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Ships Get a Lift From Synchrolift
■ Offering
ln8 drydock method by
inc ° ^ou^e *ts shipbuilding capacity and 25(,c/ase its ship repair operations by tj °’ Todd Pacific Shipyards Corpora- wn ^as inaugurated the use of the iu c S *ar8est “Synchrolift” facility in tS Saa Pedro yard.
from the conventional float- both in appearance and in the which its facilities are inte- theleCl 'n*° t'le functi°ns °f the shipyard, ^^ Patented Synchrolift—the name is a to ,'Stereci trademark—makes it possible f*nsfer a vessel from the lifting plat- Synto a work area inland. This frees the
first °^t to lift other vessels while the ship is repaired or overhauled. res ,e ^8 million Todd installation is the l9ki a contract signed on 1 April q0 between Todd Pacific Shipyards Pe.r^0rat'on’ Los Angeles division, and Mi.rson Engineering Company, Inc., of 0f !*"> Florida, designers and suppliers fheae Patented Synchrolift equipment. nie. lnstallation was dedicated at ceremo- t^.^Hducted on 27 March 1984, when sileRentz (FFG-46), a guided mis- 3(] n§ate, was lifted out of the water in ^onstration 0f the Synchrolift equip- at s operation.
tvid ^*at orm 665 feet long and 106 feet Cai|C's raised or lowered by 110 electri- r(1 -V Powered hoists connected by wire anieS °ne anc* fhree-eighths inches in di- en .er- These ropes are designed and turg ?eered by Pearlson, and manufac- g4)under its supervision. Each wire is p^n.zed by a special process which ProtUCeS a roPe tensile strength
EaCkCtC<J from corrosion by the coating, al, °f the hoists is driven by a special ti0nnat'n8 current, synchronous induces .’ '^ree-phase 15-horsepower motor with integral watertight disc arees of marine construction. Motors (]ruCOnnected through a gear train to the °n which the wire rope is reeled. Pi? r! rnotors are electrically synchro- 0,. . to work at exactly the same hoisting 'Pch Werin§ sPeec* °f approximately nine Irib CS ^er m’nute> regardless of the dis- st0DUtion of weight on the platform. They P automatically when the platform has reached the upper or lower limit of travel. Electronic sensors monitor performance; if any motor gets out of synchronization for any reason, all 110 motors are shut down instantly. Once this automatic safety stop occurs, the motors can be actuated only in the lowering direction. An operator sitting before a free-standing console in the control tower receives constant information on each motor’s performance; indicator lights pinpoint the exact source of any irregularity in the machinery’s functions.
The hoisting or lowering drum drives a multiple-part wire rope system by reeving the rope through two sets of sheaves, one in a housing joined to the platform and one on the support structure.
An integral part of the Synchrolift platform is the three pairs of heavy steel crane rails, similar in appearance to railroad tracks, on which the wheeled cradles and keel-block carriages are positioned. The interval between pairs of rails is designed to give maximum flexibility in the siting of the cradles to conform to the width of the ship to be lifted. Smaller vessels can be accommodated on cradles using the inner four rails; passenger vessels, because of their width, are typical of those ships which require that cradles be spotted on the outboard rails. The keel cradles are built with wheels which roll on the center rails; similarly, the side cradles roll on the outer rails.
The procedure for positioning a ship over the cradles and keel blocks on the Synchrolift platform is the same as for a floating drydock, except that the preliminary calculations must be more highly refined, because the ship’s weight is carried entirely by the platform’s steel support structure.
As the platform is raised from the bottom of the dock—with a maximum theoretical draft over the cradles of 37 feet— the ship settles on the keel cradles and is supported laterally by the side cradles. When the platform has been elevated to the transfer level, the ship is pulled from the platform and towed to the side transfer carriage. This carriage, with the ship and cradle system, is then moved laterally on prepositioned rails to the desired work bay by an installed, hydraulically powered gear and cog rail mechanism.
The ship is hauled from the Synchrolift platform to the side transfer carriage and from that point to the work bay by the two high-powered Caterpillar tractors especially equipped with a hydraulically actuated pulling bar. The ship’s enormous weight makes it necessary to clamp the tractors to the rails embedded in the ground of the work area and to break the vessel’s static posture by the power of the hydraulic mechanism. Once the ship has started to roll, the clamps are released, and the ship is towed to the desired position. The operation is exactly the reverse when it comes time to return the ship to the Synchrolift platform; the ship is pushed on the side transfer carriage, and then to the platform.
One work bay area has six rails which are aligned with the six rails on the side transfer carriage and extend 827 feet. The second work bay area has four rails aligned with the four center rails on the side transfer carriage. These rails extend 544 feet.
The Synchrolift has an interesting structure. Massive steel beams, destined to be linked to the hoisting cables, are laid athwartships. The six rails are then emplaced and secured. The platform’s working surface consists of heavy wooden planking laid in wide intervals to prevent water from being retained on the platform.
The platform does not ride between vertical guides but relies entirely on the wire ropes for vertical rigidity. The total lifting capacity is 26,200 long tons (a long ton equals 2,240 pounds), of which 3,970 long tons represent the weight of the empty platform, resulting in a theoretical maximum lift capacity of 22,270 long tons.
Weight distribution is critical for the Synchrolift and is the absolutely essential datum on which the entire lifting operation depends. In positioning the cradles, the rule is that the total weight of the ship
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JOHN GRAHAM
With the Synchrolift platform, Todd Shipyards can move ships tike the USS Elliot (DD-967) to work areas on land, freeing the Synchrolift to transport three other vessels to dry land work spaces and increasing significantly the shipyard’s capability.
to be lifted cannot exceed 34 tons per foot of platform length, averaged over 12 feet of that length. Should the ship have a long, heavy overhang at the stem, special high steel support cradles are positioned to assure that the weight of the stem section is properly distributed so that no part of the platform supports more than its designed capacity.
The theoretical load of 22,270 long tons can be lifted only if the weight is distributed equally over the entire length of the Synchrolift platform. However, ships are not built with their weight distributed in this way; therefore, the maximum lift is 14,920 long tons.
The Todd installation is the largest Synchrolift in the world at this time. It is the latest in a series of such installations, the first of which was built in 1957 following the invention and patenting of the system by Raymond Pearlson in 1954. Synchrolift systems have been installed in 58 countries around the world for more than 160 clients. There are 27 of these devices in the United States, either in operation or under construction. The Navy has one at the Naval Air Station, Patuxent River, Maryland, and one at the Naval Training Center, Great Lakes, Illinois. The Lykes Seabee class of bargecarrying ships is fitted with Synchrolift elevators to handle barges in which the cargo has been prestowed.
There are economic advantages to installing the Synchrolift for a shipyard. When a vessel is placed in either a graving dock or a floating drydock, that facility is dedicated exclusively to servicing that ship. Should the yard have only one dock, its capability to repair or to do other work on ships is limited by the rapidity with which the dock can be made available. With the Synchrolift, each vessel is lifted out of the water, removed
from the platform, and towed to a ^ land area. The Todd installation is ^ signed to accommodate four vessels land. .
According to Hans W. Shaefer, Pre^ dent and chief operating officer of T° Shipyards Corporation, the Synchro1^ will provide the San Pedro yard these benefits: .
- Ships hauled from the Synchrolift p*a
form to a dry-land work area can ^ reached easily and safely by workers an support vehicles ^
- Compared to the working condition-1” a floating drydock, the Synchrolift s 11 significantly more satisfactory
- The flow of materials used in
or repairing a ship can be improved ticeably, as compared to supporting vV° in a floating drydock , f
- “Pre-outfitting” of modular units hulls under construction at that time c be accelerated
- Ships can be built on a level platf° j rather than on inclined ways, and P'aC.-t in the water by means of the Synchro'1^ thereby eliminating many strains inhere
hull
t l^e conventional launching of a ^°ni the inclined ways
°th mechanical and electrical power T fae conserved
rial "6re *S *SSS waste anc* *oss °f mate- fin h&S cornParec' t0 working in the cony tl sPaces °f a floating drydock
e noticeable savings in costs can be along to customers in the form of er charges for drydock services in b ^es'§n °f the Synchrolift structure I 1 eory permits the platform to be d|cfhencd as the needs of its operators cdate- ft is not practicable, however, to plac ^ w'dth once the platform is in
Fr
m , o.111 the viewpoint of emergency 'hzation, this potential of expansion 0erec* hy the Synchrolift deserves seri- leS consideration. Adding 45 feet to the rai ^ °* ’h6 San Pedro platform would ton6 ^’ng capacity by 1,530 long (L S’ an(f permit lifting longer ships less utel feet wide with an evenly distrib- li We>ght of 23,800 long tons. Addi- ^ al controls, of course, would have to fiui !nstalled- The usefulness of this ckly enlarged dry-docking capacity to
the Navy is self-evident.
Pearlson Engineering Company furnished the hoists, including the electric motors and brakes, the wire rope assemblies, the lower sheaves in a structural housing which is part of the platform, and the fully wired motor control center. It also provided the engineering drawings to guide the fabrication of the platform, the ship transfer cradles, and the side transfer carriages. Todd did the civil engineering incident to the layout and structure of the dock and the working area. This required Todd to drive hundreds of precast, prestressed concrete piles. According to Todd’s records, the piling, if laid end to end, would reach a distance of 68 miles. Thirty-one thousand cubic yards of concrete, reinforced hy 8.1 million pounds of half-inch steel bars were needed. (If these were laid end to end they would stretch from Los Angeles to New York.) Pearlson furnished nearly 11 miles of wire rope.
An inspection of the Todd installation showed nothing exotic or super-specialized about the Synchrolift, except the basic idea of the inventor and the novel use of readily available materials. Should it be desirable to construct several shipyards in time of national emergency, “off the shelf” supplies of structural steel, wire rope, winches, reduction gears, and electric motors could be used with only those modifications which might be dictated by the Synchrolift’s dimensions. It is not unreasonable to envision stockpiling most or all of the components of the Synchrolift system in selected yards and keeping them against military emergencies. It was an evidence of the Navy’s appreciation of the Synchrolift’s potential that the inauguration ceremonies were attended by Undersecretary of the Navy James Goodrich and Vice Admiral Earl B. Fowler, commander of the Naval Sea Systems Command.
Colonel Kendall has worked in the commercial shipping industry, been on the faculty of the U. S. Merchant Marine Academy, and served as a senior staff member of the Military Sealift Command. He has been a contributor to Proceedings since the 1930s and received the Naval Institute’s award of merit in 1975 for his contributions as an author specializing in merchant marine matters. The fourth edition of his book, The Business of Shipping, was published in 1983.
^aKnife Arriving
B ------------------------ —----
y J°hn Stebbins
fun s Ctlual to, and may be better than a U|ly . . /■,
ubrnerged hydrofoil.
*je °f crew, hull, and equipment *111(1 much improved. Small, fast. Pro maneuverable, SeaKnife hulls can bjijf'd® the surface Navy with new capa- '®s and improved effectiveness at rea- able cost.
J*d advantage has long been a deter- 'ng factor in surface naval warfare. In
ttiitn.
'778
is • ^eaKnifc supercritical planing hull S(rafIVln8 on the maritime scene, demon- qu, ,!n8 impressive speed and seakeeping rivj ',6S' ^he knifes through waves, deSUPPort fr°m them while skimming as i°PS’ us'n8 water as a cushion, not hard, bumpy surface. Stability and knoneuverability up to speeds of 100 Seass can be achieved. Her ride in heavy
ally'
Sp ne SeaKnife has a much better ride at dj | than conventional combatants with fast acement hulls, conventional planing Clc‘attack craft (FAC), air cushion vehi- (s fACVs), and surface effect ships cs)- Yet the SeaKnife hull is simply ^ted. seaworthy, and efficient, C(>nv '°W kucd consumption compared to S-^tmnal planing craft. Because the ar)(j lfe experiences much less shock tian Vlk,rat'on> endurance and perfor-
John Paul Jones stated, “I wish to
have no connection with any ship that does not sail fast, for I intend to go in harm’s way.”
Problems in attaining very high speed have required complex technological solutions. High development costs have overshadowed advantages. A. Silverleaf of England’s National Physical Laboratory concluded, “Perhaps, after all, the air-water interface is not the best possible place for really high speed travel.” New programs for hydrofoils and SESs in the U. S. Navy have all but ground to a halt. Meanwhile, the number of small powerful FACs, ships of under 1,000 tons, with speeds greater than 20 knots (exclusive of antisubmarine warfare [ASW] corvettes), has been growing in naval fleets around the world, inferior only because their conventional planing hulls exhibit poor seakeeping qualities. However, work on new hull forms has continued.
New Hull Form Developments: Captain John E. Moore, editor of Jane's Fighting Ships, in the 1979-80 edition characterizes the state of the surface naval forces of the world:
“The inventory of surface ships in
any navy has consisted almost entirely
of vessels with displacement hulls: normal ships obeying Archimedes’ Law. It is this very normality which has meant that other forms of hull design have been classified as unconventional: the hydrofoil, hovercraft, Sea Knife and the like. While these have aroused scant enthusiasm among the more traditional minded, the displacement hull ships have also suffered from a lack of imagination. . . . To provide the smallest practicable hull for the job is clearly a desirable economy, provided the performance of sensors and weapon systems remain adequate.”
