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The Straits of Malacca and Singapore, which connect the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea, provide a strategically important waterway for both merchant and naval vessels. Although merchant vessels of all types use the straits extensively, the most important commercial use of the passage is by supertankers carrying crude oil from the Persian Gulf across the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea to Japan and other East Asian countries. The navies of both the United States and the Soviet Union consider the straits vital to their interests, since both recognize the importance of projecting influence and power in the Indian Ocean from bases on the shores of the South China Sea.
The Soviet base at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, is only 760 nautical miles from Singapore, and Soviet warships can reach the straits in slightly more than two days at 15 knots. The U. S. naval base at Subic Bay, Philippines, is almost twice as far away, but the straits still provide the most direct, fastest way to transfer forces between the Pacific and Indian oceans.
Commercial and naval interests in the oceans cannot readily be separated, however. Japan’s need for unobstructed passage of crude oil carriers along the lengthy route from the Middle East has become a concern for the U. S. Navy. Protection of Japan’s oil lifeline is one of a large number of tasks for the U. S. Pacific Fleet, since the capabilities of the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force are limited, both by the size and composition of the fleet and constitutional prohibitions against operations far from Japanese waters, which might be interpreted as offensive rather than strictly defensive in nature.
The coastal states—Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore—view the straits as vital to their interests as well. Indonesia’s largest oil terminal, Dumai, is on the east coast of Sumatra, and Malaysia has important ports at Port Kelang and Port Dickson. The latter is also an oil terminal, through which Malaysia receives the bulk of its petroleum imports. Singapore’s port is famous for efficiency and the amount of traffic it handles. As an island city-
:*n
state, Singapore is extraordinarily dependent on its,P facilities and on unimpeded navigation through the S|n^f pore Strait. Singapore is also a transshipment p°'ntr much of Southeast Asia and a vital oil refining ceI1t,rn Protection of the marine environment is another cone of the three countries, since fishing is an important in ^ try in the region, and fishing boats of all sizes comP ^ with large merchant ships for the crowded water*• grounding or collision involving a tanker could pollute waters and the shores, creating conditions detriments ^ fishermen and the coastal communities on both side® the straits.
The Straits and the Law of the Sea: The Convention
on
the i
t0r.j ,aw °f the Sea permits coastal states to establish terrier ^as extending out to 12 nautical miles from their tj0r)Sts- As a result, the straits are now under the jurisdic- |e„ the three coastal states through much of their c°U1h ^nc^er the principle of innocent passage, warships aC(i . transit the straits with certain restrictions on their iHj^'ttes while under way. But the convention also per- terjlc°astal states to suspend the right of innocent passage protPorarily if such suspension is deemed essential for the j^ction of the coastal state’s security.
Ventany maritime powers argue, however, that the con- tj0 'I*11 gives coastal states too much control over naviga- c0na| r'ghts of transiting naval vessels. Consequently, the Vcr>tion provides for a less restrictive navigational regime of transit passage for straits used for international navigation, that is, straits connecting one area of the high seas with another area of the high seas, such as the Malacca-Singapore Straits. Under the transit passage rules, warships must merely proceed through the straits expeditiously and refrain from using force against the coastal state. Most important, there is no allowance for suspending transit passage. Consequently, nations with blue-water navies can be guaranteed the essential mobility their forces need to operate effectively.
The United States is one of a small number of nations that refused to sign the convention. U. S. objections are to provisions for regulating mineral mining of the deep seabed, and it was largely to accommodate the interests of the
United States that the international straits and transit passage rules were incorporated. Many nations believe that since the United States does not subscribe to the convention in its entirety, it is not entitled to the rights and protections of the document. Therefore, under some interpretations of the principles of international law, coastal states could forbid passage of U. S. warships through waters under their jurisdictions.
