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bi
8 winner in the no-limit stakes—
daCC sooner’ but the Japanese delayed their progress a full Cq^ 'n an effort to approach Attu under cloud or fog
:3n be sensed as the beginning of spring, but the season cifj ^ recognizable, normally, in the stormy North Pa-
^ luck or skill make “Soc” McMorris the
^nner-take-all—Komandorski card game? Ven those who knock “Soc” will admit ^at> whatever the luck of the deal or the rayv, cards must be played skillfully to win.
Strange indeed was the Battle of the Komandorski Islands—the Japanese call it the Battle off Attu— fought for the better part of a stormless day on the §e of the Bering Sea in late March 1943.' s. I rangc, because it was a running battle in which the (oe w*th faster ships and greater firepower seemed unable to K°Se’ °r cEose not t0’ *n order to destroy a foe it knew weaker. Also, the battle lacked involvement of the Power which was available to both sides but was not by reason of intent or force of circumstance. The °diandorski battle was strictly ships versus ships.
(j, trange because of its length—almost four hours in in ,g.ht—and stranger still, because despite the seem- § y interminable ordeal for ships and crews kept under nstant shelling or threat of it, few men were killed or Unded and only minor damage was done to their ves- ban Evepy S^'P on both sides was still operational at the at,,e’s end.
^trange even in the quiet, mild weather that character- placday battle. (In fact, the battle might have taken
er ) In most of the northern hemisphere, late March , » be s s hardh
0[.lc- Nevertheless, on this day the wind was only a one- atWo-kn°t zephyr, the sea smooth, with capless swells §entle, shallow troughs, and the horizontal visibility fQlrtl>ted despite a thickish grey overcast—weather ideal battle performance. Bleak and snow-covered, the do Untain°us island of Medny, easternmost of the Koman- rskis, glistened in its whiteness within easy view, 50
miles northward, during almost all of the battle, to which it gave the American name.
But more strange than any of these aspects was the battle’s climax: the American task group’s most formidable unit, the heavy cruiser Salt Lake City (CA-25), lying crippled and dead in the water while three valiant U. S. destroyers were braving a deluge of enemy fire in a suicidal, last-minute torpedo attack against Japanese heavy cruisers. During these “last” moments, probably all but a very few among the Americans who could see what was taking place had made a realistic assessment of the situation and mentally ceded victory to the Japanese. There were more than a few, most in the seemingly doomed Salt Lake City. who made open preparations for going over the side, by donning life jackets and extra clothing.2
But what seemed during much of the battle to be a Japanese victory turned with unbelievable suddenness into withdrawal and defeat—a defeat which foreshadowed the fast-approaching end of the Japanese thrust into the Aleutian Islands.
Prologue: Task Group 16.6, under the command of Rear Admiral Charles H. McMorris, had for some time been assigned the mission of patrolling waters off the western Aleutians to interdict Japanese efforts to supply or reinforce the occupied islands of Attu and Kiska. The group was composed of six ships, three of them recently joined. The most heavily gunned was the Salt Lake City. Others were the 20-year-old, four-stack light cruiser Richmond (CL-9), Admiral McMorris’s flagship, and four destroyers comprising Destroyer Squadron 14, commanded by Captain Ralph Riggs. The destroyers were the Dale (DD-353), Monaghan (DD-354), Bailey (DD-492), and Coghlan (DD-606). The Salt Lake City had recently relieved the heavy cruiser Indianapolis (CA-35) so the latter could return to the mainland; the Dale and Monaghan were also newcomers.
Rough weather had prevented fueling of the Bailey and Coghlan from the Salt Lake City for several days prior to 25 March, the day before the battle.3 Both were running low on fuel, a condition that could have proved disastrous the next day. While refueling was in progress, Admiral McMorris received orders directing him to return to base at Adak, but he continued the fueling nevertheless. His act was that of a prudent commander desirous of keeping his
supply
create^
an expectation on McMorris’s part that he might be inte cepting only a small, weakly protected group. A sim' night interception a few weeks before was fresh W memory. .
The ships of the Japanese force, it can be assumed, & were at general quarters or in a state of alertness, navigating officer in the Asaka Maru made out the m of an American ship in the darkness only minutes a ward. His feat testified to the high quality of Japan® eyesight (allegedly poor), as well as their visual ai However, as the navigator of the Richmond pointed oU a chronology attached to his ship’s report of the ba > lookouts in the U. S. flagship spotted five of the er^ ships only two minutes after the first radar contact, were not able to identify the Japanese ships because o darkness still prevailing.
of"
the
ports, the only plane launched was from the
ships in maximum readiness for a fight at all times. His prudence was to pay off on the morrow.
