Professional Notes

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 “New” as in Nuclear Land Attack Tomahawk

In June 1984, with little fanfare, nu­clear land attack Tomahawk missiles (TLAM/N) became operational on board Navy general purpose ships and subma­rines. This deployment represents a major new Navy contribution both to de­terrence and to the attainment of national goals should deterrence fail. The policy implications of nuclear sea-launched cruise missile deployment deserve seri­ous study by naval officers.

The family of sea-launched Tomahawk weapons includes a conventional antiship missile, a conventional land-attack mis­sile, and the TLAM/N. The Tomahawk antiship missile uses either active radar search or a combination of active search and passive detection to seek out and at­tack high-speed maneuvering ships at operational ranges of approximately 250 nautical miles. Armed with a conven­tional warhead, the antiship Tomahawk extends the standoff range of surface ships and submarines by a factor of four to five over that currently available with Harpoon. It allows a single ship to en­gage targets spread over an ocean equal >n size to the combined areas of the states of North and South Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey.

The capabilities of the conventional land-attack Tomahawk are equally strik­ing. It can be employed at ranges of 500­700 nautical miles, complementing the carrier-based strike aircraft capability or allowing a limited, measured response as an expression of U. S. will and determi­nation without risking aircraft or pilots. It also allows high leverage strikes against land targets from the majority of attack submarines and surface combatants. When employed in conjunction with car­rier aircraft, the conventional land-attack Tomahawk offers a range of options which provide increased conventional attack capability, raising the nuclear threshold.

These two conventional Tomahawk variants give the Navy important new capabilities, but they do not change the fleet’s basic purpose or mission. The TLAM/N does. It offers a major new contribution to deterrence and a unique set of challenges. In the past. Navy nu­clear weapons could be easily divided into two groups. Strategic weapons were carried on dedicated fleet ballistic missile

Even though it looks just like its conventional counterparts, the nuclear land attack Tomahawk missile changes the general purpose forces by increasing their deterrence capability.

submarines and had little impact on the rest of the fleet. Tactical weapons for an­tisubmarine warfare (ASW) or antiair use were widespread. These weapons, how­ever, were inherently defensive for use at sea to defend the fleet. With the excep­tion of nuclear strike bombs on aircraft carriers, the demarcation between strate­gic and tactical nuclear weapons was easy and complete. Only aircraft carriers failed to fit the neat, simple labels of “strategic” or “tactical.” Nuclear strike bombs on aircraft carriers had—and still have—inherent capabilities for both stra­tegic and tactical warfare. But as the car­rier’s strategic role diminished and her general purpose tasks increased, the Navy became divided into a small, sub­marine-based strategic nuclear compo­nent and a far larger general purpose component. The advent of TLAM/N has changed that.

While the Navy considers TLAM/N primarily a theater weapon, it has impor­tant strategic capabilities. This strategic aspect was specifically recognized by President Ronald Reagan when he an­nounced the decision to procure the nu­clear Tomahawk as part of his 1981 stra­tegic modernization program. Deploy­ment of TLAM/N is significantly dif­ferent from deployment of a new ASW or antiair warfare (AAW) weapon. Con­siderations which before could be left to strategic nuclear planners, to a few attack aviators, or to the nuclear-powered fleet ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force will now impact on fleet operations and on the general purpose Navy. TLAM/N’s deployment calls for new thinking and an understanding of deterrence on the part of naval officers.

Like all U. S. nuclear weapons, TLAM/N’s primary purpose is deter­rence, to which it contributes in several ways. Perhaps the most important, as well as the most difficult to understand, is its contribution to the nuclear reserve force, that part of our nuclear forces de­signed to be withheld to deter a follow-on attack against the United States or its al­lies. The concept of nuclear forces held in reserve for possible use after a large-scale strategic nuclear exchange is difficult to grasp and foreign to the thinking of many military officers.

The consequences of strategic nuclear use are so severe it may seem redundant to consider a reserve for use after the hol­ocaust. But we do not seek to deter our­selves or other Americans. We seek to deter the Soviets and must, therefore, consider Soviet thinking, not our own. Since the Soviets may believe the strug­gle will continue after the exchange of strategic weapons, it is important for them to understand that even in this ex­treme case, they cannot hope to prevail. The assignment of TLAM/N to the nu­clear reserve force strengthens deterrence by making this fact clear.

TLAM/N contributes to deterrence in other ways as well. It provides the theater commander with a survivable nuclear capability, enhancing deterrence by de­nying the Soviets any reasonable hope of preemptively removing U. S. theater forces. TLAM/N, therefore, both reduces the attractiveness of strikes against air­craft carriers in a possible Soviet attempt to preempt U. S. worldwide options and provides an on-scene deterrent in the ab­sence of carriers, whose presence may be required in other areas. In addition, TLAM/N provides a key deterrent to pos­sible Soviet plans to use nuclear antiship missiles launched from Soviet naval avia­tion “Backfire” and “Badger” aircraft to attack the U. S. Navy. By removing any possible Soviet perception that So­viet Naval Aviation could initiate nuclear war at sea from land-based sanctuaries, TLAM/N makes it clear that nuclear strikes against the fleet could have wide­spread consequences, increasing our abil­ity to deter such attacks.

While the deployment of TLAM/N provides important new capabilities to attack submarines and surface combat­ants, it does not change these ships’ es­sential role. They remain general purpose platforms whose principal mission is to implement the Navy’s maritime strategy. TLAM/N employment planning is de­signed to ensure the primacy of the gen­eral purpose mission. No ship or subma­rine will be stationed in any given area solely because of its nuclear Tomahawk capability. To preclude any possibility of conflict with general purpose missions, the Tomahawk will not be part of the Sin­gle Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), the nation’s basic nuclear war plan. Fi­nally, no ship will be employed in special ways because it is a Tomahawk platform; despite their new capabilities, ships or attack submarines with Tomahawk nu­clear capability will remain general pur­pose forces whose operations are un­changed from the past. What will change is the need for commanding officers o Tomahawk platforms and staff officers who supervise the operation of such p>^at' forms to recognize the major new role the fleet has assumed.

The Navy’s contribution to deterrence has always been immense. The SSBN force forms the most survivable leg of t ^e strategic triad and is thus a major contri utor to deterrence of nuclear attack. The wide-ranging nature of naval forces along with their inherent mobility and power play a major role in deterring lower le^ye attacks. With the deployment of m® TLAM/N, the Navy has a new deterrent capability bridging these two areas. The employment of Tomahawk will ensure that the new additions to- nuclear deter rence do not come at the expense of ^[1] ® Navy’s continued ability to deter ^a forms of aggression. Instead, TLAM/ will be a significant addition to an alrea y formidable deterrent, providing a P^oten force for peace.

Captain Brooks has spent the bulk of his career billets associated with the submarine force. Asho ’ he has served in the offices of the Secretary of ^ fense and Chief of Naval Operations. His wriMS^ have previously been published in Proceedings a ^ the Naval War College Review. Captain Brooks > currently assigned to the staff of the Chief of Na'¹ Operations.

The Survivor Benefit Plan

By Lieutenant Colonel Michael B. Cathey, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve, and Major Donald E. Clemmer, U. S. Army

In 1972, Congress enacted the Survi­vor Benefit Plan (SBP) to protect the sur­vivors of retired military service mem­bers. Under this plan, the government, for a specified cost, provides an annuity in monthly payments to the retiree’s spouse upon the retiree’s death.

Participation in the program has never reached the anticipated goal of 85%. The FY 1983 DoD Statistical Report on the Military Retirement System shows that the SBP participation rate for new retirees is 55% overall—74% for officers and 45% for enlisted personnel. Although counselling programs have improved, prospective retirees still find the various SBP components, costs, options, and benefits confusing. As a result, they have difficulty deciding between SBP and commercially available alternative plans. SBP seems costly, but so do alternatives. In making comparisons between the two, the retiree is confronted with determining the value of premiums, dividends, net surrender values, tax-exemptions, and tax deferrals under conditions of uncer­tainty about future rates of inflation, his own life expectancy, and his spouse’s life expectancy.

Our goal in this paper is to provide a military retiree with the information to make a reasoned decision in choosing between the SBP program or an alterna­tive plan from the private sector. We will compare the costs and benefits of SBP with those of four representative life in­surance plans from several commercial life insurance companies.

The variation in a prospective retiree’s life insurance and estate planning needs makes it virtually impossible to provide an analysis that will be universally appli­cable. In an effort to simplify the analy­sis, however, we have chosen the follow­ing example for use in comparing the SBP with alternative plans:

• Year of retirement: 1984
• Grade at retirement: lieutenant colonel
• Years of service: 20
• Age of retiree: 43
• Dependents: spouse only, assumed to be female
• Age of spouse: 41           .
• Income tax assumptions: 1983 rates t married and single taxpayers; standar deductions; and no other earnings

The Survivor Benefit Plan: The SB? provides financial protection for a r® tiree’s survivors based on his military ^r® tirement income. It is available to a members when they become entitled to retirement pay, regardless of phy^sl®. disability. A service member elects his level of participation by selecting “monthly base amount,” which must at least $300 and can be as much as hi* monthly retired pay. Both the cost an amount of the SBP annuity are comp^ut® using this “base amount.”

