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In Counterattack: The West’s Battle Against the Terrorists, authors Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne wrote “Terrorism ebbs and flows like the tide, one moment crashing frighteningly on the foreshores of our lives, then retreating to lie quiescent, gathering strength for its next assault.
. . . But at no time has the assault been fiercer, more ruthless, more sustained or caused more permanent social, legal and political change. . . .” The macabre image of stunned Marines searching through the rubble of their Beirut barracks suggests that the Corps will need every ounce of the uncommon valor it displayed in the Pacific War if it and its sister services are to counter the rising tide of terrorism which, both at home and abroad, is almost daily escalating the danger to those who serve in the military.
A gray Navy bus, contrasting sharply with the brilliant colors of a tropical dawn in December 1979, made its way toward the Naval Communications Station at Sabana Seca, Puerto Rico, taking sailors to work. Along a road they had often traveled before at this early hour, there suddenly erupted a hail of bullets. Automatic weapons fire blasted the bus from both sides, shattering the peaceful dawn in a few terrifying seconds. Two sailors were killed in the attack; eight others were wounded, some critically. All were brought to the hospital where I worked at Roosevelt Roads. It was their baptism of fire into terrorism. And mine.
At first, many of us tried to minimize and deny the seriousness of what had happened: “Crazy Ricans . . . election year madness . . • sneak attack . . . lunatic fringe . . . target of opportunity . .-. isolated incident . ...” But as with most terrorist attacks, FBI investigations showed this one to be well planned, well coordinated, and well executed; it was no “target of opportunity.” The Macheteros or “machete wielders,” a local Puerto Rican terrorist group, had been Cuban trained and equipped with Soviet Ak-47 assault rifles. They were seeking independence for the island and the end of the U. S. presence there. This deadly Machetero attack against unarmed, unsuspecting Navy victims was a message to the rest of us, a way to make their political point.
That winter was one of innocence and ignorance. Most of us wanted to believe that this terrorist attack had been an isolated incident, a problem that would soon be quelled by the authorities. Arrests would be made, the perpetrators would pay, and so on. How wrong we were, as the intervening years have shown.
The Threat of Terrorism
Today, at almost any hour, somewhere, terrorists are planning, organizing, or executing an assault against unsuspecting and unprepared victims. Increasingly, these victims are military personnel, bases, and facilities. Because of this steadily escalating danger, every person in uniform has a need to know:
- What terrorism is and what its goals are
- Who the terrorists and their groups are
- How they are organized and how they operate
- Why they are more dangerous to the military than ever before
- How to protect himself, his family, and his shipmates from assault
- How the Code of Conduct and the new Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 1300.7 of December 1984 apply in peacetime detention, and how they can be used for survival by all military personnel who may be taken hostage
Nature of Terrorism: Terrorism is systematic use of fear aimed at a
Commander Derrer is a licensed clinical psychologist and a consultant to the FBI Academy on field training exercises in terrorism and hostage survival and stress. He received his BA in psychology from the University of Colorado and his MS in physiological psychology and his PhD in social psychology from Yale University. He is currently an assistant professor of psychology at the U. S. Naval Academy. His previous jobs include clinical psychologist for survival, evasion, resistance, escape (SERE) school. Naval Air Station North Island, San Diego; and clinical psychologist, Neuropsychiatry Service, and assistant chief, Alcohol Rehabilitation Service, Naval Hospital, Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico.
target audience beyond the victims of an assault. As the ancient Chinese put it, “Kill one and frighten ten thousand others.”
Terrorist attacks are minimally tactical and maximally psychological. They arouse fear, create alarm and disruption, and publicize a terrorist’s cause. Certainly, fear and publicity were the results of subsequent Machetero attacks in Puerto Rico, as they blew up electrical power substations, blacking out wealthy and tourist sections ot San Juan as well as Roosevelt Roads. People on the naval base felt angry and afraid. Distrust of Puerto Ricans in general grew as apprehension increased. Stereotypes were forming from fear.
Terrorist targets are often symbolic—selected for their “media appeal” and psychological impact. Such targets have included political figures, the judiciary, corporation executives, police, the military, and heads of state.
Wide media coverage is an essential ingredient in terrorist operations. Attempted assassinations against the President, the Pope, and the Prime Minister of Britain illustrate the political, publicity, and psychological power of even a near miss. The killing of a head of state has an appalling potency for instant worldwide headlines for the perpetrator. It also has the political impact of widespread violence, government destabilization, and increased repression as the murders of Anwar Sadat and Indira Gandhi have shown.
Several of these points were illustrated when the Macheteros made an overwater assault on a guarded airfield of the Puerto Rican Air National Guard. Nine of 13 pipebombs placed in the wheelwells and air intakes of A-7s and F-104s detonated, causing $45 million in damage, then a record for destruction of military equipment in peacetime. The Puerto Rican Air National Guard was nearly put out of business.
The psychological effect of this symbolic attack had enormous impact. It generated vast publicity, much political consternation and discussion by U. S., Puerto Rican, and Navy officials, and a considerable degree of fear and alarm on base.
Many persons refused to go into town, confining themselves to base and limiting their personal freedom. Some Navy personnel sent their families home. The jungle became ominous and malevolent; it could so easily hide a vicious attacker in spite of the heightened base security. Many of us stopped jogging in the cool evening hours because it was hard to see who might be out there. In a year since the first killings, no arrests had been made. The Macheteros could be anywhere; they seemed a constant, lurking threat.
Psychological Impact: In the presence of a terrorist threat, emotional reactions undergo a fairly predictable sequence that can have adverse effects on combat readiness. Reaction to an initial attack is often surprise, anger, and fear. Fear and anger motivate worry and increased vigilance as everyone tries to be extra alert for possible danger.
Such hypervigilance is exhausting and hard to maintain. Further attacks reduce morale so that fear and anger give way to resignation, depression, and fatalism as people feel increasingly helpless and vulnerable. Reaction times change unpredictably. Judgment and decision-making ability are adversely affected. Personnel can become careless, even impulsive and accident prone.
As a result of these emotional sequelae, combat readiness suffers, and preparation for the next attack can deteriorate. These psychological factors may help to explain the vulnerabilities of the U. S. embassies and the Marine Corps barracks in Beirut. Constant exposure to terrorist threat, unpredictable danger, and the inability to counterattack or engage the enemy in any tactical way have grave and deleterious psychological consequences for everyone from combat troops on the front lines to dependents living on base. Just such a psychological toll is one of the several objectives of terrorism.
Terrorist Objectives: Sometimes terrorist goals are simple and direct, such as getting their “brothers” out of prison or obtaining ransom money to advance their cause. Other times terrorists want specific political or military changes like removing the U. S. presence from Puerto Rico or Beirut. Their objectives can be long-range and complex. For example, in Latin America, terrorism is often a route to insurrection, revolution, and “liberation.” And always, terrorists seek publicity for its propaganda value.
