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Contents:
Shields or Swords? “Commanding the Offense”
“Computers in Combat” “Another Halfway Measure”
“Ship-Based Tactical Weather Forecasting”
“Equal Rights, Equal Risks” “Manning Nuclear Submarines” “Warriors”
“$436 Hammers and Consistent Arguments”
“The Way West: Guam”
“FCDSSA: Fleet Support That Gets with the Program”
“Standby for Weigh-Off”
“JCS Reorganization: Part II”
“To Seize the Moment”
“The Ultimate Defense”
“Understanding the Soviet Union”
“Diesel Submarines for the U. S. Navy?”
“Strategic Defense, Strategic Modernization, and Arms Control”
“The Pacific Basin”
“Turn on the Lights”
“Nicaragua”
“What’s in a Name?”
“JCS Reorganization”
“Terrorism”
Shields or Swords?
Staff Sergeant T. M. Galitello, U. S. Marine Corps—In response to President Ronald Reagan’s proposed massive space-based defensive weapons system to counter the nuclear threat—i.e., Star Wars—the Soviet Union has launched a major propaganda war against the plan. The Soviets claim that the President’s proposal would upset the delicate nuclear balance and would push the world closer to the final war. It is interesting that the Soviets fail to mention their own version of Star Wars which includes particle- beam weapons, lasers, and killer satellites, and the fact they have been in existence for several years.
Critics in this country claim that Star Wars is unworkable and dangerously destabilizing. Some say the proposed systems will not stop low-flying cruise missiles, bombers, many submarine-launched weapons, or prevent a determined nuclear attack against our cities. Other critics believe the Soviets will be forced to respond by developing contingency plans in an effort to foil each stage of Star Wars, thereby rendering it useless.
Although an arguable case can be made for some of these criticisms, they all fail to recognize the underlying wisdom behind the Star Wars plan. Star Wars will lead to a shift from the devastation of nuclear offensive weaponry to the development of more sane defensive systems: weapons without the capacity to destroy cities, weapons without the capacity to destroy people, weapons that have only one mission—to prevent a nuclear war from annihilating all humanity. As the years pass and a series of defensive systems are developed by both sides, perhaps then we will have the confidence to accomplish meaningful disarmament of offensive nuclear arms.
When Edward Teller, the father of the H-bomb, was asked to comment on the Star Wars plan, he got to the bottom line: “The logical consequence is that we would have two armed camps, armed with shields primarily and not swords, and I think shields are just very much less
dangerous than swords.”
Star Wars will become the most c0,’._ plex and expensive undertaking ever tempted by man; it will not be w'tho risk, but it stands to be our best hope the continued existence of civilization earth.
“Commanding the Offense’
(See R. C. Powers, pp. 59-64, October 1^ Proceedings)
Commander Christopher H. Johns0 _ U. S. Navy—Captain Powers is coi Although good on paper, the comp1 warfare commander (CWC) concept ^ frequently been ineffective in practice- is time for an update. ,iy
The CWC concept is fundament® sound. “Delegation of control” >s cornerstone of CWC and is the only > ^ sible method for maintaining order 'n . modem naval engagement. It is cru that we persevere to make it work- In practice CWC suffers—but ne‘^ept
use
.rrect-
>osite
because of a fatal flaw in its basic con<^ nor, as Captain Powers suggests, beca
The
CWC concept falters because it d°eS have a workable formula for dividing thority among the various comma0 within the force. The current app°rtl ment, based on warfare areas, is un”|ter ageable, unnatural, and inefficient- _ the apportionment to make it more e tive, and CWC will work. ^
Contrary to current CWC doctrine^^ naval battle problem does not divide > . naturally into antiair warfare (AA^, antisurface warfare (ASW), and ant,s marine warfare (ASUW) comp°n£j ^ Such a division is a nice analytic to j the classroom, but presents an an10f view of the tactical situation. By vid ^ their weapons and sensors, naval forces operate fundamentally m ^jps spheres of action: close in where » dominate, and distant where air^j0n dominate. These two spheres ot aC^f, are distinct; they involve decidedly ferent mechanics, tactics, phil°s0”
it is defensive in nature and origin-
► Inner-area AAW commander (A controls AAW missiles, guns, ^ ’ close-in weapons systems, and jamim against air threats which penetrate ^ outer area; runs the tactical data link l
isile
iandef
tempo, and focus; and in the final analysis they are the keys to designing tactical action.
The close-in theatre of operations (within 60 nautical miles of formation center) is characterized by the following:
- Defensive action—protecting the aircraft carrier (CV) or other high-value unit
- Shipboard active sensors (i.e., radars and sonars)
- Urgent responses to threats
- Ultrahigh frequency communications
- Primary assets—ships and helicopters
- Relative independence from carrier launch and recovery cycles
- Success hinging on ability to maneuver and employ ships and helicopters in rapidly changing situations and to integrate the guns, AAW missiles, ASROCs and Harpoons
The distant theatre of operations is characterized by the following:
- Offensive actions—first strike, sanitizing the objective area
- Broad scope of sensors—active, passive, airborne, land-based
- Deliberate, studied attacks at arms length
- High frequency and satellite communications systems
- Primary assets—fixed-wing aircraft supplemented by surface and submarine pickets
- Heavy dependence on carrier launch and carrier recovery cycles, and carrier air availability
- Success hinging on ability to locate the enemy, to use effectively tracking data from all sources, to task the carrier efficiently, to employ carrier air effectively, and to integrate it with land-based air and Tomahawks
When the task force structure is organized along warfare lines, we cut across this natural grain of operations. This forces a single commander to control two disparate tactical operations at the same time, with the frequent result of having no control at all in either sphere. This organization makes poor use of surface and aviation expertise by failing to put the commander in charge of what he knows best and forcing him to be a jack- of-all-trades. It also forces the commander to divide his concentration between two entirely different problems, instead of allowing him to focus on a single homogeneous problem.
Making CWC work is a matter of reorganization. The purpose of reorganization is to align the delegation of control within the natural boundaries of the tactical problem; to simplify and clarify the apportioning of tasks; and to allow each commander to focus his attention on a manageable piece of the tactical problem.
The following organization illustrates t direction we need to pursue. Under plan there are three principal comma ers under the officer-in-tactical comntf1^ ► Outer-area commander (AW): org^ nizes, controls, and directs CV air, Pal squadrons, surface and submarine picK in coordinated offensive and defens actions in the outer area; defends the V proaches to the task force; formulates adjusts the CV air plan; is an avia embarked in the CV 11); is a surface commander embarked ! a guided missile cruiser or guided n«s' destroyer
► Inner-area ASW/ASUW comm1 (AX): controls the inner screen of s ' and helicopters; organizes for imme response to close-in threats; coordin the employment of guns, ASROC, o ^ poons, torpedoes, and helicopters, ^ destroyer squadron commander barked in a ship of the screen
This new organization is not a c j plete panacea for every shortcoming the CWC concept, but it gives delega ^ of control an honest chance to succe ^ Like the present CWC organization
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es heavy demands on the command- r s organizational skills and professional owledge. It even proposes a warfare- nented split of its own, but only because ' Can be achieved without violating the asic tenants of the reorganization. Most important, it breaks the tactical problem
_ responsibilities, and gives each nimander a clearer, more natural area
responsibility.
: "ere is one more key to reinvigorat- CWC. The CWC concept mandates I e‘egation of control” by the higher eVe*s °f the task force. As Captain Pow- t- aP‘ly notes, we need to take delega- u'>n °P control further by making better e °f independent pickets, surface action °ups (SAGs), and search and attack , lts (SAUs). It is odd that in a system red on delegation of control so few J^rere commanders detail SAGs and *rets to perform meaningful indepen- j nt duties. The importance of delegating tr I*31 nierely that it makes for better con- in° °f ^orces> hut that it draws out the Scnuity and resourcefulness of subordi- 2' es. This reliance has long been a hall- Seark °f our Navy and one of its quintes- ntial strengths. Had Admiral Raymond PfUance controlled Commander Clar- irCe McClusky’s search effort with an th n,*lanc*’ would McClusky have found e Japanese fleet at Midway? thg11 SUrnmary, we don’t need to return to old-style officer-in-tactical command tye° COntrc|ls everything himself, nor do - have to put up with the inefficiencies vehicle for implementing it.