Captain R. S. Crenshaw, Jr., in Naval Shiphandling (Naval Institute Press, 1975) comments on displacement hulls of the U. S. Navy:
“The shiphandler should be impressed with the fact that the resistance encountered, the power required, and the fuel consumed increase drastically as the speed increases. ... It is because of this wastage of power in creating wake waves that inventors are constantly searching for ways of causing a ship to ‘plane’ at high speeds and thus es-
cape this major source of drag on a conventional hull.”
In practice, however, the only “conventional” hulls capable of making high speeds are planing craft, which avoid the wave-making resistance barrier to high speed by using dynamic forces to lift them on top of the water surface. The dynamic pressures which support them on calm water also make them pound intolerably in rough water, as they impact each successive wave. Professor Edward V. Lewis, formerly director of research at Webb Institute of Naval Architecture, summarizes the problem:
“In general, planing craft have been poor performers in heavy weather. Although they are often very highly powered, their hull form has prevented their attainment of true supercritical operation. The reason appears to be that the bottom flatness and considerable flare forward prevents the hull from cutting through the waves. Instead, at high speed there is a tendency for the bow to be forced up by the oncoming waves, with heavy bottom slamming following.”
Professor Lewis, a pioneer in seakeeping studies and originator of the supercritical ship concept, agreed with Peter Payne, inventor of the SeaKnife hull, on a solution to the problem of hull-slamming at high speed in rough water, stating, “If it were possible to devise a hull that would both plane and cut through the waves, then we could attain high-speed supercritical operation in a small craft.” Payne elaborates:
“Once one has solved the problem of pounding, so that a planing craft knifes cleanly through a wave, a number of other problems are encountered. Chief among these is the problem of waves which are higher than the boat, so that it is completely submerged as it passes through them. One solution—embraced by Dr. Felix Wankel’s hydrofoil boat—is to accept this phenomenon and make everything on deck watertight, streamlined, and structurally sound. The other approach—which we favor—is to devise a hull form which will smoothly respond to waves which exceed a given height, and provide a surface at the bow capable of generating a sufficiently high lift force to prevent the bow being submerged. In fact, the hull should act like a low-pass filter and should be subcritical to large waves and supercritical to smaller waves.”
Payne comments on roll problems by saying, “So far as roll is concerned, it has long been good practice to design for ‘super-critical’ operation in normal seas by avoiding excessive metacentric heights.” An aerospace and marine engineer, Payne is manager of Applied Mechanics Division, Ketron, Inc., at Annapolis, Maryland.
New Hull Developments in the U. S. Navy: There were many unconventional hull developments in the U. S. Navy during the 1960s and 1970s. Fully submerged hydrofoils came into being. (Before 1960 most hydrofoils were constructed on surface piercing principles which are unsatisfactory in a large chop.) AC Vs with flexible skirts, SESs with rigid side walls, and the small waterplane area twin hull (SWATH) Kaimalino were also developed. These craft are “flown,” requiring computer assistance for maintaining proper attitude. The principal designers and builders for these craft are aircraft manufacturers.
In his book On Watch (Quadrangle, 1976), Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Jr., comments on the patrol hydrofoil missile boat (PHM):
“Its purpose is mainly as a strike vessel against enemy surface craft. It will patrol narrow or coastal waters like the Gulf of Tonkin or the Mediterranean or the Red Sea, or serve as a low-value trailer of high-value Soviet ships in such waters. ... It will replace on a one-to-one basis much larger ships, with much larger fue consumption and big payrolls, 1(1 freeing those ships for essential deep water duties, and more import311' making it possible for the larger 33 more valuable ships to be outside t range of surprise Soviet cruise miss' attack.”
The U. S. Navy had hoped to Pr°cUJ11 30 PHMs, and orders were expected fr°n Germany and Italy, but costs rose als'1’’ ingly ($63 million each by 1977). * ( whole program was stopped by Preside Jimmy Carter; however, six were boug at the insistence of Congress. Now base in Key West, they face Cuba, which °P erates 18 fast missile “Osa” boats, “Komar” missile boats, eight semi-m drofoil Turya torpedo boats, and six 6”-class torpedo boats. ,
Admiral Zumwalt was also fascinaie ^ by the very high-speed, 80-to-100 k’’0. SES. In an article in the Los Ange‘.. Times in 1979, he notes that they c°u “evade detection, outrun a torpedo, ttf idly reinforce Europe and travel so that a jet aircraft will appear to land an
The Gayle Boat, facing page, first demonstrated supercritical planing with two slender flat-planing surfaces; the Wavestrider, left, planes on a “hydroplate” wing running between the two hulls; the FICAT, below, was the world’s first manned SWATH.
t °ff Vertically ” The 80-knot 2,000- Wa development program, however, ^ cancelled because of high costs. Nav^m*ra* ^umwa*t’ while still Chief of Se v ■ Operations, enjoyed driving a fid^mfe. He was impressed with her his 3lK* maneuverability, confirming to she^nxjOUS passenger, Peter Payne, that
^ high-s __________
™‘ral Zumwalt was preoccupied with a lished hydrofoil and SES programs. hi i e^ Navy’s Advanced Naval Ve- \^V~oncePts Evaluation (ANVCE): The tor, CE
e Chief of Naval Operations (Op-96),
cal l°u^ not he overturned even by radi. hlgh-speed maneuvers. At the time, odir- ■
tor Study Group, under the Direc
Navy Program Planning, Office of
evalu;
uated nine classes of advanced naval
Chicles
sUrf.
not
during the late 1970s; five were
-u 3Ce cra^ and four were aircraft (but foil Carr'er based): SESs, ACVs, hydro- grS’ Pining hulls, SWATH, wing-in- Crajnd effects (WIG) craft, air loiter air- ajr ’ Sea loiter aircraft, and lighter than 0-TA) aircraft. Evaluations were
°ased
°n potential for naval missions and
res^cted threats of the year 2000. Study tS tEe hlaval Sea Systems and Air Navems Commands, David W. Taylor (V a 8hip Research and Development ^nter (DTNSRDC), and Naval Air De-
Cally
'Pnient Center (NADC) were periodi-
" reviewed by a panel of independent g0y hs from industry, academia, and rCDernrTlent. They then made periodic /\(j0rts to the Chief of Naval Operations’ tlla^1Sory Board chaired by Dr. Alan Ber- °f the Naval Research Laboratory. fUndUr'n8 ANVCE, Payne, Inc., was |et) to provide three five-foot (overall jCai f models of the SeaKnife supercrit- I ,P'aning hull for testing. (See Figure ralt est'n8 was done at the British Admits ^ Experiment Works (A.E.W.), be-
C5Us(
tfen
heei
Eh,
e °f the low cost of tests there. Data e Processed by the Naval Ship Engi-
;fln8 Center’s Norfolk Detachment. Iw m°^e*s simulated 70-foot patrol statS °E ^0 tons in calm water, and in sea ly, three and five with speeds up to 60 PerfS ^eaKnife demonstrated impressive 0rmance at high speed in sea state
five. A movie shows it performing just as in the drawing in Figure 2, smoothly passing from wave to wave. In comparison, a conventional deep-“V” planing hull would pitch and pound excessively, as shown in Figure 2, and in an earlier test of a British SeaKnife by A.E.W. in 1975.
The ANVCE concluded “the supercritical hull form . . . has the potential for achieving high speed (approximately 50 knots) in rough seas with good seakeeping (much reduced hull pounding). Its seakeeping advantages were verified by model tests within the ANVCE project.”
Another point was emphasized by Vice Admiral M Staser Holcomb, Director of Navy Program Planning, Code Op-96, in the report transmittal dated 17 March 1980:
“The threat-oriented mission analysis points out that the most significant vehicle characteristics are those which enhance the performance of weapons and sensors, improve the survivability of the platform, or provide a reserve payload capacity. Vehicle characteristics which enhance weapons and sensor performance include speed, ride quality, maneuverability and the ability to launch and recover aircraft.”
Admiral Holcomb’s recommendation was that, “Research on supercritical hulls should be pursued for planing craft.”
Gayle Boat (Twin Hull): A twin-hulled Gayle boat built by Payne in 1967 first demonstrated supercritical planing; she made use of two slender flat-planing surfaces. The Gayle Boat I showed her superior seakeeping qualities to the U. S. Navy Little Creek Small Boat Engineering Department (SBED), in 1969, traveling at 40 knots in five-foot waves. The Gayle boat’s lurching motion in a quartering sea and when turning at speed is a characteristic which is absent in later single-hull SeaKnife designs. The advantages of the double hull are greater stabil-
lings / February 1985
ity at slow speeds and a bigger working area topside.
A mission for a Gayle boat comparable to that of the U. S. Navy’s Swift boat is feasible. The Gayle boat would have a supercritical planing speed capability of 50 knots in sea state three versus about six knots for the current Swift boat.
Wavestrider (Twin Hull): Payne’s most recent rough water boat is the transcritical 24-foot, 6,000-pound maximum weight Wavestrider, which planes on a “hydroplate” wing running between the two hulls. She was built for large loadcarrying capacity (her empty weight of 2,430 pounds allows 3,570 pounds for fuel, crew, electronics, etc.) as well as reduced hump drag, good tolerance for radical center of gravity movements while under way, and no unstableness when at rest. Her “lift/drag” ratio is approximately ten on calm water (the same as the earlier SeaKnife supercritical designs), so that she requires much less power than a conventional deep-V planing boat at high speed.
The Wavestrider transcritical planing hull’s high-speed power curve is the same as for the single-hull SeaKnife, but she has a lower power requirement in the region of hump drag.
The Wavestrider has excellent endurance. Range is 1,000 nautical miles at 40 knots in relatively calm water. A sacrifice was made in ride quality. She experiences higher vertical accelerations than those achieved in the Gayle boat, so that at 60 knots in sea state four the Wavestrider is airborne much of the time. In these conditions, the crew may wish to slow to 30-40 knots. The Wavestrider’s
115
ride, however, is much superior to that of a conventional planing hull.
The Wavestrider hull was designed for lightness and high strength by Peter Van Dine, a leading authority on advanced composite boat construction. The hull was constructed from E-glass (conventional fiberglass), S-glass (high-strength fiberglass), and carbon filament. Van Dine also supervised layup design and construction. He states that an E-glass hull is significantly stronger than an aluminum hull of the same weight, with better characteristics of tensile strength, modulus (stiffness), compressive fatigue resistance, impact resistance, thermal stability (little distortion with changes in temperature), and vibration damping. S-glass has even greater tensile and compressive strength. Carbon filament is better still in all characteristics except vibration damping and impact resistance.
The S-Boat (Tri Hull): Payne designed the S-Boat for high efficiency in protected water, such as rivers. She features skis forward and SeaKnife hull aft. Relatively wide, she has excellent stability at rest.
Favorable Interference Catamaran (FICAT) (Twin Hull): Payne’s first supercritical hull, not a planing hull, was launched in 1964. This 17-foot FICAT was the world’s first manned SWATH. The FICAT II, built in 1965, is an unconventional displacement hull designed for high speed in rough water. (Over the years, Payne has found it cheaper and better to build small “full size” boats to test his designs, rather than conduct model tests. Designers and operators driving boats can obtain a more complete picture of virtues and vices in “scale seas” up to and including severe gales.) The FICAT II was an extremely efficient displacement hull because of the partial cancellation of the hull-generated wave drag. The bow waves are made by the bows’ inboard surfaces, which reduce drag by more than 50% between the hulls. There is no spray at the bow because the bow angle is practically zero.
SeaKnife (Single Hull): The first SeaKnife single-hulled planing craft was launched in April 1971. A series of these craft have been built since then. In com-
The Soviet version of the SeaKnife single-hulled planing craft, top, demonstrated decreased resistance as speed increased, and increased load-carrying efficiency at higher speeds; the U. S. Racing SeaKnife, with her single hull in full view here, has achieved speeds of 71 knots.
parison with conventional deep-V planing hulls, a SeaKnife has almost no lifting area in the bow (unless the waves are large enough to impact the flare and bow transom). Some bow-up pitch occurs but is corrected by the lift experienced by the increasingly wide and flaired aft portion of the hull as it in turn passes through the wave. A deep-V hull has approximately six inches of available travel; the 34-foot (length overall) racing SeaKnife of similar size has a remarkably large 60-inch wave-travel.
A SeaKnife hull built in Leningrad and tested on the Neva River demonstrated decreased resistance as speed increased, and increased load carrying efficiency at higher speeds. This hull could have been driven much faster had a bigger engine been installed, although resistance would have increased at higher speeds. The SeaKnife hull also has excellent directional stability.
