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The so-called “war of national liberation” now raging in Nicaragua must sometimes seem a hall of mirrors to U. S. military planners. Insurgents in El Salvador are proxies for Ortega’s Nicaragua, which is a proxy for Castro’s Cuba, which is a proxy for the Soviet Union, which explains why a Soviet Mi-24 assault helicopter is at the Managua airport.
Many Americans are confused by the escalating military situation in Nicaragua. A muddle of words, images, and interpretations has conspired to blur their perceptions. Policymakers and military planners must put right this confusion by clearly defining and vigorously promoting the U. S. policy objective toward Nicaragua. Most critically, they and the American people must come to understand and accept that the U. S. objective can be accomplished only by the resolute and prudent application of coercive diplomacy.
Although not every issue facing the United States should be seen in purely military terms, those involving potential international conflict must be viewed in relation to America’s main adversary—the Soviet Union. Since these countries are the world’s two great superpowers, this perception is axiomatic. More to the point, the continued Soviet rhetoric supporting so-called wars of national liberation, together with their sustained arms transfer policies and their dramatic naval buildup, are sufficient indications of their expansionist intent.
Soviet expansion is most directly served by one central objective—the undermining of the Atlantic alliance. NATO as a military, political, and diplomatic community of interest is an effective counterpoise to Soviet ambitions. However, its effectiveness can be weakened if, for example, U. S. capability or resolve to come to the aid of its allies is perceived to be compromised by entanglements near home. Central America presents the Soviets with an opportunity to contrive and exploit such a perception.
In the event of war, we must be capable of resupplying not only our allies but indeed ourselves. Yet the growing ability of communist bloc forces to interdict our vital sea lines of communication is a serious military threat which would be augmented by any facilities near the Isthmus of Panama. Hence in this context, we often hear Central America called our “strategic rear.”
At present force levels, the United States has more than ample capability to overcome combined Soviet and Cuban forces in the Caribbean. Of some concern, however, is that in so doing, we may compromise our ability to project power elsewhere in the world-—particularly with respect to our forward strategy in the Atlantic, which is crucial to the credibility of NATO. Although we would not actually be fighting a war in the Caribbean, the perception that our attention would be diverted from NATO concerns tends to undermine our political and diplomatic capabilities required in the representation of our national and collective interests vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc.
When we speak of perceptions, we enter the realm of public opinion. Rightly or wrongly, the American people seem to take pride in their media sense. They are supposedly well aware of slick advertising and marketing techniques, whose traditions date from well before the Russian revolution. Yet somehow, the Soviets have positioned their program of expansion very effectively by insinuating into the currency of public debate their terms, with their definitions—the term “war of national liberation” being a case in point.
American society has its own revolutionary roots. With the Bill of Rights firmly amended to the Constitution,
Americans find it difficult to oppose policies trumpet111^ freedom, liberty, equality—indeed, the will of the pe°Ple' They tend to be susceptible to those appeals which afe ostensibly a part of their own heritage—susceptiv enough to be somewhat grudging in their support of aU thoritarian, though allied, regimes. This predisposition >s at times activated, filtered, and even biased by the me 1 and can condition policy via Congress. No military pla11 ner needs reminding that policy actions, whether invo ing military assistance, combined exercises, or covert op erations, depend on support and appropriations fr°lTI Congress. And since 1973, they must reasonably conform to the clauses in the War Powers Resolution.
Hence with regard to perceptions, public affairs office have a monumental task. They must thoroughly shift grounds of debate, so that the American people can clean understand, for instance, that a “war of national libera tion” is more accurately a sponsored insurgency.
Admittedly, the causes of Third World conflicts do exclusively result from outside manipulation by the Soyl bloc. Any number of factors—be they socio-economic politico-military—potentially contribute to the outbrea of such conflicts, and each one is uniquely configured- common sense tells us and history confirms that once a^ insurgent virus is embedded in a body politic, a prevent^ medicine of socio-economic policies alone is not likely be an effective cure.
When we look closely at Central America, we find t success of the so-called war of national liberation is a suit of its proxy nature. The region faces insurgents in Salvador, who are proxies for Nicaragua, which is a , for Cuba, which is a proxy for the Soviet Union- J United States is looking into a game of mirrors; its p°l‘^ makers need to get a bead on the relevant adversary Moreover, they have to lock on him, if they expect ^
MAPPING ASSOCIATES. -^a/PORT nEVLk«
Maintain a policy objective, much less argue for its sup- PQrt before Congress and the American people.
