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Since the collapse of the Republic of Vietnam and the fall of Saigon a decade ago, U. S. attention has strayed from Southeast Asia. To be sure, the United States has had its hands full, with Lebanon, the Persian Gulf, and Central America. Preoccupation with these disturbed areas and the painful legacy of Vietnam have caused the United States to focus its attention elsewhere. But the time has come to turn back to Southeast Asia. Gonditions are ripe for the restoration of U. S. credibility >n Southeast Asia. This can be achieved through creative diplomatic initiatives.
The region of interest runs through a long arc of disputed territories from the northern reaches of the East Ghina Sea, through the Shikoku Islands, and on to the South China Sea with its Paracel Island group, Macclesfield Banks, and Spratly Islands. It finally comes to rest on Ihe continental shelf that connects the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other regional nations. (ASEAN consists of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Brunei.)
Stability for Southeast Asia goes beyond a concern tor regional peace. The sea-lanes there are crucial to the maritime linkages of Northeast Asia with Europe, the Middle Bast, and Africa. Merchant ships carrying goods to and from Japan, one of the world’s largest maritime traders,
For too long, we have averted our gaze from the region, and we look back now to see a statue of our man in Manila being erected on Philippine soil that is now being rocked by political shock waves. If Marcos is replaced by forces hostile to us, irreparable harm may be done to the stability of an area that has plenty of other problems.
constantly transit these lanes along with ships of the U. S. and Soviet navies. In few other bodies of water do the interests of the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan converge the way they do on the seas of Southeast Asia. Even a localized struggle in this region carries with it the possibility of escalation into major power conflict over the regional international order.
Southeast Asia is, for the most part, stable. The mood, particularly among ASEAN nations, is upbeat. That organization celebrated its 17th anniversary in 1984, and economic growth rates are generally sound. However, the potential for instability is real. The nagging question of the struggle for peace in Kampuchea and Vietnam adds a measure of uncertainty to the region, particularly in Thailand, whose borders, with a warring neighbor and a domestic insurgent, offer twin threats. Most Southeast Asian nations, at least those willing to discuss the matter publicly, regard the primary danger to its respective countries to be internal rather than external. Most have indigenous communist groups, and, for some, Muslim fundamentalism is a potential problem.1 The increasing volatility of the Philippines in the aftermath of the Aquino assassination is particularly disturbing to the region. Events there will be watched in many capitals.
Disruption of regional peace could be initiated from a
number of sources. One possibility is the internal destabilization of one or more countries that reaches the boiling point and results in a radical change of regime and a major change in external affiliation. Disintegration of the Marcos government in the Philippines, for example, that left in its wake a government hostile to the United States would cause irreparable harm to the stability of the region.
Another possibility would be a Soviet threat to Southeast Asian sea-lanes. Soviet support for its Vietnamese client is well known, as is Soviet naval expansion. Too, the Soviet presence is facilitated by its use of former U. S. bases in Vietnam. Direct Soviet pressure that would risk closure of regional sea-lanes is unlikely. Short of the many possibilities attending a general conflagration, the Soviets have a vital interest in maintaining unimpeded passage through Southeast Asian waters.
This is not to say, however, that they could not be drawn into a gradually escalating conflict in support o their Vietnamese ally. The dangers of Vietnamese expansionism are well known. The Soviets have willingly supported these efforts in order to help encircle and otherwise discomfit China. Moreover, Vietnam is a major contender in regional resource disputes. In July 1980, Vietnam an the Soviet Union signed an agreement for joint oil exploration and exploitation along Vietnam’s continental shell- Heavy Soviet economic subsidization of Vietnam is a major drain on the Soviets’ own fragile economy, and any relief, such as major oil discoveries, might entice them in the direction of calculated risk.
