This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
MAF Heliborne Assault: Trump or Joker?
By Major Joseph F. Jennings, U. S. Marine Corps
Captain S. Doright, commanding officer of Company A, 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, is a worried man. His company made a heliborne assault at 0300 and now was spread much too thinly around a bridge and road junction just south of the town of Olgod on Denmark’s Jutland Peninsula. His mission is to hold this position to prevent elements of a Soviet motorized rifle regiment somewhere to his north from getting to the beach and disrupting the surface landing commencing shortly.
This mission is tough enough for the assigned forces; the problem is half the force has not arrived. Light armored vehicles (LAVs) armed with 25-mm. automatic cannons and high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) with tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) antitank missiles should have arrived 45 minutes ago. Without these vehicles, his company has only a few M-47 Dragon medium antitank!assault weapons and light antiarmor assault weapons to face the numerous Soviet tanks and mechanized infantry combat vehicles. During the rehearsal, the LAVs never got to shore because of a foul-up on the ships. If the real thing goes as badly as the rehearsal, this was going to be a long, unpleasant day.
Now Captain Doright’s scouts were reporting engine and track noises, indicating an armored column approaching his position. “I wonder if we’ve bitten off more than we can chew?" thought Captain Doright just before the earsplitting shriek of an incoming 125mm. tank round made him much too busy for idle thoughts.
Captain Doright’s situation is hypothetical, but illustrative of a potential problem unrecognized by many in the U. S. Navy-Marine amphibious team: a general lack of training and preparation to conduct a Marine Amphibious Force (MAF)-level heliborne assault, owing to a failure to realize the complexities of such an undertaking.
For as long as I’ve been associated with amphibious operations (16 years), our training has been diluted by limited ship and aircraft availabilities. For example, we preposition troops and supplies ashore to simulate their landing by helicopter, or fly aircraft from their home field instead of the deck of an amphibious ship. We seldom have enough aircraft embarked to land the assault elements of our heliborne force in a timely manner with sufficient combat power to perform their mission. We have never, to my knowledge, embarked a MAF with its full complement of aircraft and tried to make a realistic amphibious assault.
The theory is that we can learn all of the necessary techniques in a scaled- down exercise and, when the time comes, it will be merely a matter of applying those techniques on an expanded scale. I do not agree with that theory; I think the problem is more complicated than many people realize.
Consider the example of a notional MAF making an amphibious assault with two regimental landing teams (RLTs) landing by helicopter and the third landing from surface craft. The attack takes place across the beaches near Oksbol in southwestern Jutland with the objective of seizing the port city of Esberg and allowing the landing of a maritime prepositioning ship (MPS) brigade and follow-on U. S. Army forces. Opposing the attack is a Soviet motorized rifle division, with a motorized rifle regiment conducting a mobile defense in the vicinity of the landing site. The plan calls for the heliborne force to land before first light in position to isolate the landing beaches and prevent the enemy from seriously contesting the surface assault.
The problem is landing the assault ele
ments of the heliborne force from ^ phibious ships steaming about 50 nal,tl . miles from the landing zones 4ulC ' enough to be in position with full c0111 power before the enemy can K Table 1 outlines the composition ot assault elements of the heliborne ” ^ Table 2 lists the numbers and types helicopter-carrying ships in the amp ^ ous task force (ATF) and the numbed medium-lift (CH-46 Sea Knight. LP
53P ^ ^ta'E°n) ant* heavy-lift (CHE Super Stallion) helicopter opera- '°nal deck spots (ODSs)—the area on e flight deck of a ship required for the “re°ff> landing, refueling, and loading a single helicopter.
In this scenario we do not have enough Pace on the amphibious ships for the mber of aircraft required to land our assault forces in one lift. To land the as- ault forces in two lifts would require the Umber of aircraft sorties shown in hie 3. There is barely enough space in e ATF for this many aircraft if you do ot add extraneous items like AV-8B arriers. However, there are not enough a- f°r all these aircraft; in fact, each lrcraft will have to share space on the eck with three to five aircraft. l | e bulk of our aircraft are stowed uelow decks in the Iwo Jima (LPH-2)- nTarawa (LHA-l)-class amphibious ssault ships. To land the combat forces complete tactical units, rather than *ecerneal, the first deck-load of aircraft 0 ^st be loaded, launched, and sent to an J pattern while the next group of air- ra‘l is spotted, loaded, and launched.
been repeated three, four,
or five times, the helibome force is ready to make its first trip to the beach.
Unfortunately, some of the aircraft launched in the first waves probably will need to refuel before making the 100- nautical-mile round trip to the landing zone. A similar process occurs when the helicopters return to the ships to pick up their second load. Aircraft must land, refuel, load, and quickly clear the deck to make space for the next fuel-hungry load. Even without enemy interference, a command and control and traffic management challenge of this magnitude is enough to give an air boss nightmares. Imagine trying it at night, in rough seas, when radar screens are full of bogies.
From the total aircraft sorties required, shown in Table 3, we can compute the total number of aircraft that must be embarked. For the sake of simplicity, let us assume we achieve perfect tactical surprise, sustain no losses owing to enemy action, and have 95% aircraft availability on the first sortie and 92% availability on the second. Based on these assumptions, we must embark 102 CH-46s, 141 CH- 53Ds, and 66 CH-53Es to make our assault in two lifts. Let us also assume that
we have a bare minimum of 72 AH-1 SeaCobra attack helos and 24 UH-1N utility helos. We can simplify the problem by ignoring the Navy CH-46 search and rescue and MH-53E minesweeping helos which will also be embarked.
Now look again at Table 2. It is obvious that there are not nearly enough ODSs to handle all 381 aircraft simultaneously. To determine how many aircraft must share each ODS, look at Figure 1. The slanting line on the graph represents the tradeoff of medium-lift spots for heavy-lift spots—i.e., for every heavy- lift spot you give up, you get about 1.6 medium-lift spots. Therefore, any point on or below this line represents a feasible combination of medium- and heavy-lift
A MAF-level assault could become a “Chinese fire drill”—troop-laden helos orbiting, low on fuel, while the rest of the force is launched. Realistic, full-scale exercises could help prevent us from being burned in “the real thing.”
Ship Type | Number | Operational Deck Spots (medium! heavy) |
LPH | 7 | 5/3 |
LHA | 2 | 7/4 |
LHD | 4 | 7/4 |
LPD-1 | 1 | 1/1 |
LPD-4 | 9 | 2/1 |
LSD-36 | 2 | 1/1 |
LSD-41 | 7 | 1/1 |
| 32 | 105/64 |
Notes:___________________
- Although a number of other ships in the task force have flight decks (LCCs, LSTs, LKAs), it is unlikely that they would be primarily involved in the helibome assault.
- The numbers and types of ships listed are based on the Department of the Navy Amphibious Lift Study and projected for the mid-1990s. This is a best-case ATF.
Unit | Vehicles | Troops | Units | Vehicles | Troops |
RLT Command Group | 31 HMMWVs | 81 | 2 | 62 HMMWVs | 162 |
(Includes TOW platform) Infantry Battalion |
|
| 4 |
|
|
Combat Operation Center | 7 HMMWVs | 55 |
| 28 HMMWVs | 220 |
3 Rifle Companies | 3 HMMWVs | 498 |
| 12 HMMWVs | 1,592 |
Weapons Company Artillery Battalion | 25 HMMWVs | 209 | 2 | 100 HMMWVs | 836 |
HQ Battery | 1HMMWV | 8 |
| 2 HMMWVs | 16 |
3 Gun Batteries | 21 HMMWVs | 522 |
| 42 HMMWVs | 1,044 |
| 6 Forklifts |
|
| 12 Forklifts |
|
| 24 M-198s (155-mm.) |
| 48 M-198s |
| |
| 24 M-813s |
|
| 48 M-813s |
|
LAV Company | (1,248 rounds) 24 LAVs | 130 | 1 | 24 LAVs | 130 |
Table 2 MAF Assault Echelon ODSs
Table 1
Unit Composition Totals
for
for
19]-class amphibious command ships fleet command and control or LHAs
Totals 246 HMMWVs 48 M-198s 48 M-813s 24 LA Vs 12 Forklifts 4,000 Marines/Sailors
Table 3 Required Helicopter Sorties
Type Aircraft Number of Sorties spots. One feasible mix is 68 medium-1*^ spots and 22 heavy-lift spots, as illuS" trated in Figure 1, which requires that each medium-lift helo shares a deck spot with four others and each heavy-lift hel° shares deck space with two others.
It is possible to compute the time required to complete a helibome assauj when multiple aircraft share each decs spot, but the calculations are too extensive to be detailed here. However, it can be shown that for a 50-nautical mile mission, assuming there is no enemy in,er' ference and no unscheduled delays, [1] [2] takes almost two hours to land the assau 1 elements of the helibome force when five medium-lift and three heavy-lift aircrat share deck spots. Clearly, this provides a modem, mechanized enemy more than enough time to react.
What can be done to resolve this proa lem? There are three general approaches to most of the problems the military faCfs today: buy more of what you already have, buy new equipment based on ne" technology, or change your doctrine, tac tics, and techniques.
It is futile to buy more helicopters be cause we will not have the amphibi°aS ships to carry them. As noted in Table 32 ships will be required for a MAF in we 1990s, according to the Department o the Navy Amphibious Lift Study (D° . Lift Study). The Navy and Marine Corps shipbuilding goal is to have suffic*®n ships to transport the assault echelons ot MAF and a Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) simultaneously. Given the cur rent high level of commitment for °u amphibious ships and our penchant ! drawing from the amphibious squadro to meet other mission deficiencies 0 example, using the Blue Ridge [LC
sea control and fleet protection), 1 number of ships allotted to the MAF [3] [4] [5] Table 2 is very optimistic. . ?
Can we buy more amphibious ship[6]' Probably not. The number of amphibi011^ ships the Navy will try to procure bas on the DoN Lift Study is the most to Navy thinks it can get and the minimu the Marine Corps thinks it needs. In *a ’ in a compromise on the number of hv copter-carrying ships, the Marine Co>r dropped a requirement for dedicat® space aboard amphibious ships f°r • AV-8 Harrier. Now the Harriers will ® ther have to transit to land bases in amphibious operating area (AOA) a the initial assault or displace AH-1 b1-^ Cobras on board amphibious ships- appears that the option of buying tn°, ships and helicopters is pretty much dea
The Marine Corps is going ahead w
® second option, replacing the aging '46 with the MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor ^sault helicopter, and thus gaining sig- 1 'cant increases in range, payload, and A heliborne force equipped with in 3nC' CH-53Es can land the land- 8 force faster, from a greater range, and ith fewer aircraft than the CH-46, CH- la h an<^ CH-53E force it replaces. To and the heliborne assault force in the cenario would require 186 MV-22s and *-”-53Es. With this number of aircraft ^barked, each MV-22 shares deck spots on,y three other medium-lift aircraft e '*e three CH-53Es must contend for t^ch heavy-lift spot. While this is cer- s- n y an improvement over the current ,utUation, it hardly qualifies as a final so- w‘0n a"d, in any event, we will not see I '22s in significant numbers for at ast eight to ten years, j bat leaves the final option of rethink- 8 our methods of doing business. The 61em discussed in this essay is by no
means the only problem faced by those who must plan and execute amphibious assaults. The challenges posed by a sophisticated enemy who can locate and attack an ATF while it is en route to the AOA are being studied and discussed by many concerned professional officers. The same level of study must be devoted to the mechanics of getting the landing force ashore into the right position and with sufficient strength to be viable. The Marine Corps Advanced Amphibious Study Group (AASG) is examining the problems of the amphibious assault in the 1990s and trying out innovative ideas to attack the enemy where he least expects it and is most vulnerable.
But what if we go to war next week? Are we really ready to land a landing force against a serious threat? 1 recommend that we take a hard look at our capabilities in an operational context. I know it is not possible to embark a MAF for an exercise, but perhaps we could load a few ships with the density of aircraft required for a MAF assault and at least get an idea of how well we can function under those conditions. I think an exercise of this type would be an eye- opener for many people. I’m concerned that if we do not devote some serious thought to the heliborne part of the amphibious assault, Captain Doright’s hypothetical problem could become all too real in the near future.
Major Jennings is an operations analyst in the Plans Division of the Development Center, working on the light armored vehicle program. He served four years as an enlisted Marine, including 22 months in Vietnam, leaving as a sergeant and combined action platoon commander. He graduated from the University of Virginia in 1972 and was commissioned a second lieutenant. He received a master's degree in Operations Research and Systems Analysis from the Naval Postgraduate School in 1978. He has served as MAU logistics officer, regimental operations officer, and executive officer of the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines.
Mobile IMA for the MAB
y Rrst Lieutenant Wayne P. Wilcox, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve
(Msc). Military
The T-AVB was
A new class of ships could make 1986 anncr year for U. S. Marine Corps avi- cu°n Ear|y next year> the first of two 0rar,tly planned aviation logistic ships, \t *'AVBs, will be delivered to the Sealift Command
developed to fill the
ucgrj f r
fa i °r 3 m°hhe aviation maintenance 'uty which can respond rapidly in a p,oarine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) de- Stafment Eom tbe continental United He] fS Airlift of equipment and person- sca °r sucb a facili(y requires space on f0rCe strategic airlift resources needed UtlaCornbat units, and would require an li Cceptable number of sorties. Convenin'i seahft might provide the necessary ab'r resPonse, but not the mobile basing ''"y available in T-AVBs. conventionally sealifted intermediate Pla'ntenance activity (IMA) has to be fair! asbore t0 operate, requiring a (he tlsecure portion of the beach. Basing fieA offshore provides security and Uat.lb,'ity for responding to changing sit- des'°ns ashore. Because the T-AVBs are nan^net' t0 operate the IMA, mainte- WhgC suPP°rt can begin immediately tj0na 'he ships arrive in the area of operate s (AO) or within helicopter range of af,0 The T-AVB crew consists of
Ctnh-1 MSC-contracted civilians. The
M^ed IMA’s approximately 300 r'nes are normally from the Headquar-
ters and Maintenance Squadron (H&MS) of the Marine Aircraft Group (MAG).
The T-AVBs are converted Seabridge- class partial containerships with roll-on/ roll-off (RO/RO) capabilities. The T- AVBs are 602 feet long, with beams of 90 feet, and displace approximately 23,800 long tons (full load). The ships draw 29.8 feet of water with a full load, have a maximum sustained speed ol 23 knots, and can steam 10,000 nautical miles at 20 knots. Stores for ship and crew are provided for 90 days, and 30 days for the IMA.
The two ships being converted were members of the Ready Reserve Force and thus available to the Navy at no cost. Conversion of existing ships, as opposed to procurement of new vessels, provides tremendous savings in money and time. The converted T-AVBs will carry one 70-ton and ten 30-ton booms. The RO/RO ramp at the stem can hold all present and planned U. S. tanks. There is also a flight deck which can accommodate CH-53E Super Stallions.
The operational concept behind the T-AVBs calls for the ships to be maintained close to the designated H&MS in a reduced operating status by MSC crews in U. S. ports. Able to achieve full operating status in about five days, the ships will be prepared for departure while the IMA personnel are preparing their equipment for embarkation. Once on board the
T-AVBs and under way to the trouble area, the IMA Marines begin putting the IMA into operation. Equipment repair shops are assembled from maintenance facility vans for avionics, ground support equipment, ordnance, and air frames, and include a liquid oxygen plant and a temporary engine test cell. Supply vans, some stacked two high in the holds, are accessible with a special scaffolding system. Weapon replaceable assemblies (WRAs) and other spares are broken out and prepared for issue. The parts range from dimesized washers to entire jet aircraft power plants. Supplies and spares can maintain a MAG in combat for 30 days.
