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sonably high levels, generally including four or five frigates and destroyers, as well as patrol craft, support vessels, and often a visiting carrier, helicopter/cruiser, or submarine.5
The significant French naval presence in waters rarely patrolled by Western navies since the postwar decline of the Royal Navy, together with the French lack of inhibitions over military intervention in the Third World, have proven valuable to Europe and the United States, often permitting a Western presence where a purely U. S. presence would have been militarily impossible or politically unacceptable. The value of the French military intervention capacity has been repeatedly tested in Africa and most recently demonstrated off Lebanon and in 1984’s Red Sea minesweeping operations. Admittedly, the usual tension between specific French and U. S. goals and policies was present during these joint operations.
The demands of the deterrent program on manpower and financial resources, as well as the desire to maintain a
multi-ocean presence (together, perhaps, with the red"® tion in U. S. and NATO aid) moderated the expansion modernization of the conventional fleet beginning in 1 late 1950s. During the 1960s and early 1970s, a linnte number of large antisubmarine warfare (ASW) destroy® were built, as were four conventional submarines. In mid-1970s, a large class of “A-69”-type diesel-poweree corvettes was also introduced to replace larger and mo capable oceangoing frigates built during the 1950s. e placement of the frigates by coastal escorts underset the financial pressures felt during the period, as well 8s related desire to produce designs suitable for export developing nations. .
In the absence of a more extensive new construct' program, many units were extensively refitted or, in 1 case of certain destroyers and submarines, reconstruct® In general, these reconstructions were quite success permitting further deferral of replacement plans. Nev® theless, in 1975, the fleet’s aircraft carriers, cruis®r
France has charted the course for its Aeronavale for the remainder of this century and beyond. Squarely facing the most challenging aspect of naval operations, France has begun design of two nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and plans to fill them with wings of contemporary combat aircraft using catapults and arresting gear.
The French believe the relative inefficiency of vertical or short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) aircraft is unacceptable and is likely to remain so for several decades. In keeping their new carriers large, nearly 40,000 tons, they concluded that the economy of “small” carriers, carrying whatever number and type of aircraft they could accommodate, is a false economy. Thus, France will continue its membership in the ranks of truly international navies.
French naval thinkers chose this most expensive and complex alternative as the result of a methodical process. Analysis of the typical air mission dictated the sort of payload necessary for the new aircraft. To accommodate this payload and still have the necessary endurance, the size of the aircraft was established. Speed requirements, turning capability, and other performance necessities dictated aircraft configuration. The size of the aircraft, the number needed to complete the typical mission, and the support requirements of the aircraft established the size of the carrier. Postulated deployment schedules were the telling factor influencing endurance and, thus, propulsion needs.
The French could not accept the performance penalties associated with V/STOL aircraft; therefore, their carrier had to have catapults. Their carrier needed endurance, 25-plus knots of wind-over-the-deck, and good seakeeping capabilities. They settled for a 39,680-ton vessel, nuclear powered, with conventional aircraft.
Historically, France has been operating aircraft off surface vessels for almost 60 years. Beginning on the hull of a Normandie-class battleship in 1927, France put 37 aircraft to sea. French naval aviation failed to provide pivotal influence during World War II but was again in full stride by 1946. The British lent them the two-year-old Colossus, a 19,000-ton vessel. This was soon augmented by the ex-USS Belleau Wood (CVL-24) and ex-USS Langley (CVL-27), which operated Hellcats, Helldivers, Avengers, and Corsairs.
France’s largest carrier, the Ar- romanches (ex-Colossus), was purchased from the British in 1951. She was extensively refitted prior to this purchase. French carriers conducted air operations in support of ground actions in Indochina. Often, French Navy Corsairs flew out of Tourane—later known as Da Nang—as well as the French Air Force field of Bach Mai, near Hanoi.
The Arromanches launched Corsair strikes against Algerian guerrillas m 1955 as the Clemenceau was just b® ginning to take shape. One year f°*' lowing participation with the British Operation Musketeer against Eg)?11 1956, where the Arromanches and t Lafayette (ex-Langley) launched C°rS sorties, the Foch was begun. Unlik® ^ her sister ship, the Clemenceau, "'j’1 was constructed entirely at Brest, m® Foch was only completed there. Sh® was begun, as planned, at St. Nazal ^ Fitted with two catapults, capabl® launching aircraft up to 11 tons in weight, the Foch and the Clemenc?a incorporated mirror landing systems and displaced 32,780 tons. In 1957> venerable Arromanches was again r® ^ ted to incorporate the angled deck afl mirror landing system. .
These modem vessels and their J® aircraft (the Etendard and F-8E CrU' sader) allowed the French to rejoin naval aviation on par or close behm the British. From Hellcats to Crusa^ ers, from manifold pressure to MaC France now had the platforms from ^ which advanced aircraft could succ®^ fully operate. And they have done J that for nearly three decades. The 4 romanches is gone, but the Foch an Clemenceau remain, not scheduled retirement until the mid-1990s. j The decision to replace the Foch a Clemenceau with 39,680-ton, nucle powered aircraft carriers grew from
escorts, antiair warfare (AAW) escorts, and subma-
ASW
nes virtually all dated from the 1950s and inevitably reWed replacement.
ortunately for the West, recent French governments ,ave c°nsistently remained committed to modernizing all „ ernents of their fleet, both nuclear and conventional, er> as they have moved to closer military cooperation il® other members of NATO. In recent years, France
developed a fourth SLBM, the M-4, with a range of ’ dO kilometers and increased warheads, including six gentry vehicles. A sixth SSBN of improved design and °Jfd with the M-4 is now entering service. All but the wrliest of the first five SSBNs will be converted for the In 1981, President Francois Mitterand announced ^nstruction of the first “second generation” SSBN for $erv'ce in the 1990s. She will carry yet another new mis- e> the M-5, with improved range and reentry vehicle lability.
