Comment and Discussion

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ENTER THE FORUM We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, mari­time, or military interest for possible publi­cation on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.

Contents:

Ban Pornography

The First Salvo

Looks Like a Navy

Safeguarding the Sitting Ducks

Thar She Still Blows

Too Light on Lasers?

Sailing Under The Ice

An Uncontrollable Tomahawk?

Changing the Guard

Manning Nuclear Submarines

Peter Tare and the PHM

Too Much Management, Too Little Leadership

Leaders, Managers, and Mercenaries Tripping on Technology What’s Happening?

Train the Warrior, Educate the Officer

of

prohibition of the sale of certain types

“Ban Pornography”

(iSee S. A. Stott, p. 100, February 1985

Proceedings)

Lieutenant Martin E. Church, U. S. Navy—Surely, Lieutenant Stott cannot be serious in his call for a total ban of por­nography from naval ships and installa­tions. He is opening a Pandora’s Box of legal and ethical questions as well as ask­ing commanding officers to become overly involved in the personal lives of their sailors. Even if the proposed ban were adopted, enforcement would be a nightmare.

In 1981, then-Chief of Naval Opera­tions Admiral Thomas B. Hayward laid down some straight, no-nonsense guide­lines concerning “pornography” and its place on board U. S. Navy vessels. They represent an adequate balance between the professional needs of the Navy and a sailor’s First Amendment rights. Admiral Hayward prohibited the public display of any material which was “obscene or showed bad taste” within the working and living spaces. People were free, however, to purchase such material on their own so long as they viewed it within the privacy of their own staterooms or berths. The professional integrity of the work space is maintained at no expense to an individual’s right to possess such material.

Lieutenant Stott compares his pro­posed ban to current Navy regulations prohibiting drug usage or consumption of alcohol on board ships, but this compari­son is invalid. First, the purchase and abuse of controlled substances are illegal, whereas the purchase of so-called “por­nographic” material by adults is not. Second, it is legal to send so-called “por­nographic” material through the U. S. mail, while it is a felony to use the U. S. Postal Service to mail illegal controlled substances. More so, strict guidelines exist concerning the search and seizure of postal material. Playboy, Penthouse, and other periodicals won lawsuits on this issue years ago. Third, pornography, as William Shakespeare might say, is in the eye of the beholder. There are still no clear-cut laws defining what pornography is. Does Lieutenant Stott really propose to place commanding officers in the book-burning business?

Also to assert that pornography distorts one’s professional relationship with women is a risky conclusion. The sea ser­vices have invested considerable time, effort, and money in human resource ef­forts to ensure that just the opposite is the case. If an individual’s attitude is dis­torted, it was probably distorted long be­fore the viewing of “obscene” material- Pornographic or obscene material ^IS not the real issue. Rather, it is the dis­turbing trend by some officers to use the word “professionalism” as an excuse to legislate morality. In recent years, P^r0' ceedings has published articles advocat­ing: the banning of alcohol sales on mili­tary installations, a ban on cigarette sales books, and even a ban on an age-⁰' naval institution, caffeinated coffee- A of these prohibitions have been propose in the name of “professionalism." fessionalism deals with an individual s working abilities and his professional in­tegrity, not his personal reading habits- Commanding officers have a responsi bility to provide an example and a foun­dation for subordinates to develop ^an maintain a high standard of professions integrity. Personal morality, however, ^|S quite a different subject. The two may b^c linked, but not always. The wise leader^|S the one who is able to distinguish where and when his moral leadership is ^re, quired, as well as knowing where an when it is not.

“The First Salvo”

(See A. D. Zimm, pp. 55-60, February 1985

Proceedings)

Victor A. Karlson, Naval Ordnance tion, Louisville, Kentucky—Given warn ing, carrier battle groups position ^t0 avoid early losses. Presumably, ^l^^lS means avoidance of their major engage ment anywhere during the opening r°^un of hostilities. This presumption soun ^s logical in light of the author’s premi^seS regarding Soviet strategic thinking, ⁰¹¹ what is the role of the U. S. Marine Corp^s during round one?

Given the same warning, would M^a fine forces be en route or landing? C°ⁿ sidering tactical air’s critical role in ^alT1 phibious operations, clearly the earring must go in harm’s way early if m^-l Marine amphibious operations are to on the U. S./NATO menu for use during the dynamic and, probably, decis"¹- stages of armed conflict.

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“Looks Like a Navy”

(,See Y. Yamada, pp. 150-157, March 1985

Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander R. L. Crossland, U. S. Naval Reserve—All of Mr. Yamada’s photography is impressive, but I am taken with the photo of the one thing the Japanese Self-Defense Force has which the U. S. Navy doesn’t have: sea­planes. Beyond their antisubmarine war­fare and search and rescue roles, flying boats have potentially more significant application, one fitted to their unique capabilities. The workhorse Shin Meiwa PS-Is and US-Is are seagoing analogues to the C-130 Hercules, and as such, are ideally suited to supporting long-range special operations missions in maritime environments. Their ability to deploy and retrieve raiders or combat swimmers in nearly worldwide navigable waters gives them a decided edge over the C-130 in coastal missions.

The C-130 can deploy men and boats by parachute, but it has virtually no capa­bility to retrieve these men and boats. Yet current U. S. special operations doctrine relies heavily on the C-130 and parachut­ing. Unfortunately, the water-drop para­chute deployment procedure developed after the Mayaguez rescue operation has proved risky, both tactically as well as physically.

First, the C-130 must fly below the air radar scanning level to a deployment point and then momentarily climb up­ward into the air radar sweep to release parachutists and equipment for a water landing. This maneuver, however brief, exposes the plane—and indirectly the water parachutists—to detection by radar.

The second drawback to this procedure entails a more basic type of exposure. Upon hitting the water, raiders or combat swimmers are at the mercy of currents, water temperature, and sea state until they can climb into a boat, which may not always be in the immediate vicinity. It is a poor plan which expects too much of troops who are frozen or exhausted long before they have even approached their objective.

Some C-130s have been adapted to use the Fulton pick-up (the balloon and cable device made famous in the James Bond movie “Thunderball”), but it is awk­ward, time-consuming, and not really a practical way of retrieving significant numbers of combatants. It is notably impractical for handling wounded, pris­oners, or rescuees.

On the other hand, the Shin Meiwas can fly extended distances below radar and make a water landing without ap­pearing on enemy air radar. They can then deploy a substantial number of raid­ers or combat swimmers in small crat without the necessity of a water immer­sion for those combatants early in ^t'^ic mission. Conversely, the Shin Meiwas can pick up returning parties with equa simplicity. Clearly these seaplanes are the simple answer to a complex area o special warfare.

