Oceania: Once More Into the Breach

It is the 80s, not the 40s; the beach being stormed is in the Philippines, not I wo; and, best of all, it is a peacetime exercise, not a wartime invasion. But will the time come again when we must “close up the wall with our . . . dead?” Answers will vary, but leaders the world over might agree that Oceania is worth fighting, if not dying, for.

A strategic vacuum has developed over a third of the earth’s surface. If the United States and its allies do not move to close the breach, as we did in World War II, the Soviets will, to the Free World’s detri­ment. Oceania falls within the sea areas considered by Secretary of the Navy John Lehman to be “vital.”¹ Presi­dent Ronald Reagan has stated that the Pacific Basin is of primary world importance.²

Third World nations, some in the Pacific Basin, are test­ing their political muscle through the employment of stri­dent rhetoric and diplomacy. For example, Prime Minister Lini of Vanuatu (formerly the New Hebrides) has recog­nized Cuba and supports the Irian Jaya (a province of In­donesia) separatist movement. His true feelings and those of his government are not fully known. U. S. responses or lack of them to such activity in the Pacific is carefully evaluated. The current administration has stated its inten­tion to return the United States to its position as the preem­inent maritime power. To do so, it is essential, indeed crucial, that a cohesive strategy for the vast area of Oceania be developed and implemented.

Oceania could be considered to include all of the Pacific islands, but for strategic purposes we can consider Oceania as running from Kure Island at the extreme north­west end of Hawaii west southwest to Farallon de Pajaros in the commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, then to the islands of Palau 500 miles east of Mindanao in the Philippines. The southern border of Oceania would include the islands of New Guinea, New Caledonia, New Zealand and then northeast to the Pitcairn group and back to the Hawaiian Islands.

Oceania includes the subareas of Polynesia, Melanesia, and Micronesia. Polynesia generally includes the islands in the Pacific east of the 180th meridian. Micronesia in­cludes the islands north of the equator and west of the 180th meridian. Melanesia comprises those islands south of the equator and west of the dateline.

Oceania is an amalgam of 12 nations, one U. S. state, one trust territory under the auspices of the United Nations security council administered by the United States, one Indonesian province, three French overseas territories,

two U. S. territories, one Australian territory, and various islands controlled by the United States, New Zealand, Australia, and Great Britain.

Can America’s apparent lack of strategy for this huge area of the globe continue to go unchallenged? It is largely through a combination of fortuitous events that the area has been left untouched (but not undesired) by Kremlin planners. It seems unlikely that such a situation will be allowed to continue into the 1990s.

The Soviet Navy has become increasingly Pacific ori­ented in the last decade. The Soviet Pacific Fleet, consist­ing of about 125 submarines, 85 major and more than 200 minor combatants, 20 amphibious ships, and more than 70 major auxiliary support ships based at Vladivostok, Petropavlovsk, Nakhoda, and Sovetskaya Gavan, is a major force. Its primary purpose in the Pacific is certainly not to protect Soviet sea lines of communication. In addi­tion, the Soviets can use bases at Cam Ranh Bay in Viet­nam, Kompong Som in Kampuchea, and Wonsan and Najin in North Korea.

This expanded Pacific fleet would seem to have little viable defensive use for an essentially continental power. The situation becomes more ominous, however, when it is realized that the Soviet Union has proposed joint fishing and/or shipping ventures with the Philippines, Fiji, Tuvalu, Kiri Bati, and Solomon Islands and has made overtures con­cerning basing or the use of port facilities to the govern­ments of Western Samoa, Tonga, and the Cook Islands.³

It seems only prudent to consider how long U. S. bases at Subic Bay and Clark in the Philippines will be tenable. (The treaty granting the United States base rights in the Philippines was renegotiated five years ago and runs through 1991.) The stability of the Marcos government and its future beyond the scheduled 1987 elections are uncertain at best. Although there may be sufficient reasons (not the least of which are economic) for the present Phil­ippine Government to desire to continue a U. S. presence, this may not be true in the near future, and it seems even less likely in the long term.

