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The surface force needs to open its eyes *° the importance of combining long-range Precision-guided weapons with improved area surveillance. If the Tomahawk-firing New Jersey were to use this remotely Piloted vehicle, she would have a view of the surrounding seas from an altitude °f 50,000-60,000 feet for up to 24 hours.
The tendency toward political fragmentation in world affairs will most likely continue as this violent century draws to a close. This tendency alone w‘h require greater presence and improved projection capabilities for the U. S. Navy. At the same time, the Soviet a Union seems to be entering a new phase of its naval devel
opment, deploying “Backfires,” “Oscars,” “Alfas,” Typhoons,” Kirovs, and, soon, conventional takeoff and anding aircraft carriers as well.
In response to the Soviet threat, the U. S. Navy must a°t only improve its projection and presence capabilities, °ut also its ability to fight successfully for control of the Sea on a scale unprecedented in both geographic extent atl(I potency of threat. A new course must be charted to allow U. S. sea power to contain crises while improving me Navy’s war-fighting potential. It is time for a renaisSance of the surface force.
Among the restraints on U. S. sea power are domestic Political considerations, operational problems caused by oe limited number of carrier battle groups (CVBGs), and a lack of powerful naval forces not associated with a UvBG. An awakened surface force, armed with long- rar>ge precision-guided weapons, combined with improved area surveillance to give surface combatants a §reater combat role, holds promise of improving the political conditions under which the Navy operates, of easing °Perational problems by liberating the Navy from the airCraft carrier, and of enhancing the Navy’s war-fighting
Potential.
The surface combatant’s role as the capital unit of the leet passed with the demonstration that aircraft could, 'vhile operating from bases outside of the battleship’s reach, penetrate her defenses and score hits with danger- °us payloads, with enough frequency to disable the ship ^hile keeping losses at an acceptable level. The important glK actors were range, penetration, accuracy, lethality, decidability, rapidity of action, and economy. When these actors began to favor aircraft, carriers replaced battle
ships as the primary weapon of naval warfare. Through technological evolution, however, the surface combatant of the 1990s will probably regain much of the influence she lost to the aircraft carriers in the 1940s.
A new generation of surface combatants, properly armed and supported, would have a unique set of advantages and disadvantages compared with the aircraft carrier. These ships would also have offensive and defensive systems to allow operations without a carrier’s support, and which would complement and enhance a carrier’s systems when operating as elements of a CVBG.
What, then, are the requisite properties of today’s modem surface combatant, and what kind of support would she require to make a useful contribution to the Navy’s projection and sea control efforts? How would she make her contributions, and what would be her relation to a carrier battle group?
The primary weakness of a surface ship today is her limited “vision.” Today’s weapons can hit anything the ship can detect and can even reach beyond the sensor’s limits. Therefore, the primary requirement for revitalizing the surface force is to provide it with improved supporting sensors. For surveillance of the ocean’s surface and the air space at great distances from the ship, remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) could create a small revolution. Already, the Compass Cope program has demonstrated the ability to fly at very high altitudes (50,000-60,000 feet) for extended times of longer than 24 hours, gather information, and transmit it to command centers in real time. Another project involves an RPV that can remain airborne at high altitude for seven days or more at a time. The use of these platforms for airborne ocean surveillance is under active study at this time. If these or other RPVs could be adapted to provide airborne warning and control against air-to-sur- face and surface-to-surface missiles (ASMs, SSMs) and aircraft, while other RPVs support the ship’s own long- range attacks, the recent sensor disadvantages of surface units would largely vanish.
Recognizing the sensor problem, many visions for future surface combatants incorporate substantial aircrafthandling facilities, which is not a satisfactory solution. A surface combatant has problems with fuel storage, maintenance space, and stability in high seas. Large carriers are far more satisfactory for putting manned aircraft to sea. RPVs, however, offer a new dimension to naval aviation. The larger RPVs can fly great distances and remain on station for useful periods. Small RPVs can be launched from catapults and recovered in nets, requiring less space for launch and recovery than helicopters. They have enough range and payload to provide direct observation of the immediate tactical area. Moreover, their light weight and mechanical simplicity simplify storage, maintenance, and fuel requirements. By providing new surface combat-
The Axe nonnuclear short-range ballistic missiles could destroy any airfield within 350 miles of the launch point in ten minutes or less. As one option, a surface combatant armed with a number of Axe SRBMs could drive most air forces out of their coastal bases and then attack with cruise missiles.
ants with a modest RPV capacity and good high-altitude assistance, an adequate air capability for most purposes may be obtained at reasonable cost.
