g., close surveillance, sep­arating opposing forces, threatening or delivering naval ordnance, or evacuating civilians. A surface combatant operating offshore could simply be a visible symbol of U. S. interest and of the greater military power which lies somewhere over the horizon. Surface ships continue to become more potent and thus more useful symbols as their capabilities to influence events ashore increase. These

Surface combatants like the USS Ticonderoga (CG-47) and the USS Iowa (BB-61) are just what the doctor ordered for responding to a crisis because they are not as “pro­vocative” as an aircraft carrier but are very effective, carrying their own air wings, soon to be augmented by V-22 Ospreys (prototype, facing page).

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capabilities include the Tomahawk land-attack missiles, precision-guided gun munitions, the return of battleships with their 16-inch guns, and the dramatically increased reach of amphibious ships with the introduction of the air-cushion landing craft (LCACs), AV-8B Harriers, and V-22 Ospreys.

Surface ships are particularly useful in crisis roles be­cause of the unique warfare considerations in crises. Many crisis response operations involve coastal rather than open-ocean operations, with virtually no antisubmarine warfare (ASW) problem compared to the global war case, and with potential air and surface threats close at hand rather than well over the horizon. The air and surface pic­tures are a confused mixture of friendly, neutral, and po­tentially hostile forces, and hold the possibility of attack from unconventional or terrorist sources. In such a situa­tion, the priority of surface warfare and surface weapon systems is higher than in the global war case, which makes employing surface combatants all the more attractive.

Further, surface ships play strategic roles in crises and limited conflict because of the requirements for escalation control. Tension exists between deploying sufficient force

BELL TEXTRON

Surface ship-dominated peacetime and crisis response operations contribute mightily to deterrence and to pre­venting global conflict with the Soviets. But should deter­

^to demonstrate credible commitment and deter escalation °ⁿ the one hand, and creating such a perceived threat as to •nvite preemption and escalation on the other. In many ^cases, surface combatants are the proper response because 'hey provide a credible and capable commitment and de­terrent without being as “provocative” as a carrier. Should the deterrent fail and hostilities ensue, the most ^s°und tactical location for the carrier may not be in close Proximity to the scene of the crisis, particularly if the crisis involves the Soviet Union and thus is global.

Surface combatants play central roles in the violent P^eace strategy, because such a strategy differs from global ^^ar strategy in the following ways:

• Peacetime strategy is not simply a strategy to counter |he Soviets; surface ships promote a broad set of U. S. mterests.

^ Peacetime strategy considers varying ends, means, and international settings; surface ships can contribute to shap­ing the international setting.

• diplomatic, political, and other such considerations in a ^V|°lent peace strategy outweigh the more straightforward te'litary ones associated with global war; surface ships have unique capabilities in this context.

Global War Strategy: Maritime strategy for global war teill continue to be dominated by carrier battle forces and ^a"ack submarines. But surface combatants now have the ^CaPabilities to offer more than simply being ‘‘part of” jtemething else. It is time to consider how these new capa­bilities could affect the maritime strategy.

• Could an Aegis-centered, Tomahawk-armed surface ^c°mbatant group, operating along the Norwegian littoral ^ln conjunction with land-based aircraft, contribute sub- ,^stantially to deterring a Soviet invasion of Norway? Could

defend the prepositioned MAB and NATO forward ^ases against Soviet attack, providing greater flexibility ,^0r carrier battle group (CVBG) employment?

Could a battleship battle group (BBBG) in the Indian Dcean eliminate the need for a CVBG to destroy Soviet °at-of-area forces? Could a BBBG in the Caribbean pre­lude the need to divert CVBG resources from the North Atomic?

£ Could towed array sonar ships, together with land- based ASW aircraft, free U. S. attack submarines by deal- teg with Soviet submarines on analogous response deploy- tecnts or other out-of-area locations?

There is ‘‘something else” for surface combatants be- y°nd the vital but supporting roles in global war strategy. “ violent peace strategy differs significantly from global ^War strategy, and ships which may be supporting players te global war may well be the lead players in peacetime. % Protecting and furthering U. S. interests, such as free- °^m of the seas, protection of key sea-lanes, ensuring ac- |;^ess to markets, and building and bolstering alliance soli- ^ar|ty, surface ships make critical contributions to U. S. ^national security every day. Surface ships are continu- °Usly _on ^ f_ront u_{nes 0}f violent peace worldwide in °Perations and locations impossible or inappropriate for ^a,rcraft carriers or submarines.

rence fail, there are also situations in which surface action groups, battleship battle groups, and individual surface units can play important roles which provide increased flexibility for carrier battle groups and submarines.

This contribution is only a first step in articulating the strategic significance of surface warships. To realize the full potential of today’s technologically advanced surface ships and to ensure that the best use is made of approxi­mately 75% of the 600-ship Navy, we must remove the professional blinders which have led us to think of surface ships only as supporting players in a carrier- and subma­rine-dominated Navy.

‘Elmo R. Zumwalt, On Watch (New York: Quadrangle, 1976), p. 59.

²As of this writing, the most comprehensive unclassified expositions of the mari­time strategy are testimony by Secretary of the Navy Lehman and Admiral Watkins before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Seapower and Force Projection, 14 March 1984; and the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Seapower and Strategic Material, 17 June 1985.

³Philip D. Zelikow, “Force Without War, 1975-82,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, March 1984, pp. 36-37.

⁴Stephen S. Roberts, “Peacetime Uses of the U. S. Navy,” unclassified appendix to Planning for the U. S. Navy’s Role in Peacetime Crisis, and Limited Conflict Center for Naval Analyses Study CNS 1148, January 1980.

Commander Harris and Lieutenant Commander Benkert are surface war­fare officers and subspecialists in politicomilitary affairs. They are as­signed to the Staff of the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel (OP-OOK).