This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
–
To Los Angelinos in 1935, searchlights piercing the night sky could mean either a movie premiere in nearby Hollywood or a celebration of Navy Day in nearby San Pedro, right. But the confusion would end in 1940 as the battle fleet would move, never to return, to its new home in Pearl Harbor.
Every year thousands of people visit Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and sorrowfully read the list of names of the 1,102 sailors and Marines entombed in the sunken hulk of the battleship Arizona (BB-39). While there are many publications in which the average tourist can read about the Japanese attack in December 1941, little is mentioned in these accounts about the fleet before it was based at Pearl Harbor. We have grown so accustomed to the present pattern of extended overseas deployments that it is sometimes difficult to realize that the major combatant ships of the prewar U. S. Fleet operated together much of the time.
The battleships moored at Pearl Harbor in December 1941 arrived in Hawaii in the spring of 1940 for annual maneuvers. At the end of the exercises, the ships were due to return to their home port, which was 2,500 miles away at San Pedro, California. Instead, President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered the fleet to remain at Pearl Harbor as a deterrent against possible Japanese aggression. In doing so, he altered the pattern which had been in effect for more than 20 years.
In 1919, the administration of President Woodrow Wilson transferred 200 warships, including the Navy’s newest battleships, from Atlantic to Pacific when tension arose in the Far East between the United States and Japan over the fate of China. Admiral Hugh Rodman, commander in chief of the fleet, brought his dreadnoughts through the Panama Canal in record time in the “war scare” atmosphere. The port of San Diego was considered too shallow to handle the largest ships, and so on 9 August 1919 the fleet steamed north to what would become the new battleship anchorage, the ports of San Pedro (Los Angeles Harbor) and Long Beach in San Pedro Bay.1 Local patriots were ecstatic about the fleet’s arrival. A verse in the hometown press exclaimed:
We are the hounds of the sea’s estates,
We course our prey where the world’s end meets,
We hold our watch at the western gates,
We are the great Pacific Fleet.2
sUnme Port: 1919
1940
subject to attack. While the Helm Report of 1916 on nJ shore bases on the Pacific Coast had acknowledged
ongoing construction of powerful harbor defenses at { Fermin guarding the harbor, it nevertheless insisted the anchorage grounds could easily be attacked by a tile fleet even though the risk to [that] fleet could be
siderable.” While the defensive weakness of the Pedro anchorage remained a sore point for some
na
from the Los Angeles Harbor Department from 191^^
fvalV
There were a number of reasons why the San Pedro- Long Beach littoral was a suitable anchorage for the large ships of the Pacific Fleet. There was a 2.11-mile breakwater on the San Pedro side of the bay. The breakwater, which had been completed in 1910 for the purpose of establishing a commercial port, created 600 to 700 acres of anchorage space, some of it 40 feet deep. Operational conditions were reported to be near perfect, with good weather prevailing 60% to 70% of the year. The ports of San Pedro and Long Beach were near offshore island gunnery drill grounds, and had almost immediate access to the sea. Most important, Los Angeles Harbor was one of the world’s great oil ports. Savings in oil transportation costs helped keep the fleet within its modest peacetime budget.
On the whole, naval leaders were not happy about the decision to base the larger ships of the fleet at the San Pedro-Long Beach roadstead. They preferred a large operating base in San Francisco Bay or Puget Sound. However, Congress would not appropriate money for the creation of a naval operating base on the West Coast that would approximate the one at Norfolk, Virginia. Moreover, operating conditions in San Francisco Bay at that time were very hazardous because of shoals. Fleet operations in Puget Sound were made difficult, if not impossible, because of the incessant fog and forest fire sm° ' The Navy’s main objection to basing the battleship* San Pedro and Long Beach was that the deep-water a of the harbor was exposed to the open sea and therfaVai
the point yal
rcuiu ailWHUlU^V 1W11U111WU a |3U1V 1U1 ow*'- JtYli'
planners, that contention was seriously disputed by A ^ ral Robert Coontz, Chief of Naval Operations from to 1923, who argued that the fleet could remain there time of war as well as peace.4 jnj.