Later on this day, fresh intelligence prompted Rear Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, Commander North Pacific Force at Adak, to send “Soc” McMorris a message which authorized him to continue patrolling.
In the meantime, Vice Admiral Boshiro Hosogaya, Commander in Chief North Pacific Area Force, was steaming northwestward at the head of a Japanese fleet comprising virtually every combatant vessel at his disposal. His ships were to escort and cover the unloading of transports and a detached supply auxiliary vessel headed for Attu. Hosogaya’s force included the heavy cruiser Nachi, his flagship, and a second heavy cruiser, the Maya. Others of the fleet were the light cruiser Tama, destroyers Wakaba and Hatsushimo, light cruiser Abukuma (flagship of Destroyer Squadron One, commanded by Rear Admiral Tomokazu Mori), and destroyers Ikazuchi and Inazuma screening the transports Asaka Maru and Sakito Maru. Detached and ahead of the force were the slow transport Sanko Maru and one destroyer.
A word here concerning the sizes of the opposing forces is appropriate. Somewhat exaggerated statements in journalistic accounts published soon after the battle amplified the real advantage the Japanese held and contributed to the impression that the American ships had been lucky to escape defeat. Words such as “outnumbered more than two-to-one” were examples. Actually, among all of the Japanese ships just listed, only eight engaged the U. S. six—two heavy cruisers versus one, two light cruisers versus one, and four destroyers versus four.
0600, 27 March 1943: Admiral McMorris’s ships were formed in a scouting line oriented 350°-170°, distance six miles, making 15 knots, and zigzagging on'base course 170°. At this hour, the ships were ordered to turn from their southerly course to a more northerly one, 020°. Chance does play a role in battle; a real melee could have resulted had this course change been ordered, say, half an hour earlier. It would have brought the scouting line, with all ships strung out over the full 30-mile length of it, directly in front of Hosogaya’s approaching column.
As Admiral McMorris wrote in his after-action report, his choice of the six-mile scouting distance was influenced by the navigational difficulties in the North Pacific, the radar capabilities of some of his destroyers, and the desirability of reasonably rapid concentration. As it turned out, concentration of the U. S. ships was to be frustratingly slow. Had it been more rapid, McMorris might have sunk the Asaka Maru and Sakito Maru with their escorts before rousing Admiral Hosogaya’s full force to their defense.
0730—First Contacts: The American ships were going, or had just gone, to “routine” general quarters when the leading ships in McMorris’s column, the Coghlan and Richmond, made radar contact with what turned out to be the trailing ships of Hosogaya’s force—the two Marus just mentioned with their escorting destroyers. U. S. action reports give the number of first contacts as only three—significant because this small number of targets
matched the pattern of prior Japanese attempts to their beleaguered occupation forces. The number
Within a minute after the 0730 contact, McMorris dered all other ships of his group to concentrate on Richmond. The Japanese ships, counted as five in nuin at 0735, were plotted by the Richmond on course ^ speed 13 knots, and at 0740 McMorris ordered his ® ships to take this course in order to parallel his enemy; 1 course’s lateral direction also helped his rearward ships concentrate.
It was not long—about 15 minutes—before the SW. nese ships were perceived to be turning northward, change of direction was in response to Hosogaya’s or although the presence of his flagship and most of his o combatants was not yet known to the Americans- Richmond's radar plotted the new enemy course as a ^ 340°, and McMorris also turned to true north at ^ regretting that the maneuver would delay concentrati°n his force.
Why Weren’t U. S. Spotting Aircraft Launched? ^ the battle, Admiral McMorris drew mild criticism higher echelons for not getting his cruiser aircraft ca pulted in time to spot gunfire for his ships. In his a action report, McMorris even leveled some self-crltlCf. at this failure. Hosogaya was later seen by Monagho'1 P sonnel to launch a plane from the Nachi. During the ba ^ the Richmond and most other U. S. ships opened UP. *niy antiaircraft batteries on this and what they mista e |t thought to be a second plane spotting the enemy’s m' .
was McMorris’s judgment that ship-based planes ( “doubtless of material aid” to his enemy, f!T,dhis which by inference at least indicated a belief that, h ^ own planes been launched, they would have helpe~ American side. Rear Admiral Samuel E. Morison gj count of the battle in United States Naval Operatj°n$ World War II states that, owing to poor communica g and American antiaircraft fire, the Japanese sP°vjevv planes did Hosogaya little good. This is doubtful if of the Japanese alacrity in making fire control eorrectm The U. S. ships’ reports indicating more than one ^
nese plane aloft were in error, as were their clai ^ shooting down at least one. According to Japane*® ^
Nachi’
others were jettisoned. The Nachi's plane remained aloft until the battle’s end and was then dispatched to Attu.
