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his little Indian girl and the Guatemalan Qdults with her are not likely to ever forget ihe dungaree-clad doctor from the U. S.
"avy who helped her. U. S. assistance to the Caribbean region improves the socioeco- n°mic conditions of the region and improves U. S. image there.
The underdeveloped nations of the Central America- Caribbean Basin region are faced with varying j degrees of poverty, illiteracy, hunger, ill health, *ation, political corruption, and economic backward- ,ess- Most of the people in the region are living near the are subsistence level, with sanitation and public health acilities practically nonexistent.
. ^egional instability has resulted from decades of repres- rJ°n by corrupt military and landowning elites. These ^'gjit-wing oligarchs and the minority “democratic” cen- ahsts have historically been unresponsive to the needs of e general population. Consequently, the people have r°gressively turned toward Marxist-oriented, radical re- ®"?es that offer them hope of improving their futures, traditionally, U. S. response has been to provide mili- aid and economic assistance to the established pro- I Intern regimes in the hopes of averting the emergence of b i'Wing governments. This type of response has often . een described by foreign policy critics as “flexing Amer- £Can might and expanding local armies while giving just Hough economic aid to keep the region afloat.”1 They a'm that a new policy that emphasizes political and economic reform, rather than militarism, will better contrib- e to long-term internal stability and encourage a greater CePtivity to U. S. presence in the region.
One course of action in this direction is a long-range Jjjj multifaceted program of economic assistance. Former yief of Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas Moorer, Navy (Retired), stated the following in a 1984 re- 8l°nal study report:
U. S. policy needs for the 1980’s require a highly discriminating approach that is capable of responding
to a mix of socioeconomic and political-military problems .... A broad based, comprehensive, and ongoing policy must initially be aimed at promoting economic progress and social stability in the Caribbean area.”
“The U. S. naval presence in the region, which the United States long neglected, should continue to bolster other efforts to maintain regional stability. When all missions are combined, they can present a dramatic symbol of U. S. commitment to the Caribbean Basin’s peace and security.”2
In establishing the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, President Ronald Reagan sought advice on determining appropriate elements of long-range policy that would best respond to the socioeconomic needs of the region, and to both internal and external threats to its security and stability.3 The resulting “Kissinger Report on Central America” emphasized that the United States can play an important role in supporting Central American efforts to achieve adequate and comprehensive health care and “human development.” The immediate priorities of such an effort are the eradication of malnutrition, the provision of primary health care, the prevention of disease, and the improvement of sanitation facilities.
The report further proposes:
“The United States government and other donors have already expended considerable resources to promote the development and expansion of health resources in Central America. ... We endorse this approach and urge its expansion. . . . The Commission believes that effective relief efforts which would assist these people would not only serve a humanitarian purpose, but would have a positive effect on the political, social and economic future of the countries involved.”4
Two days after the publication of the “Kissinger Report,” Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger dispatched a memorandum to the service secretaries, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other key DoD officials. He wrote, “Legislative constraints, inadequate budgetary authority, and organizational impediments tend to limit severely or delay what the Defense Department can contribute.”5 The Secretary directed the establish-
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Unfortunately, however, the civic action programs of the 1960s could not, by themselves, bring about long-ten11 solutions to the problems which fomented insurgency- Social and political reforms were also needed to correct the structural inequities that were at the root of poverty and economic stagnation within these regions. The United States can leam from its experiences oif the 1960s, the most important lesson being the realization of what humanitarian assistance and civic action can, and cannot-
ment of a DoD task force on humanitarian assistance. This task force was instructed to address means of allowing greater DoD participation in civic action programs, including required changes to government regulations and restrictions, funding and budgetary considerations, and determination of existing capabilities.
General Paul Gorman, Commander, U. S. Southern Command, voiced these same concerns in April 1984, while lecturing at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. According to the general:
“We don’t have much capability in this area. To the extent that we do, we have good results. Our best assets we have in this area [are the U. S. Navy’s] Project Handclasp and a Navy reserve outfit from Florida. . . . Handclasp was able to come up with crucially needed medical supplies to enable us to innoculate every child in Honduras. This is the only officially sanctioned and supportive program of its nature in the Armed Forces.
. . . Humanitarian assistance in this very impoverished area of the world is . . . morally essential.”6
The U. S. Navy and Marine Corps has the capability to actively participate in humanitarian assistance and civic action programs. Navy and Marine efforts would involve all echelons of the chain of command, as well as specific fleet assets, while carrying out low-cost, immediate-impact social and economic development projects in the Central American-Caribbean Basin region.