Operating from an expeditionary airfield ashore, the Air Combat Element (ACE) of the MAB is supported by the IMA. Spares and WRAs are transported to shore while damaged or inoperable equipment is evacuated to the ships by helicopter or lighter. T-AVB operations continue through sea state three. If the shore situation dictates, the ships can be moved repeatedly in order to avoid detection or attack.
The IMA is capable of second and third echelon maintenance for the ACE, although the load must be tailored to some degree by the composition of the particular MAG. It should be noted that the T-AVBs are not dedicated to general supply support—they are not slated to
be
the
able to provide even better support to men who have to win the battle—we Marine riflemen.
The T-AVBs are real bargains. Their hulls made available to the Navy at no cost, they will save the lives and efforts previously required to secure a beach for an intermediate maintenance activity.
carry munition stores or aviation fuel.
As MAB operations move inland, the IMA can be phased ashore. Should operations be terminated, the IMA is backloaded for redeployment. If the IMA is ashore for long-term operations, the T- AVBs’ booms, RO/RO ramps and decks, and container capabilities enable them to begin immediate conventional military sealift operations.
Some modifications of the T-AVBs include the addition of daylight visu® flight rules (VFR)-only flight decks, in' creased water production and storage, more sewage storage and disposal, wore electrical generating capability and inte' rior lighting, and additional berthing- messing, and laundry facilities for the IMA Marines.
The T-AVB ships and operational con cept provide the MAB with signifi02/11 new sustainability and flexibility- Marine aviation community will soon
Lieutenant Wilcox graduated in 1980 from Old minion University with a B.A. in Political Sci*b and was commissioned in the U. S. Marine Corf Reserve in December 1980. After serving severaV sl tive duty assignments, he is now a research ana y for Presearch, Inc., of Arlington, Virginia.
Antiguerrilla Warfare—Soviet Style
By Lieutenant Colonel H. T. Hayden, U. S. Marine Corps
minister; Babrak deputy prime minister.
prime
named
In Afghanistan, a classical Maoist-protracted war offers the Soviets an opportunity to prosecute their style of antiguerrilla warfare. Early Soviet tactics and techniques resembled the American experience in Vietnam—relocation of the population, strategic villages, census identification, and population control. The major difference between U. S. and Soviet experiences is the Soviet use of mass reprisals against the Afghan people and the extermination or forced exile of large segments of the population.
The Soviets’ fight against a war of “national liberation” caps a centuries- old Soviet involvement in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan’s bellicose history passed its first modem milestone on 22 November 1921 when the third Anglo-Afghan War concluded with final recognition of Afghan independence. Civil war broke out almost immediately, yet the constitutional monarchy survived until 1973.
To finance the Afghan step into the industrial age, in 1956, the government signed agreements with a number of foreign powers, notably the Soviet Union and the United States. In 1961, the Americans provided financial and technical assistance while the Soviets reorganized and refitted the military.
In 1969, the second parliamentary election brought conservative elements into conflict with students. Continual friction within the government precipitated a bloodless coup on 17 July 1973, and Lieutenant General Sardar Mohammed Daoud Khan proclaimed a republic while the king was out of the country.
On 27 April 1978, President Khan’s government was overthrown by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, led by Colonel Abdul Qadir, Deputy Commander of the Air Force. The president and 30 members of the president’s family were murdered by Soviet-trained officers. The new government was composed largely of members of the (here10 fore banned and pro-communist) Pe° pie’s Democratic Party (PDP), w*llC prompted speculation on Soviet invol'f, ment in the coup. Nur Mohammed l'ara . was named chairman of the PDP an Karmal **? On |U
September 1979, Hafizullah Amin
had
Taraki. Karmal fled to Eastern Europe.
Following the overthrow of Daoud Khan, tribal Moslem groups took up arms ln open revolt against the PDP govem- ®ent. By 22 October 1978, the rebels Maimed to control 12 provinces, though none of the large towns were under rebel c°ntrol. Soviet-style communism was sl°w to take effect in the Kabul govern- a>ent under Taraki and his successor ftrnin. Ruthless, oppressive measures, causing much hate and discontent in aiany of the Kabul civilian and military sectors, prompted Soviet intervention.
A massive Soviet troop airlift on 25‘6 December 1979 installed a new So- 'aet-backed regime; Babrak Karmal was l°Wn by Soviet aircraft into Kabul from exde. Internationally, the Soviet move "'as strongly denounced as an invasion of a sovereign country, but the Soviet Union Maintained that the Afghan Government
- WV T 1VV 11 V* M lUvl illVll
y78 Treaty of Friendship in the face of Provocation from Afghanistan’s external enemies—quite “legal” under the
nited Nations charter.
Western press speculation about Soviet Motives ranged from a relatively innocent cviet desire to stabilize conditions in a I arxist state on the Soviet border and already within the Soviet sphere of influence, to the possibility that the Soviets 'Vere using Afghanistan as a jumping-off Point for the warm water ports of the In- ian Ocean and the Persian Gulf oil fields.
, A more plausible explanation reflects ^ree Soviet concerns:
Spreading Islamic fundamentalism oilowing the Iranian revolution in Janu- 1^ 1979, the Soviets braced for the Is- f* fervor to flood Soviet Turkestan.
Massive U. S. reaction to the seizure of y e U- S. Embassy in Teheran t p°ntinuation of the “Brezhnev Doc- Jne ' (First expressed in the invasion of Xechoslovakia, the “Brezhnev Doc- nKe ’ dearly states that it is the inherent i.®.l. °f the Soviet Union to assist in sta- 1 ‘xing a revanchist movement against a ^cialist state. The Red Army will not rmit the overthrow of a Soviet-style s°cialist state.)
Q|, fihe Soviets have learned hard lessons guerrilla warfare after five years of mbat. No longer are motorized rifle ^attalions or lightly escorted road consent into inevitable ambush zones. e first marked improvement in Soviet 0r1Cs was the extensive use of air assault ^ airmobile forces and, later, highly- ^cd Spetsnaz special forces.
, he Russian translation of Spetsnaz is mj lv.ersionary troops.” Their primary Sl°n is to parachute into enemy rear
areas to reconnoiter, assassinate political or military leaders, and destroy headquarters, command posts, communications centers, and nuclear weapons.
A Spetsnaz company is normally assigned to a combined arms (armored infantry) army or tank army, but usually operates between 100 and 500 kilometers behind the forward edge of the battlefield. It is composed of nine officers, 11 ensigns, and 95 lower ranks, and consists of a headquarters, communications, and three “diversionary platoons. The company can be divided into 15 “diversionary groups.” Soviet doctrine calls for units to be dropped the night before an
army begins an advance. Each front has a Spetsnaz brigade, consisting of a headquarters company and three diversionary battalions.” Western journalists visiting Afghan Mujahideen resistance groups have reported battalion-sized operations in the Panjshir Valley.
Spetsnaz forces, similar to U. S. Army Rangers and Special Forces, began a very selective counter-guerrilla campaign. However, Soviet improvements have been matched by Muhajideen guerrilla resiliency. Classical insurgency warfare tactics are being practiced, or improved upon, by Afghan leaders who claim to have learned their trade from reading Che Guevera, Mao Tse Tung, Ho Chi Minh, and Soviet counter-insurgency literature.
The initial Soviet counter-guerrilla campaign was conceived and organized from 60 years of experience throughout the Soviet Union with dissident groups, and from their experience with the Germans in World War II. The Soviets have
now been fighting the Mujahideen longer than they fought the Germans.
Initially, all Soviet political and military campaigns were focused on population control. The British in Malaysia, the French in Algeria, and the Americans in Vietnam used similar tactics. The three Western armies tried to obtain the support of the people by securing a hamlet, providing civic action, arming portions of the hamlet, and, finally, expanding the security zone. It has been called many names, but it boiled down to “winning the hearts and minds of the people.”
Soviet tactics in population control are quite different. Hamlets or villages held
From the collective experiences of motorized rifle battalions, Spetsnaz, and air assault forces, the Soviets have learned how to combat Afghan rebel ambushes. Division-sized combined forces are pushing the Mujahideen from strategic positions in the Kunar Valley.
by the Soviets are not used to expand their security base: Each barracks is a stronghold more like Fort Apache in Indian country. The Soviets learned in the Ukraine in 1933 what the U. S. cavalry learned decades earlier: A guerrilla or Indian war is not won until the last guerrilla is dead. The side that succeeds is the side that can impose and hold terror over the population. Soviet strategy lias remained constant since December 1979— exterminate all opposition to the Kabul regime. The tactics to support this strategy have gone through three phases and
Displaying their indomitable spirit, the Mujahideen stand on a military success—an almost undamaged Soviet Mi-8 “Hip” helicopter, obtained through a ruse by a colonel deserting from the Afghan Army.
are now going through a fourth. The period December 1979 to November 1980 saw the extensive use of the Soviet motorized rifle division. Tanks and armored vehicles brought the Soviet infantry to the contested Afghan villages. During this phase, homes were burned, crops destroyed, and inhabitants executed or driven off.
From September 1980 through June 1983 the Soviets began to use air power as their principal weapon of terror. Attack aircraft strafed and bombed whole villages; helicopter gunships attacked caravans and grazing herds; and transport helicopters sowed antipersonnel mines. Motorized rifle infantry set up cordon or blocking operations to stop the escaping Afghans, but the real destruction and terror fell from the sky. Whether planned or by accident, the second phase produced two important side effects that may help the Soviets in the long run. The Afghan economy has been severely disrupted by the air attacks, and refugees are creating a severe economic crisis in all areas with the departure of merchants, farmers, and manufacturers. It has been estimated that of a population of 16 million in 1979, there are now more than four million Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran.
Between June 1983 and August 1984, the war was taken to the mountainous countryside. The Spetsnaz appeared to learn from the successful Rhodesian counter-guerrilla force, the Selous Scouts, dressing and arming themselves like Afghan guerrillas and creating terror, confusion, and increased hostility among the guerrilla tribes. However, while this counter-guerrilla tactic was succeeding in the mountains, the guerrillas moved their pressure into the cities.
In August 1984, the fourth major doctrinal change in Soviet tactics began and is currently in full operation. The long- held Western estimate of a total Soviet occupation force of 105,000 has been increased to 150,000-170,000, reflecting forces available in the Soviet Turkestan military district (see Figure 1). The air assault forces rotate complete regiments. Kabul, the showcase of the Soviet-trained Afghan Government, was a city under siege. All major cities in Afghanistan were under similar pressure until August 1984. The night belonged to the resistance forces.
Additional Soviet soldiers and KGB border guards will help seal border areas and patrol the major cities, leaving combat operations to special forces and Afghan Army units. The first successful large air assault was in the Tor Ghar mountain region of Paktia on 20 November 1984. Five squadrons of Soviet Mi-6 “Hook” helicopters carried airmobile forces into an area that had been under continuous Spetsnaz reconnaissance. Ninety guerrillas were captured and “many others” were killed. Following
unsuccessful attempts in 1981 and 1983' an air assault or airborne regiment is no'v entrenched in the Panjshir Valley foll°w' ing the summer 1984 offensive.
In the summer of 1985, a major pu* by a division-sized Soviet combined arm* force began pushing the guerrilla group* out of Afghanistan’s Kunar Valley- A the eastern end of the valley, appr°xl.' mately 100 miles from Kabul, an Afghanistan Army garrison in the border town of Barikot had been under sicgc since 1981. Using airborne and airassau j troops in a blocking position, Sov'ie combined arms forces slowly push1" through eastern Afghanistan in what ap pears to be an attempt to permanently sea the Pakistan border. During the same o fensive, Western diplomatic sources re ported “waves of helicopter gunships an large troop carrying helicopters staged raid in the Paghman area west of Kabul- It would be wishful thinking to believe a coordinated guerrilla attack west 0 Kabul was initiated to relieve the pressure
°n the guerrillas on the eastern borders.
In September 1985, however, the news [ne(I'a reported Afghan rebels repulsed a 'ar§e Soviet-led offensive, inflicting neavy casualties and destroying numer- °Us tanks and helos.
Before the Soviets are in a mood, let a*one a position, to begin devolution of .tf engagement in Afghanistan, there "nil be more cordon and search opera- tlQns, air assault/airbome operations, jjnd/or combined arms offensives with the . B an(j their Afghan equivalents root- ln§ out the guerrilla leaders.
. The classical Soviet technique of send- lng thousands of young Afghans to the 0yiet Union to become officers or bu- ^aucrats for the Socialist Republic of Afghanistan has been under way for some .,me- Barring strong outside assistance or lntervention, 1986 may well be the beginning of the end of the resistance. Airborne and airmobile divisions, KGB border guards, and special units like Spetsnaz, together with a trained cadre of indigenuous agit prop (agitation/propa- ganda) leaders, will precipitate Afghanistan’s “Battle of Wounded Knee.” “Afghanistan,” Keesing Contemporary Archives, September 1979, p. 30031, and May and August 1980, pp. 30229 and 30381
David Chafetz, “Afghanistan in Turmoil,” International Affairs (London), January 1980, pp. 24-25. Captain Joseph J. Collins, U. S. Army, “The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: Methods, Motives, and Ramification,” Naval War College Review, Novem- ber-December 1980, pp. 52-61.
Mohammed Heikal, “Encircled Nationalism, The New York Times, 2 April 1980, p. 27.
D. C. Isby, “Afghanistan 1982—The War Continues,” International Defense Review, No. 11/1982, An Interavia publication, Switzerland, pp. 15231528. . „
Claude Malhuret, “Report from Afghanistan, Foreign Affairs, Winter 1983/1984, pp. 426-435.
A. Petror, “On events in Afghanistan,” Pravda, 31 December 1980, p. 4.
Zoriana Pysaviwski, “Moscow Suffers Third Undefeat on Afghanistan,” The Times, 20 November 1982, p. 6.
D. Rather, “Afghanistan," CBS TV, 5 March 1981. “Resistance Groups Must Cooperate; Interview with Ahmad Shah Massoud,” Newsweek, 8 October 1984, p. 64.
Balram Tandom, “120,000 Red Army Troops Fail to Tame Afghan Guerrillas,” The Daily Telegraph, 30 December 1982, p. 4.
“We want an Independent Afghanistan; Interview with Mohammed Zaker Shah,” Newsweek, April 9, 1984, p. 52.
“Soviets to Seal Off Afghanistan Borders,” Mainichi Daily News (UPI), 10 January 1985, p. 2. “Soviet Forces Training in Afghanistan Offensive,” International Herald Tribune (UPI), 3 June 1985, p. 4.
A previous contributor to Proceedings, Colonel Hayden is serving with Detachment “A,” 3d Force Service Support Group, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.
The Terrorist Threat: Is the Navy Ready?
Major Mark B. Pizzo, U. S. Marine Corps
s'on
Rations for service on armed vessels of 'he
the.