The SBP annuity is equal to 55% of | base amount selected by the retiree and >s the amount which will be receive monthly by a spouse. The cost of the S coverage is computed on the ’ base amount by the formula: .025 times t ^e

first $300 plus . 10 times the remainder o the “base” amount. This cost is deducte monthly from the member’s retired pay and is exempt from federal income taxa­tion. Depending on the tax laws in the state of residence, these pay deductions may also be exempt from state income tax. The value of SBP annuities for spouses is exempt from federal estate tax and, in most cases, state inheritance taxes.

SBP provides for the designation of five categories of beneficiaries for the retiree—his spouse only, his spouse and eligible children, his children only, per­sons with insurable interest, or an ex­spouse. While the cost of participation differs for each category, the cost of pro­tection for minor children is exception­ally low. In this paper, we will concen­trate on spouse-only coverage.

Both the cost and benefits of the SBP are adjusted for inflation. The survivor’s annuity is adjusted for full consumer Price index increases while the cost is adjusted by the actual percentage the re­tired pay increases. Therefore, as a mem­ber's retired pay is increased to adjust for inflation, he will still pay the same per­centage of pay to obtain an inflation-ad­justed SBP benefit for his spouse in the event he dies.

The SBP annuity is not payable as a lump sum. To make comparisons with alternatives which do provide lump sum benefits, the equivalent lump sum value °f the annual inflation-adjusted, after-tax SBP annuity will be determined. Valua­tion would be a simple task except for the assumptions that must be made regarding the variables that determine the size of the SBP benefit a spouse would actually receive (see Table 1). These assumptions will not only influence the equivalent lump sum value of the SBP annuity but will also influence the costs used to com­pare the SBP with an alternate plan.

The SBP is a tax exempt program, and the amount that one pays for participating in the program is excluded from taxable income. If a retiree should elect an alter­native plan over SBP, he would be re­quired to pay additional tax as his taxable income would be higher. The amount of additional tax that would be due is based on a rate approximately equal to one’s tax bracket. Thus, the after-tax cost of SBP is equal to the amount which remains after the additional taxes are subtracted from the additional taxable income. It repre­sents the cost ceiling a private plan must meet to be regarded as equivalent to SBP.

Our computations cover a 35-year pe­riod. This amount of time equates to a normal life expectancy of 77 years for a retiree who is now 43 years old.

The second part of the criteria for com­parison involves the provision of compa­rable benefits. Our methodology com­pares the lump sum cash equivalent value of SBP annuity payments with the bene­fits obtainable under an alternative plan for an equivalent after-tax cost. There are a number of assumptions and key varia­bles involved.

• Age of spouse: Given a normal life expectancy, the younger the spouse is, the longer she would receive payments under SBP. Our computations assume that the retiree’s spouse is two years younger than the retiree.
• Spouse’s life expectancy: These values are based on values in common use throughout the life insurance industry. Life expectancy values used are given in Table 2.
• Spouse’s taxes: SBP payments to the spouse are taxable as income: however, proceeds from alternative plans are not necessarily taxable since investment op­portunities exist which can yield tax-free

Table 1 Non-Disability Retiree Life Expectancies

expected to live to age 77.”

Elapsed years represent years since retirement.

Spouse

Years

Elapsed ¹ age at retirement: 41

Age

Attained

41

42-49

50-55

56-59

60-62

63-65

66-68

69-71

72-73

74-75

Table 2 Spouse Life Expectancies

Spouse age at retirement: 37

Notes: Life expectancy values rounded to nearest whole year.

Relationship between attained age and life expectancy simply stated is, “If spouse's age is 41, then she can be expected to live to age 78." Elapsed years represent years since retirement.

income. This analysis assumes that in­come from alternative plans will be tax free. The SBP annuity is taxed using a tax rate based only on the SBP annuity.

• Discount!present value rate: In deter­mining the current value of the SBP an­nuity, a high discount rate (rate of inter­est) will yield a lower value than will a low rate. A discount rate of 8% is used in our analysis. This is a conservative rate given the higher interest rates prevalent today, but it is above the inflation rate used. This rate of interest, or a greater rate, has been available from banks and savings and loans for several years.
• Inflation: Inflation will cause a re­tiree’s income, SBP base amount, SBP cost, and any surviving spouse’s SBP annuity to increase over time because of periodic cost-of-living allowances (COLA). A COLA rate of 6% is used in our computations to determine costs and value of the SBP annuity. This is above current inflation rate of percent but below the average annual COLA rate of 8.4% given retirees between 1973 and 1983.
• Social security offset: Current law re­quires that SBP payments to a surviving spouse be offset (reduced) by an amount equal to the social security benefit based on the retiree’s military earned wage credits. The offset is applied when the survivor becomes eligible for social secu­rity benefits. The social security offset was enacted because the government contributes to the Social Security Fund for active-duty personnel and also pays part of the cost of the SBP annuity. De­duction from the annuity results in lower overall taxes for the spouse since social security payments are not taxable.

A spouse’s SBP annuity, not the social security benefit payment, is reduced when she reaches age 62. The amount of the reduction is the lesser of either the amount of the social security benefit enti­tlement based on the retiree’s active-duty service after 31 December 1956 (military personnel came under the social security system in 1975) or 40% of the monthly SBP annuity payable. Using the compu­tational procedures specified in Army Regulation 608-9, the offset is 40% for our retiree example since his social secu­rity entitlement based on military service is greater than 40% of the SBP annuity. Our computations assume that annual

The military retiree’s suvivors must live with their former provider’s choice between the SBP and a private plan. It is critical to select the best— not necessarily the simplest—plan.

social security benefit increases for infla­tion are comparable to those for retired pay. Data for the past ten years show this to be true.

Table 3 gives the cash equivalent value of the SBP annuity if the retiree had se­lected the maximum base amount, and Table 4 shows the value if the minimum base amount were selected. The lump sum cash equivalent value is represented by the “current value” column which, at any point in time, is equal to the value of annual SBP payments that would be paid in the event of the retiree’s death until the end of the spouse’s life expectancy if the spouse was age 41 at time of retirement. The rise in the annuity value over time reflects the time value of money and the increasing size of the annuity because of the COLA. The annuity and its current value decrease at year 22 because of the social security offset.

Alternative Plans: For alternatives, we chose insurance plans available from three major commercial life insurance companies combined with the SBP mini­mum option (base amount equal to $300). We included the minimum-option SBP in alternative plans because our analysis shows that the minimum-option SBP is unbeatable by private plans.

At year one, the minimum-option SBP annuity is valued at $44,962. The annual after-tax cost is $73. Our data indicate that the annual premium for $45,000 of term insurance for our retiree would be about $85. On the basis of this compari­son, term insurance is not satisfactory as a substitute. In future years, the differ­ence in cost will become greater because the value of the minimum-option SBP annuity increases, requiring additiona term insurance to be purchased at an ever-increasing premium rate as the re­tiree gets older. Other forms of insurance were not considered as their premium rates would be even higher than that for term insurance. Therefore, it would not be prudent for the average prospective retiree to consider an alternative plan ^t0 the maximum-option SBP which does not incorporate the minimum-option SBP ^aS a feature.

The life insurance plans used can be regarded as life insurance in combination with an investment account rather than the typical life insurance policy wit which most people are familiar. Com mercial life insurance companies invest the portion of the premium that remain⁵' after deducting the cost of the insurance policy, overhead, and profit for the com pany. This investment, hopefully, ^W1 grow at a rate that will greatly increase the cash value of the entire protection plan. The investment feature comes clos est to providing the insured with some hedge against inflation.

There are means of temporarily reduc ing or deferring the costs of some p⁰'¹ cies. Such means are referred to as bor­rowing against the policy or minimum depositing the contract and would alter the costs of the plan. There are advan tages and disadvantages to borrowing against the policy, and a purchaser shou understand how his policy will be a fected before electing to take such a step-

Plan One: The first alternative com bines the $300 minimum-option SB base and $250,000 of decreasing ter”

and whole life insurance. The yearly costs and projected benefits from the in­surance portion of this plan available ^t0 the spouse at any time are given in Table 5.

Plan Two: The second alternative plan, also shown in Table 5, offers lower total costs through the life of the plan than the first alternative. The life insurance asso­ciated with the alternative is a $100,000 variable whole life policy. Ordinarily, the investment portion of the premium attrib­utable to the reserve is included in the company’s general investment fund. This alternative is unique in that these lunds are invested instead as directed by the re­tiree among the choices offered by the company. The premium is fixed at $2,258 per year. Two values for the fu­ture value of the insurance benefits using 6% and 12% rates of return for the in­vested premiums are provided.

Plan Three: The third alternative con­sists of $200,000 of term insurance and the minimum SBP option. Costs and ben­efits are shown in Table 6. The difference between the cost for this alternative and the full SBP participation cost during the early years is invested. The value of this investment is shown separately. Yearly savings on the investment are taxable. The term insurance is renewable, and the retiree remains insurable as long as the premiums are paid even though premi­ums increase at an even higher rate as one gets older. It is possible to compensate to a degree for the higher premiums later on by reducing the amount of term insurance carried; however, the cost savings in­vested earlier would have to be" large enough to compensate for the decrease in the face value of the insurance and to ab-

Table 7 Alternative Plan 4: Insurance Costs and Benefits

Insurance Investment Rate of Return

of insured.

of costs for plan three in excess of the maximum SBP costs. This begins to occur at year 31.

sorb any higher premiums remaining.