The U. S. Navy needs to examine the prospects for reintroduction of the sea­plane on a general basis. The current ac cent on special operations and unconven tional warfare demands that at least one or two aircraft of the Shin Meiwa line be acquired for specialized tasks.

“Safeguarding the Sitting Ducks

(See T. J. McKeamey, pp. 66-73, December 1984 Proceedings)

“Thar She Still Blows”

(See N. Polmar, pp. 77-81, December 1984

Proceedings)

Commander E. R. McDaniel, U- Navy, and Lieutenant Commander R- ' McCabe, U. S. Navy—Commander McKearney’s article presents several m teresting propositions. His failure to ade quately address the role of electronic warfare, an integral component of com bined warfare doctrine, in carrier batt e group (CVBG) operations, however, is ^a significant oversight.

Specifically, organic electronic war fare support measures (ESM) are a P^rl mary means of providing the CVBG wit indigenous indications and warning data- Furthermore, the article does not menti°ⁿ the Navy’s only two airborne electronic reconnaissance platforms, the carrier based EA-3 and the land-based EP-3- B^lS ironic that in the same Proceedings issue- Norman Polmar points out that VQ-1 ^an VQ-2, flying the EA-3s and EP-3s, ‘ P^r0 vide electronic surveillance in direct sup port of fleet operations,” and furthc comments that EA-3s are embarked °ⁿ forward-deployed carriers.

Operating independently or as an °^r ganic carrier air wing asset, VQ-1 ^an VQ-2 airborne reconnaissance platform provide the CVBG with a real-time

nd

warning sources, provide the battle group commander with a comprehensive pi^ctu of forces arrayed in the CVBG’s area operations, and thus allow him time select and employ appropriate tactic measures. Clearly, this is not the “sittuu duck” which Commander McKearne; describes.

Can the CVBG commander depend ⁰

the availability of Air Force E-3 support during periods of escalated tensions or wartime? The EP-3 and/or embarked EA-3, working in concert with the E-2C, can achieve results as effectively as the E-3, while remaining under the battle group commander’s direct authority.

“Too Light on Lasers?”

(See A. Skolnick, pp. 30-36, December 1984;

R. W. Gilbert, p. 16, March 1985 Proceedings)

Captain J. E. Lacouture, U. S. Navy (Re­tired)—A persuasive article on the urgent ^requirement for directed-energy weapons °n all major Navy ships and possibly on certain naval aircraft should appear in ^every issue of Proceedings until our ⁿaval leaders do something about giving these systems top acquisition priorities. The acquisition and installation of di- fected-energy weapons—initially high- cnergy lasers and ultimately particle beam weapons—on our ships would pro­^vide our naval forces with a much more effective and cheaper defense against air ^and missile attacks than will the acquisi­tion of large numbers of additional F-14 ^aircraft, Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class guided-missile destroyers, and their Phoenix and Standard missiles.

The threat posed by Soviet naval forces stacking our ships in high-threat areas such as the Norwegian Sea, the eastern Mediterranean, the Arabian Sea, or the northwest Pacific with waves of missile stacks fired from their ships, their air­craft, their submarines, and even from their ground bases is daunting, to say the 'cast. As the stand-off range of their new­est missiles increases, now estimated as 3,000 kilometers, the number of Soviet tnissiles committed to a coordinated at­tack can be significantly increased with ''ttle risk to the firing platform.

Given the number and capabilities of our current defensive missile systems, they would be saturated by the large-scale coordinated Soviet attacks mounted ^against them in these high-threat areas. As the numbers and capabilities of Soviet rhissiles continue to increase, the pros­pects for a U. S. Navy putting up an ade­quate conventional weapons defense Worsens, and the need for directed-en- ^ergy weapons to defend our naval forces becomes ever more pressing.

In the meantime, the Soviets have con­centrated on directed-energy weapons development, outspending the United Elates until recently by a factor of three to Eve times in this field, and will soon be ^able to field an operational directed-en- ^ergy weapon system. Intelligence sources 'ndicate that the Soviets have been con­ducting successful firing tests for several years against reentry vehicles at their missile test range at Saryshagen in Ka­zakhstan, using a high-energy iodine- pulsed laser prototype weapon.

Further, U. S. intelligence estimates conclude that the Soviets could deploy high-energy laser weapons satellites in space by 1986. Even now, they may have a ground-based system that could destroy low earth orbit vehicles such as our sur­veillance satellites or our space shuttle. Soon they will probably have these weap­ons on their larger ships, such as their Kirov-class guided-missile cruisers, mak­ing them comparatively invulnerable to air and missile attacks unless a counter­measure system can be devised.

Until recently, both the Navy and Air Force were conducting increasingly suc­cessful tests to develop high-energy laser beams for tactical and strategic use. The Air Force, using an airborne, high-energy laser mounted in a converted Boeing 707 airplane, has tracked and shot down both Sidewinder air-to-air missiles and low- level cruise missile drones. The Navy’s Sea Lite tests of a 2.2 megawatt device against missile targets demonstrated both a power output for weapons application as well as a high-precision capability for a pointer tracker. In addition to its high- energy laser program, the Navy also had a program, called “Chain Heritage,” aimed at the development of a charged particle beam weapon designed to pro­vide aircraft and missile defense for their carriers.

As Captain Skolnick points out, the Navy’s beam weapons program con­tained a central master plan with logical technical milestones leading to a basic tactical weapons capability. Then, as Captain Skolnick states, support for its programs vanished in 1983 as the De­fense Advanced Research Program Agency took over all beam weapons de­velopment programs and reoriented them for the long-range goal of President Ron­ald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative. As a result, there are now no Navy pro­grams under way to develop beam weap­ons for tactical ship defense.

The Senate’s Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee has strongly disagreed with the Defense Department s excluding of tactical beam weapons de­velopment. It maintains that existing ex­perimental high-energy laser devices could be developed on a short-time basis for use against low orbiting satellites and for close-in air defense.

The Navy’s requirement for a beam weapons defense of its ships is urgent, and the technology is close at hand. Naval leadership should insist, especially as a further defense buildup becomes

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more difficult to justify politically to Congress, that an operational tactical laser weapons system for installation on major U.S. Navy ships be developed as a top-priority program. Not only would this weapon system provide our task force ships with an effective defense against air and missile attack, but as the power of the system grows with additional develop­ment efforts, it would also give our task forces a capability to destroy the Soviets’ low-flying surveillance satellites, deny­ing the Soviets the targeting information required to use their long-range missiles and to mount a major coordinated attack.

With directed-energy weapons on our ships and possibly in some of our aircraft, our task forces will be able to go fear­lessly in harm’s way.