Support against the subsurface threat must come from the best antisubmarine platform the Navy has, the nuclear- powered attack submarine, with help from land-based patrol planes, helicopters, and escort ships. But this differs little from the requirements for carrier defense. Torpedo attacks on the major new surface units may actually be more difficult than an attack on a carrier. The carrier has certain unique characteristics, such as the catapults, that submarines can detect. One surface combatant’s signature may be more difficult to separate from the other sounds of the task force. Further, the overall capability required may be divided among several hulls. On the balance, then, the external support requirements of a new surface action group are not much different from the support requirements of a CVBG.
The return on the investment in support for these ships would be a large improvement in the Navy’s projection and sea control potential and international influence. The requisite properties of the new combatants include incorporating those weapons with range, penetration, accuracy, lethality, dependability, rapidity of action, and economy in their favor. In other words, the new ships must deliver a very heavy “broadside” with disarming speed and accuracy. The next generation of combatants must carry a full suite of antiair warfare (AAW) and antisurface warfare (ASUW) systems, including surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), SSMs, and advanced guns. For attacking targets ashore, these ships must have a battery of cruise missiles. Moreover, if they are to contribute to the projection mission in more than a limited way, they must introduce conventional ballistic missiles to the fleet. For attack against targets ashore, using the cruise and ballistic missiles, their broadside could easily outweigh a carrier group’s payload.
For the projection of power ashore, two cases are likely: a limited action in the Third World or a general war with the Soviet Union. In a Third World case, a modest supply of Tomahawk land-attack missiles (conventional warhead) (TLAM-C) should be adequate. As Michael MccGwire pointed out:
“Third World defenses are much less extensive, dense, diverse, and sophisticated [than the Soviet Union’s], and they cannot reach far out to sea. More important, in the Third World, the number of critical military targets and availability of alternative facilities will be limited, relatively few will be effectively hardened, and the capacity to repair extensive damage will be restricted.”1
To deal with the Soviets, however, MccGwire estimates
that close to 600 TLAM-Cs could be expended in the northern NATO areas in a conflict before the year 2000.'
Most of the ammunition expended would be used to disable airfields, a difficult task made only slightly easier by the fact that the support facilities in Third World areas are more exposed. A grave threat to U. S. naval forces in most areas would be enemy aircraft which have a strike radius on a par with the TLAM. These facts, coupled with the knowledge that the bases are time-critical targets (every hour the base operates, more damage can be done to the fleet), prove that a quick, high-confidence, long' range runway destruction system is essential. The Air Force Scientific Advisory Board recommended such a system, using a nonnuclear short-range ballistic missile- Lockheed outlined such a system, dubbed Axe.
Axe uses a Trident C-4 booster and guidance system and a large package of submunitions designed to penetrate the surface of a runway before exploding to inflict the maximum possible damage. Two such missiles could close any airfield within 350 miles of the launch point in ten minutes or less.3 A warship with a number of Axe short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) could drive most air forces out of their coastal bases—if not ground them altogether and then attack freely with cruise missiles. 1° conjunction with a CVBG, Axe SRBMs could be used to pin down enemy air forces to ensure the success of counter-air missions by the attack aircraft while the TLAMs either attacked secondary targets or softened up high-value targets for the carrier aircraft. The addition of tactical ballistic missiles to the fleet would not only add a potent weapon, but enhance both other weapons’ effeC' tiveness and the fleet’s security while conducting offem sive operations.