The sociopolitical objectives of terrorists in fomenting wars of national liberation follow a well-established Marx- ist-Leninist formula. They begin with attacks against a “hit list” of prominent persons to demoralize and discredit the government by making it appear inept and unable to protect the people. Divisiveness and anxiety result- The terrorists appear invincible and omnipotent, as if they can get anyone, anytime, anywhere. Effective assaults yield greater cohesiveness among terrorist groups as they rally under the banner of the one with the most impact- Media publicity, of course, greatly aids this process of cohesion. Repeated terrorist actions bring the final phase of this scenario; provocation of government overreaction, increased repression, reduced freedoms and civil liberties, and establishment of a police state or martial law. Increased repression leads to widespread dissatisfaction
among the people and creates the necessary climate for
revolution.
Does this formula work? El Salvador is a good case in Pmnt. In the late 1970s, this tiny country had as many as f ,^'^erent leftist groups. Terrorist actions of a few uni- le them into five groups, which are one umbrella organisation, the FMLN (Faribundo Marti Liberacion Nacio- na '• and brought increased government repression. The People became increasingly restive as they were caught etween the assaults of the FMLN and the reprisals of the army and the government death squads. Sporadic and se- ective terrorist strikes developed into organized guerrilla operations, leading to the present situation in El Salvador— civil war.
Can anything like this happen in the United States? mbably not on the Salvadoran scale. But where terrorists are unable to cause government destabilization, with- rawal, or downfall, they do attempt to erode the rights 3n freedoms of stronger Western governments. Consider ^ at happens when you board an airplane. As a response o terrorist hijackings, everyone is electronically risked, ’ and his or her carry-on baggage is examined y X ray. What has happened to their rights of privacy, Probable cause, search and seizure, and due process? Of ootirse, such precautions are necessary for security in the °Pe of preventing a terrorist incident. Most people regard . ern as an inconvenience, not a loss of rights. Such secure seeks to protect us all. Agreed. But we should at least e aware that a significant erosion has taken place. And ® have terrorism to thank.
Who are these terrorists? How are they organized? Who . acks and supports them? How do they operate? Describ- lng a “typical” terrorist greatly depends on one’s histori- w and political perspective. Take Anwar Sadat and enachim Begin for instance. Both won the Nobel Prize ., r.Peace, yet both had been jailed for terrorism earlier in e’r lives. One man’s terrorist can be another’s hero. errorist Profile: Often, it is easier to say what terror- $Sts are not. They are usually not the “lunatic fringe” of 0rrie radical movement, wantonly throwing bombs and ~°mmttting random acts of violence against some ill-de- med “establishment.” Nor are they generally from the Untrodden, deprived, and uneducated socioeconomic Masses.
Although generalizations are limited, a “typical” pro- 1 e reveals that terrorists are predominantly male (80- A) and are relatively young (20-35 years). They are _lngle, of urban origin, and from the mainstream of soci- A the middle and upper-middle classes. Most are educa- . with two or more years of college. Exposure to Marx- I .Philosophy and doctrine radicalizes some students, and ls from universities that they are mainly recruited. Ter- nsts are also recruited from prisons for their skills in eaPons use, breaking and entering, car theft, forgery, nd so on.
Dnce into the terrorist ranks, a young radical can ad- •ance his apprenticeship with practical, hands-on training hecarnps in the Middle East and the Soviet Union. There, sj w,ll be instructed in weapons, marksmanship, explo- e ordnance, bomb-making, martial arts, kidnapping,
politics, and guerrilla warfare. These “finishing schools” have successfully organized alienated radicals into an effective assault force.
Organization: Ordinarily, terrorist organizations are a pyramid structure with the leaders and planners at the top; this is the hardcore. Beneath them are the special operators, the action arm that carries out the mission; often they are the criminals mentioned previously. Next are the active supporters who run safe houses, supply and move weapons, and do surveillance or guard duty if there is a kidnap victim. Finally, there are the sympathizers who provide money, safe havens, vehicles, and political and ideological support. These organizations are difficult for counterinsurgency forces to penetrate. The cells are small, and often the members have known each other for a lone time. Passage from the role of sympathizer to the hard core level can take many years and can be fraught with traps and obstacles.
Strategy and Tactics: Bombing is by far the most popular tactic; recent targets have included embassies, military bases, department stores, hotels, and cars. Hijacking occurs with a frequency that belies increased security by airlines around the world. Ambushes and assassinations can occur anywhere and are aimed at individual victims such as Chief Petty Officer Sam Novello in Turkey, Lieutenant Colonel Charles Ray in Paris, and Navy Captain George Tsantes in Athens. Rounding out the tactical list are kidnapping and hostage taking. These tactics are used to obtain ransom money, for political action, or to brine pressure against a government. Examples include the U. S. embassy personnel held in Iran for 444 days and General James Dozier taken by the Red Brigades in Italy.
Dr. Frederick J. Hacker, a psychiatric specialist in ter-
rorism, characterizes terrorists as crusaders, criminals, or crazies. The year 1 left Puerto Rico, 1981, a variety of operations took place by each kind of terrorist. President Ronald Reagan was shot in March by a crazy. Pope John Paul II was assaulted in May, whether by a crusader or a criminal is still being determined. Ramstein Air Force Base was bombed in August by crusaders of the German Red Army Faction (or Baader-Meinhoff gang). And in September, crusaders attacked the Commander in Chief, U. S. Army, in Europe with rocket-propelled grenades while he was riding in his armored staff car. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was assassinated by members of a conspiracy within the ranks of his own army.
Operations—Style, Success, and Support: In the late 1960s and early 1970s, most terrorist operations were national, that is, confined to their country of origin. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) stayed in Ireland; the ETA Basque (Basque Fatherland and Freedom) separatists remained in Spain; the Red Brigades in Italy, and so on. In recent years, however, terrorist operations have become transnational or international in scope. Groups have linked together into networks so that one group can provide what another lacks in arms, intelligence, cash, experience, and the like. An operation can be planned by one group, funded by another, documents provided by a third, armed by a fourth, executed by a fifth, with safe haven provided by a sixth group.
This international network coordination took place as early as 1972 in the Lod Airport massacre. Members of the Japanese Red Army (JRA) traveled to the United
States, Canada, France, and then to Lebanon where they were trained by the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) in assault tactics and weapons. From there, they traveled to Rome, where they were given Czech weapons and hand grenades, then on to Frankfurt for safe haven and to await the fateful flight to Tel Aviv.
JRA members undertook this slaughter to repay the PFLP for the training they had received by acting as their action arm against the Israelis. Ironically, many of their victims were Puerto Rican tourists, visiting the Holy Land to celebrate Easter.
The grisly “success” of that operation indicates how good most terrorists are at what they do. It is characteristic of terrorist operations to be well-planned, carefully rehearsed, precisely timed, and smoothly executed. Success rates in 15,000 major operations between 1970 and 1983 have been estimated at 91% by Risk International, Inc- But the very precision of their operations can be a liability for them and an advantage for anyone wishing to avoid attack, as will be discussed.
