DDG-51 and the Future Surface Navy

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% 1989, when the guided fissile destroyer Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) takes the place of this artist’s conception, she will §^et a chance to answer the *ttany questions her design P°ses for naval commanders ^a°d budget-builders. The lead ^hip in a new class, the Arleigh °urke was designed to replace the fleet’s older destroyers of th^eCharles F. Adams and \°ontz classes. She and her ^s*sters will provide antiair Protection to carrier battle groups with their improved ^egis system. But conceived as 't Was in an atmosphere of cost ^restraint, the class has been ^Cut in terms of both capabilities and number of ships. How ooes the DDG-51 class fit into the Navy of the decades ahead, ^and will it meet the destroyer ^roquirements for both the career battle group and the sur- |^ace action group? The Arleigh °^ltrke may well become a Metaphor for the danger zone that defense programs enter ^hen strategy meets economics.

The Navy has a new Aegis ship. A few months ago, after more than five years of studies, planning, and design, the Navy obtained funding for the USS Arleigh Burke (DDG-51). She will be the lead ship in a new class of Aegis-equipped destroyers that will replace the Charles F. Adams (DDG-2) and Coontz (DDG-40) classes and complement the Navy’s new Ticonderoga (CG-47)-class Aegis cruisers.

In contrast to the Ticonderoga, which was authorized only after an extensive public debate, the Arleigh Burke won approval from Congress with relatively little discussion. And over the next few years, as more CG-47-class ships are commissioned, the DDG-51 program seems destined to exist in the shelter of the Aegis cruisers.

All the same, the Arleigh Burke class constitutes a major shipbuilding program in its own right. So what is to be made of this new Aegis platform? How will these ships compare with the Aegis cruisers, and how will they fit into Navy plans? What needs will the DDG-51 program satisfy, and what issues will it leave unresolved?

The Program: Schedule, Cost, and Configuration

The schedule for the lead ship—to be commissioned in 1989—is shown in Table 1. Cost and schedule details are subject to change. The administration plans to request 29 hulls in three flights over an eight- year period (see Table 2). Under this plan, all 29 should be in commission by 1997.' They will replace 20 of the 23 Charles F. Adams-class ships and nine of the ten in the Coontz class. The Tattnall (DDG-19), Goldsborough (DDG-20), and Benjamin Stoddert (DDG-22) will be retained after comprehensive antiair warfare modernizations.² The Mahan (DDG-42) will be kept in the fleet because she has received the New Threat Upgrade, which permits mid-course guidance of the Standard SM-2 missile and improves automatic detection and tracking in a heavy electronic countermeasures environment.

In constant fiscal year 1985 dollars, the lead ship, the Arleigh Burke, will cost about $1.25 billion, including $79 million in advancement procurement from fiscal year 1984 and about $415 million in non-recurring program startup costs; the total is equivalent to about $1.1 billion in fiscal year 1983 dollars. The 28 follow-on ships will cost about $763 million each. This is the fiscal year 1985 equivalent of the Naval Sea Systems Command’s average estimated cost for ships six through ten.

Table 1 Schedule for the lead ship

Event	Date
Begin contract design	May 1983
	(done)
Issue draft Request for Proposal	March 1984
(RFP)	(done)
Complete contract design	June 1984
	(done)
Award construction contract	March 1985
Begin construction	July 1986
Land machinery	April 1987
Land combat system	April 1988
Commission ship	October 1989

Captain Bowen was graduated from the Naval Academy in the class of 1946 and earned a master of science in international affairs from George Washington University in 1970. During his 30 years of active commissioned service, he had duty in a variety of surface combatants and was chief engineer of an aircraft carrier. He commanded a minesweeper, two destroyers, and a cruiser. Ashore he coordinated the recruitment, training, and assignment of officers and enlisted personnel for shipboard weapon systems, and he spent three years as director of the Surface Warfare Plans and Programs Division in the Office of the CNO. Following his retirement from active duty in 1975, he has been a naval affairs specialist with the Congressional Research Service, conducting policy analysis of national security issues.

Ronald O’Rourke received a B.A. in international studies from the Johns Hopkins University in 1980 (summa cum laude) and an M.A. in international studies from the University’s School of Advanced International Studies in 1981 as its Christian A. Herter (valedictorian) Fellow. He has worked as a research assistant on naval integrated logistics support (ILS) issues for American Management Systems, Inc. of Arlington, Va., and as a consultant on defense issues for Governor Pierre S. du Pont IV of Delaware. He now works as a naval affairs analyst for the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, where he has covered the DDG-51 program.

Table 3 breaks down the key elements of the ship’s antiair, antisubmarine, and antisurface combat systems. Figure 1 provides a profile view of the ship and the location of selected configuration items. As currently designed, the Arleigh Burke class will have an overall length of 504Vi feet, a waterline length of 466 feet, a maximum beam of 59 feet, and a full-load displacement of about 8,300 tons. Four General Electric LM 2500-30 gas turbines will generate up to 100,000 horsepower for a maximum sustained speed possibly in excess of 30 knots. The ship will have a complement of 303, with accommodations for 339. The ship has no separate cabin for a commo- dore/squadron commander. The ship’s commanding officer would have to be bumped from his cabin to make room.

The DDG-51 will feature the Aegis air defense system; the Navy’s new SQS-53C sonar and UYK-43B general purpose digital computers; the Seafire electro-optical system, which provides targeting for laser-guided projectiles; and a 90-cell vertical launching system (VLS), with 29 cells forward and 61 aft. It will also be the first surface combatant to benefit substantially from the Navy’s Ship Systems Engineering Standards (SSES) program, which is aimed at standardizing and modularizing weapon systems.

Specifically, the DDG-51-class ships will feature partial modularity in the vertical launch installation.