“Sailing Under the Ice”

(.See N. Polmar, pp. 121-123, June 1984; A. S. McLaren, pp. 170-171, December 1984 Proceedings)

Norman Polmar—I was disturbed and disappointed by Captain McLaren’s charge that the “majority” of my column was based on his article, “Under the Ice in Submarines.” My column began with a statement which Secretary of the Navy John Lehman made after McLaren’s arti­cle appeared. In addition, of the 18 para­graphs in my column, 11 were on issues not even mentioned in McLaren’s article. Of the other paragraphs, except for the subject, there was little similarity.

With respect to some of McLaren’s specific comments:

• My column was written before the February 1984 Soviet operation cited by McLaren.
• The caption about the USS Queenfish (SSN-651) passing over, under, or through the North Pole was provided by the editor. I liked the caption—it was a whimsical comment that fit well with the issue of Arctic operations.
• McLaren may disagree with the com­ment of the commanding officer of the USS Aspro (SSN-648) concerning the difficulty of Arctic operations, but that was his statement.
• With respect to the five-year hiatus in Arctic operations after the loss of the USS Thresher (SSN-593). I wrote that the hiatus was “caused by several fac­tors” but especially the diving limitations imposed after the loss. That statement is from an active-duty flag officer submari­ner currently involved in Arctic matters.
• Contrary to McLaren’s statement, our knowledge of ice conditions is limited in many respects. Even Dr. Waldo Lyon wants to obtain more data on this subject, as McLaren notes, he has been severely limited in the funds for the research he would like to conduct in this area.
• If the Los Angeles (SSN-688) subma fines can easily operate under the ice. ^aS McLaren states, then why is the Navy now spending considerable amounts to reconfigure the new boats of this class with a different bow-mounted, retractab e diving plane arrangement and other fe^a tures for under-ice operations?
• A review of U. S. nuclear submarine accidents and incidents certainly does n leave me—or several of the submariners who have spoken about the subject-— with the complacency McLaren has abou their ability to handle “all eventualities under the ice.
• My column, necessarily limited to an

unclassified discussion, was based on variety of material that led me to my con elusions about the limitations of U. • submarines in Arctic operations, 1" view is shared by some who are “in ¹ business.”                                                 .

• I stated that “there is evidence tha the new Soviet “Typhoon”-class nu clear-powered fleet ballistic missile su marine was developed for under-ice op^er ations. In 1984, the under-ice capabm¹/ of the “Typhoon” was cited by the Dj rector of Naval Intelligence, Rear Adrm ral John L. Butts, when he told Congr^esS’ “‘Typhoon’s’ ice-penetrating feat¹¹¹' clearly demonstrate the Soviets’ f^,r,. commitment to operating under the ice-

“An Uncontrollable Tomahawk?”

(See R. S. Hibbs, pp. 65-70, January 1985:

P. G. Johnson, pp. 16-20, March 1985 Proceedings)

Leon F. Cohn—The caption to the phojfg graph on page 65, which shows the U New Jersey (BB-62) just offshore, ⁱⁿj plies that the ship is off the coast of B^el rut. However, a closer look at the ph⁰¹⁰, graph reveals that the battleship is off¹ port of Haifa, Israel. Further proof of¹ ^ location is provided by the name ⁰ bank which is visible in the picture. Bank Leumi, whose name appears b in English and in Hebrew, is an I^sra institution which would not be doing ^ve well in Lebanon.

In addition, the curve of the shore hⁿ^’ the structure of the jetty, and the arrang ment of the cranes are all synonym⁰ with Haifa, a port developed by the B^fl ish during the Mandate.

Editor’s Note: Dr. Cohn is correct-

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“Changing the Guard”

(See L. I. Kiem, pp. 76-83, February 1985

Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander W. D. Kline, U. S. Coast Guard—While it is true that a percentage of the Coast Guard Academy’s graduates will have academic credentials in management and govern­ment, the intent of the Coast Guard Com­mandant’s policy regarding the majors program is to ensure that 75% of our graduates are versed in the technical ma­jors. Too many cadets were opting for the less-demanding academic regime of the other majors. A concern for the future well-being of our service, not our desire for a new self-image, led to the policy.

In addition, the summer training pro­grams of the 1970s, wherein cadets were assigned to district offices and Coast Guard headquarters for exposure to the bureaucratic nature of the service, came into being in response to a numbers crunch, not from a desire to change cadet training. We had more cadets than could be accommodated afloat. The headquar­ters district visits were initiated so that the cadets would have something to do.

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That “something” was left to the indi­vidual offices receiving cadets.

While well-intended, these visits were a waste of valuable training time. Expo­sure does not equate with training. These summer assignments were often no more than guided tours that provided an oppor­tunity to read organizational manuals. Our return to more traditional summer training programs was not in response to the hue and cry of the “traditionalists,” but was the result of our recognition of the failure of these exposure programs to accomplish anything of valqe.

The Coast Guard Academy’s summer training programs remain ambitious and varied. They are organized, structured, and carefully designed to provide cadets with meaningful experience and training.

Cadet training afloat is still the corner­stone of the academy’s summer programs because the Coast Guard is a seagoing ser­vice. Every academy graduate serves an initial tour afloat. This front-line service is critical to the development of leader­ship and professional skills within our organization.

Bureaucrats can always be hired.

“Manning Nuclear Submarines”

(See F. G. Satterthwaite, pp. 61-67, February

1985 Proceedings)

Vice Admiral Nils R. Thunman, U. S. Navy, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Submarine Warfare)—Captain         Sat-

terthwaite’s article contains a number of conclusions and opinions with which I must disagree. While we will continue to have shortages in the mid-grade and sen­ior ranks for the next several years, the shortages will not be of the magnitude or duration cited by Captain Satterth waite. Significant progress has recently been made in increasing our junior officer in­ventory, resulting in an improved cycle of sea/shore rotation. Indeed, all junior officers are now able to rotate to shore duty at the completion of their submarine division officer tour, a situation which was not true only four years ago.

An integral part of this favorable cycle is the opportunity for postgraduate educa­tion and career-broadening assignments ashore. Currently, 49 submariners are enrolled in 22 postgraduate curricula; 42 others will be assigned during this fiscal year. Other officers are participating in programs at civilian universities both in the United States and abroad. Shore as­signments encompass traditional subma­rine force billets as well as instructor duty at Officer Candidate School and Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps units, recruiting, and joint staffs. Our nuclear- powered ships are experiencing worl wide access to more ports than ever, have made great strides in this area, an foreign port visits, by both nuclear-pow ered attack and ballistic missile subma rines, are today a routine part of subma fine life.