Racing SeaKnife (Single Hull): The heaviest SeaKnife built to date is the 34- foot offshore racing boat weighing 16,420 pounds fully laden with three crew members and 450 gallons of gaso
line, and powered by two 500 cubic inC engines which develop 625 horsepo'A each. She has achieved speeds of knots. Tests were conducted at the moa of the Chesapeake Bay by the Naval Se Combat Systems Engineering Static11 combatant craft engineering departin'1 ' based at the U. S. Naval Station, folk, Virginia, a Field Activity of Nav Sea Systems Command. The U. S. C°;1 Guard and DTNSRDC also participate° in the tests. . 0
A 38-foot deep-V open-ocean rad11-' boat was compared with the Rac,K' SeaKnife during the tests. I rode in
ded ‘‘
center of gravity. At 26 knots bounced on top of waves/swells and bt nicely and firmly. However, when Itra^
pitching. My ride in the Racing SeaKi”)1 in high state two seas was in the naV1' j tor’s position, while standing on a pad deck, at least eight feet forward of 1
deep-V planing boat in sea state with winds of 13 knots. She provi' good ride in the cockpit area, close to
the
three
th®
she
eled forward six feet into the for^f
cabin, I experienced the uncomforta effects of hard slamming and vio
,ble
dent
£enter of gravity. My ride there at 52
Analysis: These graphs show the superiority of the SeaKnife and Wavestrider planing hulls for high-speed efficiency, ideal for fast attack craft. The displacement hull, characteristic of most combatant ships is ideal for slow transport of heavy loads; efficiency drops drastically at speeds greater than hull speed, a function of waterline length. The SWATH semisubmerged hull provides improved efficiency over displacement monohulls at speeds greater than hull speed, and over planing hulls at speeds up through the region of hump drag.
Hull Speed (knots) = 1.34 x Vwaterline length in feet = 1.34V20.5 = 6 knots; the most important things in a boat over hull speed are power-to-weight ratio and hull form.
Legend:
------- 7,000-pound displacement boat, 25 feet L.O.A., displacement hull, 20.5 feet at
waterline, 20 SHP, curve is characteristic of large combatant ships.
o—o—o 6,000 pounds, Off-Shore Dayboat, 26 feet L.O.A., 300 SHP, Deep-V planing hull, this curve is characteristic of most FACs.
-------- 5,800 pounds, Wavestrider boat, 24 feet L.O.A., 280 SHP, transcritical twin planing
hull, current top speed is limited to 63 knots because propellers are too small and larger pitch ones are unavailable, theoretical top speed is 105 knots.
o—d—a 5,800 pounds, SeaKnife, 25 feet L.O.A., 300 SHP supercritical planing hull design.
a—a—* 5,800 pounds hypothetical twin hull semisubmerged displacement, SWATH, 21 feet L.O.A., 175 SHP, scaled from the Kaimalino (SSP-1).
knots boat
P°'nt, the Racing SeaKnife rode over a ^ake-swell and left the surface of the ater> flying to the next wave and gently n>hng back to a planing position on the
tie Ce WaS resPons've t0 ff*e throt- and wheel, showing smooth accelera- n and tight-turning maneuverability. Colw° comments from the Naval Sea °nibat Systems Engineering Station eP°rt No. 60-113 are noteworthy:
‘A few qualitative comments are Presented since measurements were n°t obtained. The Sea Knife is Quipped with a power steering unit Waking the helm forces very small. Hence, control of the craft is rela- tlvely easy and the turning system itSelf presents no problem. High speed tUrns can be performed without concern to the chines digging and tripping lhe hull. In fact, it is desirable to turn rather tight turns to prevent the hull from sliding out on the turn. Consid- erwg the high performance nature of tj'e test craft and the radical hull form here never appeared to be any unUsUal turning characteristics. ... It W'as further noted that when the Sea Knife was dead in the water (DIW) it, 'ke most small craft, will eventually assume a beam sea attitude. Once in h>s position there was practically no r°H induced by the waves. The craft Would heave slightly and pitch up by he stem as a wave passed, but no sig- h>ficant beam sea induced rolling was hoticeable.”
owner of the Racing SeaKnife, aijhhg driver Ron Cain, believes that of j boats he has handled, the Racing staKi *s dle *east demanding, most aisle> and most economical on fuel. She 0 'eaves the crew unscathed in rough e hr- A new lighter, larger racing . Knife of the same horsepower has fc^n built, 12 meters in length (39.37 lQ '• She is made of aluminum. Her full re | Weight is 10,700 pounds. She is cur- lly undergoing trials and should make to so ^Uln knots. She can go from zero 60“ knots in nine seconds and can turn Per second.
paMission Patrol (Single Hull): q has proposed building a multi-mis- lj)n Patrol boat (PBM) SeaKnife for the l() S. Navy. Weighing 71 tons fully stat 6C*’ S^e would make 50 knots in sea itn E b|Ve with low accelerations for max- lQ* crew comfort. She will approach dj(. knots in light-ship/low fuel load con- J°ns> with a range of 1,700 nautical es on one Allison 501-KF gas turbine
The
maneuverable, and seaworthy ships the supercritical hull technology-
SeaKnife hulls, such as the SeaKnife PBMs manned with SEAL teams, offer options to boat commanders much like those available to aircraft commanders: fast reaction at long range, varied weaponslfuel loading, selection of speed profiles, and efficient transit and loiter.
engine operating at maximum continuous power. A lift/drag ratio of eight was conservatively estimated. By adding additional fuel, range could be increased to more than 2,000 nautical miles.
This SeaKnife PBM design refutes a misconception held by some that there is insufficient room in a SeaKnife hull to mount a useful military payload. The Payne PBM-design for either the Harpoon, Penguin, or SEAL team mission has a small overall length and weight (less by a factor of 50% than a comparable SES, and by more than 50% than a similarly configured conventional planing hull). The hull would also be easy to construct of durable 5,000 Series aluminum, a common boat-building material. Payne estimates PBM construction costs, less weapons and electronics, would be about $1.5 million.
Supercritical SeaKnife hulls offer an advantage over most naval platforms, including aircraft and submarines (i.e., the ability to perform missions in bad weather and at speed in the harsh air- ocean interface environment). Small, easy-to-construct SeaKnife craft would offer options to boat commanders much like those available to aircraft commanders. fast reaction at long range, varied weapons/fuel loading, selection of speed profiles, efficient transit and loiter, with high reserve power for attack/evasion/ withdrawal. Good directional stability provided by supercritical operation makes high-speed replenishments-at-sea possible, without regard to direction 0 the seas, thereby decreasing vulnerably to submarine attack. Supercritical FICA catamarans and SWATHs could provi°e steady platforms for more efficient air craft operations at higher speeds than ate now possible, with more usable tops'0 space for sensors, antennae, and we°P ons, with less interference among the111. Small supercritical planing S®P (under 500 tons) could perform °Pea ocean missions as escorts and deco? because of their seaworthiness. SeaK® ships would excel in advanced hosh areas: performing clandestine sp°cl warfare missions; in amphibious opera tions, as high-speed minesweefet> (manned or unmanned), for shore bo® bardment, and as high-speed land10® craft; for patrol and blockading; condu0^ ing riverine patrol and supply; and a FACs against opposing FACs and °ve larger naval combatants, by using re 3 tively short-range smart missiles and' torpedos. To paraphrase a mine warfat motto, “To successfully operate wher the Fleet is going,” will require faS
SeaKnife concept is the key to future s°r face naval warfare success.
Mr. Stebbins received a master's degree from A111-, can University in 1974. He was a surface nava*.°|5S cer for ten years. His tours of duty included the Brister (DER-327), Providence (CLG-6), Staff mander Cruiser Destroyer Flotilla Eleven, , Commander Atlantic Fleet Weapons Range- a Ozark (MCS-2). He is a contractor to'the NaA'
Ocean Fronts and Eddies
By William H. Beatty 111
“It is my responsibility to ensure that every Soviet submarine understands the ocean and how to hide in it. ’ ’
Rear Admiral A. I. Rossokho Soviet Navy Oceanographer, Paris, 1973
As the oceans have become noisier, Soviet submarines have become quieter, faster, and operate deeper than ever before. The submarine, surface, and aviation communities have experienced increasing difficulty in separating their targets’ acoustic signatures from the ocean’s ambient noise. In spite of the progress sonar design engineers have made in electronics, signal processing, and the design of acoustic sensors during the past ten or 15 years, it is not feasible to engineer around the environment.
Scarce and expensive assets must be deployed judiciously in order to achieve the maximum probability of detection and kill.
Barring some incredible new breakthrough in physics such as neutrino detection, laser penetration of sea water, or hydrodynamic wake detection, underwater acoustics remains the only practical means for the foreseeable future of locating a submerged submarine. The antisubmarine warfare (ASW) operator and tactician must understand the soundcarrying properties of the water between the sensor and the target. The side that uses the environment to the better advantage could have the decisive edge in a shooting war at sea.
Fleet operators and oceanographers are aware that the world ocean is not a horizontally homogeneous body of water b° comprises numerous water masses, ea with its own temperature and sali01' characteristics. The boundaries betw°e^ these water masses are called oce fronts and are analogous to weather fr011 in some ways. However, ocean fronts a^ not as well understood as weather fr°n for a variety of reasons:
- The ocean is a very hostile envir0
ment in which to work. ,
- Sea water is largely opaque to eRctft magnetic radiation.
- There is a lack of synoptic obst’U
tions in the ocean. y
- There is a lack of availability of surve ships and aircraft for frontal work. ,s
- The temperature and salinity ' { may reinforce or compensate one anot L to varying degrees in the formation
u8h ocean fronts may be described as
^ensity or sound speed gradients. Oceanographers do not yet fully underand the fine-scale and meso-scale dy- 3?.'cs °f ocean fronts.
^Since the early 1970s, the Navy has . acted numerous surveys and exer- ,;ISCs m several frontal regions around the Q orld in order to investigate their effects ternaval operations, especially underwa- acoustics. Enough knowledge and Penence have been gained from these d P^'ments so that there remains little bt of the significance of ocean fronts . r,n8 ASW operations. These features ae lmPortant not only to ASW but also to "'ide range of naval operations, includ- . 8 search and rescue, underway replen- Jdent (UnRep), ship routing, mine e|J arc, missile and torpedo firings, and ctrornagnetic wave propagation. h,.,.1^Ure 1 depicts the approximate mean Slhons of most of the known signifi- jlj01 ocean fronts. Fronts are found in j °cean areas of interest to the Navy, t|.C uding the northwestern Atlantic, qC Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom p3P’ Norwegian Sea, the western North ^ die, the Mediterranean Sea, the Ara-
t,an Sea, and the Indian Ocean. Al-
■noi
demarcations between water masses with different physical characteristics, each front has its own set of peculiarities in its formation, dynamics, and evolution. The very complexity of ocean dynamics and the numerous and complicated processes involved in their development makes any attempt at classification of these features a challenging task. Table 1 shows criteria for rating the relative strength of ocean fronts as shown in Figure 1.
The Navy is interested in ocean fronts principally for their acoustic effects on ASW. Sound speed in sea water increases with increasing temperature, salinity, and pressure (depth); temperature is usually the dominant factor in the upper layers. Because fronts are associated with strengthened horizontal temperature and salinity gradients, they are also associated with strengthened horizontal gradients of sound speed. The following acoustic effects may be observed across a strong front:
- Sound speed may change by as much as 30 m. (100 ft.) sec-1
- Sonic layer depth (SLD) may change by as much as 300 m. (1,000 ft.)
- Changes in in-layer and below-layer gradients may occur
- Depth of the deep sound channel axis may change by as much as 800 m. (2,600 ft.)
- Increased biological activity along the front may cause an increase in ambient noise and reverberation
- Increased ambient noise levels may be associated with increased sea states
- Bearing errors may occur when sound rays cross a front at an oblique angle
Although the acoustic effects of strong ocean fronts, such as the Kuroshio and the Gulf Stream, have been rather extensively documented, weak, seasonal thermal fronts such as those found in the Sargasso Sea between the Bahamas and Bermuda also exhibit pronounced changes in acoustic conditions. Oceanographers have attributed such weak thermal fronts, which are located in regions of little horizontal thermal variability, to the convergence of surface waters driven by two opposing wind systems, the prevailing westerlies to the north and the northeast trades to the south. The confluence, or convergence, of these surface waters results in the establishment of a weak thermal discontinuity at some central latitude.