Basing rights in Japan have long been taken for granted by the United States. Although this may be conventional wisdom, one cannot assuredly predict what the Japanese attitude will be into the next decade and beyond.

In the summer of 1984, New Zealand Prime Minister David Lange’s Labour Government announced it would not allow nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed vessels to visit New Zealand ports. For a short while, Australia and Fiji had similar policies. Lange’s policy flies in the face of the long-standing U. S. position not to confirm or deny th^e existence of nuclear weapons on board U. S. ships. The Labour Government has softened its position on the ad­mission of nuclear-powered ships, but both governments appear to be at an impasse at the moment on the question of making port facilities available to nuclear-armed ves­sels. How these conflicting policies can be resolved, if³* all, and what effect they will have on the 34-year-old ANZUS treaty remain to be seen. If New Zealand bases are not available for U. S. naval ships, then the possibility of the use of port facilities in other areas of Oceania be­comes of even greater importance.

Without the possibility of using bases or port faciliti^eS in the Philippines, Okinawa, Japan, and New Zealand, long-term strategy as it relates to bases and port use in the region becomes a real problem.

What should U. S. strategy in Oceania be and ho'V should it be implemented? Currently the United States apparently has no articulated doctrine for Oceania per ^se other than President Richard Nixon’s Guam doctrine pos­tulated in 1969. This doctrine basically called up^orl friendly Pacific governments to do more in support of their own security while making assurances that the United States would continue as a Pacific power.

Besides some occasional naval ship visits to some ports, the only other demonstrated U. S. interest in the area has been the considerable negotiations relating to the political status changes of members of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. That our lack of an Oceania strategy has not caused us significant problems since World War U does not mean we will be so fortunate in the future. It has been fortuitous that our relative lack of continued demon' strated interest in the region has gone untested.

The U. S. role, as well as the Soviet role, in Oceania is first and foremost a naval one. All of the 2,100 islands in Micronesia, for example, do not comprise the land area of Rhode Island, but are scattered over an area that approxi­mates that of the United States. On the other hand. Melanesia’s New Guinea is the second largest island in the world and is home to about five million people (including the independent and Indonesian parts of the island).

Our strategic role in the Oceania region should have a^s

Proceedings / August

objectives the ability to control sea lines of communica- ^l|on, preparation for force projection, presence, and sea denial to Soviet naval forces if the occasion warrants. In formulating our strategy for the Pacific, we must consider, ^ln addition to objectives, capabilities of our forces and allies and those of our potential adversaries that might be brought to bear in the region. In addition, we must make ^Certain assumptions based on the best intelligence avail­^able to include strategies of allies and potential adversar­^Ies> military capabilities of countries in the Pacific Basin, ^ability of national institutions in the region, demograph- ^lcs> environmental factors as they relate to strategic con­siderations, and finally, an analysis of present and poten- bal threats in the region.

In combining our strategic objectives with an analysis °f capabilities and assumptions, we must still factor in the final element of the strategic equation—cost. How many nien and how much equipment will be required? How does ^lbis prospective strategy impact on the national and naval budgets? Is there a cost or benefit in terms of national will °r morale? Is there a cost or benefit in terms of U. S. Perception in other countries?⁴

To implement its objectives, the United States must ^c°mmit itself to an increased naval role in the Pacific with- °ut impinging on a spiraling national debt in a significant ^way. What is needed are a number of relatively low-cost, high-speed vessels that would maintain a constant pres­ence in the islands of the Pacific. These vessels would be

»USTEN

based, in part, in locations not now home to any naval vessels, except for, in a few cases, small craft belonging to the prospective host country. U. S. vessels to be based in Oceania would include surface effect ships (SESs), pos­sibly twin-hulled (SWATH) vessels and air-cushioned landing craft (LCAC) capable of carrying loads over the vast distances of the Pacific at 50 knots in good weather.⁵

In an area such as Oceania where distances are vast and transit times correspondingly long, advanced logistic bases acquire considerable importance. Without the base at Ascension Island, used for both logistics and rehearsal purposes, the British likely would have been unable to mount the effective effort that they did in the Falkland Islands in 1982. It is 4,400 miles from Hawaii to Auck­land, New Zealand, 5,300 miles to Manila, Philippines, and nearly 5,100 miles to Sydney, Australia. Even with bases in Guam, Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines, those lines of communication are extremely long and ex­posed. It has long been a maxim that the potential for warfare is inextricably tied up with logistics, and logistics means bases in naval warfare.