Many governments back and support terrorism i11 “soft” ways by permitting them safe havens, easy border passage, and readily obtainable weapons and explosives. Governments providing “hard” support are those that house the training camps, provide money and weapons, fund operations, and export terrorism. Direct support of terrorist activities has been traced to Libya’s Qaddafi, Cuba’s Castro, and the Palistine Liberation Organization’s Yasir Arafat. Indirect backing comes from the Soviet Union, which has a vested interest in the destabilization of
APTEE
SYGMA (PHILIPPE LEDRU)
At the beginning of the Iranian hostage crisis, the Ayatollah Khomeini got the news media’s attention—and some sympathy for his cause among Third World nations—by releasing some of the hostages.
Western governments, and in any group professing to be fighting a “war of national liberation.”
Victims, Targets, and the Media: Terrorist attacks are simple, dynamic, hit and run, and designed for their impact on a larger audience. Those losing life or limb are the victims, but we are all the targets of the psychological and political impact of terrorist strategy. Terrorists use violence for effect as they play to the media in their theater of the obscene. Immediate worldwide media coverage of terrorist acts vastly multiplies their power to influence.
Attacks Against the Military: Media coverage partly accounts for the escalation of terrorist attacks against the military. Terrorists perceive U. S. involvement with for- c'gn governments as making the United States part of the regime the terrorists are trying to overthrow, whether the military is there as advisors, peacekeeping forces, or as a Presence with bases on foreign soil. In a high-threat environment, the military usually tries to maintain a low pro- 1 e- But the media often advertise the military presence and involvement, thus calling attention to military personnel as potential targets.
For example, in March 1983, Life magazine carried a mailed photo-essay of U. S. military advisors in El Salvador. The advisors do not wear uniforms and try to blend mto the local community. But pictures of many of them ^ere prominently featured—on training operations with e Salvadoran Army, jogging, at graduation ceremonies pllh their pupils, at leisure, and so on. Two months later, 'eutenant Commander A1 Schaufelberger, Navy SEAL and deputy commander of the forces in San Salvador, was assassinated by the guerrillas as a “response to the criminal intervention of Yankee imperialism. ’ ’ Was there a connection between the media coverage and the assassina- >°n? In a high-threat environment, it does not pay to advertise.
Another reason for increased attacks against the U. S. military is because military personnel are deployed world- w>de. We represent the United States abroad. We symbol- 1Ze U. S. values, customs, influence, and power. So an attack against the U. S. military becomes an attack against e United States and for all it stands.
. Finally, statistics on terrorism against all targets are ris- steadily around the world. Terrorism is, indeed, a growth industry of the ’80s.” Thus, U. S. military targets are hit increasingly in this rising tide of terrorism.
terrorism and Democracy: Terrorism is tyranny of the Weak, perpetrated by the few against the many. Often ter- r°nsts have no constituency; they are completely selfserving. For example, in seeking total independence for uerto Rico, the Macheteros were acting contrary to the esires of more than 90% of the island’s population.
As warfare, terrorism is cheap, effective, efficient, and SasY- It is very difficult to combat in the traditional mili- arV sense. The terrorist has the element of surprise. JacoS Ven, former commander of Israel’s National Defense'' °Hege, believes that terrorism should be regarded as conditional warfare to enhance our preparedness, resources, ancl diplomatic and military responses to terrorists.
Free countries and those struggling toward democracy are vulnerable to terrorism. There is little terrorism in seCured totalitarian states, except that practiced by the state Against its citizens. Just as our democratic rights and free. °ms belong to us all, we all have a responsibility to assist ln the fight against terrorism.
The terrorist threat is real—worldwide. The danger is ®Scalating, especially to people in uniform. Terrorist acts re both tactical (victims) and psychological (targets). Ter- °r'st violence in a country tends to increase as the government weakens or destabilizes. Regardless of rank, all miliarY personnel are at risk when they deploy throughout the
world. Everyone can act to counter this deadly threat by knowing as much as possible about personal protection and hostage survival.
Personal Protection
In December 1984, the DoD issued an updated version of Directive 1300.7, which originally established Code of Conduct training. The directive now also includes guidance for hostile detention during peacetime for all military members. This marks the first time such uniform policy has existed. The directive advises “ . . . if assigned in or traveling through areas of known terrorist activity, U. S. military personnel shall exercise prudent antiterrorism measures to reduce their vulnerability to capture.’’ The essence of such personal protection is a strategy of avoidance. Such a strategy is built upon understanding and knowledge. Knowledge of how terrorists operate, how they think and plan, can be helpful for designing specific methods and techniques for personal protection. Understanding the psychological effects of terrorism helps to surmount their impact and to resist their influence.
Before applying any methods, however, there are three essential psychological factors that must be understood and acted upon to maximize personal protection and security against terrorism. These factors are denial, organiza-. tional dependency, and the Phoenix effect.
Overcoming Denial: “It’ll never happen to me!” is the usual way denial is expressed. No one wants to think of oneself as a possible terrorist victim. Believing that it happens only to the other guy interferes with contingency planning—taking the steps necessary to reduce risk to ourselves and our families. Ostrich-like behavior, motivated by denial, makes one even more vulnerable to the ravages of terrorism.
“I’m not important enough! ’ is another common expression of denial. It is simply not true that terrorists confine their actions to people of prominence, high rank, and importance. The year after I left Puerto Rico, four enlisted sailors on liberty were shot in the streets of San Juan by the Macheteros; one man died. Dutch school children have been held hostage by South Moluccan terrorists as have Israeli school children by the Palestinians. And terrorist bombings on a mass scale like those at the Marine barracks in Beirut and Ramstein Air Force Base in Germany make little distinction between rank and status.
It could happen to you! To the extent that you realize that and plan for the possibility, you will be far better prepared and may well reduce your risk. No one wants to imagine oneself the victim of a terrorist assassination or kidnapping. But overcoming denial and learning what to do to prevent it is a crucial first step toward survival.
Organizational Dependency: It is all too easy to rely on the military organization to provide security and protection in trouble spots. Bases, ships, and squadrons go to considerable extents to make all hands safe while on board. But that protection does not extend everywhere, nor can it surround the sailor all the time. And base security cannot be 100% certain, as shown by the bombings in Germany and Beirut.
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SYGMA (VAN PARYS)
Terrorist bombings—whether overseas, above, at a NATO facility in Brussels, or at the Washington Navy Yard, facing page—get the serviceman’s attention. The initial reactions of surprise and anger often give way eventually to the fear that “My country seems to be powerless to protect me and my family.”
Military personnel must relinquish the belief that they can depend completely on the military for security. Each person must take responsibility and learn what to do for protection of self, shipmates, and family when deployed to a high-threat area.