Although the convention was signed in December 1982 by a large majority of the countries of the world, thus far only 11 nations have ratified it. The convention will not officially come into force until one year after it has been ratified by 60 nations. Nevertheless, some legal scholars argue that many of the convention’s provisions have already achieved the status of customary international law and are the norm for all nations, even those that did not sign the convention. It is uncertain how Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore will choose to interpret the rules.
Of the three countries, Indonesia is most critical of America’s failure to support the convention after apparently favoring it during many years of negotiations. But whether this informal criticism will result in restrictions on the navigational rights of U. S. naval vessels remains to be seen. Singapore is not likely to favor any restrictions, since its economy is based largely on its port and free navigation for all ships in the straits. Malaysia, too, is unlikely to create problems for the United States.
Problems of Navigation: Navigational problems in the straits fall into two categories: political and physical. The political problems are associated with the various interpretations of the Law of the Sea. Under the regime of innocent passage, there are numerous specific restrictions on the activities of naval vessels. For example, submarines must navigate on the surface and show their flags, a regulation of no consequence in the straits since the waters are too shallow for safe, submerged operations. Under transit passage, ships must simply “refrain from any activities other than those incident to their normal modes of continu-
by
ous and expeditious transit unless rendered necessary force majeure or by distress.” There are more import concerns, however. The right of a coastal state to suSP^ innocent passage under certain circumstances could 111 , a naval power hostage to the political whims of a. c0.aoIi. nation’s leaders, creating a political hazard to navigatl^(0 Physical hazards to navigation in the straits are eas*eh define. The straits are narrow through much of their ‘en^c and are shallow in some critical areas. Moreover, amount of vessel traffic in confined navigational requires that commanding officers exercise great vig>a. if collisions are to be avoided. The Sailing Directl>e< (Publication 170, page 471) provide the most acCLir. at succinct description of the straits and the problems ships might encounter in navigating them:
that
can be safely navigated by large ships drawing as
^be traditional route used by ships operating between e N part of the Indian Ocean and the North Pacific is r°ugh the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. The trait of Malacca, more than 200 miles wide at its NW eJ^> narrows to no more than 8 miles amid islands and stl°als in the SE. Singapore Strait is less than 6 miles at its narrowest point. Shipping channels in Malacca narrow to about 2 miles and those in Singa- P°re to about 1 mile. Channel depth is even more reactive than width. Depths in the SE part of the Strait 0 Malacca and in the Singapore Strait are in several P aces only about 22m (12fm). In addition, the shifting ott°m sands make the exact location of these shallow ^Cas unpredictable. This means that large vessels over *5,000 dwt. and/or drawing more than 19.8m (65 ft.) s °uld not use the straits.
From the approach to One Fathom Bank until clear the Singapore Strait, the passage is very dangerous, abstantial course changes are required to keep ships at m_aximum depths and avoid the many shoal areas. Most the shoals are unmarked and there are few naviga- l0nal aids or landmarks for accurately fixing the ship’s P°sition. The frequent course changes in confined wa- ers complicate navigation since a vessel must show •rst one sidelight then the other to opposing traffic.
. hese hazards make the danger of collision or ground- lng significant.
Unlike the Strait of Malacca, Singapore Strait is datively well marked with navigational aids. How- ^Ver> in some respects it is even more dangerous for eep-draft vessels. The area is extremely congested not only with through traffic but also numerous coastal and 'j>hing vessels bound into and out of Singapore Roads. be channel is very restrictive in both width and depth p0rn the entrance to Main Strait, N of the light on u'au Nipa (1°09'N., 103°39'E), until clear of the boal area nw of Batu Berhanti light structure , M'N., 103°5 3 'E). The narrowest part of Main Strait
much as 19.8m (65 ft.) of water is one mile wide S of Raffles Light.”
In May 1981, traffic separation schemes were established; lanes for east- and westbound traffic have made the straits somewhat less hazardous. At the same time, an underkeel clearance requirement of three-and-one-half meters went into effect; this has reduced the number of very large, deep-draft tankers in the straits. Since vessels of this type are notoriously unmaneuverable and limited in their navigational options, the straits are now presumably safer for the smaller ships, including naval vessels.
