Guarding the Coast

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that vulnerability in our “home waters” may be the most significant part of that flaw.

In the past, our ability to defend ourselves at home has suffered badly from vacillating interest and diffused re­sponsibility. Over the years, coastal defense organizations have been created and abolished with astonishing regular- 'ty. These two new commands present a different ap­proach. Their creators recognized that coastal defense must include both protection of essential ports and the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) closest to our shores, ^which is best done by one single command. Most impor­tant, it was recognized that this responsibility cannot be met on either an ad hoc or part-time basis.

The key to understanding the renewed interest in coastal defense lies partly in the historic inconsistencies in the hi' S. strategy for protecting home waters.

Background: In the 19th century, U. S. coastal defense "'us primarily an Army responsibility. The Navy s role ^was seen as supplementing local harbor defenses or pro­tecting unfortified stretches of the coast. Until the turn of ^lhe century, the principal foreign threat was presumed to he from European navies, and, therefore, the Atlantic was tee focus of our attention. Throughout most of the 19th century, the only substantial fortification on the West Coast was at San Francisco. Navy involvement was simi­larly small—the Pacific Squadron’s responsibilities were too far-flung and it was too small to defend the entire

coastline.

During the decades surrounding the turn of the century, expanding U. S. interests in the Pacific were confronted hy the increasing presence there of the British, Spanish, German, Japanese, and Russians. In response, the Army began a modest expansion of West Coast defenses, includ­ing adding fortifications at San Diego, Los Angeles, the Columbia River, Puget Sound, Hawaii, and the Philip­pines. Ironically, a far-sighted report in 1906 recom­mended that Kiska—one of the Aleutian Islands occupied hy the Japanese in 1942—also be fortified, but this was never done. Concurrent with the buildup of coastal fortifi­cations, the Navy’s Pacific Squadron grew into a true bat­tle fleet. By the 1920s, the United States had a credible home defense in the Pacific.

The Navy clearly recognized the need for “a proper system of Naval defense of our coast” in 1903 with the establishment of naval districts, whose principal mission ^was coastal defense. This responsibility had been previ­ously assigned to naval stations. Initially, there were only two districts on the West Coast—the Twelfth, headquar­tered in San Francisco, and the Thirteenth, headquartered in Bremerton, Washington. In 1916, the Fourteenth Dis­trict was established in the Territory of Hawaii. At the same time, the Territory of Alaska was added to the Thir­teenth Naval District. In 1920, the Eleventh District, headquartered in San Diego, was separated from the Twelfth District. Curiously, it was not until 1944 that the huge Alaskan Territory was established as the Seventeenth

District.

During World War II, Coast Guard districts were rea­ligned to be consistent with the Navy’s system. The Coast

Guard district alignment is essentially the same today. Naval districts gradually were given a greater number of administrative and logistic responsibilities. By 1941, they had become de facto “branch offices” of the Navy De­partment. Administrative duties quickly overshadowed coastal defense responsibilities. As early as the 1920s, there was talk of establishing yet another organization dedicated exclusively to coastal defense planning.

In 1935, the Army and Navy Joint Board published Joint Action of the Army and Navy, in which the two ser­vices agreed to coordinate “frontier defense ... to re­move any anxiety of the Fleet in regard to its bases.”¹ Four coastal frontiers were established. Local coastal de­fense preparations were to be coordinated between the Army Corps commander, or subordinate coast artillery district and harbor defense commander, and the corre­sponding naval district. The Army still retained primary responsibility for . . defense of all permanent naval bases . . . and facilities ashore within a harbor.” The Navy would provide . .a system of offshore scouting and patrol to give timely warning of an attack.”²

Navy Department General Order 143 of February 1941 provided that the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces would consist of “Naval Coastal Forces” under a newly created coastal frontier commander, who would report directly to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), and “Naval Local Defense Forces,” which would remain under the naval district commander reporting to the Navy Department. This approach perpetuated the separation of coastal issues from port and harbor matters. On 1 July 1941, the CNO ordered activation of the Naval Coastal Frontier Com­mands. Commandant, Twelfth Naval District, was as­signed additional duties as Commander, Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier (Eleventh and Twelfth naval dis­tricts), and Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District was designated Commander, Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier (Thirteenth Naval District and Alaska). A third naval coastal frontier was established in Hawaii.

