Comment and Discussion

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Contents:

JCS Reorganization: A Maritime Perspective

The Survival of NATO

“New” as in Nuclear Land Attack Tomahawk

The Santa Cruz—A Record Setter

The Germans Are Coming! The Germans Are Coming!

The Ticonderoga Story: Aegis Works

Manning Nuclear Submarines

The U. S. Navy Yesterday

Leaders, Managers, and Mercenaries

Helicopters: To Arms! To Arms!

U. S. Naval Aircraft and Missile Development—1984

$436 Hammers and Consistent Arguments

The Coast Guard Reserve Protects the Space Shuttle

Plus c;a Change

ENTER THE FORUM

We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, mari­time, or military interest for possible publi­cation on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.

Warriors

Terrorism

What’s in a Name?

To Seize the Moment

The Ultimate Defense

Trident

Distaff Duty

Coastal Defense

Photo Contest

“JCS Reorganization: A Maritime Perspective”

(See T. R. Fedyszyn, pp. 80-87, July 1985

Proceedings)

Robert Previdi—After more than 20 years of studying military affairs, I be­lieve it would be a big mistake to change the balance within the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) by increasing the power of the JCS Chairman.

Decision-making, particularly the es­tablishment of U. S. military strategy, is best centralized with the President and his principal civilian agent, the Secretary of Defense. The country is served best when the military is held responsible only for executing the military strategy which has already been established by our civilian leaders. To tip the balance toward further centralization by increasing the power of the JCS Chairman would make decision­making somewhat faster, but it risks cre­ating a point of dangerous competition among the JCS Chairman, the President, and the Secretary of Defense. It also blurs the crucial issue of who is responsible for establishing strategy versus who is re­sponsible for executing the established strategy.

There must be a clear separation of what our civilian leaders are held respon­sible for and for what we hold our mili­tary leaders accountable. When this sepa­ration is not clear, you end up with a Vietnam which was, in my view, not a military failure, but a failure on the part of civilian leadership. As Commander Fedyszyn puts it, “This determination of vital national interests and priorities should not be delegated to any military staff.”

The genius of the American system has been our fundamental commitment to civilian control of the military. We can­not risk the potential danger involved in making one military man too powerful. This move would be a drastic change from our history. Certainly it would have represented a dangerous situation for President Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War and for Presidents Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt during World Wars I and II respectively.

In his testimony in 1946 before the U. S. Senate Committee on Naval Af­fairs, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King said, “The strength of the Joint Chiefs of Staff lies in the combined knowledge pos­

sessed by the individual members and m the checks and balances that tend to pm* vent domination by any one person. Admiral King who, along with Genera George C. Marshall, was responsible to President Roosevelt for running ⁰¹¹¹ worldwide military operations in Worl War II, went on to say, “The proponents, in my view, have confused the apph^ca' tion of the principles of centralization an decentralization. I state again my belie that the most effective use of our fight'¹¹? forces can be attained by intelligent inte­gration of various agencies for the com­mon defense. I do not concur that w^e must have an overall centralization to accomplish such essential integration- I believe it is important to maintain th^e current arrangement which keeps the ulti­mate strategic responsibility where it be­longs, with the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Congress. In fact, the more we make the military responsible for only the execution of civilian strat­egy, the better off we will be.

“The Survival of NATO”

(See M. T. Owen, pp. 56-61, June 1985

Proceedings)

Ambassador Robert W. Komer, Und^er Secretary of Defense for Policy, 1979" 81—I wouldn’t mind being accused of ^a “great error in strategic thinking,’ ⁱⁿ Lieutenant Colonel Owen’s words, if he showed any sign of really grasping my views. But my book Maritime Strategy °^r Coalition Defense? (Abt Books, 1984), '^s hardly guilty of “focusing almost exclu­sively on NATO.”

Nor do I disagree, contrary to his as sertion, that “coalition defense . • • ^lS dependent upon and inseparable f^10,11 U. S. maritime superiority.” In the P^re1' ace of my book, I stressed that “maritime versus continental strategy is not an et- ther-or proposition but a question of P¹¹' ority emphasis. Although my views W inevitably be taken as having an anti' Navy cast, I fully recognize that com­mand of the sea at times and places of out choosing is vital to the overseas fb^rce projection strategy wisely practiced by the U. S.” What I did attack “is not the need for a powerful U. S. Navy but fo^{r a} particular type of very costly navy, °^ne which stresses maritime force projection

at the expense of sea control.” I repea

.ted

these points in my “Summing Up.”

I agree with much of what Colonel Owens says. But he is not entitled to use ^me as a whipping boy to buttress his ar­guments. Indeed, in 1980, I personally ^Was the first to make an official case to °^Ur allies that the United States would have to divert resources from NATO to t^ter any attack on Persian Gulf oil.