Actually, there was a good reason for the reluctance in launching U. S. spotting planes, and McMorris did indeed consider doing so. Immediately after the Richmond went to general quarters, he had a long conversation with the ship’s senior aviator, Lieutenant W. L. Lamberson, regarding a launch. The pilot urged it as forcefully as his junior position permitted, but McMorris remained adamant, undoubtedly because speeding up the Richmond to provide sufficient relative wind for a safe launch would have greatly delayed concentrating his ships. Later, at the moment the Nachi opened fire (0840), McMorris ordered the Salt Lake City to launch aircraft. The Salt Lake City's chronological log notes receipt of the order and states a “prepare to launch” order was given but never carried out. McMorris ordered the Richmond to launch as well, but immediately rescinded his order.
Commence Firing! As the early morning light increased, it became possible for the Americans to identify the five Japanese targets—all that were then in view. At 0811, the Richmond's forward main battery control party made out two transports, two light cruisers, and one destroyer. Soon, masts were sighted on the horizon, and at 0820 these could be differentiated as rising from four additional ships. At 0835, these four were identified as two heavy cruisers and two destroyers. At 0838, the Maru transports were observed swerving off to the northwest.
Hosogaya’s leading heavy cruisers, screened as they were from McMorris’s view as they “ascended” the earth’s curvature beyond his horizon, injected a strong element of surprise into the battle’s opening scene. Such an overpowering force was clearly not expected by the American admiral, whose anticipation of a “Roman holiday” (his own words) slaughtering the two Marus and their small defenders quickly had to be discarded. In the words of his report: “The situation had now clarified, but had also radically and unpleasantly changed.” He had less than five minutes in which to decide what to do.
McMorris’s orders admonished him not to engage a superior force. If he were to conform to them, he must retire, preferably eastward toward friendlier waters and possible help from Army bombers based on Adak and Amchitka. But Hosogaya was bearing down on McMorris’s starboard bow at high speed. If McMorris turned eastward, ranges would be rapidly closed, and he would lose precious minutes in bringing his ships on a course and to a disposition that would allow their full batteries to bear on the enemy. McMorris also had not brought his ships to full speed, because his laggard but most powerful ship, the Salt Lake City, had barely joined up. (She did so at 0835, but remained well astern of the Richmond.) In his report, Admiral McMorris had himself carefully and thoroughly weighing his alternatives, but in reality Hosogaya’s initial tactic had left him with virtually no choices. Keeping on his northward course or turning to starboard in order to retire southeasterly would have risked the destruction of his task group. To put it bluntly, Hosogaya had maneuvered his ships to cut off McMorris’s escape, and in effect
Figure 1 Contact—0730-
SAKITO MARU
14,000 yards
/
6 miles between ships
Not to Scale
SALT LAKE CITY
forced McMorris to the wisest choice he could make un the circumstances. (
McMorris turned his force 30° left, to 030°, and wet0 to a speed of 25 knots. The maneuver brought his ships^ an approximate reverse of the enemy’s course, so that American guns could bear fully on their targets as came into range to starboard. This was at 0839. At 0 J the Nachi opened fire on the Richmond at a range 20,000 yards. .
In the words of the postwar Japanese account, this Y proach phase gave the Japanese a much-welcomed °PP tunity to cut off McMorris’s avenue of retreat. Hosog ^ sought this advantage with as much anticipatory zea McMorris had possessed for his “Roman holiday the Marus, which were now skittering to safety . Staff g nery officer Kinoshita on board the Nachi dissefflina fire control data and instructions to all units of the JaP^ nese covering force, which started on the cutoff mane ^ “with increasing speed.” Quoting from the Japanese history, “At the beginning of the battle, the enemy ha ^ make a disadvantageous move by turning ... the a a tage was ours. The Maya and Nachi were able to first.”
The Americans Draw First Blood: The flagship mond replied to the Nachi's fire at 0841, about the inst
the latter’s first salvo arrived, accurate in deflection
Figure 2 0840-
\
short 1,000 yards. The Richmond turned left, conti*1^^ to send off her seven-projectile salvos from two twin mounts forward and aft, and three side 8unS'-c|c|y
\
Nachi’s second salvo was a straddle, and she 9U1'
ASAKA MARU SAKITO MARU
\
\
scored another. Still another followed. One Japanese twanged a guy wire in passing between the American cruiser’s third and fourth stacks. This and other
hell
ligh*
ne^
\
21,000.