F°r the most part, the Soviet Politburo appears to have legated operational command in this region to Cuba, astro has already proved himself capable of furthering 0c interests in Africa. The Soviets have their own eco- n°mic and military limitations aggravated by their on- ®°'ng leadership crisis. Indeed, Castro’s decision not to j*t,end Chernenko’s funeral might have been an attempt to eak a logjam of unresolved policy differences between ,e new General Secretary, Mikhail Gorbachov, and For- f'§n Minister Andrei Gromyko, affecting Cuba and Central America.
Perhaps by accident—but possibly by design—the oviets gained one advantage from the Cuban Missile r‘sis of 1962. In exchange for the permanent removal of nd-based strategic missiles and 11-28 bombers from uba, the United States agreed not to invade its hostile uthern island neighbor. That agreement has become for e United States, in effect, a de facto recognition of the •Jjstro regime, despite the absence of diplomatic relations, ntis, with Cuba comfortably legitimized and secure, the v'ets began an incremental arms transfer of conven- '°nal weapons to Castro in the late 1960s. Since that time, I- , buildup has continued and has been challenged pub- lc’y only twice.
^ot long ago, a Soviet bloc official referred to Cuba as °ur island flat-top.” Indeed, the agreement reached after e utissile crisis is now largely moot, owing to the confines improvements to the naval facilities at Cienfuegos, tj b*ch indirectly enable the Soviets to service their ballis- c uiissile submarines. Thus, the unfortunate result is the uiergence of Cuba as a secure, forward logistics and a'n>ng base for bloc operations in this hemisphere.
^n Ae case of Nicaragua, Cuba housed and trained ayardo Arce, Tomas Borge, and many other Sandinistas o were the leaders of the pro-Soviet faction within the ^ndinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). Until early however, the Sandinista comandantes received milary assistance from a number of sources. Primary logistic suPport came through Venezuela until the departure of the c,alist Perez government. The comandantes, already °Se to victory, had to look elsewhere for assistance.
The USS Iowa (BB-61), beyond fishing boats off the northern coast of Honduras, demonstrates U. S. interest and resolve in Central America and U. S. military capability and state of readiness. At the same time, her discreet presence sends an unsettling signal to the Cubans and Soviets.
Logically, they turned to Cuba. But before Castro would oblige, he required of them a new command structure, unified under a leadership having his approval. What emerged was a new unified command led by the pro-Soviet group and the Ortegas, which excluded other Sandinistas, some of whom are now contras. Only after the Castro-orchestrated and -approved command structure was in place within the FSLN, did the Sandinistas receive the additional military assistance (including Cuban advisers) necessary to victory.
From the time the Sandinistas came to power until January 1981, U. S. attention was drawn from Central America to Iran and the hostage crisis. During this period, a steady and massive arms buildup took place in Nicaragua. The pace was carefully timed so as not to arouse the fears of an otherwise distracted American people. The policymakers of the new Reagan administration took note and raised alarums and excursions. But they were not able to generate public, media, or congressional support for any effective policy to counter these developments. The growing threat represented by the Nicaraguan armed forces was neither successfully articulated by our leaders nor sufficiently perceived by many of our people.
Simultaneously, a familiar pattern was emerging in El Salvador. In 1980, five guerrilla groups were active and in need of training and assistance. When some of these guerrillas looked to Nicaragua, the Sandinistas insisted on a tested precondition—a new command structure, unified and led by Sandinista-approved leaders together with Nicaraguan and Cuban advisers. Today, logistics and operations in El Salvador are coordinated by a military commission in Managua, which is housed in the Ministry of Defense and headed by Nicaraguan Army Chief of Staff Joaquin Cuadra.
In 1983, a similarly unified command was formed by guerrilla groups in Honduras. In addition, the Sandinistas now train a small’ number of Costa Rican rebels to fight alongside their forces in the south against the contras led by former Sandinista comandante Eden Pastora.
If the whole structure is perceived in the geopolitical context, which it should be, it is clear the Soviet bloc intent continues to be expansionist. And given the ideological antipathy which characterizes Soviet doctrine, diplomacy alone will not thwart further expansion. As intelligence analyst Ray Cline has often said, we should learn to take the Soviets at their word.