Plan Four: This alternative combines the minimum SBP option with a universal life insurance policy for which the amount of coverage is adjusted through­out the retiree’s life. Costs and benefits are shown in Table 7. This alternative is similar to plan three except that yearly earnings on the invested excess premiums are sheltered from taxation. This alterna­tive assumes that the retiree would re­main insurable so as to be able to increase the amount of coverage as needed.

Commercial life insurance has other features which should also be considered. First, death benefits can be taken in a lump sum to be invested or to cover un­foreseen emergencies. Second, proceeds of life insurance are income tax free; however, they may be subject to estate tax. Third, life insurance proceeds are more liquid than SBP and can be invested so as to provide tax-free income. Finally, life insurance proceeds can be passed to persons other than the spouse or minor dependent children.

Evaluation of Alternatives: Using our example, an alternative plan must pro­vide equal or greater benefits for equal or lower costs to be considered equivalent with the maximum SBP option, or SBP. The graph in Figure 1 gives cost compari­sons of the alternative plans versus SBP. The costs graph shows the annual cash outlays for each alternative versus the after-tax costs required to provide the maximum-option SBP. Comparisons of the benefits associated with the alterna­tive plans and SBP are presented in Fig­ure 2. The total benefit for each alterna­tive is the life insurance benefit, valued at the total amount of death protection pro­vided at that point in time, plus the cur­rent value of the annuity for the minimum option SBP.

Plan One Versus Maximum SBP Op­tion: The costs for obtaining alternative plan one in the first year are competitive with SBP; however, in following years, the annual costs of plan one significantly exceed those of SBP until about year 35. The maximum difference in costs be­

tween the two plans is $2,512, whic occurs at year 22. ,

Figure 2 shows that the first year * benefits of plan one are superior to those of SBP, exceeding them by almost $86,000. In fact, the benefits associate with plan one exceed those of SBP P^ast year 35. Flowever, if the retiree P^ur' chased term insurance with the difference in costs, he would surpass the extra bene fit provided by plan one. This leads us to conclude that plan one is unsatisfactory because of higher costs.

Plan Two Versus Maximum SBP: ' costs of plan two are relatively level; th only real fluctuations are caused by cost of-living increases applied to the mint mum-option SBP portion of this plan- The costs of plan two exceed those ⁰ SBP in the early years, but by about ye^a^ 15, COLA increases have caused SB^ costs to exceed those of the alternative- The excess costs of plan two during years one through 15 are fully recouped by y^ear 35 through lower premiums. Therefore- plan two costs can be regarded as equal to

or less than those of the maximum SBP option.

A comparison of benefits reveals that in early years SBP offers almost $60,000 more in benefits. Plan two could possibly catch up in later years, depending on the success of the plan’s investment portion. If the retiree is willing to risk being in­sured at a lower amount for about 15 years and if he is confident of earning a 12% return, then plan two is attractive. If the rate of return is only 6%, which is unlikely, but possible, the benefit would not exceed SBP until beyond year 35 (age 76); therefore, this plan would provide substantially lower benefits than SBP. Plan two is regarded as unsatisfactory because of the risk incurred by the retiree during the benefit shortfall period of the early years.

Plan Three Versus Maximum SBP: Plan three is attractive. Costs are equal to those of SBP for our time horizon, and the benefits are greater than the after-tax SBP annuity. Therefore, plan three is regarded as an acceptable alternative. If an after-tax investment yield of greater than 8% is realized on the cost savings, this alternative becomes even more at­tractive. After year 35, the term insur­ance premium increases exponentially.

Plan Four Versus Maximum SBP: Plan four is also attractive. Costs are essen­tially equal to those of SBP for our time horizon, and the benefits are greater than the after-tax SBP annuity. In fact, the benefit equals the value of the before-tax SBP annuity. Cost and benefit values are not exactly equal as data presented to the insurance company were rounded for computational ease. At a lower invest­ment rate, say 9.5%, the cash value does not increase substantially and begins to erode after year 30. At this rate, the amount of insurance eventually would have to be decreased or higher costs in­curred to maintain protection equivalent to SBP.

Older Retirees Versus Younger Re­tirees: One would expect that older re­tirees would not fare as well as younger retirees do with private plans, primarily because the older retiree would pay a higher insurance premium because of the age factor. There are other factors, too, such as higher taxes because of a higher retired pay base (assuming that years of service is greater). In evaluating the age factor, we advanced the retiree’s age, his spouse’s age, and his years of service by five years. The same tax table was used; however, our 48-year-old retiree has a higher tax rate because his retired pay is higher. Other variables were not changed.

Using our methodology, the value of the SBP annuity for the 48-year-old re­tiree’s spouse is less than that for the 43- year-old retiree’s spouse at corresponding ages or years since retirement. This is the result of a combination of factors, includ­ing the annual COLA increase assump­tion. The SBP annuity values are shown in Table 8.

We used plan three to compare private plan results. As can be seen from com­paring values in Table 9 with those in Table 6, the 48-year-old retiree does not fare as well under this alternative plan as

the 43-year-old retiree does. Using our criteria of equal or lower costs for equal or greater benefits, this plan is an accept­able alternative for our 48-year-old re­tiree. Erosion begins to occur to the in­vested difference because of higher insurance premiums after year 30.

Two factors allow commercial insur­ance plans to compete as effectively as

they do. The first is that higher interest and investment rates have become avail­able within the past few years. Equally significant are the new investment type commercial life insurance policies that have come into being in the past decade.

The second factor involves the increas­ing SBP costs new retirees must pay as compared to earlier retirees for equivalent protection. This occurs because protec­tion at the minimum level for new retirees is not indexed for inflation. For example, a person retiring several years ago would pay $7.50 per month for the first $300 of his elected base amount. If subsequent COLA raises increased this minimum base amount to $400, the retiree would pay $10.50 per month. A new retiree

Table 8 SBP Annuity Value for 48-Year-Old Retiree

Minimum Option                        Maximum Option*

♦Values shown are based on the maximum base amount for which our 43-year-old retiree would be eligible. The maximum base amount for the 48-year-old retiree is greater as his retired pay is greater.

♦♦Beyond range of life expectancy values in Table 2.

Table 9 Alternative Plan Three For 48-Year-Old Retiree: Costs and Benefits

nsumaieu cost.                                                                                                                                                                                         .                                                                                         . _n _*_s

²This column represents the difference between the maximum option SBP and the costs shown above for alternative 3 at an 8 percent after tax return. As shown it re the withdrawal of costs for alternative three in excess of the maximum SBP costs. This begins to occur at year 23.

Table 10 Cash Equivalency Comparison of SBP Annuities¹

would pay substantially more—$17.50 —on a base amount of $400. The fifth Quadrennial Review on Military Com­pensation (QRMC) advises that correc­tive action is under way. Cost adjust­ments are not expected to be retroactive but will insure that, after enactment of legislation, future retirees will all pay the same amount for an equivalent amount of protection.

Risk Assessment: Risk is the amount of potential undervaluation of the SBP an­nuity the retiree accepts because assump­tions must be made concerning the uncer­tainty of the future. Assumptions used in the valuation process may not actually hold in a real life situation. In addressing risk, one could ask, “What is the signifi­cance of a $20,000 valuation error? It represents only 6% of the maximum value shown in Table 3.” The signifi­cance of this shortfall is that it could be equivalent to not paying a widow an SBP payment during her last two years of life. Depending on how long a widow actually lives, the shortfall could be even greater. A glance at Table 10 shows the risk value can be even greater, e.g., in the event a spouse lives longer than 87 years. For example, the annuity for a spouse who is age 41 at retirement and has a life expect­ancy of age 92 has a maximum after-tax lump sum value of $480,000.

The effects of some assumptions may not be readily apparent to the reader. For example, the table values used in compu-

If You’ve Got It,

By Thomas P. Faulconer

Considerable interest is being evinced by knowledgeable officers, experienced engineers, and pilots about the beneficial characteristics of “seaplanes” or flying boats as the solution to our military needs as a world power.

Since the early days of aviation, sea- based aircraft have progressed hand in hand with land-based craft in speed com­petition, altitude, range, endurance, and other criteria of airborne vehicles. The proven stamina, flexibility, cargo-carry­ing ability, and other combat applications of the flying boat are again being pro­claimed in articles appearing in the Pro­ceedings and other industry journals.

The fleet air ultra naval transport (FLAUNT) flying boat can deploy a Har­rier squadron of six aircraft to a 3,000- mile distant station in five hours, con­trasted with the four days and four hours required for a 30-knot ship to cover the

tations for our analysis remained con­stant. Would Congress revise tax rates should inflation for the next 35 years av­erage 6% annually? A lowering of the rate would increase the annuity value, but would also increase the after-tax cost. Another factor would be the time of year of the deaths of the retiree and spouse. This could result in a valuation error of as much as two years. Our calculations as­sume that the retiree dies at the beginning of a year and that the spouse dies at the end of a year. Finally, whose life expect­ancy values should be used? Our values for the spouse are different than those used by the QRMC and result in a 2% lower lump sum value for the spouse’s annuity in year one.