One aspect of the new fleet home port which was ^ tially deficient was that of shore support. The existence^ local shop and repair facilities could not have been incentive to home-port the battleships at San Pedro because local yards could not accommodate the ships. The only installation that existed in the twin bar ^ of San Pedro/Long Beach when the fleet arrived in ^ ^ was a submarine base at San Pedro, which was w jj
1923. It was used to store targets, berth oilers, and fresh water to the fleet. There were and still are naVu‘. 0ff storage tanks in San Pedro. The oil was piped to a doc 22nd Street, where barges distributed the fuel to the ^ chored battleships. While major repairs and overhau ^ the battleships took place at the Puget Sound Navy anCe Bremerton, Washington, interim repair and mainte Rework was carried out alongside repair ships anchors ^ hind the San Pedro breakwater. Both the Vestal ( ^ and Medusa (AR-1) served the fleet in San Pedro u most of the interwar period.
Soon after the fleet’s arrival in 1919, a slip near the tavy landing was rented by Commander Base Force for arget repairs. When the space allotted proved inadequate, e target repair function was moved to the former collier anshan (AG-3), moored a few hundred yards off ■ akrillo Beach. In 1923, the Procyon (AG-11) became to the flagship of the Base Force and the Battle Fleet’s ar§et repair ship. Admiral Henry A. Wiley, who coincided the U. S. Fleet from 1927 to 1929, described his °He port in the following way:
As for the battleship force, such a base! It was at San Pedro, Calif. It was simply a large anchorage ground in lhe open sea, protected by a breakwater behind which toree battleships, or four as a maximum, and a few “Auxiliaries could be anchored. The major part of the battleships were without protection. When at anchor toey rolled more than they would ordinarily roll at sea. ^ith no facilities of a base whatever, this delightful Place was a part of the Port of Los Angeles.”5 y
et San Pedro remained the major base of the battleships the U. S. Fleet for more than 20 years. It was there that e fleet spent most of the year recuperating, taking on uPPlies, and undergoing minor repairs, the dramatic increase in commerce during the prospers 1920s brought overcrowding in the ports of San Pedro When the fleet was in port, perhaps as many as eight eadnoughts anchored in the open sea beyond the break- ^ ter. Because secondary anchorages inside the existing water were reserved for auxiliaries, including a hos- a* ship, merchant captains were sometimes forced to chor east of the battleships. The port manager received Herous complaints when surges ripped into the exposed t^Ps, and the port accordingly began to get a bad reputa- t n‘ Moreover, the battleships to the east of the breakwa- s°metimes blocked the lighthouse, and some merchantmen were unable to get their bearings as they entered the fairway into the inner harbor. After discussions between the port manager and Admiral Edward W. Eberle, Commander of the Battle Fleet in the early 1920s, the Navy - agreed to move one of its battleships and vacate an anchorage and thus clear the entrance to the harbor for the increasingly heavy traffic.6
Overcrowding continued to be a problem. On 17 March 1928, the outbound SS Ruth Alexander collided with the incoming USS Colorado (BB-45) as the battleship was making her way to anchorage. In another misfortune, a Norwegian ship rammed the Maryland (BB-46) as she returned from gunnery practice.7 As traffic increased and sheltered anchorages were at a premium, the increasing possibility of losing a command weighed heavily on naval officers and merchant captains alike.
Southern California had a reputation for a mild, sunny climate, but certain winds called Santa Anas could be a tremendous nuisance for unprotected forces afloat. These winds brought 60-mile-an-hour gales; even the largest battleships rolled and pitched. Admiral William V. Pratt, Commander Battle Fleet in 1928-1929, described the sand brought by the winds as similar to an Argentine ‘‘stiff pampero.” It cut into the paint of the dreadnoughts, giving them a “mud bath.” Frequently, a second anchor had to be dropped to keep the vessels from dragging. Sailors were forced to use nets in order to embark on barges and gigs. Hearings before the Army Corps of Engineers for the purpose of building a breakwater extension were held, but government economies delayed construction until 1932. It was hoped that the breakwater extension would provide more and safer anchorages and offer protection for new commercial ventures then under consideration. Meanwhile, the heavy ships of the Battle Force (as the Battle Fleet was renamed in 1931) continued to roll and pitch until the completion of still another breakwater extension
57
^edings / Supplement 1985
1800. The fleet was in port that night and fortunately 1 ^ worked out plans with local governments for just sue emergency. Three thousand sailors and Marines ^ quickly ordered into the city to render assistance. A la » crevice in front of the Navy landing complicated the P*° lem of getting ashore. Gangways were hurriedly Pu ^ & place, and relief operations were ready to commence i relatively short time. The shore force included a conlP nC hr»cr»itc»1 unit from the liaht nniicer Dmnhn (C'I .-4), 61^ .