“ ‘New’ as in Nuclear Land Attack Tomahawk”

<^s«e L. F. Brooks, pp. 127-128, April 1985; k- S. Hibbs, p. 73, June 1985 Proceedings)

j-^aPtain Linton F. Brooks, U. S. Navy— ⁿ a recent professional note, I described the basic policy governing the deploy­ment and possible employment of nuclear land attack Tomahawk missiles (TLAM/ hi)' I stressed that the ships and subma- ^r'nes which carry them would remain general-purpose forces whose operations Would not be curtailed by their new Weapons. Mr. Hibbs takes me to task for failing to take adequate note of the radical changes TLAM/N offers. His comments P^rompt three replies:

First, I was not seeking to critique or analyze policy but to describe it. I hoped ^t0 counter two erroneous but opposite ’mpressions: that TLAM/N will change nothing or that this new weapon will turn 'he entire fleet into a sort of “mini­nuclear-powered fleet ballistic missile ^submarine force,” replacing aggressive naval tactics with some desire to preserve and protect “strategic” weapons. We cannot discuss and debate policy until we Understand what it is; I sought to facilitate 'hat understanding.

Second, even though my purpose was ⁿ°t to analyze the merits of our current Policy, I think that policy is sound. Mr. Hibbs suggests, as do many others, that cruise missiles will transform the Navy, bringing greater changes than were Wrought by aircraft. This may well be ^true at sea; I tend to agree with Mr. Hibbs’ illustrations of the tactical trans­formations brought about by increased Weapon range. It may also be true for conventional land attack cruise missiles. Hut for nuclear land attack cruise mis­sies, which is what I was writing about, 'he transformation is less clear.

Advocates of TLAM/N suggest it will revolutionize naval warfare. Perhaps so, hut it is difficult to see how. TLAM/N disperses offensive nuclear strike power ^and complicates Soviet planning, and 'hose are clearly good things. It offers a Way to increase the nuclear reserve, and 'hat provides an important contribution to deterrence. Despite this, it is difficult to

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^see any unique military mission which °^nly TLAM/N can perform and which Would justify reversing the current fleet ^emPhasis on conventional war.

Mr. Hibbs suggests the warfighting mode of the future will consist of re­peated nuclear exchanges. We need to P^n for such a contingency, of course, °^ecause to be unprepared is the best way 'o invite such an exchange. But the Navy, me nation, and our allies will be better off 'f the United States can stop any future War before it reaches a nuclear stage. The ^renaissance in strategic thinking within the Navy is aimed at using maritime forces to do just that. It is a difficult enough task for a Navy to influence a ^c°ntinental adversary; we shouldn’t make ¹¹ harder by overstressing the rather mod­est contribution TLAM/N can make to nuclear warfighting at the expense of our conventional capability.

The final point raised by Mr. Hibbs is the “critical issue” of “to what extent ^shou!d a naval officer express ideas that ^are contrary to current policy?” As I have ■ndicated, my ideas on this subject are completely consistent with current pol- ^lcy. Mr. Hibbs’ comment is nonetheless a Grange one to find in Proceedings, a magazine which offers a forum for chal­^lenges to conventional wisdom unique among the services.

Examination of Naval Institute Prize Essays over the years shows a dispropor- honate number which challenge some form of party line, whether in strategy, in ^ship design, or in the emphasis (or lack of emphasis) on various areas of naval war­fare. Indeed, the same issue of Proceed- ^tn8^s in which Mr. Hibbs’ comment ap­pears contains Navy Commander John Eyron’s outstanding piece “Warriors,” ^which takes the entire naval profession—- including its leadership—to task for hav- !ⁿg lost sight of its basic purpose. It is mteresting to note that when an Army officer recently chose to make a similar argument in Armed Forces Journal, he did so under a pseudonym.

If Mr. Hibbs thinks those officers who elect to write for Proceedings are inhib­ited from challenging accepted policy, he ^ls out of touch with the current state of the naval profession.

platforms for our new Tomahawk mis­siles. The land-attack Tomahawk is an important weapon because it can be used on many platforms. Few of these plat­forms, however, are capable of surrepti­tiously positioning themselves.

In its land-attack mode, the Tomahawk missile gives many platforms the ability to project power across the beach where until now only aircraft carriers could send conventional weapons beyond gun range. In support of European theater opera­

tions, for example, the NATO force com­mander may wish to soften a well- defended target by firing a dozen Tomahawk missiles to disrupt communi­cations, radar, and defenses before launching a conventional attack. He may have no land-based missiles available. In the likely event that the Navy’s major battle groups were otherwise engaged and that the mission were suicidal for a single surface combatant, the likely candidate called upon for missile fire support would

‘The Santa Cruz—A Record Setter”

(See R. L. Scheina, pp. 107-109, June 1985 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander Howard M. Hol­land, U. S. Navy—Perhaps we should consider submarines as capable as the ARA Santa Cruz as possible launching

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be the Tomahawk-equipped attack sub­marine, probably of the Los Angeles (SSN-688) class. The difficulty with this choice is that our Navy’s fastest, quietest, best-listening antisubmarine and anti­shipping submarine would have to be diverted from the mission for which she was designed.