Captain Satterthwaite’s opinions con ceming counterproductive work ethics, overworked submarine and tender crews, supremacy of the Operational Reactor Safeguards Examination (ORSE), excessively rigorous and restrictive P^a^ to command, inter alia, reflect a lack ⁰ understanding of today’s submarm force. This is not surprising since Capta¹ Satterthwaite’s professional backgroun does not include service in a modern ^vvar ship, exercising the responsibility a accountability integral to the operatic^

and maintenance of a nuclear-powere

ship, or the day-to-day knowledge o submarine and her crew. Rather, he ba his advice on a few carefully selected a outdated statistics as well as intervie with sailors and officers who j^ustl their decisions to leave active service i reciting negative memories.           ^

Yes, the submariner works hard, ask him to spend time at sea away f^r0'|| his family, and we administer difi>^c^ examinations. The singular importance Operational Reactor Safeguards Exa^nlJ nations alluded to in the article is °^ve stated. While we hold officers ac⁰⁰¹^ able for overall nuclear propulsion P*^a safety and reliability, we also assign g^re

nd

examinations such as periodic T^aCt,c Readiness Evaluations. At the same tim > we reward the submariner with tim^e 7 advancement, special pay (though not y enough), and trust him with much ot strategic and deterrent defense of country. Attainment of command only one constant, qualification. bⁿ" neer officer tours are not mandatory Today, 61 submarine officers in or ^ dered to command have not served engineer officers.            ,

In conclusion. I’ve had the good tune of serving in the submarine f°^rce₍, more than 26 years. SSN, SSBN, or S staff or shore—it has all been great d^ I’m most proud of my participation in small, but elite group of some ot Navy’s finest professionals. Today ^s . mariners are dedicated and talented ⁱⁿ viduals, highly trained and superbly co petent operationally. They will ^sal _a|| harm’s way under the ice and through the world’s oceans. To speak di^sP^ar^, ingly of a program to which such fs professionals are committed is a g disservice.

“Peter Tare and the PHM”

@^ee B. L. Gravatt, pp. 129-131, August 1984 Proceedings)

lieutenant Commander Fred W. Rosen, U- S- Naval Reserve (Retired)—I read Commander Gravatt’s article with great 'Merest, having served as a patrol torpedo FT) boat captain in Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron (MTB Ron) 15 (a Higgins Squadron) from December 1942 to July 1944. If Commander Gravatt had access ^to all the archives and history of PT boat °Perations, he would have described the imposition and abilities of these boats ^W|th better detailed information.

First, I take exception to the descrip­tor¹ of “a redundant propulsion plant.” ’he boat’s propulsion plant contained hree 1,350-horsepower Packard engines ueled by 100 octane gasoline, with a Modification in mid-1943 increasing its rive to 1,500 horsepower. During my '6-month experience in the Mediterra­^nean, our engines, properly maintained Recording to squadron doctrine, very sel­dom failed to perform to expected stan- uards. The one exception was during the summer months when the higher temper- ^a’ures of the seawater used to cool the Engines, coupled with the heaviness of air lowing into the engine room caused a ten t? ’5-knot loss from maximum speed, ’he boats were equipped with four fuel ’^anks, two forward and two aft of the ^eugine room, carrying a total of 3,000 gallons, which allowed a range of ap­proximately 400 nautical miles. When additional range was required, we would exceed 550 miles by carrying extra fuel in ^0'gallon drums on deck.

The Higgins PT boat hulls proved to be excellent seagoing boats with the excep- h°n of having an awfully wet bridge "'hen heading into a choppy sea. When seas reached more than five feet, it was difficult to operate from a stable platform °^r firing torpedoes.

The armament consisted of four Mk-8 'circa 1913-1917) 21-inch, 27-knot for­goes, two twin .50-caliber mounted Sbns, one 20-mm. gun, one depth ^harge, and one smoke generator. After arriving at our operating area, we added a second 20-mm. gun and several .50- and •40-caliber machine guns welded to the orpedo tubes. In early 1944, we swapped he aft 20-mm. gun for a 40-mm. gun. In May 1944 _t|_le mr-13 torpedoes finally ®^Carne available, and our boats ex­^changed their torpedo tubes for Mk-13 ^racks and torpedoes.

Commander Gravatt’s description of °^Ur “torpedo director” is accurate; how- ^^Ver, Squadron 15’s torpedo attack tac- ^lcs called for a maximum launch range of 750 yards with an ideal range of 500 yards. At these ranges, the director was a help, but the majority of firings were governed by the seaman’s eye.

The percentage of hot, straight, and true torpedo runs were not very high, due to the Mk-8’s inadequacies. As testimony to this torpedo’s accuracy, during an action our division leader once broke radio silence to ask the commander of the last boat in the division, “Have you fired your fish yet?” He received the immortal reply, “Hell no, I have not finished dodging Sandy’s and yours yet!”

Our squadron first saw rockets in June 1943 at Bizerte Harbor. We saw landing craft tanks being converted to rocket plat­forms. The rockets were to be delivered in one salvo on the beaches of Sicily, prior to the landing force assaults. After many frustrating actions with Mk-8 tor­pedoes having a minimum depth of six feet against the German F Lighters (Ma­rine Fahr Prahm, transport ferry/landing craft) the draft of which was a little over five feet and armed with 88-mm., 40­mm., and 20-mm. guns as well as sundry smaller caliber automatic weapons, the squadron commander had each of the boats fitted with four wooden rocket racks, each carrying three beach rockets. The launch doctrine was similar to that for torpedo launchings. After two hair­raising rocket actions (which scared us more than the enemy), we were forced to abandon the rocket. All hands knew if we had the proper research and development as well as engineering capabilities avail­able, the beach rockets could have re­duced the enemy’s sea traffic to zero!

MTB Ron 15’s mission was to “Seek out the enemy and destroy him.” This was accomplished by:

► Patrols operating every night in the enemy’s sea-lanes

• Sea blockade of Cape Bon, northwest Africa, successfully preventing the enemy’s evacuation of its troops from North Africa
• Screening our fleet’s landing opera­tions during the invasions of Sicily, Salerno, Anzio, Elba, and southern France
• Transporting, landing, and retrieving Office of Strategic Services (OSS) per-' sonnel from enemy beaches.

The win/loss record recorded in Com­mander Gravatt’s article prompts me to cite the MTB Ron 15’s record. This 18- boat squadron:

• Operated continuously from April 1943 until October 1944, from North Africa; Sicily; Italy; La Maddalena, Sar­dinia; Corsica; and southern France
• Carried out 55 OSS missions
• Engaged the enemy in 73 actions re­sulting in 30 enemy vessels destroyed, nine enemy vessels probably destroyed, 24 enemy vessels damaged, and eight enemy vessels probably damaged
• Destroyed or damaged a total of 56,300 tons (This is an average of ap­proximately 3,100 tons destroyed per PT boat, the equivalent of 50 times each PT boat’s own tonnage.)
• The cost was 16 boats damaged by enemy action, two boats sunk by enemy mines during invasion of southern France, one officer and three enlisted men killed in action, and seven officers and 24 enlisted men wounded in action.