yards
Not to Scale
misses shook the Richmond so severely her bridge P^y thought at least two hits had been made. The repair p sent to investigate found no damage. . ute
The Salt Lake City opened fire on the Nachi a 1111on. after the Richmond, range 21,000 yards. As the range c tinued to close, the Bailey fired on one of the Japa - (probably the Nachi) at 14,000 yards, ^ to a three-stack light cruiser. The Cog' opened up on the Japanese flagship from 18,000 >' Thus, all but two of McMorris’s group were exchanf.^ ship-to-ship fire with the Japanese, making this ope . phase the most hotly contested period in the battle- ranges were drawing rapidly closer, and the situation^
heavies
switched
SALT LAKE CITY
verging on full engagement. McMorris ordered speL ^ creased to 28 knots. He had already veered 40° more to west to throw off enemy fire when they opened. 3111
d a'
A
0835 he ordered a further turn southwesterly to 23 ^
minute later, with the Richmond still under heavy f,re’ turned the force right, to 240°. ,|jflg
As beheld by the Japanese, the American salvos ta ^ close aboard the Nachi “were beautiful things.” (A ^cji cept destroyer shells carried identification dyes made the splashes appear like colored fountains.)
near m'sS
salvo of the light cruiser [Richmond] was a
Fir g
of
The second “was over by 400 meters.” The first sab ^ the Salt Lake City “fell about 100 meters forward 0
^achi.” Several straddles and close aboard splashes then Figure 3 0953 raPidly followed, one “spraying our bridge and our bow
Was inundated.”
The Japanese believed their enemy was unaware that °sogaya was gradually increasing speed and credit this actic with throwing off American fire. However, it was c°se enough to shake the Nachi violently, so that “the fe*‘ salvo was thought by all on board to be a direct hit.”
1 was not, but the shaking influenced a starboard turn.
The Nachi launched a spread of eight torpedoes at 0845
*
v\
SALT LAKE CITY
18,000 yards
and
assumed they had “repulsed the enemy van’s counter
^ove” (McMorris’s slight turn northwesterly before tum- lag due west, then southwest) and forced him into a “dis- vantageous move by turning southwest to retreat.” Ac- Ua'ly, McMorris’s force had not noticed the torpedoes; ater a few lookouts reported sighting wakes, but their reP°rts were discounted. McMorris’s turn to the southwest "jas made to open gun range, which had commenced to c°Se rapidly. The Japanese knew their torpedoes had 1Ssed and believed they ran north of McMorris’s van. because of the southward turn, which was executed rather slowly, the Richmond's forward twin mount could no longer bear on the Japanese ships. As a result, control ° (he guns was shifted to Director II. In salvos of lessened °Iume, ultimately reduced to two shells, the Richmond ^(lr|tinued to fire at the Nachi and was able to get off 26 unds before the turn, and an increase in speed opened e range beyond her guns’ reach, jy 0850, one of these salvos from the Richmond hit the , ac^i, one shell exploding on the starboard side of the atter’s bridge and signal deck, killing 11 signalmen and °unding 21. The confusion undoubtedly caused by such Jirnage on the Nachi's bridge was augmented by wounds ,? ‘he officer personnel, the Japanese account stating that ^rgency medical treatment was continued to the staff lcers on the ship’s bridge.”
rhe other shell of the salvo hit the Nachi's mainmast . severed the ship’s communications. These hits, along 'm the resulting failure of electrical power to the Nachi's ^munition hoists and gun mounts, caused her to cease |T'ng and drop back. The effect was to bring the relative ■ Power °f the two forces almost to even terms for a 'gnificant period of time.
a ^editing the Richmond with the hits made at 0850 and other two minutes later in the Nachi's torpedo tube com- ^ nrnent may excite some argument among students of the attle, but is in accordance with available evidence— /'acipally that supplied by the Japanese. In the Rich- ond’s action report, her commanding officer, Captain e°dore M. Waldschmidt, modestly made no claim that e flagship had scored any hits, citing only observed addles, but some of his officers and men believed that fQns °f the obsolescent cruiser nicked the vastly more i Ridable Nachi. And at war’s end, some assessments by 'v<duals on the receiving end supplied confirmation. s he strongest documented evidence that the Richmond n0red all of the hits on the Nachi is the statement of ,0rntr|ander K. Miura, staff officer on board, who insisted were made by six-inch projectiles; of the American
Not to Scale
Figure 5 1157-
HATSUSHIMO WAKABA •*
Not to Scale
‘hat all
shi
Ps engaged, only the Richmond had guns of this diame-
&
18,500 yards
*V
yp'
0s
v'
SALT LAKE CIT^^"
^ DALE
$
ter. Miura’s statement was first related to the author by Admiral Morison shortly after the war and appears as a footnote on page 26 of Volume VII of his history with an assertion that the Richmond was not firing at 0850. The assertion is in error. Her action report documents fire from her after guns continuing until 0903. The Japanese history ascribes the hits to a destroyer. The Coghlan was the only destroyer then firing on the Nachi, and also observed the first two hits. However, the destroyer reported them as appearing to have been made by the Salt Lake City.