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We don’t need an $800 million subma­rine to slink around undetected and launch tactical missiles. Perhaps a stretched West German “TR-1700” sub­marine with a vertical launch system able to ripple fire a dozen or so Tomahawk missiles in each of four or five separate attacks is a wiser investment. If a “TR- 1700” can transit at ten knots by snorkel- ing only two hours per day, how long can she loiter without snorkeling at all-stop, oriented so that her magnetic signature is least, using a BRA-8 buoy or floating wire antenna for communication recep­tion, running an 0-2 generator periodi­cally? Five or six days? With a loiter mis­sion, a 30-man crew seems feasible.

Few operations are more revealing of your position than launching missiles. Perhaps dedicating a warship to the sup­port of someone else’s land mission is unattractive to U. S. naval planners and officials. Losing a Los Angeles-class sub­marine when NATO political considera­tions require her use in this role will be even more unpalatable. An order for a submarine to launch missiles at a given time is a clear statement that the missile mission is more important than the sur­vival of the submarine. Our nuclear-pow­ered ballistic submariners know this doc­trine well. However, should we risk so valuable an asset as a Los Angeles-class submarine for such a small mission as missile fire support?

It may be more prudent for our blue- water Navy to accept a cheaper alterna­tive to having one of its most valuable weapon platforms exposed on such a high risk mission.

A submarine operating as a hidden tac­tical missile carrier need not be limited to a land-attack role. Wouldn’t a squadron of these submarines operating from Ice­land increase the threat to surface forces in the Soviet Northern Fleet? Suppose a U. S. nuclear-powered attack submarine encounters a Soviet surface group transit­ing south. As the submarine attacks, she also sends a “burst” transmission of data, possibly by buoy. Within a half hour, a dozen Tomahawks arrive to comb the area for what’s left. Such a force would make an effective one-two punch.

In the high-threat environment, attack submarines are more effective if they are nuclear-powered. However, why assign SSNs to a mission which does not require this capability and increase the risk of losing them? Aren’t they so capable and so needed in their principal role as to make this poor policy? The nonnuclear tactical missile carrier need only loiter on the fringes of the high-threat area, re­maining undetected and ready to lob her missiles and clear datum.

“The Germans Are Coming! The Germans Are Coming!’’

(See W. W. Biggers, pp. 38-43, June 1985

Proceedings)

George A. Bleyle—In July 1918, I ¹⁰⁰ saw a German U-boat off our coast. I ^waS nine years old and on vacation with my parents at Minot, Massachusetts, just south of Boston Harbor. My grandfather had given me a telescope which I would steady on the seawall, watching j^ust about every vessel that passed.

On a warm, sunny Sunday afternoon with ceiling visibility unlimited, I heard a series of heavy “booms.” I grabbed my telescope and rushed to the seawall- I could see a submarine and a merchant ship not very far off shore exchanging gunfire.

Soon a four-stacked destroyer arrived on the scene from Boston. The submarine slid under the waves, and the merchant ship continued on to Boston Harbor.

Monday’s Boston papers reported, “Naval Target Practice Off Scituate. h was target practice all right; each target was firing at the other.

“The Ticonderoga Story: Aegis

Works”

(iSee J. L. McClane, Jr., J. L. McClane, PP- ^

129, May 1985 Proceedings)

Robert C. Beers, Manager, DDG P^r°' gram, RCA Corporation—I had the pri^v" ilege of serving in a succession of billets in the Aegis Weapon System Project Of­fice from April 1970 until November 1976, and then in NavSea-06 as combat system engineer for the Long Beach Aegis Conversion prior to assignment as PMS-378 in June 1977, from which I subsequently retired in October 1981 - Based on my recollection of that period, 1 wish to add some comments to this well- written and accurate report.

The authors are somewhat incomplete in their discussion of the early roots ot Aegis. They have also left the impression that the Aegis system’s space and weight requirements grew considerably during the development phase, making a choice of hull more difficult, whereas just the opposite was true.

The initial planning for Aegis full- scale development (in 1969-70) was closely tied to the USS Virginia (CGN- 38)-class cruisers. This close-coupling included the following:

► Budgets for weight, space, power, and manning were negotiated with PMS-378. the ship acquisition project manager l°^r the Virginia class, and these budgets were carefully managed during the early years of the Aegis development program-

• The initial Virginia ship design incor­porated the necessary structural consider­ations and support system reserves to accommodate these Aegis budgets.
• The Mark-26 guided missile launching system (GMLS), already in development, was included in the Virginia design. In anticipation of Aegis, two Mark-26 GMLS units were installed, providing more firepower than needed to support the Tartar-D fire control system and Mark-86 gunfire control system in the Virginia-class ships.
• Production options in the RCA Aegis development contract were coupled to the then-planned Virginia nuclear-powered guided missile cruiser (CGN) program. Because of a variety of factors, mostly political, the CGN program was curtailed and eventually limited to four ships, all equipped with Tartar-D.