Commander Gravatt asks what we can learn about fast patrol boat warfare from PT boat operations in World War II. Using Proceedings magazine as a forum,

I volunteer my services and urge my fel­low PT boat officers to use their experi­ence and knowledge in any way that can help make our Navy stronger and wiser in fast patrol boat warfare tactics.

Comment and Discussion

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“Too Much Management, Too Little Leadership”

(See R. E. Gonzalez, pp. 86-87, February 1985 Proceedings)

“Leaders, Managers, and

Mercenaries”

(See C. A. Leader, pp. 92-95, November 1984;

J. T. Hayward, p. 126, January 1985; W. E.

Meyer, p. 18, February 1985 Proceedings)

Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, U. S. Navy (Retired)—I would not have continued to read every issue of the Proceedings since 1922 were I not convinced that it serves a useful purpose for the U. S. Navy. But I continue to wonder whether your “lead­ership” articles do what I presume you intend for them to do: make better leaders of our young officers.

A two-part question I would like you to ask your members, particularly the younger officers, is: Has anything you have ever read in the leadership articles helped you to become a better officer? If so, how?

I will look forward to reading the responses.

Captain R. G. Thomson, Jr., U. S. Navy (Retired)—Commander Gonzalez and Admiral Hayward were right on the mark. In the military, personal and in­spired leadership is more important than management over the long haul. The lat­ter is, of course, necessary in Washington budget battles and for the efficient ex­penditure of funds throughout the naval establishment. But foremost in our think­ing should be the fact that our Navy is first of all a fleet of warships and aircraft, and sailors and Marines. It cannot be put into the same mold as a business, and from the top on down, it cannot be oper­ated like one.

I saw leadership at its finest while at the Naval Auxiliary Air Station, Saufley, Pensacola, Florida, in late November or early December 1945, as an aviation cadet in the final stage of flight training. I was among the dwindling number of ca­dets bent on mastering the SBD Dauntless of Midway fame and determined to win our wings even though the war was over.

Word came that Admiral William F. “Bull” Halsey, Jr., was going to visit Saufley. We had heard of the admiral, and in our young minds, we associated him with the heart and soul of carrier avi­ation. His biography and his share of his­tory had yet to be written, but of all the great naval heroes of that era, he was the one with whom we budding aviators identified.

Although the aviation cadets were not made privy to the reason for his visit, we were told to prepare for an inspection. There was a great flurry of activity: shoes were shined, blues were pressed and brushed, hair was cut, and white cap cov­ers were stretched. We were ready. I’m sure that the commanding officer and executive officer were in a state border­ing on panic planning the schedule of events, but all we cadets had to do was stand at attention. With intellects in neu­tral but our emotions charged with eager anticipation, we hoped we would at least get a side glance of Bull Halsey.

Admiral Halsey’s aircraft, an R5D if I remember correctly, arrived on time and taxied to a position in front of the assem­bled cadets. The door opened, and the admiral appeared. I don’t know what we expected, but I’m sure that we assumed that he would be in service dress blue, with gold to his elbows, a chest full of ribbons, and his hat visor a vision of scrambled eggs. Not so.

The admiral stepped forward with a huge grin and his hands in his trouser pockets. He was wearing aviator greens without ribbons (although permitted on greens at the time) and a fore-and-aft cap at a rakish angle with wings in place o the customary cap device (again, perm' ted but not seen often). He was looking directly at us. He made a few remar s

which I don’t remember, conducted a

very informal inspection, and made m departure. It was magic.

If the war had started again, we who came under his unpretentious spell 1° those few minutes would, like so many before us, have followed him anywhere- He exuded command presence, insp'ra tion, and pure, personal leadership of¹ highest order. I’m sure that he could have spelled management that day, but I dou that he ever entertained any thoughts tha equated it with the type of leadership tha wins wars.

More recently, Chief of Naval Opera tions Admiral James D. Watkins demon strated that same type of charisma- 'ⁿ vited as the speaker to the closing banquet of the annual Tailhook Associa^ tion weekend last September in L-^a Vegas, he was facing an audience tha was, to put it mildly, parochial an maybe fanatic in support of the ‘ d^al hook Navy.” When Admiral Watk|^a made his entrance, any negative thougn about having a “Blackshoe” address o crowd were swept away. First there was surprised silence then a hail of appl^auS^j. cheers, and an aerial bombardment dinner rolls, some of which scored hd^s^

Admiral Watkins wore a huge grim ^ leather flight jacket with a white scar^ draped over one shoulder, a cloth hein' with circa 1944 goggles down and rea ; for action, and flight gloves. Before uttered his first words, he had alrea >' won over our group with the same co mand presence and magic displayed years earlier by Admiral Halsey.

With that simple act, Admiral Watki became an honorary Tailhooker in view. His dress did more to brush asi the corrosive facet of the warfare ^c° ^ munity syndrome than any instruct' could ever have hoped to achieve, ^a more eloquently than any spoken w°^r ’ this act demonstrated his respect ^a admiration for his aviators. He ^rlC deserved the applause and standing °^v tion that followed his remarks.

“Tripping on Technology”

(See J. G. Gavin, pp. 51-55, January 1985

Proceedings)

Lieutenant John S. Kelly, U. S. Navy— Complex military hardware is required in managing a highly dynamic, split-second tactical environment. The question is, “How much complexity is enough?”

Complexity for its own sake is a risky path to follow. Although a specific sys­tem may be the slickest piece of hardware to hit the fleet since the naval gun, it may require a master of science in electrical engineering to operate, and there is no guarantee that one of its many parts would not fail just as an approaching SS- N-19 has locked on to your ship.

Mr. Gavin cites the impressive sortie rates for the F-14; these figures should be eyed carefully. As a naval flight officer, I know that the ability of the aircraft to fly has absolutely nothing to do with the ability of the mission systems to work.

Complexity for its own sake has other penalties. For example, we have invested heavily in getting Harpoon missiles into the fleet, but look at the loadout of any surface ship nearby: four to six, maybe ^eight missiles, tops. And how often do We get to train with these little golden Wonders? Well, my patrol squadron com­munity, Patrol Wings Atlantic, with its 12 squadrons, 108 aircraft, and 144 crews, got to fire one missile last year. My crew enjoyed its 1/ 144th of the test shot, even if I wasn’t there to see it. (I did see some neat pictures later, though.)