Most kidnap victims are abducted when they are traveling to or from their homes. An armored staff car is useful against small arms fire, but it will not stop a rocket-propelled grenade or a bomb. Young sailors have been killed while on liberty and far from the security of their ship. Clearly, terrorists know our vulnerabilities and take advantage of them. Thus, it is especially important that everyone know what to do for oneself and others when not under the protective umbrella of the military.
The Phoenix Effect: Periodically, in a mood more hopeful than realistic, the authorities announce that “the back has been broken” of some terrorist organization. But terrorist groups have a way of rising from the ashes like the mythical Phoenix. In a police sweep, it is extremely difficult to apprehend all the dissidents who make up an organization. Those remaining go underground, reform and sometimes rename the group, gather strength, and later emerge with another assault. A case in point: after the dramatic rescue of General Dozier by the Italian police, it was widely broadcast that the end of the Red Brigades was at hand. Yet scarcely a year after the general’s release, Leamon Hunt, head of the Multi-National Force in the Sinai, was killed with the Red Brigades claiming responsibility. Such announcements of the “elimination” of terrorist groups should be met with skepticism and, more importantly, no reduction in one’s security precautions. Just such a lapse is what terrorists are awaiting.
‘ ‘An Ounce of Prevention . . . ” The basic principles of personal protection are quite simple: be alert, be unpredictable, and keep a low profile. Each will be discussed in turn to show how it can be specifically applied.
Be Alert:
- Be sensitive to surveillance, and if you suspect it, report it. Terrorist attacks and kidnappings are well planned. If you are being set up, terrorists will watch you to learn your habits, patterns, goings, and comings. If you believe you are being followed or watched, do not hesitate to report it to security. General Dozier’s wife observed the surveillance of them by the Red Brigades and told her husband. At the time, he ignored the information, but he is a wiser man today.
- Stay informed. When reporting to a new area, read local newspapers and find out about local groups, their methods of operation, and level of activity. Naval Investigative Service (NIS) can supply intelligence reports of local terrorist activity in a particular country as well as worldwide threat assessments. Use its services.
- Get acquainted with neighbors and other military people living in the area. Involve others in mutual security plans so that all are aware of and concerned about each other’s welfare.
- Secure quarters. NIS or Security can conduct a survey
196 Proceedings / Naval Review 1985
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°f home and office and provide specific advice on how to enhance security. In choice of quarters, a well-managed aPartment building with a resident manager is usually JTiore secure than a separate dwelling. Establish a “safe aven ’ within the house, such as a bathroom or bedroom ^hh a solid door. Install an extra phone there with ecurity’s number posted clearly. Family members can go here and be safe while they call for help in an emergency.
Use strict caution in admitting unknown persons to your quarters. When the Red Brigades arrived to kidnap Gen- ^ral Dozier, they were disguised as Italian plumbers who ad come to repair a leaking washer in his utility room. §ain, his wife urged him not to admit them. But he did and quickly became the plumbers’ hostage.
Brief family members and have a response plan. Too often in the interest of “protecting” our families from needless” worry, we fail to discuss potential problems W|[h them. Should terrorists attack, uninformed dependents are much the worse if they have not been briefed.
°°d security is everyone’s responsibility. Make sure everyone is alert to the problem and knows what to do.
, Uo not hesitate to report suspicious events to the author- tttes. This is one of the most important principles. An alert C|hzen in Evanston, Illinois, reported suspicious nighttime activities in his neighborhood to the police, who subse- ing this, plan their operations to take advantage of such predictability. Certainly, this was the case in assaults against General Alexander Haig, when he was Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, and General F. J. Kroesen, Commander in Chief, U. S. Army, Europe. Arriving at the scene of his intended demise just seconds late, General Haig survived a bomb attack by the ETA Basque separatists that nearly demolished his car. Two rocket-propelled grenades launched by the Red Army faction missed General Kroesen in his car by only six inches. Admiral Car- rero-Blanco of Spain was not so fortunate. The ETA spent weeks tunneling under a road that he always traveled to work at the same time every day. Twenty kilograms of high explosive placed in the tunnel blew his car over a five-story building. An unpredictable target may never become a victim.
- Vary routes and times to work meetings, and social engagements. Select and randomly use alternate routes of arrival and departure from home and office.
- Use well-traveled streets. Be watchful for any signs that you are being followed. If so, do not drive home. Go to the nearest police station, military base, government building, or hospital.
- Learn defensive driving skills. Attempts at hostage-taking often occur while one is traveling in a car. Maintain at
gently arrested a group of FALN (Fuerzas Armadas para a Liberation National: Armed Forces of National Libera- ®n) terrorists. This man probably averted a major wave °‘ bombings in the United States as that was just what . ese Puerto Rican terrorists were about to undertake, •ertness and public support are two key ingredients that e FBI emphasizes in the prevention of terrorist acts.
Be Unpredictable: Typically, military people like Schedules, routines, and regular habits. Terrorists, know- least a half tank of gas in the car at all times. A radio, telephone, or CB rig can enable you to call for help. If you are being followed and cannot reach a safe place or if an interdiction is attempted, try to evade in your car; escaping on foot is not likely to succeed and can be dangerous. Practice evasion tactics mentally, which is almost as good as field training in learning new skills. Try to imagine various interdictions, and plan how to evade.
► Vary other routines, habits, and patterns of behavior.
- Again, advise the family. Help family members alter their habits and develop contingency plans.
Maintain a Low Profile:
- Avoid crowds, demonstrations, and riots. Even if they are not anti-American, there is a distinct danger of getting caught up in the violence of the mob and becoming a victimized bystander. Stay home when the local residents are restless.
- Do not cluster. Avoid clubs, bars, and restaurants that are popular with Americans, especially those off base. In February 1985, 57 U. S. servicemen and their dependents were injured when a terrorist time-bomb exploded in an Athens bar they often frequented.
- Do not advertise your military membership. Wear civilian clothes when going to work, on liberty, or in a travel status. Do everything you possibly can to blend into the local community.
- Get a local car and plates. If base or DoD passes have to be used, attach them to the sun visor and swing them into view when needed or keep them on a card in the glovebox.
- Keep travel plans private. Check in regularly. Avoid identifying yourself as a military member to anyone who does not have a need to know.
Finally, terrorists have used letter and package bombs to assail an intended victim. When sent through the regular mail system, letter bombs sometimes explode in the automated stamp cancelling machine, which is good for the victim but hard on equipment. Consequently, many such devices are hand delivered. Be alert. Recognition points include:
- Something you did not order or expect
- Special delivery, confidential, or personal letters with no return address or a foreign return address
- Incorrect titles or titles but no names
- Misspelling of common words; handwritten or poorly typed address
- Excessive postage or weight; excessive tape, string, etc.
- Fopsided, uneven envelope; oily stains, discolorations
- Protruding wires, tinfoil, etc.
If at all suspicious, call Security or the base explosive ordnance disposal unit. Do not attempt to dispose of it yourself. Do not put a suspected letter or package bomb in water; that will not disarm it. It will only soften the glue and cause it to detonate anyway—killing and drenching you in one blast.