The fact remains: sustained incremental support whereby arms transfers are linked with organizational consolidation has produced hostile elites. These Soviet-inspired, Soviet-coordinated elites are, under the banner of “national liberation,” opposing by insurgency our allies in Central America.
When Alexander Haig attempted in February 1981 to orchestrate public support for a strong, aggressive policy in the region, he and the administration got their knuckles rapped. The press, the public, and Congress were just not willing to jump into what was called “another Vietnam.” On the one hand, Haig pronounced he was going to draw the line against the insurgents in El Salvador, while on the other, he uttered vague threats to Cuba about going to the source. Haig correctly perceived the geopolitical context. However, he was not able to define or promote a clear, precise policy objective in the region. And without that, a consensus proved elusive.
Some ten years ago, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, former nief of Naval Operations, coined a phrase “relevant Power,” meaning, in his words, “the specific force or P°wer that can be effective in a particular situation.” Rel- e',ant power is a concept that is the key to identifying a
- ear, precise, and attainable policy objective. The ques- 'on a U. S. policymaker must answer then is whether the 5 evant power of our adversaries in Central America is
e Salvadoran insurgent movement, the Nicaraguan armed forces, Cuba, or the Soviet Union. The answer, of C°Urse, is the Nicaraguan armed forces. Nicaragua is the nexus of the whole sponsored insurgent structure in the region. Thus, the U. S. policy objective must be the denial °' this capability.
The public position, since spring 1984, enunciates four P°*nts to further this objective. The United States wants e Sandinistas to: end their support for guerrilla groups; Sever their military and security ties to Cuba and the So- v,et bloc; reduce their military strength to levels restoring ecNilibrium in the region; and fulfill their original prom- ,es ,0 support democratic pluralism. Concomitant to a 'Plomatic solution that is verifiable and enforceable, the nited States endorses the Contadora process and has par- C|Pated in seven rounds of bilateral talks with Nicaragua a Manzanillo. Further, the United States has often de- ared “emphatically” that it has neither considered nor as it developed “plans to use U. S. military forces to nvade Nicaragua.”1
Clearly, the United States has sought a diplomatic solu- °n. Yet the question remains how best to get the San- 'n>stas to negotiate seriously and substantively since their Jective is so obviously contrary to ours. They have said e'r struggle is a “revolution without frontiers.” No |e °ner Ortega regime arrogate for itself a spurious
8'hmacy after its “elections,” than the Soviets began other round of precisely timed military escalation with e expectation that it would cement the revolution in ace. What was particularly disturbing to our defense in- "‘gence analysts was the patently offensive nature of ese weapon systems. In no way does history suggest that oiled forces actively replenished by a superpower ally o inspired by revolutionary ideology will disarm by negations alone.
Contadora and the Manzanillo meetings have value to pe Sandanistas as public relations devices that buy time. k°r the United States, these diplomatic endeavors might j,e Useful to “play off” Nicaragua against Cuba or the
- v,et Union or to probe the cohesiveness of the compet- n§ factions within the FSLN. Yet the greater the Nicara-
an buildup of offensive weaponry, the weaker the U. S. 'Plomatic leverage.
. 'he conclusion is inescapable. To attain our policy ob- ctive—whether by negotiations or otherwise—we must Ploy coercive diplomacy.2 In general, such diplomacy n involve the use or threatened use of force against an Versary, for example, to deter him from a policy or c,,on adverse to U. S. interests. Frequently and with ^eater difficulty, the use or threatened use of force must reniployed to compel an adversary to cease or even to Verse a policy or action.
With respect to Nicaragua and our four-point objective, it is obviously no longer a question of deterrence. The United States seeks a cessation of Nicaraguan support for guerrillas operating against its neighboring countries and Soviet military ties with Nicaragua. More ambitiously, the United States seeks a reversal of the buildup of the Nicaraguan military and totalitarian apparatus. Practically speaking, the objective cannot be realized all at once. A momentum has to be effected. The task for military planners is all the more complicated by the necessity to structure, employ, and explain coercive elements, particularly those requiring U. S. armed forces, in such a way so as to maintain congressional and popular support. Planners can expect every “incident” involving our 55 advisers in El Salvador or resulting from our combined military and naval exercises in Honduras or the Gulf of Fonseca to be scrutinized by Congress and the press and related to the familiar clauses of the War Powers Resolution.