A prospective retiree is uncertain about how long he or his spouse will live, what his health will be, how the economy will perform, or what future interest rates will be. If an alternative plan is chosen, the retiree must accept some risk about the outcome of events.

SBP contains the lowest amount of risk because it is indexed to inflation and be­cause assumptions do not have to be made, especially those regarding the life expectancies of the retiree and his spouse, tax rates, and investment rates. Based on our study, we believe that SBP provides the maximum protection at the least cost for each dollar spent. We regard this conclusion to be completely irrefut­able when only the minimum SBP option is considered.

FLAUNT It

same distance. At her speed and altitude, FLAUNT will be much less vulnerable to enemy attack under way and will have a short response time to evasive action when on station, being able to put 600 miles per hour between herself and the enemy. Sea Harriers armed with ad­vanced medium-range air-to-air missiles could provide excellent defense, react­ing to enemy attack foreseen by the FLAUNT airborne early warning system.

The Harrier carrier mission is best de­scribed by John F. Farley, Manager, Dunsfold Plant, British Aerospace Air­craft Group and pioneer Harrier test pilot.

Farley’s opinion is, “The hull volume of FLAUNT is sufficient for a viable mil­itary force, a squadron of six Harriers. ” At a gross weight of 1,708,000 pounds, FLAUNT could provide 266,855 pounds of fuel and 81,200 pounds of offensive armament for a total of eight 800-mile

SBP is an excellent buy for protection of a surviving spouse. After all, the spouse will bear the consequences of a wrong decision. Costs are important as long as one lives. On the day of death, costs are irrelevant—the adequacy of a retiree’s provision for his spouse then becomes the only important issue. Before making a decision on whether or not to participate in the SBP, a prospective re­tiree should study the plan carefully.

Lieutenant Colonel Cathey, a 1967 graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy, holds a master's degree in business administration from the University of West Florida. He has served as a forward observer and tac­tical air observer in Vietnam and as a flight instructor for OV-10, and A-6s. He is currently the Special Assistant for Marine Corps Reserve to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Reserve Affairs) and is also pursuing a Doctor of Business Administration degree at the George Washington University.

Major Clemmer was graduated from Jacksonville State University in 1965 and received his master’s degree in Industrial Management from the Georgia Institute of Technology. He has served in numerous Automatic Data Processing (ADP)-related assign­ments and in the Studies and Programs Office. Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. U.' S. Army. He is currently an ADP Management Officer in the Worldwide Military Command and Control System ADP Technical Support Directorate, Joint Data Systems Support Center, Defense Communica­tions Agency. He is also enrolled in the Doctoral Study Program in the School of Government and Business Administration at the George Washington University.

range squadron missions, or 48 unit Har­rier missions, in addition to the fuel re­quired for the get-home leg of the FLAUNT carrier, after a 3,000-mile ini­tial flight. He said that the British “are looking for a means of rapid deployment of Harrier squadrons combined with a stable platform for launch and recovery (carrier style) and an operations and maintenance base for squadrons of six Harrier aircraft.”

Farley also made the following state­ment about FLAUNT:

The^l50 ft. run and a ski-jump angle of 12 —15 is more than enough for take-off. Plane handling, landings, etc. will be similar to ordinary aircraft carrier procedures. Harrier operations at sea have shown that flight opera­tions can be carried out with deck motions of ±5° roll and ±2° pitch.”

Dr. John Fozard, designer of the Har­rier, says, “Quite breathtaking in its scope and implications—it could prove quite practicable.”

The FLAUNT retractable spar buoy stabilization (RSBS) system was proven to have considerably less roll or pitch even in very heavy sea states.

With the highly mobile FLAUNT, Harrier missions could be carried out well forward by deploying the whole squadron on board FLAUNT, reducing the need for airborne refuelling.

A complement of 20 men assigned to squadron operations, maintenance, and armament will be included, as well as repair and maintenance shops, normal spares, and supplies.

With the changes in global threats, the need for rapid deployment and strong countermeasures grows every month. The flying boat now appears to be the most practical, cost-effective system to meet these pressing requirements for a worldwide navy.

Large-scale, long-range logistics to combat “brushfire” incursions and ter­rorism demand immediate response. The

Falklands Conflict demonstrated this need, yet three weeks was the best a modem navy could achieve. Compare this fact with the potential reaction time of less than 36 hours to arrival at the scene with a very effective, viable force, by means of the FLAUNT system which would provide not only the logistical ve­hicle but also the operations base.

The flying boat proposed in this pro­fessional note, because of its size, speed, payload, and unique stability on the sea surface, along with the capacity for beach loading and off-loading, self protection and offensive power, combines the ulti­mate capabilities for its many missions, unrivaled by any other type of craft and would require no fixed forward base.

FLAUNT can land in heavy seas on her ski, taxi to exact mooring coordi­nates, and sit for days or weeks impervi­ous to gales or sea conditions. Upon completion of her mission, or under threat of attack, she can retract the stabi­lizer system and take off to relocate at 600 knots.

As in ships of the line, the quarters, galley, wardroom, captain’s cabin, a large electronics suite, and special facili­ties for her many and varied missions would be provided.

When the RSBS system is not needed, it can easily be stowed ashore, adding another 126,000 pounds for cargo, arma­ment, or fuel to be carried in the wing tanks provided.

The advantage of speeds in the hun­dreds of knots can never be accomplished by surface vessels, while, as size in­creases along with waterline length, fly­ing boats of 500 to 850 long tons become capable of operation in bad weather and heavy seas without weight penalties in hull structure.

There is probably only one legitimate provable argument against the use of fly^­ing boats in any type of combat mission normally accomplished by surface craft, and that is their vulnerability to severe weather when at rest. All ships are lim­ited by bad weather, but the conventional flying boat is particularly affected be­cause of the heavy loads imposed upon its flotation hull and widely separated stabi­lizing floats mounted under the wing or sponsons extending from the hull. The

Table 1 Loading Schedule and Estimated Range for Various Missions, Which Include ASW, Long Duration Sea-Sitter, Quiet Stable Platform

Mission

Normal

Extended

Rapid

Mine

Bomber

Evacuation

Harrier

Carrier

loads imposed on these structures by large waves can be most destructive.

A solution to the problem which limits year-round deployment of flying boats in all oceans, lakes, and rivers is proposed by the incorporation of spar buoy stability in the boat. The principle of spar buoy stability has been investigated and proven over the past 18 years by the Scripps In­stitution of Oceanography, Marine Physi­cal Laboratory of the University of Cali­fornia. sponsored by the Office of Naval Research. More than 100 sorties in many oceans and weather conditions have dem­onstrated the practicability of the Floating Instrument Platform (FLIP).¹

During tests in the Gulf of Alaska, where FLIP was on station for 45 days, gale force winds and seas were practi­cally continuous and offered ample op­portunity to evaluate FLIP’S capabilities. Maximum vertical oscillation was^mea- sured at less than 3.5 feet. Seas of 35 feet were encountered during this period. Angles of roll and pitch were less than 1°. In cross seas, roll to 5° maximum may be observed. A single point mooring, or anchor, has been used in 3,000 fathoms, and multiple point precision positioning anchorage capability has been perfected. One recent example resulted in FLIP maintaining position in 2,500 fathoms for a period of 35 days, and the mooring line components except for bottom tackle were recovered and reused.²

The marriage of this successful con­queror of rough seas and bad weather and the proven flying boat has tremendous possibilities.

For the following roles and applica­tions, FLAUNT shows capabilities well beyond the range of surface, submerged, or land-based platforms such as ships, submarines, or conventional aircraft.

► Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW): Peace­time with rapid transition to wartime; passive, quiet monitoring of nuclear

powered fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs); attack and destruction of SSBNs with surface-to-surface missiles, and attack and destruction of submarine- launched ballistic missiles with air-to-air missiles

► Fleet Air Defense (FAD): Sea-sta­tioned combat air patrol (CAP) with weeks of loiter possible

• U. S. Continental Limits (CONUS) Defense: Sea-stationed CAP-rapid mov­ing, weeks of loiter time
• Cruise missile launcher or mobile in­tercontinental ballistic missile launcher

The “seaplane frigate” would be equipped with a mix of ASW, an airborne surveillance system (ASS), and power projection weapons.³ It could carry sev­eral antiair missiles while its major arma­ment would include five ASW torpedoes, one ASW tactical nuclear weapon, and approximately ten Tomahawks. With four Phoenix and two Sidewinder mis­siles added for self-defense, the total weapons payload would be about 47,000 pounds, making it as deadly a ship as a destroyer or cruiser.

