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It is safe to predict that, in a shooting war between East and West, the Soviet Black Sea Fleet—“Kashin”-class destroyers, right, are moored at a Black Sea naval base—is certain to play a pivotal role.
If and when the shooting starts between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, what role will the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and its offshoot, the Fifth Eskadra, fill? How will they be employed? For what missions? A review of the force composition and capabilities provides only a partial answer. The Soviet Union’s southwestern border region has historically been the center of many significant Russian naval battles. Admiral Sergei Gorshkov’s emphasis on the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean in his writings provides insight into how the present forces may be applied in a NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation. By coupling these two facets, historical inquiry and capabilities analysis, a more accurate determination can be made as to how the Black Sea Fleet will be employed.
The Black Sea Fleet: 1696-1900: The Russians’ drive to establish a foothold in the Black Sea and gain entry to the warm water ports of the Mediterranean began in earnest in the late 17th century. Campaigning under the guise of champion of the Balkan Christians, Peter the Great took the port of Azov from the Turks in 1696, providing Russia with unimpeded access through the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. As Admiral Gorshkov aptly remarks, “Further development of the state and its economy could have proceeded only with the reestablishment of outlets to the sea.”1
For the next three-quarters of a century, the Russians were unable to consolidate their position. Preoccupied by war with Sweden and political intrigues in central Europe, they were limited to an intermittent presence in the Sea of Azov. During the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774, the first Russian Mediterranean squadron, under the command of Aleksei Orlev, scored major victories against the Turks.
But the Russians still were unable to gain immediate access to the Black and Mediterranean seas. With the assistance of the British and French, who feared Russian intentions of establishing a power base in the Mediterranean, Turkey retained control of the Black Sea and Turkish Straits and excluded the Russians from both. Not until the war with Turkey ended with the Treaty of Kuchuk- Kaynardzha in July 1774 did the Russians secure the right of free navigation for commercial shipping in the Black Sea. In addition, Russia received substantial territories located in Crimea, enhancing the commercial importance of access to the Mediterranean ports of southern Europe and North Africa.
Gorshkov deemphasizes the economic aspects of these accomplishments. Instead, he emphasizes the role of the navy in the defense of the homeland:
“Thus, in 1770-1774, the Navy rendered most important aid on the strategic plane, not only in the defense of the southwestern regions of the country, but also by diverting large enemy forces toward itself, and directly aided the Russian Army in achieving remarkable victories on the Danube front.”2
The missions of defense and diversion become persistent themes as Gorshkov outlines subsequent operations in the Black and Mediterranean seas.
In 1787, tensions flared once more between the Russians and Turks, resulting in the Second War of Catherine, which continued until 1792. Following a decisive victory at Kersh in 1790, the Russian Black Sea Fleet expelled the Turkish fleet from the Black Sea. Distracted by a simultaneous war with Sweden and the accompanying naval operations in the Baltic, the Russians were unable to deploy a
fleet to conduct operations against the Mediterranean coast of Turkey. Instead, they outfitted detachments of Greek ships, creating privateer squadrons. These squadrons were able to interrupt
“the enemy’s shipping and [attack] his coastal bases, [diverting] considerable Turkish land and naval forces from the main, Black Sea theater. This essentially created a second front for the Turkish Army, which undoubtedly had a considerable effect on the course and outcome of the struggle in the main area.’''’
Once again, the dual roles of defense and diversion are evident in Gorshkov’s writings. The Russians’ desire to open a second front was apparently strong enough to resort to forming a privateer navy from Greek vessels. That this decision was made while war was already being waged on two other maritime fronts, the Black and Baltic seas, reflects the strategic importance of the defense and diversion mission to Russian military planners of the time. It was an action considered vital to successful consolidation of the Russian naval presence in the Black Sea.
Thus, by the turn of the century, four basic missions of the Black Sea Fleet falling under the rubric of wartime defense of the southwestern flank are identified by Gorshkov: anti-sea lines of communication (SLOCs), blockade of the Turkish Straits, landing/amphibious operations in support of ground forces, and diversionary operations to detract attention and forces from the main battle front. With the Russian fleet entrenched in the Black Sea, these missions remained virtually unchanged through a series of Russo-Turkish wars and a war with Napoleonic France. The blockade mission was modified and increasingly replaced by the need to control the Turkish Straits.