Humanitarian Assistance and Civic Action Programs: Military humanitarian assistance and civic action can generally be defined as the use of military forces on projects useful to the local population in such areas as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, emergency food and clothing assistance, medical assistance, and health sanitation. These efforts contribute to economic and social development, while simultaneously serving to improve the relationship between those military forces and the population.
Military humanitarian assistance and civic action are not new ideas. In the early 1960s, the U. S. Government employed them to counter the influence of left-wing insurgents in the Third World. Use of military civic action in this mode was a new phenomenon, particularly emphasized in Southeast Asia and Latin America, and it achieved only uncertain and mixed results. It was believed that civic action programs would facilitate the development process and demonstrate to disaffected populations that both the United States and the host country government were concerned with their problems; the appeal of left-wing insurgencies would correspondingly decline.
When U. S. Coast Guard lieutenants hand out toys to Panamanian children, and U. S. SeaBees, Marines, and Navy- men build bridges over jungle rivers, who benefits? The receiving populations, of course. But so, too, does the United States benefit diplomatically and the servicemen morally.
accomplish.
To maximize and promote U. S. image overseas, humanitarian assistance and civic action programs must pr°" ject a cooperative image between U. S. naval forces and the host govemment/local community inhabitants. The programs should clearly dispel the perception of a free- one-time handout. Participating elements should project a working-level, low profile, instead of a public affu'[s show. The effort should strive to create a spirit of participation and self-help among the local population, a spit'd that can be a basis for continuing social and economic progress once U. S. Navy and Marine Corps participant have departed; this would create a sense of local pride and accomplishment and provide the basis for responsible
|n-country, direct participation by U. S. naval person- e‘ will accomplish two primary objectives of the humani- .^lan assistance and civic action process. First, it will “kntify the U. S. Government with the country concerned a the local community level and emphasize U. S. interest 'n the welfare of the people. Second, this level of particiPation would overcome one of the frequent criticisms of e hJ. S. economic assistance program; that is, the local Population often does not feel the effect of aid directly and Us seldom realizes the magnitude of U. S. contributions 0 the nation’s welfare. Above all, it would ensure that j*ervices and supplies reach the intended recipients and are .?t ^directed by corrupt government officials or become aek market commodities.
j ^ Perhaps equal importance, U. S. Navy involvement /t humanitarian assistance and civic action programs °uld also provide valuable training opportunities for par- ^'Pating personnel, including construction battalions eaBees), U. S. Marine Corps engineers, and medical and dental teams, both regular and reserve. These types of Hits often have difficulty obtaining realistic training op- phunities within the United States because of budgetary 'Citations and conflicts with the competing civilian conation industry and medical/dental facilities. Conse- t)Uendy, the construction units have had to confine their activities to limited on-base construction and maintenance Pr°jects, often of limited training value. The medical/den- a Personnel have been exposed only to practice under 1(leal conditions.
. addition, overseas projects would provide an excel- ent opportunity to refine forward deployment and embar- at'on planning and to test U. S. forces’ ability to live, °Perate, and maintain equipment under adverse tropical Editions in remote areas. Embarkation, movement, and SuPport of these forces could simultaneously provide realistic training for participating fleet units. Finally, civic action projects would allow the U. S. Navy to maintain a low-cost, active military presence in the region while ostensibly carrying out a humanitarian, nonmilitary mission— shifting the emphasis from gunboats to diplomacy.
Project Handclasp: The heart of the U. S. Navy’s humanitarian assistance program today is Project Handclasp. In fact, it is the Navy’s only official source of humanitarian material for overseas shore-based and ship-sponsored people-to-people programs worldwide. As a low-level, basically unfunded operation, Project Handclasp accepts voluntary material donations from U. S. citizens and private and public organizations. This material comprises three general categories: (1) humanitarian assistance items such as food, clothing, and medical supplies and equipment; (2) educational items such as school and library books, school supplies, and training aids; and (3) goodwill items such as toys, playground equipment, and sports gear.
These materials are sorted, inspected, and packaged, then provided to deploying ships for direct distribution by volunteer crewmembers to needy individuals or organizations during overseas port visits, usually in conjunction with other planned community assistance activities. Materials are also distributed to major overseas shore-based commands by U. S. service personnel in conjunction with ongoing community relations programs.
Direct distribution of materials by Navy personnel to recipients is an important aspect of the program; not only are the people most in need assured of receiving the material, but the servicemen involved in the distribution gain a keen insight into, and a greater appreciation for, the problems and life-styles of people of different cultures. Such activity has had a significant positive impact on the morale
of participating U. S. Navy personnel.
