This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
Are carrier “nukes” surface warriors first?
The Navy is wasting time and money sending carrier-bound nuclear-trained junior officers to the Surface Warfare Officers School (SWOS) basic course prior to their initial tours in nuclear- powered carriers (CVNs). SWOS basic training is best scheduled after the carrier engineering tour.
Current detailer practice is to send nuclear-trained junior officers via the SWOS basic course en route to their first tour on board a nuclear-powered guided missile cruiser (CGN) or a CVN. Having run the gauntlet of nuclear power school and prototype qualification as a plant supervisor, the 16- week instruction in surface warfare provides a comparatively relaxing but educational introduction into the community. Ostensibly, the “nuke” is welcomed back into the fold and reminded that, above all else, he is a surface warrior. For the ensign or lieutenant (junior grade) who will soon assume responsibilities as a CGN division officer, the pipeline is a worthwhile and practical means to learn those skills which he will employ daily in surface operations. For his counterpart, the young officer with orders to the reactor or engineering department on board a CVN, the great bulk of information gained at SWOS basic will be shelved and largely forgotten during the two- year tour. He soon finds his role as an engineer, with the basic structure and organization of the ship affording little or no opportunity to delve into the “real world” of surface warfare.
This is a reality that those managing the program have been slow to recognize and perhaps afraid to admit. They are particularly afraid of a perception among new nukes, or potential nukes, that surface warfare plays second fiddle to engineering. Nonsense! In fact, the conspicuous disuse of surface warfare skills among carrier nukes in the present career pattern is a source of the problem. To benefit the officer and the surface community, SWOS basic training should follow the carrier engineering tour.
Carrier nukes are engineers first. Almost without exception the nuclear- trained officers on a CVN have no involvement with the tactical operation of the ship and her weapons. The myriad of “topside” watch stations are manned from the ranks of conventionally trained surface warfare officers or members of the aviation community serving their “dissociated” sea tour. While “dabbling” in activities outside the propulsion plant is of professional interest and benefit to the nuke, gaining officer of the deck certification and the like is an essential career milestone for other officers on the ship. Dozens of officers on a carrier must “jump through the hoop”—it simply is not practical for the nuke to integrate into shipboard operations. Also, the tremendous workload shouldered through the employment cycle by the snipes, with acknowledged manning shortages in the nuclear surface community, makes it unthinkable that the reactor officer or the engineer officer could release a junior officer for the necessary time to pursue his surface warfare qualification. Although no statistics are published, I suspect the infinitesimal number of surface nukes who have earned water wings during a carrier tour will show this. Finally, the objective of a carrier engineering tour for a nuke is to qualify as a propulsion plant watch officer and pass the prospective engineer officer exam. In effect, the 16-week delay created by SWOS basic results in a loss of proficiency and hampers the individual’s engineering qualification.
A successful exam is a necessary ticket for a future department head assignment and return to the reality of surface warfare, where a “1110’ designator is essential.
Carrier nukes begin their follow-on split-tour in “topside” jobs at a disadvantage. With little time after the CVN engineering tour and only a vague recollection of SWOS basic some 24 to 36 months earlier, the nuke steps into his first non-engineering billet considerably out of step with his contemporaries. A newly christened lieutenant by now, his expectations of quickly going forth and doing great things may frustrate both the command and the individual. This is the precise time for enrollment in the SWOS basic course to prepare him best for the topside tour and to revitalize his senses after a very demanding two years on the carrier. This way the carrier nuke looks forward to more than a follow-on sea tour at a time when many junior officers decide to resign- If necessary, orders to SWOS basic could be contingent on an agreement to serve all or a portion of the subsequent sea tour to better protect the interests of the detailer. The officer is also inclined to more seriously pursue the SWOS basic curriculum after two years at sea than on the heels of prototype qualification. Already a division officer, he can appreciate the importance of the material taught and is not as apt to be “let down” after the rigors ol nuclear power school and prototype. With improved attitude and knowledge’ the officer’s new command gains a better product.
To suggest that nukes can serve successfully through a two-year division officer tour on board a CVN without first attending SWOS basic seems to imply that the curriculum itself is of little consequence. This is not the case- But, the portions of the curriculum— personnel and administrative matters vital to the nuclear-trained officer en route to a CVN are sufficiently narrow in scope to be acquired on board.
Those who have done this experienced favorable results.
The surface nuclear navy largely re' tains its officers on the premise that they are surface warfare officers, and not just engineers. While the theme is
on target, sending the nuclear-trained Ju
nior officer to SWOS basic before his CVN engineering tour contributes little to this end—it is practically counterproductive. The best option for the Navy and the officer is a seat at Surface Warfare Officers School basic after the CVN tour.