For the Navy’s other major wartime mission, sea control, a new breed of surface unit’s usefulness breaks into three areas: antisubmarine warfare (ASW), AAW, and ASUW. The ships themselves are not likely to be very useful as antisubmarine vessels and are more likely to be targets than anything else. Yet, this does not preclude n role in ASW. Unlike U. S. submarines, Soviet submarines
Arietta
not generally operate alone. Surface units are actively engaged in supporting submarines, protecting them from Patrol aircraft and, along with Soviet patrol aircraft, from S. submarines. Attacking Soviet submarines in this en- Vlronment are likely to impose heavy attrition on U. S. ASW units. If, however, these ships could attack and disorganize the surface ships, the patrol aircraft and their oases, and the communications facilities that tie the Soviet system together, they would make a large, though indirect, contribution to antisubmarine operations.
In ASUW, ships armed with cruise missiles have great Potential. However, without mid-course guidance, a oruise missile attack at long range faces serious obstacles, oven if the target’s location at the time of the launch is known, the missile could arrive in the target area and find nothing but ocean. The missile would then be forced to fly n search pattern, using active radar to locate the target. Not only is this likely to warn the target of the missile’s aPproach, which reduces the chances of penetration, but tllere is no guarantee it will find the target before its fuel is exhausted. Moreover, the number of missiles likely to ar- r'Ve in the target area at the same time is small, reducing ne chances of saturating the enemy’s defenses. Consider- 'ng the quality of the latest Soviet antiaircraft weapons and "e small number of cruise missiles normally carried on current surface units, this is a serious problem. (One source estimates that 18 tactical air-to-surface missiles w°uld be required to deal with the Kirov alone.)
If, however, RPVs support the attack, the situation changes radically. After preliminary observation and Peking of the targets by an RPV, the ships would launch udr cruise missiles. These missiles would be divided into Several waves timed to arrive in the target area at the same time but from different bearings. The patrolling RPV would update the cruise missiles with mid-course guidance, adjusting the courses and timing. As the missiles arrived in the target area, either one of the cruise missiles or a second RPV would engage in electronic warfare, attempting to confuse the Soviet formation as to the size, direction, and nature of the attack. Hopefully, most of the cruise missiles would penetrate the defenses, find the targets, and sink or disable the enemy vessels. The RPV would provide the ship’s commander with a post-strike report, and the commander could launch a second strike if necessary.
If the attack were made in conjunction with manned attack aircraft, not only would the prospects for correct timing and coordination be enhanced, but the losses among the strike aircraft would be reduced, and more extensive damage would be inflicted on the Soviet formation. The cruise missiles could be used as cannon fodder, forcing the Soviets to turn on their radars, so anti-radiation missiles could disable the formation. Alternatively, the missiles could be used to disable or sink the escorts of a high-value unit, clearing a path for the attack aircraft. Finally, they could be used simply to multiply the number of targets with which the Soviets would have to contend. This final case would be important when trying to break
A Patriot surface-to-air missile with a booster and an autopilot, guided by an RPV and its own radar, could travel 120 kilometers or farther. This ultra-long-range surface-to-air missile could be a key step in improving the viability of the surface action group concept.
through the combat air patrol over a Soviet carrier.
As an AAW unit, the new surface combatants would be dependent upon their airborne sensors. The development of ultra-long-range SAMs is a key step in the viability of the surface action group concept. The ultra-long-range SAM would be launched by the ship and guided by either the early-warning RPV or by a separate, targeting RPV and would intercept its target beyond the ship’s radar horizon. If the ultra-long-range SAM could keep the Soviet Tu-95 “Bears” at a distance, it would be a good investment. An ultra-long-range SAM is technically feasible. A Patriot SAM with a booster and an autopilot could go out 120 kilometers or farther, guided over the last part of its journey by the targeting RPV and its own radar. A medium-range SAM barrier could be erected by the existing Standard with the associated electronics. Obviously, Aegis would be desirable, but it may not be affordable. As the range closed, medium- and small-caliber guns could contribute to the ship’s defense.
When operating with a CVBG, a combatant with ultralong-range SAMs adds an extra layer of protection to the carrier’s defenses. When only one carrier is in the area, and a continuous combat air patrol is difficult or impossible to maintain, that extra outer layer could be very important. Ultimately, of course, the attackers will succeed if not counterattacked and defeated at their bases, a task the new surface combatants would be well equipped to do.
