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Mn ^ ^tron8’ ar)d Far” is its motto. A its ^ *ron Flst grasping a thunderbolt is ,f^ nih'Cni- The recently created Force (i'AR,|°,! ^aP'de (Rapid Action Force W' *S a unlclue instrument of French S(Jrn^n^and military policy. Its purpose,
• Lieute
dan[ "p UP succinctly by its comman- js ( ’ lieutenant General Gilbert Forray,
counter the unexpected.”1 General Fo~-” -—1-;—a FAR:
*n a dangerous and often unforesee
able
world, the [French] Govern-
ent wanted to have ready a ‘plus’ ' ■ • one supplied by a mobile, power- u force whose rapidity was adapted the world in which we live. . . .
crance
must guarantee security in a
in^cfold ‘field of action’. . . . First French territory, secondly in Eu- Pc> and finally in more distant re- i ns where we have jurisdiction, in- es's, and various responsibilities.”2
par ,e FAR is almost automatically com*" t0 the U. S. Rapid Deployment
°tce >ie:
(RDF). There are obvious similar!
a*so hnportant distinctions be-
f<>cu the
, ------------------------ ^-------- r---------
The p|'^m NATO and outside Europe. c|em UF is a joint command representing a Coents °f all services, while the FAR is $i$te^1Fonent of the French Army, as- f0r 0r supplemented by air or naval AhuWhen required.
iej hough the French have closely stud- r RDF concept, they are unlikely to T^'t or C]ajm (hat it inspired the FAR. ever Slrn*larities in force structure, howto^’ are striking. The RDF’s ground sionP°nent consists of an airborne divi- si0n’ airmobile division, armored divi- hlry ’ i!eparate armored brigade, air cav- qw r'gade, and Marine division—a forcF°nent of a Marine amphibious inC]a'^he FAR, once fully fielded, will diVj . c an airborne division, airmobile diVj °n’ light armored division, marine ^°n, and an alpine division.3 ere are also remarkable parallels in
■ en the two forces. The RDF’s mission has wide-ranging responsibili-
Uses strictly on Southwest Asia, while
the events which led to the creation of the two forces. In the early 1970s, both France and the United States experienced a period of isolation. The United States was entering the post-Vietnam era, while France was shedding itself of the last of its overseas territories. Interventionism had become unpopular in both countries.
In France, public controversy surrounded the employment of French troops in the first Chadian civil war, leading to withdrawal of the troops in 1972. Thus, France, like the United States, experienced difficulty in defining its external security interests.
The U. S. retreat from the world scene in the mid-1970s created a political-military vacuum which France was forced to fill at least partly, particularly in Africa. In 1975, when the U. S. Congress compelled the Central Intelligence Agency to cease its support of anti-Communist Angolan rebels operating from Zaire, the minerally rich African nation became vulnerable to Marxist aggression.
In 1977, Angolan-backed Katangan rebels invaded southern Zaire. France declined to intervene directly in the former Belgian colony but did provide air transport to deploy a Moroccan Army battalion which helped repel the invaders. The rebels returned a year later, in far greater strength, captured the city of Kol- wezi, and murdered hundreds of Europeans. On 19 May 1978, 400 French foreign legion paratroopers were dropped into Kolwezi from U. S. C-141 transports. Together with a Belgian commando battalion, they drove out the Katangan rebels and rescued the surviving Europeans. The rebel slaughter of men, women, and children at Kolwezi outraged the French public and demonstrated the need to prevent future tragedies to meet French nationals.
In 1977, France granted independence to Djibouti on the Horn of Africa. To deter any interference by Ethiopia or Somalia, President Valery Giscard d’Es- taing deployed a naval aviation group to reinforce the Foreign Legion Regiment in Djibouti in Operation Saphir.
On 27 January 1980, Libyan-backed rebels attacked the Tunisian garrison at Gafsa, killing 41 persons. President d’Estaing, fearing a possible Libyan takeover of the former French colony, dispatched warships into the Mediterranean to support Tunisia.
Later that same year, France initiated another preventive operation. When Iraq invaded Iran, a flotilla of minesweepers was dispatched from Djibouti to help keep the sea-lanes open through the Persian Gulf. In March 1980, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the U. S. Government created the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force to deter Soviet and other threats to the Persian Gulf.