This strategic shift from blockade to control is first evident during naval operations against England in the early 1800s. Indeed, Russia was allied with England against Turkey, but Gorshkov claims, “the true intentions of England boiled down to not allowing free passage of Russian ships through the Black Sea straits, thus ensuring complete sway for her ships in the Mediterranean Sea.”4 As a result, one complete Russian squadron blockaded the Dardanelles, ensuring Russian ship access to the Mediterranean while preventing England from gaining entrance to the Black Sea. According to Gorshkov, this action was instrumental in enabling the Russian fleet to win several “brilliant victories in the Aegean Sea.”5
Once again, in the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-1829, a Russian squadron “tightly blockaded the Dardanelles and the Turkish coast from the south,” contributing to significant Russian naval victories against the Turkish Navy.6 In April 1833, the Russians deployed a squadron to the Turkish Straits and landed troops on the Asiatic side of the Bosporus Strait to preempt British or French occupation during a conflict between the Sultan of Turkey and Mohammed Ali of Egypt.
The importance of the Russians’ new-found ability to control the straits was reflected in the Treaty of Hunkiar- Iskelesi between Russia and Turkey in July 1833. Each party pledged to come to the aid of the other in case of attack. However, a secret article relieved the Turks of this obligation in return for an engagement to keep the straits closed to all foreign warships. In effect, the treaty, which was effective for eight years, guaranteed Russian dominance of the Black Sea and free passage to the Mediterranean Sea.
The successes of the 1830s proved short-lived, and
Gorshkov discusses the subsequent failures of the Black Sea Fleet at great length in three separate articles. He states that Russian losses in the Crimean War (1853— 1856) and Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878) were devastating and resulted from an inadequate and ill-prepared navy, specifically the Black Sea Fleet. Despite significant territorial concessions by Russia in the Treaty of Paris (1856), Gorshkov claims that the severest provision was “the prohibition against a Russian Fleet in the Black Sea.’’7
In March 1871, Russia abrogated the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris. Nonetheless, the tzarist government failed to take “decisive measures to restore seapower in the southwest. ”8 Consequently, at the onset of the Russo- Turkish War in 1877, the Black Sea Fleet was once again ill-equipped and unprepared for naval battle. Gorshkov places the blame for Russia’s losses at Constantinople on
CHARLES RAGLAND the navy, or more accurately, Russia’s lack thereof.
The defeat forced the Russian Army “to flee without achieving one of the main goals of the war—free access to the Mediterranean Sea.”9 This inability to maintain an ample Black Sea Fleet had two other consequences of potentially greater importance, which are perhaps applicable to the Soviet fleet of the 1980s. First, the Black Sea Fleet was “too weak to compel the enemy and the powers supporting him to accept peace conditions essential to Russia.”10 This contrasted sharply with the freedom of movement and influence wielded by the Russians in the southwest during the brief 20-year period of control from 1833 to 1853. According to Gorshkov, the Black Sea Fleet should have been translated into an instrument of definitive wartime influence and power.
Second, when faced with a powerful naval threat in the region, “Russia was compelled to abandon the fruits of
her victories, and sometimes even suffer defeats.”11 Gorshkov attributes the losses experienced in the Crimean and Russo-Turkish wars to Russia’s inability to extend maritime power beyond the shores of the Black Sea. Although the Russian fleet could achieve supremacy against the Black Sea power, Turkey, defeat was imminent as soon as other naval powers intervened.
Throughout the 19th century, Russian sea power rarely ventured from the confines of the East Mediterranean. The absence of a modem Black Sea Fleet opened the Russian southwest to security threats from the more powerful European fleets while simultaneously preventing the Russians from gaining a permanent foothold in the Mediterranean. Without control of the Black Sea, Turkish Straits, and neighboring maritime geography, the Russians were relegated to responding to the whims of the European fleets.
Interestingly, Gorshkov shows no desire to secure bases or territory beyond the immediate area of the Black Sea and East Mediterranean. Access to the Mediterranean is clearly of great commercial importance, yet the emphasis in Gorshkov’s writings appears to be on translating access to the Med into an ability to influence regional conflict from the sea. Present deployment patterns of the Fifth Eskadra in the East Mediterranean indicate these interests carry much the same weight today as they did in the mid- 19th century.