Protection of Naval property at Naval
ns and bases” is also a high prior- Security on board U. S. Navy car-
Almost every week, we witness a °ody demonstration of international . rr°rism. Fanatical, well-trained terror- ,^ts execute coordinated attacks with milary skill and sophisticated weapons. aving served the past two years on se- arity duty, I know the very difficult allenge of naval installation security Ust be pursued by every sailor and Mane to maintain the national defense. The U. S. Fleet Marine Force’s power Ejection mission is certainly a top naval J* national priority. However, the mis- “to provide detachments and orga-
1 e Navy, and security detachments for
stati0: tty.1
[!ers and surface combatants helps ensure . success of naval missions. The Na- °nal Security Act of 1947 established a arine Corps Security Force (MCSF) ^‘ssion; Under Title 10 of the U. S. Code u 13, the Marine Corps is tasked with •I V|ding security for naval vessels, sta- °?s> and bases.
j The restructuring of the MCSF in the e * 970s required the Chief of Naval Op- a'ions (CNO) and the Commandant of j-6 Marine Corps (CMC) to produce a Motive in 1981, the Secretary of the ..^Instruction (SecNavInst) 5530.4, (A arine Corps Security Force (MCSF), ap, acks and detachments ashore and th°at’" wTiic:h defines the authority of CM Sccretary °1 the Navy, CNO, and C over the MCSF and the appropriate and inappropriate duties for MCSFs. A valid post requires an “armed, combat- trained Marine,” and establishes a triennial validation process for all barracks."
Each year since its implementation, the SecNavInst has been reviewed by the CNO and CMC. A 6,500-Marine ceiling and other important features have been approved each year. However, since 1983, with the increasing threat of international terrorism, the Commander-inChiefs (CinCs) of the Atlantic and Pacific, type commanders, and other senior naval officers have voiced stem criticism of the SecNavInst and the management of the MCSF (ashore) program. The major arguments are as follows:
- Although fleet CinCs are responsible for the security of assigned naval assets, the SecNavInst places control of MCSF assignment and use under the CNO and CMC rather than the responsible CinC.3
- Although the SecNavInst defines appropriate and inappropriate duties for MCSF personnel, it neglects to specify the priority of missions or the activities that warrant combat-trained Marines.4
- The CMC staff can limit Marine involvement in naval installation security to a maximum of 6,500, remove Marines from non-critical posts, and avoid general “installation security” functions—a challenge to the spirit of the mission assigned by DoD Directive 5100.1, which assigns the general missions of the Navy, Marine Corps, and MCSF.
Before 1980, the continental United States appeared to be immune to international terrorism, owing to a general lack of resources, unity, and leadership among the various terrorist organizations. However, technological advances and international state sponsorship provide terrorists with the ability to strike targets on any continent with tremendous effect. With satellite communications, they are assured a global audience. As international terrorism spread, splinter groups consolidated to fight combined causes. For example, the nuclear peace movement could provide an excellent cover for a terrorist group intent on destroying or capturing a nuclear weapon.
On 5 July 1982, nine antinuclear protestors penetrated General Dynamics’ Electric Boat facility in Groton, Connecticut, and damaged sonar cones and a Trident nuclear submarine.5 Although this incident did not involve Navy or Marine security forces directly, Congress conducted investigations which included Navy and Marine Corps security.
The deployment of cruise missiles to Europe and troops to Lebanon brought increased incidents of protest, sabotage, and bombings. In 1983, more than 500 attacks were carried out by international terrorists, of which more than 200 were against the United States.6
The reduction of installation security at a time of increased terrorism has instilled grave concerns among fleet CinCs and type commanders. According to one CinC, “There is evidence of expanding international terrorism against U. S. interests world-wide; major Navy installa-
| Table 1: MCSF Security Use10 |
|
| |
| % of MCSF | % Security | % Non-security | |
CNO | 1.0 | 86.6 |
| 13.4 |
NavEur | 6.3 | 77.4 |
| 22.6 |
NavSea | 23.8 | 84.6 |
| 15.4 |
LantFlt | 26.5 | 88.2 |
| 11.8 |
PacFlt | 42.3 | 85.7 |
| 14.3 |
*85.6% of the total MCSF is presently used specifically for security. |
|
| ||
Table 2: MCSF Security Use Breakdown (Percentages)11 |
| |||
| CNO NavEur | NavSea | LantFlt | PacFlt |
NWPNS | 37.6 | 56.3 | 28.1 | 39.8 |
TACAMO |
| 0.9 | 0.4 |
|
ACS CON | 89.7 3.8 | 6.0 | 61.4 | 33.6 |
AA&E | 13.2 | 33.0 | 1.3 | 14.5 |
NUC FUEL |
| 3.0 |
|
|
SECGRU | 5.6 |
| 1.6 | 2.0 |
TELCOM | 7.5 |
| 0.4 | 8.2 |
FC/HQ | 22.3 |
| 5.9 | 1.9 |
CEREMONY | 10.3 |
| 1.0 |
|
NWPNS—nuclear weapons TACAMO—mission | ready aircraft ACS CON | —access control | ||
AA&E—arms, ammunition, and explosive NUC FUEL—nuclear fuel SECGRU—security group | ||||
TELCOM—telecommunications FC/HQ—fleet CinC/hcadquarters |
|
| ||
Table 3: Possible “A” Billet (Support) Reductions1'1 |
| |||
Billet | Cumulative TIOs |
|
|
|
Barracks/Grounds | 37 | Food Service |
| 233 |
Maintenance | 21 | Commissary Supply | 4 | |
MT/Drivers | 29 | Club Personnel |
| 28 |
Training/Education | 24 | Special Services |
| 15 |
Ceremonial | 15 | Career Planner |
| 5 |
Liaison (misc) | 23 | BEQ Manager |
| 1 |
Postal | 11 | Exchange Section |
| 14 |
MP/Shore Patrol | 24 | Ship/Det Supply |
| 5 |
Travel Clerk | 1 | Financial Records |
| 1 |
Casual/Transit Unit | 5 | Freight Section |
| 7 |
Range Section | 37 | Logistics Section |
| 6 |
Correction Facility | 8 | Drug/Alcohol |
| 1 |
| Total | = 557 |
|
|
Justified “A” billets not included (about 353) are in | administrative, supply, and weapons maintenance. |
commanders to seek more Marines
tremely restrictive. Most commanders
law en’
l' ... .......W ] —
forcement unless expressly authorize j
personnel to actively engage in
of
pressing this argument feel that many
for
as
lent
the
Marines on the MCSF function physical barriers, not law enforced11 officials. Even though guards have 1 authority to use deadly force, it is 0lj' authorized in special areas (geije.ra . around nuclear weapons and facility and the rules of engagement are e^
,ed
tions with virtually unsecured flight lines and waterfronts offer prime targets.”7 Traditionally, the MCSF’s mission has been to ensure the security of nuclear weapons and support the Navy’s role in the strategic triad. The MCSF mission is criticized mainly for the SecNavInst’s criteria for a validated MCSF post. Specifically, the “unique capabilities of an armed, combat-trained Marine” could be interpreted in many ways.8 Generally, CNO and CMC staffs interpret it as assigning armed Marines to those posts requiring the use of deadly force to stop unauthorized access and those posts that require combat training, such as patrolling or reaction by small tactical units.
Gate guards or facility entrance guards do not require special combat skills and, therefore, are not considered MCSF posts. Gate guards are not considered by the CNO and CMC to be a viable use of combat-trained Marines. Some CinCs maintain, however, that the perception of vigilant security is a prime deterrent and that alternative security forces, whether civilians or armed sailors, do not provide the same protection.9
Tables 1 and 2 summarize differences in the use of the MCSF.
Two trends are evident from these tables. First, only 86% of the 6,500-man MCSF is actually used in a security role and, second, there is a general lack of
consistency as to where and how security personnel should be employed.
A viable criticism of the MCSF by some fleet CinCs and type commanders is that the 14% support portion (910 Mu rines) of the MCSF should not coun against the 6,500-man ceiling. Those
the support functions can be handled by the Navy or that some of the billets are unwarranted. For example, if all dimn? facilities that support the Pacific Flce Marine barracks were assumed by Navy host commands, 82 MCSF billets currently charged against the 6,500-Marin^ ceiling could be eliminated.12 This P0111^ is used by CinC and type commanders t° justify requests for more Marine security' While increasing international terror ism has caused some fleet CinCs and tyP
security, employing MCSF security shipyard gates, flight lines, radio sta^ tions, banks, and other facilities dilj*]® the MCSF Marines’ effectiveness. T general perception is that the presence Marines will deter terrorist attacks. 8 more presence is needed. A major Pr° lem is that many commanders have di culty distinguishing between the authc| ity for the use of deadly force and 1 authority for law enforcement
not understand this issue and have uSI Marines for many inappropriate assig ments, such as snipers and special We" ons and attacks teams. The Posse C°'
itatus Act does not permit tnih
law e
in
fact, the lead agency for the operati0^ response to a terrorist incident Is^ FBI.13 Obviously, the MCSF Marines-^ designated areas, can detain Pers0(0 but require law enforcement officia carry out the arrest. ^
This overview of the MCSF Proj^£(j. raises major issues that must be sol The following are key points: •„
- The 6,500-man ceiling will rern constant for the foreseeable future.
- The fleet CinCs and type coniman^
probably will not be given authority assigning MCSFs. 0f
- There is an unacceptable number Marines on the MCSF who do not P ^ form security functions but still cou part of the total 6,500-man figure-
- There is a lack of consistent emp -
1985
inadequate security against terrorist
^10n would be easy and cost-effective, th 0l.^er replacement source should be e civil service. Many of the clubs, spe-
the
threats to naval installations should comPel the Marine Corps to assume some responsibility for this security as directed in fle Marine Corps mission statement.
To accomplish its physical security fission within the 6,500-man limit, the ^CSF (ashore) must restructure tables of °rganization (T/Os), consolidate security j^ponsibilities, and organize reaction °rces for specific naval installations, ^structuring of T/Os can be accom- Pnshed by reducing “A” billets (support) and “B” billets (security), and redistrib- utlng the excess “A” and “B” billets. As previously mentioned, some of the eet CinCs and type commanders feel at the MCSF should be composed of jjniost all “B” billet personnel and that e majority of “A” billet personnel nould be provided by the host Navy j^mmand. Table 3 gives possible cuts at could be made within the current . to reduce the number of support bil- ets hunting against the 6,500-man total.
There are, then, 557 billets counted gainst the 6,500-man ceiling that do not ''tribute to security. If these billets g?e replaced with security billets, the '->00-man force would be boosted from ^ to 94.5% security.
Whenever a billet is eliminated, the i estion arises: who or what will replace e eliminated function? CinCs and type inlanders say naval installations could o should provide the majority of sup- ^ functions. For most of the eliminated ^ billets, the Navy is already aug- ented by non-MCSF Marines; the tran-
cial services activities, dining facilities, and other Navy services are already manned, managed, and supported by civil service personnel.
Further restructuring of the T/Os could reduce the number of “B” billets that do not need combat-trained Marines. Access control/gate guards provide a case in point. There are 900 state-side access control billets and another 2,500 abroad. Roughly 39% of the entire MCSF is devoted to access control.
There are many reasons why Marines should not be access control/gate guards. First and foremost is that a Marine gate guard does not have the legal jurisdiction to enforce the law or to make an arrest.
Most combat-trained Marines on access control duty are armed with pistols without ammunition magazines inserted, diluting the perception by a potential intruder of a base’s security. Considering the size of most installations and the distances between control/gate points, the small-unit combat skills of the Marines are significantly diminished. It is difficult, if not impossible, to assemble a unit that is spread out over a vast installation. Finally, as a former commanding officer of a MCSF unit and having observed many different installations, I know that, with the exception of nuclear weapons and facility security, fixed access control points provide little deterrence against a determined terrorist group, and fixed points significantly degrade the combat power of a Marine security force.
Other “B” billets that should be eliminated are: fleet CinC headquarters access control areas; arms, ammunition, and explosives areas; telecommunication facilities; and security group facilities. Most Marines providing security to these areas are insufficiently armed and employed more as a cosmetic placebo rather than as a security barrier.
Scapegoats for political antipathies,
U. S. military installations cannot be too secure. Two people were killed and 11 wounded in this Red Army terrorist group car bombing at Rhein Main (West Germany) Air Base on 8 August 1985.
By redistributing the vacated billets, physical security capabilities of the MCSF are increased and security requirements of the fleet CinCs and type commanders can be met without requiring future Marine Corps program objective memorandum (POM) action.
In addition to restructuring the T/Os, fleet CinCs and type commanders should consolidate the responsibilities of the MCSF, master at arms, and civilian security into a single installation security plan. There is little, if any, coordination among the various security elements on naval installations.
The MCSF should be responsible for nuclear security, short-term war resources (aircraft and ships), and critical communications. Owing to their contribution to national security, nuclear weapons are the highest priority targets for terrorist units, so it is essential that the total combat-trained Marine capability be devoted to nuclear weapons security.15
But terrorists also can affect the military’s ability to deploy forces or weapons by targeting a flight line or damaging ships in port. Large groups of land- based aircraft or ships in port take up vast areas, requiring large units rather than a roving patrol for physical security.
For communications facilities to qualify for Marine security they should not have a secondary system (e.g., satellite, alternate station) providing immediate back-up communications if the primary site stops communicating and they must broadcast critical, highly classified material. Like bases, communication sites generally require a large area for antenna farms and associated communication facilities, and, therefore, require a 15-man security force.
Although the Navy does not have a professional security force, it does have a documented need for one.16 Currently, there is only a small master at arms (MA) force. The Navy should establish a professional security force by increasing the strength of the MA rates, lowering the entry level from E-6 to E-3, and augmenting the force with fleet augmentation component “U” (90-120-day temporary active duty) personnel. The MA force should be responsible for access control, internal security, and law enforcement.
Navy master at arms personnel satisfy
ded re
ear
m
day
fro111
CMC
secu
Employing Navy and civilian personnel in support and gate control billets now filled by MCSF Marines at naval installations would free Marines for the kind of combat security they were trained to provide.
the access control requirements of fleet CinCs and type commanders to have a highly visible presence at station gates as an antiterrorist deterrent. They are trained policemen with legal jurisdiction for search, seizure, and arrest. If outfitted in a tactical uniform and properly armed, they would present a convincing image of vigilant security.
MAs should provide security for: fleet CinC/headquarters access control areas; arms, ammunition, and explosives area guards; telecommunications facilities; and security group facilities. The combination of fixed posts integrated with barrier security provides adequate security for these areas. MAs are trained in law enforcement and physical security, and additional training could be acquired through mobile training teams or by attending a physical security academy like the Army’s military police academy at Fort Gordon, Georgia.
Unannounced, random MA security checks of automobiles, supply vehicles, and legal search and seizure operations would keep terrorists and other criminal elements off balance and increase the perception of vigilant security. Waterfronts, communication facilities, and aviation maintenance spaces should be patrolled by MAs trained in the techniques of physical security for facilities.
Civilian security forces should be responsible for perimeter security, longterm war resources (bulk fuel storage, reserve armories, depots, ammunition dumps), and minimum law enforcement. Perimeter security should be conducted around industrial areas, shipyards, installation perimeters, exchange areas, medical facilities, automatic data processing areas, electrical power stations, and similar areas considered low priorities to national defense. It is important that the civilian security force have law enforcement authority.