Another class of fronts may occur
Table 1 Criteria for Rating the Relative Strength of Ocean Fronts
Maximum Change in Change in Sonic Depth Persistence or
Sound Speed (ft!sec) Layer Depth (ft) (ft) Seasonality
Strong | >100 | >500 | >3,000 | Year-round |
Moderate | 50-100 | 100-500 | 300-3,000 | Year-round |
Weak | <50 | <100 | <300 | Certain Seasons Only |
made
A great deal of progress has been
Allan1,!c
Good Hope, and across the
:dij
shiPs
along the edges of continental shelves in middle and high latitudes. These fronts, which are often weak or moderate and seasonal, are associated with wind-induced upwclling, precipitation, and river runoff from adjacent coastal plains. Being very close to continental land masses, they often cause rapid and pronounced transformations in the overlying air masses. The Bay of Biscay shelf edge front in the vicinity of the seaward approaches to the English Channel is denoted by an elongated band of relatively cold water extending northwestward along the continental shelf break south of the Celtic Sea. The cold, upwelled water associated with this front often underlies warm, moist air to produce thick fog, reducing visibility. Moreover, atmospheric thermal inversions may accompany marine fog causing warm, dry air to overlie cool, moist marine air. Under such circumstances, radar ducting or trapping may occur which will affect the performance of air and surface search and fire control radars and may have profound influences on electronic warfare.
Most strong ocean fronts, such as the Gulf Stream, are major current boundaries and as such can be of great concern to handlers of large, deep-draft naval vessels operating close to each other during such complicated and crucial maneuvers as UnRep. During January and February 1981, two near-collisions occurred between large ships engaged in UnRep operations in the vicinity of the north wall of the Gulf Stream. Examination of the navigation and engineering logs indicated set and drift of 050° and 3.9 knots and a rise in sea surface temperature of 6° in eight-ten nautical miles. Such a strong set and drift coupled with the drastic rise in sea surface temperature indicated that the first near collision occurred close to the north wall. During each incident, strong current shear near the north wall produced such a strong torque that the two UnRep ships tended to turn. Collision was averted only with the timely execution of emergency breakaway.
The most obvious lesson to be learned from these two near collisions is that UnRep should, when possible, be avoided in the vicinity of strong ocean fronts such as the Gulf Stream. Strong current shear occurs not only in the north wall of the Gulf Stream, but also in the warm core and, to a lesser extent, at the southern edge of the Gulf Stream. Warm (clockwise) and cold (counterclockwise) eddies (rings) that are spawned from the Gulf Stream can also be accompanied by strong current shear. When large ships in excess of 1,000 feet in length, 80,000 tons in displacement, and 30 feet in draft are affected by current shears, all vessels operating in strong frontal zones should exercise extreme caution during UnRep.
Given the increasing awareness of the importance of fronts and eddies and the myriad of fleet acoustic and environmental prediction systems, where are we now, and where should we be going? Computer-produced acoustic prediction products such as the Ship/Helicopter Acoustic Range Prediction System and Acoustic Sensor Range Prediction have been issued to fleet units for the past ten or 15 years by the Fleet Numerical Oceanography Center and other shore- based regional oceanography centers. The fundamental objective of these acoustic products is to describe as accurately as possible the acoustic properties of the water in the operating area. However, the principal drawback of computer forecasts from shore is that they are dependent on enormous computerized data bases augmented by only a handful of bathythermograph (BT) reports scattered over a considerable area. Because such forecasts are biased toward mean or average conditions, they may be woefully inaccurate in regions of high oceanographic variability. In addition, they are dependent on ship-to-shore communications circuits which will almost certainly be overloaded or unavailable in time of war.
A step in the right direction toward increasing the accuracy and representativeness of acoustic forecasts and solving the communications problem is the Integrated Command ASW Prediction System (ICAPS), developed by the Naval Oceanographic Office (NAVOCEANO), and the Sonar Insitu Mode Assessment System (SIMAS), developed by the Naval Underwater Systems Center. Both systems have the capability to merge an on-scene BT observation with deep history files resident in a computer to arrive at a complete sound speed profde from surface to bottom. Propogation loss >s then computed using standard Na'l acoustic models. Also, several multip1 profile or range dependent models have been developed and are in use at vari°uS Navy laboratories.
in naval environmental prediction sys terns but much remains to be done. Fir of all, workable tactical doctrine that ca® be applied in the vicinity of an oce front must be devised. Greater etnphaS1 should be placed on tactical oceanogra phy and oceanographic variability at 1 various fleet ASW and sonar trainHU. schools. It does little good to be aware ^ the presence of a front or of the details0 its oceanography unless that knowing can be applied to the fleet problem ‘ hand. Although the amount of ocean® graphic data in the data files around t world is considerable, the archived da are at best of marginal value in delinea^ ing the locations of ocean fronts. * variability in ocean frontal regions isse verely aliased in both time and space 1 the enormous computerized data fHcS Quasi-synoptic “snapshots” of select® ocean fronts should be made availa and understandable to fleet operated Climatological data, while giving a rea sonably good insight into mean or avC age conditions, may not be represent;®1^ of true conditions existing at the time an operation. _
Naval Oceanography Command C® ters have made an excellent start in 1( direction by promulgating to the ocean frontal positions ascertained fr° satellite infrared imagery. In addin011 scientists at NAVOCEANO are using stjj' tistical techniques for inferring the sU( surface position of ocean fronts from s3 ellite data, and future satellite sen1’0 will give indirect measurements of subsurface density, temperature, and ® linity variability. It will become avail® during the middle 1980s. Commer®1 vessels of opportunity transiting varl° world trade routes provide excellent °P portunities to obtain time series BT sC tions across ocean fronts. This technic has been used with great success act , the Gulf Stream between New York a^ Bermuda, across the Somali eddy >16 ^ between the Persian Gulf and the Cape equatorial current system. Finally, Ju. . cious use must be made of survey ' 1 and aircraft for frontal studies. ^ Ocean fronts and eddies are not . cause of or the answer to all ocean-rd® fleet problems. In some areas, they n1 be insignificant, or for some sensors t may be unimportant. However, sufficl information has been gained from th°0 • toX^.er'ments> and operational experience Justify a concentrated look at their Potential for improving the Navy’s Warfighting capabilities. As with any jjjodern technological development, the avy’s understanding of ocean fronts 111 not come rapidly or easily. However,
NAVOCEANO, working in concert with Navy laboratories, and the operating forces should make substantial progress over the next few years.
Mr. Beatty attended the U. S. Naval Academy and graduated from the University of Washington with a bachelor of arts degree in oceanography. He earned a master’s degree in oceanography from New York University and is currently employed as a civilian oceanographer in the Tactical Analysis Division of the Naval Oceanographic Office in Mississippi.
Their Sea-Based Fighter
7 John D. Gresham
In
roundly criticized as the Soviet Yak-36
been the subject of various criti- including the lack of range, interarmament, long-range air-to-air maneuverability, speed, and an
°ut to
sea simply to be used as targets-
and
tact;
recent years, few aircraft have been
°rger.” The “Forger,” which oper- es °ff Kiev-class aviation cruisers (i.e, rcraft carriers) has, since the first de- , .°yment of the aircraft in the summer of
•976, c,sms Hal
radar,
'■'•fcctive long-range air-to-air missile
lAAM).
listen to the tactical pilots of the ■ S. Navy, Air Force, and Marine ,0rPs, and of our Allies, one would think at the “Forger” was an “easy” target they all hope they may see in large , (rubers. Our carrier-based fighter and auk communities almost seem to rate e forger” as a “nonthreat.” while many of these assessments are °bably correct, they do not take into ^c°unt several important factors. First, e Soviets would not put these aircraft
very expensive ones at that—by our ^ leal aircraft. Second, this mentality is ased upon looking at the “Forger’’/Kiev craft/ship system from a “Western” point of view. Third, the Soviet Union always does things for a reason. With these facts in mind, we should look at the “Forger” and ask what its missions are, and what it does have in the way of performance, capabilities, and armaments. Most important, we should ask: If the “Forger” constitutes no significant threat to our tactical aviation assets, who or what does it threaten?
The Kiev/“Forger” System: Since, at this time, the “Forger” is deployed only on board the Kiev-class aviation cruisers, it stands to reason that the “Forger” was designed specifically as a Kiev subsystem. Therefore, by looking at the Kiev’s missions, systems, and capabilities, some insight into the “Forger’s” missions, capabilities, and targets might be derived from this.
The Kiev-class aviation cruisers represent the second generation of air-capable ships produced by the modem Soviet Navy. Despite the favorable comments that followed the Kiev’s first deployment in 1976, she is not the revolutionary ship that some naval analysts would have us believe. On the contrary, these aviation
cruisers appear to represent an evolutionary development by the Soviet Navy. The Kiev is a logical, conservative follow-on to the Moskva-class aviation cruisers which were first deployed in 1967.
In the design of the Kiev-class cruisers, the Soviets appear to have developed a requirement for a vessel that could form the core of a multi-role surface action group (SAG). This means that they required a ship that was capable in all three areas of naval warfare—antiair warfare (AAW), antisubmarine warfare (ASW), and antisurface warfare (ASUW). Another requirement seems to have been that the Kiev-class be exceptional in each of these areas with redundancy in each area. Against these requirements was the fact that the Soviet Navy is last in importance relative to the other Soviet services. A less than successful design, as in the case of the Moskva class, would have to be avoided. Therefore, a rather conservative approach appears to have been chosen for the Kiev-class cruisers, both in the ship design and the weapons suite.
With this conservative approach in mind, it is logical that all of the primary weapons systems would be either well- proven systems or extremely low-risk developmental systems. For example, the SA-N-3 Goblet, the SA-N-4 Gecko, and the Ka-25 “Hormone” had all been in service for ten years by the time the Kiev appeared on her first deployment.
Even the new SS-N-12 Sandbox antishipping cruise missiles appear to be an evolutionary development of the older SS-N-3 Shaddock cruise missile that has been carried by the Kynda and Kresta-1- class missile cruisers now for more than 20 years. The new Slava-class missile
The “Forger-A” single seat VISTOL strike!fighter, the first shipboard fixed- wing aircraft to deploy on board a Soviet ship, should not be underestimated—as it seems to be—by U. S. and allied pilots.
fall
gine
burner because of the use of thrust-
The “Forger B” is a two seat trainer, which, along with the “Forger A,” has received an addition of several aerodynamic body fences, possibly to improve problems with lateral stability or with the ingestion of hot exhaust gases.
cruisers are an extreme example of this thinking, lacking a single new weapon or ship system identified as unique or new to the class. Therefore, it is logical that any new tactical aircraft that might be carried by the ATiev-class cruisers would not be a primary weapons system in any of the three primary warfare roles (AAW, ASW, and ASUW).
“Forger”—The Design: Even with a secondary role to the Kiev-class’s primary missions, much would be expected from this, the first shipboard fixed-wing aircraft to deploy on board a Soviet ship. With so much riding on this aircraft, in terms of prestige, capability, and the long-term growth of Soviet naval aviation, a conservative design and development approach would appear to have been mandatory. Another apparent consideration was that the aircraft design should impact ship design and operations to the smallest degree possible.
Maybe most importantly, the aircraft should also be simple to fly and maintain so that the Soviets would be able to operate the plane with their extremely limited at-sea aviation experience. A result of this final point is that this aircraft would provide a core of experience and personnel that would be required if the Soviets ever were to move on to conventional aircraft carriers—as they are now doing.
These points in conjunction with the lack of Soviet experience in shipboard fixed-wing aircraft operations made the choice of a single seat Vertical Short Takeoff and Landing (V/STOL) strike/ fighter a logical choice. The Soviet designers, though, went many conservative steps further in the “Forger’s” design. In the choice of propulsion/lift systems, the designers chose the interesting alternative of integral forward fuselage lift jets with a separate vectored thrust engine to provide aft lift and forward thrust. While this may seem overly complicated, the decision makes good sense for several reasons. Soviet engine technology, then and now, lags badly behind that of the Western nations, especially in the area of advanced, high bypass turbofan engines, such as the Rolls Royce Pegasus that powers the many versions of the Harrier, and that are required for a fully thrust vectored aircraft like the Harrier. Another reason may be the relative lack of success enjoyed by the purely thrust vectored (Yak-34 “Freehand”) and lift jet/con- ventional (MiG-21 PFM “Fishbed-G,” “Faithless,” “Flagon,” etc.) prototypes that were developed to test V/STOL concepts in the Soviet Union.
While the actual results are, of course, unavailable to the West the problems of the French Mirage III vertical lift jet/con- ventional fighter prototype may be representative of those suffered by the Soviet V/STOL program. With these points in mind, the idea of a hybrid lift jet/conven- tional lift/propulsion system makes some sense. This solution would allow the use of the Soviet Union’s well-developed turbojet (non-afterburning) technology (especially for the lift jets), as well as the inherent stability of vectored thrust propulsion during the critical vertical to forward flight transition period.
In addition to a conservative propulsion/lift system, the Soviet designers also appear to have used an extremely conventional airframe design. In fact, the “Forger” bears a remarkable resemblance to the West German VFW-191B V/STOL tactical reconnaissance fighter. The Soviets have never been above copying a good design, and this may explain the uncanny resemblance between the two aircraft. The construction appears to be relatively conventional with no exotic shapes or materials.
