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most important actions during World War II, but he emphasizes that the Black Sea Fleet had “considerable effect on the course of military campaigns.” Naval operations in the Black Sea and Turkish Straits prevented the emergence of an enemy threat from the southwest and allowed the Soviet Union to focus its efforts on the main battle front.
Admiral Gorshkov’s analysis of the Black Sea Fleet during World War II is particularly relevant in attempting to extrapolate “intent” from historical analogy. He is speaking from experience. In June 1941, he commanded a cruiser brigade in the Black Sea. Four months later, following a successful landing operation near Odessa, he was promoted to rear admiral and placed in command of the Azov Flotilla, then a component of the Black Sea Fleet.16 Not surprisingly, the four historical missions continued to dominate his writings of Black Sea operations.
In summarizing the Black Sea Fleet’s contribution to the defeat of Adolt Hitler’s Germany, Gorshkov writes:
“These operations were the disruption of enemy sea
communications, the delivery of strikes from the sea against naval bases, ports, and military-industrial objectives of the enemy, the destruction of his surface ships and submarines at sea, the blockading from the sea of areas which were more important to the enemy for combat operations, active mine-laying, and numerous landings of landing parties.”17
Admittedly, these operations were common to all four Soviet fleets throughout the war. However, Gorshkov points out those operations most apropos to the Black Sea Fleet. In addition, although somewhat out of place, he manages to include a quote by former Defense Minister, Marshal A. A. Grechko:
“The Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla also rendered considerable support to the ground forces in the offensive period. By landing parties of naval forces the troops were aided in breaking through the powerful permanent defense of the enemy.”18
In the early 1970s, during the administration of President Richard M. Nixon, there was a thaw in U. S.-Soviet relations. For a time, a spirit of detente prevailed, and it was in evidence in naval activities. One objective was to eliminate unpleasant incidents at sea, such as the harassment of U. S. ships and formations by Soviet vessels. An individual who got to implement the spirit of detente was the commander of the U. S. Sixth Fleet.
When I was Commander, Sixth Fleet from 1971 to 1973, we often came upon Soviet ships in the Mediterranean. The approach I took with the Soviets was to be a professional sailor. We were always very friendly to the Soviet ships, trying to communicate as much as possible. We used flashing light signals all the time, for instance, to be courteous.
My instructions to the fleet were simple: Be professional seamen. 1 told them that every time they joined with a Soviet unit, to send a flashing light signal and sign the name of the commanding officer. “Compliment them on the appearance of the ship,” I said. If you
Admiral Miller’s encounter with the helicopter cruiser Moskva in the Med was nothing but friendly.
want to go alongside their ship to take a look, ask permission to do so, and after permission is granted, go alongside in a professional manner.” Those were the instructions for commanding officers, and I followed those instructions as well, frequently. I spent hours looking at the Soviets.
One day, the Moskva came to the Med. I’d never seen the Moskva, so I sent a message saying, “Beautiful ship. I’m new in the Mediterranean. I’d love to come alongside and take a look at her. Request permission to do so.”
And, by God, they said okay. I steamed up to within 500 feet, and we went side by side at about 15 knots.
Her rail was manned. Every sailor manning the rail rendered me honors. We rendered honors back. We would have the band on deck, and they would play rock tunes and so forth, but always respectfully. We had signs made up in English, “Hello.” Flip it, and there it was in Russian. They started to respond. Finally, they would break their ranks, and their cameras would start flashing.
Then I sent a message that I’d like to send a gift to the captain. “We don’t
Included for whatever reasons, the emphasis on landing operations cannot be dismissed lightly. Of the four Soviet fleets, the Black Sea Fleet conducted the most and the largest amphibious landing operations during World War II. Nearly a quarter of all landings were under the command of Admiral Gorshkov.19 The vast majority of the landings were successful, particularly those launched against Turkey.
The Black Sea Fleet: 1946-85: The confusion and weakness prevalent throughout Europe in the immediate postwar period provided the Soviets with the opportunity to renew efforts to gain control of the Turkish Straits. Since the mid-18th century, the Europeans had thwarted Russian attempts at control. Now, these same powers were recent allies, and they were preoccupied with internal reconstruction and domestic priorities.