Features adding hardness and survivability include the following:

• ► A low design profile. The DDG-51 class ships will sit low to the water and have a reduced radar profile. Compared with the CG-47 class, the DDG-51 will have a greater proportion of her critical equipment—including the combat information center (CIC)—below deck.
• ► A distributed combat system. The ships will be the first surface combatants in the Navy-,with a substantially distributed combat system. A distributed combat system has many of its critical components (particularly its computers) dispersed to various locations around the ship- This reduces the likelihood that a single hit on the ship will neutralize all of her military capabilities.
• ► A collective protection system (CPS). They will also be the first surface ships in the Navy with a CPS, which provides collective defense against radioactivity, and biological and chemical warfare agents.³
• ► Increased fragmentation protection. The all-steel superstructure will differ from the partially aluminum superstructure of the CG-47 class and other recent U. S. Navy surface combatants.
• ► Increased nuclear war protection. Compared with the CG-47 design, the DDG-51 class will have increased resistance to the effects of electromagnetic interference- They will also have more than twice as much resistance to nuclear blast effects. The DDG-51 will withstand seven pounds per square inch (PSI) of overpressure—the CG-47 can take three PSI. Finally, the Arleigh Burke will have more than three times as much resistance to nuclear thermal effects.

The DDG-51 was designed in an atmosphere of strict cost constraint. The goal from the outset was to design a ship that could operate with a carrier battle group and that would be affordable in large numbers. In February 1983, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman specified a cost ceiling, in fiscal year 1983 dollars, of $1.1 billion for the lead ship and an average of $700 million for ships six through ten. In an implicit sense, the $700 million ceiling also applies to ships 11-29. Using the Department of Defense s inflator for shipbuilding purchases, these ceilings translateFiscal Years

Table 2 Planned schedule for authorizing all 29 ships 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992

1 0 3 5 5 5 5 5

-51	-52	-55	-60	-65	-70	-75
-53	-56	-61	-66	-71	-76
-54	-57	-62	-67	-72	-77
	-58	-63	-68	-73	-78
		-59	-64	-69	-74	-79

Flight I Flight II Flight III

Quantity

Hull numbers (DDG- )Table 3 DDG-51 configuration by warfare area

Antiair Warfare

SPY-ID multifunction radar

² SPG-62 illuminators

Standard SM-2 (in vertical launch system)

² Phalanx CIWS SLQ-32 (V-2)

Mark 36 Super Rapid Bloom Off-board Countermeasures (SRBOC) decoy launching system (DLS)

Antisubmarine Warfare

SQS-53C bow-mounted sonar SQR-19 (TACTAS) towed array Ship-based LAMPS electronics Helo landing pad and refueling capability Vertical Launch ASROC

6 Mark 46 torpedoes from two triple Mark 32 mounts SLQ-25 NIXIE electro-acoustic torpedo decoy system Mark 116 Mod 7 antisubmarine combat system

Antisurface Warfare

SPS-67 surface search radar

Ship-based LAMPS electronics

Helo landing pad and refueling capability

Tomahawk cruise missiles (in vertical launch system)

S Harpoon cruise missiles in 2 quadruple cannisters 1 Mark 45 5-inch/54 caliber gun Seafire electro-optical system Mark 160 Mod 4 gunfire control system

•uto fiscal year 1985 figures of about $1.22 billion and S'78 million, respectively. The effect of the ceiling is to hmit the cost of each follow-on DDG to 75% of the cost of ^an Aegis cruiser.

To make the ship affordable in large numbers, the Navy ^began by using a good deal of off-the-shelf equipment, ^specially for the propulsion train. It then designed the ^PY-ID radar to require only one deckhouse and only one transmitter (the SPY-1A/B carried by the Ticonddroga- ^class ships requires two of each), and excluded some types °f equipment from the ship’s design. When Secretary Lehman established the program’s cost ceilings, the cost of the lead ship in fiscal year 1983 dollars was estimated at about $1.3 billion, while that of the follow-on ships was put at $760 million. To help bring the ships under the new ceilings, the Navy cut additional equipment from the design, reduced the ship’s beam by two feet, and substituted steel for armor protection where lighter but more expensive materials were originally specified.⁴ When the ship’s design finally emerged, the following proposed items, among others, had been deleted:

• ► A dedicated gunfire control radar
• ► The SLQ-32(V-3) electronic warfare system, which is capable of both detecting and jamming the radars on enemy missiles; the SLQ-32(V-2) system, capable of detecting the radars only, was substituted
• ► A fourth electrical generator, reducing the ship’s potential from 9,000 kilowatts to 7,500 kilowatts
• ► Shafts capable of transmitting to the ship’s two screws all of the 100,000 horsepower available from the ship’s engines. The shafts inherited from the CG-47 propulsion plant, which are capable of transmitting a maximum of 80,000 horsepower, were retained.

The CG-47 ’s shafts restricted the DDG-51 to a maximum sustained speed of less than 30 knots. The size of the shafts was in turn limited by the ship’s propellers. The situation, as explained by the Navy, was as follows:

“100,000 brake HP installed per ship would achieve the maximum speed desired if it were able of being transmitted into the water. Because of the desire to have a common controllable pitch propeller mechanism with the CG-47, it is estimated that the propeller, if installed without modification, would not be capable of transmitting the amount of power developed by the gas turbine engines. . . . There are no deficiencies with the gear box. This is being designed to handle the maximum power available from the gas turbine engines. Because of the uncertainty of whether controllable pitch or fixed pitch propellers would be used in the early design, we opted not to develop a new higher horsepower propeller, but rather modify the CG-47 propeller. This propeller may not be able to transmit the full power available from the gas turbine engines. The propeller shaft is being sized for the maximum propeller power.”⁵

The House and Senate Armed Services Committees di-

NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND

rected the Navy to place the shafts capable of 100,000 horsepower back into the design. This change, which would increase the cost of an average follow-on ship by only $500,000—less than one-tenth of 1%—would enable the ship to achieve a maximum sustained speed in excess of 30 knots. The House and Senate Appropriations Committees, however, did not explicitly fund this change, so the ship’s shafting, and thus maximum sustained speed, remain open to question.