The next major French military intervention occurred on 20 August 1982, when 300 French foreign legionnaires were dispatched to Beirut as the lead element of a multinational peacekeeping force. The French contingent was quickly increased to 2,000 men. The legionnaires were later replaced by a brigade of French marines. The legionnaires, in turn, returned to replace the marines. The French public solidly supported this action, even after the tragic terrorist bombing of the French military barracks in October 1983. When the multinational force was finally withdrawn in early 1984, the French contingent was the last to depart.
Shortly after French troops were sent into Lebanon, the government of President Franqois Mitterand initiated sweeping changes in the French military. In a general reorganization, the armed forces were reduced by 35,000 men.4 On 24 November 1982, Defense Minister Charles Hemu told the supreme council of the army that, as part of this reorganization, one of the army’s three corps should be organized into an “action and rapid assistance force . . . capable of inserting itself into an allied battle plan in Europe in any zone where it would be needed.”5 The following April, the government five-year defense program revealed plans for creating a 47,000-man expeditionary force by 1985. Its primary
,nSs / March 1985
161
cilitates its primary mission of c0j^erjn2 7,700 men, of which 50% are carer
ing amphibious operations. Nun1
fine infantry regiments (three oi ^v.
are manned by naval troops), and a
nt, anttau
craft regiment, and engineer comp1
cars, 15 105-mm. howitzers, ^ ’ 96 mm. mortars, 32 81-mm. nl°rt^'ir]i ' Milans, and 60 20-mm., eight 30' ^ and ten 40-mm. antiaircraft gunS’ iojni
veiu^
mission, according to Hcmu, would be “opposing an armored thrust” into Western Europe and “engaging [in] defensive combat wherever we decide.”6
The defense minister emphasized, however, that the FAR would not be integrated into the NATO military structure, although France would work with NATO in developing contingency plans for deploying the FAR.7 Its mission is not limited to NATO but extends to French interests outside Europe.
The first use of FAR forces in combat occurred in Chad. In late June 1983, a combined Libyan-Chadian rebel offensive threatened the Chadian capital of N’Djamena. In response to requests for assistance from Chadian President His- sein Flabre, some 3,000 French troops, primarily paratroops, were hastily deployed to Chad in Operation Manta. The ground forces were supported by a contingent of Jaguar fighter-bombers. By mid-August, the French had established a line of defense several hundred miles north of N’Djamena, effectively blocking the rebel advance.
The Libyans and rebels kept a cautious distance from the French forces, although a French Jaguar was shot down on 25 January 1984. This action prompted the French to reinforce their air force and extend their zone farther north. Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Qaddafi, persuaded that the French meant business, submitted proposals in mid-May calling for the withdrawal of both Libyan and French troops from Chad. Following weeks of negotiation, an agreement was reached, and the last French troops were withdrawn on 10 November 1984. About 1,000 of the troops were redeployed to nearby French bases in the Central African Republic.8 Qaddafi announced that his troops had also withdrawn. However, the discovery of residual Libyan forces in northern Chad caused embarrassment to the Mitterand Government.
Although Operation Manta was not directly controlled by the newly formed FAR headquarters, it nevertheless represented a successful application of the FAR’s reaction/deterrent mission. French Navy Captain Jean Drocourt breaks this mission into two parts: the preventive mode and the curative mode. The preventive mode involves deploying a force in anticipation of a crisis in order to discourage or deter aggressive action. The curative mode responds to an attack by deploying forces to reconquer lost territory or restore a preexisting situation.9
Should the FAR be called upon to respond to a crisis, the army chief of staff would be responsible for tailoring the appropriately sized and configured force. To accomplish this, the FAR embodies a flexible organization. The general staff of the FAR consists of 100 officers and noncommissioned officers based at Camp Gallieni near Saint Germain et de Maisons-Laffite. The staff is assisted by another 400 base support personnel. Operating directly in support of the FAR headquarters is the 28th Orleans Signal Regiment and a logistics brigade which includes the 511th Auxonne Transportation Regiment. Three of the FAR’s five divisions already exist while two are still being formed and equipped.10
The 11th Parachute Division is headquartered at Toulouse on Corsica and would conduct airborne operations. The 13,300-man division is 45% professional soldiers and is divided into three components. The core element is the Airborne Group, a highly professional force capable of independent deployment. The Airborne Group includes the 2nd and 3rd Foreign Legion Parachute Regiments and the 8th Marine Infantry Parachute Regiment, all directed by the 1st Command and Support Parachute Battalion.