Become a hardened target by knowing and using these principles of personal protection. Avoid becoming another victim.
Hostage Survival and the Code of Conduct
In spite of your best efforts at personal protection, there is still a possibility that, someday, you could become a hostage of a terrorist group. Through the use of coping strategies, this section examines what you can do before, during, and after a hostage-taking episode to improve your prospects for survival.
The Navy’s survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) schools are tasked with teaching personnel who could become prisoners of war (POWs) about coping with captivity, resisting enemy exploitation, and applying the Code of Conduct. SERE schools are attended by those who are at high risk of capture in combat such as pilots, flight officers, air crews, SEALs, and Marines.
However, terrorists can and have struck all manner and kind of military people, and never in a combat environment. The following procedures and recommendations described evolved from research I conducted and training I received while assigned to Navy SERE as a psychologist. These strategies can and should be used by all military personnel who are deployed throughout the world.
Overcoming Denial—Again: The prospect of becoming a hostage is even more difficult for most people to consider and plan for than taking precautions against the possibility of a terrorist assault. Most people simply ignore the problem. Others, when they think about it, engage in fantasies of macho heroics in which they imagine themselves evading cleverly or fighting their way out. But such imaginings are usually unrealistic and dangerous. It is far better to face the problem and plan accordingly. Studies of returned Vietnam POWs showed that those men who anticipated the unpleasant prospect of becoming a prisoner of war and planned with their families for that possibility were far less distressed and worried during captivity than those who did not.
Before You Are Taken: Prior planning includes putting personal affairs in order—for example, ensuring your will is up-to-date and that your spouse can readily take over business and legal matters such as taxes and mortgage payments. If you are deployed overseas, decide in advance whether your family will return home or not should something happen to you. Make other contingency plans as necessary to your personal situation. The main purpose of such prior action is to reduce your worry about your family while you are a captive. Remember that worry about the welfare of one’s family is one of the more difficult aspects of captivity and one which a captor is likely to exploit. So prepare accordingly.
If terrorists are in the process of capturing you and escape routes have been blocked, this is not the time to run. fight, give physical resistance, or act impulsively. The terrorists will be anxious and tense, and this is a most dangerous time for the victim. Attempted heroics will only get you hurt; avoid turning a kidnapping into a killing-
At this point, the safest options are to control your emotions and outwardly comply with the terrorists’ demands- Later, when things are more calm and a routine has been established, resistance and escape can be considered. Bear in mind that the beginning and ending of a hostage-taking episode are the most dangerous times for the hostage- Once the terrorists have established control and a custodial routine has begun, the situation will be calmer and relatively safer. During this middle phase, the hostage needs to know how to cope with captivity and how to behave toward the captors to improve chances for survival.
Coping with Captivity: Psychological studies of former POWs and hostages have shown that captivity is a highly stressful experience. But, surprisingly, boredom and frustration are the captive’s worst problems. Confinement with little or nothing to do for hours and days, deprivation
for
. going slowly.
Finally, have faith in God. Most captives report a pro- °und deepening of their religious values during their or, • Certainly, meditation and prayer can be a great
s°urce of strength and comfort.
,^ostage Survival: As recently as 19 December 1984, e Department of Defense has finally established uniform Policy for military personnel in all branches of the armed
the usual amenities that everyone takes for granted, rePeated frustrations resulting from the captive’s inability to alter the situation, and the psychological strain of hav- "Jg an indefinite “sentence” all contribute to what psychologists call learned helplessness. Normally active and ealthy people become depressed, despondent, compliant ^>th the captor’s demands, and self-reproachful. Success- U1 coping with captivity is a constant battle against degrading conditions and debilitating emotions. But it can be ^°rie. Some approaches that have helped former prisoners
^ Stay physically fit. Maintain health and personal hy- §lene as best you can under the circumstances. Exercise regularly, even if all you can do is stretch or do isometric exercises against your bonds. Eat everything, no matter 0vv unappetizing. You will need all the nourishment you Patl get. So eat with your stomach, not with your eyes.
Maintain personal discipline. Set and keep a daily Schedule of activities. Draw out those activities as much as Possible and make each one an event. Keep your mind Usy, if possible with reading and writing; ask your cap- °rs for these materials. If they refuse, use other mental rrjethods. Working problems, writing poetry or music, and Playing games in your mind are helpful to pass the time ?nd keep up your spirits.
. Use your mind to dwell on happy memories, enjoyable imaginings, and pleasant fantasies of the future. Review ‘*e plans and goals, looking toward the things you would . to do when free. Avoid worry and dwelling upon the lndefinite length of your captivity. Reassure yourself that Wlth each passing moment, hour, day the resolution of V°ur captivity comes closer.
Have faith in yourself and in knowing that others have een in a similar situation and survived. You are not the 'rst to face such difficulties. They made it; you can, too.
Have faith in the United States and your government, nowing that all efforts will be made to obtain your reease. But do not try to push things; there are good reasons
Two months after a Life photographer showed him and another advisor walking a Salvadoran street, U. S. Navy Lieutenant Commander A. Schaufelberger, right, was assassinated as a “response to the criminal intervention of Yankee imperialism.” Was there a connection between the media coverage and the assassination?
forces to guide their conduct during peacetime hostile detention, either by foreign governments or by terrorists. This newly revised DoD Directive 1300.7 states:
“All members of the Armed Forces are expected to measure up to the standards of the Code of Conduct. Although designed for Prisoner of War (PW) situations, the spirit and intent of the Code is applicable to service members subjected to other hostile detention, and such members should conduct themselves, consistently, in a manner that will avoid discrediting themselves and their country.”
There are important legal and psychological differences between being held hostage and being a POW for which the Code of Conduct was originally designed. Fortunately, the code is a living, adaptable body of moral guidance. It can be used effectively by the military hostage to assist survival with honor, integrity, and self-respect.
As a hostage, you have been taken for what you represent, not for who you are. To the terrorists, you are a symbol of America’s military might, of American values and purposes. They do not know you, yet, for the person that you are, but rather for the government that your uniform represents. From their point of view, you may well symbolize an “American war-mongering, imperialist, aggressor-pig and lackey of the Wall Street capitalists!” Since terrorists do not see you as a person, some terrorism specialists believe that the hood frequently used to cover the heads of hostages is less to prevent hostages from seeing where they are going and more to depersonalize them further.
Unfortunately, it is psychologically easier to harm or kill a depersonalized symbol than it is a fellow human being. The Code of Conduct and the new DoD directive, however, can be vital in reducing that symbolism and enabling the hostage to emerge as a person in the terrorists’ eyes. Bringing about such a change can improve treatment of the hostage, and ultimately, be life-saving. Advice about how to survive as a hostage follows:
- Control your fear and anger toward the terrorists. Certainly, those emotions are normal in a life-threatening situation, but it is essential to maintain self-control and not to act impulsively nor to become hysterical. “Regardless of the type of detention or captivity, or harshness of treatment, U. S. military personnel will maintain their military bearing. They should make every effort to remain calm, courteous, and project personal dignity” (DoD directive).