The DDG-51 design excludes other features commonly found on recent U. S. Navy cruisers and destroyers, such as a second air search radar, a second 5-inch gun, and hangar and maintenance facilities for embarking a helicopter on a permanent basis.

Table 4 presents some key differences between the DDG-51 design, a vertical launch-equipped CG-47-class ship, and a Kidd (DDG-993)-class ship. With regard to antiair warfare, the DDG-51-class ships would be less capable than the CG-47-class ships because they would be able to engage simultaneously, in the terminal phase, only three-quarters as many air targets. They would also have a less capable version of the SLQ-32 electronic warfare system, and would not have a second air search radar operating in a different frequency band. Having such a second radar can be useful, because it provides some redundancy and creates an opportunity for surveillance burden-sharing during saturation attacks in an electronic countermeasures (ECM) environment. It also improves the ship’s ability to detect “stealth” objects, counter broad-band jamming, engage in cover and deception, and change its radar signature for passive defense against antiradiation missiles. The DDG-51 class would, however, be superior in antiair warfare to the DDG-993 class, which is equipped with the Tartar-D system. The Tartar-D is not expected to meet the

Soviet threat much beyond the turn of the century.

With regard to ASW, the DDG-51, lacking hangar and maintenance facilities, will not be able to embark a light airborne multi-purpose system (LAMPS) helicopter on a permanent basis. This will limit her relative effectiveness as a stand-alone antisubmarine platform. The small torpedo load of the Arleigh Burke underscores this limitation.

The limited LAMPS facilities will also restrict the stand-alone effectiveness of the DDG-51-class ships in surveillance, tracking, and surface warfare operations relative to the Ticonderoga-class ships. The single gun is a further limitation, since it provides no redundancy in the gun battery. The DDG-5l’s Seafire system, however, offsets this to some extent (by providing an alternative to radar-directed fire control), as does her Harpoon missile load, which is equal to that of the cruisers.

The DDG-51-class ships will be clearly superior to the CG-47- and DDG-993-class ships in the area of hardness and survivability, having been designed with these desired characteristics in mind. The design work on the DDG-51- class destroyers began five years ago, but given the attention paid to hardness, and survivability—particularly the incorporation of an all-steel superstructure and extra nuclear, biological, and chemical defense features—the ships represent, to some extent, a post-Falkland Islands War design philosophy.

Table 5 summarizes the above comparisons. The comparison with the DDG-993-class ship is of interest, since the Kidd's cost is roughly equal to that of the DDG-51- What it suggests is that the Navy, in designing the DDG-51, sacrificed endurance and antisubmarine warfare capability, but saved some money, increased antiair warfare capability, and achieved greater hardness and survivability.

A final note about the ship’s configuration concerns the Propulsion train. It is essentially the same as that used in he CG-47 class, which in turn received it from the DD- o3 class. This design strategy reduced technological and . ^L|dgetary risk, and enhanced reliability and maintainabil- 'v' P^{ut a}^^so generated two issues. The first issue, the ^ship s shafting and its effect on maximum sustained speed ^Was discussed above.

The second issue concerns the Rankine cycle energy recovery (RACER) system, which converts the exhaust eat from a ship’s gas turbine engines into useful steam Power. Now in development and scheduled for procure- hient beginning in fiscal year 1988, the RACER system ^°uld increase the DDG-5l’s unrefueled cruising range y more than 20%. (A 30% gain was originally forecast. ^uch a gain would have saved an estimated $2.8 million j?^er ship per year in fuel costs, assuming 27,600 barrels of hel at $100 per barrel—delivered—in fiscal year 1983 °Uars.)⁶ With the RACER system, the DDG-51 would ^ave a cruising range more comparable to, but still a good ^eal less than, that of its companions in the proposed career battle group—the DD-963- and CG-47-class ships.

he Navy plans to fit the RACER system into the DDG-51 ^cla*s, beginning with the second flight (DDG-59 and succeeding ships). The design for the first flight (DDG-51 . ^r°ugh DDG-58), however, reserves no compartment for

much to the consternation of the House and Senate ^rmed Services committees, which have strongly sup- P^0|ted the idea of eventually backfitting the RACER sys- ^err> into the first-flight ships.

In an address last year before the American Society of ^aval Engineers, Vice Admiral Robert L. Walters, Dep- ^utV Chief of Naval Operations for Surface Warfare, commented on the propulsion train adopted for the DDG-51:

“I am convinced that in the final analysis, we are not giving adequate priority to endurance in our ships. Endurance may be a factor in ship survivability, yet in DDG-51, we ultimately made sacrifices in speed and endurance, the long standing number two priority in the top level requirement. Although we made considerable progress in propulsion plants, I believe we have not given power density an equivalent effort to that routinely done in aircraft design.”⁷

Assessment

What kind of ship is the DDG-51? The following are some broad observations.

A Multipurpose Ship: With capabilities in both antiair warfare and antisubmarine warfare, the DDG-51 reflects the Navy’s renewed policy of designing only multipurpose destroyers.

A Mid-Mix Ship: All the same, the Navy cut some corners in designing the new class. With regard to antiair warfare, the DDG-51 will lack the second air search radar and fourth illuminator of the CG-47 design, and will carry a less capable version of the SLQ-32 electronic warfare system. With regard to antisubmarine warfare, the ship lacks a helicopter hangar and maintenance facilities and will carry only one torpedo for each of her six tubes, with no reloads.

The design, in effect, represents a compromise between the need to limit the cost of the ship and a pair of decisions—that the ship be a multipurpose platform and that she carry the Aegis system—that from the start meant that the ship would have a considerable cost.