During 1972-73, the Naval Ordnance Systems Command (NavOrd) executed a comprehensive simplification effort in Aegis which reduced the system’s weight, space, and power estimates by significant amounts below the CGN bud­gets, without forfeiting system perfor­mance characteristics, and permitted Aegis to be considered for use in smaller hulls than the Virginia class. These sim­plifications also resulted in a significant cost reduction on a per ship basis.

Many feasibility studies were con­ducted by the Naval Ordnance Systems and Naval Ship Systems commands dur­ing this period which supported the via­bility of installing this simplified Aegis system in the Spruance-class (DD-963) hull as well as backfitting Aegis into Ter­rier-Tartar-equipped, guided-missile de­stroyers (DDGs).

Based on the reduction in ship require­ments that resulted from the simplifica­tions noted above, the Navy developed the “DG” ship concept—an austere, antiair warfare-oriented fleet escort whose estimated displacement was in the 5,000+ long ton range, with a single Mark-26 GMLS and two Aegis illumina­tors. The updated Aegis program was successfully presented to Defense Sys­tems Acquisition Review Council II in June 1974, but the DG was abruptly ter­minated shortly thereafter when the Navy strategy shifted to a more offensive pos­ture and the strike cruiser concept emerged as the prime target for the intro­duction of Aegis.

It was at approximately this same time that Congress recognized the need to pro­vide for more comprehensive integration and test of the full combat system prior to committing to a shipbuilding program. Consequently, in the fiscal year 1975 au­thorization, funds were included for the creation of the Combat System Engineer­ing Development Site at Moorestown, New Jersey.

Recognizing the urgent need to get Aegis ships into the fleet, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld directed that the Navy proceed with the DDG-47 program—a gas turbine-powered Aegis ship with emphasis on commonality to the Spruance class—in June 1975. This direction led to the authorization of the Ticonderoga (CG-47; then DDG-47) in fiscal year 1978, and the subsequently successful ship program so well de­scribed by the authors.

Several false starts were made during the late 1970s; in 1976, after several years of study, an Aegis conversion of the USS Long Beach (CGN-9) was ap­proved, but this decision was shortly re­versed for other than technical reasons. About the time of the termination of the Long Beach conversion plan in early 1977, the strike cruiser concept was set aside in favor of an Aegis CGN-42 pro­gram, with many of the same features as in the DDG-47 program. The CGN-42 program was cancelled in late 1978.

These minor historical footnotes should not distract from the overall com­prehensive and firsthand report of Cap­tain McClane and Commander McClane. The benign skepticism and “show me” attitude of the users are being replaced by a healthy acceptance of the quality and reliability of Aegis, and the McClanes’ report is a clear, strong indication of that acceptance.

Midshipman (Second Class) Elliott Stof- fregen, III, U. S. Naval Reserve— Although I thoroughly enjoyed the 1985 “Naval Review Issue,” I feel obliged to point out one minor error. On page 127, the ship identified as the fast combat sup­port ship USS Detroit (AOE-4) is in actu­ality the replenishment oiler Savannah (AOR-4).

“Manning Nuclear Submarines”

(See F. G. Satterthwaite, pp. 61-67, February 1985; N. R. Thunman, p. 32, April 1985; M. McHugh, N. F. Dingemans, pp. 22-28, May 1985; F. M. Nielsen, J. A. Pasko, pp. 16-24, June 1985; S. D. Lisse, P. R. Schratz, pp. 106­108, July 1985 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Robert F. Urso, U. S. Navy— Captain Satterthwaite was correct when he stated, “Enlarging the manpower pool of submarines obviously would go a long way toward solving the manning problem [in the wardroom].” Using limited duty officers is not the only solution to this problem, however. The Navy’s greatest resource for resolving this situation is the corps of general submarine offic^ers (GSOs).

Most officers external to the submarine force are not familiar with the term GSU and are unaware that the community °> several hundred well-qualified submari­ners currently supplies manpower in sup­port of the Navy’s deep submergence program and the diesel submarine fl^eet and provides weapons officers and navi­gators to nuclear-powered attack and fle^et ballistic missile submarines.

The GSO, in most cases, is a profes­sional weapons (both tactical and strate- gic)-trained submariner. He often is ^a better “ship driver” than his nuclear- trained counterpart by virtue of the fad that the GSO does not have to divide his time between engineering watchstandmg duties and duty as officer of the deck- The GSO, however, is denied progres­sion to executive officer and command­ing officer tours in nuclear submarines because he lacks nuclear power training As a result, scores of highly qualify post-department head submariners are encouraged to apply for lateral transfers to other Navy communities because or the lack of a career path offered them p^ast the ten to 12-year point of commissioned

service.

