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The problem of changing dollars and figures into the right balance of weapons and manpower is often as difficult as making two plus two equal five. Warriors must not only factor “how much is enough” into the warfare equation, but also the human variables of intuition and military experience.
the defense decision-making process has, for the time, forced a recognition that military requirements ^ costs are related and cannot be established in respectl isolation. .
Other advantages for using quantitative analys .
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whether in the form of systems analysis or operations an sis, exist. First, quantitative analysis techniques pro
In recent years, the Department of Defense has raised to new heights of importance the quantitative analysis techniques known as systems analysis and the related analytical field known as operations analysis. The use of these management techniques has become so pervasive and the scientific approach so central to the modem military decision-making process that at times it seems as if our national security is in danger of being mired in theory. Operations analysis and systems analysis were originally instituted by the Defense Department in ordef to provide a rational basis for deciding between strategic alternatives and for planning and allocating budget resources. Now a debate has arisen questioning the ultimate viability of quantitative analysis as an aid to military decision making.
Quantitative analysis, as conducted within the Department of Defense, can be divided into systems analysis and operations analysis—each being performed at different levels. Systems analysis is conducted at the strategic level and has its roots in the attempt to apply economic theory to operational problems. In this context, economics is concerned with getting the most out of available assets through the allocation of resources. The process of systems analysis is continuous and consists of the following cycle:
► Definition of objectives
► Design of alternative means of meeting those objectives ► Critical examination of each alternative in terms of cost- effectiveness
► Reevaluation of objectives
► Establishment of new objectives (where the process cycle begins anew)
The most important element of systems analysis as a vehicle for managing resources is quantification, and cost- effectiveness is its most important tool. An econometric technique for posing both a problem and its solution, cost- effectiveness establishes system performance criteria in line with basic objectives and then either maximizes system effectiveness given a fixed cost or minimizes the cost of achieving a satisfactory level of prescribed objectives. The technique, as a management device, differs from others because it attempts to solve a large, complex problem by dividing it into smaller, simpler problems; clearly defines the underlying assumptions; and attempts to quantify aspects that previously were unquantifiable (for example, military effectiveness, unit readiness, etc.).
The other level at which quantitative analysis is conducted is the operational level, and it is here that the techniques of operations analysis are employed. The goal of operations analysis is the basic understanding of operations in order to provide a means of optimally directing resources. While systems analysis is more managerial in nature, operations analysis is more scientific. The application of operations analysis involves the construction of mathematical, economic, and statistical models to aid in the analysis of alternative decision choices. While it was originally employed to study problems of achieving optimal results using existing forces and equipment, operations analysis now is used to predict results that can be expected by employing alternative forces or systems. These predictions are then often used in the development
of future tactics, strategies, force structures, and systems-
Many reasons for formally introducing quantitative analysis into the defense decision-making process have been offered. Foremost among them is that comparative military analysis has become too complicated, that the i0‘ creasing managerial burden resulting from the introduction of new, complex weapon systems and equipment haS made it all but impossible for a single individual to ma*1 sound judgments based solely on intuition. Consequently- in the early 1960s, Department of Defense officials be lieved a new approach and new techniques were needed t° examine the nature of war. These techniques would re place qualitative judgments with precise, quantitative an swers and would enable decision-makers to discern Pal terns in the employment of forces and equipment tn would be otherwise too intricate to evaluate by the tra 1 tional processes of military intuition. These technique would entail dissecting complex problems, reducing the to their basic components, and then solving each simpie component. ^
One application of these techniques was in the area ^ systems analysis, and two specific provinces where tn J are currently applied are in the planning and budget11^ processes. The focal objective here is the organized c°a trol and centralized management of what had previous y been a planning and budgeting system of guesses an biases. Prior to the appointment of Robert S. McNamar^ as secretary of defense, the planning and budgeting ° military strategy and forces had been almost independ^ activities, performed by separate offices, at differ/1 times, with no method for integrating the plans and 1 ^ available budgetary resources. Strategy and forces 'ver planned by the military without any reference to costs- There were no systematic means of comparing the final] cial costs of alternative actions or force structures. geting, on the other hand, was done by civilians and t defense budget was based strictly on a preestablis^ monetary ceiling without reference to military reCluirof ments or strategies. There were no systematic means comparing the impact on national defense of differe(0 budget levels. The introduction of systems analysis
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means for formalizing the notion of uncertainty. T*11 that were previously thought to be unquantifiable can incorporated into the decision process by using such cepts as subjectively assessed probabilities. Uncertain can also be included by exploring their limits and incorporating the range of uncertainty into the Pr°,^eSt solution. This process might begin with a subjective guess” for each of the descriptive elements in a pr° c and then include an optimistic or upper-boundary esti and a pessimistic or lower-boundary estimate to esta ^ the limits of possible problem solutions. Using such tne
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is to disrupt his alliances. What is of supreme impor-
0(k> it might be possible to increase the probability of Caching a correct problem solution. But, by systematically culling impractical alternatives through the use of analysis, thereby presenting decision makers with fewer Problems to judge, we may also save time and free them to concentrate on other things.