Computers in Combat”
Geuu,enant Brian J. O’Keefe, U. S. Coast p[„ I mostly agree with Mr.
and ders's description of current failures layj m'stakes- However, I feel that his tion ® °f hlame is based on a misconcep- Cotn tke computer scientist’s role,
vpjth Puter science is a very large area, jn Socializations as particular as those Mr p.hdds of engineering or medicine. ejvj| anc*ers certainly would not expect a det- ,en8'neer t0 comprehend fully the sim‘ s °f a sonar system, yet he proposes crw ar unrealistic expectations for a >uter scientist.
a computer science student, I was
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rial equations, and the like. As computer scientists, we did not discuss particular applications of these tools to world problems; we discussed the various methods of executing the mathematical problems in digital technology. Mr. Flanders speaks of programming teams, but then seems to forget about them. We should remember that each member of a team has a particular role. The sonar engineer could recommend that the system should implement a fast Fourier transform at a particular point in the application. The computer scientist then should be able to recommend methods to encode the algorithm and make the team aware of the various time, size, accuracy, and speed tradeoffs. In this way, the fighter pilot hopefully will not see “computing . . . please wait . . .” on his display or lose the fight because of a compounding error inherent in the coded implementation of the algorithm.
The programming team is important to the development and life cycle of an automated system; perhaps more so in an impeded system. We should not expect the systems engineer to be able to perform the function of the computer scientist, nor vice versa—both are specialists. A manner for effective communication between the two groups is needed. Programmers are just translators (the word “programmer” is not interchangeable with “computer scientist”) who tell a computer what you said, not what you meant to say. The engineer should contribute the best system design, to be effectuated using the best and most applicable computer algorithms coded using the most suitable languages for that application. The expected benefits are an effective system, which meets the design parameters and performance specs, and which is maintainable and predictable for the life of the system.
in the different departments similar to their surface counterparts. The department head tour on a submarine is also a “specialization tour.” The difference between the submariner and the surface ship officer lies in the level of the engineer’s involvement in the tactical employment of the ship.
On a submarine, the bridge and combat information center (CIC) are located 'n the same space—the control room. The engineer on a fast attack submarine >s typically in a four section officer-of-the- deck (OOD) watch rotation—six hours on, 18 hours off. It is not unusual forju" nior officers to stand OOD under instruction with the engineer. As OOD, the engineer is involved with all facets 0 submarine tactical employment. On a submarine, the real question might be* “Can an ex-operations officer handle a sustained reactor scram while under tn Arctic ice?”
Several items from DeMasi’s articl need to be addressed from a submarine viewpoint. Surface engineers are occu pied in the “hole” while the ops an weps are busy topside with schedulcs' radars, administrative duties, etc., whic train them to be commanding officerS' Since a submarine engineer owns neart; half of the crew, he gets very involve with such shipwide administration aS weekly training board meetings, training lectures, captain’s mast, enlisted evalm* tions, officer fitness reports, pay Pr° lems, and ship correspondence. On sitf face ships the ops and weps get involve
with tactical trainers and memorize
the
“Another Halfway Measure”
(See F. D. DeMasi, pp. 142-144, July 1985;
L. G. Williams, p. 168, October 1985,
Proceedings)
Lieutenant David T. Norris, U. S. Navy, Damage Control Assistant, USS Haddock (SSN-621)—The issue of whether line officers should also be engineers is an old one. Commander DeMasi maintains that the operations and weapons specialists are going to be better prepared to perform as executive officer and commanding officer than will the engineer. While I cannot speak for the surface community, I can provide some insight as to why this is a non-problem for the submarine force.
During a submariner’s division officer tour, junior officers assume responsibility
threat matrix while the engineer is busy with engineering duties. Engineers 0 board operational fast attack submarine also visit the tactical trainers and stu v the threat matrix. And no line officer better trained in Soviet military warship and aircraft recognition than a submarine who relies so much on a sea-level Pe,'_ scope view of the enemy. On my boat ■ transit to the Western Pacific, our eng1 neer regularly scored highest in SoV> recognition quizzes during wardroo training
Even though the issue of eng>
neef
■o'O'
the
overspecialization is not as acute a prl
lem in the submarine force as it is in
been
surface community, steps have taken recently to broaden departm1 head experience. Under this new Pla officers (less overhaul engineers) c split-tour weps/ops, weps/eng, or ops/e for two two-year tours on different bo in the same port. This effort will go far^ ensuring our already good XOs get e better.
(Continued on page
ent
106)
i9«5
Comment and Discussion
be used by the tactician. The requircrn1 for on-board generation of these produ is clearly justified by communicate1’ limitations alone. Besides the obvi°u' requirement for continued model provements to remedy limitations, eu° ‘ in two areas will be needed. First, in a dition to dropping the hardware business' the environmental R&D community m become heavily involved in specify}11® the requirements for the next generat'
only
of Navy standard microprocessors.
the
fleet
needs in environmental support. Secoi because we can’t have a thoroughly
rid>
en-
very
bens'"
task-
“Ship-Based Tactical Weather
Forecasting”
(,See D. W. Jones, pp. 113-115, September
1985 Proceedings)
David A. Isquith, Head, Command and Control Design Arrangements Branch, Naval Sea Systems Command—The trend mentioned by Lieutenant Jones toward increased shipboard employment of desk-top commercial computers is very observable in the Naval Sea Systems Command Weapons and Combat Systems Directorate. For example, plans are well under way for installation of the advanced desk-top tactical-support computer (DTC), in the form of a Hewlett- Packard HP9020A computer with added DTC disc drives, a printer, and a remote color graphics terminal as a sonar in situ mode assessment system in cruisers, destroyers, and frigates. Among other advantages incident to this installation will be the capability to increase antisubmarine warfare (ASW) effectiveness through use of environmental programs of the fleet mission program library. In many of these ships the DTC equipment will replace military specification hardware, including AN/UYK-20X(V) data processing sets.
Similar DTC equipment is expected to be installed in carrier ASW modules to replace obsolescent desk-top computers used for the integrated command ASW prediction system function described by Lieutenant Jones. The 32-bit HP9020A computers are also expected to be used in the tactical information command and control system and in integrated tactical decision aids applications on board ship. In addition, based on current hardware proposals for the tactical environmental support system (TESS), HP9020A computers will be installed as key items of TESS equipment in all ships with manned meteorological facilities.
Lieutenant Commander Keith H. Toep- fer, U. S. Navy—Lieutenant Jones makes a valid point concerning the disparity in speed between military specification (MilSpec) procurement procedures and the rate of technological development in the electronic computing industry. His counsel to the environmental R&D community to abandon the hardware business is also sage. Unfortunately, a number of his other assertions are apparently based on implicit assumptions of questionable validity.
In the introduction, Lieutenant Jones states that a tactical advantage from the environment can be gained when the data are “derived accurately, transmitted expeditiously, and used wisely.” In the latter lies the rub which may not be altogether obvious to the tactician. Wise use of numerically-derived environmental products involves more than a simple application of tactical doctrine to “known” environmental conditions or parameters. Forecasting the weather is as much an art as it is the science of meteorology. A primary reason for Navy forecasters is that numeric models of the environment are not yet able to predict, with sufficient reliability, the specific environmental events which affect the weapons, sensors, and platforms. Whether this will change markedly in the future is a matter of speculation and debate. At a minimum, forecasting requires interaction of a highly trained human with the model. Our present capabilities for interactive forecasting are very limited, although systems currently being procured offer hope for the future.
Lieutenant Jones asserts that IBM compatibility is the “free market standardization” and the “ultimate solution.” It’s not that black and white. Space and funding on many Navy ships are constraints. The less likely that a qualified environmental forecaster is aboard, the more likely that the ship has neither space nor funds for a variety of dedicated microprocessors. The problem then is obtaining a standard processor for all the validated requirements. Multiply this process by the number of ships and the answer is not very “standard” at all. Microprocessor acquisition history, albeit viewed from a very short temporal perspective, seems to indicate that a Navywide, requirement-based acquisition of
fers a cost-effective approach to achie' ing a balance between standardization a an acceptable level of capability an timely procurement. That process did no produce all IBM clones, but it was rela tively quick and did not “wrap itse around the axle” of MilSpec. This com promise, involving a non-MilSpec No ^ standard microprocessor, can avoid least some of the chaos likely to res from each ship (randomly?) purchasing her own computer. ,
Despite the limitations suggesle above, there are useful numerically-11 rived environmental products which ca
- :men‘ ducts
by doing so can we be assured that^ agreed Navy standard will meet
vironmentally-trained person on e ship that needs support, we must ensU that every product developed for nn luted use by a tactical operator pr°duC reliable information, or that its lim1 tions are clearly understood by its us Given the sophistication of the numer>c models and the environmental comp10
ity which we try to make comprel ble, this latter will not be an easy
“Equal Rights, Equal Risks” ,
(See R. M. Hixson, pp. 37-41, September 1 ' Proceedings)
Mr. Robert J. Keevers—Command’^ Hixson’s article raises interesting 9 ^
tions but sets them in a trendy framed . that does little to help find answers- erences to the Equal Rights Amendm and a passing tip of the hat to compaj"a worth economics show that enhgn
that
inaccuracies and opinions, and a tone
ment and progress are being ritually observed at whatever cost. National survival is considered so briefly that this overriding element in the equation is almost lost.
