Japan: Keeping the Balance? `

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When they met recently, the President and the Prime Minister were aware that, unless and until the Japanese can agree on a peacetime deterrence-by-doing strategy, Japan will have to count on U. S. military doers to make sure the balance of power in the Pacific doesn’t shift any further against the United States and its allies then it already has.

The military balance of power in East Asia and the Pacific has been shifting against the United States and its allies during the past decade. The Soviet Union has improved its military capabilities with more modem and capable ships, aircraft, and theater intermedi­ate range ballistic missiles. These forces are more asser­tively employed, particularly anticarrier ships, subma­rines, and strike aircraft based in Vietnam and operating in the South China Sea.

The decline in relative U. S. military advantage in the Pacific has slowed since 1979, but the diversion of some forward-deployed forces to the Indian Ocean and Central America has reduced U. S. presence in the critical area from Petropavlovsk to the Singapore Strait. The need to hold some forces in reserve to surge in crisis has prevented filling that crucial gap.

Most Asian nations cannot assume the slack. The mili­tary modernization of the People’s Republic of China is slow and will not offset growing Soviet power because it is limited to defending border regions and coastal waters. South Korean forces aim at deterring North Korea. Aus­tralian, New Zealand, and Canadian forces are aging and focus more on local defense than theater-wide deterrence. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) forces are also local, developing slowly, and cooperate in mutual defense only minimally.

Japan is the keystone of our Pacific coalition. Its poten­tial military capabilities make it critical to the balance of power. In attempting to strengthen the alliance with Japan, current U. S. policy is to avoid proposing specific pro­grams and to concentrate on achieving an agreed division of labor between the two countries in terms of roles and missions. These missions, however, are defined mainly in war-fighting terms, and less in terms of balance of power or theater deterrence.

We need to expand the scope of the U. S.-Japan defense dialogue to incorporate an explicitly deterrent strategy for the alliance, to assist the government of Japan develop a more persuasive justification for changes in Japan Self­Defense Force (JSDF) missions and the size and mix of JSDF capabilities, to articulate the explicit conventional deterrent emphasis of U. S. strategy and programs, and to reduce constraints on the employment of combined forces in the Western Pacific. These potential changes in the dia­logue would be largely semantic in the beginning, but in time could pay off substantially in countering the Soviets’ growing Pacific power.

There are obstacles to Japan assuming a more effective and explicit role throughout the Western Pacific. Fiscal constraints include the one percent of gross national prod' uct cap on defense spending (possibly to be breached soon); competition for funds caused by current deficits and the “administrative reform” program; and the reluctance of the Ministry of Finance and Japanese Defense Agency to change relative allocation of resources within budget totals.

Political constraints include policy prohibitions on “collective defense,” “overseas deployment,” and ‘ °*' fensive” capabilities; real though declining Chinese and ASEAN resistance to an expanded JSDF theater mission, the slow pace of change in attitudes among Japan’s leftist parties, the press, and intellectuals; and the Japanese Gov­ernment’s desire to minimize costly bureaucratic or fac­tional battles.

Greater Japanese regional efforts also pose a diplomatic dilemma. The more the United States needs Japanese help to build up the coalition’s overall power, the more some Japanese question the credibility of the U. S. commitment and the greater the risk (they allege) of Japan seeking ^a “Gaullist” solution to its defense needs. Many Japanese fear a Gaullist policy would revive militarism.

Finally, the Japanese political opposition insists there is no consensus on the nature of the Soviet threat. They argue that the Soviets are unlikely to attack (hence, no greater forces are needed) and that, if they did attack, Japan could not survive even with greater forces.

Despite these problems, there are signs that the policy changes in this proposal may be achievable. Asian opp°^s1' tion to expanded Japanese military capabilities is decreas­ing. Singapore would probably welcome a combined U. S.-Japanese counter to the Soviets in the South China Sea. Other ASEAN nations have been less positive, but a combined U. S.-Japanese effort would very likely be p^re' ferred by all to an uncountered Soviet presence, a unilat' eral Japanese effort, or greater U. S.-Chinese mili^taIT cooperation.