History has shown that the nature of warfare prevents it jrom being easily quantified. Sun Tzu, the fifth century “ C- Chinese general and military theorist addressed the >ssue in his treatise, The Art of War:
“Now if the estimates made in the temple before hostilities indicate victory it is because calculations show one’s strength to be superior to that of his enemy; if they indicate defeat, it is because calculations show that one is inferior. With many calculations, one can win; with few one cannot. How much less chance of victory has one who makes none at all!”
^here is no precise method for measuring military effec- tlveness, as there is for measuring costs, and no analytical Method has yet been fashioned to accurately relate the tw°. part 0f tjje reason for this js that warfare is a very j^an endeavor. Consequently, one of the major com- Ptaints about quantitative analysis is that the myopic procures used by analysts to determine the minimum cost °f a fixed level of effectiveness often prevent appreciation °f this human aspect of war. An approach whose primary to°l is data analysis may be prone to exclude those moral ar,d mental factors which are important in combat but which are not truly quantifiable. Sun Tzu wrote that there are f°ur ways of defeating an enemy: “The worst policy is 0 attack cities. The next best is to attack his army. Next
ance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy.” Sun Tzu’s aPproach is, in effect, to destroy the enemy’s mind, disal- °wing his ability to mentally function and adjust. Quantitative analysis, as conducted by the Department Defense, does not concentrate on destroying the
There is no precise method for measuring military effectiveness, as there is for measuring costs. . . . Consequently, one of the major complaints about quantitative analysis is that the myopic procedures used by analysts to determine the minimum cost of a fixed level of effectiveness often prevent appreciation of [the] human aspect of war.”
enemy’s mind. The analyst, in the performance of his work, often regards technology and rote logic (in the form of mathematics) as the governing elements of war. Consequently, success on the battlefield is often defined in concrete terms, such as number of targets destroyed or “body counts,” rather than in terms of how effectively the enemy’s cohesion or their will to resist have been shattered. However, in actual warfare, Napoleon’s dictum that the moral is to the material as three is to one still holds true. In making decisions regarding the conduct of war, the human intangibles of leadership, ingenuity, experience, and intuition are the most important factors.
The most familiar example of this notion is the German blitzkrieg of World War II. At the beginning of the war, French and British forces stationed in France had more tanks than the Germans, but the Germans were able to exploit Allied weaknesses because they had devised a new concept of how to use their tanks. General Heinz Guderian, whose background was with the German signal corps, equipped his tanks with radios so that he could deploy them in radically new ways while still maintaining control. This insight, although perhaps scientific in nature, was more in line with the writings of Sun Tzu than with those of the quantitative analyst. Quite simply, there are ways in which the human mind is capable of grasping and dealing with large-scale problems that are difficult, if not impossible, to duplicate on paper or by a computer model. Such thinking, when coupled with outstanding and daring leadership, may at times transcend seemingly rigid rules of nature. In effect, there are some warriors who can make two plus two equal five.