There are also three parachute regiments filled with conscriptees, the 1st and 9th Parachute Cavalry and 6th Marine Infantry Parachute Regiments. Finally, there are the division staff, artillery, engineering, and support units, including a mobile airborne operational base. The division’s major equipment includes 40 AML (90-mm.) armored cars, 115 20-mm. antiaircraft guns, 36 120-mm. mortars, 48 81-mm. mortars.
and 168 Milan antitank guided missj .s The 9th Marine Infantry Div'sl° (0 garrisoned in Brittany. Its proximo the main French naval base at ®re£juCt-
___ career
sonnel, the division consists of ^^jch airy regiment, artillery regiment, an1
- - X ore*
Its equipment includes 60 AML am11 ^
division participates annually in a. major exercise, Korigan, which inc ^ the 11th Parachute Division along naval and air units. 27th
The remaining division is the ^ ^ Alpine Division, specially configurc^or. mountain warfare. Little specific 1 ^ mation is available about this un> though its organization is apparently^), ilar to French infantry divisions, number 7,000 men, 1,600 vehideS’
100 pieces of artillery and morttn^gj. infantry division has three infantry ments, an armored regiment, and an ^g) lery regiment.12 The alpine divist°n^e[,t include an armored cavalry reg je'’ equipped with the ERC-90 “Sage .„i wheeled 6x6 armored fighting
(AFV)-'3 •
Two new divisions are being oe
and organized especially for the ^ General Forray describes the 6th r Armored Division as the “800 k»° per day” division.14 Consisting armored car regiments and two teg1 w) of infantry carried in 6x6 VAB ^odi^ armored vehicles, the division e,rl Me a revolutionary concept in a dept J ^ fighting force.15 All vehicles wheeled, and most will be armore ■
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/ Marcl1
'tUng exceptionally high mobility and and °yability' Excluded are heavy tanks other tracked vehicles whose weight . maintenance would slow deployment overland movement, a 0e division’s main fighting vehicle is a ^MX-10RC armored car, armed with . 5-mm. antitank gun, which is replac-
8 the aging Panhard and AML vehicles. vj"ere will be 72 AMX-lORCs in the di- ji, °n- Mechanized infantry will eventu- AUv56 hansported in a variant, the TX-'0P infantry fighting vehicle.16 0 equip the division and other French Sl-led armored units, a family of 8,000 ^; and four-wheeled armored vehicles is lng developed to perform reconnais-
San
ijn Ce and support roles similar to the armored U. S. high mobility multipur- Ush VV^lee'ed vehicle.17 When the 6th j( ® 1 Armored Division is fully fielded, forWl11 constitute a powerful maneuver to e 'deally suited for hasty deployment Remote areas.
^ "c 6th Division is being organized ti0Unc* 'he 31st Infantry Brigade, sta- Mf6? 31 ^"hagne on 'he Mediterranean, ti0 ch specializes in amphibious opera- inc]s- Numbering 2,600 men, the brigade U(^es 'he 2nd Foreign Legion Regi- n1(;nt and the 21st Marine Infantry Regi- Afviv ls currently equipped with 24 liglt 10RC armored cars, 69 VAB 6x6 |)0 armored vehicles, five 155-mm. and 1 Zers’ 24 20-mm. antiaircraft guns, tars 18^ '20-mm. and ten 81-mm. mor- si0 ‘ Besides the 31st Brigade, the divi- 'v,h also include the 1st Algerian
Spahis Regiment, an artillery regiment, and an engineer regiment.19
The 6th Light Armored Division will operate closely with, and complement, the 4th Airmobile Division. General For- ray describes the soon-to-be-organized 4th Airmobile not as a “division of the ground forces that can fly” but as a “flying unit which conducts ground combat.”20 Speed and maneuverability will characterize its operations. Consisting of four 60-helicopter regiments, two infantry regiments, and a command regiment, the 4th Airmobile is being organized with antitank operations in mind.21 When fully fielded in 1985, the division will initially be equipped with 120 Gazelle antitank helicopters, which will soon be replaced by the new Franco-German produced PAH-2 gunships, of which 90 will be configured with Hot and Milan antitank weapons.22 The division’s remaining 94 Puma transport helicopters will carry assault troops.