Added to the perils of internal disorder and outside intervention is the vulnerability of the area to intraregiona dispute over seabed resources. The Falklands Conflict was a violent manifestation of but one of potentially dozens o conflicts over island ownership and seabed resources. The
lesson to be learned from this war, military experience aside, is how quickly dormant political disputes over a remote area can erupt into an armed clash.
Since World War II, the number of conflicts over zones in the sea has constantly risen. Beginning with the 1960s, the search for food and energy, supported by advance
resource-gathering techniques, has carried the potem
ntia*
n<J
for conflict beyond territorial boundaries. As stakes a expectations increase, transcending mere national pfld ’ so do the volatility of seabed disputes. Worldwide, there
are nearly 400 marine boundaries that are either actively under dispute or for which no delimitation has been agreed uPon. Only about one-fifth of these lack the basis for seri- °Us disagreement.
Southeast Asia has long been the scene of boundary disputes, and as fish stocks, hydrocarbon deposits, and other resources become more valuable, historical ownership claims are being exacerbated by the extension of traditional boundaries. ASEAN states, for example, in declaring 200-mile exclusive economic zones, have added m°re than two-and-one-half million square miles to their respective jurisdictions. This has caused problems within and outside the ASEAN group. Except for Indonesia, each ASEAN state has at least one conflicting territorial claim with an ASEAN partner, and only Singapore is without an unresolved seabed dispute with an extra- ASEAN state.3
Islands, rocks, and banks aside, there is an abundance of continental shelf in Southeast Asia. Approximately 20% of the world’s total continental shelf, lying within the relatively accessible 200-meter isobath, is in the region.4 Regional non-ASEAN nations are similarly affected. A w'de range of jurisdictional disputes directly affect China, f°r example, with its borders on the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, the Gulf of Tonkin, and the South China Sea. Other major powers are indirectly concerned. Vietnam, for instance, relies on the Soviet Union for superpower Support, and Thailand on the United States. Malaysia and Singapore are linked by defense pact to Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.
The willingness of the United States to play a major leadership role in the prevention of conflict in Southeast Asia is currently perceived as reluctant. Since the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine in 1969 and the subsequent withdrawal of U. S. forces from Indochina, there has been a general reduction of U. S. military strength in East Asia. This has been exacerbated by the so-called “swing strategy,” which calls for Pacific-based U. S. forces to be redeployed to the Indian Ocean and to other areas as well.
U. S. strength, or just as important, the perception of E. S. strength, among Asian nations ebbed to its lowest Point since World War II during the closing stages of the Carter administration. While President Ronald Reagan’s demonstrated determination to counter Soviet moves Worldwide has bolstered faith in U. S. commitments everywhere in the Free World, the feeling continues among Southeast Asian nations that U. S. priorities lie elsewhere.
For some, this condition is accompanied by a sense of Relief. As Soviet capabilities to project their naval power Into the region grows, a few Southeast Asian leaders have Placed their faith in neutrality and have expressed a preference to be excluded from the superpower competition. How much of this is a product of a notion of U. S. unreliability that was fostered by the U. S. withdrawal from Vietnam is unknown. Other area leaders are left with a sense °f bewilderment or resentment at what they perceive to be U. S. neglect. This view is as important as the perception °f U. S. reduction of military power in the Western Pacific
and the well-publicized U. S. policies regarding Europe, the Middle East, and Central America.
■ There seems to be a general, if unspoken, consensus that the United States no longer has a clear policy for dealing with Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the emerging nations of Southeast Asia feel that their maturity and'sta- bility, as demonstrated in many cases by enviable economic growth rates, are not adequately respected by the U. S. Government. For example, delays in making U. S. ambassadorial appointments to Indonesia, where the post was long vacant, reinforce the perception of neglect.5
The combination of bruised feelings and the potential for conflict creates an unnecessary and unacceptable condition in the region for the United States. Add to this increased Soviet military activity in the Pacific and the renewal of efforts by the Soviets for a Sino-Soviet rapprochement, and the result is a perfect recipe for a nowin situation in which the United States could be faced with the unattractive choice of either a major confrontation with the Soviet Union or else providing too little, too late to a neglected ally.