On 1 November 1941, the Coast Guard was transferred to the Navy. By the end of that month, most seagoing cutters and long-range aircraft had been assigned to the naval coastal frontier commanders, doubling the available coastal patrol assets in the Pacific.

The invasion of Pearl Harbor suddenly changed priori­ties. Credible threats existed on both coasts, and coastal protection was essential. By the end of 1941, naval coastal frontier commands were firmly established, separate from the naval district organizations.

In spite of this resurgence of Navy interest, harbor de­fense was still primarily an Army responsibility. In the early stages of World War II, the Army laid electrically activated minefields across harbor entrances and manned searchlight and artillery batteries. The Navy supplemented these defenses with submarine nets, outer harbor defen­sive minefields, offshore patrols, and mine countermea­sure efforts. The two services jointly operated harbor en­trance control posts.

In February 1942, as part of a major defense reorganiza­tion, the naval coastal frontiers were redesignated as sea frontiers. Unlike their predecessors, the sea frontier com-

manders were responsible to the fleet commander in chief. While district commandants still remained responsible to the Navy Department for local defense, the focus of re­sponsibility was gradually shifting from Washington.

Because the enemy threat to the Pacific Coast was largely eliminated after the battle of Midway, the Western Sea Frontier was never involved in extensive antisubma­rine warfare (ASW) operations, even though some ASW operations were conducted in the Alaskan and Hawaiian sea frontiers. On the East Coast, however, the Atlantic submarine threat was so great in 1941 that it had been the principal factor in the activation of the coastal frontier commands. By the end of the war, Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier (ComEastSeaFron), was the principal ASW commander for the Atlantic Coast, with some operational responsibilities extending beyond his nominal mission area.

Between March and November 1944, through a series of minor organizational changes, the responsibilities for both harbor and offshore coastal defense were placed under the fleet commanders’ cognizance and naval district commanders were made subordinate to the sea frontier commanders. For the first time, the inseparability of these two aspects of coastal defense was recognized, and cogni­zance for defense of home waters was fully transferred from Washington.

As battle lines receded across the Pacific, the Western Sea Frontier increasingly assumed a fleet support role. A¹ the end of the war, the Pacific Reserve Fleet was estab­lished to handle deactivated ships, and Commander, West­ern Sea Frontier, was assigned further duties as its com­mander. When the naval districts returned to their prewar role as Navy Department “branch offices,” and when the sea frontier was transformed into primarily a logistics sup­port command for the fleet CinC, coastal defense planning took a backseat in the Navy. In the Army, coastal defense organizations were abolished in 1949 and 1950. There were no immediate threats to our shores, and coastal de­fense again was assigned a low priority.

In the late 1950s, Commander, Western Sea Frontier (ComWestSeaFron), was assigned yet another title Commander, U. S. Naval Defense Forces Eastern Pacific-^" in recognition of supposedly broad operational responsi­bilities. By this time, however, most operations were actu­ally coordinated by Commander, First Fleet, or ASW Forces Pacific. In February 1973, when these commands were combined to form the Third Fleet, which had overall operational responsibility for the Eastern Pacific, the fu­ture of the Pacific Sea Frontier Command was sealed. H was abolished later that year. Coastal defense planning tasks were relegated to the naval districts, but no resources were provided for this work.

In the late 1970s, the naval districts were abolished- Many of their administrative and logistic functions, pl^uS their coastal defense missions, were returned to the naval bases whence they had come three-quarters of a century

before. By this time, there were few forces from any ser- ^Vlce committed to coastal defense.

Resurgence of Coastal Defense: In the past five years, there has been renewed interest in an awareness that our coastal “flank” is vulnerable, and that there has been an ^Organizational void to deal with the problem. The Navy’s focus on forward deployment, combined with continuing budget constraints, left little in the active Navy to address Problems in home waters. With this posture, U. S. ports ^ar>d coastal SLOCs were vulnerable to attack by enemy forces.

These ports and SLOCs are critical elements of the stra­tegic mobility formula. The overwhelming majority of critical raw materials and finished goods to sustain over­^Seas theaters must move by sea. Further, our strategic sup- P*y lines depend on a surprisingly small number of critical Ports. This concentration of activity and those ports vul­nerability to mining, sabotage, or direct attack give an enemy the potential to interdict a large volume of shipping "'ith a modest force commitment. This is too attractive a Possibility for an enemy to overlook, or for the United States to fail to counter. Ironically, coastal defense turns °ut not to be focused on repelling invaders. Instead, it has become an indispensable prerequisite to an effective for­^ward deployment strategy.