Indonesian, Malaysian, and Singaporean Naval Capabilities: The United States, Japan, and the three straits states all have interests in keeping the sea-lanes through the straits open. Japan’s Maritime Self Defense Force is limited in size and operational range and cannot be expected
Table 1 Indonesian, Malaysian, Singaporean Naval Forces
| Indonesia | Malaysia | Singapore |
Submarines | 3 | — | — |
Frigates | 10 | 4- | — |
Guided-missile patrol boats | 4 | 8 | 6 |
Patrol boats | 14 | 27 | 8 |
Patrol craft | 4 | — | 12 |
Mine warfare vessels | 2 | 2 | 2 |
Amphibious warfare vessels | 11 | 36 | 12 |
Customs and police patrol | —80 | 58 | 54 |
Source: Combat Fleets of the World, 1984-85
Indonesi^
departing
to operate far from Japanese home waters. Even if Japan was to extend its defensive naval capabilities to protect its shipping out to 1,000 miles, its forces would exercise no direct influence in the straits.
The U. S. Pacific Fleet has a large number of missions and therefore would like to depend on Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore to control the straits. Table 1 shows the naval forces available to each of the three countries. Any analysis of the adequacy of these forces must consider other tasks assigned to the three navies, in addition to surveillance and control of the straits.
Indonesia now has sovereignty over vast archipelagic waters and jurisdiction over resources in a large exclusive economic zone. Its naval forces must provide surveillance over these large areas, as well as enforce fishery regula
tions and protect offshore oil installations. The navy 11111'j combat smuggling and illegal barter trade and act as marine police force. This latter mission is necessitate the presence of dissident groups on some of the islanCl the far-flung archipelago. There are a number of o important straits of concern to the Indonesian Navy. ^ bok Strait is frequently used by tankers too large f°r , Malacca-Singapore Straits. The Ombai-Wetar Straits a the Sunda Strait are also strategic passages. ^
The Indonesian fleet is designed for its many tasks, submarines can operate effectively in the deeper stra (Lombok, Ombai, Wetar), and the frigates are suite ^ surveillance and enforcement roles at long distances n Java, the geographic core of the nation. The small, attack craft, particularly those armed with surface-to-s face missiles, can be used to control choke points- ^ navy is too small, however, for the size of the archipe'ar , the length of its country’s coastline, and the numerous ^ difficult missions. Despite its interests in the Malac^ Singapore Straits, Indonesia cannot be counted on to c° tribute much toward defense of the straits.
But the future might be brighter for the Navy. The Indonesian customs and police _
have large building programs under way, and the na^ patrol craft to be added to their fleets are indicative plans to undertake patrol and surveillance duties carrfj. carried out by the navy. Thus, in the future, the In^0 ^ sian Navy should be able to concentrate on improving fast attack craft forces. The first of a series of ultimately intended to be 49 armed versions of a B°el^ jetfoil design was laid down in December 1983 f°r navy.
Malaysia’s unusual geography creates problems f°r . navy. The country consists of a peninsula, with
it ef
coastlines on the South China Sea and the Stra ^ Malacca, and an eastern wing consisting of the state ^ Sabah and Sarawak on the north coast of the islan Borneo. The intervening water is under Indonesian J diction and is part of that country’s archipelagic wa The Law of the Sea Convention allows Malaysia to c ,j. a sizable exclusive economic zone and continental s the latter contains valuable offshore oil. But these n extensive maritime jurisdictional regions need to be tected. Other tasks for the Malaysian fleet are assoC|a
n° submarines. The largest ships are frigates, but the lrnportant from the standpoint of defense of sea-lanes
straits are the missile-equipped fast attack craft. a base at Woodlands, on Singapore Island, the navy
With
1 well
Positioned to use these small vessels effectively.
countering piracy, smuggling, and illegal fishing. jtplas£ ^a^aysian Navy is not as large as Indonesia’s, and
most
ir> the
jna'aysia is improving its maritime defense capabilities ad(JW0 Ways- It is directly improving its navy, and it is ne^n8 seagoing units to the Royal Malaysian Police. A twenaVa' ^ase at Lumut, on the Strait of Malacca be- jy ®'Penang and P°rt Kelang, will be completed soon, ■Ww w*2 some important additions to the fleet.