The Black Sea Fleet: 1900—46: At the outbreak of World War I, the Russians had one of the smallest fleets of the entente. Germany’s navy was more than two and one half times larger. Only Austria-Hungary had a smaller navy. Russia’s defeat at Tsushima in 1905 during the Russo-Japanese War had decimated the greater part of the Russian Navy. What remained was obsolescent. During World War I, the Black Sea Fleet was initially tasked to ensure free access for Russian ships to the Mediterranean. However, the Turkish fleet was reinforced with the German cruisers Goeben and Breslau; therefore, the Black Sea Fleet’s mission was revised to “take actions connected with establishing conditions favorable for Russia in the Black Sea straits.”12
Though disputable in fact, Gorshkov attributes great strategic successes to the Black Sea Fleet. Contrasting his description of Russian naval operations in the Black Sea during World War I with his earlier description of Russian naval operations against the Turks during 1770-74 reveals two things. First, there is continuity in mission requirements. Second, Gorshkov places much importance on control of the Turkish Straits:
“. . .the Russian Fleet . . . was able to blockade the surface ships of the German-Turkish Fleet in the straits, to go over to systematic operations off the enemy coast, and render direct aid to the maritime flanks of the ground fronts with gunfire support, the landing of landing parties, and transporting troops and supplies. Moreover, by mass mine-laying and operations against the ports and ships at sea, the Black Sea Fleet hindered the sea communications of the enemy . . . .”13
The four primary missions mentioned previously— anti-SLOC, blockade, landing/amphibious operations, and diversionary operations—dominated the Black Sea Fleet’s actions. Although never conducted, one of the main missions of the fleet according to Gorshkov was “the landing of a major landing force to capture the Bosporus.”14 The many landing operations which were conducted, combined with the extensive planning devoted to the Bosporus landing, led to development in the 1930s of the “very first theory of amphibious landing operations which was checked in the course of combat training” during the interwar period.15 The theory would be used frequently in subsequent landing operations during World War II.
Gorshkov concedes that ground forces performed the
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most important actions during World War II, but he emphasizes that the Black Sea Fleet had “considerable effect on the course of military campaigns.” Naval operations in the Black Sea and Turkish Straits prevented the emergence of an enemy threat from the southwest and allowed the Soviet Union to focus its efforts on the main battle front.
Admiral Gorshkov’s analysis of the Black Sea Fleet during World War II is particularly relevant in attempting to extrapolate “intent” from historical analogy. He is speaking from experience. In June 1941, he commanded a cruiser brigade in the Black Sea. Four months later, following a successful landing operation near Odessa, he was promoted to rear admiral and placed in command of the Azov Flotilla, then a component of the Black Sea Fleet.16 Not surprisingly, the four historical missions continued to dominate his writings of Black Sea operations.
In summarizing the Black Sea Fleet’s contribution to the defeat of Adolt Hitler’s Germany, Gorshkov writes:
“These operations were the disruption of enemy sea
communications, the delivery of strikes from the sea against naval bases, ports, and military-industrial objectives of the enemy, the destruction of his surface ships and submarines at sea, the blockading from the sea of areas which were more important to the enemy for combat operations, active mine-laying, and numerous landings of landing parties.”17
Admittedly, these operations were common to all four Soviet fleets throughout the war. However, Gorshkov points out those operations most apropos to the Black Sea Fleet. In addition, although somewhat out of place, he manages to include a quote by former Defense Minister, Marshal A. A. Grechko:
“The Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla also rendered considerable support to the ground forces in the offensive period. By landing parties of naval forces the troops were aided in breaking through the powerful permanent defense of the enemy.”18
As I Recall... Sailing with the Soviets in the Med
In the early 1970s, during the administration of President Richard M. Nixon, there was a thaw in U. S.-Soviet relations. For a time, a spirit of detente prevailed, and it was in evidence in naval activities. One objective was to eliminate unpleasant incidents at sea, such as the harassment of U. S. ships and formations by Soviet vessels. An individual who got to implement the spirit of detente was the commander of the U. S. Sixth Fleet.
When I was Commander, Sixth Fleet from 1971 to 1973, we often came upon Soviet ships in the Mediterranean. The approach I took with the Soviets was to be a professional sailor. We were always very friendly to the Soviet ships, trying to communicate as much as possible. We used flashing light signals all the time, for instance, to be courteous.