The U. S. Government must make broad initiatives toward the preservation of stability in Southeast Asia. Such initiatives would be directed toward the ASEAN nations with the limited participation of China and Japan. The goals of this effort would be fivefold:
- Promote better U. S. relations within the region with a comprehensive diplomatic policy that demonstrates its respect for the maturity and stability of ASEAN nations
- Promote greater understanding about the need for cooperation over international shipping lanes, including a collective effort to confront the problems of safety of navigation in maritime narrows and regulation of the size, speed, and numbers of vessels
- Forestall or attenuate seabed resource disputes that have the potential for local destabilization and the interruption of vital shipping lanes
- Promote resource discovery and development to reduce dependency on the vagaries of Middle East politics
- Reduce or at least retard the further growth of Soviet- Vietnamese influence
There should be a series of wide-ranging conferences on Southeast Asian security, seabed boundary disputes, and economic cooperation. The first step has already been taken. In July 1984, the members of ASEAN began a round of meetings in Jakarta to which they invited five non-ASEAN countries: the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The purpose of the conferences was to create a Pan-Pacific planning group to discuss such noncontroversial subjects as “human resources through training and cultural exchanges.”6 This is a small but significant opening that can be used to forge new ties among the fastest-growing nations of the world. It is important for two reasons. First, it signals a reduction in the preoccupation of ASEAN nations with the Vietnam question. Second, it points to a willingness to participate in extra-regional relationships, an activity generally rejected since the early 1970s when Japan’s call for a Pacific Basin agreement got nowhere.
The participants must be convinced that wider coopera-
If the United States is to regain its credibility in Southeast Asia, it must win its competition with the Soviet Union in the Pacific. The expansion of the Soviet Pacific Fleet and its operations—like the forward deployment of a surface action group composed of these ships and others earlier this year—demonstrates that the contest will not be an easy one.
tion in these interrelated matters of regional stability, seabed resources, shipping lane security, and economic cooperation bears far greater promise than neglect or confrontation. Peaceful resolution of seabed boundary disputes, for example, will reduce the chances of both regional instability and resources being lost through the disintegration of friendship and escalation of local conflict into major power intervention. Further, neutrality, although a short-term solution to avoid commitment, is, in the long run, unworkable for ASEAN nations. The growing strategic importance of their seabed resources and geographic propinquity to major international sea-lanes suggests that they will figure in superpower competition, like it or not.
Soviet Pacific Fleet expansion clearly signals an intent of the Soviet Union to play a major role in the Pacific. The outcome ot the U. S.-Soviet competition will determine the regional international order, the relationship between ASEAN and a Vietnamese-dominated Indochina, and the regional role of the great powers.
Participation of China and Japan must be earnestly solicited but must be orchestrated in such a way to reduce fears of the small regional nations. Memories of Japan’s advances into Southeast Asia during the Pacific campaign of World War II are still vivid enough to refresh apprehensions. President Suharto of Indonesia, for instance, has recently expressed concern over Japan’s decision to patr°7 waters up to 1,000 miles from Japan’s home islands.
Concerns about China are equally strong. China’s support for an attempted coup in Indonesia in 1967 has not been forgotten.8 But China’s stock appears to be rising among ASEAN nations. ASEAN is continuing a policy 01 implicit cooperation with China against the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia.9 Although several member nations have publicly expressed concern about the dangers ot an economically strong China engaging in Southeast /koicin auaiio, lilulC lo CVILICIIL^C llltll pUUllviy dllUU v
cerns are largely for domestic political consumption. Actually, some ASEAN nations are privately helping China modernize.10
Participation by both Japan and China in the Southeast Asian region will have to be, by mutual agreement, balanced and carefully limited to the levels necessary to accomplish agreed upon tasks. China’s involvement is needed because of its physical dominance over much ° the region and its role as a major contender for seabed resources. Stability in the region is clearly advantageous to the Chinese, who would benefit from the containment of their Vietnamese neighbor. Moreover, the possibility economic links with its partners in a cooperative Southeast Asia would enhance its recently announced policy of economic rehabilitation along capitalist lines.