Sj ^6St tjerman-built frigates should improve Malay- dist CaPai)'bties to both defend the straits and patrol more craft01 Waters- The police have a number of new patrol coa °n orc*er’ a sign that the navy may turn over basically ^'guard-type duties in the straits to the Royal Malay- t\Vo °'*ce- Although coordination problems between the a^ir°r8anizations during wartime might arise, the overall gj, Y °f the combined forces to carry out police, coast r ■ and combat functions will be enhanced somewhat.
T'h •
sea |e Singaporean Navy’s primary mission is to keep the aranes open. Without large maritime jurisdictional f[leS to defend, there is no need for long-range vessels. WatnaVW has fast attack craft to operate in the protected eneers °f the straits, and minesweepers to ensure that an •he ^oes not bottle up the fleet or impede shipping in fast 'nf=aPorc Strait or in the port itself. Three additional gaa"ack craft will be added to the small efficient Sin- gap fean Navy, further improving capabilities in the Sin- Su0re Strait, and the Air Force has ordered 22 French er Puma helicopters for sea surveillance.
Jqai ^^aits Maritime Defense Force? Since Indonesia, sccu ^S*a’ and Singapore all have interests in maintaining seanty of shipping in the straits, and since control of the fet)ln the region is an important element of national de- d0e f°r Singapore particularly, but for Malaysia and In- us well, there would be advantages in cooperation ir^t the three countries in naval operations. The ulti- Slr|C c°°peration could be the formation of a Malacca- c0lfaP°re Straits Maritime Defense Force, with each contributing units and accepting responsibility for rtiai°Us functions or specific geographic areas. Less for- c°operation could take the form of frequent consultations among the three countries and some sort of coordinating committee to develop joint strategy in defense of the straits. Bilateral or trilateral training exercises could be conducted to test tactical concepts and practice coordinated operations.
Whether such cooperation is possible depends on a number of factors. Some of the necessary incentives are present, since the three countries are members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and have similar political, economic, and security concerns. Although ASEAN is not designed to be a military alliance, there have already been a number of joint exercises conducted by ASEAN military forces. From a geostrategic viewpoint, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore can be viewed as the core of the ASEAN region, with the Philippines and Thailand forming the periphery.
The developing naval strength of Vietnam, assisted by military aid provided by the Soviet Union, is the chief intraregional threat to the three nations. The formation of some sort of common naval strategy should focus on countering this threat.
Over the last decade, the three straits states have successfully negotiated among themselves and with outside maritime powers, represented principally by Japan, internationally agreed upon navigation regulations, such as the traffic separation schemes and the underkeel clearance requirements previously mentioned. These regulations had little to do with security, but the seeds of common concern among the three countries have been sown. Future cooperation on a regional basis is possible in other areas.
Indonesia has recently acquired sophisticated early warning aircraft, which could form the basis of an enhanced surveillance capability in a joint maritime defense force. If these aircraft are to be used collectively in the straits, the always sticky question of shared intelligence must be considered. The three countries do not always see eye-to-eye on a number of issues. Under wartime conditions, with a common enemy, disagreements in policy would undoubtedly be subordinated to military needs, but in peacetime there are problems.