My instructions to the fleet were simple: Be professional seamen. 1 told them that every time they joined with a Soviet unit, to send a flashing light signal and sign the name of the commanding officer. “Compliment them on the appearance of the ship,” I said. If you
Admiral Miller’s encounter with the helicopter cruiser Moskva in the Med was nothing but friendly.
want to go alongside their ship to take a look, ask permission to do so, and after permission is granted, go alongside in a professional manner.” Those were the instructions for commanding officers, and I followed those instructions as well, frequently. I spent hours looking at the Soviets.
One day, the Moskva came to the Med. I’d never seen the Moskva, so I sent a message saying, “Beautiful ship. I’m new in the Mediterranean. I’d love to come alongside and take a look at her. Request permission to do so.”
And, by God, they said okay. I steamed up to within 500 feet, and we went side by side at about 15 knots.
Her rail was manned. Every sailor manning the rail rendered me honors. We rendered honors back. We would have the band on deck, and they would play rock tunes and so forth, but always respectfully. We had signs made up in English, “Hello.” Flip it, and there it was in Russian. They started to respond. Finally, they would break their ranks, and their cameras would start flashing.
Then I sent a message that I’d like to send a gift to the captain. “We don’t
Included for whatever reasons, the emphasis on landing operations cannot be dismissed lightly. Of the four Soviet fleets, the Black Sea Fleet conducted the most and the largest amphibious landing operations during World War II. Nearly a quarter of all landings were under the command of Admiral Gorshkov.19 The vast majority of the landings were successful, particularly those launched against Turkey.
The Black Sea Fleet: 1946-85: The confusion and weakness prevalent throughout Europe in the immediate postwar period provided the Soviets with the opportunity to renew efforts to gain control of the Turkish Straits. Since the mid-18th century, the Europeans had thwarted Russian attempts at control. Now, these same powers were recent allies, and they were preoccupied with internal reconstruction and domestic priorities.
Between 1945 and 1947, the Soviets made several territorial demands on Turkey, which included the sovereignty over the east Turkish provinces of Kars and Ardahan and joint control of the Dardanelles. All the demands were rejected by Turkey, which was backed by U. S. and British support. Joint control of the straits would mean eventual Soviet military dominance of the straits and the extension of influence over Turkey. But the Soviets, once more, lacked the naval power to pressure Turkey or counter the gunboat diplomacy of the U. S. naval forces deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean. In addition, the Western nations were reluctant to modify the provisions of the 1936 Montreux Convention, which at least kept a check on Soviet warships entering and exiting the Black Sea.
With at least access to the Mediterranean guaranteed by the Montreux Convention, the Soviets increased efforts to gain a foothold for operations from within the Mediterranean basin proper. Following an arms embargo to Egypt in 1955 by the West, the Suez Crisis in 1956, U. S. intervention in Lebanon in 1958, and the unpopular French War in Algeria in 1955-62, the Soviets made their initial political inroads with arms assistance and aid. Between 1955 and 1964, roughly three billion dollars of Soviet arms assis-
By Vice Admiral Gerald E. Miller, U. S. Navy (Retired)
need your gift,” they answered, “but thank you very much. Appreciate it.”
“Can I send some ice cream for the crew? I’ll lower it by helicopter onto the deck,” I sent back.
“We don’t need ice cream. We have ice cream of our own.”
I would always sign my name to the messages, but I never got one from the Soviets with the name of the admiral or commanding officer. The only way I knew who their admirals were in the Mediterranean was through the Beirut newspapers.
I encouraged all our people to communicate. I would go out to Kithira anchorage near Greece, and the Soviets would be performing logistics operations with the Moskva. I would go in with the flagship and lie to. There, I would spend a whole day, sitting on the bridge with binoculars watching Moskva's logistics problems—their difficulties getting food and supplies aboard. They’d have to rig a crane on the bow. Then a small craft would come alongside, like we used to do in San Pedro in 1937. It was unbelievable what you could find out just by watching their daily activities. I spent a lot of time at this, but I was always polite, congratulating them on their appearance and evolutions.
The Sixth Fleet commanding officers picked up the policy very well. When the first “Krivak” came out, a brand- new Soviet destroyer, I had a ship join up with her to take pictures, follow her, see what she could do. The commanding officer, in the spirit of things, sent a message to the captain of the “Krivak,” saying, “She’s a beautiful ship. Is she for sale?” He never got a response.