“Forger"—Sensors and Weapons: External examination of the “Forger” reveals no apparent long-range sensor systems, active or passive. This conclusion is supported by the pointed nose which appears to have only a small white dielectric nose cap, probably housing a small range-only radar for the weapons delivery systems. In addition, the “Forger” has no apparent apertures which might indicate Infrared (IR), Electro-Optical (E/O), or laser sensors of any kind, as on the MiG-23/27 “Flogger” series aircraft. The only long-range sensor of any kind that may possibly be on board is the Sirena III Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) that most Soviet aircraft use for early detection of enemy radars “locking” onto them.
While this apparent lack of long-rang1’ sensors might be viewed as a signify2 design weakness by some, it is, in fad' rational design feature—or, in this case' omission—since the Kiev and most laire Soviet ships have numerous air surve1 lance radars (Top Sail, Top Steer, TeP Pair) which may be used to guide jn “Forger” to a positive ground-control^ intercept (GCI). This interception tactk’ used with such effect on KAL Flight 00 j has been a primary tactic of the Sovl military for decades. .
With the shipborne controller handli*1^ all navigational inputs to the pilot, excep for the final visual lock-on and weap°2 launch, there is no real need for any borne radar system on the “Forger.’ this case, a radar would only be red1*2 dant weight on board an already weig*1 limited aircraft.
The lack of sensors on board * “Forger” does not preclude the carry111' of a large variety of air-to-air and air-10^ surface weapons. There are four pyl°n, for the storage of external stores wh*c appear to be capable of supporting proximately 250 kilograms (550 pound1;, each. This means that the “Forger _ probably has a maximum external stofe capability of about 1,000 kilogr2^, (2,200 pounds). To date, the “Forgcl has been seen carrying AA-8 Aphid air-to-air missiles (AAMs), AS-7 Ke^ air-to-surface missiles (ASMs), GSh- ; 23-mm. gun pods, drop tanks, and SL’V^ eral types of as yet unidentified stof® pods. It should also be capable of carf/ ing 57-mm. rocket pods and free ' bombs. .
‘ ‘Forger’ ’ —Aircraft Performa,,L j'
The “Forger” appears to be a sligd1 supersonic (Mach 1.2/800 mph/l-- kmph at 36,000 feet/11,000 m) airc^ with both limited range and maneuve*" bility. These assessments are made ba* upon several basic assumptions. * “Forger” is approximately the same -sl as the MiG-21 “Fishbed” fighter/in^ ceptor that has been in use for more tn 25 years. Given that the “Forger” IllU* carry two lift-jets and that the niai# e cannot use a conventional al
haust hi!
’his
A and B versions of the “Forger.’ i0rrie observers have used the lack of the t,0hy fences on the original “Forgers” I at deployed with the Kiev in 1976 to J’lfy the argument that these early 0rgers” were actually preproduction Prototype aircraft that were still being ’ed on the Kiev’s early deployments.
nQn.
’ioi
ce: Observations of “Forger” opera-
*0r'ng nozzles, the “Forger” should only ® able to be slightly supersonic with C ean wings and a light fuel load.
Soviet aircraft of the “Forger’s” gen- ^ation (MiG-23/27 “Flogger,” MiG-25 Foxbat,” Su-17/20/22 “Fitter”) have AjVer been noted for their long range.
llh a highly weight-limited, turbojet- P°Wered aircraft like the “Forger,” the lnternal fuel load must both be rapidly 0nsumed and rather limited. The rorger” can, of course, make use of ^ternal fuel tanks, but even with this aed fuel capacity, the combat radius °uld appear to be fairly limited (100- 2°0nm/12O-24Okm).
. 1 he small wing area of the “Forger” ^Pproximately 170 square feet/15.8 MUare meters), as well as a pronounced l^nward dihedral to the wings (about b must result in an extremely high ln8 loading (approximately 129 pounds r square foot/626 kilograms per square ^eter). This, combined with an inability Use the lift-jets in a vector-in-forward- Jght (VIFF) mode like the Harrier, as e ’ as a very low thrust-to-weight ratio, °uld make the “Forger” an aircraft lth extremely limited horizontal and ^■cal maneuverability.
Forger” Variants and Modifications: n‘y two variants of the “Forger” have s?Peared to date. The “Forger A” is the n8je seat combat version. The other ^sion is the “Forger B,” which has Teen modified into a two-seat trainer.
only noticeable modifications have l Cri the addition of several aerodynamic .,0(v fences just aft of the cockpit on ei- ^er side of the lift jet inlets. One expla- (tlon of this modification would appear have been some possible problems llh lateral stability. Another explanation 'Sht be that the “Forger” may have had . °blems with the ingestion of hot exgases which tend to flow around the j,.Setage during takeoffs and landings. I^nce the ingestion of warm air tends to C 'Ver the efficiency of jet engines, body ofnces would tend to limit the reingestion >, Steady “hot” air as a result of ?r°Und effects.” Whatever the reason, modification has been added to both
Forger’ ’ Operations and Mainte- ns from the Kiev-class aviation cruisers PPear to involve only vertical takeoffs landings. This is logical since the use
of lift jets by the “Forger” probably precludes the use of rolling takeoffs. While some observers might be critical of the disuse of “Ski-Jump” technology by the Soviets, it should be remembered that the original work on the famous “Ski- Jumps” that have made their way on the British carriers was published in 1973 by Lieutenant Commander D. R. Taylor, Royal Navy.
At this same time, the prototype “Forgers” were probably doing their first test flight operations off of the Moskva, and the first unit of the Kiev- class was probably being fitted out. There would have been no time to backfit this design concept to either the ship or the aircraft as both were in production by this time.
The takeoffs and landings appear to be extremely smooth, prompting some analysts to believe that this is handled by some sort of automated takeoff/landing system. If this is not the case, the quality of the aircrews must be exceptional to handle this demanding task. Not surprisingly, the Soviets have copied much of Western carrier operations. During flight operations, an escorting destroyer or frigate is kept in the “plane guard” position aft of the ship to assist in rescue operations resulting from any mishaps that might occur. In addition, a rescue helicopter (usually a utility version of the Ka-25 “Hormone”) is kept ready.
Early “Forger” operations had all of the arming, servicing, and stowage of the aircraft done in the hanger. As they have gained more experience, more and more of these operations have been done on the main flying deck. Facilities for these operations are provided by several elevators along the edges of the deck. In addition, what appear to be fueling lines and automatic test equipment umbilicals are accessed through hinged doors at the edges of the flight deck. Flight operations appear to be supervised from a glass enclosed “pri-fly” at the rear of the massive “island” structure on the starboard side of the ship. The Soviets have quickly gained experience in their flight operations and are undoubtedly putting this experience into practical use in the design and development of their new conventional aircraft carriers.
“Forger”—Its Missions: The primary AAW weapons systems of the Kiev-class aviation cruisers are their batteries of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). With a range of approximately 30 nm/55.5 km, the SA-N-3 Goblet provides an extremely capable AAW punch for a Kiev-equipped SAG. It, therefore, makes sense that the “Forger” is used in a secondary AAW role to the SAM batteries. Since the “Forger” has only a limited combat radius (100-200 nm/120-240 km) and only a short loiter time on station, as well as poor performance in an air combat maneuvering sense, a combat air patrol mission would appear to be impractical. This makes even more sense when it is considered that the attack aircraft that the Western nations deployed when the “Forger” was being developed had superior sensor/weapons suits to what the “Forger” has now.
With the deployment by the Western nations of third-generation jet-powered attack aircraft (such as the French Super Etendard and the U. S. F-18 Hornet), the performance, sensor, and weapons inequities between Western fighter/attack aircraft and the “Forger” will only grow.
Since the “Forger” probably cannot win in AAW duels against Western fighter/attack aircraft, and the Kiev-class aviation cruisers do not carry enough “Forgers” (12-15 “Forgers” per ship) to overwhelm an incoming strike force by force of numbers, other targets must be anticipated for prosecution by the “Forger.” Logically, these targets should be slower, less maneuverable, and even more poorly armed for AAW combat than the “Forger.” In addition, these targets must be of extreme value and mission importance from the Soviet point of view. Taking these factors into account, it would appear that the “Forger” would be used to detour/destroy patrol/ASW aircraft (P-3 Orion, S-3 Viking, Nimrod, etc.) and helicopters (LAMPS Mk I/III, Sea King, Lynx, etc.). This mission would fit in nicely with the existing theory that the Soviet surface forces are primarily designed to support and protect the vast submarine fleets of the Soviet Navy. In addition, by detouring/destroy- ing the maritime surveillance aircraft (E-2 Hawkeye, E-3 Sentry, Nimrod AEW, EA-6B Prowler, etc.) that would be sent to target the Kiev SAG before an airstrike by Western attack aircraft, the “Forger” would enhance the survivability of the Kiev-equipped SAG itself.
Since the very beginnings of the modem Soviet Navy in the 1950s, the primary ASUW strike weapon of the Soviet Navy has been the surface-to-surface missile (SSM). This has not changed after almost a decade of deployments by the Kiev- class cruisers. Even the land-based strike aircraft (the “Backfires,” “Bears,” and “Badgers”) of Soviet naval aviation use air-launched versions of antishipping cruise missiles. It is, therefore, logical to assume that the strike component of the Kiev’s “air group” are the 24 SS-N-12 Sandbox missiles that are contained in the launchers and magazines in her bow. Yet, not all of the surface targets that a Kiev- equipped SAG might encounter are worthy of one of the huge (and expensive) Sandbox missiles. Clearly, the limited supply of SSMs that the Kiev carries are intended for much larger game than a patrol boat or corvette. In spite of this fact, the Soviets cannot afford to ignore the threat of any SSM-equipped vessel since she might be capable of a “David and Goliath” style confrontation in which the K/ev-class cruiser or some of her escorts might be damaged or sunk.
It is, therefore, in the role of “light” strike or ASUW that the “Forger” may find a mission. Since such vessels tend to have an extremely limited or no AAW capability, the “Forger” could provide an extremely cost-effective means (as opposed to the Kiev carrying a smaller SSM system such as the SS-N-2c Styx or the SS-N-9 Siren as a secondary ASUW armament) of dealing with such a threat. Equipped with free-fall bombs, 23-mm. gun pods, 57-mm. rockets, or AS-7 Kerry ASMs, the “Forger” could quickly deal with any small surface threat that might appear within, say, 100 nm/120 km of a Kiev-equipped SAG. The “Forger” has the added advantage of being able to recycle many times, as opposed to the rather one-shot method associated with a SSM. This concept was well proven by the British during the 1982 Falklands Conflict. The use of armed aircraft and helicopters (carrying, for example, AS-12 and Sea Skua ASMs) against patrol boats, submarines, and other targets helped the British maintain sea control around the islands and their task forces.
The “Forger” would appear to have some degree of usefulness in several other warfare roles. For example, it might be used to prosecute surfaced enemy submarines in support of Ka-25 “Hormone”/Ka-27 “Helix” helicopters or land-based ASW aircraft. Another role might be that of providing close-air support (CAS) to Soviet naval infantry forces during amphibious operations beyond the range of land-based Soviet CAS aircraft such as the Su-20 “Fitter” or Su-25 “Frogfoot.” While some might criticize this as a waste of very expensive and limited naval aviation assets, if these operations take place in an area that does not have much of a defensive AAW capability , the presence of a Kiev-equipped support group and her air wing of “Forgers” might just be what tips the balance in such an operation. Remember, if the “Forger” is the only aircraft in the area,
it is, by default, the best aircraft in ^ area.
As has been shown, the “Forger” isaI! extremely limited aircraft. In spite ® this, when placed in the context of 1 ^ entire Kiev ship/weapons system- proves to be a capable companion to ® other systems carried by the Kiev-clasS cruisers and her escorts. While, by itsel j the “Forger” constitutes only a margin threat, the synergistic effect of 1 “Forger” upon the other ships and sys terns in a Kiev-equipped SAG sh°n make the net effect greater than its in® vidual parts. It fills in many “gap8 the various weapons envelopes of 1 Kiev and her consorts and, therefore makes the entire ship/SAG more P°wer ful and flexible. In addition, 1 ^ “Forger” is providing both experienC and a core of trained personnel that be needed when the new Soviet nuclei powered conventional aircraft came begin to deploy in the early 1990s.
Mr. Gresham is currently employed as a professljU analyst by Delex Systems, Inc., and is Assistant t tor for Micro Times, a computer software and gal11 magazine based in Southern California.
Competition Advocates: A First Year Report
By Commodore Stuart Platt, Supply Corps, U. S. Navy
lished a competition base for aircraft 'n
, . r . i.jccf
ertial navigation systems using ring li‘; gyro technology, which should break sole-source hold existing for years. J
ulate
resulted in savings of $108 million the President’s budget request.
Interjecting competition in the reo acquisition of “RD-358” shipboat“ magnetic tape units produced a winn,rlr bid of $27 million from the challeng^ providing the Navy with a savings some $20 million from the bid of the Pr ^ vious sole-source supplier. Compel*!® for production of 42 “TBX” Thim"1, Arrays is saving the Navy $250,000 PE unit from the production estimate
During the summer of 1983, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman established the Office of the Competition Advocate General of the Navy to pursue increased competition in the procurement of weapon systems, components, parts, and services for the Navy and Marine Corps. This professional note in the form of an annual report reviews the results of the first 12 months of the Department of the Navy’s Competition Program. It represents just one in a series of communications from the Competition Advocate of the Navy to command competition advocates throughout the Navy.