To provide security for short term war resources and critical communication facilities, and remain within the 6,500- man ceiling, the Marine Corps must develop installation reaction forces. These can be formed by redistributing the “A” and “B” billets eliminated by the reductions proposed earlier. The idea of a reaction force was developed from tests completed at Mare Island, California.
Planning for these tests began when the
Senate Armed Services Committee addressed their concerns for installation security in the Omnibus Defense Authorization Act of 1984. The Vice Chief of Naval Operations then directed the directors of Naval Intelligence and Naval Investigative Service to determine the feasibility of preventing terrorist attacks by a dedicated force against a naval installation and provide advice for countering the attack. A pilot program was initiated at Mare Island Naval Shipyard and associated facilities.17
Four assumptions were incorporated into the Mare Island tests:
- Terrorist attacks cannot be prevented. The purpose of the test, then, was to determine if security upgrades could reduce the installation’s vulnerability.
- The threat consisted of a well-trained, logistically supported, highly motivated ten-12-man team of terrorists intending to obtain political impact through fear and intimidation.
- The goal was to deter the terrorist attack with security upgrades, detect the attempted attack, delay the attackers, and deny them their goal or goals (the four Ds).
- Recommendations were designed to physically thwart terrorists’ access, employing air intrusion, waterborne intrusion, and/or land intrusion—all without disrupting the shipyard.18
The following recommendations were derived from the test:
- Forward looking infrared radars, side- scan sonars, closed-circuit TV, ground radar, microwave scanners, and other devices should be integrated in a physical security plan with barrier plans that cordon restricted areas.
- Rules of engagement and security guidance can be established and enforced much more easily if the boundaries and airspace of a security area are clearly marked restricted. Surveillance, detection, and delay are thus vastly improve ■ and a reaction force can respond mu faster in a restricted area.
► Reaction forces should be authorize to use deadly force. , .
The reaction force concept is a rau|C^ change from the current “validated gaa post” concept of allocating V*30’’^ (found in SecNavInst 5530.4). The CIV ^ vehemently contests this idea. But if j1 CinCs and type commanders are the authority to allocate some MCSr sources, then this concept will Pr°v , the type of MCSF support they l,cC With approval of the recommend ductions in “A” and “B” billets, are sufficient MCSF personnel to Pr°v!“ a well-trained Marine combat reaCtlt,j force. The best use of combat-trat11^ Marines is achieved when they are 1 ployed as a fighting unit. ,,t
Reaction forces could be formed only those installations that lack a su cient number of validated MCSF P°sts^ support a Marine reaction force fron^ off-duty reliefs of the guard of the ' Those installations that can form a r tion force from their validated p°sts^ ready have the capability to impleJ11gi this concept. A small Marine barrack* ^ guard detachment would be requite: those major installations that do not validated posts. Those installations do not have validated posts and are c to bases that do have a MCSF shorn ceive a reaction force detachment the centralized barracks. In this nianrt all administrative and supply sU^r0- could be handled at the barracks that P^. vide the reaction force detachment- ( consolidation of tasks meets the • CinCs’ and type commanders’ nec^J accomplishes the goal of the maintain a 6,500-man MCSF.
A proposal for the reaction force t ture, provided by the fleet physical rity officer for CinCPacFlt, is prese
ln Table 4. Currently there is no written standard for an installation reaction force, his structure is modeled after the struc- Ure used by nuclear security forces, and assumes a 24-hour-a-day, seven-days-a- ^ek requirement.
Table 4: Navy Installation Reaction Force Requirements19
\*Tsonnel Per day:
Marine Barracks communication ^atch (12-hr. shifts)
^action Force NCO ^Sst. Reaction Force NCO eaction Force
P
ersonnel per guard detachment: ^ard Officer Guard Chief eaction Force NCOs °ntmunications Watch ^action Force Personnel uPernumeraries uPport Personnel
2
1
1
II
17
1
1
4
4
26
4
_5
45
Hi
lote- if
^b|.' 11 a separate barracks would have to be es- pr^d because no other barracks exists in close reXun*ty» an additional 15 personnel would be ^ lred as a headquarters/command section.
di!
.^°me senior Marine Corps officers
SaPprove of the idea of a reaction force
bec ■
atause if it is adapted, it will necessitate a unfavorable change to the SecNavInst. re6 G-MC insists that SecNavInst 5530.4 Presents a detailed agreement (after aeuded negotiations) between the Navy the Marine Corps, sets up a central-
replace an invalidated MCSF post. However, the process necessary to physically replace the post (i.e., POM) takes longer than 18 months. In an interview, former barracks commanding officers and staff members said it was not an effective use of Marines, that the reaction force would not be large enough to effect any situation, that the small force of Marines would become involved in functions other than security, and that morale would suffer because of billeting with Navy personnel and other factors.22
To get the best security from the available forces requires an integrated security force concept. Marines should guard high-risk targets; master at arms personnel should guard medium-risk targets; and civilian/DoD forces should guard low-risk targets. This concept is based on the fact that there are insufficient MCSF assets to perform all the desired functions of fleet CinCs and type commanders. The Navy should establish clear distinctions between the respective missions of the three security forces and establish a hierarchy of security priorities based on the installations’ high-value assets and the vulnerability of those assets to loss, damage, or destruction.23
The Marine Corps should restructure the MCSF T/Os, providing a surplus of Marines for redistribution to critical security areas; consolidate MCSF assets to provide sufficient Marines for critical security roles; and develop reaction forces to provide physical security for major naval installations.
(■ structure to efficiently and effec- ofe‘y manage a limited asset in the face Cxpanding requirements, and provides cstandardized criteria for evaluating seanty missions for MCSF units.20 Navy the'011 °®cers have indicated support of
'he 6
concept of a reaction force because
the J’"^0-man ceiling is not affected and ^1 c°ncept appears to present a very via- q. °Ption to a complex problem.21 Fleet tlj Gs challenge the SecNavInst because t06^ heel it severely restricts their ability pi tfeet security requirements. For exam- e’ a fleet CinC has only 18 months to
'Joint Staff Officer’s Guide 1984, Armed Forces Staff College, National Defense University, pp. 112.
Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5530.4, Department of the Navy, 13 August 1981, pp. 2-6.
3Position Paper on Allocation of MCSF Assets, Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Fleet Physical Security Department, 3 October 1984, p. 1.
4Memorandum on Priorities for Assignment of PACFLT Security Forces, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Fleet Physical Security Department, 3 April 1984, p. 1.
5Ann Baldelli, “Authorities Tight-Lipped on EB Invasion,” The Day, 6 July 1982, pp. 1-2.
6Admiral James D. Watkins, USN, “Countering Terrorism, A New Challenge to Our National Conscience,” Sea Power, 27 November 1984, pp. 3537.
1Message on Marine Corps Security Force (MCSF) Post Validation Policy, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, 11 November 1983, p. 1.
8Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5530.4, Department of the Navy, 13 August 1981, p. 1.
9Message on Marine Corps Security Force (MCSF) Post Validation Policy, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, 11 November 1983, p. 2.
10Major Scott Brasington, USMC, Branch Head, Marine Corps Security Forces, Department of the Navy (OP-009D), Personal interview about MCSF, Suitland, MD, 13 February 1985.
"Ibid.
"Message on Navy Physical Security Program, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, 19 September 1984, p. 2.
13Memorandum of Understanding, “Use of Federal Military Force in Domestic Terrorist Incidents,” DoD, Department of Justice, and FBI, June-August
- p. 1.
14Table of Organization Checklist Numbers 6012, 6017, 6021, 6031-32, 6053, 6056, 6067-69, 6102, 6104, 6111, 6114, 6119, 6122-24, 6129, 6131, 6143, 6151, 6171, 6201-05, 6207-09, 6211, and 6220, 26 October 1984.
l5Orr Kelly, “If Terrorists Go After U. S. Nuclear Bombs,” U. S. News and World Report, 12 March 1979, p. 43.
'^Point Paper on CEB Plan to Utilize FAC “U" Personnel to Establish the Navy Security Force (MCSF), Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Fleet Physical Security Department, 16 August 1984, p. 1. "Memorandum for the Director of Naval Intelligence (OP-009) and Director Naval Investigative Service, Department of the Navy, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, 28 May 1984, p. 2.
'‘Brief of VCNO, Department of the Navy, Physical Security Programs Division (OP-009D), 15 June
- p. 1.
19Memorandum on Priorities for Assignment of PACFLT Security Forces, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Fleet Physical Security Department, 19 July 1984, p. 2.
20Point Paper on Allocation and Assignment of Marine Corps Security Force (MCSF) Guards, Department of the Navy, Physical Security Programs Division (OP-009), 14 May 1984, p. 1.
2lBrasington interview.
“Interview with ten former Marine Corps barracks commanding officers and staff officers, Quantico, Virginia, 7 March 1985.
23Memorandum on Priorities for Assignment of PACFLT Security Forces, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Fleet Physical Security Department, 19 July 1984, p. 2.
Major Pizzo is operations officer of the 27th Marine Regiment. He served five tours in Fleet Marine Forces, including service as commanding officer of several platoons and companies, and as battalion operations and executive officer. He was commanding officer of Marine Barracks, Signonella, Sicily—part of the MCSF program. Major Pizzo graduated from San Jose State College and attended Amphibious Warfare School and Command and Staff College in Quantico, Virginia, where he was an honor graduate.
J^ansporter Submarines
By p
Koger A. Beaumont
Sub a 'onS dormancy, the transporter vj tttitrine has moved once again into for ^lncc 1914, the use of submarines sha ?°n~cornbat purposes has been overfed by the image of fleet boats in
battle and commerce raiding and by the deployment of strategic nuclear submarines by at least four nations.
Concepts, experiments, and actual employment of submarines can be traced
back to the classical age. It was Jules Verne’s vision in 1869 of the Nautilus in his book Twenty-Thousand Leagues Under the Sea, however, that had the greatest impact on developments in the
East. All the attempts by the Axis nu^ ^ appear to have been either ill-start ^ crowding the state of the art. Most ble of these appears to have been _ sinking of a German submarine be j two tons of uranium in 1943 “by A naval vessels”; the shipment was m^n sponse to a request from the director atomic bomb project. e jn
The Italians, after much experiences
late 19th and early 20th centuries. While his specific plans were not directly adapted, he was the first to think out the complexities of engineering submarines as a system—one aimed mainly at peaceful pursuits. As a result, the first U. S. nuclear-powered submarine was named the USS Nautilus (SSN-571) in his submarine’s honor.
Simon Lake, a pioneer in submarine invention, was reported to have been inspired when, at the age of ten, he read of Captain Nemo and the Nautilus. It should be remembered that their potential for war had been the driving force behind the actual building of the first operational submarines.
Lake was an indefatigable proponent of transporter submarines throughout his career, mainly in the first third of the 20th
When one of the first cargo submarines, the German Deutschland, visited the port of Baltimore in 1916, she was riding high on a wave of initial success. But when her sister boat sank not long afterward, enthusiasm for cargo subs died—until recently.
126
century. While he foresaw their value in bypassing ice barriers, Lake’s successes were attained only in limited demonstrations of his own designs, and in the voyage of the German cargo submarine Deutschland to Baltimore in 1916, when, as the Allied blockade tightened, the Germans applied his concept of a cargo sub to the problem of breaking through and reaching foreign resources.
When the Deutschland entered the port of Baltimore on 9 July 1916, she caused something of a sensation as she unloaded her burden of scarce dyestuffs and pharmaceuticals and then loaded strategic minerals. Unarmed, she displaced almost 800 tons and had a crew of three officers and 26 ratings. Since negotiations before the war between Lake and the Germans had ended on a sour note, Lake tried legally to block the Deutschland’s return to Germany. Things soon moved along a different course, however; a Krupp representative and a Norddeutsche Lloyd agent on board contacted Lake and suggested he build 5,000-ton supply submarines for them in the United States. While the plan would have produced only a dribble logistically, it would have opened up regular commerce and communication be-
tween Germany and the United States ata time when the Allies had cut the cab e and were striving to generate sympattu for their cause through censorship an propaganda. The British were visibly ag1 tated at the prospect.
Up to that point, things appeared have gone very well. The Deutschland Captain Konig had made his voyage wit ^ relative ease, keeping on the surface mo of the time. He dove 20 times, 12 t'nie in the English Channel and North Sea^ The enthusiasm, however, was so dashed, when the Deutschland’s sis boat, the Bremen, was lost, and apP ^ ently sunk westbound in the summer 1916 with gold on board; another f°^ cargo types abuilding were not broug into transport service, but at least on®’ along with the Deutschland, later sa service as an attack U-boat.
Lake’s enthusiasm did not flag- the United States declared war, he ap proached the U. S. Shipping Board wit plan to build 100 cargo submarines. ^ view of the serious merchant ship l°sS then being incurred. However, the sU cess of the convoy system and the e ^ straints on priorities and material cans the plan to be pared and later shelved-
After the war, Lake continued to se support for his dream in vain. Sir Hu Wilkins made a futile attempt to Pcnetra;l| the polar ice with a “surplus”
Navy submarine, affirming the conve tional wisdom that viable transporter s marines were well out of the reach ot isting technology. When global war ca again in 1939, however, the need auxiliary submarines quickly bee apparent, and their use widespread- j
In addition-to a substantial diversion various combat types to other functi the Germans, Italians, and Japanese ^ submarines for cargo-carrying alone- the Battle of the Atlantic mounted^. German need for a U-boat logistical . marine led to the “Type-XIV,” ^ ^ entered service in 1940, and sU -ygO heavy losses. Displacing about L^s tons, these submarines carried torPt qoO and fuel; their range was about l5,. miles. Other special supply tyP®s j eluded the “Type-XV,” “-XVI, ^
“-XX,” designed for runs to the
■; natiw
supp“
Proceedings / NoveniWr
J9*5
War. Only 20% of Japanese runs out
than
combat patrols, including the inser-
DYNAMICS
ar,d troops by submarine, built several double-hulled types for the Far East voyages. Two were seized when they arrived ln Singapore and Sabang in September y43, just after Italy had changed sides in
°f Singapore to western Europe bearing tln and rubber to exchange for optical fipment returned safely to port.
U- S. use of submarines in the transfer mode and related special missions e*Panded during the Pacific War. Such . uty was seen as onerous by submariners ln many instances, since they preferred to at’ack the enemy more directly. Fleet Submarines were assigned such missions jfon after Pearl Harbor. The besieging of n° U. S. forces in the Philippines led to Several attempts, almost all of them sucCessful, to carry in supplies and to evacuate records, gold, and military civilian Personnel, including General Douglas ’UeArthur during part of his voyage to
Ustralia, and Philippine President Man- Ue* Quezon. Throughout the rest of the . ar in the Pacific, U. S. submarines were '[Wolved in almost 300 missions other *i°n of agents; landing and deployment of ^Pecial troops, reconnaissance parties and n<Jerwater Demolition Team personnel; jfuation of agents, civilians, and miliary personnel; various reconnaissance uties at sea; supplying of coastwatchers dut' ®Uerr'^as; an^ rninelaying and picket
Perhaps the most well-known of these tssions was the transportation of 221 arines—Carlson’s Raiders, the 2nd aider Battalion—on the raid against , Island in the Gilberts in August tli ' ^wo *arSe minelaying submarines, e USS Nautilus (SS-168) and the Argo-
naut (SM-1) were employed. While the raid was proclaimed a success at the time, it proved less dramatic in hindsight. Several problems appeared on the 4,000-mile round trip. Each meal for the Marines took about three hours; Japanese air patrols limited exercise and access to fresh air, and the stench on board the submarine was noted as overpowering even by hardened submariners.