Project Handclasp has provided support to U. S. Navy and joint-service humanitarian assistance activities in Asia, Africa, Central and South America, the Caribbean Basin, and the Indian Ocean in coordination with various military commanders. During 1983, 60 ships carried and distributed Project Handclasp material to at least 50 countries and islands worldwide.
A typical example of a highly successful Project Handclasp humanitarian assistance program is the support provided to Commander in Chief, South and Commander, Joint Task Force-11 during joint, combined Exercise Ahuas Tara II in Central America during November 1983. (Ahuas Tara means “Big Pine” in the language of the Miskito Indians of Central America.) The CinCSouth civic action effort called for the support of Honduran National Vaccination Week, 7-12 November, sponsored by the Honduran Ministry of Health. This project was nationwide and was directed at immunization of all Honduran children at every level of society. Particular emphasis was placed on supporting previously unreachable remote locations. The U. S. Navy’s Project Handclasp office was approached regarding the requirement for vitally needed medical and vaccination supplies. These were obtained through donations from various corporate donors, and with the use of space-available airlift, 45,000 pounds of essential supplies were shipped from Naval Air Station North Island to their eventual destination.
Although proven highly successful in recent years, Project Handclasp has not been used to its full potential, nor is it properly and fully supported within the U. S. Navy and Marine Corps. In fact, the East Coast Project Handclasp office in Norfolk, Virginia, has closed because of lack of command emphasis on and support of the program. The West Coast office, on the other hand, has not only sustained operations, but has achieved extraordinary
success, primarily as a result of the dedication, tenacity- and dynamic management of its director, who has been extended in the billet during recent years.
Proposal for Increased U. S. Navy-Marine Corps Par' ticipation: The Central America-Caribbean Basin region >s a prime area for the United States to reap benefits associated with humanitarian assistance and civic action projects. At the same time, heightened U. S. concern and strategic interest in the area requires added U. S. Navy presence. In the future, the frequency of carrier battle group and amphibious task group exercises off Central America will most likely increase. In addition, the regi°n may draw more fleet presence through special operational requirements, type training exercises, and scheduled por* visits. This increased presence will provide greater opp°r' tunities to engage in humanitarian assistance and civic action projects.
Between deployments, fleet units are engaged in a fairly structured maintenance and training schedule in preparation for the next deployment. Toward the end of this cycle, the units will participate in mid-intensity, squadron-level underway training operations, usually in conjunction with an out-of-area port visit. For example, a San Diego-based amphibious squadron might have a two- to three-week scheduled type training period a few months prior to 3 western Pacific deployment. Squadron ships would conduct intership training en route to various port visits along the west coast of Mexico. This type of training presents 3 unique, low-cost opportunity to conduct assistance pr°j' ects in the Central America-Caribbean Basin region. This is particularly true for amphibious and service force ships, which would not yet have a full deployment load-out- These ships could load significant quantities of Project Handclasp material in San Diego—along with designated civic action teams (construction, medical, etc.) and theh equipment—for eventual off-load during the scheduled port visit.
Amphibious ships are ideal platforms for humanitaria11 assistance and civic action projects because they have the space and accommodations to embark, transport, off-load> and support the other U. S. assets—such as SeaBee units. U. S. Marine Corps engineering groups, and U. S. Navy
Hiedical and dental teams. In addition, such embarkation n support is part of their designed mission. This would simultaneously provide invaluable training to both the par- un't^ating amPbibious ships, as well as the embarked
Amphibious ships are frequently required to engage in exactly this type of operation during forward deployments. For example, as commanding officer of USS Schenectady (LST-1185), I participated in an extensive civic achon project at Dengalan Bay, Republic of the Philip- j/nes> in 1983, which involved the embarkation, move- ent, off-load (by LST beaching), and support of both medical/dental teams and engineering and construction 's- Later, during the same deployment, the Schenec- jQ } similarly transported a U. S. Marine Corps engineer- m§ group from Okinawa to Tinian Island for a three- °mth training and civic action program. h^iJepending on beach suitability, area accessibility, and st government concurrence and cooperation, amphibi- Us ships could also deliver material, personnel, and sup- •0rt e<)uipment over-the-beach in remote regions, via tank ^nding ship (LST) and utility landing craft (LCU) opera- °ns. Such operations could be conducted concurrently m training and exercise objectives.
*ne predeployment exercise or type training period inh exten^e<^ tf afloat units were required to remain he area to support the civic action team or to back-load •J” team and equipment upon completion of the project.