in late 1937. After that, it was no longer necessary for ships to anchor in the open roadstead.
It is hard to estimate how many ships could be accommodated in San Pedro Bay after the building of the later extension of the breakwater; 103 warships were in the protected anchorage when probably the worst gale to hit the roadstead occurred, on 24 September 1939. Fifty-foot seas and 60-knot winds struck at the massive concentration of ships readying for maneuvers. The storm’s intensity was so great that huge cap rocks on the breakwater extension were lifted into the sea, allowing swift surges to threaten the moored warships.8 More than 30 of the men-of-war put to sea immediately, while others moved about aimlessly behind the breakwater. Rough seas prevented crews from returning to their ships when liberty boat service was suspended. However damaged, the breakwater extension was credited with keeping the fleet from being driven ashore as it lay helpless in the face of the battering storm. The need to guarantee safe anchorage to naval forces prompted the federal government to consider building a second extension of the breakwater. This was completed during World War II.
A natural catastrophe comparable to the gale winds was the “killer” earthquake which struck Long Beach on 10 March 1933. The potent tremor killed 54 people and se
hospital unit from the light cruiser Omaha (CL-4), <relief crews, firefighting units, rescue parties, and a
bodied sailors and Marines ready to keep law and orde -c a devastated city. The president of the Pacific Elec Transportation Company echoed the prevailing attlgat.
among grateful citizens when he said, “We have the gr est Navy in the world.” ,[0/
It was during the interwar period that the San Pe Long Beach area became the major bedroom commu for the crews of the Battle Fleet’s larger ships. Oft'c, g began buying houses in Long Beach, and by the end o 1930s more than 9,000 Navy families lived in that co
there were two family °u "
munity. During the 1930s,
tient clinics in the area, one in San Pedro and one in 1on Beach. But the major medical tasks were performe board the hospital ship Relief (AH-1), which moored n
the repair ships behind the San Pedro breakwater. < The vast majority of that era’s navymen were unffla and lived on board their ships. To those of the Battle r ships, San Pedro and Long Beach were not bedroom munities but liberty towns—places for relaxation, and excitement. But Long Beach was not always a p ant place to go. While the Pike Amusement Park an ( dance halls might be entertaining, it was still obvious the young sailors were rejected by “polite society- ^ stereotype of the “drunken sailor” had taken h, ^,0ff
‘polite society — had taken hold, there were even signs that said, “Sailors and dogs keep
s ,^°ng Beach boasted that he would use the fines paid by [5!0rs for illegal drinking to build a new jail. Angered by ls belligerent attitude, Admiral Eberle threatened to a^e the city off limits to naval personnel. The judge ^PParently apologized, and the flow of Navy shore boats Long Beach was not halted.
The Navy’s role in the 1933 earthquake and the need for . 'berty’ ’ dollars during the Depression may explain the '^s changing relationship with the fleet. It was esti- 5. ated that 75% of the $2.8 million monthly payroll was Tent in Long Beach during this time. The city’s chamber ^ commerce and naval affairs committee honored the 5vV when it returned from a cruise to the East Coast in
grid
"•the
^uld witness two games going on at once. Sailors were Serious about battleship football teams as they were
d ^5 by starting Fleet Week, a period of entertainment ve ’cated to the Navy. City officials provided a carnival, § U(tcville show, street dancing, and a beauty pageant. On . atUrday night, Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, Commander p Chief, U. S. Fleet, was honored at a banquet at the ac'fic Coast Club, and a formal ball in his honor was s,en in the municipal auditorium. In return, the Navy ^cduled fleet football games and illuminated its ships at
<, ^ smaller number of sailors spent their leisure hours in ^an Pedro, a town much smaller than Long Beach. There ey congregated on notorious Beacon Street with its nu- r°Us beer joints, fleet followers, loan sharks, and gyp •sts. (Many of the bars had been established for mer- ^atlt marine sailors and were already in existence when e Navy arrived in 1919.) San Pedro was also the site of ch of the fleet athletic competition. New Deal funds used to restore the city-run Navy Field, and two new •tons were built. San Pedro was one of the few places world where a spectator high up in the bleachers
about gunnery scores. The locally operated Admiral Leigh Basketball Stadium and the Anderson Memorial Pool were also built to enable the sports-minded sailors to relax and play in San Pedro.