Complexity and even innovation of design are of no value if the weapon or system fails to be easily produced or re­paired. Given the stringent requirements generally placed on the design engineer, “overdesign” often results. The techno­logical base certainly allows for this; ci­vilian computer technology is years ahead of the fleet. The military specifica­tion system does nothing to discourage such overdesign, either.

A better approach would be to acquire a greater number of a slightly less-fancy weapon. To me, and I would hazard a guess that I am not alone, it is better to have a missile which has a 75% probabil­ity of hit instead of 90%, but which, be­cause of its lower costs, can be purchased m sufficient numbers so that we can shoot twice as many of them at an enemy. Likewise, rather than having an “elec­tronic light show” in the cockpit or tacti­cal station of an aircraft, provide me with the information that I need to do my job and nothing more. I’ll play RasterBlaster when I get back to the wardroom.

Sophistication does not necessarily require complexity. For example, in the

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adjusted and expanded to keep pace changes in technology, economics,

area of computers, modern very large scale circuit integration devices offer the user tremendous power in a small, easily interfaced package; witness the modem microcomputers that do as much as mini­computers or even mainframes of not so very long ago. User interface techniques— employing mice, touchscreens, pulldown windows, and the like—offer simply understood and employed methods of controlling this power. Interestingly, many of these advanced machines are

competitive in price with the lesser equipment. The use of such techniques is an example of technology correctly ap­plied. Complexity for its own sake is technology misapplied—expensive, dif­ficult. and often getting in the way of accomplishing the job.

We need to take a detailed look at mis­sion requirements and the sort of technol­ogy that may be required to perform the mission, and then proceed to use only as much technology as is required to per­form the mission. This makes the system simpler, easier to maintain, less expen­sive, and maybe even more effective.

“What’s Happening?”

(See W. P. Gates, p. 179, November 1984 Proceedings)

Lin Chapman—Mr. Gates struck a re­sponsive chord. Does anyone else re­member the Old Navy? Here are three more questions to add to Mr. Gates’ list:

• Does the executive officer borrow an old wallet from a lowly electronics tech­nician third class petty officer (ET3) in an attempt to catch a petty thief below decks?
• Does the same executive officer drive his 1948 Buick convertible from Phila­delphia to Vermont on a weekend fall fo­liage trip?
• Does this executive officer drop off the lowly ET3 at home in Connecticut on the way to Vermont and pick him up again on the return trip to Philly?

If the executive officer’s name is Ern­est J. King, Jr., he does these mundane but very human things, and he will never be forgotten for them.

“Train the Warrior, Educate the Officer”

(.See B. D. Cole, pp. 44-47, January 1985 Proceedings)

Admiral Robert B. Carney, U. S. Navy (Retired), Chief of Naval Operations, 1953-55—Commander Cole’s treatment of his subject is an update of a Navy training philosophy which has been firmly in place since the early years of this century.

Shipboard training, weapons exercises and competitions, and tactical exercises were all devised and executed for the pur­pose of readying the Navy to cope with disasters, and with the exigencies of war as war was then envisaged.

Educating the officer has been an ob­jective in the Navy even longer than training efforts, but a valid and compre­hensive history of the educational process would be as voluminous as the history of the Navy itself. John Paul Jones’ concept of the desiderata of proper naval officer character implies education. Alfred Thayer Mahan stimulated interest in the interrelation of sea power and history. Since Mahan’s time, the Naval War Col­lege curriculum, like all service educa­tional programs, has been periodically foreign policy. The Naval War College even conducts correspondence courses. Postgraduate education is firmly estab­lished in the Navy, and, in addition, numerous technical schools offer educa­tional programs within special parameters.

But back to training.

To speak of the prospective warrior as a de facto warrior is premature. No one is truly a warrior until he has experienced the actual test of war, whether in combat or in some other position where vital war decisions must be made. The best that we can do in peacetime is to assume the shape of future conflicts and train accord­ingly. All too often, that “best” has been proven wrong by war’s unpredictable

unfoldings.

Prior to World War II, some “conven­tional wisdom” foresaw an early and decisive victory over the Japanese fle^et- But the war in the Pacific did not follow that scenario.

Within the fitness measurements of the years between World Wars I and II, many fine professional reputations emerged- Actual hostilities, however, sorted out those who could durably and successfully cope with the pressures of war from those who could not.

We must train as best we can, but we must never lose sight of the fact that war is unpredictable, and that the success or failure of individuals tested by war is unpredictable. There is no proven way °* identifying in advance the special spird and tough fiber—or lack of it—in indi­viduals called to battle.

Captain R. Salopek, U. S. Navy, Offi^cer in Charge, Engineering Systems Schools, Service School Command, Naval Train' ing Center, Great Lakes, Illinois—' Commander Cole’s article articulates the rhetoric that numerous officers have heard for more than 20 years. Significant portions of his article are valid and accu­rately reflect difficult issues. The article may, however, reflect a prevalent attitude in many of our officers who have devel­oped the consummate skills of the prob­lem identifier. Comments addressing hard training issues fail to consider nu­merous major training initiatives recently completed, scheduled for implementa­tion, or under development.

The Navy now has a viable training

continuum for fossil fuel propulsion engi­neering from the apprentice level to se­nior officer ranks. Since 1983, we have moved from computer-managed, com­puter-assisted instruction, and the eso­teric academic educational theory of the 1960s to vocational training and the es­tablishment of hands-on skills supported with broad technical education. This shift in philosophy reflects the commitment of a small group of officers within the train- ^lng community who are not content to accept the bureaucratic nonsense that impedes the implementation of common sense. The training community is made ^UP of officers and enlisted personnel who eome from the operating fleet and, for the most part, return to it. Their perspectives °f current fleet problems and solutions are instrumental in the formulation and nurturing of major initiatives that address technical training shortfalls. The Navy’s training community is not a monolithic organization.

We have completed the implementa­tion of a total overhaul of propulsion rating training for machinist’s mates, boilerman technicians, enginemen, elec­trician’s mates, and gas turbine systems technicians. Our entire officer engineer- ^lng training continuum was comprehen­sively scrutinized recently. Although the formal report is at the Deputy CNO for Surface Warfare (OP-03) level for re­^view, many significant initiatives and modifications to officer engineering training strategy have been completed.

Not all members of the training com­munity would, perhaps, agree with Com­mander Cole’s assertion that “the suc­cessful junior naval officer need not be an engineer, but he does need to be able to combine scarce personnel and material resources to achieve a desired goal . . . combat readiness. The technical knowl­edge can be instilled through in-service training.” As technology continues to improve rapidly, it becomes increasingly dangerous to believe that an adequate level of technical knowledge can be in­stilled through in-service training; theo­retical knowledge alone is not enough. Without such requisite knowledge, a sig­nificant portion of our engineer officers would be in over their heads attempting to manage complex marine propulsion Plants.