Barring a precipitate Soviet or Cuban action, such as the introduction of a combat brigade or high-performance aircraft in Nicaragua, U. S. efforts should continue to emphasize the interdiction of Sandinista support for guerrilla groups in neighboring countries. To complete the task, we must increase the amount of security and military assistance to allied forces in the region. Of particular value are programs and operations involving combined reconnaissance. Concrete evidence of the flow of Nicaraguan arms is crucial to presenting our case to the world’s nations. Despite our sophisticated efforts, this evidence is hard to come by and even harder to put into a form that can be made public. Combined reconnaissance with its command, control, communications, and intelligence application further allows us to contribute meaningfully to counterinsurgent operations without introducing U. S. forces “equipped for combat” into situations where “hostilities are imminent.” Such tactical or real-time intelligence is vital to the Salvadoran forces particularly in their efforts to interdict sea supply in the Gulf of Fonseca, off Jucuaran, and near the mouth of the Rio Lempa.
As to U. S.-sponsored military and naval combined exercises, their value is threefold. First, they familiarize larger forces with facilities, climate, waters, and terrains in the region. Second, they develop coordination with our allies, not the least of which boosts allied morale. And finally, exercises demonstrate U. S. resolve through a maintained presence of substantial forces. By continuing a succession of exercises, we achieve a de facto deployment, sufficient to reduce further Nicaraguan logistic capability to support guerrilla operations. Increased military and security assistance to our allies should enable them to effect complete denial of this Nicaraguan assistance.
Incidents involving Nicaraguan borders, air space, or territorial waters are bound to be contrived by our adversary. Such incidents would be used by the Sandinistas both to justify their intransigeance vis-a-vis Contadora and to prompt editorialization by sympathetic segments of the media.
However, we must not let this concern blunt the effectiveness of our activities with respect to interdiction. Where there is potential for an incident, our unit com-
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manders and intelligence teams must relate “iffy” operations to the diplomatic process and be guided by the principle of incentives and pressures. When the process is going well, they should give the Nicaraguans the benefit of the doubt. When it is going badly, they should apply the pressure.
More controversial, yet perhaps ultimately necessary, would be the use of U. S. naval forces to interdict military shipments to Nicaragua. In addition to its intelligencegathering mission, the discreet U. S. naval presence on station off Nicaragua is currently showing interest and at times resolve. Beyond that, U. S. exercises and maneuvers elsewhere in the Caribbean are certainly demonstrating a military capability and a state of readiness, while sending a signal to the Cubans and Soviets. Yet planners ought to question whether such gestures are making the Nicaraguans more tractable or the Soviets more cautious.
In a well-publicized incident in August 1983, we established a precedent in regional waters. The Soviet cargo ship Alexander Ulyanov was challenged to state destina-
To attain a reversal of the Nicaraguan military and totalitarian apparatus is not the task of the United States, but rather of the contras and their leader, Eden Pastora, right. They can be the only coercive element that can make the Sandinistas, below, reverse anything.
tion and cargo, and she cooperated. Bound for Corinto. the ship claimed to be carrying medical supplies, whic were subsequently discovered to include two helicopters and spares for transport aircraft. Such precedents shou be developed, and combined participation with alhe forces in the region should be sought. As our resolve >s seen to grow, so will the Soviets’ correspondingly u tested. Both precedent and posture must begin to shift tn initiative to our side in line with our goal of ultimate; severing Nicaragua’s military and security ties with tn Soviet Union.
To attain a reversal of the Nicaraguan military and tota itarian apparatus is not appropriately our task. Policyma ers are aware that direct intervention invites historic comparison to the days of our pre-Good Neighbor “gringo” arrogance and “yanqui” imperialism. Proper ; speaking, the internal question in Nicaragua is rightful; the concern of the contras. For our purposes, they are t only coercive element that can make the Sandinistas ^ verse anything. But our support for their efforts is mired best by misperception, at worst by misrepresentation-
Currently, our policymakers are faced with anotne public affairs problem. Until the ground of debate between the contras and the Sandinistas has been shifted, no pr0 gram of covert assistance can hope to be secure again media revelations and the congressional knife. At the veO least, a public affairs campaign must help the contf°s
SYGMA
ISomos hi’Qs de Snndino
y Bolivar!