Without repeating the great costs in­volved in landing fields, attention must be given to the plentiful bodies of water, lakes, rivers, seas, and oceans. In most continents, such flying boat landing sur­faces far outnumber all airfields of any size. In 1940, C. A. Van Dusen, Vice

President of Consolidated Aircraft Cor­poration, manufacturer of the PBYs, ex­pressed many facts even truer today:

“Water types (flying boats) may be flown overland throughout practically all parts of the world with greater safety than large land planes. There are few large landing fields as com­pared with suitable water areas. Fly­ing boats used for scouting with the fleet have demonstrated their ability to keep the fleet informed of all vessels on and under the water well ahead of the fleet. Flying boats can rest on the surface when not in the air and thus extend their time on station greatly, whereas the landplane must return to base after relatively short sorties to refuel. Flying boats are generally be­lieved to be slower than comparable land planes, but only because flying boats usually fly at lower ‘cruise con­trol’ speeds in order to accomplish very long range flights. Even in 1940 Dick Archbold flew his PBY, ‘GUBA,’ from Dakar to St. Thomas in the Virgin Islands, approximately 3,300 miles with enough fuel remain­ing to fly an additional 1,800 miles, or a total actual range of 5,100 miles!”⁴

The mechanical, structural, and hy­draulic systems would include a telescop­ing RSBS buoyant spar platform to sup­port a large flying boat at an elevation

^Supplying a Landing Craft

system should be lowered fully, tube number four blown to the specified net buoyancy, and locked in place. The ski valves should then be opened and the ski flooded. Minor changes in position may be made by the use of one or two main engines or by towing at slow speed. It precise stationkeeping is required, the anchor should be in place.

Preparation for takeoff requires un­locking the system and maintaining hy­draulic pressure in the pistons to control the rate of retraction while blowing the water ballast from tube number four. The system always has positive buoyancy, so it must be pushed down into place and controlled when retracting. When the system is up and locked, the ski should be extended to takeoff position if desired at

FLAUNT Harrier Carrier

JOE FERRARA

above the crests of large waves.

The result of this combination is a boat of high speed (600 knots), tremendous range and cargo capacity, sea-sitting ca­pability comparable to most ships in bad weather and high seas, combined with adaptability to efficient minelaying, bombing, ASW mother ship, and casu­alty evacuation.

Current events in world affairs and the dispersion of our forces to Near East, Far East, Central American, and other hot spots emphasize the need for an appropri­ate high-speed, long-range vehicle which can be deployed overnight, with ample equipment and personnel, to any point on earth. All the better if it can arrive on station within hours instead of days or weeks and be free of requirements for air­strips or other facilities. It took the Brit­ish forces several weeks to reach the Falkland Islands, and resupply was slow because the nearest friendly airfield was about 4,000 miles away at Ascension Island.⁵

The debate over the next generation of VP aircraft must not omit from consider­ation the flying boat, a platform which has proven itself in combat in three major wars. Many veteran boats of World War II are still active as civilian transports and firefighters.

The criteria for the stable sea sitter, FLAUNT, include takeoff and landing capability in rough seas, full sea sitter functions, long range, speed comparable to land-based transport aircraft, capacity for substantial payload for resupply, re­fueling, support of submarines and me­dium-sized ships, smaller aircraft, and ample reserves of fuel, spares, and food for extended deployment. Exceptionally

Elevator

Hangar Decks 1, 2, 3.

long range may be realized by employ­ment of the hull and wing tanks, doub­ling the fuel available at some cost in re­duced military load. Self-protection in all modes, electronic countermeasures, can­non, missiles, detection, and firing sys­tems must be included.

This concept truly flaunts its superior features which are possible because of its unique seakeeping ability.

The RSBS system, dry, includes 89,950 pounds in the main tubes, seals, and operational bearings, 21,500 pounds in the steel hydraulic piston assembly, and 2,100 pounds for the ski. The air­craft’s 49,910 pounds of electrical, hy­draulic, and pneumatic systems will pro­vide the necessary power. Fuel transfer will be handled by the 21,700-pound fuel system, while cargo in the number one RSBS tube will be handled by the for­ward, aft, and bomb-cargo cars under the wing, for which there is a 34,925-pound allowance. Weight and balance control is programmed into the boat’s computers and will be under command of the boat’s engineering officer.

With the boat in normal configuration, ready for takeoff, the ski flood valves should be closed and the RSBS number one tube lowered 15 feet to extend the ski to takeoff position. After takeoff, the ski should be retracted.

If the mission calls for sea-sitting, the main fuel supply must be in the number one tube tank, with operational fuel in the bilge tanks, and 151,000 pounds of mis­cellaneous cargo must be in the tube. To prepare for landing, the ski on the num­ber one tube should be extended 15 feet, locked, and left in place. Upon landing at the deployment coordinates, the RSBS time of takeoff.

The center of mass/center of buoyancy relationship in the FLAUNT RSBS sys­tem is about 25% greater than in the Scripps FLIP of 700 long tons displace­ment; therefore, the spar buoy stability should be somewhat stiffer and positive, resulting in less motion at sea. In heavy winds, FLAUNT will “weathervane’ to head into the wind, reducing the exposed area and the wind-heeling moment.

Logistics for our mobile forces tradi­tionally are dependent on well-estab­lished air heads such as Rota, Spain (Sixth Fleet), Cubi Point, PhilipP>^nes (Seventh Fleet), and Diego Garcia (Task Force 70). Since each of these places is highly vulnerable in time of war, we must be able to operate in these areas and oth­ers, regardless of loss and with great flex­ibility, hence the FLAUNT stable flying boat.

FLAUNT can sit at sea indefinitely or can take off to continue a mission or to initiate a new sortie. The RSBS stabiliz­ing gear is retractable and provides tank­age for 498,900 pounds of fuel and

1. pounds of miscellaneous cargo- The RSBS unit’s primary function is, iⁿ the first extended position, to provide a ski for takeoff and landing, similar to those proven on other flying boats. At rest in sea-sitting condition, the RSB5 system is fully extended, including ^a “hard” section of the buoyant tank which raises the main hull 20 feet above the sea surface and provides the flotation necessary to establish the center of buoy- ancy/center of mass relationship neces­sary for the true spar buoy stability re­gime. Picture a flying boat of 762 long tons, with the displacement of a fleet minesweeper, but having a new usable cargo space of more than 500,000 cubic feet because of the fact that its engines are in pods suspended from the wing ana because fuel tankage is half in the wing

and half in the bilge.

Imagine a cargo plane that can deliver to a beach through its bow doors and cargo ramp, or can sit absolutely stable at anchor to transfer cargo to lighters or other craft by means of its bow and mid­ships cargo booms and cranes, or by use of bomb and minelaying cars running out the lower wing surface on integral tracks which are also used for bomb or minelay­ing purposes. Picture a full-sized mine­layer that can be effective at 5,000 miles from home within just hours of departure and can return home.

Visualize an assault transport that can deliver 2,000 troops with full pack and

1. pounds of supplies, vehicles, and munitions to a destination 4,000 miles away in ten hours. Place FLAUNT in a covert mission involving a planned intermediate loiter of, say, a week, then proceed at 600 knots to any ocean, lake, or river, regardless of weather during the sea-sitting mode, then to takeoff on a prescribed mission of several thousand miles.

FLAUNT can be as well armed for self protection as any surface ship. State-of- the-art electronics, including electronic countermeasures, missile guidance sys­tems, a complete electronics suite and combat information center along with cannon, air-to-air, and air-to-surface mis­siles will be included. She can also fly out of harm’s way.

As a sea sitter, FLAUNT provides a quiet stable platform for a number of di­rect and remote tech assembly systems (TASS) and ASW systems. The on-sta­tion time would be many times that of land- or carrier-based aircraft. A flying boat can search areas much larger than either a submarine or surface ship be­cause she can take off and rapidly relo­cate ASW sensors to keep up with the carrier battle group. By loitering on the surface during deployment of ASW re­mote controlled devices, a flying boat could probably accomplish a week’s ASW mission at a third of the cost for deploying a similar number of land-based P-3 ASW aircraft and one-eighth of the cost of an ASW mission conducted by surface vessels.⁷

With its unique sea-sitting, fuel-con­serving capabilities combined with rapid mobility, FLAUNT could provide new extensions for ASW operations. Nor­mally, FLAUNT can complete a long- range mission, including weeks of loiter, and return to base. However, FLAUNT can refuel FLAUNT plus submarines and other boats. Similarly, FLAUNT can re­supply ships, submarines, other aircraft, and beachheads.

Serious consideration should be given to the procurement of a fleet of FLAUNT flying boats to place us in an unquestion­able position of superiority in mobile striking forces and promising a means of sustained support or invasion operations at any location, as well as to eliminate the tremendous logistics, engineering, and manpower requirements of the develop­ment and maintenance of foreign airbases.

The country that moved in a single decade from a collier converted to flight deck use to modem aircraft carriers ought to be able to move to an aircraft at least three times the size of a 747 that should be capable of sweeping all before it.

‘E. D. Bronson and L.W. Glosten, "Floating Instru­ment Platform—FLIP,” Scripps Institution of Oceanography, Marine Physical Laboratories. 15 November 1973, ONR Code 466, SIO ref. 73-30. -Philip Rudnick, “Motion of Large Spar Buoy in Sea Waves,” Journal of Ship Research, December 1967 pp. 257-267.

³R. Artigiani and G. P. Harper, "The Flying Frig­ate, Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1983 dd 55-59.                    ’

⁴C■ A. Van Dusen, “Seaplanes for National De­fense,” Consolidator, December 1940, pp P-13 ’Neville Trotter, "The Falklands and the Long Haul, Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1983, p. 108.