It can, in fact, be argued that quantitative analysis, as a philosophy, rejects the entire idea that war is a unique phenomenon, requiring historical knowledge, application, and experience in order to be fully understood. The stand of many defense systems analysts seems to have been best exemplified by a paragraph from a 1974 study entitled “U. S. Tactical Air Power” which states in part, . . waging war is no different in principle from any other resource transformation process and should be just as eligible for the improvements in proficiency that have accrued elsewhere from technical substitution.” This sounds as if a military decision-maker might benefit more from an advanced degree in economic theory than from a knowledge of history or from combat experience.
Military theorist Karl von Clausewitz, on the other hand, argued that war is a unique human enterprise. “War,” he wrote, “is a special profession, however general its relation may be, and even if all the male population of the country capable of bearing arms were able to practice it, war would still continue to be different and separate from any other activity which occupies the life of man.” In other words, the conduct of war is inherently different from any other human endeavor and the only way to deal with it successfully is to deal with it on its own terms. Solutions to problems that make sense in other areas (such as the application of economic theory to business-oriented management decisions) may make for failure when applied wholesale to the conduct of war.
It can also be argued that the analytical approach, by
assigning quantities to heretofore unquantifiables, minimizes the effect of military and political uncertainty in war. Analysts assume that it is possible to predict the enemy threat and possible scenarios for future conflicts. But this threat is one of the greatest of all uncertainties. War is inherently unpredictable mainly because of the problem of enemy reaction to our tactics and strategies. The enemy is not static and predictable but, rather, reactive and unpredictable, not only on the battlefield but in the political arena as well.
Quantitative analysis would be best applied to a purely military war—one that includes no social and political factors—but it is an inescapable fact that, at least in the foreseeable future, any conflict that we might become involved in will have both social and political elements. Problems of defense policy include more than determinations of strictly military operations and military cause and effect relationships; they also include political and economic factors. During the Vietnam War, the mindset of systems analysis led Secretary McNamara to set policy in terms of “making the costs exceed the benefits” for the North Vietnamese instead of in terms of destroying the enemy’s will to resist or disrupting their cohesion. Systems analysis should not be the sole determinant of national wartime strategy.
Another major drawback of quantitative analysis is that it tends to stifle innovation and reinforce an “attrition” style of warfare. The analytic method is, intrinsically, a structured approach that tends to channel thinking and restrict alternatives during the early stages of problem formulation, and thus, may encourage a mindset that precludes change and innovation. Such a mindset can be deadly because quantitative analysis supports and, in turn, is supported by attrition warfare, a type of warfare whose character is amenable to strict analytical techniques. The problem with this attrition warfare/quantitative analysis connection, however, is that quantitative analysis is, basically, marginal analysis. Vietnam is an excellent example of basing tactical policy on the principles of marginal analysis—a few less of these forces here, a little more bombing there. Analysts seem to have an instinct to go for the capillaries rather than for the jugular. If we allow the analyst to direct operations on the battlefield then we consign ourselves to merely operating on the margin of events and risk losing our ability to deliver a quick, decisive, and fatal blow to the enemy.
Despite the highly advanced mathematical techniques employed in its conduct, quantitative analysis still fails to completely and accurately answer the question for which it was designed, that is, “How much is enough?” In spite of the fact that cost overruns have received quite a bit of publicity in recent years, the Department of Defense still does not know how to accurately predict procurement costs or life-cycle costs. If quantitative analysis is merely “quantified common sense,” as some analysts suggest, perhaps we might be better off were we to rely more on common sense of the old-fashioned variety.
Despite its obvious shortcomings, quantitative analysis does, in fact, have a role to play as an aid in support of
“Despite the highly advanced mathematic techniques employed^ in its conduct, quantitative analysis still fails to completely’ and accurately answer the question for which it was designed, that is,
‘How much is enough?”’
intuitive military judgment. Such things as the psycholog1' cal and political consequences of military operations may certainly dominate a particular problem, but there are also other factors that cannot be determined strictly on an intux tive basis. For these questions it is best to employ a combi nation of quantitative analysis, intuition, and actual mil* tary experience. f
What we should strive for is not a total rejection 0 quantitative analysis, but, rather, a more effective £I11' ployment of its techniques. Although analysis has proven harmful in some applications in the past (body counts an the hamlet evaluation system in Vietnam are but two e* amples), it has also proven itself to be helpful (especia y as an aid in determining convoy and antisubmarine tactic during World War II). The key to effective usage of <luan titative analysis is in its intelligent application.