Indeed, the GSO is a highly motivated submariner. He is well qualified techni­cally, and he has proven his managers and leadership skills through two to three successful sea tours in nuclear subma­rines. Why, then, has the Navy turned its back on these proven professionals and “turned them out to pasture” at their mid-career points? Such a waste of talent and experience seems unjustified.

“The U. S. Navy Yesterday”

(See Supplement, March 1985; W. E.

Scarborough, p. 14, May 1985; W. W.

McKenzie, p. 81, June 1985 Proceedings)

Captain Frederick H. Lauder, U■ Navy (Retired)—I enjoyed very much the articles that appeared in the supplement and hope you will continue to publish such commemorative issues from time to time. When we read of the new innova­tions and of present-day events, we are prone to forget the traditions and heroics of the past. It is well to remember the p^ast and feel indebted to those who have pre­ceded us.

Editor’s Note; Captain Lauder passed away on 22 April 1985. He was a 50-y^ear member of the U. S. Naval Institute.

(Continued on page 90) 1985

Comment and Discussion (Continued from page 32)

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“Warriors”

(See J. L. Byron, pp. 63-68, June 1985

Proceedings)

Jerome G. Peppers, Jr.—The points made by Commander Byron are as true in the other services as they appear to be in the Navy. Although I have no naval ser­vice, I do have 45 years of joint military- civilian service with the U. S. Air Force in the area of military logistics. The last 20 of those years were spent in faculty and management roles in the Air Force Institute of Technology with classes com­posed of members of all services and branches.

I have found we have developed a host of superb managers who have no real combat logistics experience (which is not their fault, since they were born too late for that kind of activity) and who seem to have little real interest in learning about combat and its attendant logistics prob­lems. When I have tried to encourage the study and discussion of World War II, for example, my efforts have been met with disbelief and comments which indicate there are a lot more important materials to study. These managers believe that when the time comes, people will do the right thing. They do not understand that those who do not know history are doomed to repeat it.

The logistics profession is filled with very competent specialists, but it suffers from the decided absence of true “logis­ticians” in the armed forces. There are some, of course, but the number is so small it can do little to overcome the problems created by the unionism of spe­cialization. Air Force Lieutenant General Leo Marquez, Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics and Engineering, has called this extreme specialization “stovepiping,” by which he means career development within the narrow confines of a single technical specialty. The result is a collec­tion of finely honed specialists which re­flects the situation Commander Byron terms “tribalism.”

Another consequence of stovepiping is the stultifying effect of everyone thinking alike and/or within those narrow stove­pipe confines. We have lost the general logisticians, and as a result, we do not necessarily have the logistics systems and preparations our great nation deserves and needs. I hope no great combat need develops before we can reverse this trend, but, like Commander Byron, I am dismayed and worried.

Lieutenant William J. Toti, U. S. Navy— Commander Byron provides a needed voice when he serves to reinforce our warrior personae. But I think he some­times does a disservice to those who rely so completely on a very complex ma­chine for their wartime success. A mas­tery of that machine is essential. He states that the attempt to cram both the techni­cian and warrior “into one skull” is use­less. I believe it to be mandatory.

“Terrorism”

(See D. S. Derrer, pp. 190-203, May 1985

Proceedings)

Gordon J. Douglas, Jr.—Lieutenant Commander Derrer’s article may be the best piece I have read in Proceedings since joining the U. S. Naval Institute in 1966 as a Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps midshipman. While Commander Derrer gives excellent advice to U. S. military personnel, his article has valu­able applications to government civil ser­vants as well. After all, being considered a “political symbol” is nothing new to a civil servant.

As a naval architect at Long Beach

Naval Shipyard, I am both a civilian and a member of our naval establishment. I travel to and from naval shipyards at home and abroad. When off duty, I l'^ve off base—residing at my apartment when in the Long Beach area and staying at hotels and motels when traveling ' increasing the risks that I may become an accessible target for terrorist attack.

Perhaps Commander Derrer might offer his advice on self-protection and the training of civil servants to cope with ter­rorism and the threat of being terrorist targets.

“What’s in a Name?”

(See S. A. Swarztrauber, p. 110, April 1985;

W. C. King, p. 16, June 1985; P. A. Young,

p. 23, July 1985 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander Richard Strout, U. S. Navy (Retired)—I couldn’t dis­agree more strongly with Rear Admiral Swarztrauber’s assessment that what we need is a ship named for a Vietnam battle to pay the proper tribute to those of us who served in Southeast Asia. I was there as a lieutenant with the riverine forces on the upper Mekong. For 18 years, two vivid memories of the Vietnam War have stayed with me: the men of my command who became letters I had to write home and the bureaucrats in Saigon and Wash­ington who taught many Nam vets to challenge authority ever after. The latter group is served by ship renamings and the former by what that “black wall” be­comes in the eyes and under the fingertips of the Vietnam War survivors.