When I entered the Naval Academy in 1946,1 recall an early indoctrination session in which a senior officer reminded us that “the Navy is a ‘democratic institution’ but there is nothing democratic about it.” In those days perfectly fit male applicants were turned down if they were too tall or too short. Their claim to equal rights and opportunities was subordinate to the needs of the service. Now we are asked if women can justly enjoy traditional rights and opportunities without accepting the risks men must accept. But all of this risk taking is individual, not collective—If I am a citizen and never take a risk, are my rights reduced? The artificial premise that current rights must be currently earned is misleading. What must be done is to carry out our missions effectively.
It is almost amusing to read that American society, since the Vietnam War, has undergone a fundamental change, and then read that it may be unjust if women do not assist in defending this new way of life. Perhaps “way of life” needs a better definition—If I take big risks in defending a way of life and then it is fundamentally changed, I could argue that my risktaking occurred under false pretenses and that compensation is due. All of this is nonsense. The Navy’s task is to defend the country. Individual members are also responsible as voters to adjust their way of life, if called for by the citizenry. So far the citizenry has firmly rejected the Equal Rights Amendment.
The Navy is not a proper vehicle for experimenting with social fads. It may achieve multiple national goals, but one goal must predominate. National survival is the name of the game. Adjustments which recognize the individual talents of any citizen should not be ruled out. Rules favoring women are no more justified than special rules for the short or the tall. Some problems will surely be identified in any review of current personnel practices, but the criterion for making changes should be individual contribution to the mission (including individual contribution to group morale).
Since survival is at stake, let’s stay alert and watch our naval and military rivals. Those who would like to bury us are not sentimental and are not particularly fascinated by human rights. As the) exercise hard-headed, results-oriented choices in personnel assignments, it is at least worth asking why they do not consider feminine equality in their decisions.
Master Sergeant Robert A. Fielding• U. S. Air Force (Retired)—If all billets are not combat billets, then males who occupy noncombat billets also have equa rights without equal risks. Rest assured. Commander Hixson, if war comes “Mary Ann” will do her part. She always has.
Lieutenant Lynne Masters, U. S. Navy—' As I read Commander Hixson’s article, became increasingly incensed. I foun could be called, at the very least, depre" eating. It wasn’t until the last three para' graphs that I got the impression he worn consider the use of women in comb duty. No disrespect intended, but his ver
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The year 1984 may have given us the
woman vice-presidential candidate,
Ni
•hat
Slgned
to a unit is a slap in the face to
a* manner cannot possibly endear him to .e military women who have been fu- "lely requesting equal treatment in duty assignments.
at Victoria Woodhull ran as the presi- ential candidate of the National Radical eformers party in 1872, and Margaret base Smith of Maine was nominated at be Republican National Convention to ®ad the same ticket in 1964, although sbe was never given a chance to run.
As for the first woman to be killed in Action being an eventuality, explain that 0 the families of nurses, yeomanettes, and any other women who may have died htle being in a support position during of the wars involving our country, omen serving in combat roles will at east be in a position to protect, defend,
anfi retaliate.
„ Commander Hixson’s statement that some women are suitable for assign- jbent to any combat unit in today’s armed °rces. They are the exceptions, the in- erse 0f males who are not suita- ,e • • •” smacks of the same nonsense . at we were told seven years ago at the avy’s Officer Candidate School in eWport, Rhode Island. We were told
most women would not be able to aapt to a life at sea, just as there were a w men who could not. It is common n°wledge that most sailors become sails after they have been trained and oard a ship for a period of time, not e °rc they set foot on deck. As many en as women are unprepared for sea saty before they are assigned to their first
No self-respecting woman would ever Prolong a fight for the sake of honor, or °w troops to go unsupplied or missup- e led. Women with minimal training who forced to fight, will fight to win. Few °men find combat glamorous, as por- ^aVed in a John Wayne film. If women ai.ned in and assigned to a certain unit mch suddenly finds itself in a combat ne are removed, morale problems will Velop and combat readiness will deease if they arc replaced by men untried bh the unit.
fe Nic bit about the unattainable, ideal male who avoids pregnancy while assery female who did just that while ^^"8 in the military. The majority of d w°nien I knew while I was on active 7 would probably not have wanted to s, Pregnant unless they were stateside on t^lre duty, or just about to rotate there. If , y Were married it was going to be their (^band’s child, not just anybody’s. If ey weren’t married, they were not
about to be rotated out of their career path or unit for this reason unless they badly wanted out of the unit or the military, which would indicate a morale problem.
Fraternization is a double-edged sword. American fighting men have always left progeny in countries where they served. Who’s to say that a woman won’t go outside her unit to fraternize? After all, if she works well with the men in the unit, they are all more likely to look upon one another as brother and sister, rather than a possible roll-in-the-hay. Of course, serving on cruisers and destroyers does not give one the same perspective that can be gained by shore-based and non-combatant personnel.
Commander Hixson has presented a fairly complete essay on a complex problem. The only glaring omission is that the military must look at the impact of women in the Coast Guard and Merchant Marine. Only when women are recognized as equals during peacetime operations can we be successfully accepted for possible future combat operations.
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' P- 32, August 1985 Proceedings)
“W;
inning Nuclear Submarines”
19skF Satterthwaite, pp. 61-67, Febraary W ’ N- R. Thunman, p. 32, April 1985; M. lg„ u8h, N. F. Dingemans, pp. 22-28, May 5; F- M. Nielsen, pp. 16-21, J. A. Pasko,
108 D4’ Iune 1985; S- D Lisse' PP- 106“ U ’ P- R Schratz, p. 108, July 1985; R. F.
arriors”
Byron, pp. 63-68, June 1985; J. G. PPcrs, W. J. Toti, p. 90, August 1985; J. R. larns, p. 166, October 1985 Proceedings)
(°mrnander Rue O’Neill, U. S. Navy Sy{lre^—1° commenting on Captain t,U erthwaite’s discussion of manning cear submarines, Lieutenant Pasko J* that one problem is that “too c0 ” ernPhasis is placed on mission ac- Sa P'.^hment vice crew morale.” In the the 6 ISsue’ Commander Byron discusses
w, nee<J for the warrior leader, and "hies;
. are on a foul course, emphasiz- lng dry land activities instead of main- aming our steady gaze on a nasty out- S|de world that may require us at any iPoment to conduct prompt and sus- a'ned combat operations at sea. SimP y said, we are in danger of losing °Ur edge, of worrying so much about running a good business that we forsake our true craft, of focusing so intently on peacetime issues that we lose our warrior soul.”
I believe the first quotation bears out the second. The “manager-leader” worries about the balance between mission accomplishment and crew morale, while the “warrior-leader” ensures that the two are synonymous.
“The Pacific Basin”
(See August 1985 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Ed Griffith, U. S. Navy, Engineering Department, USS Midway (CV- 41)—It is widely assumed that in the event of a major war with the Soviet Union, the primary mission of our surface warfare forces will be to resupply Europe, with the Pacific Fleet assuming an auxiliary role, at best. 1 suggest the future lies with Asian rather than European countries, and it is dangerous to become preoccupied with Europe alone for the following reasons:
► Since 1983, East Asia has surpassed Europe as the leading market tor American agricultural products and last year accounted for one-third of all American agricultural sales abroad.
- Last year, Asia became America’s top foreign market for both agricultural and manufactured goods, bringing in $140 billion. Europe was a distant second with $110 billion.
- In the past ten years, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore have averaged a phenomenal 9% growth rate, about three times that of both the United States and Europe.
- The two major wars since World War II were both Asian wars.
- Unlike many European nations which seem unable to distinguish between the United States and the Soviet Union, Asian nations are generally more reliable allies.