In any event, the Japanese record is clear that “the enemy who destroyed the Nachi’s bridge earlier again scored a one-shell hit in the control room [literally pipe or tube room] killing two more and wounding five.” This casualty, along with the prior damage to electrical circuits important to main battery fire control, prevented the Nachi from using her guns for a period of time. “The consequences . . . were serious and caused great inconvenience in the [ensuing] battle.” The inability of the Nachi to fire and her withdrawal from full action was observed on the American side.
Thus, virtually all of the damage done to the Japanese ships, as well as casualties among personnel, occurred in this brief, opening phase of the battle.
The Ordeal of the Salt Lake City: After the initial phase of the battle, there is little doubt that Admiral McMorris’s sole concern was saving his ships. Cut off to the east and to the south by Hosogaya’s interposition, he had no place to go but west. The U. S. ships set off generally in that direction on the long “end run” that was to last the next three hours. McMorris tried to work north for a while, but Hosogaya again cut him off and ultimately forced him back to the west. It took all of two hours before Hosogaya’s maneuvers put his ships to the north of the Americans and presented McMorris with his opportunity to veer southward—at least partially accomplishing the end run. Once again, Hosogaya turned inside McMorris’s track to block his way to the east—full circle—and waters closer to the U. S.-held territory.
Except for an occasional shell lobbed in the direction of McMorris’s flagship, brief exchanges of fire with Japanese light forces suspected of attempting to launch torpedoes, and attempts to shoot down the Nachi’& spotting plane, the “end run” was something of a respite for McMorris’s four destroyers and the Richmond. But this was not the case for the Salt Lake Cityl
She suffered a long torment which has few parallels in naval history. She was punished by two adversaries each her equal, although one of these, the Nachi, had been weakened in the opening round. In this running engagement, she fought at a further disadvantage, seldom being able to bring her forward guns to bear. Despite these and other disadvantages—and the inevitable hits which by all odds the Japanese should have scored more often than they did—the Salt Lake City was able to keep up an almost steady rate of fire. Undoubtedly, she fended off Hosogaya, wary of torpedoes in his pursuit of the American ships, and kept his two larger combatants from closing in on McMorris’s group.
The American cruiser, familiarly known in the Navy a “Swayback Maru” because of her profile, used up ° , rounds of her armor-piercing projectiles and was reduce to firing 26 rounds of high capacity shells by battle s en because of the exhaustion of her after magazine. PovV( and shells from her forward turrets were trundled aft uu ing much of the battle, an extremely hazardous but neces sary expedient for continuing fire. .
The accuracy of the Salt Lake City’s fire was great•' affected by the inability of her battery control to spot t landing of salvos much of the time through the srno screen laid down by herself and the American destroyer ■ On the other hand, the screen was effective in hiding n from the Japanese cruisers and slowed their fire, at tm1 even stopping it completely.
Had the Salt Lake City succeeded in launching
her
planes when McMorris gave the order, she would found it much easier to make fire corrections—-and ' entirely different story of the battle might have been t° ^ As it was, a hit received at 0910 set her starboard Pain afire, and it had to be jettisoned. gaf
ither
and
The Salt Lake City scored only once, on the Nachi, 1 the battle’s end. She herself was struck six times by e
the Nachi or Maya, at 0910, 0920, 1010, 1059, 1103
1152. (Morison lists only four hits.) On the basis
of the
Japanese reports, the hits, or most of them, appear to
have
been achieved by the Maya, which claimed she “sej * ( to a Pensacola-class ship.” The Nachi’s report stated j she “sighted hits on quarterdeck of Chicago-0 a cruiser” but did not specify she had made them-
The Charge of the Light Brigade: Flooding from the lu^ she had received had given the Salt Lake City a list- in transferring water to correct it, seawater was inJeC,, , into her only operating fuel line. Her boiler fires 9U1^ 0 went out. At 1153, she reported over her voice ra
“My speed is 22 knots.” jc
For the next three minutes, there followed in dram^ ^ sequence a series of transmissions which let the 0 ships of the task group know that the battle’s climax at hand:
“My speed 14.
“My speed eight.
“My speed four.
