The Reserve's Biggest Problem

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Today’s Naval Reserve is on the move—“in renais­sance,” says the Chief of Naval Operations. Its missions are expanding; its numbers are growing; its equipment is modernizing and filling out. Today, re­serves are at sea, in the air, and ashore. They train with the active forces. They do training of the active forces. They augment the active forces. They are ready to perform mis­sions for which the active forces are not trained. They preserve the talent of the active forces. They perform spe­cial studies and analyses, sit on selection boards, represent the Navy in the civilian world, and represent the civilian world to the Navy. They do more than the active Navy realizes. They do more than Congress appreciates. They do a lot. But the Naval Reserve has the capacity to do more.

Despite today’s unprecedented operational tempo, the Navy does not need as large a force structure in peacetime as it would in war. To maintain an unnecessarily large Navy in peacetime would waste tax dollars. To maintain active force capabilities and skills needed only in full- scale war is also a waste. Yet, in modem war, there will be little time to train and equip all the people, ships, aircraft squadrons, construction battalions (SeaBees), medical teams, and other specialized units needed. A strong, well- trained, well-equipped, and well-organized Naval Reserve enables us to have just such a posture: active forces to meet peacetime commitments and crises; active and re­serve forces to meet the requirements of war.

Regrettably, the Navy is only partially structured to enable the Naval Reserve to take on a larger load. For years, we have attempted to build the Navy to meet every commitment and every war plan with forces in being as­signed only to the active Navy. Only when faced with a budgetary or political constraint have we turned to the reserve for help, frequently with seeming reluctance. Thus, we have developed a force structure of ships and air squadrons—some with reserve augment units, some with­out—largely dependent upon whether or not the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OpNav) sponsor can afford to “buy out” all the billets. Commissioned Naval Reserve g Force (NRF) ships and aircraft squadrons are in the Navy | force structure because there happens to be equipment and g people available. For similar budget and political reasons, i we have placed all of our domestic organic airlift and all of i our combat search and rescue helicopter forces in the "

Nobody knows better than John Lehman—seen exhorting fellow reservists and regular crewmen in the New Jersey off Lebanon and, inset, prior to flying an F/A-18 Hornet—that the Naval Reserve is a vital part of today's Navy. But the Secretary of the Navy, who is both captain and cheerleader for today's Total Force team, knows, too, that the reserve's biggest problem is that its story and capabilities are unfa­miliar to those who most need to know: the Active Navy.

defined is because for years, reserve issues have ^L

has been

shortage of emotion, polemics, and politics, virtually

Naval Reserve with no capability for surging to meet crises other than that provided by limited numbers of as­signed full-time personnel or reserve volunteers. Other examples of random reserve assignment to mission abound. But there remains no science to the methodology for determining optimum active/reserve force mix. In­stead, it has pretty much all “just happened.”

The Naval Reserve has almost always grown in tune with the historical reserve mission of training for mobili­zation. A more recent impetus to growth has been a de­mand for reserve forces to take over peacetime missions to reduce active personnel end strength. Within limits, this can be done, but these limits must be defined. Active/re­serve mixes in individual deployable units can be ad­justed, but there will be peacetime capability problems if the active Navy is excessively reduced in either numbers or particular skills. Active/reserve mixes among units can capitalize on reserve potential and generally lessen cost, but at the expense of increasing operational tempo for de­ployable active ships and, perhaps, reducing the numbers of ships available for forward deployments. Whole mis­sions might be given over to the reserve force, but contin­gencies short of presidential call-up must be planned. For example, Naval Control of Shipping is assigned to the

Naval Reserve with little risk of being caught short 1 crisis without call-up. On the other hand, the mineswee^ ing mission is well within the capabilities of the rese > but the active forces must retain some minimum ^caP^aC to sweep to preclude lack of capability should a vita P j sage be mined when reserve call-up is not possible.

One reason the active/reserve force mix is not

clouded in a milieu of myth. Although there has been ^

widespread understanding of the Naval Reserve exis The most prevalent myth about the Naval Reserve that it has little to offer in the way of personnel ta ^e Reservists are too often perceived as a group of ⁿ°ⁿP^ ducers who could not stand the rigors of active Navy ’ or as freeloaders, or both. Nothing could be further the truth. The typical reservist is a patriot. Many are p service veterans who have elected to pursue ^a. career pattern than their active-duty contemporaries, are no less dedicated, no less skillful, and no less ot ¹ or sailors. The vast majority are true volunteers. They S up their weekends and, very often, much other time well in order to drill. They often forego vacations to y form annual active duty for training (AcDuTra). They

f_{0r s} ^ ^r'^s^ the displeasure of their full-time employers their          ^{so muc}h time on Navy business. They and

f_0rm ^arn'hes are Navy through and through. Reservists their T* ^exP^er'^enced resource anxious and willing to put fieht^S * ^to work in preparing the Navy to be ready to ^ ^and win at sea.

and ^Sec°ⁿ^ myth about the reserve is that even if trained „_he,^^an-d, its members will not rally to the colors tion ^Ca"^eth Most often, this charge is made in connec- c°_U|₍|^VUh an apocryphal tale about how the air reserves l^:>Uebi °^{r W}.^0ldd not get ready for combat during the 1968 Scri_Dt° ^<“^r'^s’^{s ca}ll-up. The story comes replete with de- pe₀ 1 ^ns °f aviators turning in their wings and enlisted caii_C(i ^tr^'ⁿ§ 1° opt out in other ways. The fact is the ^readv ^UP ^s9^uadrons did report. Attitudinally, most were th_{e a} ®⁰' ^ hew individuals did quit, but it was actually Wh₀ ^1Ve Navy that let down the majority of reservists With ^rea(ly by not providing them modern aircraft

Of t\[_av       . - —j ------------------ o----------- J---------------------

Whii_e ^ P^^0ts who found ways to steer clear of combat °f N' ^C°^nt'^numg on active duty. Ignored are the numbers ea_st a r ^eid'^ste(l people who found ways to avoid South- ