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The alliance between Japan and the United States is as close today as their destroyer Shirane and our command ship Blue Ridge were in this recent photograph. But, if we were to wake up one morning to find that Japan had become determinedly neutral—or that the Philippines had fallen into unfriendly hands, or that China and the Soviet Union had buried the hatchet—the successful implementation of our current Pacific strategy would become very difficult.
Admirals (and generals) are often accused of preparing for the last war, the implication being flag officers lack the wit either to recognize change or to adapt to it. As an introduction (and to dispel that canard), it may be useful to recap the principal changes in the global strategic environment during the past several decades. ► The Soviets have attained nuclear parity with the United States. This alteration in the military balance between East and West is of more enduring significance than the onset of the era of U. S. nuclear monopoly. Recently, the United States has begun to pursue development of a deterrent based on defensive—rather than offensive—weapon systems. A successful transition to strategic defense would be the third change in the superpower military balance. ► Collectivism has evidently failed. Almost four generations after the Russian Revolution, it is clear that communism has failed utterly to redeem its two promises: economic vitality and social justice. Indeed, Marxism- Leninism has spawned some of the world’s least productive economies and most repressive states, rivaled perhaps only by today’s Iran.
► East Asia has become a global region of economic productivity and vigor. We have every reason to believe that littoral Asia will play an increasingly important part in the international marketplace. Whether this economic vitality will later find its reflection in corresponding political influence and military strength remains to be seen.
► Soviet naval power (and Soviet military strength in general) has grown. With this growth, Soviet influence has expanded. The Soviets have increased the size of their Red Banner Pacific Ocean Fleet by more than 50 ships and submarines since 1983. The Soviet Navy is growing also
ln terms of new capabilities and expertise. Their large base at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, signals a new Soviet Pacific Reet modus operandi, which is based on the U. S. model: ^stained forward naval deployments supported from ushore.
^ Monolithic communism has dissolved. The People’s Republic of China has offered itself as an alternative politiCal and economic model of communism and, in so doing, exposed security interests, vis a vis the Soviet Union, that China holds in common with the Free World. The United States and China are in the second decade of attempting to huild a relationship on the basis of these common, but hmited, national security interests.
* There has been a return of national self-confidence in (he United States. For ten years—a decade of ‘ ‘malaise”— Vietnam, Watergate, inflation, and unemployment battered American citizens, sapping our trust in government a°d sharpening social differences. If we were sick then, teost symptoms are gone today; the disease is, however, "ot fully cured. We have not yet returned (and perhaps never will return) to full bipartisan support of national security and foreign policies.
. Finally, there has been a renaissance in strategic think- lng by naval officers, paired with the end to a perilous ■^0-year decline in U. S. naval strength. The nuclear era bought with it the virtually complete civilianization of strategic thought in the United States and an exclusive theoretical focus on nuclear warfare issues. During those same 30 years, attention fixed on the unknowable requirements of nuclear deterrence and on the insatiable requirements of conventional conflict in Europe. The result was that naval forces were seriously neglected; our Navy began vanishing ashore and withdrawing at sea.
The 1980s have brought an end to both these dangerous trends. Today, the Navy’s articulate maritime strategy has reestablished—in Washington and in the fleets—a clear understanding of the vital role naval forces play in crisis management, in deterrence, and, most important, in conflict. Articulation of the strategy has been matched by progress toward putting a 600-ship navy to sea.
As Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, I have two principal concerns. The first is the preservation of deterrence; the most important thing the Pacific Fleet does is to contribute to preventing war. Should deterrence fail, my second concern is the readiness of the fleet to sink the enemy’s navy. These are very near-term objectives: to deter today and, failing that, to win at sea tomorrow.
I do not foresee that such a maritime conflict would be restricted to the Pacific theater, rather it would be global in scope, and quickly involve all four U. S. fleets (and our sister services). I also believe that the conflict would remain nonnuclear for an extended period of time, perhaps throughout. Both superpowers understand well the great costs and grave risks of nuclear war and have developed
JAPANESE MARITIME SELF-DEFENSE FORCE
restraints and controls to prevent an early or accidental resort to nuclear weapons. Parenthetically, I see no strategic advantage to either navy in initiating a nuclear weapons exchange at sea, irrespective of the scenario.
There are a number of strategic factors that would be significant in the event that deterrence should fail and that the Pacific Fleet would find itself at war.