“My speed zero.” Qf
In the pause after the last transmission, the v0’cenie Captain Riggs, the destroyer squadron commander, c over the speaker, requesting permission to make a tofiU^
run on the Japanese cruisers. McMorris first directed to stand by, a moment later to execute the run. then ordered the Richmond to turn back and close the Lake City and simultaneously to help the Dale 111 smoke that would keep the stricken cruiser hidden- With the Bailey in the lead and Coghlan and MotiOg ^ following, Captain Riggs gave his Davids his c°^0 (300°) and directed them to prepare for firing on the Japanese Goliaths. Quickly, the American destroy t drew such heavy Japanese fire that they were al ^ totally obscured by shell splashes. The Bailey w‘lS once, then again. The Coghlan was hit. The first hit on
eflt
h
ti
d
l
d
1
f
t
F
t
l
i
$
1
I
i
end
a,% by an eight-inch Japanese projectile induced Cap- *a'n RiggS to order torpedoes fired. At 9,500 yards, the estroyer got off five; none found their mark, although ailey personnel thought that they had scored hits. Imme- 'ately after firing, the lead destroyer took a serious hit in er forward engine room and soon came to a stop. The ,lrst hit was in the vicinity of her galley, where five mem- ers of her damage control party—off station—were preparing a snack. The explosion killed all five—on this day j Price of a ham sandwich was death. Neither the Cogh- an nor Monaghan got off their torpedoes.
I*1 his report, Admiral McMorris used the words “A Magnificent and inspiring spectacle” to describe the destroyers’ charge. “Destroyers continued to smoke as they ^ent in and zigzagged to dodge enemy shells. All fire had lifted to them. They appeared to be smothered with flashes. It was incredible that they should survive, but aey continued in.” Strangely, neither the Japanese his- ,)r.v, the official Japanese track chart, nor any of the Japanese ships’ records note the destroyer attack.
The Salt Lake City's “speed zero” transmission was at By 1203 she was moving again and reported her sPeed to be 15 knots.
1213: Salt Lake City making 22 knots.
1225: Destroyer torpedo attack completed.
1230: Enemy retiring to westward. Action broken off. cMorris soon set his group on a base course east. His run was full circle, the battle over.
unobserved by Hosogaya’s spotting plane. He therefore was not induced to close in for the kill. He was low on fuel, and both the Nachi and Maya had already fired a high percentage of their ammunition. He could have feared air attack, which at this late stage of the battle he may have considered imminent. Nevertheless, his real reason must remain a matter of speculation. Let it just be said that the attack of the American destroyers helped him make up his mind.
As to the possibility that Hosogaya feared air attack, an incident occurred during the battle which conceivably could have allowed him to make an estimation of the time bombers from Amchitka might be expected to arrive over his fleet.
That the Japanese were adept at intercepting American radio transmissions is well known. The larger ships had operators trained in copying international Morse and individuals expert in translating English. In mid-battle, the Salt Lake City attempted to contact the Army’s Amchitka base with a request for bomber support, using the fighter- director voice frequency. After first answering, Amchitka broke off the communication, probably for security reasons. The Salt Lake City then transmitted her dispatch by key in plain language, over the regular ship-shore frequency used for contact and amplifying reports. The language of the dispatch revealed that bombers had not yet taken off. An easy calculation would have given Hosogaya the period of time he could expect to be secure -
^ ^hat Made Hosogaya Quit? No one who witnessed the .er°ism of three destroyers daring the might of °Sogaya’s entire force can find it easy to consider any ber reason for the enemy tumaway than the sudden ag- ^ressiveness of their attack. Throughout the chase : °s°gaya had shown himself wary of torpedo fire by stay: jj.at extreme range. But the Japanese records give no -M-hcation that Captain Riggs’s run turned their fleet.
I .ete were, in truth, other possible reasons. The smoke >d down by the Dale and Richmond must have obscured eSalt Lake City's plight even skyward, so that it was
h
from air attack. The calculation in fact checks out closely to the time of his tumaway. The Salt Lake City’s dispatch was not only a lapse of communication security, it also breached the chain of command by bypassing the task group commander.
Epilogue: That McMorris and his smaller task group won the battle goes without saying. He accomplished his mission of preventing the resupply of Attu. Hosogaya failed in his. Damage to ships was not major on either side, although greater for the Americans, in that three of their vessels were hit as opposed to one Japanese. American fatalities totaled seven (five in the Bailey, two in the Salt Lake City) versus 14 Japanese (all in the Nachi). That McMorris won the battle partly by default—the “miracle” of the Japanese tumaway at the very time the Salt Lake City was disabled, forcing a desperate decision to engage at whatever cost—can be argued.
But a thorough study of the record on both sides shows that almost every significant event of the battle flowed
from a decision or act of one of the commanders. Evej1 some of these are construed as mistaken by after-the- 1
quarterbacking, their effects on the course of the ac still must be attributed to the interplay of opposing c°n a
mand decisions—a vector addition, so to speak.