During the raid, deficiencies with rubber landing boats, command and control problems, and the need for these giant submarines—the largest in the fleet to dive under air attack contributed to less than the expected level of operational efficiency against an outnumbered and surprised foe. One hundred twenty Marines were left on shore overnight; Marine losses almost equalled the size of the Japanese garrison, and nine who were left behind were later beheaded. The lesser known special missions carried on later in the war had far less complications.
While special missions were viewed as important during the rest of the war, plans for a class of 2,000 transporter submarines, the Barracudas, were put on the shelf. Fleet submarines and the big minelayers henceforth performed such duties. The Argonaut, the only submarine formally designated as a cargo type during the war—her designation was changed from SM-1 to APS-1—was lost soon after the Makin Raid, and while her sister, unsuitable for combat patrols, continued to provide such service, she received no special designation.
From August 1942 on, the Japanese also began to rely on transporter submarines on a large scale. In the Guadalcanal campaign, over the next year, they lost slightly more than half of the fleet sub-
This artist’s concept of a submarine tanker operating under Arctic ice demonstrates one of the U. S. projects proposed which may verify the visions of Jules Verne and Simon Lake.
marines employed in their desperate attempts to supply and finally evacuate their hard-pressed forces. Japanese reliance on transporter submarines became much greater in the last half of the Pacific War, as large garrisons were isolated by U. S. air and naval power and by distance. A bitter by-product of long-standing interservice rivalry was the lack of concern shown by the Imperial Navy toward the stranded ground forces. After repeated requests for assistance were ignored and rejected, the army finally undertook construction of a fleet of 26 special submarines, which ranged in displacement from 429 to more than 3,500 tons.
The British experience was similar to that of the United States; they made use of fleet types in special roles. The Royal Navy used them extensively in the provisioning of the island of Malta, the key British base in the battle for the central Mediterranean. As it became more and more clear to the Italians and Germans that Malta was vital in hampering the flow of supplies to their forces in North Africa—half of which were lost in transit—they moved increasing numbers of bombers into southern Italy. Malta became known as the “most bombed spot on earth.” A direct invasion was planned in detail but never executed. The little island, a kind of strategic centipede, was able to keep sting in its battered tail because of many heroic efforts to sustain it. Transport submarines carried in almost 70,000 tons from mid-1941 to mid-1942, without loss—the largest operation of its kind to date.
Transporter submarines were used extensively by several nations in inserting and withdrawing agents. The landing of German saboteurs in 1942 on the east coast of the United States was well-publicized when the FBI announced their capture. Submarines were used widely in intelligence activities. The British Commando raid on German Field Marshall Erwin Rommel and the secret visit of General Mark Clark and other officials to Vichy-held North Africa were well- publicized soon after the actual operations. Subs were also used in the British MI 9 prisoner-of-war escape system.
After World War II, the U. S. Navy undertook a series of modifications of
fleet submarines, including amphibious support types. Various acronyms were used: APS for cargo and special duties; APSS and AOSS for amphibious troop carrier and oiler, respectively; SSA for cargo; SSP for transport; and SSO for oiler in the late 1940s. Currently, an AGSS auxiliary type is designated for experimental and special duties, as is an LPSS for amphibious transport.
The concept of a commercially viable or strategically useful submarine was also expanded and refined after World War II. The USS Nautilus turned many of Jules Vemes’s visions into reality. Proposals and designs for a transpolar tanker increased in frequency and scale, especially after the Nautilus’s success in reaching the North Pole. By the early 1960s, analysis of such projects had received support not only from visionaries and enthusiasts but from engineers and economists.
While the United States is working on several projects which may realize the visions of Jules Verne and Simon Lake, there has been a great deal of speculation about the goals and programs of the Soviet Union regarding transporter submarines. Indeed, the long-standing Soviet interest in the concept, and even the Western use of the term has been driven by awareness of possibilities if not probabilities of Soviet efforts within the Soviet Union in this area.
While one cannot be sure of the full experience of the Soviet Navy with submarines in the transporter mode during the Great Patriotic War, there are glimpses of it which are interesting. It is known that a substantial effort was made by the Soviet Navy in submarine resupply and evacuation of wounded with several types of fleet submarines in the. siege of
Sevastopol in the spring of 1942.
A continuing interest in transporter submarines has been visible in Soviet writing on naval matters since 1945. The transporter-special mission function also appears elsewhere—the term pod- vodnnye lodki flota in the Dictionary of Military Terms (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1965), the definition of which noted that fleet submarines may also “conduct reconnaissance, lay mines, land reconnaissance-sabotage groups clandestinely on the enemy coast, guide friendly strike forces to enemy targets at sea, transport personnel and important cargoes . . . . ”
Several other terms and definitions also touch on the subject (e.gperevozki podvodnuie—underwater shipping/trans- portation) and the definition of “Atomic Fleet” in The Great Soviet Encyclopedia (Macmillan, 1979), which indicates that the Soviet atomic submarine fleet can “provide sea transport and landing of troops on the enemy’s shores . . . and they support troops engaged in land operations in the war theater.” In the same vein. Admiral Sergei Gorshkov has indicated that “Soviet atomic powered submarines are first-class modern universal all-purpose fighting ships Just
what “all-purpose” means in the final analysis is obviously a matter of some importance.
The logic behind the giant Soviet submarine under construction in the late 1970s led analysts to ponder over: “What are the Russians storing in the extra space?”2 Uncertainty about the covered wells in the afterdeck of the sail of the “India” class has also been expressed.
The transporter submarine's reemergence, then, is noteworthy from the standpoint of naval architecture, of eclh nomics, and of grand strategy and tactics- While of obvious value in economic warfare, blockade, limited warfare, and in" telligence, the transporter submarine als° fits into a more sinister and far more grave sub-logic—that of “broken-back war and of nuclear war-fighting. It lS a world-view with which few Westerned seem to be ready to grapple. Neverthe less, the Soviets have lived through a ver" sion of it. While they may not wish to it again, the ordeals of 1941-45, and the ultimate survival of their system, raises a question in every facet of Sovietolog) and strategic analysis: how might a Par ticular piece of doctrine, policy, practice- or equipment fit into a scheme of war fighting or broken-back warfare? TraIlS porter submarines would, in such a gris' and bizarre world, be especially valuab to survivors who sought to make the of deal and sacrifice worth something, h°'v ever hollow the word victory may see11’ now. Since it can be seen that they 0 plan for such contingencies, the questi°n is well worth attention and analysis
's. G. Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State ( napolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1979). P- ^ ••
2Peter Pringle, “The Sub That’s Long as a Strc^ • The New York Times, 16 November 1980, p-
Dr. Beaumont received a PhD from Kansas State ^ 1973 and served two active-duty tours in the An11/ a military police officer. He is the North Amerlat editor of Defense Analysis. He has taught history Texas A&M since 1974.
Author's Note: The author would h' to thank Professor John Erickson oj 1 University of Edinburgh.
A BICC for the MAU
By Sergeant First Class Peter L. Bunce, U. S. Army
. thC
only of the enemy, but of the terrain ^ unit is expected to defend or atta
;S tn
ontio'
Thus, the BICC usually prepares unit’s intelligence annex to its c<
areas.
Initial reports from the bombing of the U. S. Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983 suggested such an overwhelming amount of intelligence flowed into the 24th Marine Amphibious Unit’s headquarters that valid threat warnings were lost in the message traffic.1 The number of sensors on today’s battlefield are proliferating to the point where the field commander can lose vital information among the mundane.
The U. S. Army recognized this years ago and established battlefield information coordination centers (BICCs) first at the brigade level about five years ago, and recently at the battalion level.
A BICC is essentially a small, unit- level intelligence analysis and production section. At brigade, a BICC consists of a captain as tactical intelligence officer and three intelligence analysts: a sergeant first class, a staff sergeant, and a sergeant. At battalion, a BICC has a first lieutenant tactical intelligence officer and a staff sergeant intelligence analyst. At both brigade and battalion, the BICC supports the unit’s intelligence staff officer, it does not replace him.
A BICC’s mission is keyed to the unit’s contingency missions, in a process the Army calls intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). IPB is a study not
gency operation plans (OPLANs)- ^ BICCs carry over the IPB process to e ercise OPLANs and prepare intellige.n ^ studies, briefings, and classes as 11 permits. Some BICCs maintain rudim1-^ tary order of battle files to track maJ enemy maneuver units in contingeI
Translating this Army organization the Marine amphibious unit (MA^ which is between the Army brigatU battalion in size, would call for a tn
not
SUffi,
cient depth to interpret otherwise j hne messages properly: The rotation g 0 Lebanon of the Syrian Yth Armored Agade, replacing the Xth Armored Bri- ,a<Ie, is significant to the MAU’s tube- (^ached, optically-tracked, wire-guided UW) and tank gunners if the Xth Brians *S eclu'PPe(I wIth Soviet T-55 tanks, ^ the BICC’s order of battle files show 1^ ^t*1 Brigade equipped with T-64/T- I s- On a Mediterranean deployment, at yasL daily intelligence reports from the States European Command s^EUCOM)—“EUCOM Intelligence u PPc’tt Cables”—would be available to hie316 onIer I*311*6 and political
loliticai files on the various militias, r °nst groups, and prominent political should also be kept, group’s track record in fol- Sqng through on threats and promises, ejhen the MAU is on the ground in the - ntry, responses from these groups and ®Plc can be assessed. c0lrri>larly, ground work on the MAU’s h n‘lngency in Cyprus could track the ^ Public’s National Guard, Northern Pnis security forces, the Greek Com- t,. ndo battalion, the Turk’s 17,000 °PS. the British Army (3,367) and
Hian BICC—a captain as tactical intelligence officer, and a gunnery sergeant and a staff sergeant as intelligence analysts 0r Perhaps two staff sergeants). This will ensure 24-hour manning: the captain and °ne noncommissioned officer (NCO) on j'day shift, the other NCO at night. The being essentially a combined arms u.n*t task-organized for a particular mis- Sl0n, the BICC personnel need not be f^nnanently assigned to one of the build- lng block units of the MAU, but could Cc>me from the Marine division intelli- 8ence staff.
ipAs an illustration of how the BICC and n would support a MAU, imagine a IV‘AU assigned to the Sixth Fleet, with c°ntingency missions to evacuate civil- )ans from Lebanon and Crete, and a war- ‘Itle mission of supporting the Turks at de Dardanelles.
In support of the Lebanon mission, the DC could maintain order of battle files n the Syrian, Israeli, and Lebanese ares> and the larger Lebanese militias, J*eh as the Amal and the Phalange. In Qition, United Nations forces such as e United Nations Interim Force in Leb- : °n’ consisting of detachments of vary- sizes from France, Fiji, Finland, hana, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Nor. ay> Senegal, and Sweden, should be
tr:>cked.
peeping track of order of battle need get into great detail, but should have
traU[eS *n t*le country I eking each group’s
. thmiioh r\n th
Royal Air Force (1,445), as well as monitoring Greco-Turkish relations and Cyprian politics.3
Again, the wartime Dardanelles reinforcement mission could be supported by order of battle files on the Bulgarian and Romanian armies and air forces, as well as those forces in the Odessa military district of the Soviet Union. Terrain studies should be collected on various landing beaches, landing zones, air heads, and exploitable harbors and air fields.
All this sounds like too much to be collected, analyzed, cross-referenced, and
Knowing your enemy also means knowing the terrain where you may find him—such an intelligence preparation of the battlefield by a BICC can fill many intelligence gaps for a MAU.
filed for one deployment. It is. What would make the BICC system a success is the complete transfer of all files and references from one MAU to another upon being relieved. Instead of starting over at the beginning of the deployment, each MAU’s BICC would add to and refine what other BICCs have done before. This also would prevent any tendency toward tunnel vision by any group of analysts and could make up for the BICC’s small size.
While all this filing of reports and posting seemingly obscure changes in orders of battle appears somehow insignificant in the face of the rather impressive intelligence collection capabilities of a modem carrier battle group (CVBG)— given its organic resources and its access to various national collection agencies— it must be remembered that the BICC will win its stripes not while the MAU is afloat, but when it goes ashore.
The BICC should have input into the MAU’s OPLANs before a contingency plan is implemented. But ashore, when the MAU receives input both from the supporting naval units’ sensors and spot reports from the engaged forces, the commander requires a filter. The BICC is such a filter: With order of battle files, terrain studies, political background studies, and perhaps some studies prepared for the commander by the BICC, the BICC can assess the value of those reports and decide what is of immediate value (to be brought to the commander’s attention) and what needs merely to be posted on the situation map. In addition, the BICC will have the information available and the analysts to assist in preparing new plans to face new problems not addressed in the original contingency plan.
Having been advised previously of what the commander needs to know in order to accomplish his mission (known variously in the Army as essential elements of information or priority intelligence requirements), the BICC should be able to identify gaps in the intelligence picture as the situation develops and exercise collection management. This is no more than recognizing that a gap in information exists, determining what element is best equipped to provide the information, and then asking for it.
A BICC offers the commander of any deployed force a means of applying intelligence information to a tactical situation, recognizing gaps in that information and going after them, so the commander has the best possible information available. Afloat, perhaps, much of this can be done by computer, or passed from higher headquarters. But, a handful of knowledgeable men positioned correctly in the information flow can make a difference in the area of operations ashore.
'Time, 7 November 1983, pp. 37-38.
2IISS, The Military Balance, 1984-1985, p. 58. lIbid., pp. 35, 43, 49, and 52.
Sergeant First Class Bunce is an intelligence analyst and acting tactical intelligence officer for 4th Battalion, 69th Armor, in Mainz, West Germany. He has previously served with 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) in Germany, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in Vietnam and Germany, and the U. S. Army Armor School. Sergeant Bunce graduated from the University of Southern California in 1984 with an M.A. in International Relations.
Naval Surface Fire Support and the Iowas
By Scott C. Truver and Norman Polmar
complements, rather than competes ’
The
In recent years, issues related to naval guns and naval surface fire support (NSFS)* have confronted each new surface combatant shipbuilding program. Both in the Navy and Congress, the size and number of guns mounted on new surface combatants have been debated. With recent events in Lebanon, concerns about the Navy’s ability to provide effective gunfire support for Marine operations ashore have been rekindled, including speculation that the ammunition available to the USS New Jersey (BB-62), while stationed off Lebanon to support U. S. Marine positions ashore during 1983 and 1984, was both limited in quantity and suspect in quality, requiring the Navy to use air strikes to perform naval gunfire support (NGFS) missions. Similar apprehensions have been expressed about the perceived lack of gunfire support available to U. S. forces landing in Grenada.
The Fiscal Year 1984 Senate Department of Defense (DoD) Authorization Bill was amended by congressional initiative to provide $1 million—which was not requested by the Navy—for a study of ways to improve naval fire support capability, and $500,000 to investigate a specialized NSFS ship. The amendment was approved by Congress and the President as part of the DoD Authorization Act for FY 1984. Later, in the appropriations cycle, the House of Representatives accepted the recommendation of its Committee on Appropriations to add $500,000 above the budget request for “an authorization initiative to fund a study to look at the options available to improve the Navy’s gunfire support capability.” The ongoing Navy NSFS study is the result. It is clear, then, that Congress is serious about improving the Navy’s NSFS capabilities.