I e ships could also return for back-loading following a Ca* P°rt visit. If the civic action team’s in-country time (, Vered an extended period of several weeks or months, en subsequent training units could be scheduled to con- mi reembarkation at a later date.
0 be most effective, humanitarian assistance and civic tl0n Projects conducted in this manner would be tailored g c°ntribute to the special needs of the local community, fasic Projects such as the construction or improvement of ^eUer roads connected to highways would receive priority cause they will contribute significantly to the develop- went °f the agricultural economy of the region. Priority °uld also be given to the provision of medical and dental re> the provision of potable drinking water, the con- TUetKjn 0f sanitation facilities and drainage systems, and e distribution of food.
Secondary priorities would include the construction, a'ntenance, and remodeling of schools and other civic Jhldings in the community. These efforts could be sup- dented by the delivery and distribution of food, cloths’ goodwill, and medical and educational supplies made liable through government-sponsored economic aid <>th^rarns, S. Navy’s Project Handclasp office, and
er voluntary aid organizations. n short, the U. S. Navy and Marine Corps has an op. ^unity to greatly expand its humanitarian assistance and ^ v'c action programs within the Central America-Carib- Qean Basin region by thinking in terms of full-ship load- nUts: by employing SeaBees, U. S. Marine Corps engirding groups, and U. S. Navy medical and dental teams, . by coordinating humanitarian assistance and civic Ctl°n efforts with scheduled type training and exercise
plans. Such efforts would significantly increase U. S. participation in these programs at minimal cost, while simultaneously maximizing training opportunities.
Requests for this type of humanitarian assistance should originate within the foreign country concerned and must have the support and concurrence of the local U. S. embassy, U. S. military commander, and the host government. The project should necessarily be closely coordinated with the local U. S. military assistance advisory group, mission or military representative, and local civilian community officials. For projects requiring materials that fall outside the established scope (i.e., humanitarian, educational, and goodwill materials) of Project Handclasp, the appropriate unified commander should coordinate humanitarian assistance and civic action programs with other U. S. Navy and Marine Corps organizations, the State Department, DoD, and other agencies.
Depending on the nature and magnitude of the project, it might be advisable for an advance party from the participating units to visit the local area and to participate in the local planning effort well in advance of actual deployment. In the case of LST or LCU over-the-beach off-load operations, an advance beach survey team should survey and report on beach conditions at the desired landing site. In this way, supporting elements and materials can be effectively programmed, and the best size and type of equipment needed for the project could be predetermined. The training value of even this advance planning function is obvious.
Problems and Opposition: In spite of the advantages that can be derived from effective humanitarian assistance and civic action programs, such efforts are not without their critics. Some senior military officers and government officials harbor an inherent reluctance to engage in projects that are not directly linked to the U. S. Navy’s and Marine Corp’s primary missions. The biggest problem the military services currently face in conducting civic action projects in Central America is congressional opposition arising from three basic issues.
First, some legislators claim such activities are in conflict with regulatory statutes, such as U. S. Code Title 10: Armed Forces and Title 22: Foreign Relations and Intercourse. These codes place specific regulatory restrictions on the use of military forces, U. S. assets, and funds for nonappropriated activities. These legislators are also concerned that engagement in such activities could lead to proposed increases in the defense budget.
Second, certain congressional committees believe that the sponsorship and control of humanitarian assistance and civic action aid in this region are within their special purview, not that of the military. Third, there is significant political opposition to a U. S. policy of involvement, in any form, in Central America and the Caribbean Basin.
Opposition is also voiced from the private sector. Many complain that the military transportation of aid material and equipment is competing with a depressed U. S. maritime industry, which could otherwise transport the aid cargo into the region. Civic action projects may also generate complaints within the host country that such activity
is interfering with the operation of private industry.
Although humanitarian assistance and civic action projects could be accomplished at minimal cost, some additional funding would be required. Special legislative action would be needed to enable the military forces to use exercise and operations and maintenance funds, or to separately allocate funds for these types of projects.
While fleet units are engaged in humanitarian assistance and civic action projects, with aid personnel, material, and equipment embarked, their readiness for immediate forward deployment in case of national emergency may be significantly reduced.
Finally, U. S. Navy and Marine Corps humanitarian assistance and civic action programs are not as widely promoted nor used as they could be with existing assets and facilities. With the exception of the Project Handclasp office in San Diego operating under the sponsorship of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Op-61), there is no other functional office, staff component, or agency within the Navy Department with primary responsibility for the development, implementation, and execution of humanitarian assistance and civic action programs. Improved participation in these programs will undoubtedly require a greater personal commitment and involvement— such as policy, organizational, and scheduling initiatives— by higher authority.