- The largest Soviet fleet is the one based in the Pacific.
- The only Soviet warm water port, Cam Ranh Bay, opens to the Pacific Ocean.
- The major countries over which the Soviet Union has established control since World War II—Afghanistan, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia—are not European countries.
I am not suggesting that the United States should abandon NATO or consider Europe irrelevant, but by concentrating solely on the resupply of Europe, we run the risk of preparing for the last war.
WERE FIGHTING FOR YOUR LIFE ^
American Heart Association
Pa'N IN THE NECK
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DON’T GIVE THESE SIGNALS A SECOND THOUGHT.
act immediately.
These signals may be the warnings your body gives you of a heart attack. And by ignoring them, you could be risking serious problems. Remember each year 350,000 Americans die from heart attacks before reaching the hospital. Often after much delay ignoring these warning signs.
So learn to recognize the symptoms of a heart attack. And when you see one or feel one, act quickly. As soon as you recognize a signal seek help immediately from a paramedic. Or get to an emergency room the fastest way possible.
You may not have a second to spare.
WARNING SIGNALS OF A HEART ATTACK
- An uncomfortable pressure, fullness, squeezing or pain in the center of your chest behind the breastbone.
- The sensation may spread to your shoulders, neck or arms. If it lasts for two minutes or more, you could be having a heart attack.
3.
Severe pain, dizziness, fainting, sweating, nausea or shortness of breath may also occur, but are not always present.
Comment and Discussion
(Continued from page 113)
MS’*'1"
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and other programs ad infinitum. are also contractors who would ra profit than point out inefficiencies. Tl> are also taxpayers who dearly va'ue. .j. deductions for mortgage interest, dized mass transit, health subsidies research, guaranteed student loans, s°. security., and other so-called “rnid ,rS class” programs. When one conS1t^at these factors together with the fact nondefense discretionary spending vV° need to be virtually eliminated to bala the budget—and that includes such d® as law enforcement and the Coast Guar there should be little wonder that s tension exists. . g
This is not the time for finger P0!”^ however—but for taking responsibi
“Turn on the Lights”
(See R. A. Stratton, pp. 81-86, September 1985 Proceedings)
Captain J. Robert Lunney, Judge Advocate General Corps, U. S. Naval Reserve, Director and Legal Officer, The Chosin Few—Captain Stratton properly commends the Marine Corps for bringing out their dead and wounded during the Chosin Reservoir campaign. However, national attention should also be focused on the 8,177 U. S. personnel still unaccounted for in combat during the Korean War. Indeed, particularly disturbing is the fact that 389 of these MIAs are “presumed alive.”
The Chosin Few is an organization uniting the survivors of the Chosin Reservoir campaign. Since The Chosin Few is the only association of veterans from the “forgotten” Korean War, one of our goals is to locate our MIAs. For months, we have chased rumors of the 389 presumed alive and have unofficial confirmation of their limbo status. Frankly, we’re concerned over the possibility that American prisoners might still be in North Korea, and we feel morally obligated to resolve the matter.
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We have been checking on the 389 with sources in the Pentagon and with the U. S. Mission to the United Nations. Some officials we have contacted wondered when Korean War veterans would finally get around to doing something about their MIAs. Besides our research at home, we have requested permission from the North Korean Government to be allowed to send a team there to search for bodies of MIAs.
By taking on this special mission, survivors hope to commemorate the valor and sacrifice of our missing comrades.
“$436 Hammers and Consistent
Arguments”
(See R. R. Harris, p. 142, July 1985; S. D.
Amote, pp. 98-99, August 1985; D. J. Brindle,
G. M. Attura, pp. 30-34, September 1985;
J. G. Gavin, p. 177, October 1985 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Todd C. Nichols, U. S. Naval Reserve—Having just ended an eight-year stint as a senior congressional staff member, 1 can understand Commander Harris’s chagrin at being a “target of convenience” for the multitudes who are righteously indignant at the prospect of $436 hammers and $7,600 coffee makers. However, I must take exception to some of his remarks and to comments on them in the September 1985 Proceedings.
The fact is that the Department of the Navy and the Department of Defense belong to the executive branch of our federal government. The executive branch is charged with carrying out and enforcing laws enacted by the Congress. The American public knows this, and it knows that government, not major corporations, ought to be the first line of defense in ensuring the efficient use of government funds, which are either collected from them in the first place or, increasingly these days, borrowed.
Commander Harris uses social welfare spending as an analogy to his arguments with regard to critics of defense spending. The key element missing from his contention is that social spending has been reduced drastically, relative to de fense spending, because of substantial*; larger defense budgets over the past years. In an era of $200 billion annua federal deficits and the prospect of add,nF over one trillion dollars to the nationa debt in well under a decade, the traditi°n ally deep public support for a strong aIj adequate defense is rapidly and tragic3* ) eroding.
Traditionally, most politicians recog nize that taxpayers do not object to taxes per se so long as they are evenly appl'e and all pay their fair share. Because cur rent attempts at budget balancing c°nSlS primarily of spending reductions as °P posed to tax increases, any conseque hardships must also meet a fairness stan dard. Hammers costing $436 for the fense Department obviously play have with sober policy making in this regar ' A variety of reports conclude that o readiness posture is no better today t*1^, in 1981, despite drastically increase funding. This also makes national fense spending harder to sell to the Putl |L each new day.
This is not meant to place all resp°nSl^ bility on either the Navy or the Defe*1* Department for the current state of a fairs. There are plenty of congressni who fight for obsolete or ineffec*1 weapons systems, bases, agricu* price supports, freeways, water projec ’
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and a leadership role in restoring the public’s confidence. A few years ago, a lieutenant commander informed me that he thought the General Services Administration (GSA) was charging the Navy and other government agencies far more for office supplies and furniture than civilian department stores, and he supplied me with specific examples. Subsequently, Representative Claudine Schneider (R- RI) introduced legislation which forced the GSA to make reforms estimated to be saving $400 million each year. Certainly, it is inappropriate to run to Congress every time a procurement practice is questioned; but there are many traditional avenues for the military officer to pursue, such as consulting superiors or bringing discussion to the pages of professional journals. No individual can rectify all our nation’s ills, but each of us has an obligation to recognize his responsibility to act whenever possible.
The article, and the reaction to it, reminded me of remarks I constantly heard in my own days as an active duty naval officer. These blamed Admiral Elmo Zumwalt’s policies for every conceivable lapse of discipline, usually as an excuse for local failures to enforce regulations. It was not Admiral Zumwalt’s fault whenever a sailor wore a sloppy uniform or failed to salute, no matter what one’s personal feelings may have been about the CNO’s policies. Similarly, one cannot expect criticism (but little else) to rectify serious, current problems.
As critical as the federal budget situation is today and as crucial as public support for national defense must always be, the time has arrived to stop assigning responsibility and to start taking it. As President Ronald Reagan said, “If not us, who? And if not now, when?”
“The Way West: Guam”
(See B. Blaz and J. C. Scharfen, pp. 62-65,
August 1985 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Mary T. Hall, Judge Advocate General Corps, U. S. Navy—General Blaz and Colonel Scharfen present an excellent case for concentrating Pacific resources on Guam. Their theory is hardly a novel one, however. Alfred Thayer Mahan was a zealous advocate of developing Guam as the only necessary first class station in the Pacific. In a letter dated 1910, Mahan declared that the United States possessed nothing else equal to Guam’s potential for protecting every American interest in the Pacific. Mahan envisioned Guam as an “American Gibraltar,” which, like Gibraltar, would require adequate fortification and manning. Unfortunately, isola
tionist attitudes denied Guam this development. In 1922 the United States and Japan at the Washington Naval Conference agreed to forego building up their respective holdings in the Central Pacific- Instead, in the years preceding World War II the United States focused on improving Pearl Harbor.
Mahan’s advocacy of Guam also figured heavily in his comments on the Naval War College’s Strategic War Phm of 1911, which (like many others in those years) pitted Japan against the United States in a hypothetical war in the Pa" cific. Mahan wrote that if he were a planner for the Japanese Navy, his first move upon the outbreak of hostilities would be to seize Guam, and then immediately f°r' tify it to prevent its recapture. The events of December 1941 show that the Japanese gave greater heed to Mahan’s direction than did the United States.