McMorris, up to the point of Hosogaya’s final u west, already had maneuvered his ships into a disposi of disengagement, his objective. And he saved his snip • his prime consideration after the battle’s opening P*13 His decision, however harsh for the Salt Lake City, r
leave her in a position to bear the battle’s brunt canno t
faulted. He was fighting a retiring engagement, and guns had the longest range. And when the final necess 1
arose, he used all of his ships unhesitatingly and aggr ,
sively to save her. j. t
Hosogaya, on the other hand, sacrificed his initia vantage in speed and firepower by overcaution in stay beyond torpedo range of the Americans and a v*rtuaua| I complete failure to employ his lighter ships—an units tactic for the Japanese Navy, which had superior torp does and relied heavily on their use.
A Postscript
By Commander Ralph H. Millsap, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)
craft. He had ordered all ships
Rich-
cuucciuiaiiuii as lapiuiy as ^ / r*
much too slow for launching aircr3
But much to McMorris’ frustration
discomforture, the Salt Lake Cit been steaming with most of her
had
Writing almost six years after completing this article and following the recent publication of The Battle of the Komandorski Islands (Naval Institute Press, 1984) by John A. Lorelli, I believe that it is necessary to correct the record with regard to Admiral Charles McMorris’s conduct of the battle.
The charges of “overconfidence” and lack of farsightedness levelled at McMorris are not justified. His early- stage anticipation of a “Roman holiday,” per his action report, was based upon experience only weeks prior, when a Japanese ammunition ship attempting to supply Attu was intercepted and sunk by the Indianapolis (CA-35) after all the torpedoes launched by McMorris’s destroyers proved to be duds. The discovery of the Japanese ammunition ship was at night, as were the first radar contacts (and only three at that) in the Komandorski action. The victim of the prior action was in fact “escorted” by units which stood off so distant that their presence was not known until after war’s end. And the pattern of Japanese attempts to resupply Attu and Kiska by small units under cover of darkness and fog was one followed throughout this period. The intelligence provided McMorris on the day prior to the Komandorski battle was not specific as to character of the Japanese forces he could expect. But, after receiving it, he did cancel an intended return to Adak, and prudently refueled two of the destroyers.
Silly is the charge that McMorris failed to exercise his task group or communicate with his captains as to “tactics to be employed, or the role of any ship.” An offset gunnery practice was the first thing ordered after the Salt Lake City and her accompany-de- stroyers joined the task group. To say that McMorris was greatly displeased with results of the practice is putting it mildly. As for tactics, I must ask, tactics for what? The ships were assigned to a long-interval scouting line the night prior to the Komandorski action, and their captains well knew the role and function of their ships.
McMorris’s operation order assigned him the task of interdicting efforts of the Japanese to supply or re-garrison their occupied islands, but specifically admonished against engaging a superior force. This order was one of the prime reasons he failed to launch spotting aircraft—perhaps a more legitimate criticism of his prebattle planning. But at this early stage of a developing confrontation, Hosogaya’s presence with a superior force was not known, and had
it been known, McMorris would n° have engaged or launched his aircr for the useless purpose of spotting l ^ fire he did not expect to take P*ace'ese planned to close only the few J;lPan vessels then detected by radar and quickly sink them, hopefully at f'rs under cover of darkness. (The eIie'^ ships at this time had shown no s>£ ^ that they had spotted the U. S. /°rCfea- However, there was a more telling son for his failure to launch his air
of ®e
task group to concentrate on the * ^
mond. The latter was slowed t0 en3_ concentration as rapidly as possibl
ana
boilefS
cold, and could not get up enough steam to increase her speed and J rapidly. I would point out that I ^ standing by McMorris and overhe ,(S the full discussion of the launch an
advisability.
As a matter of fact, the heavy cruiser was not completely joined and in position when the Japanese opened fire on the Richmond, Per^of- answering another criticism of fans, for not ordering his “commenc ing” before he did.
\
In the end, was it skill or luck that won the Battle of the ^°niandorskis?
The element of chance exists in any battle, as it does in any other sort of “game.” But whatever the deal of the c3rds, they must be played skillfully to win. At the scene ? action on 27 March 1943, it seemed that the more tangi- e elements of naval combat—good gunnery, damage c°ntrol, the performance and stamina of ships, the courage and determination of officers and men, the tactics of admi- and captains—all of these had won the day for the merican task group.
Additional facts and the benefit of time’s perspective J^not changed that assessment.
l?1'* material for this article has been drawn from official microfilmed records, ria American and Japanese. Particularly helpful were the action reports of Com- inv i r ^as*c ^rouP 16.6 and the commanding officers of the individual ships Uti(l° VC<* 'n *ae 6alllc; the narrative from the monumental World War II history [BfS PreParat'on by the Japan Defense Agency (Boeicho Kenshujo Senshishitsu . ^1); action reports of the Abukuma, Nachi, Maya, and Tama; and the personal ki r,exPer'ence of the author, who was a member of the ship’s company of the USS during the Battle of the Komandorskis. Samuel Eliot Morison’s History berniIe^ States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume VII, Aleutians, Gils and Marshalls was used as a reference, and some annotations from that book have been included in this text. All of the Japanese material was translated and supplied to the author by Paul S. Dull, author of A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978).