- Try to obtain respect from the terrorists. This can be accomplished by controlling your emotions and by behaving in a military manner toward the terrorists. That means being respectful, polite, and living your values by show-
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ing self-discipline and personal strength. That does not mean showing John Wayne-style true grit. Rather, show quiet courage in the face of adversity.
- Develop rapport with the hostage-takers and attempt to reduce their ability to depersonalize you. “Surviving in some terrorist detentions may depend on the hostages conveying a personal dignity and apparent sincerity to the captors” (DoD directive). That can be done by effectively communicating with the terrorists, for which the Code of Conduct gives you guidance.
The Code of Conduct:
- Article I states, “I am an American fighting man. I
That Army Brigadier General James Dozier survived his captivity by the Red Brigades in Italy to participate in a press conference of his own may have been the result of his improvised code of personal conduct. He did that which he was forced to do, but he gained the respect of his captors and developed a rapport between himsell and attending guards.
SYGMA serve in the forces which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense.” Are you? A few hostages have been murdered; some have faced repeated mock executions, as in Iran; most have heard death threats. There is evidence that some hostages, by being too resistive, have provoked captors into killing them, even when the captors were reluctant to do so. Selfcontrol, communication, and respectful behavior are safeguards against such provocation. Bear in mind that the terrorists have gone to a lot of trouble to capture you; they are unlikely to kill you for no reason. You are more valuable to them alive than dead, and statistics show that most hostages survive.
► Article II states in part, “I will never surrender of my own free will.” This may be a moot point when it comes to a hostage-taking. As previously discussed, terrorist operations are carefully planned, rehearsed, and executed so that you may have little choice. Excessive resistance and foolhardy escape attempts have gotten people killed. Also, in a group hostage-taking, one must bear in mind that there are other lives at stake; act cautiously.
^ Article III enjoins military personnel to “ . . . continue to resist by all means available . . . And the DoD directive emphasizes “ . . . there are no circumstances in which a detainee or captive should voluntarily give classify information or materials to those who are unauthor- lzed to receive them. Detainees, captives and hostages must resist, to the utmost of their ability, each and every attempt by their captor to obtain such information.”
Furthermore, Article III states, “I will make every ef- °rt to escape and aid others to escape.” But the directive adds these cautions: “Escape attempts will be made only after consideration of the risk of violence, chance of suc- |-ess, and detrimental effects on the detainees remaining behind. . . . Hostages and kidnap victims who consider escape to be their only hope are authorized to make such attempts.”
The military hostage’s actions pertinent to this guidance depend on whether he is alone or part of a group. If alone, ne will probably be heavily guarded, and escape may be nearly impossible. If in a group, many of the same consid- lining authorization from the senior ranking officer, who ^bst weigh the risk of reprisals to the others in the group against the value of the escape. Furthermore, if hostage negotiations are in progress, which the captive may know nothing about, a poorly timed and imprudent escape could nave serious adverse consequences. Finally, as much in- orrnation as possible should be brought out by the esCaPee. Details about where the hostages are kept, about ne terrorists and their weapons, and about locations of doors, rooms, exits, and entrances can be extremely useful to a tactical team mounting an assault against the terrorists to free the hostages.
Article III concludes, “I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy.” This portion of the article does not prohibit a military member from accepting early release in a hostage situation. “U. S. military detainees should not refuse to accept release unless doing so requires hem to compromise their honor or cause damage to the
U. S. government or its allies. Persons in charge of detained U. S. military personnel will authorize release under almost all circumstances” (DoD directive). Negotiators may have worked hard to obtain such a release. The terrorists may be willing to release personnel who are sick or injured. In any case, a military person can bring out information that can be highly valuable to the negotiators and to the tactical team.
- Article IV states in part, “ . . .1 will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no information nor take part in any action which might be harmful to my comrades.” The directive adds, “U. S. military personnel, whether detainees or captives, can be assured that the U. S. government will make every good faith effort to obtain their earliest release. Faith in one’s country and its way of life, faith in fellow detainees or captives, and faith in one’s self are critical to surviving with honor and resisting exploitation.” These points are especially important in a group hostage situation as captors will often use divide- and-conquer tactics, special favors, selective information, and other distortions to manipulate and exploit certain hostages or the entire group, especially if it is mixed military and civilian.
The directive underscores the importance of establishing a military organization, chain of command, effective communications, and participation by civilian captives. Such an organization will aid group cohesion and faithkeeping, serve as a source of strength, and support everyone in resisting the captor’s goals of exploitation for propaganda or political purposes.
It is important for the military hostage to remember that he does not have the full picture. He is being allowed to see only what his captors select. Under stress, one tends to be more critical of others’ behavior than one’s own. Consequently, suspending judgments about others in the group, pulling together as much as possible under the circumstances, and maintaining group morale through mutual support are the essential resistance goals for the hostage to strive to meet.
- Article V, pertaining to authorized communications with captors, is amplified considerably by DoD Directive 1300.7. Together, the intentions of these two sets of guidance are seemingly contradictory. On the one hand, it is important to limit communications with captors and to be careful of what one says to them to avoid possible exploitation by hostile governments or terrorists. On the other, it is essential to communicate, especially with terrorists, in an effort to develop more of a personal relationship that can enhance survival. Clearly, this is a tightrope that must be walked carefully.
Military members detained by hostile governments in peacetime are authorized and encouraged to give name, rank, service number, date of birth, and those circumstances leading to their detention. Furthermore, they are encouraged to ask, continually if need be, to make contact with personnel representing the U. S., allied, or neutral governments. There is no need to sign any document nor to make any statement; exploitation takes many forms. Firm, polite resistance to such attempts will reduce one’s exploitative value to the captor and may lead to earlier
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release. Detainees are recommended to confine conversations to matters of health and welfare, condition of their fellow detainees, and returning home.
Being the hostage of a terrorist group presents some additional challenges and complexities. Article V enjoins the military member to “ . . . make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.” Usually, terrorists are not much interested in interrogating hostages nor are they very good at it.
However, they sometimes do want “confessions of guilt for alleged “crimes against the people,” or they want the hostage to present their demands. Obviously, any such “confession” is an effort at exploitation, can only worsen the hostage’s plight, may lengthen his captivity, and should be resisted or evaded as much as possible.
It may be prudent to present the captor’s demands in that one may be able to pass information or at least assure others that one is alive and well. If this option is elected, the hostage should take care to present the demands as those of the terrorists and not an admission of guilt by the hostage.
Conversing with terrorists over nonessential matters is authorized and encouraged by the new DoD directive, and it can serve several purposes. It can assist in evading terrorists’ more compromising questions. It can help to establish rapport with them and to reduce their dehumanizing and ideological hatred of the military hostage. ‘‘A hostage also may listen actively to the terrorist’s feelings about his or her cause to support the hostage’s desire to be a ‘person’ to the terrorist; however, he or she should never pander, praise, participate, or debate the terrorist’s cause with him or her” (DoD directive). Discussion also gives the hostage an opportunity to assess his captors.