Never before has a war memorial com­municated what war is really all about—^a black gash of 58,000 dead young men. not flag-waving glory, just a simple, stark statement of fact. By making the memorial nothing more—just the black surface and the carved letters that be­come, under the fingers of wives and buddies, the man himself—it lives, and the names are transformed from the ghosts of nightmares and bodybags into comrades finally honored for their mili­tary service and sacrifice.

What the Vietnam Memorial seems to do that no ship named for a Vietnam bat­tle could ever do, no matter how sin­cerely or honorably dedicated, is provide

the survivors with an accessible, tangible link with their losses. It’s a focal point for the catharsis that anyone who was in­volved in the war needs to undergo.

There’s nothing more you can say about the Vietnam War to which all 58,000 would attest. There could never be a more fitting memorial to them that we would accept.

“To Seize the Moment”

(See J. D. Watkins, pp. 13-16, February 1985; D. P. Domning, p. 36, May 1985; E. J. Higgins, p. 16, June 1985 Proceedings)

“The Ultimate Defense”

(See B. L. Valley, pp. 30-37, February 1985;

D. P. Domning, p. 36, May 1985; E. J.

Higgins, p. 16, June 1985 Proceedings)

Commander Bruce Valley, U. S. Navy—I would like to respond to two letters offer­ing comment on my February article. Both Professor Daryl P. Domning and Commander Earl J. Higgins, U. S. Naval Reserve, made excellent points, reflect­ing many of the concerns, questions, and criticisms that should—and do—attend a national journey toward a possible new strategic destination. It should be noted that most of these questions have already been asked and are in the process of being answered by those within government and industry charged with responsibilities for SDI research. Far from trying to ig­nore the evidence that research into active strategic defenses will encounter a com­plex, novel, even mystifying set of prob­lems, every effort has been made to ap­proach the research task patiently, honestly, and inquisitively—in fact, a conscious decision has been made not to select final technologies and architectures for some time in order to avoid foreclos­ing future possibilities and settling pre­maturely on a lesser system. Why are there always those who must assume government cannot be trusted to serve the interests of its citizenry?

Professor Domning quoted Einstein— “nuclear weapons had changed every­thing but the way we think”—but may have missed his point. Actually, nuclear weapons have changed very little in the world. It is not what they have changed but rather their potential to change—their power to threaten change—that is so concerning. But the inference that no change has taken place in the way people think is certainly well taken. Perhaps Einstein was really saying that human nature never changes—and in that he ts correct. This, fundamentally, is why we must have safeguards for personal and national security. It is why a technologi­cal progression in arms has taken place. It is why a relationship of enmity and dis­trust exists between many nations, to­day’s two superpowers included. And it is why a view of the world which in­dulges in fantasy and false hope—and does not face facts—is dangerous.

Domning’s assertion that the ABM Treaty of 1972 “is a worthwhile end in itself” is a good example of such a fan­tasy. A treaty is merely an instrument of security. If it fails to accomplish its task-- as, inarguably, the ABM treaty failed in limiting offensive nuclear arms and re­ducing the risks of war—it is virtually worthless. One could argue that this treaty was based on delusion and false hope and that, for this reason, it actually hurt America’s security. Worthwhile- Any national security instrument—be it made of paper or steel—that doesn’t en­hance a nation’s safety and advance its interests should be discarded.

Finally, Domning seems to suggest that the history of warfare is a steady pr°"

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cession of increasing horror. That may be so in certain regions—particularly in parts of the world like Cambodia and Af­ghanistan, where a ruthless, godless, to­talitarian people now hold sway. But for civilized peoples, this is a questionable Proposal. Any balanced and thorough reading of history suggests that the pen­alty for losing a war in ancient times was far more severe than today. The Old Tes­tament is filled with references wherein one city or state overcame another and annihilated its population—even dis­mantling the cities, plowing up the land, and sowing salt in the fields.

I am in complete sympathy with Com­mander Higgins’ concerns regarding SDI’s cost and the possible weakening of conventional forces which may result as defense budgets are spread even thinner. We should both take solace in the fact that no system of active strategic defense would ever be deployed if the test of cost—and also tests of effectiveness and survivability—were not rigorously ap­plied and passed.

The concern of Commander Higgins that “one can hardly expect the Soviets to wait passively” for the United States to develop their SDI makes me wonder if he missed the page in my article where I out-

single

lined Soviet efforts in strategic defense, most of which predate or parallel our own: their active strategic defense now deployed around Moscow; their ABM treaty-violating phased array radars (as at Krasnoyarsk); their highly sophisticated air defense (perhaps possessing ABM capability in SAM-12); and their civil defense.