⁶R. B. Laning, “Elevation of the U. S. Fleet,” Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1981, pp. 33-37. William Welling, “Renaissance for the Seaplane,” Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1981. p. 69.

Mr. Faulconer received a bachelor of science degree in engineering from the University of California at Berkeley in 1940. He was an engineering and corpo­rate executive for Consolidated Aircraft Corporation, 1935-48. He was a lieutenant in the Coast Guard Reserve, 1942-45. Mr. Faulconer has written several books, including Introduction to Aircraft Design (McGraw-Hill, 1944). He has been involved in con­tinuous design activities from 1930 to the present and is currently consulting on marine and aircraft systems for stability.

Offense Versus Defense

By Captain S. D. Landersman, U. S. Navy (Retired)

Joe Theismann takes the ball from cen­ter and drops back to pass. His offensive linemen form a pocket to defend him. Dallas defensive linemen attack, attempt­ing to get to the Redskin quarterback. The pocket collapses, and Theismann is forced to scramble to protect himself until he can locate a receiver and get off his pass. The pass receivers have either been knocked down or are closely guarded. The tight end breaks free. Theismann passes just as he is hit. His pass receiver is jarred as the ball reaches him causing him to juggle the ball and lose it— incomplete pass. The Redskin offensive team failed to give its quarterback suffi­cient protection. The Dallas defensive team attacked the Redskin quarterback and his pass receivers.

In the Navy, the aircraft carrier is the quarterback of the battle group. A battle group can be employed in defensive or offensive missions, but in all cases the aircraft carrier must be protected. She carries the leader of the group and has the capability to project power with her air­craft against enemy ships, aircraft, sub­marines, or targets ashore. Defending the carrier is a protective role of surface-to- air missile ships as well as the carrier’s fighter, electronic warfare, and early warning aircraft. The Aegis ship is one of the protectors of the carrier, perhaps the most important of the defenders, as she picks off enemy missiles as well as air­craft which have penetrated the outer de­fenses. Just as any quarterback relies on his teammates for protection, the carrier is protected by the Aegis ship. What is the value of this protection? Ask the quarterback, or watch a game in which one team protects its quarterback and the other team does not. The team which de­fends the passer has a successful offense. The team which fails to protect the quar­terback loses.

In the past few years, the U. S. Navy has developed a syndrome which ap­proaches paranoia concerning systems, training, and the planning for or conduct­ing of combat operations which might be labeled as “defense” rather than “of­fense.” The feeling is that defensive op­erations are to be avoided as they are lesser in status, represent weakness, and are conducted only by inferior naval forces and inadequate commanders at sea. Those naval officers who demean defensive tactics seek to be identified with offensive operations, which appear to be higher in status, represent strength, and are conducted by superior forces rnd competent aggressive commanders. The shortsightedness of this view becomes apparent to students of Sun Tzu, Napo­leon Bonaparte, Karl von Clausewitz, Baron Henri Jomini, and Alfred Thayer Mahan.

Basic understanding of warfare should

and

identification of potential assassins

be sufficient to show that defense is at least as important as offense, requires as much intelligence, and demands the same dedication and aggressiveness as do of­fensive operations. The two are so inter­dependent and closely related that it is

The aircraft carrier is the Joe Theis- mann of the battle group, and, like the Redskins’ quarterback, the carrier needs defending if the Navy is to conduct a successful offensive drive.

difficult as well as unnecessary to sepa­rate actions into categories of offense and defense.

Clausewitz wrote, “A defensive cam­paign can be fought with offensive bat­tles, and in a defensive battle, we can employ our divisions offensively.” Also, he told us that defense is permeated with pronounced elements of the offensive, and offense is perpetually combined with defense. Clausewitz recognized the ne­cessity of defense as part of offense.

Although most Americans might not understand Clausewitz, most understand our great national war game of football. American football is a game similar in some ways to war. Each of two opposing disciplined uniformed units uses its com­bined strength, cunning, and skill to gain an objective in the enemy’s territory. We often refer to the quarterback as a “field general,” and a series of pass plays as an “aerial attack” with “bullet” passes and “the bomb.” A lineman is called a “sub­marine,” and a series of running plays is referred to as a “ground attack.”

On any weekend in the fall, we watch the offensive players of our favorite foot­ball team attempt to score a touchdown against our opponent’s defensive team. When our quarterback, the field general of our offensive team, retreats to pass, at least six of his ten offensive teammates defend him by blocking the other team’s defensive players from reaching him. Those defensive players on the other team are attacking our quarterback.

In football, most of the players on the offensive team defend, and most of the players on the defensive team attack. Offensive tactics are part of the defensive campaign. Defense is part of offensive tactics. Clausewitz would have under­stood football.

Just as in football, the unpopular real war includes a close interrelationship and melding of defense as a part of offense and offense as a.part of defense.

North Vietnam attacks South Vietnam, which is an offensive action. The United States responds with defensive support to South Vietnam which includes carrier aircraft conducting offensive attacks on North Vietnam. North Vietnam defends itself from these air attacks by attacking the ships and aircraft of the U. S. battle force in the Gulf of Tonkin. U. S. carrier air strikes are directed against the air and naval bases of North Vietnam. The U. S. fleet defends itself by offensive actions against an enemy who is trying to carry out offensive strikes against that fleet so as to defend his country and enable that enemy to conduct offensive actions against his neighbor. Each side claims that offensive actions are necessary for defense, and a successful defense will enable that side to carry out offensive operations necessary for defense.

In a typical war game at the Naval War College, a U. S. battle force, which in­cludes four aircraft carriers and a forma­tion of combatant ships proceeds across the Norwegian Sea to conduct offensive strikes against Soviet bases on the Kola Peninsula. This offensive action by the U. S. battle force is necessary to assist

NATO forces fighting to defend northern Norway against an offensive attack by the Soviets, who initiated the hostilities. The Soviets respond to this offensive threat to their homeland by sending aircraft to at­tack the U. S. battle force. U. S. antiair resources are employed in offensive ac­tions to attack the Soviet aircraft as they close the battle force. The Soviet aircralt are defending their land against the threat of carrier aircraft strikes. Carrier aircraft defend their battle force by attacking the Soviet aircraft. Both sides are using an offensive tactical action for defensive purposes.

The evening television news shows us the President en route to a meeting, and we see that he is surrounded by secret ser­vice agents. It is their job to protect the President. The agents we see are obvi­ously in a defensive role but there are other agents, unseen by the television camera, on rooftops, in windows, ⁱⁿ nearby and distant positions to intercept an attacker. There are still other agents who have penetrated organizations iden­tified as dangerous to the President. This the undercover operation may have been going on for months or years. It is a form of offensive action by the defenders, a necessary part of their protective role.

Clausewitz wrote about the importance of an aggressive and offensive defense and the importance of defending while on the offensive. Mahan discussed in detail the value of attacking an enemy to pro^­vide for defense.

Defending a battle force, convoy, °^r amphibious group is a necessary employ^­ment of naval forces. It can and should be as aggressive as an offensive operation. Defense may include offensive actions against the enemy’s bases, ships, subma­rines, and aircraft as they depart their base areas along their transit routes anu before they reach their weapons’ range from our force. It may also include de­fensive measures to deceive and destroy the enemy in the vicinity of our force, as well as the destruction or deception of his weapons.

Aggressive initiative is the key. m war, just as in football, offense and de­fense are interwoven and inseparable- The terms are not mutually exclusive. Action instead of reaction is more imp°^r- tant than labeling a procedure as offense or defense.

Captain Landersman has commanded a frigate. ^ stroyer, destroyer squadron, and tactical tramint group. He was a member of the Strategic Stu Group at the Naval War College. He is canen J employed by the Johns Hopkins University Appl>^c Physics Laboratory.

^r

The Second Career

By Colonel William L. Hauser, U. S. Army (Retired)

If you ask the honoree at a military re­tirement ceremony what he plans to do next, it is not unusual to be told, “I don’t know. I suppose I’ll find something.” That is the ultimate in faithfulness, for it shows that the officer is so dedicated to his profession through his very last day of service, that he has ignored his personal future. That is more than faithfulness; it is self-sacrificial, unnecessary, and wrong.

It is not my wish to induce any officer to leave military service. I count every day of my 25 years of duty a worthwhile experience and a precious memory. But there comes a time in every officer’s life when he must consider leaving the mili­tary to seek a second career. The impetus is different for each: for one, a realization that he has gone as high as he is likely to go; another, a wish to round out his pro­ductive years with new and different challenges; for another, a desire, after years of materially undercompensated public service, to give his family a richer lifestyle. Whatever the reason, when the officer has made the decision, he owes it to his family and himself to do it right.

The first question the officer should ask himself is whether he wants a career in business, rather than in, say, civil ser­vice, social work, or education. Buy a copy of the Sunday New York Times. Look at the employment ads at the rear of the “Week in Review” section then at the ads at the rear of the “Business” sec­tion. If you are more at home with the former, a business career is probably not for you, but if the jobs the latter ads de­scribe interest you, then making your second career in business may be your thing.

Business is very different from the mil­itary, however. Knowing what the differ­ences are will make your transition much smoother and your new life more quickly a pleasant and productive one.