The DDG-51 will be closer in price to the Ticonderoga (CG-47) than to the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7), and sheTable 4 CG-47, DDG-51, DDG-993: selected features

	CG-47	DDG-51	DDG-993
Length overall (feet)	567	504.5	563
Length at waterline (feet)	529	466	529
Maximum beam (feet)	55	59	55
Waterline length-to-beam ratio	9.6:1	7.9:1	9.6:1
Displacement (tons) full load	circa 9,60C	circa 8,300	9,570
light	7,202	6,609	6,645
Screws/shaft hp	2/80,000	2/100,000 or 2/80,000	2/80,000
Maximum sustained speed (knots)	31 +	29-30 or 30-31	31 +
Endurance at 20 knots (unofficial)	6,000	4,400 nautical miles	6,000
	nautical miles	(without RACER)	nautical miles
Complement (total)	346	5,280 + nautical miles (with RACER) 303	338
AAW system	Aegis	Aegis	Tartar-D
Air search radars	SPY-1A/B	SPY-ID	SPS-48C
Illuminating radars	SPS-49 4 SPG-62	3 SPG-62	2 SPG-51D
Missile capacity	122 (with VLS)	90 (VLS)	1 SPG-60 68 (Mark 26)
EW system	SLQ-32(V-3)	SLQ-32(V-2)	SLQ-32(V-2)
Sonars	SQS-53A/B	SQS-53C	SQS-53A
	SQR-19	SQR-19	SQR-19
Permanently embarked helos	2	0	2
Mark 46 lightweight torpedoes	42	(landing pad) 6	24
Harpoon SSM capacity	8	8	8
5-inch guns	2	1	2
Hardness/survivability	somewhat	(with Seafire) much	about the
(versus DD-963 class)	better	better	same

 

Table 5 DDG-51, CG-47, DDG-993: Cost and capability rankings

	Cost			Capability rankings
	(in millions of fiscal year 1983 dollars)	AAW	ASW	ASuW	Hardness and survivability	Speed and Endurance
CG-47a	938b	1	1	1	2	1
DDG-51	687c	2	2	2	1	2
DDG-993d	ca. 740c	3	1	2	3	1
“With VLS (61 cells forward, 61 aft) bRequest for ships in fiscal year 1985 authorization	CNAVSEA estimate	dNotional design with VLS (61 cells forward)

will carry the expensive Aegis system, so on first inspection she might appear to be a high-mix ship. But the CG- 47, it should be remembered, represented a lowering of sights compared with the nuclear-powered strike cruiser (CSGN) and the CGN-42 class, both rejected on grounds of cost. The CG-47 herself is thus not a true high-mix ship. The DDG-51, in turn, represents less antiair and antisubmarine capability than the CG-47 and incorporates many cost-limiting design features. In spite of her price tag and Aegis capability, then, the DDG-51 might properly be seen as a mid-mix ship.

A “Team Player:’’ Lacking a helicopter for convergence-zone antisubmarine operations and over-the-horizon targeting, the Arleigh Burke will be able to operate in high-threat environments only if she steams in the company of LAMPS-embarking ships. The single air search radar on the DDG-51 will reduce her ability to engage in singlehanded cover and deception, and for this reason a^s well, the ship will be more effective in combination with other platforms. The DDG-51, in sum, will operate best as

3 ^{4 4}*

team player,” as destroyers have in the past.

^ Battle Group Participant: Her Aegis system notwithstanding, the Arleigh Burke will in most high-threat situa- ^IQns also require the long-range protection of a carrier’s ^a,r wing. With her proportionately wider hull, which improves seakeeping, and her added hardness and survivabil- ^lly features, the DDG-51 is well suited to operate in the prttgh seas and high-threat environments in which a carrier ^attle group might steam.⁸ Lastly, the DDG-51 class will ^rePlace ships that have operated primarily as battle group Participants. In all these ways, .the Arleigh Burke-class ^mP^s appear both designed and destined as carrier battle §^r°up participants. The DDG-51 thus reflects a Navy deci- ^8l°n to retain the carrier battle group as the primary sur- ^ace-ship unit of organization well into the next century.

Primarily an Antiair Warfare Ship: In spite of the g ove-discussed cost-limiting features, the Arleigh ^Wr^^e’s antiair warfare system is still basically complete— ^{e s}hip has a fully functioning Aegis system. Her antisub- ^rtlarine warfare system, however, was significantly lim- ^e(i by the exclusion of the helicopter hangar, the light ^0rPedo load, and the decision (made elsewhere) to cancel pvelopment of the surface-ship version of the antisubma- ^r,ne warfare stand-off weapon (ASW SOW). The surface- ^’P ASW SOW was once slated to replace ASROC and °uld have been capable of reaching out to convergence- one distances. Now that it has been cancelled, the DOG'S left with the vertically launchable ASROC, which .¹ * have a range of less than 10 nautical miles.⁹ The ^rleigh Burke will consequently have no ASW weapon ystem capable of reaching convergence-zone targets.

*he DDG-51 design thus reflects a judgment that the183

^Wdings / Naval Review 1985battle groups currently need added antiair capability more than added antisubmarine capability. This contrasts with the DD-963 design, which was optimized in an atmosphere of cost constraint in favor of ASW, the warfare area then seen as the battle groups’ most pressing deficiency.

A Relatively Big Ship: At 8,300 tons full-load displacement, the DDG-51 will break the trend toward ever-larger destroyers, just as the CG-47 and FFG-7 broke similar trends for cruisers and frigates, respectively. This is not surprising, since all three were designed with an eye toward economy. All the same, the DDG-51 will be a fairly large ship. Advances in radar technology might someday permit a powerful antiair system to be put aboard a smaller combatant. In the initial design studies for the DDG-51, however, a 6,500-ton design was examined and found inadequate.¹⁰ For the time being at least, smaller and less costly warships will continue to be difficult to achieve."