Finally, Commander Higgins’ closing comment that “weapons don t work, that they are not the answer to peace, and that peace can only be obtained by the understanding of peace as a function of enlightened self-interest” is fantasy world stuff. This kind of thinking is far from America’s self-interest. The peace that Admiral James D. Watkins described and to which Commander Higgins re­ferred, is—like the deterrence which sup­ports it—directly maintained by making any potential enemy’s hope of gain at our expense too painful and costly to con­sider. Two things are absolutely required for this policy to be credible—weapons and will. All else, even negotiations and treaties, as important as they can and should be, is useless without those two vital concomitants of national power and peace. That is another definition of “en­lightened self-interest.”

“Trident”

(See N. Polmar, pp. 117-118, April 1985

Proceedings)

Thomas S. Hoback—Authors—even Norman Polmar in Naval Institute Press books—make mistakes. Trident's au­thors may have offered much new mate­rial simply unavailable elsewhere and my concern is that potential readers may not discover it because they have been dis­couraged by Mr. Polmar’s over-exuber­ance in faultfinding.

“Distaff Duty”

(,See C. Conilogue, pp. 84-85, June 1985

Proceedings)

Ensign Daniel L. Richardson, U. S. Navy—Lieutenant Commander Coni­logue writes, “Women are legally re­stricted from combat duty.” Isn’t this convenient for the Navy as an institution? It can recruit women and make cosmetic changes to the Woman-at-Sea program, claiming that the institution is doing everything possible to provide opportuni­ties for women to participate in fleet op­erations and have sea-duty experiences similar to those of men, given congres­sionally set limitations.

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What is needed, however, is a new approach to provide more meaningful career opportunities for women in the Navy. Let us start at the root of the prob­lem and urge Congress to remove the combat-duty restrictions for women, at least for women in the Navy. Naval duty is unlike service in the other branches of the military, where combat duty can mean days of privation on the battlefield. Naval combat duty, on the other hand, means that a warship—providing berth­ing, messing, work centers, and recrea­tion—is liable to get shot at.

Were congressional restrictions to be lifted, there would still be other prob­lems. Berthing areas and heads would have to be segregated. With such facili­ties labeled, manning documents would have to be changed to reflect a crew mix of women and men. Rates currently closed to women would have to be re­evaluated to develop nondiscriminatory skill criteria. The Navy would also have to develop a meaningful approach to deal with the “Love Boat” syndrome.

The benefits outweigh these problems, though. Our manpower pool would dou­ble, and retention of women would in­crease as career restrictions were lifted. Mixed-crew conversion for many of the Navy’s newly built ships is as simple as putting up a few signs. Also, since the military pay scheme is inherently based on an equal-pay-for-equal-work system, having male and female integrated crews would be an example for other sectors of society to emulate in the push for greater equality of opportunity for women in the workplace.

Let’s stop hiding behind Congress and provide more equal opportunity for career advancement in the Navy.

“Leaders, Managers, and

Mercenaries”

(See C. A. Leader, pp. 92-95, November 1984;

J. T. Hayward, p. 126, January 1985; W. E.

Meyer, p. 18, February 1985; H. G. Rickover,

R. G. Thompson, p. 92, April 1985; J. C.

Gamboa, p. 23, July 1985 Proceedings)

Midshipman Fourth Class John H. Ditt- mer, Jr., U. S. Naval Reserve—Over the past 18 months, I have read many things in the leadership articles of which Admi­ral Rickover has been critical that have helped me. The articles have taught me ideals about military leadership by pro­viding the following lessons.

In the past, when a major power has suffered a serious defeat or near defeat, its military has undergone a period of self-examination and reform. This has been done, to modify the proverb, so as to not repeat the same mistakes. Exam­ples of this were the Prussians after the Napoleonic Wars and the Soviets after World War II. On the other hand, powers that fail to examine and reform, such as the Austrians in their war against the Prussians in 1866 and in World War 1 and the Russians in the Russo-Japanese War and World War I, seem to have been fated to suffer their misfortunes again.

One of the first things that is examined is the military leadership. Leaders always receive the praise or blame for the fate o their missions. It does not matter if they are serving only as a fire-team leader or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the story remains the same; the responsi­bility belongs to them and them alone-

After the Vietnam conflict, peopl^e asked, “What went wrong and what can we do to prevent failures in the future- Many believed that the problem of l^ovV morale among military personnel in Viet­nam was because of a lack of faith m what they were doing. Making personne believe in their work is a part of motiva­tion which is the responsibility of a go°d leader.

Achieving the state of motivation nec­essary for satisfactory performance ^ot duties can be done in many ways. Them are as many leadership styles as there art- leaders. What is important is how the leader adapts general leadership princt' pies to his particular situation. No one is going to be exactly like Navy Admira Chester W. Nimitz or Marine Lieutenant General Lewis B. “Chesty” Puller, but. individually, we should make every ^ej' fort to be the best officers we can be. It^lS an obligation we owe to our nation, °^ur service, our people, and ourselves.