Another town frequented by sailors of the Battle Force was Los Angeles, with its glamorous suburb of Hollywood. Only 20 miles away from the naval anchorage, the big city was easily reached by taking the famous “Red Car” trolley from either Long Beach or San Pedro. Hotels in Los Angeles were frequently used for ships’ parties. San Francisco and New York, however, were considered better liberty towns than any of the communities in Southern California.
The fleet’s annual training routine called for summer drills off Puget Sound and then a return to Southern California in the fall. During the year, there might be a concentration of the combined fleets off Panama in the winter and an occasional run to Pearl Harbor. The core of the fleet training program, however, was spring gunnery practice off Santa Rosa and San Clemente islands in April, May, and June. Devised by the OpNav Division of Fleet Training, gunnery exercises consisted of night practice, torpedo practice, and both divisional and fleet maneuvers. These activities were competitive and the ship with the best overall record in the competition won the battle efficiency pennant for the year.9
Particularly distasteful to veteran battleship commanders such as Henry Wiley and William V. Pratt was the belief that domestic considerations and low fuel budgets dictated the course of fleet operations more than anything else. Wiley lamented that men were seldom at sea overnight and that many of them became accustomed to reporting to their ships each morning as if it were just a regular job. Admiral Pratt, who commanded the Battle Fleet, was also bothered by the thought that the fleet’s routine made an officer’s career something akin to that of a shoe clerk or
of the fact that Pearl Harbor was not deep enough i°r^s the ships, the decision was made to register
14
shopkeeper. In order to change this situation, Pratt began keeping his battleships at sea for five days at a time. With the slogan “Week out, Weekend in,” Pratt found an excellent anchorage in 20 fathoms of water just south of Santa Rosa Island. Though crews were not happy about being at sea all week so close to home, operational results improved. On 1 February 1928, the battleship divisions fired their salvos in record time. Pratt also understood that week-out operations reduced the strain that went with the rush to get home evenings after target practice.10
Target practice was a hazardous business. For example, the California (BB-44) firing at targets towed by the New Mexico (BB-40) almost fired on the ship herself when a spotter mistakenly placed the dreadnought’s guns in the wrong direction. Fortunately, an alert gunnery officer saw the mistake and stopped the firing. In November 1931, an antiaircraft gun exploded on board the Colorado, killing five sailors.11 But the gunnery accident that had the most impact on the Navy and local residents alike was the turret flare-up in the Mississippi (BB-41) in June 1924; the mishap killed 47 officers and men. The accident was caused when 50-mile-an-hour winds blew down the 14-inch guns of the ship’s number two turret and prevented the incandescent gases and burning bag fragments from being expelled after firing. The explosion occurred when the next
Rescuers using acetylene torches cut through the h steel armor of the turret and found the dead gun P0111^ sitting at his post. When they were removing the body’ gunner’s arm brushed against the turret’s firing sW1 ^ and the 14-inch gun roared its final shot. Fortunately, gun was pointed out to sea.12 ,er
The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in Septe111 1931, had a great impact on the Battle Force’s anchor^ At first, Secretary of State Henry Stimson wanted to s the force to Hawaii. This being impossible, partly beca j
- )Ugh for
Ameflca
disapproval of Japanese aggression by ordering the I cruisers of the Atlantic-based Scouting Force to remal the Pacific. By the fall of 1934, the home port of Scouting Force ships was officially changed from York to San Pedro. The number of ships based in th® Pedro-Long Beach roadstead increased to 14 battles 1 two carriers, 14 cruisers, and 16 support ships manne 31,286 men.13 {
Two government policies which had a great impaC ^ the area were the Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934, 'V ^ would build up the fleet, and the use of public works $ to improve shore facilities. As early as 1933, both the of Los Angeles and Long Beach presented the Navy ^ new and more adequate fleet landing facilities using P° ^ funds. In July 1933, the Los Angeles Harbor Depad ^ in conjunction with the State Emergency Relief Ag® .s provided the Navy with a target repair base in San Pe(0 West Channel. This small facility was used primarli ^ overhaul targets, moor Base Force auxiliaries, and sets ships’ boats when the warships were busy firing at a off the Channel Islands. Garbage scows, oil barges. small tug attached to the base improved conditions efficient waste collection and mail deliveries.