The FAR’s 5th division cannot deploy or operate without the support of the navy and air force. To transport the FAR’s amphibious units, the French Navy has nine transport and landing ships capable of lifting five infantry battalions, a mechanized regiment, and two motorized battalions.23 The French Air Force’s 200 transport aircraft, mostly C-130 Hercules, can carry 1,000 combat-loaded paratroops.24 The French Tactical Air Command can support the FAR with up to nine attack squadrons capable of rapid overseas deployment. These squadrons are equipped with Jaguar As, Mirage Ills, and Mirage 5Fs. There are also three squadrons of Mirage F-1CR photoreconnaissance aircraft and 11 C-135F air refuelers.25
Because the French are deliberately vague on the role of the FAR, the types of scenarios in which it would be employed can only be speculated upon, based on official statements and recent events. Armed Forces Journal editor Benjamin F. Schemmer notes that the FAR is “particularly well configured for overseas power-projection operations requiring air-transportable, wheeled AFV’s, but it is relatively ill-equipped for large-scale conventional combat in Central Europe.”26 Defense & Foreign Affairs assistant editor Dr. Michael C. Dunn supports this view, observing that “some observers have questioned the utility of a light armored division ... in a major European war and suspect that the [FAR] is really intended as a broadened Third World intervention force.”27
Despite speculation on its overseas projection role, Defense Minister Hemu has emphasized that the FAR was created primarily to counter an “armored thrust” into Europe. There are four possible areas in which the FAR might be deployed: the NATO Central Front, the NATO southern flank, the Mediterranean littoral, and Central/Eastem Africa. The Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean, while of great concern to the French, is an unlikely area of operations for the FAR. The French appear content to leave that responsibility to the U. S. RDF. The NATO northern flank, principally Norway, is already well supported by U. S., British, Dutch, and Canadian contingency forces.
If the FAR were employed in the NATO Central Front, it would most likely be in conjunction with the French First Army, which maintains one corps in West Germany and two corps in northeastern France. The scenario would probably be similar to the German breakthrough in the Ardennes in 1944, when the U. S. 82nd and 101st Airborne and 7th Armored Divisions were rushed forward to stem the panzer tide. In such an instance, the 6th Light Armored, 4th Airmobile, and 11th Airborne could be rushed to fill the breach until more powerful armored forces could be redeployed to reduce the penetration.
On the southern flank, the FAR could play an important role by assisting the Italian Army against a secondary Soviet thrust through the Alps. Before the Soviets could reach Italy, they would first have to penetrate either Austria or Yugoslavia, leaving at least a short period during which the FAR could deploy. The
163
lngs / March 1985
A 1973 graduate of the Naval Academy, Maj°r ,jeS art has a master’s degree in national security ( from Georgetown University. A signals intel ig
27th Alpine Division would be particularly suited for such a scenario, as would the 4th Airmobile. If Greece or Turkey were attacked and requested support, the FAR could rapidly deploy its amphibious and airborne forces as reinforcement.
Any FAR contingency along the North African coast focuses almost immediately upon Libya. Not that the French are likely to invade Libya, unless of course it became a base for Soviet action against French territory, but because the Libyans are the most likely ones to behave aggressively against their neighbors. Tunisia is particularly vulnerable.
In Central and Eastern Africa, the FAR must be prepared to counter Soviet- or Libyan-backed threats to former French possessions such as Chad, the Central African Republic, Gabon, Senegal, the Ivory Coast, and Djibouti. Small French garrisons are already maintained in several of these nations.
Should a major conflict occur, the FAR could also complement and indirectly support RDF operations in the Persian Gulf by seizing and keeping open the vital sea-lanes through the Mediterranean and Red Sea. This would free U. S. forces in the Mediterranean for employment in the Indian Ocean.
The FAR represents an important development in French political and military doctrine. Its very existence is a clear admission by the otherwise proud and independent-minded French that their ultimate fate is inseparable from the other nations of the West. But, most important, it helps deter aggression in several important and vulnerable regions.
'“La Force d'aciion rapide,” Armees d aujord hui,
No. 87 (January-February 1983), p 20
2Ibid.
3Benjamin F. Schemmer, “Front Line in Europe,’’ Armed Forces Journal International (May 1984) p 64.
4Dr. Michael C. Dunn, “Mitterand’s France Shapes a Nuclear Defense,” Defense & Foreign Affairs (July 1983), p. 12.
5The New York Times, 7 December 1982, p. A5. ‘The New York Times, 18 June 1983, p 14 7Ibid.
The New York Times, 11 November 1984, p. A21. ’Captain de Frdgate Jean Drocourt, “De’ploiments pre’ventifs,” Armees d'aujord hui. No. 78, (March 1982), p. 37.
l0“La Force d’action rapide," p. 20.