Summary: If the characteristics of the DDG-51 can be summarized in a phrase, the new Arleigh Burke might be termed the 1980s version of the Charles F. Adams (DDG- 2). The DDG-51 will have almost twice the displacement and more capability for both antisubmarine and antisurface warfare. But she will still be primarily an antiair warfare ship, like the DDG-2, and she will, for the most part, fulfill the role that the DDG-2 has performed in carrier battle group operations. As capable as they are, the DDG- 2- and DDG-37-class ships need to be replaced during the 1990s. Since the DDG-51 is essentially a repeat of the DDG-2, however, she leaves open several questions regarding the future of the Navy’s surface combatants.

Future issues

The long-range issues for surface combatants prompted by the DDG-51 program can be placed under four general headings: force levels, antiair warfare, antisubmarine warfare, and antisurface warfare.

Force levels: Originally, 63 Arleigh Burke-class ships were envisioned by the Department of Defense.¹² With 63 hulls, the DDG-51 program would have provided one-for- one replacements for the 51 Adams (DDG-2)-, Coontz (DDG-40)-, Leahy (CG-16)- and Belknap (CG-26)-class ships, and enabled the Navy to attain its stated force level goal of 137 cruisers and destroyers. The 63-hull DDG-51 program fit into Navy planning as shown in Table 6.

The 29 ships in the current program amount to less than half the number originally planned. The schedule may have been cut to reduce total program costs: Congress might have balked at the bill for a 63-hull program. The current schedule also leaves open the option of designing a new surface combatant for the 1990s. Such a new ship might be designed to emphasize antisubmarine capability, as was the Spruance class.

Whatever the reason for the reduction in schedule, the fleet plan presented in Table 6 will now have to be modified. The overall force level goals, however, have survived the cutback in the planned DDG-51 class procurement. In testimony given before the House Appropriations Committee on 4 May 1984—several months after the decision to reduce the DDG-51 program to 29 hulls—Vice Admiral Robert L. Walters reiterated the overall goals presented in Table 6:

“Surface combatant force requirements are derived from our overall naval strategy and are necessarily somewhat dependent upon carrier and amphibious force levels and the breadth of sea lane defense projected in our national strategy. Since each combatant is an integral and indispensable member of a battle force, we have placed emphasis on total force capability vice numbers of ships in developing a realistically attainable and capable minimum force level objective. Over the past few years, the requirements for surface combatants have remained stable. Support of all projected tasking requires four battleships, thirty-three guided missil^e cruisers, sixty-seven guided missile destroyers, thirty- seven destroyers and one hundred and one frigates- This is considered our minimum force level objec-

tive.

These figures were also confirmed by Admiral James D-Table 6 Conceptual U. S. Navy Surface Combatant Formations^a California

Formations	Iowa (BB-61) class battleships	(CGN-36) & Virginia (CGN-38) class cruisers	Ticonderoga (CG-47) class cruisers	Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers	Kidd (DDG-993) class destroyers	Spruance (DD-963) class destroyers	Frigates	Total
^ Carrier Battle		6	23	31		30		90
Groups6		/
4 Surface Action	4		4	12				20
Groups
Amphibious Task				10	4		8	22
Groups for
1-5 Marine
Amphibious
Force
10 Underway				10			30	40
Replenishment
Groups
2 eonvovs						7	63	70
Total	4	6	27	63	4	37	101	242

33 CGs 67 DDGs

& CGNs

137 cruisers and destroyers of all types

The table was taken from U. S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 5968, Department of Defense Authorization for ppropriations for Fiscal Year 1983, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 4 of 7 Parts, March 2, 3, 4, 10, 11, 17, and 24, 1982. (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office ^«²), page 122.

^e plan is to use 15 carriers to form seven battle groups with two carriers each, and one with a single carrier. The two-carrier groups would each have three CG-47 class 36/r "^Ve DDG-51/CGN-36/CGN-38 class ships, and four DD-963 class ships. The single-carrier battle group would have two CG-47 class ships, two DDG-51/CGN- CGN-38 class ships, and two DD-963 class ships.Catkins, Chief of Naval Operations, in a written response ^to a question submitted by a member of the Senate Committee on Appropriations.¹⁴

Taking into account ships in active service, foreseeable mtirements, planned reactivations, and shipbuilding and conversion programs already in progress, the Navy can ^reach or almost reach its stated force level goals for most types of surface combatants by the turn of the century. The cutback in the planned procurement of the DDG-51 class, nowever, leaves open to question the attainability of the '-hull force level goal for DDGs and the 137-hull goal or cruisers and destroyers of all types. In 1990, when the ^avy is scheduled to achieve a force of 15 carriers, there ''oil be only about 113 cruisers and destroyers. By 1997, J?^e figure will be, at most, 126. Many of these will be etrier- and Tartar-equipped ships that, even with the New hreat Upgrade, may have a difficult time meeting the oviet air threat of the late 1990s.

This shortfall was foreshadowed in Navy testimony two ^^ears ago, when the decision to reduce the DDG-51 pro- §^fam to 29 ships was presumably under discussion. At that 'me, Vice Admiral Walters gave the testimony quoted ‘move but appended the following sentence: “Actual force level goals to be achieved have become an affordability issue.”¹⁵ A year later—last year—Admiral Walters discussed the need to replace the 29 aging DDG-2- and DDG- 37-class ships and then stated, “The other reason that we limited the DDG-51 class to 29 ships was that we felt quite sincerely on an affordability basis that we could only build x number of ships per year.” He said that the Navy of 1991 will, at best, have only about 80% of the required number of destroyers. This figure was dependent upon a current option: equipping another four Coontz-class ships with the New Threat Upgrade and extending their service lives, as was done for the Mahan3⁶

If the Navy falls short of the 137-ship cruiser-destroyer objective, it will not have the ships it has repeatedly said it needs for all its planned formations. If priority is given to filling out the carrier battle groups, then the amphibious task groups, underway replenishment groups, and the convoys may come up very shorthanded.