The first factor has less to do with strategy than with politics, bureaucracy, and human nature. How would our government respond to intelligence warnings that conflict was either imminent or increasingly possible? A prompt and vigorous response to unambiguous threatening indicators is what we would hope for and expect. Such a response, including, for example, a quick call-up of selected reserves, might be our best deterrent.
A totally unambiguous early warning, however, is most unlikely. It is only as warning time becomes short that the alert itself becomes clear enough to compel political decisions to be confidently made which would prepare us for the worst. Consider the agonizing dilemma the national command authority would face if such a warning were received. Any president would wish to be absolutely certain in an environment of overwhelming uncertainty. He would wish to act decisively, while recognizing that decisive action might be—or appear to be—provocative and destabilizing. He would be urged by some to take irrevocable actions at a time when his greatest need is for more information and more time.
An early response to warning during the moments of crisis that encompass the transition from vigilant peace to violent war can never be certain. That decision to act is the heaviest burden of presidential leadership. It is, however, an essential precondition to our success at sea, to prevent us from being maldeployed as we steam from crisis management to conflict.
A second strategic factor that would weigh heavily in defining both the naval character of war in the Pacific and its ultimate outcome is the role of Japan, the Philippines, and China.
We assume that in any conflict the Japanese would be active allies. It is, in fact, essential for the successful defense of Japan and for the success of our larger strategy in the Northwest Pacific-—which includes, obviously, the survival of South Korea—that Japan play an active role as an ally in the event of any conflict. It is, nevertheless, possible that a future government in Tokyo would elect to opt out of a war. That choice would eject us from East Asia. Let me add quickly that I have no reason to doubt that Japan would be as faithful an ally in war as in peace.
Next, the United States has a number of essential bases on Luzon in the Philippines. If these bases were not available to us, even if we had substitutes elsewhere, our ability to support our strategy in the Southwestern Pacific and Southeast Asia and to preclude the Soviets from operating their huge installation at Cam Ranh Bay would be sorely limited. Consequently, if political events in the Philippines obstruct our use of those bases, our strategy, our war-fighting posture, our combat sustainability (and not coincidently our deterrent) would be severely affected.
Another important bilateral relationship is the developing (but as yet largely undefined) one between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. We have since early in the 1970s developed a relationship with China that has obviously important salutory strategic implications. A rapprochement between the Chinese and the Soviets would profoundly alter the existing military balance in the Pacific and the world and greatly complicate U. S. unilateral and NATO planning.
These three relationships define the central political- military elements in the Pacific theater. If we were to discover one morning that Japan was determinedly neutral that the Philippines had fallen into unfriendly hands, an that China had again found common cause with the Soviet Union, the successful implementation of our current Pacific strategy would become very difficult. We could then confront a world in which the full weight of U. S. influ' ence is not felt past the mid-Pacific—a dangerous world indeed. Accordingly, the conduct of a wise national policy would have us continue to develop further close and friendly relationships with all three countries.
The Pacific theater includes the Indian Ocean and those Middle Eastern states whose shores are washed by this sea. The Indian Ocean is significant for a number of reasons, the most important of which is that it is the marine highway across which virtually all Middle East oil fl°wS to Europe and Japan.
This region is the global arena least accessible to U. S- military power. Inaccessability is the conundrum Commander in Chief, Central Command, must solve to contribute to deterrence. Naval operations (or any other mih" tary operations) in the area would be difficult to sustain and could only be mounted at substantial expense to more urgent campaigns we must first conduct elsewhere.
Today’s large oil reserves in the world’s Western states mean that we would be, in time of war, much less dependent upon Middle East oil than it might appear from superficial analysis. But should a conventional weapons conflict be prolonged, or if the region was lost permanentlyto Soviet influence, the long-term implications would be grave indeed.
Accordingly, a third strategic factor in any Pacific war is the necessity at some time to be present in the India11 Ocean and in the neighboring Middle East in suffic>ent force to keep our friends free of Soviet military and poll1' cal domination.
The security of the Aleutian Archipelago, which divideS the Bering Sea from the Northern Pacific and the Soviet Union from the United States, is the fourth strategic factor in a Pacific war. The Aleutians lie on one route along which we would expect Soviet bombers and cruise missiles to strike Alaska and penetrate the Northern Pacific to the west coast of our country. .
A firm and successful defense of the Aleutians from a,r or special forces attack is an essential precondition to our military success in the Northern Pacific, and to our conf1' dent defense of the western United States, which migb* otherwise be threatened by Soviet air-launched cruise missile-equipped bombers. In general, the air defense of °ur ashore infrastructure in the Far East concerns me. The Navy’s full-forward press presupposes secure rear areas-
This security is increasingly expensive for our sister services to provide in the face of growing Soviet strike warfare capabilities in the Western Pacific (and in the face of competition with programs more directly related to their own requirements).