First, there is little opportunity for lat­eral entry into the middle and upper lev­els of business professions. Entry into a corporation itself, yes, but not into the professions within the corporation: mar­keting, sales, financial control, produc­tion, engineering, etc. You must show, from your service experiences, creden­tials in one of those professions.

Second, there is no “promotion,” as such, in the business corporation. Rather, a person is selected to move from his cur­rent position to fill a vacancy in another position. If the new position carries

higher pay and perquisites, then we say the person has been “promoted.”

This is very different from the military system of promoting the best of a group of officers and then finding them posi­tions commensurate with their new rank. Is the business system “equitable”? Of course not. Being “at the right place at the right time” is important. There is a “free enterprise system” in the making of a business career.

What this means to the officer seeking entry into a corporation is that he must specify the type position to which he as­pires. To state on a resume that he seeks “a position which will utilize my exten­sive managerial experience and leader­ship ability” is a sure invitation to the circular file. The corporation is not just interested in what he can do; they want to know what he can do for them.

There are those who will say that to describe a specific position on a resume is like trying to “hit a bullet with a bullet.” It is better, they maintain, to fire a “shot­gun” in hopes that one of the pellets may intersect a target.

Anyone who argues that way does not know how resumes are handled by com­panies. Rather than flying by, resumes land on desks and lay there awhile. Then, even if the employment office lacks a listing which matches the resume, that office will often pass it to some of the company’s divisions to see if they are in­terested. It is also not unusual for a suit­able position to open up in the future. If the resume is a good one, it will be re­membered and retrieved from the file. A good resume could even be passed to another company as well, since corporate recruiters’ have their own mutual assist­ance network.

The third major difference is a concep­tual one, between “development” and “accomplishment.” Military officers tend to emphasize on resumes their de­velopmental history: multiplicity and va­riety of assignments, early promotions, selection for schools, and awards and decorations. But, remember that the busi­ness corporation wants to know what you can do for them. The best evidence you can offer is what you have accomplished for your current employer. An assign­ment is not an accomplishment; nor is it a promotion, a school, or an award. The crucial question is not what you contrib­uted to your own development, but what you contributed to the mission of your organization.

There are three possible ways you can communicate with a prospective em­ployer: in person, on the telephone, or in writing. Now, prospective employers, particularly those in large corporations, are besieged with job-seekers. To expect them to interview an uninvited job­seeker, in person or on the telephone, is unrealistic. But a good resume can get a response. It is not unknown for a business executive who is sent a resume by the corporate employment office (“ . . .for your possible interest. . .”) to say to his secretary, “This guy sounds like some­body we could use in this organization. We don’t have an opening of the sort he’s looking for just now, but let’s get him in for an interview anyway.” If you send out enough good resumes to enough cor­porations, sooner or later this will happen to you. But the resume must be good.

Now, how do you work up a good re­sume for yourself?

Think of your resume as a telephone conversation. The conversation with, a prospective employer you will not get because his secretary will not put you through. But if she did, here is how it might go:

Question: “I understand you’re look­ing for a job. What kind of job?” Answer: (You have to state succinctly the sort and level of position you are seeking. This is the crucial item of the resume, which the remainder supports. It is also the toughest, because you are de­ciding the first step of the rest of your life. That will take much research into what sorts of jobs there are in business firms and into your own background, ap­titudes, and interests.)

Question: “What makes you think you can do that sort of job?”

Answer: (You need to summarize what skills you will bring to the position you have just described. Be sure to put your­self in the mind of the prospective em­ployer. He is not interested, at least not initially, in your ability to acquire skills; he wants to know what existing skills you will bring to the job right away.)

Question: “What have you done in the past that substantiates those skills?” Answer: (You need to do more than just listing and describing positions; you also must show your accomplishments in those positions, quantified as much as possible. Business people are not im­pressed by a multiplicity and variety of assignments. They view that as unprofes­sional. You would do well, going back

It’s too late to contemplate the future after the retirement ceremony. An officer should not be so faithful to his naval career that he has not already explored all of his options for a second career.

ten or at the most 15 years, to consolidate position descriptions and accomplish­ments into three- or four-year blocks.)

Question: “What is your educational background?”

Answer: (Emphasize those aspects which support the business skills you have claimed.)

Question: “Tell me something about yourself.”

Answer: (State those attributes, associ­ations, and interests which are relevant to your employability. For example, your marital/parental status affects your mo­bility, while professional associations and civic activities indicate your sense of commitment. Even your avocations have some relevance, because they make you an interesting person, someone with whom a prospective employer might like to work. But some items are so irrelevant as to call your judgment into question— your height and weight, say, or your mil­itary medals. It is good to save some things for interviews.)

No, it is not easy, but there are places to go for help. First, there are a number of books on job-hunting. The best known is Richard Bolles’s What Color Is Your Parachute? (Ten Speed Press, 1982); also quite good are Carl Boll’s Executive Jobs Unlimited (Macmillan, 1980) and Tom Jackson and Davidyne Mayleas’s The Hidden Job Market (Time Books, 1981). The one I like best is Richard Payne’s plain-spoken How To Get a Bet­ter Job Quicker (Taplinger, 1979). Sec­ond, some university business schools offer courses in “career transition” or “career reassessment.” I would not take a course attended principally by military officers as you will lose the important benefit of comparing notes with business peers.

Third, there are “Forty-Plus” clubs in most major cities, where unemployed and retired business executives help one an­other in their job searches. If you are in­terested in the New York metropolitan area, the West Point Society of New York, which is made up largely of busi­ness executives, has a “career advisory service” offered to retiring military offi­cers at a nominal fee. Finally, I would not recommend any of the so-called career- advisory firms or resume-writing experts which you see advertised in the newspa­pers. They are generally too expensive for doing work that is best done by you.

There are some good career advisory firms of a special sort, but unfortunately they are not available to individual offi­cers. These “outplacement” firms nor­mally do not accept individual clients, because the relationship is almost always unsatisfactory. That is, when the job­seeker himself is the client, he tends to regard the firm as his “job-finder, rather than recognizing that the responsi­bility for finding a job is his alone. How­ever, when a corporation is the client, the individual has the assigned duty of find­ing himself a new job; he and the outplacement firm are partners in the ef­fort, and both answerable to the corporate client.

Ideally, the Department of Defense ought to use such outplacement for its retiring officers; if not for all, then at least for those in positions requiring con­tinuity for effectiveness. The results would be beneficial not only for those officers, but also for national security. For example, suppose every retirement- eligible officer were required to contract each time he accepted such an assign­ment, not to retire until completion of some minimum time, say three or four years. In return for this limitation on his freedom of action, the officer would be guaranteed outplacement when he re­tired. The contract would be self-enforc­ing: if the officer broke it, he would not get the outplacement but would retire “on his own” as is the case today.

Assuming the officer honored the con­tract, what would he receive?

First, a trained counsellor would inter­view him to get essential facts out on the table and to establish rapport in what is likely to be a fairly intensive relationship lasting several months. Then the officer would be given a series of multiple- choice tests, designed by industrial psy­chologists to determine his vocational interests and his management type °^r “style.” While these tests are being ana­lyzed by the counsellor, the officer would be engaged in an essential “homework project, reviewing his entire life fr°ⁿ¹ childhood through his recent career. From that review, done in a way sug­gested by the counsellor, the officer would determine a pattern of accomplish­ments and of skills which produced the outcome. The officer and the counsellor would now be ready to plan a campaign

to get “the right job.”

Meeting perhaps twice a week at first, later only every couple of weeks, the of­ficer and counsellor would work up a good resume. They would also devise cover letters for responding to ads, for writing to suitable companies, and for sending to “network” contacts. When some of these letters result in invitations for interviews, the officer would go con­fidently, having been given training in interview techniques.

What would such a program cost the government? Assume that 1,000 officers were to be outplaced each year. Paying the outplacement firm 12.5% of “regular military compensation” (pay and allow­ances plus tax advantage, assumed average grade 0-6) would cost

1. x 0.125 x $60,000 = $7.5 mil­lion. Even adding several months’ “con­tinuation pay” (full pay instead of retired Pay) would bring the total scarcely to $10 million. This may sound like big money, but if it resulted in those officers’ extend­ing their terminal assignments an average of one year, the savings in permanent- change-of-station costs alone would ex­ceed $10 million. The additional savings created by improved continuity and effi­ciency, in such positions as weapon sys­tem project managers and installation commanders, would quickly show a “profit” of many millions. The program would more than pay for itself.

The Department of Defense is not cur­rently interested in such a program. But I believe interest will be generated in the near future, for two reasons. First, there is rising pressure on Capitol Hill to re­form the military retirement system. If the defense establishment can show that it is taking steps to reduce the frequency and cost of losing key people prema­turely, they may be able to stave off an overhaul by Congress. Second, and even more fundamental, the current generation of senior corporate executives, many of whom saw service in World War II and Korea, is passing from the scene. They will be replaced by business leaders lack­ing such experience, who tend to view military officers either as “Washington bureaucrats” lacking in business-trans­ferable skills or as “temporary consult­ants” to be used for their contacts and then discarded. This less receptive cli­mate will intensify the pressure on offi­cers to retire “early enough to start a real second career. The time for action by the Department of Defense is short.