The Geneva Conventions, though they do not legally apply in peacetime detention, provide excellent guidance to the hostage by underscoring the value of talking with captors about matters of health, welfare, and comfort. “Hostages, therefore, may discuss non-substantive topics such as sports, family, and clothing, to convey to the terrorists the captive’s personal dignity and human qualities” (DoD directive). Topics to be avoided in such conversations are political, economic, religious, or other potentially incendiary subjects that could anger the terrorists and further polarize differences with their military hostage.
► Article VI ends, “I will trust in my God and in the United States of America." It is very important to trust. Although the United States makes no concessions to terrorists, every effort will be made to free the hostages. Negotiators will take time with their process to improve the survival chances for the hostage, to allow tactical forces to get into position, and to enable the Stockholm Syndrome to develop.
The Stockholm Syndrome: This set of psychological reactions consists of the development of mutual positive feelings between the terrorist and the hostage. It is the opposite of the depersonalization and symbolism discussed earlier. These feelings can result from communication and a growing respect and rapport between captor and captive. Such emotions can be conflicting and disturbing to the hostage as he is still in a life-threatening situation- But the reciprocal feelings by the terrorist can be life-saving as they make it much more difficult for him to harm or kill the hostage. General Dozier’s experience illustrates the application of the Code of Conduct in a hostage situation as well as the development of the Stockholm Syndrome, which probably saved his life.
Inasmuch as the Red Brigades were aware of the Stockholm Syndrome, too, they tried to keep the general isolated. He was placed on a cot inside a partitioned tent; he
They were taken, not for who they were, but for what they represented. Following 444 days of captivity, the Iranian hostages came home. Their ordeal was over, but the danger of terrorism and the threat that it poses to us all continue.
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can help the hostage cope with them more easily when they occur.
- Relief and brief euphoria are usually the immediate reactions after release. The hostage has survived a terrifying period of stress, fear, tension, and uncertainty. Reprieve from that can give him quite a high.
- Hyperarousal, a combination of overstimulation and exhaustion, typically follows as the euphoria fades, and the effects of strain and tension take their toll. Home, family, friends, good food, and sleep provide the best
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Was on one side, his guard on the other. His hands were Manacled, and there were headphones over his ears play- tog loud rock ’n’ roll. Undeterred, General Dozier took every opportunity to discuss these matters with his captors. He got them to move the manacles from his hands to tos feet and to change the music in his headphones to something he could tolerate. They discussed food, as too rr>uch Italian pasta was causing him to gain weight. He avoided what interrogation there was by turning the conVersation to personal matters. And so on.
The general’s guard had a weapon locked and loaded, was under orders to kill Dozier if anything went Wrong. When the Italian carabinieri made their spectacu- ar rescue, the guard had plenty of time to shoot his hostage, but he never used his weapon. Later, when asked why, his reply was a classic example of the life-saving Power of the Stockholm Syndrome: “Because I no longer saw the enemy. I just saw a sleeping man.”
Liberation: Hostages naturally dream of rescue, but when it comes, it can be a most dangerous time for them. Tactical teams usually assault with what has been dubbed Israeli style,” since Israelis invented it. They burst in With guns blazing, shouting “Everybody down!” Anyone n°t complying is assumed to be a terrorist and will likely he shot.
Most hostages survive their ordeal, but when hostage heaths do occur, 70-80% of them are during rescue opera- hons, usually from failure to follow orders. Instructions during a liberation are simple, but vital: get down, stay tow, blend with the group, and do what you are told. After the SWAT team has taken control, the hostage can still expect firm treatment from them until a positive identifica- h°n can be made. In the excitement of the liberation, it is ^specially important to maintain self-control and not to act lrr|pulsively. The hostage is not home yet, but freedom atld reunion with family and friends are close at hand.
Aftermath—Healing the Mind and Body: Psychologists hnow that the harrowing, life-threatening experiences of hostages usually result in certain normal adjustment reac- l°ns following captivity. Understanding these reactions cure.
- Guilt is experienced by some hostages. It seems to result from confusing pride with honor. Most persons are not as heroic in the actual situation as they imagine themselves to be before it happens. Not living up to such unrealistic expectations can result in guilt. Recognizing this psychological process for what it is and realizing that one has survived with honor often restores the former hos-. tage’s self-respect and ends his needless guilt.
- Other transient reactions include sleep and appetite disturbances, nightmares, and feeling different from others who have not had the experience. Sometimes a hostage feels the need to talk about his experience a lot, and at other times, he just wants to forget it.
- Families of hostages have similar reactions as they, too, have been under considerable stress. Families either treat the former hostage as a fragile being who may “break” at any moment; or they may try to ignore what has happened and get back to a normal life as quickly as possible. Neither approach is helpful as both deny everyone the necessary expression of their feelings.
Establishing regular times for and a climate of open communication with all family members to talk about their feelings can be valuable to everyone in working through these emotional issues. Professional psychological assistance lor a period can expedite returning to a normal life as well.
The Future—Through a Glass Darkly: Although the stress of being held hostage can pass with time and proper care, the danger of terrorism and the threat that it poses to us all continues. At least weekly, news reports from around the world detail some new terrorist action. Terrorism is no longer the wave of the future. That future is already here. Terrorism is a world problem that will not go away.
Terrorism is a direct threat to the American rights, freedoms, and values that we in the U. S. armed services have dedicated ourselves to defend and protect. It is crucial in this complex and often confusing world that we maintain a clear vision of the vital importance of our mission, that we remember for what we are fighting. It is vital that each of us learns to survive this threat with honor and integrity.
As I Recall ... 6 ‘Ritzy Duty”
By Rear Admiral Malcolm F. Schoeffel, U. S. Navy (Retired)
When my class graduated from the Naval Academy a year early in June 1918, I put in a request for destroyer duty, which I eventually got. 1 didn’t get it right away. My first assignment was to the then-largest ship in the world, the Leviathan, which was in the cruiser and transport force. One of my classmates, Clarence Schildhauer, was there also. The two of us went to the Leviathan, and we did one round-trip on her from Hoboken to Brest and back carrying troops.
Our duties were mostly watches— fire-control watches—and we also stood junior officer of the deck watches. The senior officers of the deck were all quite elderly Naval Reserve merchant seamen, and they were a delightful bunch. They were salts from way back.
Of course, they were brought up in the tradition that the officer of the watch stood his watch on the weather wing of the bridge. The Leviathan was a fast ship. We went bowling across the Atlantic at 24 or 25 knots when the weather was very good. The relative wind was almost dead ahead all the time, and it was very difficult to determine which one was the weather wing. The fellow with whom I stood watches, old Mr. Foster, would come up on the bridge and he would look around and sniff the wind. If he concurred with the man he was going to relieve, he’d go right over there and get down to busi- tual territory and there would be a relief and off they’d go. But I got a lot of amusement out of watching these old salts perform.