Another time, one of our destroyers was following a Soviet cruiser coming out of the Aegean, headed for Alexandria. He had been following for a couple of days when one morning, as the sun came up, the Soviet commander sent a message saying, “Glad to see you’re still there taking care of me.”
This was right after J. Edgar Hoover died, and we lowered our flags to halfmast. The Soviet captain sent a second message, “I note your flag’s at half mast. What’s the occasion?”
Our commanding officer replied, “Good morning. Glad to be with you. The head of our FBI, J. Edgar Hoover, just died, and we’ve been directed to fly the flag at half-mast for a couple of days.”
The Soviet captain came back with the message that he appreciated the information very much and added, “Relative to Mr. Hoover, you have our sympathies, although he never had any for us.”
There was a kind of underlying camaraderie between our navies. We might have made more of it. I addressed official messages to the Navy Department and up the line asking for permission to have either formal or informal exchanges at sea. I wanted to meet with the Russian admiral on television or privately, informally or with all the ceremony, or perhaps have a joint port visit. The replies were always polite but negative.
Once, we sailed with several NATO nations through the Aegean to the Greek-Turkish Thrace area for a joint operation. With all our flags flying, we passed the Soviet admiral in his flagship, a cruiser or tender, and he had a couple of his ships nearby. They were going to watch everything we did, trailing us. The Soviet admiral watched us going by, all the flags, and you can imagine what he was thinking. So I sent him a message, “We’re on our way to a joint NATO amphibious operation in the Greek-Turkish Thrace area. I’ll be happy to tell you anything about what we’re doing. As a matter of fact, would you like a role in this exercise?”
He replied, “Thank you very much, but we have our own plans.”
The above narrative is an edited excerpt from a Naval Institute oral history interview of Vice Admiral Miller conducted 7 July 1976 by Dr. John T. Mason, Jr. In order to obtain a catalog listing the more than 130 bound volumes of oral histories in the Institute’s collection, please send $2.00 to Director of Oral History, U. S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland 21402.
tance were extended to Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, and Somalia. The three Mediterranean countries, Egypt, Syria, and Algeria, accounted for more than 80% of the Soviet Navy’s operational port visits between 1967 and 1976. “These countries also provided the most extensive facilities to the Fifth Eskadra during the period.”20 The Soviets cleverly targeted for aid those countries that could soon thereafter provide them with essential port facilities which would enable Soviet warships to be permanently deployed in the Med in the 1960s.
The first continuous postwar deployment of the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet began in 1958 with a handful of “Whiskey’’-class submarines, home-ported at Valona Bay, Albania. Following a two-year hiatus after its expulsion from Albania in 1961, the Soviet fleet again began to grow; more than 90% of the Soviet warships that deployed, did so from the Black Sea.
Before the outbreak of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War in June, approximately 20 Soviet warships were deployed in the Mediterranean. By July, more than 46 ships, including amphibious units, and 12 submarines, had arrived on the scene. During the Jordanian crisis in September 1970, the Soviets massed more than 20 surface combatants and 14 submarines, along with the requisite support ships, in the Eastern Mediterranean. Finally, at the peak of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Fifth Eskadra contingent totaled about 96 ships; 34 were surface combatants and 23 were submarines. Clearly, the Soviets’ ability to surge deploy an impressive number and array of ships in response to crises in the East Mediterranean had surpassed the U. S. Sixth Fleet.