In the 1970s, France also began to build a class of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), the first of which, the Rubis, became fully operational in 1983. A total of five are planned, as well as a follow-up class of an additional five units. The SSNs are the smallest operational nuclear submarines in the West and, if inferior in overall performance to the latest U. S. types, they are nevertheless well suited to Mediterranean conditions.
Finally, and perhaps most extraordinarily, the Mitterand government has authorized the replacement of one of the two existing carriers with a nuclear-powered, fixed- wing-capable vessel. Appropriately to be named the Charles de Gaulle and designed to accommodate an air group of approximately 40 aircraft, she is scheduled to be completed in 1995. A second unit will be needed later in that decade.
These ambitious programs will consume much of France’s naval budget for many years, however modernization of the fleet’s other elements is by no means being neglected, particularly in areas that often receive little at-
C* economy dictate that the fol- ve'.°n aircraft should be a navalized l0n of the next-generation European
tention in the U. S. Navy. The French Navy has never lost its interest in mine countermeasures, and it was the first to complete a NATO-design “Tripartite” minehunter, one of 15 that were scheduled to be completed by 1990. France recognized the value of a tactical, sea-skimming antiship missile system well before the United States did so. The resulting Exocet has been a major source of income and prestige for France. Seven units of a large and capable ASW destroyer design, the “C-70,” have been completed or are planned, as are four of a Standard missile-armed AAW variant, although the latter group’s lengthy gestation and repeated redesign suggest that no country is immune from protracted delays and escalating costs in the production of sophisticated weapon systems. Improvements continue to be made in amphibious and logistical forces, and the fleet of Atlantique long-range patrol aircraft is now to be replaced by new and greatly improved Atlantique II airframes.
In carrying out this remarkable range of programs, the
French Navy has deliberately fostered, and in turn been sustained by, a major export program. In recent yearSj. French exports of naval equipment have exceeded th°se® Britain. In certain instances, these exports, such as . sale or loan of Super Etendard attack aircraft equ'PP® with Exocet missiles to Argentina and Iraq, have had1 portant international implications. Aircraft, missiles, corts, conventional submarines, and fast patrol craft ha^ all been sold in large numbers; the latter in particular h
good reasons to believe France will
ers
ment of a French aircraft may require more effort and expense than the French could sensibly muster.
The Grumman E-2 Hawkeye, suitably modified, is a definite possibility. There are few other alternatives. And, although France is no longer a full NATO participant, it maintains equipment that is NATO compatible. For example, during the deployment of French carriers off Lebanon in 1983, sensor information regarding the disposition of aircraft and submarines in the region was transmitted directly between French and U. S. forces. The French intend to maintain such commonality.
France’s recent deployments to the eastern Mediterranean represent only one area where its interests must be protected by the military presence carriers provide best. Like U. S. carriers, French carriers are deployed as evidence of national strength and resolve.
The French Navy has also displayed its carriers as a sign of concern in the Gulf of Guinea off the west coast of Africa. Ethopia and South Yemen also see French carriers periodically, while France’s long-standing presence in Tahiti in the Pacific, La Reunion in the Indian Ocean, and the French Antilles in the Caribbean demand these vessels more frequently. These diverse deployment responsibilities, made more difficult by the economic restraints that limit France to two carriers, and their unpredictable durations make nuclear power a necessity for the French.
Achieving these ambitious national goals—two nuclear carriers with an advanced air wing in each—presents many problems. Not surprisingly, one of these is financial. In the past, the French have been successful in offsetting costs by selling French military hardware to foreign governments.
This importance of foreign sales is reflected in the comments of Defense Minister Charles Hernu:
“If France didn’t export, it couldn’t buy its own weapons from its own producers. . . . Unit costs would rise without exports and diseconomies of scale would weigh heavily on the defense budget. It would be hard to increase the military budget. So we would have to buy more abroad. Research teams would dissolve and disband. Specialists would become redundant, and their expertise would be lost.”
In the international marketplace, France is feeling the effects of more aggressive marketing by Britain and the United States as well as by its former customers—Israel and Argentina. Some of these competitors offer terms France is hard-pressed to match. Many Third World customers are becoming cash poor and resorting to barter as a means of payment. Production under license in the customer’s country has also become a familiar request. Both'concepts spell greater agreement complexity and less financial return. However, despite
the lessened appeal of such requests, the French swung a recent deal wit*1 Kuwait for 20 Mirage fighters in e*' change for oil.
But France is a nation of many strengths, and its independent arms production capability represents one these strengths. By offering technol°£ cally contemporary weapons without the ideological conditions of either s'* perpower, France often holds a mar ing advantage. Its recent winning °* four billion dollar Saudi air defense contract is believed to be a result, >n part, of this combination. Indeed, France has the reputation of being a reliable arms supplier. The United States, in comparison, does not. The U. S. Congress can be capricious a embargoes of spares and critical con sumables. The Soviets are also cons' ered a supplier with problems. FranC ^ often appears as an attractive substi Thus, despite difficulties, there are find the means to equip its new caiF with contemporary aircraft, predonU' nantly of French design and manufaC ture. Whether these aircraft are new, smaller F/A-18s, navalized versions 0^ the next-generation European fighter, some other characteristically indeperl^ dent solution, two nuclear powered <- riers carrying a wing of convention3 takeoff and landing (CTOL) aircraft will soon become a part of, perhaps’ the world’s best small navy