Unlike our counterparts in the mer­chant marine who must be wipers before they can be chief engineers and who must Pass a series of exacting license examina­tions, our prospective engineer officers gain technical and management skills through structured pipeline training. This training has been under close scrutiny and has improved significantly over the past decade. The overall performance of our ships, taken in context with numerous complementing efforts, tends to validate this premise. We perhaps have come fur­ther in such training in the past four years than in the preceding ten years. We are making solid and measurable progress in this area.

We in the training community recog­nize shortfalls. A critical review will allow the casual problem identifier to rec­ognize that we now teach aspiring engi­neer officers management application training. In the past, we taught engineers what to manage and who to manage, but failed to teach how to manage. Our ef­forts in teaching nuts and bolts have been reflected in positive results and a reason­able upgrade in the engineering officer of the watch qualification program. We are now shifting our focus slightly to the management aspects of running the entire engineering department. Good main pro­pulsion assistants and chief engineers still, however, need prerequisite techni­cal knowledge. Similar efforts have been completed in the combat systems and other electronic equipment areas in com­ing to grips with the respective training continuums.

Sweeping changes in traditional well- institutionalized philosophies such as “the creation of a shipboard operating engineer within the officer corps of equal seniority to the commanding officer’ are strongly supported and will force the growth of technically qualified managers.

It is tragic that such common-sense ideas are rarely successful and meet the full force of bureaucratic traditionalism.

We are coming to grips with the signif­icant problems and implementing solu­tions. Our senior leadership in the Wash­ington arena is providing clear goals for the shore-based training community. We now staff the training community with highly competitive officers who are over­coming the sins of their predecessors. Initiatives are rapidly falling into place, and the beat is most positive. We have demonstrated a significant improvement in our ability to plan, program, and de­liver complex facilities required to sup­port combined technical education and technical training throughout the entire spectrum of the surface warfare environ­ment. Vastly improved technical, voca­tional, and practical advanced training for enlisted engineers, E-l through E-9, is in place and allows us to better deal with the shortfalls that create the operator/main- tainer problem.

I applaud Commander Cole for his most direct approach in identifying the problems. I hope he joins us in solving them.

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think

At present, there is no reason to

“The Unsellable Dream?”

(See E. F. Black, pp. 38-42, September 1984;

D. C. Ricks, pp. 120-124, December 1984

Proceedings)

Michael J. Dunn—As a civilian engineer currently engaged in the engineering analysis of system concepts relevant to the strategic defense initiative (SDI), I wish to respond to Mr. Ricks’s request for any “proponent of SDI” to explain its prospects.

Mr. Ricks has misstated General Black’s comment regarding popular sup­port of SDI, which was limited to the observation that there appears to be little media support of the concept. General Black did not doubt the existence of pop­ular support. Indeed, the result of a poll conducted last summer by Opinion Re­search Corporation under the auspices of the American Security Council Founda­tion indicated 85% of 1,000 U. S. house­holds-polled wanted the American people to “create a strategic defense and a civil defense which would protect U. S. citi­zens against a nuclear war at least as well as the Soviets defend their citizens.”

The results of this poll are consistent with those of another poll conducted in California in February 1984 by Arthur J. Finkelstein & Associates for the High Frontier organization, which found that 82% of the respondents approved the basic concept of active strategic defenses, and 72% of that group rated strategic de­fense of higher priority than the MX mis­sile, the B-l bomber, cruise missiles, or Trident submarines.

These results were corroborated by a poll conducted by Penn and Schoen & Associates for the Committee on the Present Danger, in which 75% of the re­spondents favored active strategic defen­ses—a response that cut across all politi­cal, ideological, and age classifications. Therefore, it must be concluded that mas­sive popular support for SDI exists de­spite media cynicism.

Mr. Ricks argues in favor of skepti­cism toward SDI by reference to “inde­pendent studies within the scientific and engineering communities” which purport to disprove conclusively that active stra­tegic defenses could ever be practical. He cites a quotation from the testimony of the Union of Concerned Scientists to embellish his case, yet fails to mention that the Union of Concerned Scientists has been conspicuously partisan against all major strategic programs. This testi­mony should be held in perspective as a political statement, and not as purely an objective technical assessment.

Aside from political bias, the fact that few, if any, opponents of SDI are specifi­cally conversant with the mission re­quirements and near-term technological capabilities appropriate to realistic SDI system concepts is a more important rea­son to hold this testimony in abeyance. The simple explanation for this state of affairs is that current SDI-related activity is classified. The critics therefore base their objections on overstated mission requirements and unduly pessimistic esti­mates of the technical performance needed to accomplish these missions.

The assessment of the Fletcher com­mittee, which included many representa­tives of the aerospace and scientific com­munity who were conversant with the mission and technologies under consider­ation, is of greater relevance. The com­mittee concluded that our current level of technology warranted a serious investiga­tion of such defensive concepts. Its rec­ommendation is only a prudent action and in no way commits the nation to a hastily- conceived crash program offering incon­clusive benefits.

The SDI program, after all, is intended to support technological research, an ac­tivity that cannot legitimately be con­strued as either unwise or bellicose. Ad­ditional support for SDI has come from the American Institute for Aeronautics and Astronautics, the professional society for the majority of this nation’s aerospace engineering talent.

There is also widespread support for the concept of active strategic defense within the industrial community. Re­cently, an official from Lockheed Mis­siles & Space Company stated that a first layer of defense could be fielded in five to ten years at a program cost of about $50 billion—a quite reasonable estimate when compared to the cost projections of other strategic programs, and especially in view of the direct defense against ag­gression or accident that such a system could provide.

Mr. Ricks supposes that the actual implementation of an active defense sys­tem would in turn prompt the Soviet Union to direct their efforts toward devel­oping more offensive systems that could be used to penetrate such a defense. Per­haps this supposition is true, but Mr. Ricks cannot avoid the logical inconsis­tencies inherent in such an argument.

For one thing, it presupposes that purely defensive systems must necessar­ily be perceived as cloaking aggressive intent. Although this argument is illogical on its face, it forces us to consider the significance of the Soviet Union’s exten­sive program of active and civil defense against strategic attack. However, Mr. Ricks does not seem alarmed at this de­velopment. One must wonder if it is wrong to insist that the Soviet Union re­spect our legitimate desires for active defense as well as it respects its own- And if they are unwilling to share this respect, would it not be more appropriate to conclude that their desire for us not to have active defenses is more indicative o their intentions toward us?