The Soviet Mediterranean Fleet has rivaled the Sixth Fleet since 1970. The number of Soviet ships in the Med fluctuates between 40 and 60. They operate almost exclusively in the East Mediterranean, taking advantage of shallow anchorages located near strategic choke points. The significance of these anchorages was made evident in Soviet President Nikolai Tikhonov’s February 1983 visit to Athens. Greece has been investigating the possibility of extending its territorial waters from six to 12 miles, which would place the Soviet anchorage at Kithera in Greek waters. It can hardly be coincidence that Tikhonov wooed Greek Prime Minister Papandreou with a ten-year economic cooperation agreement to include construction of a natural gas pipeline, expanded trade, and promise of a 600,000-ton alumina plant in northern Greece.21
Comparison of two statements made 20 years apart reflects the dramatic change in the Soviet view of naval power in the Mediterranean. In 1948, Stalin, commenting about Yugoslavia’s assistance to the communists in the Greek civil war, stated:
“The uprising in Greece has to fold up. . . . What do you think, that Great Britain and the United States— the United States, the most powerful state in the world— will permit you [Yugoslavia] to break their lines of communication in the Mediterranean Sea! Nonsense. And we have no navy. The uprising in Greece must be stopped, and as quickly as possible.”22
Twenty years later, Admiral N. I. Smirnov, First Dep
uty Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy, stated:
“Until the Soviet ships appeared the American Sixth Fleet constituted the only balance of forces. . . . Already the very presence of the Soviet ships in the Mediterranean does not allow the American Sixth Fleet to carry out the aggressive ideas of the Pentagon with impunity. They cannot throw their weight around so unceremoniously as before. The presence of our ships serves as a definite guarantee of peace and security in that area.”23
Since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the Fifth Eskadra has demonstrated to the world, especially the pro-Moscow Arabs and North Africans, that the United States is no longer the sole proprietor of the Mediterranean Sea. The prospect of a serious confrontation with the Soviet Union has undermined America’s ability to influence events where the Soviets perceive they too have an interest.
When the Shooting Starts: In light of the changes in weapons technology and naval orders of battle during the past 30 years, what does the combination of Gorshkov’s writings, Soviet deployment patterns, and the Black Sea Fleet’s force structure reveal about potential employment and missions in a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict? Admiral Gorshkov makes the fundamental security requirement obvious: defense of the southwest approaches to the Soviet Union. Historically, this has been accomplished by employing the Black Sea Fleet close to Soviet (Russian) shores and in the four basic missions identified previously. These missions, along with the anticarrier warfare (ACW) mission, remain valid. There has been little effort to conduct offensive, hunter-killer-type operations far into the Mediterranean. Gorshkov reveals no inclination to do so either in his articles or in his book, Sea Power of the State (Pergamon Press, Inc., 1979).
Until World War II, the Soviet defense perimeter extended from the Black Sea to the mouth of the Dardanelles. Today, with a somewhat larger fleet and the support of Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA), the perimeter stretches out to include the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean south of Turkey and Crete. The Black Sea Fleet’s order of battle is not large enough to project naval power throughout the Med in a shooting war. With the western entrance to the Med controlled by NATO, the Soviets cannot expect to reinforce the Fifth Eskadra except from the Black Sea. Of the estimated 84 surface combatants assigned to the Black Sea Fleet, less than 60 can be expected to be fully operational at the onset of hostilities. Roughly one-third will be surface-to-surface missile capable. Likewise, a maximum of 16 diesel submarines will be fully mission capable.
Based on these assumptions and Gorshkov’s historical missions, a framework for the employment of the Black Sea Fleet can be projected.
Anti-SLOC Operations: The lifeline between the Suez Canal and southern Europe carries vital resources, oil in particular, to the NATO countries. The Soviets will undoubtedly attempt to shut down this SLOC while keeping Suez open for possible interfleet transfers. The Soviets do
not need to close or physically control the canal itself if anti-SLOC operations can bottleneck exiting traffic at Port Said and force NATO shipping around Africa.
Anti-SLOC operations can be conducted by Soviet Naval Aviation, surface forces, and/or a small diesel submarine contingent, depending on the scenario. If the Soviets can deny NATO large-scale access to the East Mediterranean, a small Kiev-based battle group and a handful of diesel submarines could conduct the anti-SLOC operations. The possibility of short-term SNA basing in Syria and, more probably, Libya obviates the problems of overflight rights and in-flight refueling, which would plague such operations if they originated in the Soviet Union.
If the Soviets could not deny maritime access to the Sixth Fleet, anti-SLOC operations could be conducted by the diesel submarines alone, operating between Crete and Libya. This would free most, if not all, of the Soviet’s nuclear submarines already deployed in the Med for ACW operations.
Blockade!Control of the Turkish Straits and Amphibious Operations: The Soviets’ requirement to control the Turkish Straits in time of war in the 1980s mirrors the same requirement of the 18th and 19th centuries. They seek to Prevent the entrance of hostile forces into the Black Sea; simultaneously, they must guarantee Soviet transits to facilitate rearming, resupply, and repair of the forces deployed in the Mediterranean.