Leaders must always remind them­selves that the factors that motivate p^e°' pie may change. To motivate people to do things they may not want to do may ⁱⁿ' volve actions that range from the very subtle to the very direct. It could men¹¹ paying a small compliment to one of y°^ur people or giving in-depth counseling about a serious problem. The value of the articles in the Proceedings is that they give officers a chance to share ideas an^a experiences with their fellow officers that could be useful to all. As our collective experience continues and grows, we must be aware of changes in theories and id^eaS because the attitudes and thoughts of o^ur personnel are always changing.

Leadership articles provide a chance for officers to compare their leadership styles with others and reflect upon them- This type of dialogue should be maim ficers’ minds focused upon leadership which is supposed to be the essence

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their profession. Some of the authors of the leadership articles are officers with many years of experience behind them. It is critical for junior officers to have some notion of the viewpoints of their seniors. Many junior officers serious about ad­vancing their careers would appreciate knowing what is expected of them as a leader by their senior officers.

With all due respect, if Admiral Rick- over considers the current leadership arti­cles of little worth, maybe he should write one himself that would explain what he seeks in leadership. This would be of value to us all. Like him, I would like to see some other responses on this subject.

“Coastal Defense”

(See E. A. Moritz, pp. 44-48, June 1985 Proceedings)

“Helicopters: To Arms! To Arms!”

(See R. C. Powers, pp. 109-111, June 1985

Proceedings)

Commander Ronald Fraser, U. S. Coast Guard Reserve—Commander Moritz has helped put the emerging maritime de­fense zone (MDZ) commands into their long, historical context. MDZ planners must ask, “How much coastal and harbor defense is enough?” We don’t want to buy more than we need. Nor do we want to find ourselves vulnerable along our coastlines.

Making better use of existing assets is a “cheap” option always open to military planners. If one could significantly aug­ment our coastal and harbor defense ca­pabilities with a relatively small increase in our defense budget, most planners— even in the absence of a consensus of what constitutes an adequate coastal de­fense force—would feel satisfied.

Ironically, Captain Powers’ article suggests a “cheap” way MDZ planners can multiply our coastal defense capabili­ties. He notes that, except for antisubma­rine warfare, the U. S. Navy has long overlooked the helicopter as an offensive platform. This is the case, Captain Pow­ers contends, because the armed helicop­ter has lacked a “sponsor” in the Navy bureaucracy. He likens the situation to the fixed-wing naval aircraft prior to the 1930s. It was the conventional wisdom then that aircraft could not sink large naval combatants. They were used for all sorts of auxiliary jobs, but naval offen­sive strength was still thought to reside in the battleship and the cruiser. That was before visionary Army General Billy Mitchell opened the Navy planners’ eyes.

Naval air fixed-wing “sponsors” were not hard to find thereafter.

Now the Coast Guard maintains a large fleet of helicopters along the coasts of the continental United States. Like the Navy, the Coast Guard has been myopic about the helicopter, using it to find and pluck people from the water. So, absent a “sponsor” pushing for change, Coast Guard helicopters are used for little more than search-and-rescue missions.

Since the MDZ is a joint Navy-Coast Guard command, both services will be expected to do their share to provide the means to strengthen our coastal defense. Perhaps the MDZ commanders will be­come “sponsors” for change in Coast Guard air power. Untapped, existing re­sources, like the 90 or so Aerospatiale Dolphin helicopters the Coast Guard is getting, with relatively little additional cost, could become a significant national defense asset.

Today, no Coast Guard helicopter has any offensive military capability. Yet. many nations have armed Aerospatiale helicopters. Why can’t we?

“U. S. Naval Aircraft and Missile Development—1984”

(See F. D. Kennedy, Jr., pp. 74-80, 343-355, May 1985 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander C. Dean Swai'ti’ U. S. Navy—Congratulations on the May 1985 “Naval Review Issue.” I consider it your best ever. Not only is it informa­tive; it is also an excellent reference f°^r professional and personal information.

However, I was personally disap­pointed with the caption on page 74 far the photograph on page 75. The F-18 car­rier qualifications shown were conducted on board the USS Enterprise (CVN-65)- not the USS Constellation (CV-64). The distinctive island structure is the most obvious identifying feature.

I was the catapult officer shown in the photograph and distinctly remember when the photo was taken. We here on the Enterprise are probably the only ones to notice the error, but I thought you’d appreciate knowing how carefully y°^ur publication is scrutinized.

“$436 Hammers and Consistent Arguments”

(See R. R. Harris, p. 142, July 1985 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander S. D. Arnote, U. S. Navy—Well-trained, professional managers are the key to keeping acquisi­tion programs on schedule and under