Despite some inherent problems and opposition, U. S. Navy and Marine Corps participation in humanitarian assistance and civic action programs in the Central America- Caribbean Basin region holds great promise. At a time when more and more people are advocating socioeconomic aid and assistance rather than militarism, humanitarian assistance demonstrates that U. S. Navy and Marine Corps presence can simultaneously promote national development and goodwill. Once committed to the region, the United States must be prepared to sustain the program to realize the long-term benefits.
The U. S. Navy and the Marine Corps have the personnel, equipment, material, and opportunity necessary to support a meaningful humanitarian assistance and civic action program in the Central America-Caribbean Basin region. As exemplified by the Honduran Innoculation Program, the Navy’s and the Corp’s active participation in such activity can significantly contribute to regional development and, at the same time, improve long-term stability and favorable U. S. relations. These efforts can deter subversive aggression by helping to provide improved social and economic conditions within the local population.
In view of the potential of such programs for meeting the political objectives of the 1983 Caribbean Basin Initiative, the U. S. Navy and Marine Corps should review current authority for military involvement in humanitarian activities and civic action programs. The Navy and Marine Corps should also examine the status of such programs and ensure that available resources are getting the maximum use possible. Additional support could be obtained if other U. S. economic aid and assistance programs were permitted to fund U. S. Navy and Marine Corps humanitarian assistance and civic action projects.
In addition, congressional committee support, regulatory changes, and special authorization could be sought to facilitate a wider range of activities. Legislative and budgetary strategy should be developed for required program authorization and appropriated funding, in particular, special exclusionary provisions, clauses, and modifications to the U. S. Code. Currently, there are legislative restrictions on the use of appropriated funds. For example, using appropriated funds for nonappropriated activities is prohibited. Current statutes regulating security assistance also prohibit funding of programs which fall into the category of “strictly” civic action, though not those which have civic action “side effects.”
Finally, liaison, coordination, and mutual suppoft should be sought with a wide range of other military activities, government agencies, and civilian organizations (such as Navy and Marine Corps Reserve and Nation^ Guard units, the Agency for International Development- American Red Cross, Military Airlift Command, etc.)in implementing an expanded humanitarian assistance and civic action program. In transporting supplies and materials, the space-available concept can be extended to other DoD transportation resources, such as Military Airlift Command, Military Sealift Command, and government- chartered vessels. Too, the Navy and the Corps could seek cooperation from U. S. commercial steamship companies- However, there could be some reaction from domestic and international commercial carriers if the movement of humanitarian cargo and economic aid material is shipped v'a DoD transportation assets.
Greater U. S. Navy and Marine Corps involvement i** humanitarian assistance and civic action programs within* the Central America-Caribbean Basin region would greatly enhance U. S. policy objectives by promoting it**' provements of socioeconomic conditions in the regiof- improving the U. S. image abroad, and providing valuable training opportunities for participating forces.
James Le Mayne, “Reform Instead of Arms,” New York Times, 15 April 1984' Thomas H. Moorer and Georges A. Fouriol, Caribbean Basin Security, The Washington Papers/104, vol. XI (New York: Praeger, 1984), pp. ix, 87, and 88' 3Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America ’, report cove* letter, 10 January 1984, p. 1.
4Ibid., p. 68-83. Recent media reports on the Christian Broadcasting Network's (CBN) donation of humanitarian materials in Honduras over the past 10 month5 tend to show that the term . . . uninvolved in political issues ...” may be opel1 to debate, at the whim of any congressman or media representative with their o^11 ax to grind.
’Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “DoD Task Force °n Humanitarian Issues,” 12 January 1984, p. 1.
Interview with General Paul Gorman, Commander, U. S. Southern Command. the Naval War College, Newport, RI, on 3 April 1984.
After graduating from the California Maritime Academy in 1963, tain Athanson served in the USS Ashland (LSD-1), USS Morton (Dp" 948), USS Cogswell (DD-651), USS Paul Revere (LPA-248), USS Frederick (LST-1184), and as commanding officer of the USS Schenk tady (LST-1185). His staff duty has included tours as Officer-in-Char?6, Team 12, Beach Jumper Unit One; as Material Officer to Commands*- Destroyer Squadron 23; and on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operation* (Op-63). He has a BA and MA in international relations from the Navil Postgraduate School and Salve Regina College, respectively, and is cn* rently a student at the Naval War College. Captain Athanson’s next as signment is ACOS for Operations, Plans and Readiness to Commande*- Amphibious Group Three.