Nobody asked me either, but...
By Captain W. G. Carson, U. S. Navy
What’s going on here?
While leafing through a program for a change of command ceremony, I read the biographies of the three participants—the officer being relieved had five tours of duty in submarines; the officer relieving had eight, plus enlisted submarine service; and the speaker had six. “So what?” you ask. I respond by stressing that this was a change of command for a naval surface—repeat, surface—squadron.
I am sure that all three officers possess the characteristics of fine leaders— intelligence, force, dynamism, and dedication. But, I ask you, what sort of signal is this to junior surface warfare officers? Where are the intelligent, forceful, dynamic, and dedicated surface warfare leaders?
This event signifies that aspiration to a high command of surface forces requires a submarine background. This is only one of many such signals to junior surface warfare officers (SWOs). With aviation captains commanding a high proportion of replenishment and amphibious ships, an aviation background also seems to be an aid to commanding surface forces. In short, for grades above commander, SWOs may perceive that opportunities to command their own forces are limited.
Let us address the second question: Where are the surface warfare leaders? A common perception among midshipmen is that surface warfare is third best—the “leftover” if one does not qualify for submarine or aviation duty.
Midshipmen know that submariners an aviators command surface forces, but SWOs do not command submarine or air forces. They know that if they fail initial training for aviation or submarines, they can still attend Surface Warfare Officers School. Also, they are aware that SWOs do not receive the pay incentives that the submariners and aviators do.
If the trend continues, and SWO quality diminishes as the brighter junior SWOs leave the service early because of limited high command opportunitieS’ we might reach the point where the surface warfare community is incapat»e of producing great leaders for high command, such as Raymond Spruance* Arleigh Burke, or Isaac Kidd! Have 'vt- already reached that point?
Nobody asked me either, but...
By Lieutenant J. E. Kline, U. S. Navy
A new dynamic duo for the carriers?
He stood behind my shoulder, pointed to the aircraft carrier 3,000 yards off our bow and said, “When you have the conn, never take your eyes off her.” The “never trust the aircraft carrier” philosophy of my captain was well justified in my young ensign’s mind when two nights later I peered at our battle group’s flagship and saw a port running light when I was assigned a starboard screening station. The carrier was in a 180° turn and had failed to announce her intention over the primary tactical circuit!
Many of my peers who have served on the bridge of cruisers, destroyers, or frigates can complement this incident with similar stories of their own. However, it was not until two years later, when 1 personally observed flight operations on an aircraft carrier (CV), that I fully appreciated the command coordination problems experienced on the bridges of these key ships—launch and recovery cycles, fuel states of airborne aircraft, critical wind envelopes, etc.
Who are these men on the bridges of our most powerful warships? They tend to be a kaleidoscope of officer designations. Mid-grade aviation officers, junior surface warfare officers, and limited duty officers make up the bulk of the officers of the deck (OODs), junior officers of the deck, and junior officers of the watch who conn and control these vessels. The navigator is normally a senior aviation commander or captain who has an assistant navigator who is usually an aviation lieutenant commander. The navigation division officer is a first-tour surface warfare officer (SWO) who controls a division of approximately 20 men. The conductor of all these players, the captain (or CO), is a special breed. He is expected to be an expert in aviation, engineering, military and international law, warfare tactics, and an experienced mariner. As complex as technical warfare specialities have become, there does not seem to be enough time in one career to gain the experience required to be effective in all these areas.
The CO must turn to specialists for advice. Members of the Judge Advocate General Corps, engineering duty officers, meteorologists, and aviation maintenance officers are a few examples. This system is a necessity which works well for a command of more than 5,000.
My recommendation is an extension of this concept. A man who has spen1 a career as a mariner, is an expert in ship handling and navigation, and is highly experienced in engineering and maritime weather would be invaluable to bridge operations on CVs. I propose to change the navigator’s position fr0111 an aviation billet to a SWO’s post command tour.
The payoff to the ship would be obvious. The CO could turn for ship' handling advice to a man who has conned ships for at least 15 years. Be' cause of his own deep-draft experience’ the CO, using his surface warfare navl gator, would be excellent in all specia maneuvering evolutions. As a qualify, engineer officer of the watch, the navi' gator would also be an additional
1985
ource of engineering experience for “r ^Pta'n- He would provide a lnk between the aviation commu- 1 >' and surface vessels in the battle serouP- The navigator would have a exfSe ^°r screcr|ing units and be in rKTle'y sens't’vc about communicat- 8 his ship’s movements. He could
Mail this form (or facsimile) with check or money order to: Certificate Service, U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, MD 21402
Please allow 4-6 weeks for delivery.