Controlling the straits has three distinct aspects, each requiring different forces:
^ Blockade of the Dardanelles can be accomplished by a small surface combatant force composed of a mix of missile-capable destroyers and frigates. Under the shadow of SNA patrols, this force should prove sufficient to oppose most NATO, especially Greek/Turkish, efforts to mine the Dardanelles or attempts at forced entry.
^ Frigates, missile corvettes, and gunboats can patrol the Sea of Marmara to eliminate shore-based threats against transiting Soviet vessels.
^ Control of the Bosporus presents the greatest problem. The extremely narrow portion of the straits passing through Istanbul provides NATO with the perfect base from which to conduct covert operations against transit- ting Soviet warships. Waterborne patrols would be insufficient to protect these ships because movement within the city would go undetected.
The Soviets must not only control the waterway around Istanbul but also the landmass bordering the Bosporus. Here, the small naval infantry units can play a decisive role. In conjunction with airborne forces, naval infantry could land 5,000 to 10,000 troops in a short period around the Bosporus. Assisted by short-range fighter aircraft, possibly based in Bulgaria, these forces would complete the security chain running from the mouth of the Dardanelles to the exit of the Bosporus into the Black Sea. With more than 100 mine countermeasure ships assigned to the Black Sea Fleet, sufficient assets should be readily available to ensure adequate mine countermeasure operations.
Diversionary Operations: The Black Sea Fleet and its naval infantry component are not large enough to conduct effective second-front operations in the Soviet Union’s southwest sector. Should a conflict focus on NATO’s center sector, the Soviets will wish to divert as much manpower and armor as possible to that area, rather than to subordinate fronts such as Turkey and Greece. A land battle against the Greek and Turkish armies would reduce available reserves dramatically. Therefore, minimal effort will initially be directed toward ground and naval operations against Greece and Turkey.
Instead, the Soviets will attempt to neutralize these countries with threats of nuclear reprisal if either decides to participate in NATO defense. Considering Greece’s lukewarm support of NATO, this threat may well prove credible. Turkey, although historically a staunch NATO supporter, may opt for sanctuary over possible nuclear detonations on its territory. The Soviets would have to divert only a very small portion of SS-20 and bomber as-
sets to generate a credible threat.
Anti-Carrier Operations: The legacy of carrier-based nuclear-capable air power worries Soviet politicians and military planners alike. Vice Admiral K. Stalbo credits the U. S. Atlantic Fleet with more than 80% of NATO’s strategic weapons. According to Stalbo, “. . . it is a well- known fact that their range [carrier-launched aircraft] makes it possible to reach the most important targets on Soviet territory.”24 The Mediterranean provides NATO with “a southern springboard for delivering strikes at socialist countries.”25
This capability makes the U. S. carriers the prime targets for Soviet naval and air forces and ACW the highest priority mission if the carriers attempt to penetrate the Soviet’s defense perimeter in the East Mediterranean. Without the cover of tactical air, Soviet surface forces cannot hope to confront two or three carrier task forces west of Crete. Soviet nuclear attack submarines can be expected to be the primary Soviet ACW asset.
The best prospects for successful ACW operations are in the area east of Malta, where the carriers are still outside effective striking range. Because of high ambient noise, thermal anomalies, depth, and irregular bottom topography, the Ionian basin is an extremely difficult area for U. S. forces to conduct ASW, especially passive operations. Conversely, the waters are ideal for covert submarine operations. Soviet nuclear submarines provided with satellite reconnaissance data can transit at great depths and high speeds, conducting “pop-up” ACW attacks. The “Charlie”- and “Alfa”-class submarines are particularly well-suited for these types of operations.
Should these operations prove unsuccessful, Soviet surface combatants with long-range SNA will conduct attacks from the waters around Crete. Alternatively, a Soviet nuclear submarine may attempt to trail the carrier across the Ionian and provide the surface combatants with real-time position data. Then, the Soviets could conduct a combined surface-subsurface attack when the carrier approaches to within maximum weapons range of the surface combatant’s surface-to-surface missiles. This is a tenuous operation since the Soviet submarines would be risking prolonged detection by U. S. direct support Los Angeles-class submarines.