Given current ships in active service, foreseeable retirements, and new ship authorizations through fiscal year 1986, Secretary Lehman’s 600-ship goal will be achieved by 1989 or 1990.¹⁷ Concerning the fleet’s composition, however, Norman Polmar has concluded:h“The Reagan Administration still has an overall fleet goal of more than 600 ships, the exact number varying with the spokesman being quoted. But the emphasis is on aircraft carriers and submarines, and to a lesser extent on amphibious ships and auxiliaries, with a significant cutback in surface combatants to help pay the bill.”¹⁸

To attain the 137-cruiser/destroyer goal, the Navy will have to build more than 27 Ticonderoga-class ships, or more than 29 Arleigh Burke-class ships, or additional cruisers or destroyers of another (and possibly new) design, or proceed with a combination of these strategies. If a new ship is involved, the Navy, in light of affordability, might reconsider the idea of single-purpose ships. Another possibility would be to devise a hi-low mix strategy with a true high end—a ship like the 17,000-ton, 666-foot, nuclear-powered strike cruiser proposed in the mid-1970s.

The other way to meet the goal, of course, would be to redefine it. If this is the preferred path, two possibilities suggest themselves: allow frigates to be counted against the 137-hull goal, or lower the goal and compensate by substituting additional land-based aircraft or submarines.

Considering any of these strategies for meeting the force level goal will renew long-standing debates about ship design and affordability, platform roles and missions, and acquisition policies. Such debates never make for a party, but avoiding them will widen the gap between the force level objective and forces on hand.

Even if the 137-ship goal for cruisers and destroyers is attained, there are grounds for arguing that it would be inadequate. The fleet plan shown in Figure 7 includes ten underway replenishment groups (URGs). Would ten be enough to sustain a 15-carrier Navy? Commander Michael B. Edwards, an officer with considerable replenishment experience, has suggested that if operations in the Indian Ocean are taken into account, the required number might be a good deal higher:

“. . . a minimum of two replenishment groups would be required for sustained operations in the Indian Ocean scenario, and a worst case scenario exists wherein no fewer than five could be required to support the battle group. Given the overall strategy of battle groups operating simultaneously around the globe, a worst case requirement from each of the battle group scenarios exists for as many as 25 URGs in order to sustain the operations . . .”¹⁹

The fleet plan in Table 6 shows one guided missile destroyer for each replenishment group. Accepting the proposed fleet plan for assembling a replenishment group, an increase in the number of replenishment groups to 15 or 20 would raise the force level requirement for cruisers and destroyers by five to ten ships.

One might also want to strengthen the composition of each group. A published comment on the Edwards article stated:

“[The author’s] figures for the number of underway replenishment groups (URGs), based on distances and replenishment requirements, are probably in the ball park, but it is beyond me how he can discuss the battle group resupply [issue] without discussing the Soviets’ threat to our URGs. As in the days of World War II, Vietnam, and Korea when our URGs were not subject to enemy attack except for an occasional submarine, Commander Edwards assigns four destroyers and/or frigates as URG escorts.

“Unfortunately, now our URG groups in most operating areas will be subject to air and missile attack from Soviet long-range aircraft (‘Backfires,’ ‘Blackjacks,’ and ‘Fencers’) and from long-range missile-firing ‘Oscar’ submarines. . . .”

Facing such a threat, the commentary concluded that a “few destroyers and frigates could not protect the URG forces from destruction.”²⁰

A similar argument has been made in regard to the Navy’s seven proposed convoys:

“A notional convoy protective screen consists of ten combatants—one Spruance-class destroyer and nine Knox- and Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates. The escort’s air defense capabilities will be limited to the 25- 40-nautical mile range of the Perry’s SM-1/2 MR missiles. Conceivably, a determined Soviet submarine or bomber force could simply stay outside missile range and lob its longer-range antiship missiles at will.”²¹

In the face of this threat, each underway replenishment group and convoy might benefit from the presence of an additional guided missile destroyer. If the number of URGs is increased to 15 and each URG and convoy is assigned one additional DDG, then the required number of cruisers and destroyers would be increased by 27.

Another reason the cruiser-destroyer requirement may have to be raised is that the Soviets have made substantial progress in quieting their submarines. If this progress continues, it might lessen the utility of the new passive, towed-array sonars now being installed on our surface ships and submarines. This in turn might force a return to greater reliance on surface-ship active sonars, which have less range than the towed arrays. As a result, the 137-hull cruiser-destroyer force level requirement might have to be significantly increased to provide adequate antisubmarine warfare protection.

These are some of the considerations that might come into play when the replacement for the Leahy and Belknap classes is designed. The original, 63-hull DDG-51 program would have replaced these antiair warfare ships with a new AAW ship. The current 29-hull program, however, leaves open the option of replacing these ships with a new- design antisubmarine combatant.

Antiair warfare: The first AAW-related issue prompted by the DDG-51 program concerns the required number of combatants equipped with Aegis. With a 27-hull CG-47 program and a 63-hull DDG-51 program, the Navy would one day have 90 Aegis-equipped ships. With a 29-hull DDG-51 program, it is planning for a total of 56. How many Aegis platforms does the Navy need?

One factor in the calculation is the research and development effort in AAW battle-management, formallycalled Battle Group Anti-Air Warfare Coordination, or BGAAWC. In short, this effort is aimed at ensuring that a carrier battle group’s Aegis ships can exchange data and operate in a coordinated, efficient manner. A later goal is ^to give the Aegis ships the ability to assume control of rnissiles fired from non-Aegis ships. Success in achieving these goals will tend to reduce the number of Aegis- equipped warships required, because it will enable the Aegis ships to assign among themselves responsibility for separate targets. Eventually, it might allow one relatively expensive Aegis ship (the “fire control” ship) to coordinate or control the missile firings of a group of less-expen- ^Slve non-Aegis ships (the “magazine” ships).