This high level of congressional interest in NSFS, considering recent histories of naval guns and NSFS capabilities in surface combatants, does not necessarily ensure a completely objective treatment of the issues surrounding current and future NSFS roles. The controversies over the installation of the Seafire guidance system in the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class, a move supported by the Marine Corps and Congress but resisted by the Navy on cost grounds until Congress mandated its inclusion into the design, provide a case in point. Indeed, the resis-
•NSFS is a broader term than naval gunfire support, as it includes rocket and missile fire, not just naval guns.
tance by some in and out of the Navy to have the Iowa (BB-61)-class battleships reactivated was based, in part, on conventional thinking that sea-based tactical air would be available when and where needed, and would be more effective than NGFS.
DoD interest in augmenting current NGFS/NSFS capabilities over the past two years has been focused in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), where investigations of possibilities for new NSFS systems for various destroyer classes and the Iowas began. The Navy has responded to OSD and Congress by studying the need and feasibility of installing NSFS systems in several surface combatant classes. From political, operational, mission, and naval architecture/ combat system engineering perspectives, however, the /oua-class battleships are probably the only serious contenders for NSFS upgrades.
During the past few years, intent on developing better NSFS systems, the Navy has developed the Mark 71 eight- inch major caliber lightweight gun, intended for the 30 Spruance (DD-963)- class destroyers, and a proposed 155mm. vertical loading gun system. Both of these weapons, as well as other concepts, have not been deployed for a number of reasons, chief among which are high development costs and limited platform requirements. Neither are expected to change in the foreseeable future, inhibiting the major upgrading of large gun systems, i.e., the 16-inch guns on the Iowas. There may be too few 16-inch barrels (36) to justify the costs and years of effort to develop new projectiles, propellants, and fire control systems.
An alternative would be to adapt a weapon system already in production and use. Perhaps the most obvious system for the Navy to consider is the multiple launch rocket system (MLRS), which can literally dump several tons of antiperson- nel/antimaterial ordnance on targets more than 32,000 yards away. The basic system is now in production by LTV Aerospace and Defense Company for the U. S. Army and several NATO countries.
Thus, development and system start-up costs have been paid. The current MLRS round is ideal for countering enemy infantry and light armor. Improved rounds are already under study to provide greater range—over 50 nautical miles—and warheads suitable for heavy armor and hard targets such as bunkers. LTV Aerospace has begun development of a ship board version of the Army system, desig nated assault ballistic rocket systen1 (ABRS), to complement gun systems m fire support missions. ABRS is an idea candidate weapon system for future NSFS upgrades, especially for the Io'va class battleships.
ABRS consists of five major elemen15' many of which are common, if not idea11 cal, to the MLRS:
- The launch pod/container (LP/C) c°n^ sists of six rockets sealed individually 11 launch tubes at the factory and handled a a single “wooden round” package- * LP/C weighs 5,000 pounds loaded and > 13.6 feet long, 3.5 feet wide, and 2.7 ‘ee deep.
- The launcher houses two LP/Cs, ha-’ been modified to maintain firing ang regardless of ship motion, and jettis011* empty LP/Cs overboard.
- A magazine storage and reload systeI moves the LP/Cs from primary an ready-service magazines to the launch^
- A fire control system controls launch and handling process, includnv calculating the aiming point, comma11 ing the launcher, selecting and automa cally firing individual rockets, and Je tisoning empty LP/Cs.
The ABRS stabilized launcher is caP[e ble of performing in seas up to sea s five while providing accuracy and 4U1 reloading. Designed to handle and l>r family of rockets with several dif>er warheads, the ABRS free rocket syst^
i wim-
existing gun and missile systems- ^ size of the rockets dictates the nunibe1 rockets in each LP/C; Currently- MLRS nine-inch rocket is packaged I rounds per LP/C. Larger diameter t and 18.5-inch) rockets with longer rang (over 50 nautical miles) and larger P
loads could also be accommodated, a
at reduced LP/C loadouts. It is feaS1 ^ moreover, that the ABRS launcher a ^ handling system could launch Harp ^ and the antisubmarine rocket (ASK from special LP/Cs, producing some1 of a universal launcher. «$/
The baseline nine-inch diameter A® ^ MLRS rocket carries 644 M77 AP ^ grenade submunitions, although g111^ weapons are currently under study ABRS rocket variants. A second^ ^ guided warhead dispensing 28 A1 titank mines is being developed for ^ Germany under the MLRS progra^.^ ranges of 16+ nautical miles, 12 base
1#
with
target coordinates. The Army
Ship position, course, and speed: 1ese are crucial if the ABRS system
ne current reactivations and moder
Uiz;
ate t'°ns ^wa-class battleships are nderi t0 aUgment the Navy’s land at-
StriVo ____ c_________ /»OTTllr\
and
>P<
unsiv,
sh0re
aSai:
r°ckets carrying M77 submunitions, rip- Pje-fired from two LP/Cs, can saturate in Pout one minute an area greater than °ur football fields. Speeds above Mach 0 are achieved during rocket flight. The ABRS fire control system is compatible with existing Navy gun fire comPuting systems, including the Mark 160, hich can be reprogrammed to meet “RS requirements. In general, the fire patrol requirements are:
^.Targeting; The ship can provide ABRS range and bearing to the target, or
LRS version uses target coordinates computes train and elevation orders tts own computer. The Navy generally Ses target range and bearing for gunfire ntrol, although target coordinates are . Sed to target Tomahawk.
* Shin_______________
Th<
, -- uutiai 11 uic
. Ps its dead-reckoning position for use ► 'u/3 coord'nate targeting system.
I Wlnd speed and direction: Atmospher- s data are needed to compute ballistic ^aJcctory in either targeting mode. firing orders: This requires a dedi- ed interface with direct connection to ,?e Rring key located at the position of the firing officer.
fiach rocket in an LP/C can be targeted sln<tividual or dispersed targets, or can urate a target area. In a typical fire . Pport mission, all target data will be Put and the fire control system will au- l^atically aim the launcher. The ucher processor will also control the Sazine and handling functions, check Uj.1 rocket(s) to be fired, and deter- dltle and input fuze settings in accor- plnce with target location data. If multi- p largets are to be engaged, after the laif preselected rockets are fired the t^ncfier processor automatically engages rip rerna'n'ng targets with no further data
surfBR^ cou*d fie installed on several $ ace combats, among them the Iowa, Prance, Kidd (DDG-993), and Burke p, Sses> and the Newport (LST-1179) and t^ston (LSD-28) amphibious war- jp.® ships. However, because of ship CqSl0n requirements, naval architecture C(1straints, and Navy policy, the low as , ently appear to be the leading candi- ®s for ABRS upgrades, the
stfike, antisurface warfare (ASUW) -M capabilities. The ships will
rin!;0rt amPhibious groups, conduct of" e operations against surface and targets, provide self-defense nst antiship missiles and aircraft at short ranges, provide naval gunfire support and strike capabilities, operate and refuel light airborne multipurpose system (LAMPS) helicopters, refuel escorts, and provide naval presence. The New Jersey (BB-62) and Iowa are active; the Missouri (BB-63) is in the yard; and long- lead funding for the Wisconsin (BB-64) has been planned for fiscal year 1986.
The original plans for the reactivation called for a two-stage modernization. Phase I includes installing the SLQ-32 electronic warfare system, adding an SPS-49 air search radar, and a general upgrade of all other electronic and communications equipment; updating accommodations; converting the ships to Navy distillate fuel; removing four (of ten) twin 5-inch/38 gun mounts and replacing them with eight quadruple Mark 143 Tomahawk armored box launchers; installing four quadruple Harpoon launch canisters; adding four Phalanx 20-mm. mounts and Sea Sparrow; reshaping the fantail to accommodate the open storage of three LAMPS helicopters, while leaving the helicopter pad open for the operation of a fourth helo, and modernizing sewage- collection and holding tank systems to meet current requirements. The flag cabins have been converted to a combat engagement center for the Tomahawk and Harpoon missile fire control electronics, and a ship command and control center.
In early 1984, Phase II discussions were curtailed and no Phase II modifications are planned. Rather, there will be a series of “incremental upgrades” that promise increased warfighting capabili-
ties “at a modest cost.” For example, there may be some research and development funding for improving current 16- inch projectiles. Terminal guidance, laser guidance, or extended range for the 16- inch projectile would be too expensive with only 36 barrels. Instead, the Navy is investigating adapting an Army submunition and a saboted projectile to the 16- inch/50 guns, among other warfare upgrades.
Given the apparent cancellation of Phase II modernizations, the impetus of the congressionally mandated NSFS study, and an austere fiscal environment, ABRS installations on board the Iowas seem congruent with both the current Navy policy of providing only “incremental upgrades at modest cost” and the intended roles and missions of the reactivated battleships.
Table 1 lists the roles and warfare tasks of the reactivated /own-class battleships. There are obvious opportunities for ABRS within this scheme, which may be enhanced by the current political climate.
On the surface, it would appear that ABRS, as a free-rocket system, is a natural candidate for increasing the NSFS and shore bombardment capabilities of the battleships. For example, in 1983, re
Replacing S-inch/38 caliber Mk-12 guns with naval adaptations of the Army’s MLRS would give the Navy’s battleships the capability to put more ordnance on a larger target area— and faster.
Table 1: Iowa (BB-61)-Class Roles and Warfare Tasks
Battle Group Escort Complement to carrier: Strike, ASUW, Shore Bombardment Complement to cruisers/destroyers: Strike, ASUW, Shore Bombardment SAG Nucleus Ship Principal combatant: Strike, ASUW, NGFS, Shore Bombardment Complement to cruisers/destroyers Warfare Areas—General Strike
NGFS/Shore Bombardment
ASUW
Presence
Primary Warfare Tasks in Amphibious
Objective Area
NGFS/Shore Bombardment
ASUW
Strike
Presence
sponding to a question posed by Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), then-Marine Corps Commandant General Robert H. Barrow all but offered a mission-element need statement for ABRS:
“The current NSFS inventory is inadequate to support Marine Corps requirements. First, the quantity of naval guns in the fleet has declined over 50% in the past decade. Even with the recent commissioning of the New Jersey, the number of platforms available to deliver fire support is deficient in view of competing requirements for these ships (e.g., antiair and antisubmarine roles, CVBG [carrier battle group] screening, etc.). Second, the range of the current 5-inch/54 and 5-inch/38 families is too short to isolate the beachhead from Warsaw Pact artillery. Third, the accuracy of the five-inch gun family is insufficient against mobile armored forces and hardened point targets. Finally, the lethality of the five-inch gun family is inadequate against these same targets.”
From the perspective of a mission analysis, the introduction of the baseline ABRS would complement the hard-target kill capabilities of the 16-inch guns and would appear to render the remaining five-inch guns superfluous, except for their close-in ASUW and point-target NGFS capabilities. These are, nonetheless, important factors if ABRS were offered as a substitute for the five-inch guns, especially as the Iowas are expected to respond to Third World crises where the five-inch guns would be useful for defense against small combatants and in collateral damage-limiting fire support operations, as was demonstrated by the New Jersey off Beirut in 1983. Nevertheless, ABRS, particularly an extended- range rocket (beyond 16-inch gun range) with laser or terminal guidance and, perhaps, a unitary warhead, should be considered a leading candidate for any future firepower upgrade proposed for the battleships.
Moreover, future concepts of amphibi
ous warfare operations involving Iowas (or follow-on NSFS ships) envl" sion high-speed, mobile, and flexiWe assaults using air cushion landing cra (LCACs), V-22 Osprey (formerly the JVX tilt-rotor) aircraft, and helicopters launching from over the horizon (OTHF This OTH assault concept calls tot achieving tactical surprise and a rap>° buildup of offensive power ashore, Pre' ceded by a short, intense NSFS opera tion. Further, the ability to employ high shock, conventional weapons in supp°n of the initial assault elements once ashore will be required to blunt enemy counter attacks. ABRS, particularly an extend6 range version, appears ideal for this ma neuver warfare concept.
The ability of ABRS to blanket areas with submunitions—creating, in effect’ killing zone—and exploit the shock va'ue of a high-volume barrage along the ax of the defending force’s line of counted tack would appear to be an NSFS nece* sity in OTH amphibious operations. * speed and versatility of the LCAC an MV-22 offer the commander the opP°rtu^ nity to operate well within the reaCt1^ cycle of his opponent. This is enhanc by the ABRS’s ability to focus intens killing power on enemy responses.
ABRS could be incorporated in ' aforementioned “incremental battlesn f upgrades.” Moreover, as a near-te incremental upgrade, the current AB is amenable to further improvements range, guidance, and warhead, with0 further ship modifications. ABRS W°u complement the Iowas' guns, requi° » the deletion of some 5-inch/38 mow1
1 23456742893 10 57 2
uPgrades for a program of “incremen- uPgrades,” the potential outcomes of
The Iowa’s 5-inch/38 Mark 12 guns jwin mount, Mark 28) fire a 54.7-pound snell with a 14.75 pound bursting charge; 'J'aximum range is 17,300 yards at 45 Agrees elevation. An experienced mount Cfew can fire 35-40 rounds per minute P®r mount for short periods of time. However, a sustained rate of fire is likely be about 12 rounds per gun/24 rounds P®r mount per minute. In a 30-minute shore fire support operation, the battle- sb'P’s six remaining mounts could deliver about 4,300 rounds, or some 118 tons of °fdnance—approximately 60% of the "'nch rounds in the magazines. In comparison, it would require about 680 rockets, each carrying 644 M77 sabmunitions, to lay down a similar bar- ^a§e (in terms of ordnance tonnage), yet SbRS could achieve this at twice the j^ange 0f the 5-inch/38 and the area of estruction would be much larger. About 112 LP/Cs in the baseline configuration w°ald suffice.
A telling comparison would be to ana- .jfZe what would be given up and gained 1 hour ABRS launchers replaced four 5- lr*ch/38 mounts. Using the same 30-minute shore fire support operation, rather ran a 5-inch/38 gun barrage of 2,880 Unds/79 tons of ordnance at maximum Stained rate of fire, the four ABRSs c°ald deliver 624 rockets and 109 tons of , finance, again at a much greater range °Ver 16 nautical miles) and with a heater killing area.
The political realities of the Navy’s ,.Un Proponents, the cancellation of Phase
U i
tal ^ ^
jhe NSFS study, and the likely locations ((.r ABRS on board the battleships point : a compromise solution. The nine 16- ach guns should be retained until the 'Ps are scrapped. It will also be ex- ernely difficult to get Navy and concessional support for removing the re- a>ning five-inch gun mounts. However, Placing some five-inch guns with RS offers the greatest potential for Renting the battleships’ NSFS capabilities in the short-term, at the lowest development and production costs.
Unlike most modem naval ships, the Iowa battleships are not severely constrained by weight and vertical center of gravity limitations: The ships’ watertight subdivision and side protection systems consist of many relatively small compartments defined by watertight and structural bulkheads. Thus, ABRS should be considered an add-on capability or a replacement for one or more secondary weapon systems.
One possibility is to replace four twin 5-inch/38 gun mounts (numbers 3, 4, 5, and 6) with four ABRS launchers on the 01 level. The two forward twin five-inch gun mounts would be retained.