Shipbuilding Competition: This fiscal year, we will buy more than 86% of our ships competitively. Especially encouraging is that more than 90% of the ships to be built or converted in the current five-year defense plan will be acquired competitively. We have set the right business posture for the future in shipbuilding, a major segment of the Navy’s budget. In shipboard weapons and equipment as well we have incorporated competition into many of our acquisition strategies. Examples include the Mk-48 advanced capability torpedo (ADCAP), the Mk-50 advanced lightweight torpedo (ALWT), and propellers for the DDG-52 and subsequent Arleigh Burke (DDG-51 )- class destroyers.
Aircraft, Missile, and Electronic Systems Competition: Major strides in competing aircraft, missile, and electronic systems have also been made. Competition is a keystone in major new programs such as the carrier inner-zone antisubmarine warfare helicopter and JVX advanced vertical lift aircraft, and in other programs such as the common ejection seat and the purchase of commercially owned C-9 aircraft. The Navy’s recent decision to establish a second production source or accelerate second-sourcing plans for the Phoenix, Rolling Airframe, and Standard missile programs is another important step we are taking to increase competition in our programs.
To benefit the F-14D upgrade program and expedite its on-time completion, the Navy selected the winner of the fighter aircraft engine competition run by the Air Force with Navy participation. We estab
Navy’s objective here, as elsewhere, put forces in place that will stim1g contractors to reduce costs and imPr^f performance so we can afford the level 0 naval weapons we must have. _
Impressive Savings: Last year’s eo
petition between prime contractors ^ three Aegis-equipped cruisers yi®J“e. $228 million in savings from Presioe^ Ronald Reagan’s budget request for ships. Competition in fiscal year 1984 Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class submari11^
:efl‘
year 1984 contract for the joint missile engine. Aggressive compe-
■°n for nuclear attack submarine cone s has motivated private submarine ^instruction yards to achieve break- I rou8ds in production technology: The Proved facilities and fabrication tech-
n^ques
lion
jq, n fiscal year 1983, we exceeded the /Vy s competition goal of 30% of total niipCt PUrcfiase dollars by some $215 cl0n- This fiscal year, we have set our 3SraPetifion goal significantly higher:
of total procurement dollars. That
'Sure i
Navy Competition Performance
?700’000 per unit, for total savings exCeeding $10 million.
competitive climate brought about ijfcwcd $22 million savings in the
cruise
ure expected to shorten construc- a Periods and cut costs. These are just evv °f numerous examples of the prac- impact of increased competition.
Th ei&Jltened Awareness in the Navy: re is an increased awareness of com- 1 i°n in middle- and first-line management throughout the Navy. People in fi ijhlnSton headquarters commands and is6 act'vilies are realizing that the Navy tjvSerious in its commitment to competing Pr°curement. Much of the change is wresult of the strong and active support rei are receiving from the President, Sec- and^ ^efense Caspar Weinberger, ofth°Ur sen'or Navy leaders. The mood p .. Public is supportive of Navy com- 0j.Itl0n efforts. This overall endorsement efferri0re competition is having a telling
38.6%
a^Uates to $15.8 billion in competitive our ™S’ and we exPect more than half of A], c°ntract actions to be competitive. Iq. °ugh progress toward this fiscal year pj 4 8°al is mixed through the first nine ms, we anticipate reaching our goal.
Fi
Project BOSS: To help correct the problems we have found in our spare parts acquisition process and to facilitate more spare parts competition. Chief of Naval Material Admiral Steven A. White established Project BOSS (Buy Our Spares Smart). Its objective is to ensure that the Navy pays only fair and reasonable prices for spare parts, which will help us obtain the highest possible state of fleet readiness with available funds. Project BOSS incorporates more than 100 initiatives designed to improve the process of buying spare parts. To support these initiatives, some 350 new billets have been allocated Navy-wide.
The breakout initiative can save precious stock fund dollars, particularly when we stop buying from prime contractors and start competing requirements directly with active subcontractors. Our inventory control points have conducted full breakout reviews of more than 3,800 items this year, already exceeding our fiscal year 1984 goals, and thousands of other breakout reviews are also being conducted. There is an across-the-board acceptance of responsibility for controlling Navy procurement costs—the bottom line is that BOSS is working. All this represents solid progress which will earn dividends for years to come.
Rights in technical data are often an essential element in obtaining competition. The Navy is systematically reviewing restrictions on data and challenging restrictions where appropriate. We have reached agreements with major prime contractors, including Litton, United Technologies, Sperry, and IBM, which eliminate or reduce restrictions on data and have been well publicized. We are committed to do battle in instances where we find improper restrictions on data. We will defend our actions in the courts if necessary.
Competition Advocates Are in Place: Competition advocates have been appointed at all buying activities with a procurement authority of more than $25,000. In addition, more than 150 competition advocates have been designated at field activities which generate more than one million dollars in annual procurement requirements.
Instructions for Competition Advocates: As competition advocates, you must use sound judgment and have the courage of your convictions as you go about executing the Navy’s program of full and open competition in procurements.
Competition should be used to help give us more quality and product for our scarce dollars. Your mission is to challenge sole-source procurements and promote maximum practical competition in contracting. We are all expected to do what is best for the Navy and our country. At times, competition may not make good business sense. In such a case, you should promptly recommend approval of a valid proposed sole-source award and move on to other issues.
You must not be overly influenced by pessimists or those who resist change or work and who do not have the open mind and vision to recognize the potential results of competition. Use your common sense and attack problems on a case-bycase basis. Be wary of studies, many of which yield distorted results and are clearly too biased for use in generalized predictions. We cannot ignore the widespread use of competition in commercial business—if competition did not work
Percentage of Total Dollars
Percentage of Contract Actions
Total Dollars (Billions)
You won’t find a fish like this Mk-50 torpedo in your local market, but the military must shop around for its money’s worth in hardware for defense as prudently as housewives budget for meals.
and make sense, industry would not be competing their purchases so extensively.
Future Actions: The people on the firing line like you will be the ones who, in the long run, will determine the success of our program. I suggest you keep the following steps in mind as you address individual issues:
- Pay particular attention to contractor support services, and pursue competition in this area with vigor; you should expect more direction in this area shortly.
- Expect industry’s continued cooperation, but be prepared if necessary to use the Navy’s resources and proceed on your own if cooperation is not forthcoming.
- Continue to press for the technical data needed to permit the second sourcing and the spare parts procurement reforms we are seeking.
- Aggressively breakout spare parts to competition to take advantage of the demonstrated savings. Spare parts procurement is one area where we all have our credibility on the line and we must remain strong.
- Enforce the contractor commitments we have obtained on lifting restrictions on data rights, use of suppliers and licensees for direct purchase, and seek commitments from contractors from whom we have not yet heard.
- Continue to emphasize early planning for competition as an essential element in a complete acquisition strategy; clearly we should look for a plan to compete in all new starts.
- Encourage maximum possible subcontractors competition; here we need our Naval Plant Representative Offices, Supervisor of Shipbuilding Conversion and Repair, and other contract administering activities to lead the way.
- Be tough-minded but fair in our dealings with industry; the taxpayers deserve no less.
Remember that we are carrying out the strategy of the Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Material to use competitive forces to our advantage. As we seek to make the procurements bidding process more competitive, we also seek to ensure quality in our weapon systems, which must be rugged, reliable, and maintainable—our ships and aircraft must be able to survive in wartime or in other crises.
We are extensively increasing the use of competition in procurement to reduce costs, improve contractor performance, and strengthen the industrial base. ^ have made competition a part of all ne shipbuilding, aviation, and missile Pr° grams, as well as having created cofflP® tition through starting dual sourcing 0 many of our existing complex weap° systems. We are using competition wher it makes sense.
The powerful market force of compeI,j tion is bringing about dramatic and re savings. We are setting the right stage t° the Navy’s future business. This imp0^ tant program you and I have been paTttC\ pating in is accelerating—we now nee to keep it moving smartly while directife it equitably. ^
Commodore Platt headed the Budget Office °f Division of Naval Reactors at Headquarters, y Atomic Energy Commission. During the War, he was the Senior Operations Analysis Adv' ^ to the Republic of Vietnam Navy. In 1977, he ' u installed as the first Commander, Subsistence 1 Activities at the Defense Personnel Support Ce1' He is currently the Department of the Navy’s CoK'r tition Advocate General.
Concepts, Procedures, and Techniques (CPT)
By Captain James H. Patton, U. S. Navy
ment procedures effectively. The
developed part of the total skill Pat'Pa“.. that is acquired through repetitious pra
ba1'
itefs
Concepts Must be Taught: There often nothing terribly intuitive ab°^ concepts. Force = (Mass)(Accelerati01^ does not leap to the mind of a high sch°
Any human skill can be broken down into three components: concepts, procedures, and techniques. Although in practice, these components overlap to a certain degree, we are going to consider them as separate entities for the sake of discussion. Also for the sake of discussion, the definitions of these terms are as follows:
► Concept: the academic truth governing laws of physics or basic “givens” of a particular skill. A concept of baseball is that after the ball is struck and hits the ground before being caught, the person striking the ball reaches a certain point before the ball does. A concept of firing torpedoes from a Submarine is that the weapon is released toward a target which is within effective range with the same speed-across-the-line-of-sight as the target, resulting in the two paths intersecting at a point.
- Procedure: the “rules” by which applicable concepts are implemented. “Three strikes and you’re out” is a fundamental procedure associated with baseball. Written advice as to the pre-launch setting of various weapon variables serves as a procedure of torpedo shooting.
- Technique: the eye-hand or mind- mouth coordination required to irllP*P tice—hours and hours in either the ting cage or the submarine attack cerf ashore. In some cases, adequate teC^- nique is developed only after years practice and apprenticeship.
All this might seem trivial, but c° . sider the next few steps in the logic cha>
J|Ut in)
fU ent as a truism until it is developed nirT>, in an academic environment by a cj Petent instructor. The fact that two Sa°Slng things will collide if they have the S(,nie speed-across-the-line-of-sight is hav"1^ nature only t0 those students who atop ^6en tau”llt die concepts of relative
■p ^°nc?pts Must be Grasped Before low' ^ Procedures: Consider the fol- 'Vlng conversation:
Coach: ‘Now remember, Smith, three strikes and you ’ re out. ’ ntith: ‘What’s a strike?’
°ach: ‘When you miss the ball.’ fmith: ‘What ball?’
°ach: ‘The ball you’re trying to hit so that it lands on the ground before being caught and so that you get to one of the bases before it does.’
^ttiith: ‘Oh!’”
lum°n?ePts and procedures are often
these platitudes? Most of the remaining allegations and examples are germane to only the submarine force, since that is what I know. Intuition, however, suggests there might be parallels in other warfare specialities.
Supportive Documentation Should Support the CPT Approach: If, in fact, the first step in the skill acquisition sequence is to master the applicable concepts, then appropriate textbooks must be available to the instructor and the students. In support of teaching military skills, these should almost invariably be unclassified with little or no reference to specific joint service series (AN) military equipment. Where properly oriented conceptual publications are available, the procedural documentation should be brief, distinct, and specific (“Switch A in position number three”). The derivation of the sonar equation in every operational sonar publication is neither necessary nor desirable.
- Ped together under a generic title of eVees-” It is extremely important, hows .r’ t0 keep the two sets clear. That ach A should be in a position three on ham sonar system is one of man’s tiQns ^Procedures) and is subject to ques- 0r conscious violation because of an
“Rul
Unanti
diated
Under
aught: if
re
dUrp'°n8 and/or complex); and the proce- a
qs ^hniqUes Must be Practiced as Often
Ptiati
re is
•concepts).
Wrong (inconsistent with appro-
0eecessary to Reach and Maintain a °f Proficiency: This would
aPpe;
llon.
exiSt,
ar almost too trite to warrant men- However, example after example
where either the complexity or rate WasCay of a technique-associated skill rf|e Underestimated (“What do you Practicing Reduced Visibility De- t0 j uring clear weather? There’s nothing an(j’dUst man the radar, blow the whistle, cont-aVC sorne°nc keep track of all the W*ts”). Athletes and musicians are skin aWare °f die half-life of unpracticed offS' Honest submarine commanding iScers admit that their handling of a per- a]() . degrades a bit during a month
gside the pier in upkeep. nat is the practical application of all
of
dei
1 rot,
If a naval officer does not learn the concept of, say, firing a torpedo from a submarine, he will strike out when he tries to learn the technique of firing a torpedo.
There is also room for technique-associated documentation, especially in the tactical area. Any book on how to play poker or golf is really technique-associated guidance. By the subject’s very nature, discussions on technique should be general. “It is usually best to draw three cards to two pair, but you should consider what others have drawn or bet, and trying to bluff by standing pat and betting heavily is a distinct option.”