The United States should pursue negotiations with some of its Pacific allies toward the use of bases or port facilities that would accommodate small numbers of men and craft. Ideally, these bases would support “low-value” (as com­pared with capital ships of the fleet) vessels that could operate at high speed and visit islands with little or no port facilities. Distances and transit times, not to mention budget constraints, mandate the use of such vessels.

There are at least three potential bases in Micronesia, Melanesia, and Polynesia that deserve consideration. These bases could serve as supply points, fuel depots, and home ports to fast, highly mobile vessels. Sailing from west to east across Oceania in search of possible bases, we come to Palau, the Micronesian islands closest to the Phil­ippines. These islands are some of the largest in Microne­sia, and suitable harbors for small craft (and larger ones) are available. When the Trust Territory is disbanded, Palau will become the Republic of Belau under the Com­pact of Free Association which the 99th Congress will likely address. Palau’s defense pact with the United States under the compact and its geographical location make the islands high on the list for a small U. S. naval presence. Palau’s proximity to the Philippines, Indonesia, and the Strait of Malacca are additional pluses.

Approximately 1,000 miles southeast of Palau, in Mela­nesia, is located Manus in the Admiralty Islands, politi­cally part of the independent state of Papua New Guinea. Seeadler Harbor, really a roadstead formed by the islands of Manus, Negros, and four other small islands, was fa­miliar to many sailors in World War II, and its port,

Mitchener’s “South Pacific” still enchants us: a paradise of lush vegetation and almost empty beaches. But there is more to Oceania than that. All of Micronesia’s 2,100 islands cover an area the size of the continental United States, but its total area is less than that of Rhode Island, whereas Melanesia’s New Guinea, left, is the second larg­est island in the world and home to five million people.

Lorengau, became an important supply center. There is now a jet airfield on Negros.

There seems to be a reservoir of good will for the United States in New Guinea. Prime Minister Michael Somare has publicly stated that it is obvious to him that the United States is the prime protector in the region. A planned U. S. naval presence on Manus, manned with selected personnel, should not upset the ecological and sociological Manus environment and should be of real benefit to each country.

By far, the most practical site for a base would be at Pago Pago Harbor in Tutuila, American Samoa, just east of the dateline in Polynesia. This U. S. territory came under U. S. suzerainty in 1900 after having been used as a

A modern tale of the South Pacific involves the two Samoas—Western, below, and American, facing page. Western Samoa, 15 times the size of American Samoa, with almost six times as many people, has been approached by the Soviets regarding basing or use of port facilities. But American Samoa has Pago Pago, one of the great natural harbors in the Pacific.

fueling station since 1878. It was controlled by the Navy for 51 years before being administered by the Departmen of the Interior. It now elects its own governor and has a non-voting delegate to the U. S. Congress.                                               .

Pago Pago Harbor is one of the great natural harbors in the Pacific. The territory’s population is extremely P^r0' American, while at the same time very conscious of its Sa­moan culture. Many Samoans are members or veterans o .the U. S. armed forces and likely would be receptive to a na­val presence, complementing the small U. S. Coast Guar detachment stationed there. Samoa is approximately 2,500 miles from Hawaii and 3,000 miles from Manus.

Bases at Palau, Manus, and American Samoa, when coupled with present bases at Guam, Kwajalein (Marsha Islands), and Hawaii, would enable the U. S. Navy ^t0 maintain a significant presence in Oceania, a presence which is not now in existence.

The type of vessels envisioned would, ideally, y manned by rotating crews much as it is done now wi ballistic missile submarines. The vessels and crews woul demonstrate U. S. presence and resolve in their respective regions. They would undoubtedly become involved, on occasion, in search and rescue endeavors, which shoul