In spite of claims to the contrary by both sides, the Soviet naval forces in the Black and Mediterranean seas do not pose an overwhelming threat to NATO security and the U. S. Sixth fleet during a war. Multiple carrier operations and the installation of Tomahawk missiles throughout the U. S. fleet present the Soviet naval planner with problems of targeting and defense.
Admiral Gorshkov’s writings, the Black Sea order of battle, and deployment patterns in the Med indicate the Soviet fleet will conduct “defensive” maritime operations close to home. The potential of Suez-to-southern Europe SLOC interdiction is perhaps the most serious and underestimated threat of the Black Sea Fleet. If these operations are conducted primarily by submarines, NATO can employ a number of counterinterdiction measures at relatively low cost. Turkey can potentially “cooperate” with
Soviet actions against the Turkish Straits, but this is unlikely as long as a credible NATO nuclear guarantee is in force. However, the same cannot be said with such certainty about Greece. Finally, the wartime contribution of Soviet non-Warsaw Pact allies such as Libya, Syria, and Ethiopia should not be dismissed lightly. Soviet use of airfields in these countries would dramatically alter the potential for SNA participation in any East Mediterranean confrontation.
The tendency to perceive the Soviets as “ten-foot tall” sailors is not substantiated by facts, at least in the Mediterranean. This is not to deny a formidable Soviet naval threat exists in the Med. However, it is all too easy to translate observations of a peacetime force into wartime capabilities without reflecting upon the numerous additional requirements a shooting war imposes. Admiral Gorshkov himself has apparently imposed achievable goals and missions upon the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron and Black Sea Fleet. NATO must develop strategies and capabilities to defeat the most likely Soviet missions as expressed by their writings, deployments, and force structure. Mirror imaging and employing Western logic could result in a dangerously inadequate and naive maritime strategy on NATO’s southern flank.
‘Sergei Gorshkov, “Russia’s Road to the Sea, Peter I to Napoleon,” Red Star Rising At Sea, ed. Herbert Preston (Annapolis, MD: U. S. Naval Institute, 1974), p. 14. Hereafter referred to as Gorshkov series.
2Ibid, p. 20.
3Ibid, p. 18.
4Ibid, p. 19.
5Ibid.
6Ibid.
7Gorshkov series, “The Post-Napoleonic Period to the Russo-Japanese War,’’ p.
- See also Gorshkov series, “Navies in War and in Peace.”
8Ibid.
9Gorshkov series, “Russia’s Road to the Sea,” p. 13.
l0Gorshkov series, “The Post-Napoleonic Period to the Russo-Japanese War,” p.
29.
"Ibid.
l2Gorshkov series, “The First World War,” p. 41. l3Ibid, p. 46.
14Ibid, p. 47.
l5Gorshkov series, “The Soviet Navy Rebuilds, 1928-41,” p. 72.
,6Gorshkov series, “Admiral Gorshkov: Architect of the Soviet Navy,” p. 143. 17Gorshkov series, “The Soviet Navy in the Great Patriotic War,” p. 94.
I8Ibid, p. 91.
l9Emest F. Hollings, National Ocean Policy Study: Soviet Oceans Development (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 61.
20Richard Remmek, “The Politics of Soviet Access to Naval Support Facilities in the Mediterranean,” Soviet Naval Diplomacy, eds. Bradford Dismukes and James McConnell (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), pp. 357-358.
21 “Soviet Seapower in the Mediterranean: Up Anchor?” Christian Science Monitor, 31 March 1983, p. 12.
22Milovan Djiles, Conversations With Stalin (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962), p. 181.
23Gary Sick, “Russia and the West in the Mediterranean,” Naval War College Review, June 1970, p. 61.
24K. Stalbo, “The U. S. Naval Presence and Defending the Interests of the USSR,” Morskoy Sbornik, no. 1, 1980, p. 74.
25V. Yefremov, “For Peace and Security in the Mediterranean,” Soviet Military Review, June 1982, p. 45.
Lieutenant Maiorano graduated from Wake Forest University in 1977. He was damage control assistant in the USS Dewey (DDG-45) and ASW officer and nuclear weapons officer in the USS Nicholson (DD-982). He is currently a masters degree candidate at the Naval Postgraduate School in the national security affairs curricula. His article “A Fresh Look at the Sixth Fleet” was published in the February 1984 Proceedings.