"“L’annee de terre,” Armees d'aujord hui, No. 72, (July-August 1982), p. 26.
12Ibid., p. 25. l3Schemmer, p. 64.
14“La Force d’action rapide,” p. 22.
15Dunn, p. 12.
16Ibid.
I7Benjamin F. Schemmer, “France’s 'Rapid Command’ Stirs Classic Competition foj LAV, ’ ’ Armed Forces Journal International ( ^
1984); Patrick Mercillan, “French Army VB p petition,” International Defense Review, °‘ No. 6, 1984, p. 688. ls“L’armee de terre,” p. 27.
19“La Force d’action rapide,” p. 22.
20Ibid.
21Dunn, p. 11. ,, frt
22Schemmer, “The Front Line in Europe. P- 23“La Marine National,” Armees d’aujord u ’
72, (July-August, 1982), p. 32. 77,
24“L’armee de Fair,” Armees d’aujordhui, (July-August 1982), p. 40. ,
25Schemmcr, “Front Line in Europe,” P- ’ 26lbid., p. 64.
27Dunn, p. 12.
- — ’c ruttettdy
electronic warfare officer. Major Stewart is - ||j,
assigned as an acquisitions project officer for ^ gence Systems at Headquarters, Marine Corp ^ has published numerous articles on mechanic . fare, rapid deployment, the Middle East, an tronic warfare in various military journals. His “Ships That Can Deliver” was published in 1 L vember 1984 Proceedings.
i,erec
Janet Allen received a bachelor of arts uc- ujSt French from Longwood College. She is a 1 - employed by the Defense Department.
The Jamaica Defence Force
By Major James Holden-Rhodes, U. S. Army Reserve
lack of sophisticated communicat’
gear is the only discernable shortfa
ed c*”
The Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) traces its origin to 1662 when the first of several military units were raised. Soldiers from Jamaica and other British territories in the West Indies formed the South Carolina Regiment in 1778. In 1795, the first West Indies Regiment was formed. From then until 1919, units of the regiment fought in every campaign in the Caribbean. Battle honors were awarded for action in Dominica, Martinique, Guadaloupe, Ashanti, East and West Africa, Cameroons, Sierra Leone, and Palestine. The Victoria Cross was awarded on two occasions to soldiers of the regiment during this period.
During World War I, the British West Indies Regiment, manned by Jamaicans who saw active service, was formed. At the same time, the Kingston Infantry Volunteers was established. At the end of World War II, this unit became the Jamaica Battalion and was expanded to regimental size in 1958. The following year, the West Indies Federation was formed, with the regiment as the nucleus of its armed forces. Short-lived, the federation floundered and disbanded in 1962, with the Jamaican military contingent becoming the JDF.
Today, elements of the JDF are an integral part of the multination Caribbean force which is on the island of Grenada. As a part of the force whose mission it is to restore stability and prepare for upcoming elections, the JDF finds itself in a new role. For a force whose charter binds it to defend Jamaica against aggressors and to support civil authorities in the maintenance of law and order, Grenada is a new challenge to a military unit that fully came of age only two years earlier during the Falklands Conflict.
The British West Indies Regiment is the primary element in a fully integrated land, sea, and air force. The infantry element consists of three rifle battalions, two regular and one reserve, and a support and service battalion. The infantry units are based at Uppark Camp in Kingston and Moneague Camp in St. Ann’s, and selected company-sized units are deployed from time to time at strategic locations around Jamaica. The air wing has seven helicopters and five fixed-wing aircraft. Coast Guard elements man four
Bay-class boats. ^
In the fullest sense of the w°r^’ ey line battalions are light infantry- j are armed with the SLR, the stan ^ shoulder weapon of the Common'*’6 1 forces. The rifle companies are equipP^^ with light machine guns and mortars-
the inventory. Several VI50 armore. provide support for the infantry unl .'on The JDF, with its unified organi7*1 has caused many to liken it to the • Marine Corps. Bonds between t^‘'ciirs. forces have been built up over the y ( One example of those ties is the faCt the U. S. defense attache is a U. S- rine Corps officer. - v0r
There is an unmistakably British s to the JDF. Drill, weapons, and um 0 all reflect the Commonwealth her,t Being around units of the JDF leave^fes- with the impression of a solid Prt sional force. p
Entrance requirements to the both officers and other ranks are gent. For the aspiring subaltern, j° jn- ing a minimum certification vvhic
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