The Soviets seem to have recognized this same vulnera­bility in their own coastal areas and have committed exten­sive resources to remedying the situation. In contrast, through the years, most U. S. Navy programs with major applications in coastal defense, such as mine countermea­sures, inshore undersea warfare, and naval control of ship­ping, have shifted almost entirely to Naval Reserve forces.

About the time the naval districts were discontinued, the Naval Reserve community began to create new units to coordinate domestic naval operations. First called harbor defense coordinating components, they were later redesig­nated as coastal defense coordinating components (CDCCs) in recognition of their expanding focus. In the ^early 1980s, these units developed a coastal defense plan ^for Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet (CinCPacFlt), then began developing supporting harbor defense plans for naval base commanders. These plans will be an important input to Maritime Defense Zone Pacific (MarDeZPac) Planning.

A need was identified. Why, then, should Coast Guard flag officers be charged with planning, organizing, and directing this rejuvenated defense organization? Again, the answer lies partially in history.

Navy-Coast Guard—An Enduring Relationship: The Navy and the Coast Guard have had a close relationship since the 1790s, from the Coast Guard’s infancy and the reestablishment of the Navy after the Revolutionary War. Early in this relationship, officers often served inter­changeably, and vessels were transferred between the two services with ease to meet specific needs. In every war or national emergency, from the Quasi-War with France in the late 1790s to the rescue operation in Grenada in 1983, Coast Guard forces have performed under Navy com­manders. Throughout this long relationship, however, as­signment of specific naval missions to the Coast Guard to manage have been uncommon and usually limited in scope. The Coast Guard has been essentially a well-trained augmenting force which has reported to the Navy to do whatever the Navy directs it to do.

Guarding the coast has never been a primary military mission of the Coast Guard, although various Coast Guard functions have historically played important supporting roles in coastal defense. In the summer of 1940, with war raging in Europe and the North Atlantic, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau made the following proposal:

“We have practically no shore batteries on the whole U. S. coast, but we have all these Coast Guard stations. ... I think it would be swell if every Coast Guard station was armed with an antiaircraft gun and a gun big enough to penetrate the armament of a subma­rine.”³

Admiral Harold Stark, then-Chief of Naval Operations, subsequently took a version of this proposal to the Joint Army-Navy Board, but nothing further came of it.

While the Coast Guard stations were never armed as coastal batteries, they did provide a network of lookouts which were soon supplemented by new Coast Guard beach patrol units using horses and guard dogs. This program was replete with service rivalries. The Army believed it should have the job. A compromise eventually established Army coast-watching units in areas where there was no nearby Coast Guard station, which was more common on the West Coast. In spite of some spectacular captures of German submarine-delivered saboteurs, both services phased out their beach patrols as the enemy threat gradu­ally diminished.

During the 1960s, there was a brief and curious resur­gence of interest in beach patrols. The Coast Guard estab­lished several new reserve units and began training “Coastal Forcemen” to detect and report enemy landings. Who the invaders were to be remains unclear. Given mini­mal guidance, these units trained extensively in land com­bat skills, frequently using Marine Corps facilities and in­structors. After about four years, the program was quietly discontinued, in the absence of clear Coast Guard tasking in this area.

The Coast Guard’s biggest role in coastal defense has been port security, which evolved out of the Espionage Act of 1917. This mission did not come into its own until World War II; at the peak, more than 100,000 Coast Guardsmen performed port security duties. Port security is still an important Coast Guard mission and the principal assignment of the Coast Guard Reserve.

The traditional Coast Guard role in port security, which is half of the coastal defense mission, explains why the Coast Guard should have a role in coastal defense plan­ning. But it does not explain why responsibility for the mission has been given to the Coast Guard under the re­spective CinCs.

Both Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, former CNO, and Admiral John B. Hayes, former Commandant of the Coast Guard, were uncomfortable with the vagueness of the war­time assignments then given to the Coast Guard. They recognized that the Coast Guard represented a significant force, with a compatible infrastructure, good command, control, and communications capabilities, an existing presence in most ports, a long-standing relationship with the Department of Defense (DoD) and other federal and essential civilian port organizations, broad statutory au­thority to control port activities, and equipment and per­sonnel who regularly operated in the coastal areas. Both officers believed this was an area where the Coast Guard was uniquely capable and in which significant contribu­tions could be made.