Between 1945 and 1947, the Soviets made several territorial demands on Turkey, which included the sovereignty over the east Turkish provinces of Kars and Ardahan and joint control of the Dardanelles. All the demands were rejected by Turkey, which was backed by U. S. and British support. Joint control of the straits would mean eventual Soviet military dominance of the straits and the extension of influence over Turkey. But the Soviets, once more, lacked the naval power to pressure Turkey or counter the gunboat diplomacy of the U. S. naval forces deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean. In addition, the Western nations were reluctant to modify the provisions of the 1936 Montreux Convention, which at least kept a check on Soviet warships entering and exiting the Black Sea.
With at least access to the Mediterranean guaranteed by the Montreux Convention, the Soviets increased efforts to gain a foothold for operations from within the Mediterranean basin proper. Following an arms embargo to Egypt in 1955 by the West, the Suez Crisis in 1956, U. S. intervention in Lebanon in 1958, and the unpopular French War in Algeria in 1955-62, the Soviets made their initial political inroads with arms assistance and aid. Between 1955 and 1964, roughly three billion dollars of Soviet arms assis-
By Vice Admiral Gerald E. Miller, U. S. Navy (Retired)
need your gift,” they answered, “but thank you very much. Appreciate it.”
“Can I send some ice cream for the crew? I’ll lower it by helicopter onto the deck,” I sent back.
“We don’t need ice cream. We have ice cream of our own.”
I would always sign my name to the messages, but I never got one from the Soviets with the name of the admiral or commanding officer. The only way I knew who their admirals were in the Mediterranean was through the Beirut newspapers.
I encouraged all our people to communicate. I would go out to Kithira anchorage near Greece, and the Soviets would be performing logistics operations with the Moskva. I would go in with the flagship and lie to. There, I would spend a whole day, sitting on the bridge with binoculars watching Moskva's logistics problems—their difficulties getting food and supplies aboard. They’d have to rig a crane on the bow. Then a small craft would come alongside, like we used to do in San Pedro in 1937. It was unbelievable what you could find out just by watching their daily activities. I spent a lot of time at this, but I was always polite, congratulating them on their appearance and evolutions.
The Sixth Fleet commanding officers picked up the policy very well. When the first “Krivak” came out, a brand- new Soviet destroyer, I had a ship join up with her to take pictures, follow her, see what she could do. The commanding officer, in the spirit of things, sent a message to the captain of the “Krivak,” saying, “She’s a beautiful ship. Is she for sale?” He never got a response.
Another time, one of our destroyers was following a Soviet cruiser coming out of the Aegean, headed for Alexandria. He had been following for a couple of days when one morning, as the sun came up, the Soviet commander sent a message saying, “Glad to see you’re still there taking care of me.”
This was right after J. Edgar Hoover died, and we lowered our flags to halfmast. The Soviet captain sent a second message, “I note your flag’s at half mast. What’s the occasion?”
Our commanding officer replied, “Good morning. Glad to be with you. The head of our FBI, J. Edgar Hoover, just died, and we’ve been directed to fly the flag at half-mast for a couple of days.”
The Soviet captain came back with the message that he appreciated the information very much and added, “Relative to Mr. Hoover, you have our sympathies, although he never had any for us.”
There was a kind of underlying camaraderie between our navies. We might have made more of it. I addressed official messages to the Navy Department and up the line asking for permission to have either formal or informal exchanges at sea. I wanted to meet with the Russian admiral on television or privately, informally or with all the ceremony, or perhaps have a joint port visit. The replies were always polite but negative.
Once, we sailed with several NATO nations through the Aegean to the Greek-Turkish Thrace area for a joint operation. With all our flags flying, we passed the Soviet admiral in his flagship, a cruiser or tender, and he had a couple of his ships nearby. They were going to watch everything we did, trailing us. The Soviet admiral watched us going by, all the flags, and you can imagine what he was thinking. So I sent him a message, “We’re on our way to a joint NATO amphibious operation in the Greek-Turkish Thrace area. I’ll be happy to tell you anything about what we’re doing. As a matter of fact, would you like a role in this exercise?”
He replied, “Thank you very much, but we have our own plans.”
The above narrative is an edited excerpt from a Naval Institute oral history interview of Vice Admiral Miller conducted 7 July 1976 by Dr. John T. Mason, Jr. In order to obtain a catalog listing the more than 130 bound volumes of oral histories in the Institute’s collection, please send $2.00 to Director of Oral History, U. S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland 21402.