Our planning is based upon what we believe the Soviets will do, drawn from our understanding of their capabilities and of their intentions. Naturally, there is some measure of uncertainty in all this. The most important uncertainty resolves itself to a profound question. To support their strategy in Europe against NATO, will the Soviets fight an essentially defensive naval campaign (restricted largely to the Northwest Pacific), or will they conduct offensive naval operations (for example, a submarine warfare campaign in the Eastern Pacific) at the same time they protect sadly, is made substantially easier by the almost overwhelming flow of information on U. S. capabilities and intentions he has. This information is provided to him through: (1) trade in Western markets, (2) the services of the world’s largest and most capable intelligence organizations—the Western news media, and (3) the world’s most visible defense decision-making process.
Closely related both to Soviet strategy and the size of our own force is the issue of whether or not Pacific Fleet forces would swing to the Atlantic to support the battle for Europe and the Mediterranean, or conversely and remarkably, whether favorable events in European naval theaters would permit instead a swing westward. A swing from the Pacific formed the central element of our planning through the 1950s, 1960s, and even into the 1970s. That strategy
their strategic ballistic missile submarine force within ocean bastions?
The significance of the past 15 years of force structure growth of the Soviet Navy is that the Red Banner Pacific Ocean Fleet has (or soon will have) the resources to do both—defend and attack—and its qualitative improvements will make it a tough adversary.
Naturally, the Soviet planner is confronted with some of the same uncertainties that I am, while he attempts to divine what we will do in the event of conflict. His problem,
Europe to our war-fighting and war-termination objec
tives, and on the other hand, the relative insignificance
The “Swing” strategy, wherein Pacific Fleet warships would swing through the Panama Canal, as the Tarawa (LHA-I) does here, to support a threatened Europe dominated our planning for three decades. But, the new Soviet threat to the Pacific should change all that.
reflected, on the one hand, the paramount importance
of
the Soviet Pacific Fleet and air forces in the Far East- Europe today is no less important, but two other things have changed.
First, the Soviet Navy in the Pacific has grown dramatically, and to swing our own fleet east would leave open the vast Pacific basin to Soviet strategic designs. Our Pacific allies are not strong enough to resist alone. Second, the nations of the Pacific littoral have become by every measure much more important, not only as political allies but also as economic partners.
An Atlantic strategy based on augmentation from the Pacific theater is fundamentally flawed. Should augmentation be directed, forward defense in the Pacific would be difficult indeed. The growth of importance of the Pacific as a world market and a world manufacturer and the growth of the Soviet Navy are potent additional arguments for a 600-ship navy, complete with the support required to operate all 600 ships.
Against this backdrop, how capable are we? The Pacific Fleet is more ready today than it has been in decades. Our sailors are brighter and more hardworking. Our equipment is more capable, and its supply support is more complete In short, we are today ready to fight and to win, and because we are, we are better able to deter.
But our military relationship with the Soviet Union is not static, it is dynamic. Consequently, we must move forward merely to remain in place. The Navy’s 198b budget provides for that movement forward, as does our defense program for the ensuing planning years. The Soviet Navy today is by many measures the world’s larges1 and by most measures the world’s second best. Ensuring11 remains second is an urgent matter to me, as well as an important matter for you. The Soviets have outspent us far a number of years, even in an economy of such famous inefficiency as theirs. The vast sums committed to Soviet arms programs—$2.17 trillion in the ten years since 1974, $569 billion more than we have spent in that same period-— find their reflection in great and growing military strength-
Accordingly, the greatest strategic factor in the Pacific is one over which I have no control whatever, and that is the willingness of our fellow citizens to make the sacrifices, to spend the money that national defense truly re' quires in the face of determined competition from Moscow. If we tire of the burdens of leadership—as debate in Congress on the fiscal year 1986 defense budget suggests we might—we condemn ourselves, our friends, and our allies to a future largely shaped by Soviet ambitions.
The United States is wealthy enough to have both guns and butter. We are prosperous enough to have national security and social security. We are productive enough to be both strong and prosperous. We can be both Athens and Sparta. Less certain is whether we are individually and m Congress wise enough to make those hard choices which will preserve us as the land of the free and the home of the brave.
Admiral Foley is the Commander in Chief of the U. S. Pacific Fleet'