One can only speculate on how an American Gibraltar in the Central Pacific would have deterred Japanese aggression leading into World War II, just as one can only speculate on how effective the preS ence of such a “sentinel” would be today in deterring present and future aggression in the area. Such speculation is an imp°r tant exercise in determining whether we can afford to ignore Mahan a secon time.
“FCDSSA: Fleet Support That Gets with the Program”
(See J. T. Hine, pp. 123-126, September Proceedings)
Captain John D. Shea, Jr., U. S- NO . (Retired)—I enjoyed Lieutenant Con\ mander Hine’s article. Having been a Pa of the early days of the Navy tactical da system (NTDS), I found Command^ Hine’s article complete, and for the m°s part, accurate. .
I must, however, take exception to n statement of the purpose for which NTU was developed. The system was de^e oped to meet the needs of combat im° mation centers throughout the fleet provide them with effective antiair wa fare capability—not just for the weapon direction function on the Terrier missj^ ships. The gunners came to the d*S‘ j age kicking and screaming. They wante^ nothing to do with NTDS. Except few far-seeing individuals, especia Admiral Arleigh Burke, NTDS cod have gone down the drain because of opposition. But the system did survi and the gunners have optimized its use the Ticonderoga (CG-47)-class gu‘ . ^ missile cruisers and the new Burke (DDG-51)-class guided-misS destroyers.
formation is reconfigured to put its surface capability, in Arleigh Bulk? ^ Gridley, along the primary threat a*18'^ 0258, the airship detects a force 0e MiG-21 aircraft lifting off from thed ^ to begin a wide circle, approaching^ battle group from the north. A f sj1jp, stream of position data from the at • provides over-the-horizon targeting^, formation to the ships. The Libyan
l9&
“Standby for Weigh-Off”
(See F. Montarelli, pp. 111-113, September
1985 Proceedings)
Commander John E. Jackson, U. S. Navy—While I applaud Mr. Montarelli’s efforts to sing the praises of lighter-than- air (LTA) craft, I feel he may be doing the cause a disservice by promising too much. He begins his piece by describing an airship belonging more in a Jules Veme novel than a professional journal. The mere notion of a ten-million cubic foot airship, airborne for 90 days at a time, and powered by a nuclear reactor, is enough to stop someone from reading any further. The likelihood of such a craft being built is extremely small, and it certainly won’t occur by Christmas 1992! Nuclear power for this craft may be technically feasible, but the public reaction to a “flying Three Mile Island” would surely be strong enough to prevent it from being built or flown!
His statement that “airships capable of making 150 knots are feasible” supports the contention that he is describing a set of unattainable capabilities. The power required to move an airship of such size at 150 knots would be enormous, and the heavy fuel consumption would negate one of the airships’ primary advantages: endurance.
There is promise in the use of modern LTAs, but extreme care must be taken to separate fact from fiction. Informed discussion on the near-term possibilities of LTA craft which could be built within the confines of existing technological, budgetary, and political constraints is necessary to convince skeptical defense decision makers and potential operators of LTAs’ worth.
One of the basic requirements of warfare is the need for intelligence about the enemy’s movements. Electronic systems now provide early warning and carrier battle groups depend heavily on airborne radar in aircraft such as the E-2C Hawk- eye and its “big brother,” the Air Force’s E-3A Sentry AWACS, to detect the enemy, to track his movements, and to direct other assets against the enemy weapons and launching platforms.
These aircraft can provide the surface group commander with invaluable realtime data on the threat within a given tactical area, but they are limited in range and endurance. The surface action group operating without carrier air support and outside the range of Air Force AWACS coverage is severely hampered by limitations inherent in shipboard sensors. The challenge is to provide the battle group commander with an organic surveillance capability in his area of direct concern, for days or weeks at a time. The naval
airship may be the answer.
In mid-February 1985, the Naval Air Development Center (NADC) in Warminster, Pennsylvania, issued a Request for Proposals (RFP) for concept formulation studies to develop a modem naval airship. On 31 May 1985, six-month study contracts were awarded to several major defense contractors to develop preliminary designs for both an airframe and a new large-array airborne radar.
NADC preliminary analysis indicates that the airship is the only known airborne platform able to provide noncarrier supported units with a long endurance capability of: “Detection, classification, identification, and tracking of airborne targets, particularly those of low radar cross-section, flying at low altitude and high speed in a sea-clutter environment.” The Falklands Conflict examples cited by Mr. Montarelli show the obvious need for such a capability.
The RFP identified a second primary function of the airship: to improve communications between all battle group elements and ensure that information on the tactical situation is freely exchanged between units. With the airship as a relay platform, secure line-of-sight communication methods could be used, minimizing the risk of enemy interception of tactical signals; and greater dispersion between units can be maintained to minimize the dangers of tighter formations. Secondary roles of the naval airship established in the RFP were to: assist in detecting and tracking antisubmarine warfare (ASW) contacts by monitoring sensors; provide search and rescue and plane-guard services; provide electronic warfare support including active jamming; provide threat warning and attack assessment of enemy weapons.
In the RFP, contractors and vendors were asked to present detailed designs and operational scenarios for several different timeframes. While NADC did not provide vendors with a specific scenario, the following events are typical of a realistic naval airship mission in the 1996 timeframe:
The battleship battle group, composed of the Iowa (BB-61), Gridley (CG-21), Arleigh Burke (DDG-51), John Hancock (DD-981), Samuel Eliot Morrison (FFG- 13), Stark (FFG-31), and the Detroit (AOE-4), had sailed from its new base in Staten Island 12 days earlier. The battle group’s mission is to patrol the Mediterranean to intercept and turn back Libyan ships which have been transporting guns and supplies to Tunisia, the scene of a bloody but unsuccessful coup attempt. As it did in 1981, Libya claims the Gulf of Sidra to be Libyan territory and threatens to attack any “hostile forces” that enter the disputed area. The aircraft carrier John F. Kennedy (CV-67) is steaming at full speed from Norfolk to relieve the America (CV-66), drydocked in NapR* to recover from a crippling hangar dec fire. This accident left the Iowa-groUP with no air cover—except for its nava airship escort.
The 350-foot-long airship has slowy circled over the center of the battle group at 10,000 feet without incident since leaving her Lakehurst, New Jersey, base- Airships less than one-fourth this si# deployed to the Mediterranean from La Coast bases during World War II- 3 two million cubic feet of helium in 1 airship’s envelope provides nearly 3 tons of lift, enough to support a crew 25 and a great deal of C3I equipment- m flight refueling of the airship from 1 Iowa, reminiscent of similar underw^/ replenishments between Navy ships a airships during the 1950s, had occult^ every three days during the trans-Atlan 1 voyage. .
In the airborne combat informal0 center (ACIC), operations special*8.^ man consoles similar to those f°un“he the E-2C Hawkeye. But because of 1 ^ greater space available aboard the 3 ship, the equipment is larger and m° capable, and the operating environment^ more comfortable. The low levels of bration, G-forces, and noise in the airs > flight reduce crew fatigue. Stress on equipment is far less than the usual abu from repeated catapult launchings arrested landings. Constant commun1^ tions are maintained with all ships m battle group via low-frequency data lm
As the battle group enters the Gul Sidra, Condition One (modified) ba stations are manned on board each 8 and the airship. Earlier that day, 1 j had been reports of “saber-rattling^ threats of a “sudden and violent ^ sponse to any intrusion into the terfl $ of the Socialist People’s Libyan A Jamahiriya.
At 0245, console operators on ^ ^ ship detect a formation of four So built “Nanuchka II”-class guided111,3 ,, corvettes, moving at 30 knots away 1 the coast. Alerted to the threat, the a ^ group goes to general quarters, an
J^ment decides to “teach the imperial- Sts a lesson.”
0315, the airship detects the launch j,'V° ^S-N-2c “Styx” missiles from ‘‘Nanuchka II” and two air-to-air tr^les from each of the MiGs. Weapon ^ ■ . analysis indicates that all incoming ban'*es are tar8ctecl f°r ships within the i^. Ie group, except for four heat-seeking s'les moving toward the airship. The sil Vette"launched surface-to-surface mis- as skini above the sea at wavetop level, are almost lost in the sea clutter on radar screens of the battle group. ^ appear clearly, however, on the air- P s large-array radar consoles, and targeting info is passed to the I ire-control systems of the ships. The weapon hatches on the Arleigh Burke's vertical launch system open, and 12 standard SM-2s ignite to engage the incoming weapons.