Proceedings / Supplen,en
The San Pedro-Long Beach area still lacked some of e Prerequisites for remaining a permanent home port for Davy’s larger ships. No naval supply center existed. lo°nsumable provisions for the fleet were provided by
- Cal vendors who delivered their goods to the fleet land- §s. By the late 1930s, 500,000 pounds of provisions
^assed through Long Beach every 24 hours. Major repairs j °verhauls on battleships had to be done at the Puget v°Und Navy Yard, and plans were moving ahead to de- (.el°P Alameda in San Francisco Bay as a rival naval sta- J)n- Local interests feared that unless permanent facilities fe6re kuilt, the large combatants were likely to be trans- |^ed. One local booster bemoaned the roadstead’s fate B en he wrote: “Although San Pedro is the base of the ip!* 5^ States Fleet, there is hardly anything to indicate
le ^Presentative Charles J. Colden and other community a^ers sought to improve San Pedro’s prospects for reaming a home port of the fleet by campaigning to use (pJL from the federal Public Works Administration l^wA) and local bond issues to improve port facilities. A
- y Part of this 1935 plan was the construction of a munic- b d *y owned graving dock which could accommodate two
attleships simultaneously. But PWA withdrew its funds j en before the voters turned down the bond issues. Col- n continued to lobby for local Navy projects, but he was j^cd down by the Bureau of Navigation, which insisted at the Navy did not need a “navy yard at San Pedro at j e Present time.”16 The situation did improve after the Panese attack on the American gunboat Panay (PR-5) Shanghai in 1937 brought talk of naval expansion ^8ain to the fore. But the Navy’s major need in the area I s to improve the naval air facility at Terminal Island, Cated midway between San Pedro and Long Beach, b he air base, named Reeves Field after Admiral 6eves, the air-minded Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
had been leased to the Navy by the city of Los Angeles for 30 years in 1935. A convenient airfield for servicing shipboard aircraft near the naval anchorage, the expanding air station was soon upgraded to the status of a fleet air base - capable of servicing 130 aircraft. Local chambers of commerce wanted to cede Reeves Field to the Navy as a final “weighty factor in clinching the U. S. Fleet for this port,” but some commercial and oil interests were opposed, because they wanted to develop part of that area themselves. The Navy and the city of Los Angeles argued over the terms of the airfield deed for more than two years. The Navy began to lose its patience, and a ranking member of the House Naval Affairs Committee threatened to find another anchorage. Finally, the federal government decided to condemn the 228-acre tract and an adjacent 105- acre tract in Long Beach for naval use.17 Long Beach, which had vacant land and was less hostile to plans for naval expansion than Los Angeles, became the site of a new naval complex. Though wartime expansion brought a large naval supply depot and other facilities to San Pedro, the building of large dry docks on the Long Beach side of Terminal Island ended San Pedro’s naval supremacy in the area.