An important measure of the Navy’s value is how its presence advances the state’s interests in peacetime. As the word implies, presence involves the location of forces. With the small number of CVBGs that will be available in the coming years, an addition to the number of powerful task forces in the Navy’s hands is important in itself.
Presence, however, involves much more than the fleet’s military effectiveness. Navies have large and important political and diplomatic dimensions. A navy’s diplomatic role, however, is complex and nebulous. Four observations may be useful in burning away some of the fog.
- The impact of a state’s naval diplomacy is based on the reactions of foreigners to the Navy, and the ships at sea have little control over the foreigner’s reactions.
- If the foreigners doubt either the military effectiveness or the political resolution behind the naval forces, the impact of the naval diplomacy is reduced.
- Foreign attitudes are influenced by domestic political opinion.
- There are many who question the will of the United States to take military action. While the political usefulness of military action is as great as ever, the political acceptability of the use of violence has declined since the Vietnam War.
The first observation, which is, in fact, an elementary deduction, is supported by Ken Booth, who wrote, “As has become increasingly stressed, naval diplomacy operates through the perceptions of others. Such perceptions are both uncontrollable and unpredictable.”5
The basis for the second observation is the existence of a relationship between power and international influence. Paul Nitze and Leonard Sullivan, Jr., frankly stated that naval presence “is ineffective if the military power or the will to intervene successfully is perceived to be in doubt.”6
The fact that foreign capitals are sensitive to American attitudes is the basis for the third observation. Their leaders are constantly assessing the conditions that might provoke the employment of military forces to obtain diplomatic objectives.7
The root of the fourth observation lies partly in a natural reluctance to accept casualties in one’s own forces, and in a desire not to inflict civilian casualties or damage civilian property near military targets, all of which happen in wars. Even an operation as fast and simple as Grenada threatened to turn into an issue in a special Senate race in Washington. After the bombing in Beirut, men in high places called for the immediate withdrawal of the Marines from Lebanon, despite the importance of trying to stabilize both Lebanon in particular and the Middle East in general. Nuclear freeze and, a few years ago, anti-Vietnam War protests were reported around the world.
To increase the impact of naval diplomacy, one could make the use of naval force to achieve diplomatic goals more palatable at home. Many have recognized the value of cruise missiles for attacking highly defended targets without endangering pilots’ lives. There is a second, less recognized factor. Cruise missiles may be able to attack their target with less collateral damage to nearby civilian installations than would be caused by an attack by fighter bombers. The two problems related to the use of force that are central to the fourth observation—our reluctance to accept casualties and our moral sensibilities regarding civilians—receive partial solution. In this way, a modest increase in absolute military capability can result in a disproportionate increase in the Navy’s diplomatic leverage-
international political influence, the power of projection, and potential for controlling the seas could be upgraded by building and deploying a new generation of surface combatants.
Aircraft carriers and their air groups will continue to be major weapons of the fleet, but there is a place for both traditional naval aviation and new methods of fighting involving RPVs and advanced missiles. As the threat grows, there is an urgent need for both. It is truly a time to awaken the surface force.
'Michael MccGwire, “The Tomahawk and Naval Forces,” Cruise Missiles, Tech' nology, Strategy, Politics, Richard Betts, Editor, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1981, p. 249.
2Ibid., p. 246.
3“Surface to Surface Missile Recommended for NATO,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 7 June 1982, pp. 64-67.
4MccGwire, pp. 238-239.
5Ken Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, Crane, Russak, and Co., New York, 1977, p. 46.
6Paul Nitze, Leonard Sullivan, Jr., and the Atlantic Council Working Group °n Securing the Seas, Securing the Seas: The Soviet Naval Challenge and Westerf Alliance Options (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), p. 23.
7Ibid., p. 23.
Mr. Ogden received a bachelor of science degree in mathematics and a bachelor of arts degree in chemistry from Ohio State University in 1984- He is currently a chemist for Orsynex Chemical, Incorporated, in Columbus, Ohio, and is pursuing further studies in chemistry, mathematics, and history.