The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program Trains Properly: Prerequisites are first firmly established. Without demon
strated previous achievement in technical academics (officers) or documented superior general classification test/arithme- tic test mental capacity (enlisted), the individual need not apply. Upon acceptance, the concepts phase is commenced with a vengeance.
Nuclear Power School has an intense curriculum stressing in-depth study of every academic discipline needed to understand the physics of plant operations. Even the brightest must scramble for survival. With this hurdle passed, aspiring Nukes find themselves essentially alone with a five- or six-foot stack of procedurally oriented books which they read, reread, study, and restudy.
Help is available in a remedial manner when a procedure is not understood because of a gap in conceptual knowledge, but the material is learned as opposed to being taught. Only after concepts and procedures are mastered, are hands allowed to touch equipment at the shore- based reactor prototypes. Until graduation, the student is practicing his technique under competent supervision.
Throughout this training path, attrition occurs for different reasons. Even the individual with superior achievement in the concepts and procedures phases may be found incapable of applying these skills in real time during a dynamic scenario (i.e., poor technique). Further, even after reporting to the fleet, the training organization is so structured that these three areas are constantly reviewed. An interesting observation for the maintenance of skills is an apparent inversion of initial learning priority. Since technique is more volatile than procedures, which are more volatile than concepts, training efforts are, therefore, appropriately apportioned in that order. This inversion is logical when one considers how many times the “three strikes and you’re out” rule has to be retaught compared to how much continuing batting practice should be held.
Over-Proceduralization is Erroneously Viewed as a Solution to All Problems: The notable success in the operation of naval nuclear propulsion plants has led many to an erroneous conclusion that demonstrated excellence is the result of the superb procedural documentation available in that area. All too little credit is given to the equally superb conceptual preparation of operators and the emphasis that is placed on constant maintenance of technique.
If a ship has a problem in coming to periscope depth, we tighten the procedural guidance (“Sweep 2.8 times in low power at a rate of 36.5° per second”) rather than reviewing the concepts in-
volved (Quickly find out if another ship is close) and checking to see how well they are taught (“Sweep at a rapid, personally comfortable rate, for as many revolutions as necessary to feel sure that if someone were within a few thousand yards, he would have been seen”). The need for frequent, repetitive practice is not always stressed. The number of revolutions necessary for a comfortable “nothing close” report might be seven or eight for Lieutenant, (junior grade) Smith, but the commanding officer can get the same warm fuzzy after two or three. But, Smith has another 12-13 years to go before he will be teaching his junior officers.
Speaking only for the submarine force, it would be criminal to assume that our platforms will continue forever to have the almost obscene technological advantage over potential adversaries that has been enjoyed (and sometimes taken too much for granted) since the USS Nautilus (SSN-571) first sailed. If historical precedent has any validity, there are asymptotic limits in areas such as sensors and quieting that will result in both blue and orange forces having roughly equivalent equipment. Our continued supremacy has to be based on operator skill. These operators must have superior and well-praC. ticed tactical guidance and be trained enough to realize when and why 1 ^ “doctrine” is inappropriate and wn “new tactics” must be invented in rt time.
Captain Patton was graduated from the Naval Ac emy in 1960. He received a master’s degree in <*•' ^ engineering from the University of Rhode Island has served in five nuclear submarines, was the ex tive officer of the Carvalla (SSN-684), and c0 , manded the Pargo (SSN-650). He was the Direct0^ Tactical Training at the Submarine School. Gro ^ Connecticut. Captain Patton is currently attach^ the Center for War Gaming at the Naval War Co
The Renaissance of Surface-to-Surface Warfare
By Lieutenant Commander Robert B. Shields, Jr., U. S. Navy
Kirov surface action group (SAG)15 erating in the area. This could NATO its most effective means of & ing the initiative. Attacks in the m . mansk/White Sea area could dish . Moscow and ease pressure on the Cen Front. If the Kirov SAG sailed int° ^ Atlantic, it could destroy area-baS
conn
support duties for Strike Fleet,
Lord Horatio Nelson’s favorite signal, “Engage the enemy more closely,” has particular meaning today to surface sailors. When he last flew it during the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805, Nelson was concerned only with a surface warship threat. As late as 1916, in the Battle of Jutland, sea warfare was primarily surface to surface, although the submarine and airborne observers began to complicate the battle problem. The battle line, precision station keeping, and coordinated fire were the order of the day.
World War II brought a different type of sea battle emphasizing initiative, flexibility, and the transfer of the fleet’s primary offensive power from gunships to aircraft carriers and submarines. After 1945, battleships were gradually decommissioned, and surface warships were mainly relegated to defensive roles as carrier escorts. Naval warfare appears to be undergoing revolutionary change again. The following factors are responsible for the return of the primary role in antisurface warfare (ASUW) to non-carrier surface ships:
- The constantly increasing range, selectivity, and accuracy of the surface-to-surface missile (SSM)
- The increasing vulnerability of tactical aircraft (TacAir) to well-defended surface units and the requirement to husband the limited number of carrier attack aircraft for strikes at the enemy’s home base
- The cost of nuclear submarines (SSNs) and their effectiveness in countering Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei Gorshkov’s “main strike force— submarines”1—this may preclude their employment against surface forces where even a small chance of the SSN’s loss is too great a risk
- The increasing survivability from manned aircraft or missile attack of surface ships, defended by automatic point defense weapons, against all but a nuclear attack or an overwhelming SSM strike
► Surface warships, because of their generally better endurance, sensors, command, control, and communications (C3) facilities, weapons payload, and embarked airborne surveillance are increasingly able to deliver the massive, coordinated, overwhelming SSM attack, which is the only assured above-water technique of destroying enemy surface ships
The Threat: The British naval strategist Sir James Cable states, “It would be absurd to describe Soviet submarines as yesterday’s threat but, on the graph of Soviet naval strength, the rising curve of major surface vessels crossed that of submarines ... in 1978 and continues to climb above it.”2 The appearance of very capable, multipurpose ships such as the Kirov, and the construction of a nuclear- powered aircraft carrier suggest a more aggressive use of Soviet naval forces. Specialized ships like the Udaloy, Sov- remennyy, and Krasina indicate that the Soviets are developing a “battle group” concept similar to that of the U. S. Navy. The Ivan Rogov is able to transport an entire naval infantry battalion with equipment. These new ships represent a quantum improvement in Soviet ability to project power.
Western strategists are puzzled by the wartime employment of these forces. Andrew Hull believes that the Soviet Navy’s primary roles are antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and support of the army.3 He does not see a significant threat to Western sea lines of communication
(SLOCs). However, Norman Friedma^ sees an intervention fleet designed to s ^ together and suggests the Soviets will a tack SLOCs if only to keep NA ^ nuclear-powered attack submann (SSNs) from attacking Soviet nUC'eaeS powered fleet ballistic missile submaOn (SSBNs).4 Norman Polmar’s assessfflf of Soviet intent is the least controvert he states, “The most significant p°!” here is that the fundamental Soviet a11, sion has been and remains, the defense the homeland, with the perimeter of1 defense continually expanding 0 ward.”5 To Western eyes, an expat1.1^ Soviet defense can look very offenslV These new Soviet ships are diff"lC targets to eliminate, but it is time to c°. sider seriously the best method of el'1’’ _ nation. If Soviet surface units are e ^ ployed in the Norwegian Sea, they threaten airborne early warning (Ah f aircraft upon which the air defense NATO’s northern flank depends. Card strike forces will be unable to press %
battle onto the Soviet homeland whiL
•sop
deny
ain-
ASW defenses which ensure the r®* forcement of Europe. What then is ^ best method of destroying these capa Soviet ships? s.
Surface Strike Options: Paul Nit?4 ei0 timates that the Soviets will commit - 60 submarines to the Atlantic ha against Western SLOCs.6 The neutral
tion of this threat, in addition to hi{ ,
’ -uiu
addin
Weapons and sensors operational. In
ate
shate
effectively in the shallow water of
y occupy NATO SSNs in the war’s ary stages. HMS Conqueror demonrated the superiority of the SSN against th°pratC'y ^efended surface ships during •he r?.^*an(^s Conflict. However, sinking the ^,rov’ which has nearly three times eGeneral Belgrano’s displacement, ou j bg more ,jjffjcuit Wounding her l)er°vv ^e waterline could leave many of
'°n, the SSN will be unable to oper-
eg'c parts of the Barents, Mediterra- an. and China seas.
in ^.'rov ar|d Udaloy display increas- 8 Soviet emphasis in the art of surface CQ1[j) ASW. NATO SSNs will be at risk ntoH Uct'n8 torpedo attacks against a riod6111 ^ov'et SAG. The post-attack pe- Pr l Wou*d be hazardous, and even a low clU(j ^ty subniarinc loss could pre- c SSN employment in torpedo at- jss against multi-ship formations. This Particularly likely considering the high °r,ty tasks at which the SSN excels, as ASW and direct support.
■tv ^marine-launched Harpoon and 0tnahawk single submarine would probably be unable to launch a large enough salvo to overwhelm a capable target totally.7 Inherent C3 deficiencies in SSNs complicate an already difficult over-the-horizon (OTH) identification problem and make it almost impossible for them to coordinate ASUW attacks. The submarine also risks exposure when launching missiles. For these reasons, the SSN is not best employed against capable or escorted surface units until the Atlantic ASW problem is manageable.
Carrier-borne TacAir is described as capable using close-in attacks against non-Kirov Soviet surface units, if attrition of 10% to 20% per sortie is acceptable.8 These loss rates are based on results of the 1983 Arab-Israeli and Falklands wars. After four sorties per aircraft, simple multiplication of losses like this would leave the carrier air wing with 41% to 66% of its attack aircraft available (for loss rates of 20% and 10% respectively). It could be difficult to replace aircraft in forward areas, and losses resulting from a close-in strike against a Kirov-defended battle group could be considerably worse. It is doubtful that enough aircraft would remain to perform what should be carrier TacAir’s primary missions—shore support and strike at the enemy’s home bases.
A coordinated strike from surface ships and carrier aircraft armed with stand-off weapons is effective. However, these strikes prove hard to coordinate without excessive communications destroying the element of surprise. This concept’s major difficulty is that if the carrier is close enough to launch an “effective” strike, it is vulnerable to enemy submarines and long-range missiles—a significant ASUW lesson of the Falklands Conflict. It would have been foolhardy to risk the carrier 25 De Mayo after losing the General Belgrano, especially when her aircraft could operate from land bases.9
As the Soviets increase emphasis on surface warfare, we should improve such areas as the NTDS Link 11, which will have surface targets as third priority as long as surface, subsurface, and air tracks are all processed on the same Link.
Surface attacks using SSM-armed surface ships and land-based TacAir with stand-off weapons have the advantages of air/surface coordination with no risk to the carrier. Carrier TacAir in an ASUW role should be reserved for when a degree of sea control has been established, and carrier vulnerability has been reduced. Then stand-off weapons must be used to preserve aircraft for the war-winning role of striking at the enemy’s base.
The best first strike ASUW option in an area like the Norwegian Sea is a battleship-centered SAG assisted by land- based aircraft. In addition to the battleship, the SAG could be Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class missile frigates. The FFG-7 with embarked aircraft and a missile magazine even half full of Harpoons would be a superior ASUW weapon at relatively minor cost. The battleship SAG to be home-ported in the northeastern United States would be ideal for this task because it would be a day closer to northern Europe than Strike Fleet because of the home port location. The SAG would be relatively self-sustaining because the battleship could refuel her escorts across the Atlantic. Using “guerrilla warfare at sea” techniques, this SAG could frustrate an overloaded Soviet ocean surveillance system and cause extensive damage in the Norwegian/Barents seas prior to Strike Fleet’s arrival.10 In the future, a SAG also could include several vertical-launch Spruances. These quiet ships would carry Tomahawk, be very difficult to detect acoustically, and capable of a sizeable surprise strike.
Some argue that surface ships are only useful as ASUW strike platforms in a preemptive attack at the conflict’s initiation, and that SSNs and TacAir have inherent advantages in surprise and deception in the battle’s later stages.11 Others state that TacAir has essential advantages in ASUW strike command and control.12 Modern surface warships are extremely quiet. If they make use of any available poor weather or merchant shipping for cover, widely dispersed formations, airborne and satellite reconnaissance, minimum communications, and maximum deception, they have a good chance of defeating a surveillance system that will be saturated by tracking carriers, SSNs, and reinforcement shipping. The advantage of TacAir in strike command and capable of firing the excellent Harp0011 and Tomahawk missiles. The battleship* are returning, Harpoon tactics course have been instituted, and there are an
abundance of tactical memorandum^
Shipboard computerized “Navtag’ an headquarters level wargaming are e(1 abling those responsible to PraCtl ASUW. Surface ships are experiment'11-' with target motion analysis, long the elusive domain of submarines. Howeve 1 in spite of these advances, the 0- . Navy’s ASUW capability can be rateda- no better than fair because of the foil0", ing procedural, training, and equip®6 deficiencies. . .