As instability in the world increased, the Navy naturally began looking more carefully into the matter of fleet security. Concern ranged all the way from fear of possible surprise attack by submarines, aircraft, and surface ships to harbor mining, sabotage, and spying. The activities of Japanese-registered ships frequenting the port and locally based Japanese-American fishermen were the most worrisome problem. Many naval officers never really differentiated between foreign and domestic Japanese. For example, Captain William F. Halsey, commanding the carrier Saratoga (CV-3), home-ported in Long Beach, believed that Japanese tankers which frequented the port were spy ships because they were handled “navy-fashion.” He also
61
l,l>gs / Supplement 1985
|
|
|
|
|
jwj i |
?ly MJ |
|
8L| * (* hwtM |
|
famr w H $ m |
■/fill |
|
|
|
|
|
|
R. C. FAY
As the 1930s drew to a close, stability—and a new instability—had come to the fleet’s home port. Long Beach, above, had become a bedroom community housing more than 9,000 Navy families. But there was another community in San Pedro that was becoming a cause for alarm among spy-conscious Americans. It was the Japanese Village, near Terminal Island, facing page, over which towered a forest of antenna poles.
believed that Japanese-American fishing boats deliberately operated near naval drill areas for other than commercial purposes.18 These kinds of anxieties would play a major role in the eventual expulsion of Japanese-Americans from Terminal Island and elsewhere after the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Admiral Reeves, fleet commander in chief during the mid-1930s, agreed with other naval officers of his generation that war with Japan would probably commence with a “Port Arthur-like” sneak attack on the American fleet. Though Reeves’s fear that local Japanese were ready to cripple the American fleet upon the opening of hostilities is now known to be groundless, he did begin a process of making the fleet more security-conscious. In a bold training maneuver in 1935, Reeves ordered the anchored fleet to make a fast departure from port. Ships were short of 25% of their crews, and some battleships went to sea commanded by junior officers. In another “expeditious departure” in 1936, Reeves ordered ships out of the harbor just as liberty parties were readying themselves for shore on Friday afternoon.19
Prior to the outbreak of World War II in 1939, there were reports that Japanese submarines were operating near the San Pedro-Long Beach anchorage. Liberty was again abruptly cancelled, and destroyers and airplanes were sent to investigate and cover the approaches to the harbor. Nobody could deny that the security of the fleet had to be tightened, especially during the two years that the United
mild
States remained neutral during World War II. But the ^ ^
hysteria that came with numerous false alarms about imminence of war or attack had some adverse ct e ^ Crews became tense and overworked, and after a whiw many “cries of wolf” made them impervious to
warnings. . eft
On 1 April 1940, the battleships of the U. S. f;'ee . et their anchorages in two main bodies and sailed f°r exercises off the Hawaiian Islands. These maneuvers ^
slated to last from 8 April until 9 May. At the ti^jj
departure, few could have imagined that this sortie w ^ bring an end to the era of basing the capital ships u\ Pedro Bay. Still fewer could imagine the fate avva'. of, these men-of-war at their new station, Pearl Haf ,
Airien'
Oahu. Roosevelt and his advisers, believing that can naval power at Pearl Harbor might deter Japanese^
gression in the western Pacific, ordered the fleet to rel in Hawaiian waters.20
The President’s decision had an immense impact oa^
local economy in San Pedro/Long Beach. Back w f Admiral Reeves had estimated that the yearly payr° £ jn the fleet was more than $21 million. One jewelry st°r
Long Beach during the 1930s had more than 2,0(|(* ^
counts with sailors. Car dealers and haberdashers also
h
a lot of business with fleet personnel. One Long Beac ^ dealer reported in the mid-1950s that he had sold 30^ ^
to Navymen during the year. It was apparent that the of these monies would be felt by the local merC, efof Admiral James O. Richardson, Commander in C*1 ,s the U. S. Fleet, did not agree with President R°°seN ,ellt deterrent policy. He felt that the Hawaiian deploy1 was hurting the fleet’s efficiency and that preparatio^ war could be done more adequately at the superior ^ ties in West Coast ports. Unable to convince the PreSl^ to bring the fleet home, he was able to win appr°v^ a temporary return of the ships on a staggered bas
62
Proceedings / SuppleIT1
Thus, the fleet returned to the West Coast in the autumn
s ^40 in three separate contingents of approximately the
j,artle size. Destroyers and some of the carriers returned to
an Diego, and the battleships and some of the cruisers
Urned to the San Pedro-Long Beach anchorage. Led by
u6 Oagship New Mexico with Richardson on board, the
^flleships Oklahoma (BB-37), Arizona, Mississippi,
oho (BB-42) and a pair of cruisers made their way to
°°rings on 30 September 1940. It was a quiet return for
, any sailors, and one observer noted the “stiff stem
10oks >>21
^The New Mexico, Idaho, and Mississippi would shortly transferred to the Atlantic Fleet and thus escape the ack on Pearl Harbor. The second group of ships re- tyt^d on 20 October. This force included the battleships cJ?,vt Virginia (BB-48), Maryland, and Colorado, three . jSers, and some auxiliaries. The last group arrived in •j-' 'November. This force included the California, the ^Oessee (BB-43), the Oklahoma once again, and three 'sers.22 The Nevada (BB-36) had come separately.