Ground P.ules: We must accept that quantitative ana y sis is not a panacea; in truth, it is quite limited. Before ^ can accept the results of any analytical study, we mu^ understand and agree with the preliminary assumpti°n made; accept that there are uncertainties inherent in am analysis; ensure that the measures of effectiveness used define the problem solution are accurate and relevant ^ the particular situation; and understand that, regardless what an analyst might tell us, the results of any analys are never truly “optimal.” t
While quantitative analysis may be quite useful- should be used as an aid to military judgment, as it calin fulfill, by itself, the decision-making requirement. often than not, nonquantitative issues are the prevail' factors in a decision-making situation. In fact, it would wise to avoid any attempt to quantify the political, s°c' logical, or moral aspects of war; that is, any area that its source strictly in the human psyche. . e
Where and When to Use Analysis: Since quantita analysis is a function that works on the margin, being u primarily to increase efficiency and effectiveness, the suits of such analysis should be used as an aid in^ tuning tactics and strategy rather than as a method ot ^ termining, directing, or providing tactics and strategy-
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a c°roIlary, analysis can be used to assist in discovering ^°me of the details of the enemy’s tactics. We must always Member, however, that the nature of enemy tactics will basically dynamic and unpredictable.
*n addition, if we are to use quantitative techniques, we ust accept the fact that the employment of analysis pre- uPposes an attrition style of warfare and that it is best Sed in situations where our intent is to fight using attrition ethods. In fact, since the conduct of war is, itself, a ..que phenomenon, it might be better to apply quantita- to £ 'echnK)ues main|y >n those situations that are similar areas in the private sector where quantitative analysis as proven effective; for example, to direct productivity at deP°t repair facility.
Although quantitative analysis has become engrained in e Weapons procurement process, we still are unable to tCUrately answer, “How much is enough?” using quanti- IVe techniques. Consequently, perhaps we should ange the manner in which we design and produce our eaP°n systems. While the determination of an alternative ethod of procurement is beyond the scope of this article, it is a matter that is certainly worth further study.
As long as systems analysis and operations analysis remain an integral part of the Defense Department decision-making process, military officers must develop a working knowledge of quantitative analysis techniques if for no other reason than to protect themselves from being duped by bad analysis. However, all members of the defense establishment must break the mindset that assumes that everything in regard to warfare is quantifiable and that final, optimal judgments can only be based on static quantitative comparisons. If this were the case, the body count tally would tell us that we won the fight in Vietnam.
Major Mitchell graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy with a B.S. in ocean engineering. He received an M.S. in operations research from the Naval Postgraduate School and an M.A. in government from Georgetown University. Major Mitchell is an artillery officer and has served as combat cargo officer on board the USS Dubuque (LPD-8) and as Fleet Marine Force Logistics Readiness Officer, Headquarters, Marine Corps. He is currently the Logistics Officer (S-4) for the 2nd Battalion, 10th Marine Regiment.
_____________________________ The Whole Truth---------------------------------
In a class at the Marine Corps Recruiters School, the instructor put much emphasis on the fact that Marines should always be truthful and never belittle the other services.
“Sir,” a student inquired, “what if someone asks if the Marine Corps is just a part of the Navy?” “Say yes, it’s true,” he answered. “But explain that it’s only a temporary measure until the Marines learn to walk on water.” Edward Vadnais
24th Annual Naval and Maritime Photo Contest—Deadline: 31 December 1985
been prize-winning photos will be . °sen and awarded $100 each in the ana ' ^aval Institute’s 24th Annual Nava b Maritime Photo Contest. The win- :_rl9 Photos will be published in a 1986 Sue of Proceedings.
Entry Rules__________________
^ ^ach photograph must pertain to a naval or th ri,irne subject. (The photo is not limited to g calendar year of the contest.)
' L|rnit: 5 entries per person.
Mail entries to:
Naval and Maritime Photo Contest U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE Annapolis, MD 21402