BGAAWC, which was advertised when the first Aegis ships were requested for authorization, has been given a °w profile in recent years. Achieving the goals of the Program would reduce the autonomy and authority of individual ship commanders, but with proposed single-carrier attle groups including up to four Aegis ships, the program will eventually become a pressing issue.

cems battle group antiair warfare operations at ranges of more than 350 nautical miles, has been spotlighted only in the last year.²³ By the time the Arleigh Burke-class ships enter service, the outer air battle issue will be an immediate concern. Development of a very-long-range surface- to-air missile (SAM) for the DDG-51 and other surface combatants is only just beginning. Without it, they will not be participants in the outer air battle.

Closely related is the fate of the Navy’s double-length, extended-range SAM. The retirement of the DDG-37- class destroyers and the eventual retirements of the CG- 16- and CG-26-class cruisers will mean the scrapping of almost all the Navy’s Mark 10 guided missile launchers, the only launchers in the Navy capable of handling a double-length SAM. The Mark 41 vertical launching system (VLS) will accommodate a weapon with much more enclosed volume than the SM-2 ER, but for technical reasons it might be desirable to fire a boosted missile with an airframe on the launcher as long as that of the SM-2 ER. The Mark 41 cannot accommodate a missile that long.The second AAW issue concerns the SPY-1 radar. As ^CaPable as it is, the SPY-1 is still based on 1960s technol-

°8y- A new multifunction, phased-array radar (MFAR) j^'ght be much more capable, and might be small enough °^r installation aboard a combatant of less than 8,000 tons. *-^eginning work on a new-generation MFAR might now ^be considered.

. A third AAW issue is the role of the surface combatant ^ln the outer air battle, an issue raised in these pages four ^ars ago.²² The subject of the outer air battle, which con-Although the DDG-51-class ships will operate primarily in carrier battle groups, they were also designed to operate as elements of surface action groups (SAGs). This raises a final A AW issue, namely, the ability of an independently operating SAG to conduct long-range air surveillance. The projected SAG (see Figure 6) would have four SPY-1 and two SPS-49 radars, and at least two LAMPS helicopters. That’s a lot of surveillance capability, but it still leaves the SAG without a built-in way to search the skies at ranges of greater than about 200 nautical miles.

Antisubmarine warfare: The effect that the quieting of Soviet submarines may have on surface force level requirements has already been discussed. Another issue is the fleet’s projected shortage of LAMPS helicopters. The DDG-51 was evidently designed in part with this shortage in mind. The DDG-51 won’t aggravate the empty-hangar problem, but it won’t solve it, either.

A third problem is the lack of an all-weather ASW weapon capable of reaching out to the convergence zone. The cancellation of the surface-ship version of the antisubmarine warfare standoff weapon (ASWSOW) leaves only the vertically launched ASROC (VLA), which, as discussed earlier, will have a range only about one-third as great as the convergence-zone ASW SOW. Assuming that Soviet submarines will still be detectable at convergence- zone distances, developing an ASW SOW-like successor to VLA may in time become a more pressing need.

Affecting both AAW and ASW is the flexibility of the fleet’s balance of AAW and ASW assets. Technological developments such as the quieting of the Soviet submarines could in the future rapidly alter the required mix of AAW and ASW platforms. In such circumstances, it might be desirable to have a fleet that provides some level of flexibility in setting the AAW-to-ASW balance. One way to provide such flexibility would be to construct a larger proportion of ships that are fully capable in both AAW and ASW. By shifting the emphasis of operations of these ships from one warfare area to the other, the fleet’s AAW-to-ASW-balance could be quickly altered. Such a plan might entail the construction of a larger proportion of multipurpose ships such as the CG-47, and a smaller proportion of optimized ships like the DD-963 or semi-optimized ships like the DDG-51. True multipurpose ships, however, are more expensive than optimized ships, so this option might not be affordable.

Another option is the so-called variable payload ship (VPS). The VPS would be the ultimate product of the Navy’s Ships Systems Engineering Standards (SSES) program—a ship with such a high degree of modularity in its weapon systems and installations that it could, according to its advocates, enter port as, for example, an AAW ship, and be transformed easily into an ASW ship. The DDG-

The Arleigh Burke class will have a 90-ceII vertical launching missile delivery system for Standard SM-2 and Toma- hawk/ASROC, a vast improvement over the Mark 26 launcher. Shown here and on the opposite page are VLS cells being installed in the guided missile cruiser Bunker Hill (CG-52) at Ingalls Shipbuilding in Pascagoula, Mississippi.

51, with its modular VLS installations, represents the first step toward a VPS. The feasibility of the VPS concept has not yet been demonstrated for battle group-capable combatants. (The West German shipbuilder, Blohm & Voss, has produced a frigate-sized VPS—the MEKO frigate— but the ship lacks a bow-mounted sonar and can accommodate an AAW battery capable of providing point defense only.) But if flexibility in the fleet’s AAW-to-ASW balance becomes a concern, the VPS concept might prove valuable.

Antisurface warfare: The principal surface battle issue highlighted by the DDG-51 program concerns the Mark 41 vertical launching system. The launcher’s cells have been sized to accommodate a Tomahawk cruise missile—but nothing larger. The Mark 41 thus establishes a limit for the time being on the size of vertically launchable cruise missiles. Barring a major breakthrough in cruise missile technology, this in turn will establish an upper limit on the range, and thus, possibly, the tactical usefulness, of the Navy’s vertically launchable cruise missiles.

Affecting the surface warfare role of the Arleigh Burke class is the future of SAGs, in which the DDG-51 could play an important role. For what missions will SAGs be appropriate? Under what circumstances will they operate independently of a carrier battle group? And when they operate with carriers, what tactics are to be used, and what functions will the SAG fulfill? These questions have yet to be resolved.