Japan, too, has the possibility for significant gain. Re" gional stability would ensure that its trade routes were kept open. And Japanese economic and political initiatives, aS well as the limited extension of its naval forces through the region as part of a Southeast Asian cooperative effort- would be more in keeping with Article Nine of its consti-
tution, which forbids war. Japanese cooperation would Serve, at the same time, to attenuate criticism of what is regarded in some quarters as its insufficient contribution to global security.
A difficult task will be obtaining the collective support °f the member nations of ASEAN. Some want to stay free °t having to choose sides in the superpower competition, are apprehensive about their larger neighbors to the north, and are in conflict with each other on some issues. But, for them too, the benefits of cooperation outweigh those of recalcitrance. For example, surveillance and protection of regional sea-lanes are beyond their capabilities. True, s°me joint exercises between their naval units and U. S., Australian, and New Zealand forces have taken place. ^Uch practices need to be expanded and regularized. Trade ls a major part of their development strategies, and with- °ut open sea-lanes, these strategies would collapse. Development money among ASEAN nations is scarce; tens
billions of dollars will be needed between now and the end of the century. Intraregional stability, seabed resource agreement, and security of sea-lanes would do much to attract U. S. and Japanese capital to the region, reduce dependence on Middle Eastern energy sources, and promote mutual economic growth.
. It is again time for the United States to play a major role ln free Southeast Asia. Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanond °f Thailand echoed regional sentiment when he expressed lrr>patience with the slowness of America’s recovery from lhe Vietnam disaster that left it with "an abiding reluctance to play an assertive role in Southeast Asia.""
The advantages for the United States of strengthened regional cooperation in Southeast Asia are obvious. Political stability, joint seabed resource development, economic °Pportunity, and a reduction of Vietnamese influence are
all worthwhile goals. The achievement of any one of them would be a major diplomatic victory. In addition, and most important, creative diplomacy with the developing nations of Southeast Asia is the perfect showcase for advancing America’s cause.
The United States can demonstrate that it is truly capable of continuing its world leadership role by departin'; from the politics of response and moving on to the politics of prevention. Through peaceful initiatives and foresighted planning, the United States can regain credibility with all nations as a world leader and a positive force in Southeast Asian affairs.
'Charles E. Morrison, ed.. Threats to Securin’ in East Asia-Pacific (Lexington MA. 1983).
2Kusuma Snitwongse, ed.. The Invisible Nexus: Energy anti ASEAN's Securin’ (Singapore, 1984), p. 111.
3Ibid., p. 116.
4Ibid., p. 52.
’Research Institute for Peace and Security, Asian Securin’, 19X3 (Tokyo 1983) n 164. '
bThe Washington Post, 14 July 1984, p. A-I2.
Research Institute lor Peace and Security, Asian Security, 19X3 (Tokyo 1983) n 164. . . .j.
8The New York Times, 21 July 1984, p. 26.
9The Washington Post, 10 July 1984, p. A-10.
"’Bernard Gwertzman. "China-U. S. Ties Make Southeast Asia Squirm,” The New York Times, 15 July 1984. p. E-4.
"The Christian Science Monitor, 12 April 1984. p. 13.
Colonel Lehrack’s final assignment in the Marine Corps before retirement was Commanding Officer, U. S. Marine Corps Recruiting Station, Chicago. He had two Vietnam tours, the first as a rifie company commander and the second as a radio battalion operations officer. Colonel Lehrack has a BA in Asian studies, an MA in Asian and Russian history, and is working on a PhD on the history of the Soviet Union as an Asian nation. His article. "Search for a New Consensus,” was published in the March 1984 Proceedings.