In 1980, a joint Navy-Coast Guard (NavGard) Board was established to look into this question and to provide a forum for continuing dialog between the two services. The board is chaired jointly by the Vice-Chief of Naval Opera­tions and Vice Commandant. The NavGard Board quickly focused on using the Coast Guard as the nucleus organiza­tion to deal with the coastal defense issue. A joint study was ordered. The NavGard Board study concluded that the Coast Guard could fill this need for coastal defense plan­ning and execution, and recommended that the two Mari­time Defense Zone Commands be established within the Atlantic and Pacific Fleet Commands. This recommenda­tion was subsequently approved by Chief of Naval Opera­tions Admiral James D. Watkins and Commandant of the Coast Guard James S. Gracey.

In March 1984, the Secretary of the Navy and the Sec­retary of Transportation formally agreed on this concept, and a joint instruction from the Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Coast Guard established the Mari­time Defense Zone commands. On 30 August 1984, Com­mander, Pacific Area Coast Guard was designated by CinCPacFlt as Commander, U. S. Maritime Defense Zone Pacific (ComUSMarDeZPac) and Commander Task Force 16. The result is a jointly staffed contingency command within the Fleet Commander’s organization, with respon­sibility for coastal defense.

Overall Perspective: While the Maritime Defense Zone organizations and missions are similar in the Atlantic and Pacific, they are not identical. In the Atlantic, naval strat­egy is closely tied to NATO responsibilities, and the Sec­ond Fleet is committed to forward deployments to support those responsibilities. At the same time, the presence of Cuba astride vital coastal sea-lanes presents a unique coastal defense threat.

In the Pacific, the Navy supports a larger number of alliances, with the Seventh Fleet forward-deployed and the Third Fleet tasked with a supporting role closer to home waters. While NATO obligations are not a pressing consideration in the Pacific, the United States has a unique relationship with Canada, which is a NATO member. Two sections of the U. S. coast are separated by Canada. Sea- lanes bringing crude oil from Alaska to the “lower 48” and supplies from the continental limits of the United States to Alaska hug the Canadian coast. Also, Seattle, one of the few major West Coast ports, shares its entrance with Canada, making coastal defense a matter of com­bined concern.

Atlantic and Pacific coastal defense differ in other im­portant ways. The Atlantic and Gulf coasts have broad continental shelves susceptible to bottom mining. On the West Coast, most ports have deep water almost to their entrance, which provides unique opportunities for subma­rines and for using deep-moored mines. Another distinc­tion is that the Pacific zone is actually three widely sepa­rated areas, presenting unique problems for communica­tions, control, and logistics. The Hawaiian archipelag⁰’ Alaska, and the mainland are separated by thousands o miles of open ocean.

Alaska is particularly challenging. We must not forg^et the Aleutian lesson of 1942, and the Soviets are twice as close to the Aleutians as the Japanese, with far more f°^r" midable capabilities than the World War II Japanese had- U. S. defense installations in the Aleutians are half as far from Petropavlovsk as from the nearest city in the conti­nental United States.

MarDeZPac Organization: MarDeZPac is a Navy Ech­elon Three contingency command within the CinCPacFh organization, whose plans may be activated whenever cir­cumstances warrant. Although it is headed by a Coast Guard flag officer, it is a component of the Pacific Fleet- ft represents an immediately ready force of regulars {torn both services who can be augmented quickly by Navy and Coast Guard reservists, specifically trained in coastal de­fense activities. It represents a peacetime planning and exercising mechanism, which will permit the Fleet CinC to have both organization and plans in place to meet a variety of contingencies.

ComUSMarDeZPac responsibilities include:

• Inshore undersea warfare
• Port safety and security
• Mine countermeasures
• Search and rescue and salvage
• Intelligence
• Reconnaissance and surveillance
• Interdiction
• Anti-terrorism counter-sabotage
• Disaster response
• Explosive ordnance disposal
• Vessel movement control
• Naval control of shipping
• Antisubmarine warfare
• Escorting shipping
• Air defense
• Antisurface warfare

In some of these missions, responsibility will be for total mission execution; in others it may be limited to supp°^rt' ing another command which has primary responsibility f°^r that mission.