Congress approved the reactivation plan for the Iowa (BB-61) class in part on the understanding that during their first overhauls, the battleships would be altered to°^{r Sc}°res of additional Tomahawk cruise missiles in a VLS farm” in place of the present after 16-inch gun turret. . he addition of V/STOL aircraft might have significantly ^proved the SAGs’ organic capability for long-range sur^Veillance and over-the-horizon targeting. The Navy now however, that there will not be a Phase II after all.²⁴ he battleships as now configured have a large helicopter anding pad and carry 32 Tomahawk cruise missiles each, remains to be seen whether Congress will accept this

arrangement for the duration of the battleships’ service lives. ²5

In the future, another SAG issue will be the replacement ? ^lhe battleships. Will the eventual need for replacements ^ead to construction of a class of strike cruisers after all, or ^ill the SAG revert to a combination of one CG-47- and hree DDG-51-class ships, as was planned before battleship reactivation became a distinct possibility? (Before the ^eagan administration, the Navy’s plans called for three AGs, each with one CG-47-class ship and three DDG- I'Class ships.²⁶) Or will the concept of the SAG disappear entirely with the retirement of the battleships and the attainment of a 15-carrier fleet?

2^look 

It takes several years to develop and procure a new Phased-array radar, a new surface-to-air missile, or a new .ip. So the time to begin answering the long-range ques- ’hns has arrived. Indeed, work on some of these issues °uld have started some time ago. The Arleigh Burke- ^ass destroyers will likely prove themselves to be worthy ^Placements for the Charles F. Adams and Coontz asses. But if it is true that every good answer only raises hew questions, then it might also be said that every good hip only poses new challenges.

‘For a review of the design and programming decisions that led to the DDG-51 class, and particularly to the ship’s configuration, see Norman Polmar, “The U. S. Navy: A New Destroyer Class,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1982, pages 122-124.

“AAW modernizations in these ships are described in P.T. Deutermann, “The DDG-2-Class Guided Missile Destroyer Modernization,” Proceedings, January 1983, pages 101-103.

³For more on the CPS, see Robert E. Boerum and Kevin P. Buck, “Naval Ship Design Implications of the Collective Protection System,” Naval Engineers Journal, September 1984, pages 29-32.

⁴For a complete list of the design changes made to get the ships under Secretary Lehman s cost ceiling, see U. S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations. Department of Defense Appropriations for 1985, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 6. (Washington:

U. S. Government Printing Office, 1984), page 483.

⁵U. S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Department of Defense Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1985, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 2 (Pages 1-655). (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1984), page 365 ⁶Ibid.

’Vice Admiral Robert L. Walters, USN, “Banquet Address: Navy Modernization and Sustainability,” Naval Engineers Journal, July 1984, page 54.

⁸For a discussion of the seakeeping limitations of older U. S. Navy surface combatants, see James Kehoe, Kenneth S. Brower, and Edward N. Comstock, "Seakeeping,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1983, pages 63-67 and James W. Kehoe, Jr., "Destroyer Seekeeping: Ours and Theirs,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1973, pages 26-37.

⁹U. S. Congress. House Committee on Appropriations. Department of Defense Appropriations for 1984, Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 98th Congress, 1st Session, Part 4. (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1984), page 580.

¹⁰See Polmar, op.cit.

“For a discussion of this issue, see James W. Kehoe, Kenneth S. Brower, and Herbert A. Meier, “The Affordability of Warships,” Proceedings, April 1984, pages 64-73.

^I2U. S. Department of Defense. Annual Report to Congress, Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, Fiscal Year 1984. Washington, 1983. page 146.

¹³U. S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Department of Defense - Appropriations for 1985, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 6. (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1984), page 388.

¹⁴See U. S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Hearings on S. 2414, to Authorize Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1985 for the Armed Forces ... and for Other Purposes, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 2, February 2, 7, and 8, 1984. (Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office: 1984), page 939.

“See U. S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services. Hearings on Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1984. 98th Congress, 1st Session, Part 4 of 8 Parts. (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1984), page 137. (The same testimony was also presented to the Senate.) ¹⁶U. S. Congress. Senate Committee on Appropriations. Department of Defense Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1985, Part 2. (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1984), page 329.

“For the composition by ship-type of the entire 600-ship Navy, including a force of 137 cruisers and destroyers, see U. S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Department of Defense Appropriations for 1983, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 4. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1982), page 361.

“Norman Polmar, “Cruisers and Destroyers: Losing Out,” Proceedings, April 1983, page 99.

“Michael B. Edwards, Supporting the Six Hundred,” Proceedings, August 1983, page 51.

“John E. Lacouture, comment on “Supporting the Six Hundred,” Proceedings, March 1984, page 168.

“Jan S. Breemer, U. S. Naval Developments. (Annapolis: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1983), page 48.

²²Bowen, Alva M. “A Modified Operational Concept for the Surface Warship,” Proceedings (Naval Review issue), May 1981, pages 132-149.

““Countering Soviets’ Long Reach.” Defense Week, 16 April 1984, pages 1, 6. “Navy Revamps Air Wings For 14 Carriers,” Defense Week, 30 April 1984, pages 1. 18. “Wade Steering Group Reports Soon on Fleet Air Defenses,” Defense Week, 1 May 1984, page 12. Clarence A. Robinson, Jr. “Soviet Threat Spurs Phoenix Follow-On,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 23 July 1984, pages 16-18.

²⁴u. S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Department of Defense Appropriations for 1985, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 6. (Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1984), page 394.

“For a discussion of Congress’ interest in cruise missiles see Howard W. Serig, Jr. "Where Are the Battleships?” Proceedings, July 1983, page 121.

“See U. S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 6495 [H.R. 6974], Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1981, Before the Committee on Armed Services, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 4 of 6 Parts, Book 1 of 2 Books. (Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1980), page 1090.Pr

°Medings / Naval Review 1985

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