City
State
Zip
Address
Name for shipping, if different
Name to appear on certificate (if custom-lettered)
Print clearly:
$1.00
□ Check here if earned during Coast Guard service.
__________ @ $3.00 =
__________ @ $6.50 =
__________ @ .50 =
Subtotal MD residents add 5% tax Postage and handling TOTAL ENCLOSED
Total
Please send me: guantity
Unlettered certificates, -------
Custom-lettered certificates,
Neptune subpoenas, ----------
Ship .
Ship .
.Finish Date .To
___________________________________________________ Start Date .
□ Icelandic Domain (“Bless”) - 11" x 14", for service in Iceland •______ From
□ Round the World - 16" x 20", for going around the world
Ship
.Longitude
□ Golden Shellback — 11" x 14", for crossing the equator at the 180th Meridian
Ship .
, Date Commissioned
□ Plank Owner — 11" x 14", commemorating the commissioning of a ship, installation, or squadron
Ship .
. Date Recommissioned
□ Recommissioning — 16" x 20", commemorating the recommissioning of a ship
Ship .
.Latitude .
. Date .
□ Golden Dragon - 11" x 14", for crossing the 180th Meridian
Ship
_ Longitude
Date .
0" Check the commemorative certificate(s) you wish to order. When ordering custom-lettered certificates, please fill in requested information.
- Neptune — 11" x 14", for crossing the equator
Ship________________________________________________ Date --------------------------- Longitude ______________
- Neptune Subpoena — 8V2" x 7V2"
- Arctic Circle (“Blue Nose”) — 11" x 14", for crossing the Arctic Circle
Unlettered certificates are $3.00 each, and custom-lettered certificates are $6.50 each. Write and ask about our special discounts offered on orders of 25 or more.
Each certificate features
- Full-color illustrations
- Gold seal and ribbon
- Matching wallet card
- Optional custom personalization
CERTIFICATES OF THE SEA
Have you crossed the equator . . . gone around the world . . . served in Iceland ... or commissioned a ship? Then you deserve one of the Naval Institute’s elegant Certificates of the Sea.
gro° *Dr°V't*e a safety check for battle fr°uP formation maneuvers originating his command and work closely as' r16 suPPorting destroyer squadron a liaison for the screening units’ re- of;rements. The surface warfare junior 'cers also would derive advantages
presence. As the senior sur-
faci
r°m his nrPCAnoa A I' nn»*
e Warfare officer on board, he could °nitor an effective qualification pro- arn for the SWOs-in-training (1160s) to the CV and provide them n . Vaiuable career guidance. As the siN 1^at°r’ wou*c* he directly respon- the rvf°r ciual>ficatic'n program of
bg6 who would undoubtedly
k. " in oivp uuu ci ui/pui i
nt head position? Officers expected ® achi( H
f°r this
e‘it from his mariner experience. A ty. 1§at0r in a post command surface and arC k'het would have the seniority brid exPerience to benefit the CO and 8e watch-standers on CVs. far hat Wouid this senior surface warty^ officer get out of this arrangement? m ^ would a man who has had com- no at sea want to step into a depart-
! , . pwoiuuu: c/iuctia tAptGitu
achieve ^jag ran^ wouj(j seiected
«Xn • P°s'ti°n to provide valuable (hg rience on CV operations to prepare Co I35 battle group commanders. By (i0nln'n® knowledge of surface opera- Ces w'th insight into sea aviation con- ■ s- We create an officer who is
a f y qualified to command and fight (,rj aP'e group. This “best and the sue test ' concept, which has been to ti,eSS^U* *n attracting quality officers Pro 6 carr'er readiness improvement n„ ?rarn’ can easily be extended to the ^gator’s position, boa h CUrrent advantage of an on- f0 ^ av'ation navigator is the support hons ' ^ ‘n tnonitoring flight opera- Proi
this
during a lengthy employment. I Pose that the executive officer fill
ty ' Jro*e 'f the navigator is a surface ins are °fficer. The advantages of hav- bri(,an experienced mariner on the fli ,®e outweigh his initial ignorance of ® | operations.
fare lt l .l'1e navigator as a surface war- futi °^lcer> the captain, junior officers, eScre battle group commanders, and ta0rt ships all gain distinct advan- aVj^s; Most important, it brings the to» L<>n and surface communities closer 6 tier to provide a more cohesive mar,t>me defense.