The wardroom of the Leviathan was very plush. There had been two dining rooms in the vessel when she was a liner. One on an upper level, which was smaller and much more plush than the one on the lower level. All the Army officers were assigned to the lower level and all the naval officers were assigned to the upper level, which the Army-types resented very much.
I found myself sitting up there in our region, which was dubbed a very fancy French name—the Ritz. We all sat at small tables, and I was at a table with just two others. One was an old
During World War I, then-Ensign Schoeffel helped transport troops to Europe in the camouflaged Leviathan. With her slap-dash paint job, neither the converted German-built luxury liner—nor her doughboy passengers— nor the black gang who loaded her coal looked very “ritzy.” ness, but if he didn’t concur, he'd stand there around the wheel and the binnacle and huff and puff, and the other fellow would stay out on the bridge wing.
It was a great big bridge, 80 or 90 feet from one side to the other, and they’d stand there and glare at each other and finally one of them would say, “Don’t you know the customs of the sea?” or words to that effect. Eventually they’d get together on mu- shellback who went over to France and took command of the Navy railroad batteries there, and the second was his aide, none other than Jay Gould. These two had a great deal to talk about between themselves—nothing to say to me, and I had nothing to add to the conversation—but I listened a lot.
The meals were very good up there, and, as far as my quarters were concerned, I don’t know how this came about, but 1 was assigned to a state-
This
room had previously been as
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r°om under the bridge. It was huge— tWo double beds and its own bathroom- ®nd this for the greenest of ensigns!
signed to the ship’s carpenter. When (hey made the ship over into a trans- P°rt, they ripped out the fresh-water c°nnections in all the cabins in the ship vvjth the exception of those of the cap- tf'n> executive officer, and, guess who, Pe chief carpenter. He, being in charge I* this, had fresh water. I fell heir to Pis room, somehow or other, and I fell Peir to his fresh water.
As I say, this was very, very plush, n later years I asked some questions ab°ut how much it would have cost to Hake a one-way trip in that ship when he Leviathan was running as a liner 0r the United States Line. It was an jhhazing amount of money. The figure have in mind, which is probably 'Vr°ng, is $5,000 for a one-way trip.
Of course, the purpose of all this "'as to transport troops to Europe. We parried a very large number, something ■ke 10,000. Upon arrival in Brest, they ■sembarked as rapidly as possible, and We set off to coal ship. That was a pery tough job because, first off, the tench brought the coal out in lighters where the coal was down in the hold, lnstead of on a flat, even deck. It’s vastly easier to dig coal from the side 0 a pile than it is to dig down from the top. The leverage is different. She ||as coaled by putting all this coal in Prough ports in her side, coaling ports, and in order to get up to these ports, v'e filled wicker bushel baskets. Then had wooden stagings rigged on the s*de, and two men on each level would Pass the basket up maybe three stages atld dump it in there.
This coaling went on day and night H'Uhout cessation for three or four ays. No individual was on all that ■He. It would be eight hours on the
coal pile and sixteen hours off, and it was plenty strenuous. At the end of that time it was announced that we had put on board some 6,000-7,000 tons. The command was very well pleased with the celerity with which the ship had been coaled, and then we turned around and headed back to Hoboken.
We carried with us a thousand or so men who were being sent back for one reason or another. We were escorted only in the vicinity of the French coast, because at 24 or 25 knots, the Leviathan was one of the fastest ships in the world in those days. Submarines could certainly not keep up with us, but I can’t remember if we zigzagged or not.
Back home, the contrast between coaling in Hoboken and in Brest was breathtaking. A bunch of coal barges were brought alongside. They were eased up alongside with electrically driven coal hoists. Down in the coal barge there would be one civilian in each barge who would push the coal over to the hoist, and up it would come and then go down the coal chutes. I suppose the black gang had almost as much work to do in Hoboken as they did in Brest, because this coal had to be evened up in the bunkers, but as far as the deck force was concerned, there was nothing to it.
After my one trip in luxury, I hung around New York awaiting orders. Eventually I was sent to Europe on board the British liner Lapland. She was being used in a convoy as a troop carrier, and on this trip carried 3,0004,000 troops of the Wildcat Division from the mountains of Carolina.
I went aboard expecting to have nothing to do and found myself faced with a considerable responsibility, because there were 500 completely unorganized sailors on board there. They had been sent in by drafts from quite a number of training stations. These 500 or so had no overall organization whatever, except that the ship’s officers had said that they should be quartered on the promenade deck. That sounds very lovely, but the promenade deck in days of peace had been glassed in with big glass ports. They had all been removed so the cold and wintery breezes blew right through the deck. They had billet hooks up there for the sailors’ hammocks and insisted that all hammocks be put in certain hammock mannings each morning. They must not have known what a sailor’s hammock was like, because their mannings were about twice the size of a couch.
I found myself the senior U. S. naval officer on board, and responsible for 500 sailors badly in need of someone to represent them, so I had to turn to on this. Among these 500, I found only three or four men who had had any previous military experience whatever. There was one old aviation chief machinist’s mate. I remember him with a great deal of respect and gratitude.
His name was Rogers. And there was a chief boatswain’s mate, who some years before had done a hitch in the Marines. And there was a Jewish yeoman from New York on duty in the Navy. Also there was a blacksmith, but he was about as stupid a man as I’ve ever Tin into and was no help at all.
One of these drafts consisted of about 125 so-called chief petty officers. They were really watchmakers and had enlisted to be torpedo-upkeep men and were given chiefs’ ratings, but they didn’t know one end of the ship from the other.
I had a terrible time getting control of all these people, but we finally got things organized well enough so that the captain, on his daily inspections of the ship, complimented us on the cleanliness of our space.
We went around the north of Ireland to go to Liverpool and, with the Irish coast in sight on the starboard hand, it was a beautiful, sparkling day. We had a bunch of British destroyers for escort, and they were bounding around. Things were very colorful at sea in that war, with all the ships camouflaged in strange patterns and colors. On a good bright day it was an extremely elevating sight.
We eventually got to Liverpool right side up, and I said goodbye to my 500 sailors. I don’t know what happened to them after that. There were a lot of my classmates there who had come over in other ships of the convoy, and they had spent all their time playing bridge or poker, while I was trying to keep my sailors out of trouble. We were all put on a small steamer and sent over to Dublin, and it was there that we began to run into the horrors of war, because all they had for us to eat for breakfast was potato and onion pie. I don’t recommend it.
This is an edited excerpt drawn from the oral history interview of Rear Admiral Schoeffel. The interview was conducted on 5 January 1984 by Dr. John T. Mason. Some of the material has been rearranged in sequence to produce this narrative. To obtain a catalog listing the more than 130 volumes of oral history transcripts in the Naval Institute collection, please send $2.00 to Director of Oral History, U. S. Naval Institute.