In the meantime, what should the indi­vidual officer do? For the sake of the country, he ought to stay in the service as long as he can make a meaningful contri­bution. For the sake of himself, when the time comes to retire, he ought to go for­ward purposefully into a new and"fulfil­ling career. There is an appropriate pas­sage from Alfred Tennyson’s “Ulysses”: “Some work of noble note may yet be done,

Not unbecoming men that strove with Gods.

The lights begin to twinkle from the rocks;

The long day wanes; the slow moon climbs: the deep

Moans round with many voices. Come, my friends,

Tis not too late to seek a newer world.”

Colonel Hauser retired from the Army in 1979 after 25 years of service. He is director of manpower plan­ning for Pfizer Inc., a large pharmaceutical and multi-product international corporation.

Is “SQ 3” Unconstitutional?

By Carlyle H. Whipple

The Coast Guard cutter gives the inter­national code signal “SQ 3” (“You should stop or heave to; I am going to board you”). Congress has authorized customs officers and Coast Guard offi­cers to stop, board, and inspect the papers of any vessel and to use all necessary force to compel compliance. The Fourth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution guarantees protection from unreasonable searches and seizures. Evidence of crimi­nal activity gleaned from an unreasonable search and/or seizure cannot be used at a trial against persons whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated.

Is the suspicionless stopping, board­ing, and document inspection which may be initiated by the “SQ 3” signal reason­able? If the answer is yes, the action is constitutional; if the answer is no, it is unconstitutional. The U. S. Supreme Court was called upon to answer this question in its decision of 17 June 1983 ■n U. S. v. Villamonte-Marquez.¹

Near noon on 6 March 1980, customs officers were patrolling the Calcasieu River Ship Canal, some 18 miles inland from the Gulf of Mexico, when they sighted the Henry Morgan II, a 40-foot sailboat, anchored on the side of the channel. The waterway connects the Gulf of Mexico with Lake Charles, Louisiana, which is a designated customs port of entry. All vessels moving between Lake Charles and the open sea of the Gulf of Mexico must traverse through the canal.

Shortly after sighting the sailboat, the officers also observed a large freighter moving up the canal creating a substantial wake as she passed the Henry Morgan II causing the sailboat to rock violently from side to side. The customs patrol boat then approached the sailboat and passed behind her stem, on which the boat’s name was displayed along with the home port of Basilea. When the officers asked the man on deck if the sailboat and crew were all right, he shrugged his shoulders in an unresponsive manner.

The customs officer, having no reason to suspect any illegal activities, then boarded the Henry Morgan II for a docu­mentation check pursuant to 19 U. S. C. §1581(a) (1976) which states:

“[A]ny officer of the customs may at any time go aboard any vessel ... at any place in the United States . . . and examine the manifest and other documents and papers . . . and to this end may hail and stop such vessel . . . and use all necessary force to compel compliance.”

The officer was handed what appeared to be a request to change the registration of the ship from Swiss to French registry, written in French and dated 6 February 1980. It was subsequently discovered that the home port designation of Basilea was Latin for Basel, Switzerland. The vessel was, however, of French registry.

While examining the document, the boarding officer smelled what he thought to be burning marijuana. Looking through an open hatch, he observed bur­lap-wrapped bails that proved to be mari­juana. All persons in the vessel were ar­rested and given their Miranda warnings. A subsequent search revealed some 5,800 pounds of marijuana on board the Henry Morgan II stored in almost every con­ceivable place, including the forward, mid, and aft cabins, and under the seats in the cockpit.

The question presented to the Supreme Court was whether the suspicionless boarding of the Henry Morgan II for the sole purpose of checking her documents

of any law, of the United States,

constituted an unreasonable search which would result in the violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. The constitutionality of 19 U. S. C. §1581(a) had not been previously considered by the Supreme Court. The court ruled that the suspicionless boarding of a vessel on federal jurisdictional waters for the pur­pose of checking her documentation and documents was reasonable and, there­fore, consistent with the provision of the Fourth Amendment.

The court’s decision pointed out that, in 1790, the first Congress enacted a comprehensive statute “to provide more effectually for the collection of the duties imposed by law on goods, wares, and merchandise imported into the United States, and on the tonnage of ships or vessels.” The pertinent part of the 4 Au­gust 1790 Act, ch. 35, 1 Stat. 145, pro­vides as follows:

“That it shall be lawful for all credi­tors, naval officers, surveyors, in­spectors, and the officers of the reve­nue cutters hereinafter mentioned, to go on board ships or vessels in any part of the United States, or within four leagues of the coast thereof, if bound to the United States, whether in or out of their respective districts, for the purposes of demanding the mani­fests aforesaid, and of examining and searching the said ships or vessels.”

The 1790 statute is the lineal ancestor of 19 U. S. C. § 1581(a) which the govern­ment relied upon when boarding the Henry Morgan II.

The court stated that, while “no Act of Congress can authorize the violation of the Constitution, the fact that the Cus­toms statute was enacted by the same Congress that promulgated the constitu­tional amendments that ultimately be­came the Bill of Rights (including the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution prohibiting unreasonable search or seiz­ures) gives the statute an impressive his­torical pedigree.”

The decision pointed out that in the area of the Fourth Amendment law, the question of the “reasonableness” of the type of governmental intrusion has to be analyzed. “Thus, the permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interest against its promotion of legitimate gov­ernmental interest.” Therefore, what may be considered either reasonable or unreasonable for border searches of motor vehicles is distinguishable from what is reasonable with respect to vessels located in waters offering ready access to or on the open sea.

The court noted that restricted water­ways which funnel into rivers and canals are more analogous to roads, making the use of a “road-block” approach to the stopping and boarding of vessels on such restricted waterways more similar to the border searches of motor vehicles. How­ever, it found that “such is not the case in waters providing ready access to the seaward border, beyond which is only the open sea.” The result is a different con­stitutional reasonableness standard appli­cable to restricted waterways from those applicable to the open seas. Since vessels having access to the open sea do not need to come into a harbor, their captains could carry on their activities by anchor­ing in some obscure location on the shoreline if they wanted to avoid the au­thorities at port, or by transferring cargo to another vessel. Waterborne traffic can be far more elusive than motor vehicles, which are constricted to fixed, estab­lished roadways. Therefore, the standard of what is reasonable for vessels with ac­cess to or on the high seas is substantially different from what is reasonable for inspection of landbound motor vehicles.

A second consideration raised by the court for the statute’s reasonableness is the distinction between the registration procedure for waterborne vessels as con­trasted to automobiles. By merely ob­serving an automobile’s license plate, a police officer can determine whether that vehicle is currently in compliance with the requirements of state law. There are no comparable “license plates” or “stickers” issued by the United States or by the various states for vessels. The re­quired exterior markings on documented vessels (the name and hailing port), as well as the numerals displayed by undoc­umented U. S. boats, “are marked on the vessel at the instance of the owner.” Fur­ther, in cases like the Henry Morgan II where the vessel is of foreign registry, the vessel carries only the marking required by her home port. The panoply of statutes and regulations governing maritime doc­umentation are likewise more extensive and more complex than the typical state requirements for motor vehicle licensing.

The Supreme Court concluded that the documentation laws serve the public in­terest in many obvious ways and are the linchpin for regulation of participation in certain trades, such as fishing, salvaging, towing, and dredging, as well as areas in which trade is sanctioned, and for en­forcement of various environmental laws. These laws play a vital role in the collec­tion of customs and tonnage duties and allow for regulation of imports and ex­ports. “Requests to check certificates of inspection play an obvious role in ensur­ing safety on American waterways.

In weighing the reasonableness of the intrusion of documentation checks upon the Fourth Amendment, the court noted that:

“While the need to make document checks is great, the resultant intrusion on Fourth Amendment interest is quite limited. While it does intrude on one s ability to make ‘free passage without interruption,’ it involves only a brief detention where officials come on board, visit public areas of the vessel, and inspect documents. Neither the vessel nor it’s occupants are searched, and visual inspection of the vessel is limited to what can be seen without a search.”

The Supreme Court concluded that the suspicionless boarding of the Henry Mor­gan II pursuant to 19 U. S. C. § 1581(a) was reasonable and, therefore, non-viola­tive of the prohibitions of the Fourt Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures for several reasons- The same Congress which created the Fourth Amendment enacted an antece­dent statute substantially similar to the statute in question, giving the current statute an impressive historical pedigree- Random stops of waterborne traffic wit ready access to the high seas is signifi­cantly different than vehicular traffic stoppage on highways. The prescribe outward markings used by states for ves­sel registration and the documentation o vessels by the United States are different than for the outward markings of motor vehicles and are more variable and com­plex than state automobile registration laws. Governmental interest in assuring compliance with the documentation re­quirements is substantial. All of these factors override the minimal intrusion which may be created by a document²' tion stopping, boarding, and inspection- A companion statute to 19 U. S. C. §1581(a) used by the Coast Guard f°^r documentation checks is 14 U. S. ^L §89(a) (1976). This statute states, where applicable:

“The Coast Guard may make inquir­ies, examination, inspections, searches, seizure, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the United States has jurisdiction, for the prevention, detection, and suppre^s sion of violations of laws of the United States. For such purposes. (Coast Guard) officers may at any time go on board of any vessel subjec to the jurisdiction, or to the operation

dress inquiries to those on board, ex