Another point is the relative efficacy o the proposed active defenses versus the hypothetical countermeasures. At P^re*' ent, it is a stated SDI objective to identify defensive concepts whose implementa­tion will require less cost for expansion than the Soviets could afford for counter­measures. In other words, the goal is ^a system for which it is cheaper to provide additional defense than it is for an aggres­sor to mount additional attacks.

that this goal is impractical. Those who argue in favor of the superiority of often sive countermeasures do so in ignorance of the technical, operational, and eco nomic difficulties associated with sue countermeasures, thus framing the pr° lem as pitting fallible defenses again^s infallible offenses. But nothing can be so simple.

The technical and theoretical basis for spaceborne defenses was largely under stood 20 years ago, as a result of wor accomplished under Project Defender; conducted by the Defense Advanced R^e search Projects Agency (DARPA) 0h^eI1 ARPA) during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. The development ⁰ such a system might have begun long ^a§° had not the idea of active defenses been supplanted with the mutual assured de struction (MAD) doctrine of hostage p°P ulations. Is it a coincidence that the p®^r son who terminated Project Defender activity and promulgated the doctrine ⁰ MAD is also one of the most vocal opP° nents of SDI: ex-Defense Secretary R° ert S. McNamara?

The countermeasure argument must allowed its share of skepticism. “East y manufactured penetration aids, such ^aS decoy boosters” are imaginary. To pr°P erly simulate an intercontinental balU^stlC missile (ICBM) infrared signature- ^a decoy would have to have ICBM-s*^ze thrust levels; for it not to be discrimin^ate by distinctive acceleration characteris tics, it would have to be as massive as an ICBM. When all is said and done, t ^e “decoy” amounts to an ICBM witho^u^ payload—which undermines the end concept of a cheap decoy.

Similarly, the idea of fast-burn boos ers that burn out while still in the atmo sphere incur the penalty of severe ptf load reduction to the point that » strategic defense system did no more tn drive the Soviets to that option, it wou

indirectly reduce their throw-weight by as much as 80%. The net result of all these responses is a combined economic, oper­ational, and strategic burden on the So­viet Union if it attempts to redress the imminent obsolescence of its ICBM ar­mory. This is de facto arms control be­cause the Soviets cannot afford to indulge ^ln all these countermeasures.

There is a final point to the concept of strategic defense that has not been men­tioned. It is the fact that any active de­fense system applies a deterrent leverage that works in favor of the defender. A simple consideration of the statistics of a counterforce preemptive attack by the Soviet Union against our ICBMs and command-control communications nodes would reveal tremendous degradation ol ^a Soviet first-strike if as little as 50% of its attack were intercepted.

In order to restore its prior level of at­tack effectiveness, the Soviet Union Would have to double or triple the size of Us original strike. This-means that a de­fensive system can be effective as a de­terrence enhancement at modest levels of effectiveness, well below that which the critics find necessary for a “perfect” de­fense system.

Thus, SDI opens the door to both en­hanced deterrence and an economic/oper- ational justification for the obsolescence °f ICBMs or submarine launched ballistic missiles, which is a start toward disarma­ment not to be despised.

Opportunity Knocks for the Navy

David Kayseri—Opportunity knocks for the Navy’s advanced ship commu­nity. That knock is the result of a recent decision by Congress to mandate that the replacements for the auxiliary survey ships (T-AGSs) USNS Bowditch (T- AGS-21) and USNS Dutton (T-AGS-22) be new construction rather than conver­sions. Those deep ocean survey (DOS) ships support the fleet ballistic missile Program by acoustically sounding the depths of the world’s oceans in which our “boomers” operate. The condition of these ships has been referred to as “worn out” by Commander John Alden in his article “Tomorrow’s Fleet” (February 1984 Proceedings, pp. 113-123). The replacements, designated T-AGS-39 and T-AGS-40, were to be funded in fiscal year 1985.

But how does this give the Navy’s re­search and development community an opportunity? The answer is the small Waterplane area twin hull (SWATH) con­cept. The replacement T-AGS program gives the community the opportunity to get exactly what it has been asking for. The class would be small (only two ships), perfect for a demonstration with­out a tremendous risk and commitment of assets. The mission is tailor made for SWATH, since SWATH’s inherent roll and pitch stability in a seaway would markedly improve the operational win­dow available to the mission system’s acoustic sensors. The current ships are reported to curtail operations in moderate seas because of the degradation in sensor performance caused by roll motions.

The size of the designated conversion candidates, two Mormac-class freighters, was dictated more by the requirements to maintain sensor immersion by draft and for seakeeping rather than by the weight or volume requirements of the DOS mis­sion system. A SWATH could meet these requirements at a significantly smaller displacement, offering the possibility of a less expensive ship.

So far, it has been assumed that the SWATH’s mission system would be iden­tical to that of the conversions. However, the twin hulls offer the possibility of a stereoscopic sonar system, mounting one transducer on each hull. Commercial stereoscopic sonars now exist and offer significant improvements in resolution.

There are some drawbacks to the choice of a SWATH hullform for the T-AGS replacements. Those replace­ments are desperately needed, and it is not possible to pull a contract design of a SWATH off a shelf for modification. The lack of operational experience with SWATHs in the 5,000- to 10,000-ton dis­placement range will not give the “warm fuzzies” to the operational types, who seem to be willing to take the “second” ride on a new design. Maybe the records of Kaimalino, Duplus, Suave Lino, and numerous self-powered, semi-submersi­ble mobile drilling rigs, which all have been operating for years, will allay these concerns if they are considered. If further proof is needed, the Japanese have just recently completed a 3,000-ton SWATH ocean research support ship, Kaiyo, which is now operational.

It is true that the only cost data on SWATH hullforms of the size needed for DOS are estimates of paper ships. There are few guidelines for comparisons to equivalent monohulls. But a SWATH is just a displacement ship, not a high-tech vehicle whose cost per ton is closer to that of an aircraft than that of an auxiliary ship. Because stability is the primary push for increased displacement for the new T-AGSs, the smaller displacement required for a SWATH to perform the deep ocean survey mission could offset any cost-per-ton differential.

Could a SWATH perform the T-AGS mission effectively? For the sake of speed of acquisition, feasibility studies were done by the Navy prior to making its de­cision to convert existing ships. The body of engineering analysis, model test data, and performance data on existing SWATH ships indicates that it can per­form effectively and with minimal tech­nical and cost risks.

Opportunity is at the Navy’s door. If the advanced ship community can open that door and embrace this opportunity to show its stuff, the Navy will acquire two very capable T-AGSs at very little risk. But if the advanced ship community can’t get the door open, opportunity will move along to another door—again.

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