The new command will generally be concerned with waters within the exclusive economic zone—planning will focus on the 200 nautical miles adjacent to the coast- In some missions, such as search and rescue and salvag^e> operations in more distant areas may be conducted as di­rected by CinCPacFlt. The command is divided into sec­tors (see Figure 1). Sector commanders are either Navy °^r Coast Guard officers, who will have responsibiliti^eS within their respective port areas and within U. S. territo-

^r'al waters (three-mile limit). Seaward operations beyond ^Sector limits will be directed by ComUSMarDeZPac in San Francisco.

A full-time peacetime staff has been established in the headquarters of Commander, U. S. Coast Guard Pacific Area. Staffing for the new command comes from both regular and reserve Navy and Coast Guard forces. Regular forces organic to the Navy and Coast Guard organizations ^signed will form the nucleus of the command. Reserv­es from both services will comprise about half of the ^aPproximately 35,000 personnel within the MarDeZPac command.

Consistent with the NavGard Board’s conclusions, the Principal goal of each MarDeZ command is the better inte­gration of many existing Navy, Coast Guard. DoD, and other federal organizations dealing with contingencies in Ports and coastal areas. Already, some duplication and overlap have been identified. As the organization matures, further efficiencies and redirection of assigned resources can be expected. As an organization, MarDeZPac is an excellent example of the “one force concept.”

External Command Relationships: Extensive intercom­mand relations are involved with the establishment of MarDeZPac. A basic concept of the command is to avoid replication of any function that exists in another command which can support the coastal defense mission. Accord­ingly, relationships will be created with other Pacific Fleet Navy commands—Readiness Command, U. S. Army Force Command, U. S. Air Force Defense Command, Military Sealift Command, Military Traffic Management Command, the Army Corps of Engineers, Joint Task Force 119 in Hawaii, and two joint task forces in Alaska. A recent DoD/Department of Transportation Multiagency Memorandum of Understanding on Port Readiness will go a long way toward facilitating this project.

Because MarDeZPac will be CinCPacFlt’s agent for peacetime as well as wartime responses to civil disasters, there will also be extensive involvement with the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Looking Ahead: As the MarDeZPac plans and organiza­tion mature, traditional distinctions among various mis­sions and organizations are likely to fade. In MarDeZPac, one command now has overall responsibility to protect ports and our coastal areas against all enemies. We no longer need to distinguish between harbor defense and port security based on service lines or the direction from which the enemy comes. Navy coast defense coordinating component planners are already working side by side with Coast Guard planners. Coast Guard surveillance systems such as Vessel Traffic Services are exercising alongside Navy Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Units to provide enhanced surveillance and control of shipping.

Navy patrol craft are being integrated into Coast Guard harbor patrol forces, and both are reporting to Harbor De­fense Commanders, regardless of whether they are Navy or Coast Guard officers. Coast Guard vessels will be per­forming route surveys in support of Navy mine counter­measure efforts. The examples of integration grow monthly. Even in the infancy of this new command, it is clear that the vision of the Navy-Coast Guard Board will be fulfilled.

'James O. Richardson and George C. Dyer, On the Treadmill to Peart Harbor, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1973. p. 15.

-Ibid., p. 337.

’Unpublished Records, Commander Third Fleet.

Admiral Costello is a 1952 graduate of the Coast Guard Academy, a Distinguished Graduate in management from the Naval Postgraduate School, and holds a master’s degree in government from George Wash­ington University. He has served on board five Coast Guard cutters of which he commanded three, and in numerous other assignments. His flag assignments have included command of the Fifth Coast Guard District and assignment as Chief of Operations at Coast Guard Headquarters. Admiral Costello is currently Commander of Maritime Defense Zone Pacific, reporting to Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. He also serves as Commander, Coast Guard Pacific Area, Commander Twelfth Coast Guard District, and Region Nine Emergency Transportation Coor­dinator for the Secretary of Transportation.

Commander Wood is a 1969 graduate of Haverford College and was graduated from the Armed Forces Staff College. He has served in a variety of assignments ashore and afloat and is a reserve program admin­istrator with a subspecialty in military readiness planning. Commander Wood is currently chief of the plans branch on Admiral Costello’s Mari­time Defense Zone Pacific staff. He has contributed several articles to the Proceedings.