Piracy is not uncommon in the straits. Reports of attacks by pirates on transiting ships have appeared in periodicals in the region, such as Malay Mail, New Straits Times, The Star, and Far Eastern Economic Review. The Honolulu Advertiser has also described a number of incidents. In 1982, there were 40 attacks by pirates on either supertankers in the straits or fishing vessels. While statis-
tics for 1983 and 1984 are not available, there have been several statements in the press that the problem is increasing in seriousness. Cooperative efforts by the three countries to protect the straits from this menace have not been successful, primarily as a result of the less than enthusiastic participation of Indonesia, which has pointed out that the incidents generally occur in international waters near Singapore and are reported to Singaporean authorities.
Smuggling is another illegal activity in the straits, which could be brought under better control by cooperative efforts of the three navies. Singapore has not viewed smuggling as a problem, since its economy is based primarily on free trade principles. Indonesia and Malaysia treat smugglers as criminals, but they are hampered in their enforcement efforts because of lack of cooperation by Singapore.
The three countries do not agree on fishery policies, and each enforces regulations independently in its territorial sea or exclusive economic zone. In many cases, Malaysian and Singaporean fishing vessels are seized by Indonesian naval or customs forces. Such treatment of one nation’s citizens by another, presumably friendly country obviously does not foster cooperation in other matters.
Military cooperation in the region might be difficult to achieve also because relations between Malaysia and Indonesia have not always been amicable. Malaysia remembers the “confrontation,” a mini-war started by Indonesia in 1963 as a response to the proposed accession of the north Borneo British possessions of Sabah and Sarawak to the new nation of Malaysia. Sukarno, Indonesia’s president at the time, coveted the British Borneo territories for himself, or at the very least wanted an exclusive Indonesian field of influence over them. Although the Indonesian Navy was reluctant to engage British Commonwealth naval forces assisting in Malaysia’s defense and the Sukarno government was toppled in 1965 and replaced by a
more moderate regime, Malaysia does not trust donesia’s intentions even after 20 years. jts
Cooperative efforts in maritime defense in the stt■ will depend on how strongly the three countries vievV^ disagreements compared with the advantages of c0° nated planning and operations of their navies.
U. S. Agreements with ASEAN Nations: Although ^ members of ASEAN have repeatedly emphasized th® , organization’s aims are economic, cultural, and p°1 j„ rather than military, individual members have j°'ne’’ ■$ bilateral and multilateral defense pacts with both ou . powers and among themselves. U. S. formal involve11^ with Southeast Asian regional security dates back t° ^ Manila Pact, which was signed on 8 September 195 ■■ though two of the original signatories, France and • stan, subsequently withdrew and the formal treaty °r£s zation, SEATO, was disbanded in 1977, treaty between the United States and Australia, the United Cjj dom, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailan exist. U. S.-Philippine ties depend not only on the M ^ Pact but on a 1947 bases agreement, which was fo011 renewed in 1983. In addition, the two nations have a tual defense treaty, dating from 1951.
Arrangements with other ASEAN powers are less mal, consisting mainly of bilateral contacts between and individual ASEAN governments and routine m11 exercises between ASEAN and U. S. forces. Training ^ ercises and U. S. military aid have focused mainly °nf£ Philippines and Thailand, but Malaysia and S»n§aP re have also been involved to a lesser extent. In 1983. j were a total of 27 bilateral or, in a few cases, trila^es exercises involving U. S. and ASEAN units, and exera or U. S. ship visits to many ASEAN countries have 1^ place during 1984. The U. S. administration has plflI^ j ,,- military aid to all the states of ASEAN, which now ^ eludes the newly independent nation of Brunei. Th'Sj|l ranges in amounts from $105.4 million to Thailand to ^ million to Malaysia, and lesser amounts to Singap°re j-0r Brunei, which are financially better able to provi their own military hardware needs.
•p, ““nuns.