19*5
Pfesent their leaders, their programs, and their story to the orld’s nations. Such a campaign is vital to the policy Jective and appears to have been largely overlooked, ‘he contras consist of a broad spectrum of groups: Jtoging from former comandantes, Sandinistas, and other toocratic opponents to Somoza’s government to busi- essmen, peasants, and Miskito Indians. They are not all mocistas or national guardsmen, as some vocal critics itray them. Indeed, many are those whom we supported er the revolution while our aid to Nicaragua continued. s to their being described in the press as “mercenaries,” e term is as unfortunate as it is false. A mercenary is a °tossional soldier serving for pay in a foreign army. The 0>nras are Nicaraguans fighting in Nicaragua against a ®1Ine whose legitimacy they do not recognize.
More to the point, they believe they are conducting a v'l War against that regime that has betrayed the original r°tomitments of the Sandinista revolution. Further, they ^§ard Ortega and his faction as a Soviet-sponsored elite.
tones, the contras have phrased their opposition with Ppeals to the Organization of American States (OAS) sarter and the Rio Treaty provisions regarding collective j. .‘'defense against foreign interference in the internal af- *‘s of the hemisphere.
°toe critics question whether there is a civil war in cICaragua. A comparison is appropriate. El Salvador is a °Untry of five million. Reliable estimates put the insur- ^etlt total at 8,000. In Nicaragua, with half that population e'''o-and-one-half million), some 20,000 contras are op- 0j.at'ng under two leaderships in both the north and south 'he country. Since October and dqspite the congressional freeze on funding for their operations, both forces have been active. In the north, the Nicaraguan Democratic Force has conducted extensive operations around Leon, Esteli, and Jinotega. In the south, Eden Pastora’s forces have been especially active in Lake Nicaragua and around San Carlos. According to reports broadcast via clandestine radio and from Radio Managua, contra movements and operations are a weekly, if not daily, fact of life.
The oft-cited quid pro quo, whereby the United States would parley abandonment of the contras for Nicaraguan promises to forsake the Salvadoran guerrillas, is nonsense. Not only is the suggestion cynically indifferent to the fate of some 20,000 lives, it is woefully myopic with respect to the concerns of Nicaragua’s neighbors, indeed to their very faith in a U. S. commitment to democracy and security in the region. But if we can present provocative evidence that the Sandinista regime is not serious about substantive negotiations, which the foregoing has endeavored to suggest, continued and increased support to the contras is a wholly appropriate linkage.
Traditional diplomacy aspired to quid pro quos, to be sure. But it can also serve as a tool to up the ante. Our American sense of fair play together with our short memory predisposes us to the traditional notion. Too often, our people forget history. Too often, they have been kept ignorant of context. Too often, they have suggested we give away more than we have received.
The Grenada liberation, for the moment, reversed what the Soviets call the correlation of forces. Indeed, in this hemisphere, the United States is still the relevant power. As Secretary of the Navy John Lehman has said, “The West wilL. . . need to create trends unfavorable to Soviet power projection in strategically significant regions of the world.” Like it or not, we are squaring off against the Soviets again in Central America. The momentum is ours, but we can easily lose the initiative. Again to quote Secretary Lehman, “For strength to be credible, it is absolutely vital that the world clearly perceive the determination by the United States to act and use strength when its interests are threatened.”
Without resolve, without a strong, focused politico-military effort behind our diplomacy in Central America, the Sandinista regime will continue to use its diplomacy to up the ante. The Sandinistas must, with force if necessary, be made to accept half the pie, though they clearly want it all. And if need be, they must be shown that continued, incremental provocation may result in their not having any pie at all.
‘For a statement of our policy objective towards Nicaragua, see U. S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Mining of Nicaraguan Ports and Harbors, 98th Cong., 2nd sess., 1984, pp. 4-5, and Central America: The Ends and Means of U. S. Policy, 98th Cong., 2nd sess., 1984, p. 22. For the White House statement on invasion plans, see The Mining of Nicaraguan Ports and Harbors, pp. 28-29. Contadora, consisting of the nations of Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, and Panama, was named for the island where officials of the coordinating nations first met in January 1983 to discuss mediation in Central American conflicts.
For a discussion of coercive diplomacy, see Alexander L. George, ed., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Greenwood Press, 1966).
Mr. Morton is a communications consultant currently in Washington specializing in defense and security policy. He received a BA and an MA in international affairs from The George Washington University.