At other consoles in the airship’s ACIC, sonarmen monitor a field of sono- buoys sown by the airship the previous afternoon. Soon after the first hostile act by the Libyan boats, the distinctive signature of a “Foxtrot” (SS)-class attack submarine was detected in the vicinity of the battle group. Alerted by the airship, John Hancock immediately maneuvers to cover the contact, forcing the submarine to begin evasive maneuvers. With the aid of the Samuel Eliot Morison and Stark, aggressive antisubmarine tactics keep the submarine from attacking the Iowa or other battle group units.
Within minutes of their launch, the bulk of the incoming missiles are intercepted by the defensive missile barrage launched by the Arleigh Burke, and the Phalanx close-in weapons system takes care of the “leakers.” The Iowa and Gridley launch eight Tomahawk missiles to engage the corvettes which are making a high speed run for the coast. The Iowa also launches four surface-to-air missiles in defense of the airship. In a classic “hand-off” maneuver, the airship assumes control of the missiles in flight, and directs them to intercept three of the incoming missiles. In a unique defensive measure, the airship temporarily stops all of its engines, thus greatly reducing its infrared signature. Because of its buoyancy, it remains on station and functioning without using its engines. The airship’s on-board point defense system then engages and destroys the final missile. Recognizing that the attack has failed, the MiGs return to base without firing additional weapons. The four retreating corvettes are hit by Tomahawks and severely damaged or sunk. The order to secure from general quarters is given throughout the battle group.
The battle group successfully defended itself against a multi-threat attack. The naval airship defended itself and provided vital support to the group’s defense. It gave early warning of the enemy’s approach, relayed OTH targeting information when the battle began, provided ASW support by monitoring a large son- obuoy field in the operating area, contributed to inter-unit communications during the attack, and provided after-action damage assessments.
The airship’s key attributes of range, endurance, and payload are clearly obtainable in the near-term, without technological breakthroughs. The current research efforts solicited by the NADC contracts should provide detailed plans and designs for the employment of a battle surveillance airship and demonstrate the potential of a vital “eye in the sky” for battle group commanders. Montarel- li’s professional note does a good job of teasing the imagination, but at this point it is overly optimistic to advocate airships as flying battleships or airborne aircraft carriers. They can be highly capable surveillance platforms with unique capabilities—and unique vulnerabilities. An open mind on the part of all naval officers to objectively consider the possibilities of modem LTA craft will determine if they are a good return on the investment.
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force by the United States in a brother”-type application of power prefer to keep the elected officials of out country as the legislators and enforcers o our Constitution and laws, which in eludes control of the military instruments necessary to preserve, protect, and d fend them.
Vim °re
etnam battle, rather than a hero, are
ndt'
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little further to the Korean War. Veter ^ of Korea have no national monument there were more battles fought there Inchon. A ship named The Chosin,10 ^ sometimes in company with the Le"lS . Puller (FFG-23), is another place to st '
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“Nicaragua”
(See J. F. Morton, pp. 49-55, June 1985; G. Russell Evans, pp. 16-19, July 1985; R. J. Higgins, pp. 25-29, October 1985, Proceedings)
Commander James J. Franconeri, U. S. Navy—Captain Evans criticizes Presidents Kennedy and Carter for not using the Monroe Doctrine in Cuba and Panama. This criticism is unjust. Even President Monroe probably would agree that the doctrine did not apply to the Bay of Pigs in 1961, nor to the transfer of the Panama Canal to the Republic of Panama in 1978.
The purpose of the Monroe Doctrine was to oppose outside interference in the Americas. The Cuban revolution which led to Fidel Castro’s rise to power was seen in this country as an internal struggle. The Castro regime was recognized by the United States as having both de facto and de jure legitimacy. Castro’s subsequent proclamation of Marxism surprised many in the Eisenhower administration. Historians will argue about the actions taken by President Kennedy regarding the poorly-planned Bay of Pigs fiasco, but to charge that he should have used the Monroe Doctrine as a shield against outside aggression in Cuba is very unjust.
It is surprising that Captain Evans did not cite the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis as an example where President Kennedy successfully applied the Monroe Doctrine. This was a clear attempt by the Soviet Union to endanger the peace and security of the United States by the introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba. President Kennedy knew his history and used this knowledge wisely in the crisis. A classic example of more than 20 years of indifference and lack of resolve by subsequent administrations led to the extensive Soviet grip on Cuba today.
Captain Evans also criticizes the Panama Canal transfer. The Torrijos administration was certainly nationalistic, but to say that it was “communist-leaning” is going too far. The United States recognized the Government of Panama as the legitimate government of the country. The canal transfer was based on a treaty negotiated by both countries and ratified by the U. S. Senate. Clearly the Monroe Doctrine did not apply to this inter-American matter.
As a comparison, the Brezhnev Doctrine has been used by the Soviet Union to keep its own satellites in line, notably against Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Poland in the 1980s. This doctrine is similar to the Monroe Doctrine because it decrees that the Soviet Union will take any action necessary to preserve fraternal socialism within its sphere of influence to protect the integrity and security of the Soviet homeland and the revolution. The use of military force to subdue a nation, such as Czechoslovakia, with the excuse of preserving socialism is wrong. 1 d°uD that Captain Evans supports the actions taken against the Czechs and the P<+s yet he seems to encourage the use ° “What’s in a Name?”
(See S. A. Swarztrauber, p. 110, April 1985.
W. C. King, p. 16, June 1985; P. A. Young, p. 23, July 1985; R. Strout, pp. 90-92, AugU 1985 Proceedings)
Commander Richard H. Purnell, UNaval Reserve—Perhaps the rather m3 cabre Vietnam Memorials in Washing1^, and New York are fitting reminders war’s personal price, and therefore tn J reflect the depth of this nation’s 8ener?s analysis of that war. These monumen do not commemorate the mild"/ achievements which occurred on the 0 tlefields of our latest and strangest lafge scale military conflict, as Adnur Swarztrauber so rightly points out.
The politics of naming a ship for 3
complex than Admiral Swarztrauber i cates. For example, the amphibious sault ship, LHA-5, authorized in year 1971 and laid down in Novem 1976, was originally named Da ^anr, LHA-5 was renamed on 15 Febru3^ 1978, according to Jane's Fighting and was subsequently commissioned Peleliu on 21 June 1980. Politics of ^ moment, it seems, interceded to kcCP, Vietnam battle from being comme”1^ rated in the name of a ship-of-the-11
As suggested, military and veterans df ganizations would do well to urge nam1^ ships after some of our accomplishm in Vietnam. I might opt for the firstt0|e- named The Tet since that was the sing ^ most decisive campaign of the long c .( flict. If that effort is successful, perhap’ g would be appropriate to look back Ju ^
,d
than
j9»5
the
opinions of current leaders and a re-
if
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JCS Reorganization”
T. R. Fedyszyn, pp. 80-87, July 1985;
"■ G. Hanne, pp. 88-96, July 1985;
, • Previdi, p. 16, August 1985; W. H. Rice, p. October 1985 Proceedings)
JCS Reorganization: Part II”
iq? Tangredi’ PP- 87-93, September 85; J. x Hayward, pp. 93-100, September ^85, Proceedings)
^aPtain Roger C. Burk, U. S. Air Force— have always enjoyed the Proceedings cause of its breadth of view, fairness, Jad willingness to air all sides of contro- ^ersial issues. The recent sections on JCS Organization, however, have not met pur usual standards. In the July issue, astead of finding articles for and against rengthening the JCS, I read a defense of a current system, an argument for abol- ^aing (he JCS, and a speech by a World ar II hero on how well the JCS system ^°rked >n 1956. The September issue as little better—it gave a summary of
fo^al reformers’ arguments in the ha of a book review.