• e United States should continue to support ASEAN
'ts role as a stabilizing influence in the region. Such
l lnce Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea, treaty links 'andh£n United States and the Philippines and Thai- Ho "ave been strengthened, and Indonesia and Malaysia Hal h eem more *ncbned to agree with Singapore that for- able C^ense arrangements with the United States are desir- lheeTrASEAN nations now appear to agree that pacts with has' n'tec* States, on a bilateral rather than ASEAN-wide pre'S’ W'^ bclp to keep U. S. forces in the region, thereby enting a preponderance of communist power.
tj Possible U. S. Role: ASEAN is a regional organiza- ^ /*at has been successful without influence or member- ore • outs*de powers. Its members undoubtedly wish the 'itat niZat'on t0 remain so, and any role for the United B«>n the region must continue to be an indirect one. ae coastal states recognize the vital interests of the
the States in unimpeded transit of its warships through Ohs. Since U. S. refusal to sign the Law of the Sea shi ention jeopardizes guaranteed passage of U. S. of 3 the United States should attempt to minimize Law c0u ^ea disagreements, particularly with Indonesia, the jj sntrY that appears to take the most serious view of the off[1] Position. Quiet negotiations with Indonesia might be s0rtictive, although bilateral talks could be interpreted by its v£ as an admission on the part of the United States that *‘°n e.SSeU do not have the right under customary intema- Co a law to use the straits but must obtain it from the >1 nations.
Hi
The U. S. Pacific Fleet should make more use of Singapore for refueling, liberty, and ship repairs. The Port of Singapore has superb facilities for supporting both naval and merchant vessels, and visits by the U. S. Navy would certainly be welcomed by the Singapore Government. Moreover, Singapore could serve as a backup for the naval base at Subic Bay, Philippines, and U. S. dependence on the Philippine Government for base facilities in Southeast Asia would be reduced. Geostrategic considerations make Singapore a better location for U. S. naval units, since Subic Bay is much farther from the crucial area of interest— the straits themselves. U. S. units at Singapore would be readily and rapidly available to assist in defense of the straits.
Although Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore should retain responsibility for defense of the straits, the United States should participate in occasional joint exercises with coastal countries’ forces. The exercises should emphasize the primary role of ASEAN navies, but can underscore the supporting role of the U. S. Navy. Training for ASEAN navies should be the chief purpose of these exercises, since the light forces of the Indonesian, Malaysian, and Singaporean fleets are ideal for operations in the protected, confined waters of the straits. U. S. units can act as backup forces, provide logistic support, and train participating units in techniques of operations involving ships of different characteristics and capabilities.
Finally, visits of U. S. Navy ships to ports in the region can be beneficial. “Show the flag” visits should be made by small ships and should emphasize friendly U. S. interest in the country rather than be demonstrations of force. Port Kelang and Penang on the Malacca Strait and Pasir Gudang on the Johor Strait are likely candidates for U. S. visits in Malaysia. Visits to Dumai on the Sumatran coast could help Indonesian-U. S. relations. Visits to these ports would also exercise U. S. transit rights in the straits. The more frequently these rights are used, the more routine and accepted they become.
The Malacca-Singapore Straits are vital to U. S. interests in the western Pacific and Indian oceans. They are likewise of crucial importance to many of America’s allies. The straits certainly deserve the U. S. Navy’s attention, but the principal responsibility for their defense ideally should remain in the hands of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. With cooperation and help from U. S. fleet units, this strategically important waterway for both merchant and naval vessels can continue to serve the needs of the world.
Captain Morgan retired from active service in 1974. His last tour of duty was in the intelligence division of Commander in Chief, Pacific. He is now an associate professor of geography at the University of Hawaii and a research associate at the East-West Center, Honolulu.
Dr. Jaafar received his PhD in geography from the University of Hawaii. He has been a Malaysian government servant for several years and served as a member of the Malaysian delegation to the United Nation’s Conference on the Law of the Sea. Currently, he is Principal Assistant Director, Department of Environment, Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment, Malaysia.
[1]hilit°rt Can extend t0 the continued provision or sale of for |ary equipment to the three coastal states, particularly Sin ae'r naval and air forces. Control of the Malacca- fne8aP0re Straits must remain in the hands of these d'y ASEAN members.