^ Df the battleships that were home-ported in San Pedro ay in the interwar period, seven were not at Pearl Harbor the ^ecerr,fler 1941. Of the eight that were present during . attack, three were sunk, one capsized, and four were ^ ^aged. By that time, the San Pedro/Long Beach period p s aAeady over. The men who had served in the Battle thtCe SA'PS now fla(l only memories to remind them of lib°Se ^ears wAen their primary concerns were weekend theerty. gunnery scores, fleet athletic competitions, and Various other concerns of a peacetime navy.
The * ■ .
Westlviding line of the twin harbors of San Pedro and Long Beach is now the >i0n ***« boundary of the Long Beach Naval Station.
® °each Press-Telegram, 9 August 1919.
3Autobiography of William V. Pratt, Chapter XVII, p. 5.
4“Preliminary Report of Navy Yard Commission,” 64th Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives, Document No. 1946, 1916. U. S. Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations, “Hearings,” 1922, p. 324.
5Henry A. Wiley, An Admiral From Texas (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran and Company, 1934), p. 238.
6U. S. House of Representatives, “A Preliminary Examination of the Los Angeles and Long Beach Harbors,” 68th Congress, First Session, 1924, Document 349, p. 86.
1Long Beach Press-Telegram, 17 March 1928 and 30 October 1928.
8Robert G. Wells, “Long Beach’s Great Barrier Reef,” Southland Magazine, Long Beach Press-Telegram, 29 January 1956.
9Yates Stirling, Sea Duty: The Memoirs of a Fighting Admiral (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1939) p. 192.
,0Gerald E. Wheeler, Admiral William Veazi'e Pratt: A Sailor’s Life (Washington, D.C.: Naval History Division, 1974), p. 162.
11 Annual Report of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, 1931-1932, p. 34.
12Wiley, op. cit., p. 248.
,3James H. Collins, “The Fleet in Cold Cash,” Southern California Business, November 1934, p. 19.
,4“San Pedro’s Target Repair Base,” Our Navy, Mid-September 1937, p. 16. l5San Pedro News-Pilot, 1 January 1936. l6Los Angeles Times, 31 July 1937.
17San Pedro News-Pilot, 10 August 1940.
,8William F. Halsey and J. Bryan III, Admiral Halsey’s Story (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1947), p. 64.
,9John D. Hayes, “Admiral Joseph Mason Reeves, USN, Part II, 1931-1948,” Naval War College Review, January 1977, p. 57. San Pedro News-Pilot, 21 March 1936.
20Letter from Admiral Harold Stark, USN, to Admiral James O. Richardson, USN, 27 May 1940, Pearl Harbor Hearings, Part XIV, p. 2,106.
2lOur Navy, 1 November 1940, p. 38.
22Long Beach Press-Telegram, 19 October 1940 and 13 November 1940.
Mr. Beigel received B.A. and M.A. degrees in history from California State University at Los Angeles (UCLA) and has done graduate work in history and international relations at the University of Southern California. He has taught history for 28 years, the last 25 of which have been at Venice High School in Los Angeles. During this time, he also taught at Los Angeles City College. He is a consultant for the College Board in both American and European history. He has had a long-standing interest in naval affairs, and during his teaching has stressed the role of the Navy in American history. His article entitled “Pig Boats of San Pedro" was published by Sea Classics magazine in 1982. He recently visited Normandy, France, particularly the Omaha Beach area, where he began to research the role of the battleship Nevada in the D-Day invasion.
63
Itngs / Supplement 1985