Each ABRS launcher is loaded from its adjacent ready-service magazine which can stow four LP/Cs, which are loaded through a pneumatically powered door and along a pneumatically powered roller conveyor. LP/C launcher alignment is provided by an overhead hoist and spanner rail system. Each of four primary magazines on the third deck, formerly the 5-inch/38 projectile and powder magazines, can store 16 LP/Cs. Each ready-service magazine and primary magazine would be served by a 12,000-pound- capacity weapons elevator. The upper handling rooms for the four 5-inch/38 mounts would be removed from the main deck and 01 level for the ABRS launchers and blast deflector structure. The ready- service magazine and the primary magazine will each require three or four personnel for LP/C handling and launcher loading, thus resulting in some reductions from 1985 manning levels. A maximum of 104 LP/Cs (624 rockets) could be accommodated. Firing all 26 LP/Cs per launcher is estimated to take 28 minutes, or an average of 12 rockets every two minutes.
The ABRS baseline concept’s biggest effect would result from the installation of ready service magazines and elevators, which would require the relocation of some living spaces, shops, offices, a
damage-control space, and engine room air supply and exhaust trunks. All could easily be accommodated, however. More serious are the potential impacts on the shipboard system of pipes and cables.
There will, nevertheless, be a significant weight impact resulting from the ABRS—a reduction of approximately 350 long tons in lightship displacement, caused principally by removing four 5- inch/38 mounts and considerable structure. The net reduction in full load displacement is smaller—only some 242 long tons, which would have a negligible effect on ship stability.
A preliminary cost estimate for installing ABRS, including design and analysis costs and shipyard work and materials, is $40 to $105 million per ship. It is estimated that the baseline concept project will require some 300,000 shipyard manhours per ship, which a work-force of 300 could accomplish in six to eight months. This could be carried out during the first scheduled overhauls for the lowas, beginning with the New Jersey in 1987.
The Iowa-class battleships appear to be ideally suited to receive ABRS, and the political environment appears sanguine. The ABRS seems to be a natural and readily available solution to the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ problem of meagre NGFS/NSFS capability in support of amphibious landings, especially in future OTH-assault concepts. Naval architecture considerations make the installation of ABRS in the place of four of the remaining six 5-inch/38 gun mounts a very attractive concept.
Mssrs. Truver and Polmar directed a study of the feasibility of installing ABRS on board several U. S. Navy surface combatants. Dr. Truver heads the Naval and Maritime Policy Department at Information Spectrum, Inc. Mr. Polmar, a Senior Consultant at Information Spectrum, specializes in U. S. and Soviet naval issues; he is the author of The Ships and Aircraft of the U. S. Fleet and Guide to the Soviet Navy, both published by the U. S. Naval Institute, among numerous other publications.
tj n 1978, then-Captain Henry C. Mus- pn (n°w Commander, Second Fleet) de- f neH the raison d’etre of the U. S. Sur- the6 ^avy: '*■ • • it is °n the surface that e day-to-day commercial activity takes aceand over which the bulk of military (. PPlies necessary for overseas opera- °ns must flow.”1 The central element
of our ability to maintain freedom of movement on that surface is the carrier battle group. Aircraft and submarines weigh heavily in maintaining local sea control for battle group operations, with the former shielding the battle group against the brunt of the enemy air threat. But surface combatants must provide the
jjie State of Surface Antiair Warfare____________________
^ Thomas B. Blann
final protection against attack from the air.
It has been more than two years since Aegis, described as the most capable antiair warfare (AAW) weapon system in the world, went to sea in the USS Ticon- deroga (CG-47). Ample attention has been focused on Ticonderoga’s perfor-
Table 1 Soviet ASCMs
Approximate Range
Designation | (nautical miles) | Launch Platforms |
SS-N-2 (Improved) | 40 | Modified “Kashin” (DDG), Modified “Kildin” (DDG), “Osa II” (PTG) |
SS-N-3b | 250 | “Kresta I” (CG), “Kynda” (CG) |
SS-N-3a | 250 | “Echo II” (SSGN), “Juliett” (SSG)-surfaced |
SS-N-7 | 30 | “Charlie I/II” (SSGN) |
SS-N-9 | 60 | “Nanuchka” (PGG), “Charlie II,” “Papa” |
SS-N-12 | 300 | Kiev carriers, “Echo II,” Slava (CG) |
SS-N-19 | 270 | Kirov (CGN), “Oscar” (SSGN) |
SS-N-22 | 120 | Sovremennyy (DDG), “Tarantul II,” Wing-inGround Aircraft |
AS-3 | 200-300 | “Bear” |
AS-4 | 150-250 | “Blinder,” “Backfire” |
AS-5 | 100 | “Badger” |
AS-6 | 150-250 | “Badger” |
Source: Norman Polmar, Guide to the Soviet Navy, U. S. Naval Institute Press |
mance. That the CG-47-class cruisers are introducing new dimensions to AAW, there is little doubt. But how do nonAegis surface forces stack up overall in AAW, and what is on the horizon?
Today’s Air Threat: The embodiment of the air threat our surface forces face is the antiship cruise missile (ASCM). It comes in a variety of shapes and sizes, but the characteristics that must concern us are its detectability, speed, destructive power, and accuracy.
Detectability is determined in part by the missile’s radar reflectivity: the ways in which the size, shape, and flight trajectory during approach affect the target echoes received by ship radars. Other determining factors are emissions—radar signals from the ASCM which track and guide it toward its target, and infrared emissions from the ASCM’s propulsion and leading edges of the airframe heated by aerodynamic friction. The more difficult our detection of cruise missiles, the longer detection is delayed and the shorter the time there is to counter them. Payloads vary from conventional high explosive to nuclear. Cruise missile guidance can be active, passive, or a combination of the two. Active guidance is controlled by a small radar transmitter/ receiver mounted in the nose, operating at relatively high frequency to achieve a narrow beam width. The seeker searches for, locks on, and tracks the target. Passive guidance makes use of a receiver to detect and track radiation from the target, which could be the emissions from ship radars or infrared from the exhaust stack.
Table 1 presents data on Soviet ASCMs, which can be launched from aircraft, surface ships, submerged submarines, and shore batteries. Coordinated attacks may be mounted to attempt saturation of AAW defenses by achieving near-simultaneous arrival of ASCMs on the target. Electronic countermeasures (ECM) probably would be used to delay ASCM detection and defeat a coordinated defense.
Although Soviet surface combatant ASCM capability cannot be dismissed lightly, the aircraft and submarine launch platforms are a greater threat. The number of ASCM launchers Soviet Naval Aviation could put in the air and their ability to close rapidly to launch range (more will be said about the outer air battle) pose a significant threat. Submarines, using the stealth afforded by their environment, may be able to close within ASCM launch range of a battle group. Submerged “Charlie”- and “Oscar”- class nuclear-powered guided missile submarines can launch SS-N-9 (60-nauti- cal mile range) and SS-N-19 (250+-nautical mile range) missiles, respectively.2 If they can solve the targeting problem and remain undetected, they can deliver an offensive challenge.
Battle Group Defense-in-Depth: A U. S. Navy battle group typically consists of an aircraft carrier, two or three cruisers, two or three destroyers, and one or two attack submarines. The battle group’s role is one of power projection: delivery by attack bomber of destructive ordnance ashore or on opposing naval forces. Increasingly, the offensive capability of the attack bombers is being complemented by the Tomahawk cruise missiles carried by submarines and surface combatants. An aircraft carrier must reserve a substantial portion of its available space for aircraft other than attack bombers, however. It requires aircraft for airspace control, cover for attack bombers en route to or returning from strike missions, surveillance and reconnaissance, and search and rescue.
The outer edge of the battle group AAW defense-in-depth, at ranges of Du to 250 nautical miles and beyond, is provided by the F-14 Tomcat fighter. Flying combat air patrol (CAP), F-14s enga§e enemy aircraft before ASCMs can be launched at the battle group. The space between the battle group and this outer air battle zone is guarded by the surface missile systems (SMS) on board the cruisers and guided missile destroyers (DDGs)- These SMS ships provide area defenseshooting down ASCMs which, having escaped CAP aircraft, may be guiding toward the SMS units or the carrier. A ships also have self-defense systems, ranging from Sea Sparrow missiles on destroyers and some carriers, to Phalanx close-in weapon systems on almost every platform. “Soft kill” deception devices such as chaff dispensers and ECM induce inaccurate terminal guidance by enemy ASCMs. To these self-defense system^ will be added the rolling airframe missi (RAM) in the future. There is considers ble overlapping of the zones, establishing a formidable, layered defense.
Today's AAW Capability in Surface Combatants: Table 2 lists the AAW s>^ terns on board most surface combats ^ classes and carriers. A discussion of the systems follows:
► Aegis is at sea in three cruisers no" - and another 21 are programing “Aegis” is a loosely used term to refer the overall combat system in the Tic0’1 deroga-class cruisers as well as the Aeg weapon system. Aegis’ phased srr ; radar monitors the tracks of dozens of tsr gets while simultaneously searching 1 skies for newcomers. While track im0^ mation is filed, threats are identified a prioritized for destruction. j
Our AAW systems of the 1960s 3,1 ^ 1970s were limited by the number n tracking and illuminating radars ava ^ able. The maximum available were the nine Leahy (CG-16)-class cruiser® still in use today—with two track/id1111’,^ nate radars both fore and aft. A tracked by one of these radars and associated illuminator is turned on at m sile launch to illuminate the target radar energy. The launched missile ‘ detects the target-reflected illuminatt signal and uses it to guide to interc V ^ This type of missile guidance, using j transmitter not in the missile, is terwjth semi-active homing. The problem . these older systems is that a track/idu . nate radar or channel must be dedic to a single target for the duration of111
Table 2 AAW Systems on Active U. S. Navy Battle Group Surface Ships
Class Number of Ships Aegis Terrier Tartar Sea Sparrow Phalanx
cv | 9 |
| X | X |
CVN | 4 |
| X | X |
CG-47 | 3 | X |
| X |
CG-16 | 9 | X |
| X |
CG-26 | 9 | X |
| X |
CGN-9 | 1 | X |
|
|
CGN-25 | 1 | X |
| X |
CGN-35 | 1 | X |
|
|
CGN-36 | 2 |
| X | X |
CGN-38 | 4 |
| X | X |
DDG-2 | 23 |
| X |
|
DDG-37 | 10 | X |
|
|
DDG-993 | 4 |
| X | X |
ADG-963 | 31 |
| X | X |
FFG-7 | 38 |
| X | X |
FFG-i | 6 |
| X |
|
FF-1052/1078 | 42 |
| X | X |
^°urce: Norman Polmar, The Ships and Aircraft of the U. S. Fleet, | U. S. Naval Institute Press |
| ||
_ |
|
|
|
|
le flight.3 The ship’s AAW capability C.‘'n be thwarted by more targets than the *P could service—i.e., five or more. With Aegis, this limitation is avoided r°ugh the use of the medium-range Stan- ard missile (SM-2), which has an inter- ^ePt range of 40 miles.4 The missile is rC(i and flown on an energy-efficient Rectory to the vicinity of the predicted percept. Then the, illuminating radar tenna (of which there are four) bathes
the target with radar energy for the terminal portion of the flight, when the missile and its target are in proximity. Thus, the illuminator is not tied up during missile flight constantly illuminating that single target. Instead, with adroit scheduling by weapon system computers, it can be time-shared with other in-flight missiles destined for other targets. Moreover, Aegis’ phased array radar can track dozens of targets.5
How well is Aegis working? In the words of Rear Admiral Edward W. Carter, III, Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force (OpTEvFor), following the 1983 operational evaluation, “. . . (the) dedicated OT&E of TICON- DEROGA involved the most intensive short-of-war operational testing of a surface ship in the history of our Navy. . . . TICONDEROGA demonstrated formidable warfare capability under threat test environments that would have totally overwhelmed any other ship in the fleet today.”6 And, following the April 1984 testing, ”... in combat Ticonderoga would have survived, and so would the ships that she was protecting. . . . Area defense, which is why we bought the Aegis system, is tough. And she performed superbly, at targets two-digit miles away from her, killing them out there. Crossing targets. Incredible, absolutely incredible.”7 This comes from the Navy’s independent test and evaluation agency, which Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James D. Watkins says ”... tries to defeat each new system on its own terms. “Our program managers view OPTEVFOR as an adversary.”
► The long-range Terrier missile system is installed in 21 cruisers and ten Farra- gut (DDG-37)-class destroyers. Terrier ships are being converted to fire the SM-2 missile, but with an important difference from the SM-2 used with Aegis. The Ter- rier/SM-2 version receives initial propulsion from a solid propellant rocket motor or booster, enabling it reach targets out to 90 miles.9 With the SM-2 and computer scheduling, a single tracker/illuminator can time-share multiple targets since the SM-2 requires target illumination only for the terminal portion of its flight. The effect is to increase the number of targets that the ship can engage simultaneously.
Terrier cruisers are undergoing the new threat upgrade (NTU) program, which improves detection by integrating the inputs from different shipboard radars and using the combined sensor capabilities to obtain an enhanced air picture. Undergoing the NTU are the nine Leahy (CG-16)-class ships, the nine Belknap (CG-26)-class ships, and three nuclear- powered Terrier cruisers: the Long Beach (CGN-9), Bainbridge (CGN-25), and Truxtun (CGN-35).10 These ships will see active service well into the next decade,
Before intercepting enemy aircraft at its maximum range of 65 miles, the SM-2 surface-to-air missiles can share a target-illuminating radar.
V.
AAW capability should be a consider
improvement. Phalanx will provide p[7] defense. .
► The new threat upgrade (NTU) instan lations for Terrier cruisers should begin1 1986, with completion of the 21 cruise scheduled for 1992. As noted, the Mo^a has the system used for test and evalu11 tion. Ten Tartar ships—six CGNs a(1^
engage the Soviet ‘ ‘Backfire’ ’-launch^’ high-altitude cruise missiles in ajamm* -
environment.
► In October 1982, improvements m FFG-7s were begun, aimed at impr°'
discussed but it may not be affordable'
vste*11
► The rolling airframe missile (RAM)1
when DDG-37-class ships will be approaching block obsolescence. These guided missile destroyers fire the earlier version of the extended-range Standard missile, the SM-1, which has intercept capability out to 40 miles. The USS Mahan (DDG-42) also has the NTU system because she served as the test ship.
- The Tartar missile system fires an earlier version of the Standard missile with intercept capability out to 25 miles and requires a dedicated track/illuminate channel. The six Tartar nuclear-powered guided missile cruisers (CGNs) and the four Kidd (DDG-993)-class destroyers will be upgraded to receive SM-2 capability and will receive the NTU." Block obsolescence of the Charles F. Adams (DDG-2)-class ships will occur in the next decade with the exception of three ships that were modernized: the Tattnall (DDG-19), Goldsborough (DDG-20), and Benjamin Stoddert (DDG-22).12
- Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigates provide limited area defense coverage. They are equipped with a single rail launcher that fires the 25-mile range version of the Standard missile (SM-1). A dual channel, track/illuminate radar is available with the Mk-92 fire control system. Although the Mk-92 is limited, it is being upgraded.13 This class provides a
The last protection in the Navy’s layered antiair defense, the Phalanx close-in weapon system buzzes like a beehive as it fires stinging uranium projectiles at enemy “leakers.”
pool from which antisubmarine warfare (ASW) gap-fillers—with an admittedly modest area defense AAW capability— can be drawn. Although these ships were not conceived as battle group participants, their capabilities are becoming better appreciated.