Within Japan, a political role to match economic power on the international scene is now explicitly supported by the government and much of the public. Many participants in the public debate, both government and academic, have also broached the possibility of a commensurate military role without generating serious backlash. The limits °ⁿ “overseas deployment” and “collective security,” which are the aspects of the status quo most directly challenged by this proposal, are construed to be prohibited by Article IX of the Japanese Constitution but are actually embodied in Diet resolutions and cabinet pronouncements. The alter­natives—uncountered Soviet presence or U. S.-Chinese defense cooperation—would be more unpalatable to Jap³' nese elites who will influence the debate.

A distinction between deterrent strategies is significant for the U. S.-Japanese coalition. U. S. deterrent strategy is divisible into elements that accomplish their purpose simply by being and others which do so by doing- The former include mainly strategic nuclear deterrent forces and continental U. S.-based Army divisions; the latter include mobile conventional power projection forces, sued as the Army’s 82nd Airborne Division, Navy battle groups

^and amphibious task forces, Air Force tactical air wings, inkers, and B-52 bombers, and Marine brigades whose ^equipment is in maritime prepositioned ships.

Aside from the strategic nuclear umbrella, U. S. forces ^vvhich operate to deter the Soviet Union in the Pacific and Asia are mainly doers. Those related directly to Japan in­^clude: (1) the USS Midway (CV-41) battle group and sup­port ships based overseas, (2) battle groups, amphibious task groups, attack submarines, and supporting forces ^r°tationally forward-deployed, (3) the III Marine Amphib­ious Force on Okinawa and Honshu, and (4) the tactical lighter wings of the 5th Air Force on Okinawa and

Honshu.

These are all classic doers, heavily scheduled and oper­ated with high operation and maintenance costs for flying hours, ship steaming days, and consumables. Consum­ables, except for ammunition, are constantly exhausted and must be replaced. Sustaining doers is less a function °f stockpiling than rationing operation and maintenance funds and scheduling operations to ensure balance be-

^ FOflCE (C. S. MCGILU                                                                                                                                                                                                                             _____ tween on-line, essentially ready forces and less ready forces undergoing maintenance and training.

Schedules for doers focus on unit training, joint and combined exercises, intratheater “presence” deployments, port visits, staff command post exercises, etc. These serve multiple purposes: developing interoperability, familiarizing U. S. forces with the geography of the area, demonstrating combined readiness to the Soviet Union, and reassuring the Japanese of the U. S. commitment.

Be-ers must be maintained but are used little until war occurs. They require training in peacetime, but less sup­port than would be required in war. For be-ers, consuma­bles must be stockpiled and wartime support mobilized.

Japanese Self-Defense Force officers, especially in the Maritime Self-Defense Force, share the idea of deterrence by doing. However, the official strategic concept as de­scribed in the Japanese Defense Agency’s white paper se­ries Defense of Japan is deterrence by being. “Overseas deployment,” “collective defense,” and “offensive ca­pabilities” are all essential elements of a deterrence-by­doing strategy. The defense-only precept limits operations to defense against an actual attack on Japan. Operations prior to attack, except for training and disaster relief, are not provided for in the laws establishing the JSDF.

The absence of Japanese consensus on a peacetime de­terrence-by-doing strategy is also one reason for the con­tinuing political sensitivity of some U. S.-Japanese com­bined activities. Most important, it also adds to Japanese Defense Agency difficulties in justifying an increased

JSDF role in maintaining a favorable balance of power m the Western Pacific. Another initiative to redefine com­bined strategy more explicitly to include deterrence-by­doing offers prospects of ameliorating these difficulties- A revised U. S.-Japanese combined strategy and de­rived missions should include at least the following:

• Strategic deterrence: The U. S. maintains a strategic nuclear umbrella over Japan as part of its global nuclear deterrent. Strategic defense would also be primarily a U. S. role but might benefit from Japanese assistance m countering Soviet SS-20s and theater-targeted missiles launched from “Yankee” and “Golf” submarines.
• Conventional defense of Japanese territory: Japan, with U. S. collaboration, would have the primary responsibility for countering the Soviet air threat to Japan itself ana U. S. bases, securing Japan against intimidation, as wel

as attack. The force goal would be air superiority °^v®^r Japan and air denial over surrounding waters. The U- f- role would be offensive counterair, long-range reconnais sance, etc. In addition to air forces, anti-invasion g^roun, and maritime forces would be maintained by Japan wit the United States providing a strategic reserve.

and

► Sea lines of communication (SLOCs) defense: Patrol­ling in peacetime and defending in wartime the sea and a'f

lines of communication against Soviet interdiction,

placing at risk important Soviet lines of communication would be a collaborative effort, with the relative contribu­tion of each country a function of distance from Japan, but with no absolute constraints. Within the 1,000-nautical otile arc adopted by the Suzuki and Nakasone administra­tions, Japan should have the primary responsibility, and 'tie United States should help. Conversely, such areas as tile Philippine Sea, the South China Sea, the Indian ^0cean, and the East, Central, and Southeast Pacific should be primarily a U. S. or other ally responsibility; but unique Japanese capabilities such as minesweepers could help there as well. Within all the areas where Japanese forces would have a mission, a functional division of labor should be superimposed based upon each country s unique capability. The United States should concentrate on of­fense, and the Japanese forces should emphasize defense. ^ Land defense outside Japan. Defending other land areas against attack by the Soviets or their surrogates would not he expected of Japan. However, facilitative assistance to L. S. forces and assisting the United States in isolating a crisis area through SLOCs defense and interdiction would he appropriate.         .           . .

The force structure and mix of readiness, sustainability, and modernization programs necessary to this strategy Would require extensive consultation and willingness on both sides to modify programs to achieve combined effec­tiveness. The United States should retain in the area offen­sive and defensive nuclear deterrence forces, rapidly de­ployable power projection forces (not necessarily all Permanently forward-deployed), and significant sea con­trol and denial forces, both naval and air. Some level ol sustainable forward deployment should be agreed upon, both for defense purposes and to counter the charge that the United States is withdrawing from Asia. Japan would need strong anti-invasion forces and significantly in­creased air superiority and sea control forces.

Implementation of this division of labor would require increased efforts for interoperability, consultation on lev­els of theater presence for both sides, and a tailored exer­cise program to develop and demonstrate combined capa­bilities. These programs now exist and would require little policy change to expand.

The net change in the status quo to be effected by adop­tion of this strategic framework includes; (1) explicit ac­ceptance by the government of Japan of a combined de­fense mission, in peacetime as well as after an attack, in collaboration with U. S. forces, (2) expanding the scope of various Japanese SLOC defense missions, and (3) Japa­nese acceptance of an active SLOC defense, as well as facilitative assistance roles in various Northeast Asian crises, although this could lead to a potential Japanese adversarial position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, the Peo­ple’s Republic of China, or North Korea.

Japan continues to increase its military capabilities. These capabilities will no doubt be ever more useful in defending Japanese territory. If the need for such a de­fense is to be minimized, however, more attention must be paid to collective, active deterrence during peacetime. A sound strategy is the first prerequisite of an effective mili­tary posture. The U. S.-Japanese defense coalition’s progress in the past few years has brought about a situation ripe for rationalizing such a strategy. Now is the time to launch new initiatives in this area.

Captain Doerr is currently Chief of Staff, Commander, Carrier Group Eight. Before this assignment, he was a senior fellow at the Strategic Concepts Development Center at the National Defense University. Previ­ous billets include Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans and Policy, Com­mander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet; Commander of Destroyer Squadron Fifteen; and Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans and Policy, Commander, Seventh Fleet. Captain Doerr has an MA in Law and Diplomacy with specialization in East Asian affairs from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.