Commander Fedyszyn’s article was i. r^aPs the worst offender. He attributes Unrelated, spasmodic attacks on the Ufrent JCS system” to “disparate ar°uPs” and “self-proclaimed defense na'ysts,” but criticism has been consist- o and continuous and has come from t,e highest military levels. He says that Iq current system was “chosen” in c but in fact it was arrived at as a ^promise after bitter and prolonged toting among the services. He credits ,,e JCS with 40 years of success and .negligible loss of friendly territory,” q^ufng Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, p. ha, Nicaragifa, Angola, Libya, Ethio- , > and many others. Nuclear war has C()en avoided and the U. S. has not been »nnUered, hut our military power has, riQ1 recently, been so overwhelming that (L. ®reat genius was needed to guarantee fes s(atus. In fact, there has not been a l^at °f unquestioned military genius since ^Arthur landed at Inchon in 1950, and «*Jhat was accomplished in spite of— pe, because of—the JCS. Commander s» t/,SzJ'n claims that “scope and diver- Ilg require more efficient integration. ijnsuPports the current system with the Provable claim that it is “the perfect ter >> ^or lhe American national character u3nd sumrnons Jhe shades of Alexan- tef ^aiT|ilton and Thomas Jefferson to chehd it. He raises the specter of “un- hon Cd Power’ ’ as though anyone quests ?d civilian control of the military, or
lie sta^ were a danger to the repub' “e elevates a shortcoming of naval
forces (their isolation from higher command) to a virtue, and argues that the JCS should promote that virtue by being weak. He concludes his argument by describing the current JCS as “a system designed to protect service loyalty, autonomy, and competition”—of which he seems to approve, though it sounds to me like a condemnation. The JCS should be a system designed to defend the nation.
Lieutenant Tangredi’s report was the most valuable article. His message was that the service chiefs and the civilian secretaries are reasonably satisfied with the current system and are working to improve deficiencies. This is good news, but other parts were not so reassuring. The oft-repeated remark that good people and good personal relationships are more important than good organization is true, but beside the point. If the people are good, even the most awkward organization can be made to work. We need an organization that will work even with untalented people, or when the system is under unusual stress, as in wartime. The most alarming thing in the article was the report from the commanders-in-chief (CinCs) of the unified commands. They complained that they did not have enough influence in defense planning, and that they did not have proper authority over assigned forces—in short, that they have unsatisfactory relationships with both superiors and subordinates. These CinCs have the immediate responsibility for planning and conducting war. I would feel much better if it were the service chiefs and secretaries who were dissatisfied, instead of the CinCs.
The September articles both touched on the anomalous position of the CinCs, who have major responsibility for military readiness but almost no budget authority—an underlying problem in our present national command system. The armed services retain their traditional administrative powers, but they are no longer responsible for waging war. Their role is only to organize, train, and equip forces, and make them available to the CinCs, who actually fight. The CinCs and the officers on their staffs identify with their parent services, not with the joint organization to which they belong. These commanders report ‘ ‘through but not “to” the JCS, whose staff is another group of officers with only passing attachment to their current jobs. The President has no dedicated, efficient military staff to deal with Department of Defense problems. The unified commands lack the influence that they should have. The services, with well-established organizations, personal loyalty, and major budget authority, have power out of proportion to their responsibilities.
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Commander Valley’s article was
winter when he says U. S. allies “that Moscow might be tempted . launch a preemptive attack because it a U. S. missile defense was a likely P Iude to a U. S. strike.” The Soviet UjN is run by conservatives who are not a ^ to launch a preemptive nuclear attats against the United States prior to achieving a strategic defense eapab1t since the Soviet leadership realizeS ^ such an attack would likely mean the
of human life on earth. .
Obviously, we should give top P° ,£. to the development of an effective fense against nuclear weapons. A ^ same time, we should negotiate a jr with the Soviets calling for a slSn^lC verifiable reduction in nuclear we r ^ arsenals. If this is attainable, agree!^jt, could be reached by both sides on 1 y ing the deployment of directed eIlt weapons in space.
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“To Seize the Moment”
(See J. D. Watkins, pp. 13-16, February 1985; D. P. Domning, p. 36, May 1985; E. J. Higgins, p. 16, June 1985; B. Valley, pp. 9293, August 1985 Proceedings)
“The Ultimate Defense”
(See B. L. Valley, pp. 30-37, February 1985;
D. P. Domning, p. 36, May 1985; E. J.
Higgins, p. 16, June 1985; B. Valley, pp. 9293, August 1985 Proceedings)
Captain J. E. Lacouture, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Admiral Watkins makes a persuasive case for supporting President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative. However, nuclear winter, supposedly an effective deterrent to rational nations against launching major nuclear attacks, was never mentioned.
Nor did he come out forcefully enough in portraying Soviet all-out efforts to attain a strategic defense capability and military control of space before the United States can develop weapons to gain supremacy in these fields. The Soviets have been working longer and harder for years to attain these capabilities. Soviet military space doctrine calls for attaining and maintaining military superiority in space. Further, no mention was made of other space-based directed energy weapon capabilities or the ability to destroy our airplanes, our satellites, and ultimately our ships at sea and vital targets on land from space.
Admiral Watkins’ argument that the Strategic Defense Initiative would give us at least a 100% defense against nations possessing small nuclear arsenals with irrational men like Libyan leader Mu’am- mar Qaddafi or Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini at their head is a good one. It should receive more emphasis.
It is arguable whether our pursuit of strategic defense initiatives will cause the Soviets to start a massive nuclear weapons buildup to saturate any system we may develop. I believe they will try in every way possible to slow down our efforts to achieve a strategic and tactical defense against nuclear missiles and at the same time will redouble their already massive efforts to develop a strategic defense capability before we do. If they do develop this capability first and simultaneously achieve a capability to attack targets such as aircraft, ships, and ground targets from space, they will soon dominate the world.
Finally, Admiral Watkins advocates, as do we all, a significant cutback in nuclear weapons yet does not mention what will take their place to deter the Soviets from mounting a massive conventional offensive on the Central Front. It is
NATO that is relying on nuclear weapons to stop such an attack. The Soviets do not need to use nuclear weapons to attac successfully Western Europe, consider' ing present relative conventional troop and weapons strengths. Probably we should be pushing our NATO allies to provide an additional amount of funding’ equivalent to the amount we are spending to achieve a strategic nuclear defense, to build up their conventional forces t0 achieve a conventional deterrent postufe vis-a-vis the Soviets.
strongly supportive of President Reagan s Strategic Defense Initiative. He, m0^ than Admiral Watkins, raises the specter of the Soviets achieving this capable first. Discussing Soviet military policy ,n space, Commander Valley cites a De fense Intelligence Agency report SoV>e Military Space Doctrine describing viet doctrinal objectives “to attain an maintain military superiority in °ut . space sufficient both to deny the use 0 outer space to other states and to assu maximum space based support for Sovi ^ offensive and defensive operations land, at sea, in air and other °ute space.” The intelligence agency rep° also states, according to Commander V ley’s article, that the Soviet Union has dynamic expanding and prodigious nu^ tary space program.” Indeed, accounts ^ Soviet intent and capabilities in spaC^ should be promulgated to the Amerkj^ people. At the same time, they should made aware of the urgency that we P,a high-energy weapons systems in SP before the Soviets develop the milit ^ strength to check our ability to make su space-based deployments. s
Commander Valley, however, ign^ . as well the accepted theory of nuc e
IMnfar iiiUam Un nnon TT C oil J0S
nted
,rity
tack, the first country to use weapons of destruction would be in
at- these vitinS
“Understanding the Soviet Union”
(See B. D. Bruins, pp. 66-71, September 1984, C. Townsley, pp. 103-106, November 1984 Proceedings)
Karl Lott Rankin—Dr. Bruins is to be commended for his thoughtful essay on the Soviet Union. Only by understanding our potential antagonists can we keep the peace or win in the event of conflict.
With the same problem in mind, I offer my views on this subject.
The Soviet Union is the only major colonial power in the world today. Britain, France, and others abandoned that role in great part after World War II, while the Soviet Union kept most of the Russian territory carved out over the centuries by the czars and added to it at the expense of neighbors. The result is a colonial empire of many races and languages, largely segregated geographically but contiguous politically. All minorities are dominated by the Great Russians, who make up half of the empire’s more than a quarter billion people.
In the chaotic period following Russia’s defeat by Germany in World War I, sealed by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918, several parts of the empire declared independence and set up their own governments. Most of these revolts were put down as soon as the Red Russian armies could be reorganized, an accomplishment credited largely to Trotsky. Poland and the three Baltic states Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia survived until World War II. Thereafter, Poland remained nominally independent, less some Polish territory annexed by and a communist government imposed and dominated by the Soviet Union. Poland, thus, became the most important of the buffer states on the empire’s borders, with Afghanistan the most recent. As was true of czarist Russia and as is true of the Soviet Union today, the Russian bear is both hated and feared by all its neighbors, including its buffer states.
West and east, two peoples offer potential danger to the Soviet Union, the Germans and the Chinese. After suffering two devastating German invasions in the present century, undertaken largely to gain greater lebensraum, “living space,” and to unite all European Germans and historically German territory into one reich, the Soviet Union annexed peripheral German areas to the east in 1945 and set up a buffer communist-run state in what remained of eastern Germany. As a result, over 90 million Germans are concentrated in three countries with a living space only slightly larger than California.