Problem: Procedural Deficiency Surface surveillance and identifies110 are regarded as secondary roles for cad1 aircraft and treated as such. Hawkey crews are always busy with AAW a° early warning (EW) and are unable contribute much to the surface picture- link-capable S-3 is a superb surveill3116 platform, but it is rare for one to be de 1 cated and interested in ASUW. Too muC evaluation is done in the cockpit of a A-7 traveling at 8,000 feet and 350 knob; resulting in only “contacts of inters
In areas like the Norwegian Sea, we should make more use of surface action groups, including ships such as the USS King (DDG-4I), built as a missile frigate, and the Arthur W. Radford (DD-968), a Spruance-c/ass destroyer.
control is that the squadron works up together and flies from the same platform or station. Warships which train together should display the same coordination if simple, effective strike procedures are developed and practiced in earnest.
Are We Ready? Recent improvements have been made in our ability to fight an antisurface war. There are a large and growing number of ships and aircraft
ft
being reported. Every surface coflta^ within the force’s surveillance area be tracked, evaluated, and targeted un identified as friendly by the Autism10 _ Warfare Coordinator (ASUWC). The ^ cation of merchant shipping in the ^ get’s area is as vital as the position . hostile and friendly units for success OTH targeting. e
Nighttime identification procedures -
major
success. Few ships can conduct
must
require the ASUWC to maintain a
arget, and identify all surface contacts in
Suarea- The ASUWC will need more theVe*"ance assets; a thorough search of li battle group may reveal an untasked (I bt airborne multipurpose system th AMPS) helicopter or CH-46 helicopter . ' can be used for identification. Land- ^Sed aircraft may be available. Each in- UnuCn<lent tas*c orce’ including single
ance areas in which the officer in tac-
afs can detect and sometimes classify ace targets at very long ranges. Many
siv<
ut](]arnien or e'ectronic warfare operators 1'ar\CrStanc' lbat their sensors are as neces-
training in this area should be im-
To
‘re.
tiire ?0rt out ’be cluttered surface pic-
Particularly poor. The night ASUW exer- (ls® that does not have the carrier at- c. d by friendly forces is halfway to a
’ghttime challenge and reply proce- res. This leads to blue-on-blue engage- nts and the deceptively lit orange Uer sailing unopposed into the blue ^filiation. On dark nights, even well- lned helicopter crews can hover di- ct|y above a darkened ship and not even reiermine if she is military. At the cur- "Rvel of expertise in surveillance and ** targeting, ships rarely fire Harpoon SSlles near their maximum range. To e Tomahawk effectively, with its im- °vement in range, targeting and tactics Ust improve by an order of magnitude. °‘ution: The battle group commander
ttproof surveillance area and to track, target that:
transiting, should have tailored sur- veili-
tr^!! COmrnand (OTC) is responsible for t^cking ancj identifying every surface . 8et with the enthusiasm currently en air or subsurface contacts. This Caea. might range from 300 miles for a bhr battle group to 50 miles for a frigid ^AMPS. The area could be flex- tr ^^pending on aircraft availability and Cv 'lc density, but the OTC must use ry available asset to maintain an ade- ®'e surface picture. tabilize(j night vision devices for heli- and more emphasis on challenge li urep|y procedures would reduce the Son Ratification problem. Surface ship
sUrf;
and electronic support measures tioClVers have sufficient bearing resolu- sqcto Perform target motion analysis at Ckessfully- but few ships are proficient H's fairly simple technique of pas- SQii gaining a firing solution. Few ,hJ ln ASUW as in ASW or EW, and
'he'rtra:-= ■
Proved gee’ the ASUWC requires better intelli- shi CC ’n’ormation on expected merchant idg P’ng 'n his area could simplify the Ration problem. Lloyd’s of Lon- Publishes an index of most merchant ship sailings and their destinations, which is updated daily. This information is available in computer format and could be put into a shipboard minicomputer. A weekly update by mail would keep it fairly current, and a program could call up all ships expected to be within 300 miles of the ship. This, correlated with satellite surveillance, would be valuable in sorting out a complex surface picture.
Problem: Training Deficiencies: Training problems are caused by a lack of standard, simple search and attack procedures, as well as the complexities of conducting and evaluating long-range ASUW exercises. ASUW is a warfare specialty of similar sophistication to ASW. The objective is similar, though the range scale and sensors may be different. Each requires long-range surveillance and coordinated tactics to localize and conduct a precise, overwhelming attack. However, because of wartime experiences, U. S. Navy ships have standard ASW watch team organizations, flexible formations, and simple search and attack plans. Most surface ships are ready to implement these plans quickly.
Refresher Training (RefTra) in ASW is detailed and exhaustive. An officer who receives special training is designated as primarily responsible for the ship’s ASW proficiency. Shore trainers are available to maintain the ASW team’s tactical proficiency in the long series of exercises required for the ASW excellence award. In ASUW, by contrast, there are no simple, well-known search and attack procedures. As a result of the large number of experimental procedures and recommended tactics, each ASUWC essentially designs his own plan. The consequence is that each exercise has a vastly different surveillance policy, has different aircraft control and search procedures, and uses different attack plans. Few ships have trained surface attack teams which should consist of the tactical action officer (TAO), aircraft controllers, plotters, as well as sonar, EW, weapons firing, and ship handling personnel. The ASUW portion of RefTra usually consists of ensuring that someone shouts, ‘'Harpoon away,” during the final battle problem. Shore trainers are rarely used to train the entire surface attack team. Despite the similar complexity of ASW and ASUW, far fewer search, tracking, and coordination exercises are required for the ASUW proficiency award as compared to the ASW award.
Few U. S. Navy officers are aware of their allies’ significant ASUW capabilities, and little effort is made in developing and exercising Allied coordinated ASUW procedures. Around the Norwegian Sea, there are British and Norwegian SSM-armed surface ships and British SSNs with sub-Harpoon. Considerable numbers of land-based maritime strike aircraft are stationed in this area. The Kattegat is guarded by Danish Willemoes patrol boats which typically employ Harpoon at maximum range with pinpoint accuracy. Procedures exist to coordinate the efforts of these forces but are rarely exercised, and each national force in the area tends to fight its own surface battle with little attempt at coordination.
Solution: The basic device for improving ASUW training is to adapt the fairly successful ASW training regimen. ASUW attack teams should be developed in each Harpoon-capable ship. An officer should be trained for and assigned the duty of ASUW officer. The combat information center (C1C) officer would be best for this task as the main problems are targeting and the control of airborne surveillance. Exercises should be devised for each of the separate phases of the surface problem, including targeting, undetected tracking, coordinating attacks, and target motion analysis. These exercises should be intensively practiced during RefTra, which will promote a standard, fleetwide ASUW technique. Shore-based trainers and intership “Navtag” competition should be used to maintain proficiency. More complex scenarios involving different combinations of basic exercises could be evaluated later during fleet exercises and be the basis of ASUW excellence awards.
Simple, standard tactics must be developed and incorporated into basic Allied tactical publications. This will improve response time and coordination within the U. S. Navy and interoperability among NATO allies. Coordinated ASUW procedures should be practiced at every opportunity with Allied surface forces and, in particular, land-based maritime strike aircraft. The capabilities of NATO allies should be covered more thoroughly in TAO training courses.
Problem: Equipment Limitations: Two equipment limitations which seriously hamper ASUW effectiveness are the inability to rearm canister launch Harpoon missiles at sea and the inadequacy of Navy Tactical Data System (NTDS) Link 11 for ASUW. The first can cause the ASUWC to be too conservative and may force him into several tactical mistakes. One error would be to conduct an ineffective, piecemeal attack in hopes of maintaining a reserve strike capability. Another temptation would be to hold fire until absolutely sure of the enemy’s total forces and position. This may cause him to lose the “battle for the first salvo.”
refinement of the firing solution, cannot afford to waste the few pric missiles they generally carry. The atta‘ must be launched first and also must precise, well-coordinated, and °ve whelming.
gles*
ick
pro-
Tran*1'
The NTDS deficiency occurs mainly because the system was designed for an air war and as such is good for highspeed, transitory targets that require rapid decisions and engagements. The ideal surface data link would be very stable and simple. The surface battle is generally slow moving and can be handled with a low data rate link. This reduces transmission time, making the link harder to detect and jam. As long as surface, subsurface, and air tracks are all processed on the same link, surface targets get third priority in track management procedures. A high percentage of exercise ASUW attacks are conducted on NTDS symbols of
The Harpoon missile—fired from a ship like the USS Lawrence (DDG-4)— is a superior antisurface warfare weapon, but it doesn’t solve the Navy’s ASUW requirements.
questionable validity. Attacks conducted on NTDS tracks outside of the radar range of the firing unit or on latitude/long- itude positions reported by aircraft are often shown in reconstruction to have been wide misses.
Solutions: The obvious solution to the lack of at-sea rearming ability is to develop one. If this is absolutely impractical for canister launch units, then adequate stocks of missiles and associated handling equipment need to be prepositioned overseas near the deployment area. This stockpile would provide a forward reserve for the ASUWC and help eliminate the temptation to conduct piecemeal attacks. The best solution to the NTDS problem is a second link dedicated to ASW and ASUW. These problems are similar, and a simple, low data rate link could satisfy both requirements. If this is impractical, a separate surface force track coordinator (FTC) must be assigned to the ASUWC; otherwise the primary FTC will always be overloaded by the air picture.
Conclusions: To allow surface warships to achieve their full ASUW potential in the light of a constantly improving Soviet threat, the following recommendations are made:
► Tailor a surface surveillance region to each formation of ships and require the ASUWC to track, target, and identify each surface unit in that region through maximum use of surveillance and intelligence assets
- Develop and practice simple, standard Allied search and attack plans to improve interoperability of U. S. and NATO forces
- Increase ASUW emphasis in training by creating surface attack teams, designating an ASUW officer in each SSM ship, developing new ASUW exercises, and increasing their emphasis in RefTra and in ASUW proficiency awards
- Modify and use shore trainers for ASUW team training and encourage intership computerized “Navtag” competition in ASUW
- Develop a SAG centered around each battleship consisting of FFG-7s with maximum Harpoon loadouts or vertical launch DD-963s; orient these SAGs for forward operations with land-based TacAir in the Norwegian, Mediterranean, and China seas
- Ensure the ASUWC has an adequate
reserve of SSMs by developing an at-^J rearming ability for canister launch ship* or preposition replacement missiles forward areas
► Develop a suitable surface data link ® revise track management procedures ensure surface tracks receive a suit* amount of attention
In spite of the tremendous impr°ve ments in ASUW since the advent of1 Harpoon, and the increased empha lately afforded this warfare area, 1 U. S. Navy requires much improveme to master the Soviet surface thre • ASUW cannot be the part-time occupy tion of the combat information cen team in which attacks are casually f,r on questionable data. It is a full'1111^ process requiring continual updating al^
'Sergei G. Gorshkov. The Seapower of the State @ ford, 1979), pp. 196-197. .
2Sir James Cable. Britain's Naval Future (Lon 1983). pp. 185-186.
"Andrew W. Hull. “Their Surface Forces ceedings, October 1982, pp. 54-59.
4Norman Friedman. “The Soviet Fleet in tion,” Proceedings, May 1983, pp. 156— 173- "Norman Polmar, Guide to the Soviet Navy (Anna lis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983), p. 37- "Paul H. Nitze, et al., Securing the Seas (B0LI CO: Westview Press, 1979), p. 111. ,fllir
7This statement rests on the belief that a salvo o SSMs is the minimum likely to overwhelm a caP surface ship operating independently. J.
*R. M. Nutwell, "Deep Six for Tac Air?" P'oC ings, January 1983, pp. 77-83. fe.
The decision not to employ the Exocet-arnted r i 42 destroyers Hercules and Santisima against the Royal Navy carriers is more question3 If even one of these ships had survived to doS ^ within missile range of HMS Invincible or Ref' the results of the war could have been quite dimU^ In addition, it should be noted that Argentinian n' land airfields were never attacked. Had they ^ carrier TacAir would have been more critical- NATO context, the degree of home airfield Pra ^ tion will be an important factor in determining amount of land-based air support that is aval 3 IHF. J. Glaeser, "Guerrilla Warfare at Sea. ceedings, August 1983, pp. 41-47.
"W. J. Ruhe, "Antiship Missiles Launch Ne^ tics," Proceedings, December 1982, pp. 60'
UR. M. Nutwell, “Deep Six for TacAir?” Pr°c ings, January 1983, pp. 77-83.
Commander Shields was graduated from the Academy in 1972. He served in the USS ^
1081). He received a master’s degree from the t Postgraduate School. He then attended E)cpa^n Head School before serving in the USS u),iJ
(DD-982), followed by a tour in the USS ]C
K. Turner (CG-20). Commander Shields attend0^ Royal Navy College before entering Prospectivt- ecutive Officer School in Newport. He is c11^ ^l)- the executive officer of the USS Sterrett (C& '