- Sea Sparrow is a self-defense missile system having a relatively short range and providing some AAW capability for aircraft carriers and Spruance (DD-963)- class destroyers. It is also a semiactive homing missile requiring a dedicated track/illuminate radar to intercept. An earlier and less capable version of Sea Sparrow, the basic point defense system, is still installed in some amphibious warfare class ships. The Knox (FF-1052/- 1078)-class frigates receive Phalanx.
- Phalanx close-in weapon systems (CIWSs) are installed in almost all surface combatants to provide last ditch defense. Aircraft carriers have three CIWSs, cruisers two, and destroyers and frigates have one each.14 Phalanx fires 50 projectiles per second, using its own radar to track the projectiles as they approach the target to minimize detected angular errors before subsequent bursts are fired.15 Projectiles are made of depleted uranium for maximum density and hardness.
How effective is Phalanx? The British acquired Phalanx in 1982 for their carriers after Argentine Exocet missiles highlighted the vulnerability of British defenses. In subsequent sea trials, Phalanx reportedly destroyed three of four Exocets launched by HMS Alacrity at a remotely controlled Phalanx system. (The fourth Exocet evidently experienced an in-flight failure, deviating from its sea-skimming trajectory.)16
- “Soft kill” devices, jammers such as the AN/SLQ-32(V)3 and rocket-launched chaff, are installed in cruisers and destroyers. Jammers are used to confuse the ASCM’s terminal guidance, thereby inducing a miss. Chaff is ejected at some distance from the ship to present an alternate “target” in hopes of attracting the ASCM’s radar seeker. The extent to which these countermeasures are effective is a function of their deployment and the sophistication of the ASCM. For example, in the former, premature deployment may result in chaff being dispersed by winds before the ASCM’s arrival; late deployment may put the chaff cloud outside the ASCM seeker’s field of view once the seeker is locked on the ship. In the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Israelis defeated Soviet-made SS-N-2 “Styx” missiles with a combination of chaff deployment and ship maneuvering.
On the Horizon: What new surface force capabilities might we expect within this decade? The following weapons and systems, on the verge of fleet introduction, will upgrade surface force AAW capability:
- Introduction of the VLS in the Ticon- deroga-class cruisers begins with the Bunker Hill (CG-52). Subsequent ships will have VLS and the earlier hulls of the class will probably be back-fitted, replaC' ing the Mk-26 guided missile launchers- The result of this swap is a faster reaction time. Missiles can be launched vertically from below-deck, vertically stored shipping containers. This removes the dualarm launchers fore and aft which-" although fast—are unable to match the VLS concept. Further, the Mk-2 launchers could be rendered inoperabl during combat. Although some VL cover hatches could be critically damage0 as the result of a hit, others would proha' bly remain operational.
- The Arleigh Burke-class destroyers should begin entering the fleet about the end of this decade. Since they are to replace the retiring DDG-2- and DDG-3' class guided missile destroyers, ihe-v should number at least about 30, replaC ing 20 of the 23 DDG-2 class and nine oi the ten DDG-37-class ships. This ne" destroyer will have a modified Aegis sys tern, using a phased array radar (01ie transmitter instead of the two used in 10 cruiser configuration), VLS, and fire 111 medium-range SM-2. The result>n-
■ able ioinl
four DDG-993-class destroyers^ scheduled for NTU. This upgrade g* these ships the capability to detect
the ving
performance and reliability of their ^ ^ 92 fire control systems. The next phase^^ this improvement program focuses target detection, with range impr° ments of 50% under conditions of hea clutter and 70% in a jamming enVir°ay ment. A third phase, adding phased arr - radar to the fire control system, has be ,g a complementary self-defense sys designed to engage ASCMs. It has du^ mode guidance capability, using PasS
the
overall power projection capability of
than
the ship launching the missile.
homing on radar/infrared emissions from the ASCMs. It will be fired from the Sea Sparrow system in DD-963-class destroyers. The passive homing capability J^eans that the missile can be fired and torgotten, thus, several simultaneous ^ngagemcnts of ASCMs are possible.19 ' The first Aegis ship, the Ticonderoga, deployed to the eastern Mediterranean rom October 1983 until March 1984. ller Aegis system provided a thorough, aocurate picture for AAW, to the extent hat Commander Task Force 60 indicated hat he and his staff were able to concen- •rate on higher level operational matters. ^ 40% aviation fuel savings over previous deployments was logged because of ho significant drop in alert launches of '-AP which, in turn, is attributable to the Quality air picture the Ticonderoga pro- ''|ded.20 Presumably, this could be trans- ated into fewer deck spots for fighters and more for attack bombers, adding to
he carrier battle group. The Ticonderoga Cruisers can improve the performance of ojher battle group ships by providing her •gh-quality air picture through data ■nks.-1-22 Aegis’ potential will be real- l?ed as experience is gained in battle gr°up operations.
Over the Horizon: The Navy’s atten- l0n on the outer air battle has focused on °W to destroy enemy bombers at ranges huyond their ASCM release boundaries v''lth missiles launched from our VLS ships of the 1990s.23 Navy testimony last year before the Research, Development, esting, and Evaluation (RDT&E) subcommittee of the House Armed Services °mmittee indicated that “We have focUsed on extending our organic battle gr°uP weaponry into the outer air bate- ■ ■ .”24 In the years ahead, this com- ^Ument may result in a ship-launched lssile with rocket/ramjet propulsion to aph the outer ranges. This could require QCtlVe homing guidance for the missile, terminal illumination, if semiactive ® 'dance is used, by some source other
j. Laser technology has been considered 1 some time to have potential for AAW ■'defense weapons. The advantages of
laser weapons include: the effectiveness of a laser weapon against a highly maneuvering, incoming target (lateral beam movement reduces thermal blooming, the defocusing effect of the turbulence from air heated by the laser beam); the relative ease, over conventional weapons, with which a laser weapon could engage a crossing target; and “active jamming,” a side effect of tracking a sensitive optical seeker, which can wipe out infrared guidance capability of ASCMs, or at least cause them to revert, if capable of dual mode guidance, to the radio frequency mode, which is less accurate and for which shipboard countermeasures exist.25 Apparently, it will be well into the next decade before laser weapons join the surface fleet.
As we approach the 600-ship Navy, the AAW-capable surface forces are being upgraded with systems that can better contend with the evolving enemy air threat. Integration of Aegis into our battle groups adds considerably more than just an incredibly effective shooter. It adds a system that can provide complete surveillance of the surrounding defense zone and share that picture with other shooters within the battle group and with combat air patrols. The addition of the VLS to Aegis cruisers will provide the extra firepower to meet and defeat saturation attacks. Extension of our surface force AAW capability to the outer air battle to engage the antiship cruise missile-carrying bombers would be a significant accomplishment. We must expect enemy developments in whatever makes our job harder: higher speeds, lower altitude for sea-skimmers, lower radar reflectivity and infrared emissions, and improved electronic counter-countermeasures. To maintain superiority, keeping ahead of these challenges will require our sustained RDT&E efforts. * [8] [9] [10]
Hearings on Military Posture and H. R. 5968, DoD Authorization for FY 1983, Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee, Part 4, p. 484. 5Norman Friedman, op cit.
6U. S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Hearings on H. R. 5167, DoD Authorization for FY 1985, Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee, Part 3, p. 209.
7James D. Hessman and Vincent C. Thomas, "A Time of Great Testing—Interview with Rear Admiral Edward W. Carter III, COMOPTEVFOR.'’ Seapower, March 1985, pp. 30-37.
8Dept. of the Navy Report to the Congress, FY 1986— Posture Statement by Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James D. Watkins, p. 36.
9U. S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Hearings on Military Posture and H. R. 5968, DoD Authorization for FY 1983, Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee, Part 4. p. 483. ‘“Howard W. Serig, Jr., “Stretching the Fleet into the 1990s,” Proceedings!Naval Review 1984, p. 167.
MTodd K. Lufkin and Francis T. Williamson, Jr., “New Threat Upgrade for 31 Ships,” Surface Warfare, May/June 1985, pp. 2-4. i2P.T. Dcuterman, "The DDG 2-Class Guided Missile Destroyer Modernization,” Proceedings. January 1983, p. 101.
I3H. R. 5167, FY 1985, Seapower Subcommittee p. 173.
14U. S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Hearings on Military Posture and H. R. 2970, DoD Authorization for FY 1982, Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee, Part 3, p. 346.
‘-'Paul F. Walker, "Smart Weapons in Naval Warfare,” Scientific American, May 1983, pp. 53-61. ‘“Anthony Preston, “Phalanx Anti-Missile Gun System,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 16 February 1985
p. 268.
17H. R. 5167, FY 1985, Seapower Subcommittee, pp. 172-173. nOp cit. p. 173.
‘“"Dual Source Production of RAM Weapon Linked to Cost Savings,” Aviation Week, June 3, 1985,
pp. 201-202.
2"H. R. 5167, FY 1985, Seapower Subcommittee, p. 107.
2'Op cit. p. 171, p. 215.
22U. S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee Hearings on H. R. 5167, DoD Authorization for FY 1985, RDT&E Subcommittee, Part 4, p. 748.
23U. S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee Hearings on H. R. 2287, DoD Authorization for FY 1985, RDT&E Subcommittee, Part 5, p. 748.
24H. R. 5167, FY 1985 RDT&E, p. 791.
25Alfred Skolnick, "Too Light on Lasers?" Proceedings, December 1984. pp. 30-36.
Mr. Blann has been a weapon systems analyst with the Navy for 22 years. He has a B.S. degree in electrical engineering from the University of Texas and an M.S. degree in systems engineering from California State University, Fullerton. He is a division head in the Surface Weapons Department of the U. S. Naval Fleet Analysis Center, Corona, California.
^NCOs Clubs’ Revival
y Sergeant Major John L. Horton, U. S. Marine Corps
. The Marine Corps senior non-commis- °^’cers (SNCOs) club system has '■oleins maintaining itself as a viable, °ht-making enterprise. Besides a few Ccessful operations, this problem appears to be getting worse. The most obvious difficulty is a lack of attendance and participation. There are equally important social and professional problems.
Since the Marine Corps’ beginning at
Tun Tavern, the SNCOs club system has always been a Marine Corps tradition. The clubs are places where Marine morale and welfare—even professionalism— have been enhanced. They help develop
key
A fighting force’s morale is a key to its effectiveness. The Marine Corps cannot afford to lose the comraderie and esprit de corps fostered in SNCO clubs.
the concepts of “esprit de corps” and a “band of brothers.”
Recently, however, the system has suffered from many internal ailments and external social phenomena. Alcohol abuse prevention policies and related law enforcement efforts have hurt the clubs economically and socially. Heavy emphasis on physical appearance and weight control programs also has affected club attendance and participation. There appears to be a general breakdown in the comraderie among the ranks. The “father-son,” “teacher-student,” and “passing-on-of-tradition” relationships appear to be negligible or nonexistent. This affects morale, welfare, and professionalism, and corrodes the social foundation and perpetuation of SNCOs, which are in danger of deterioration or elimination if this situation is not corrected soon. Although it may seem trite, leadership and education are important steps in the right direction.
First, we must understand that the system is a valuable leadership tool. Second, we must communicate the professional and constructive purposes of the SNCOs clubs to our Marines. We must challenge and destroy many of the non-professional and destructive stereotypes and realities of the past—the clubs are not the place to get drunk, become fat, raise hell, or waste time. The clubs should become a place of mutual respect, comraderie, shared interests, and better leadership. It should be a place where values, standards, expertise, and traditions are shared and passed on from one generation of Marines to the next. Third, we must understand that the system is a reflection of the entire Corps. If we can work, fight, and die together, we must learn to communicate, socialize, and live together. We must not allow so-called ethnic, gender, and professional gaps to persist. They have no place or purpose in the Corps. Because of its inherent professional capacity, the club system can be a device for eradicating these barriers and obstacles from the Corps. Finally, Marines of all ranks must be educated about the strengths of a viable club system. Most important, we must always lead by personal example and participation. We must solve this in a professional manner, or lose an effective and productive part of the Corps.
For the club system to remain viable, it has to make a profit. While regarded as an establishment or institution by some standards, it is also a business. Since this could be the acid test for determining whether or not the clubs make it, I will use the SNCOs club at Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina—a club well on its way to recovery—as a prime example.
Like many of its sister clubs, the Cherry Point club has had to resolve problems of declining patronage and negative attitudes. The bar is no longer the
biggest attraction. Furthermore, Marine entertainment preferences and lifestyles have changed over the years, and civilian enterprises have become more numerous and competitive. To fight this trend, this club has implemented creative business principles with sound leadership tec^' niques. Some of them are: a full-time civilian manager was hired; competent assistant-military managers were hired; the station and wing commanding generals have become actively involved in clu functions and activities; the station an wing sergeants major have become actively involved in club functions and activities; each squadron or group has pr°' vided a motivated member to sit on the board of advisors; and more. A diversm cation of activities has been established, including monthly mess nights and f°r mal dine-ins; monthly bosses’ nights, quarterly commanding general’s lunc eons; holiday dances and/or dinners; prl vate socials or teen dances; bingo; etc- There are also special events and furlC tions, including lunch specials (office^ are authorized to eat lunch at the SNC Club on these days); staff wives-sister luncheon (wives are encouraged to brujS a “sister” to lunch); red “T”-shirt nig (a slight drink and/or food discount f° those wearing a red “T” shirt); and man; more. Economically and professionally’ it should be evident that the key fac(or' the successful operation of the SNC club is participation by all SNCOs.
The patron attitude survey form e serves special recognition. Simply state,. the form is a questionnaire giving 1 Marine or dependent a chance to tell t club advisory board and manageme what they think of their club. It keeps club informed of the needs and desires ^ its customers. Properly prepared widely disseminated, the form is a element in successful club operati Cherry Point has experienced great s cess with it. s
The enhancement of the Marine CorP SNCOs club system is a realistic The task is not easy—it must be un ^ stood in all its various perspectives diversifications. There are some atti . j, and management modifications W have to take place for our system t0 come more productive and usefuf^^.
4U. S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee,
CH-46 186
CH-53D 258
CH-53E 120
Assumptions:-------------------------- __
[2] CH-46s will carry only internal troop loads (16— 17 troops per load).
[3] CH-53Ds will carry externally all HMMWVs and the 12 forklifts (vehicle operators will be carried in the same aircraft).
[4] CH-53Es will carry externally all LAVs,
M-198s, and M-813s (vehicle operators and
crews will be carried internally).
‘Henry C. Muslin, “The Surface Navy: All Stop or All Ahead Flank?," Proceedings, March 1978, p. 57.
■■Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 1984, p. 62.
[9]Norman Friedman, “AEGIS, Defense Systems 2002, December 1984, pp. 18-38.
Sergeant Major Horton entered the Marine jn
- After completing advanced infantry tra,nl^c.
- he was transferred to the First Marine ®°®varj- Kanehoe Bay, Hawaii. He has been assigned
ous divisions and tours, including Vietnam ^ 1966, and has a masters degree from the *^nl^jarine of Oklahoma. He served as Sergeant Major. a„J Attack Squadron 231, Marine Aircraft Group Wing Transportation Squadron 27 at Cherry North Carolina. He is now Sergeant Major. Barracks, Norfolk Naval Base.