The Great Wall of China has stood for
centuries as a symbol of danger from the north. It did not prevent Communism from crossing into China and winning an extraordinary convert in Mao Tse-tung. Acting heroically at first and later madly, Mao inflicted greater suffering on his country than any foreign invader in history. Since his death, a more pragmatic leadership has been pulling China out of its morass. On the other hand, the Republic of China on Taiwan has shown what the Chinese people can do politically and economically with democratic rule and free enterprise. Will mainland China be the first important country to have embraced communism and, seeing its error, to take actions amounting to repudiation? Not long before his death, Lenin’s implementation of his New Economic Policy may have been a step in that direction, but it was not pursued under Stalin’s leadership.
Large-scale economic development in Siberia has brought into' this northeastern territory an influx of Great Russians and Ukranians, making the indigenous Soviet Tartar population bordering China more of a minority. Outer Mongolia, claimed by China, became another Soviet buffer state. It is generally quiet along the Chinese border to the east, but the Soviet Union maintains large military forces in that area, just in case. Unable to do anything about it at present, an overpopulated China looks with envy at the still thinly-peopled neighboring lands of Siberia rich in resources, a territory the People’s Republic of China regards as historically Chinese.
Ostensibly to export the benefits of Socialism, the Soviet Union brought down constitutional and free governments and was instrumental in propping up communist dictatorships in the capitals of its immediate European neighbors south of the Baltic. It has also extended its missionary efforts to China, southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
In exporting its ideology beyond its neighbors, the Soviet Union appears to have changed its basic position from defensive to offensive. Probably the intention remains primarily diversionary. If the United States and its European allies can be sufficiently distracted by troubles in the Near East, Central America, and Africa, as was done so effectively in Vietnam, the Soviet Union will be freer to operate in areas considered of more immediate importance. Success in exploiting such diversions can, of course, lead to more ambitious steps, as was the case in the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Meanwhile, over the past 65 years the Soviet Union has given a clearer meaning to what Communism really is. It is Socialism, imposed and operated by a relatively small and self-perpetuating group' with no organized opposition allowed to exist. Without the checks and balances o democratic government, Socialism becomes the opiate of the people and the tool of dictators. Hence, communist rule, in practice, is much like the feudalism 0 the Middle Ages, when power and wealt were concentrated in the hands of the crown and the nobles—only the decep tive term “social ownership” had not ye been invented.
Russia was emerging from such a con dition when World War I broke out an the Communist Revolution of 191? erUP ted, cancelling out the gratifying progress already recorded. The czar was replace by a communist dictator, more powertu and more ruthless. Not surprisingly- ® pattern of Communism established by to Soviet Union appeals to dictators an would-be dictators elsewhere. ,
The Soviet Union has the largest lan area and the longest borders of any ein pire in history, with a population ceeded only by that of China and In®a‘ With half its people as restive minoritie and all of its neighboring population
hostile, the Soviet Union finds i_tse compelled to maintain a huge mil'taf^ establishment and an internal p°’lC force, simply to preserve the status Qu°_
The proliferation of nuclear weapon evidently adds a new dimension the b viet Union’s situation. With no reason® bly adequate defense against nuclear
---------------- VI HUH. Utuuu wuum ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- . e
unacceptable damage to itself- . United States was the first to use aton® bombs, but it acted from a m°n°P°.(j position in a war started by others and so to shorten the conflict and save th° sands of American lives. This s’tuat*ve cannot be repeated. The present re*at't0 stalemate should serve as a deterrent rash action by all concerned and Pr°v^e opportunity for mutual agreements in interest of peace. Such steps might pul end to Soviet dreams for world ^°nl'anj tion, show that colonial empires buffer states are out of date, and ^ friends and partners are better than mies and vassals.
The Russians are a great people remarkable abilities and many admit® qualities. They have had little eXPerl^,j[h with democracy, with freedom, °r .fl. human rights. Rather, they have c0!'[g(l. ued to endure government by an y handed, self-perpetuating minority- ^ have also endured inhuman policies 1' sued by much of their leadership.
Ivan the Terrible to Stalin and bey° But Russia could still redeem itself-
19*5
^struck by the frightening realization 'he audience evidently did not under-
stand 1 he;
refl,
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FOR THE DISCRIMINA TING DRESSER
and vehemently oppose the folly of negotiating our national defense policies with an increasingly powerful, and undefeated, enemy. This tragic, perhaps fatal, failure is demonstrated in another way— by a solitary event whose profound implications are not yet noticed, much less understood, by most of our military professionals and leaders.
I refer to President Reagan’s call on 23 March 1983 for the development of defensive systems to protect our nation. President Reagan’s speech represents a call for a return to the rational, historically-validated idea which demands that our planners, when evaluating threats to the nation, examine both intent and capability of a potential adversary and take whatever steps necessary to thwart and defeat his most powerful and dangerous weapons. The President’s short speech was more competent militarily than all of what has been given to the nation by the “experts”—primarily civilian political appointees to whose ideas the military has acquiesced, in the manner of abused dogs, over the course of the past 30 years.
•ion
°dds with his means of dismissing the yth that diesel submarines operating on attery are quieter than modem nuclear ’^marines. According to Admiral Thun- an “the fact is that at comparable the Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class ^clear submarine is essentially as quiet s a diesel submarine operating on her attery.” Unless the admiral has taken xheme liberties with the word “essen- to “y>” the Los Angeles-class submarine, ^ achieve this quiet, must also operate on attery power. Nuclear submarines are v°t constructed to operate, except for a (ery short period, under battery condi- 0ns- Given a radiated noise acoustic e°mParison of less than a 12-24 hour Sagement period, the nuclear subma- tene is no match acoustically for a bat- ry-powered diesel submarine.
piesel Submarines for the U. S.
Navy?”
(See N. R. Thunman, pp. 136-137, August Proceedings)
Robert Myers, Engineer, Epoch Engi- peering, Inc.—While I agree with Admi- jT Thunman’s “No” answer to the ques- raised in his article’s title, I am at
Strategic Defense, Strategic Modernization, and Arms Control”
E’ee Panel Discussion, pp. 131-144; W. F. lernann, p. 152, September 1985 Proceedings)
k Olson—After reading Paul I Ze s opening comments to the Naval s[itute’s Annual Meeting, I was lacked by his open admission, his pub- ta ^Hfession, that every single impor- In?1 .'anris control” agreement (SALT I, j erim Agreement, ABM Treaty, SALT an ne®ot'ated with the Soviets has been abject failure in terms of its promises, sj^tations, and goals. And indeed, re Ple “bean counting” of past and cur- 1, h 'eve's deliverable nuclear war- the S ^etween us and the Soviets verifies ‘nuh of his admission. In fact, results ^hese various negotiations have mostly len exact opposites to stated goals— naf 'n® t0 speculation as to whether our t0(jl0n would be more secure militarily ay without these “agreements.” ased on the banality of the published
estions put to Mr. Nitze, I was thun- ts* that
what it had just heard. The failure ar and understand is indicative and f%eCt*ve of an ongoing, larger failure by the U,1'h°rmed military professionals (all B fWay back to the era of Secretary of ense Neil H. McElroy), to recognize
“Terrorism”
(See D. S. Derrer, pp. 190-203, May 1985;
G. J. Douglas, p. 90, August 1985; H. M. Holland, p. 16, October 1985 Proceedings)
Captain William F. Gadberry, Jr., U. S. Air Force Reserve—The United States is a major target of world terrorist activity. The terrorists have chosen us because our open society is so accessible and because we are a world power. We must take action to make it harder for the terrorists to gather the information they want to carry out their activities.
The following are suggestions which can be implemented now in all overseas locations to make the intelligence gathering process more difficult for terrorists.
- Eliminate special markings from privately owned vehicles
- Eliminate reserved parking spots at clubs, exchanges, commissaries, etc.
- Provide locally procured vehicles as loaners to “target” personnel for off- base travel
- Remove name and rank signs from quarters
Sure, the captains, colonels, and up have earned the respect we afford them, but a little inconvenience may just save their lives. These are simple ideas which, if used, could make things just a little tougher on the guy trying to find out “Who’s Who” on a military installation. Terrorism won’t go away, but perhaps we can close our society just a fraction and make the bad guys’ job a little tougher.
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