2John Bishop, The Saturday Evening Post, 5 February 1944.
’The date of the battle was 26 March by U. S. accounts, which is technically an error. When operating in these North Pacific waters, the U. S. task group frequently—sometimes several times during a single day—crossed back and forth over the international date line. To avoid tedious record-keeping, the line was “moved” to a position always westward of the group’s position. Local time was also unofficial and was chosen to accommodate ships’ routines in the higher latitudes. On the day of the battle it was zone plus 10. The Japanese were using Tokyo time, zone minus 9. In this account, U. S. time is used, with Japanese times adjusted to conform.
Commander Millsap was graduated from the University of Oregon School of Journalism with a B.A. degree in 1930. He spent the next eight years in the newspaper field and as a publicist. He enlisted in the old Naval Communication Reserve as a radioman third class and was commissioned in 1935. He was ordered to the Naval Postgraduate School in 1941 and to duty on board the Richmond after finishing refresher training in communications. He served in the Richmond until April 1945 and then reported to the new heavy cruiser Macon (CA-132) as her commanding officer until war’s end. In civilian life, he was a corporate official of the Portland, Oregon, General Electric Company, retiring as senior vice president at the end of 1973. Commander Millsap was one of many battle participants who contributed their recollections to John A. Lorelli’s The Battle of the Komandorski Islands (Naval Institute Press, 1984).
P s bridge. (His signal officer, Lieu-
and j
'ant [junior grade] Robert Coleman,
Were standing by the TBS.) Cap-
in l*16 I,ars*lest criticism of McMorris , Lorelli’s book is that the admiral flowed h‘s flagship to stand off a °d distance before returning to the of action” during the final stage j tae Komandorski battle when the tv City lay dead in the water.
's is utter nonsense.
Ia A* the time, McMorris had at long st been able to complete his “end j maneuver and had his force flee- ^ Eastward at top speed, hopefully ■ v*ng under an umbrella of approach- c ® TL S. Army bombers. (These air, t did not arrive until after Hosogaya °Le off the engagement.) Suddenly, 'Vftlfa^ came on (hc TBS
e " ber famous transmission: “My ^ ec* Zero.” But actually the message c: s a much longer one—-almost loqua- T°Us starting with “My Speed >w°” and gradually working uVVnvvard in repeated transmission 11 the zero was reached. McMorris to h *nt0 lheRichmond’s charthouse ,bear the transmissions and to obviate ^ Ing them relayed to him from the
>e.!r
"Riggs then came up on the TBS to i 3 message requesting permission ead three of his destroyers on a torpedo attack. (The Dale was by the Salt Lake City making smoke.) As previously stated, McMorris did consider the latter message—but certainly not for more than ten seconds—before ordering an “execute.” Perhaps a short hesitation is understandable, considering that daylight torpedo attacks by destroyers were considered to be suicidal, and remembering that use of their torpedoes only a few weeks earlier had proven them all duds.
There was still another long message from the Salt Lake City—this time from Captain Rodgers speaking into the microphone. It began, “During this lull in the battle, let me ... ,” and as I remember, ended with a “God Bless you all, and glad to have been with you.” Certainly Captain Rodgers believed his ship had but a few moments left. In fact, someone on the Richmond’s bridge shouted, “He’s singing his swan song.” There is little doubt that everyone hearing the transmission shared Captain Rodgers’ estimate of the situation.
During the transmission of these messages, the Richmond continued her course and speed, but when the overlong transmissions ended, Admiral McMorris quickly ordered his flagship to reverse course, make smoke (which she did from her four funnels), and circle the crippled Salt Lake City. Unspoken was the understood purpose of his order—to provide whatever possible protection to the Salt Lake City and to rescue her survivors. If the flagship’s turn-back seemed a bit slow to those on board the Salt Lake City, so be it.
In the heat of battle, a commander must act in accordance with the priorities that events determine, and McMorris did so. Greater conciseness by the Salt Lake City’s personnel in their radio messages would have mitigated some of the alleged delay.
And as a final note, I believe the guns of the obsolete Richmond hit the Nachi and reduced the Japanese force to near equal potency with the U. S. task group. Lorelli’s belief that the Salt Lake City scored the hits on the Nachi is not based on what he or anyone on board the Richmond saw or thought they saw, but after-the-fact analysis of the U. S. action reports coupled with his interpretation of the Japanese record. Because the Japanese were on the receiving end, I put stock in what they have to say. And they say the hits were made by six-inch shells—i.e., the Richmond’s guns.
IV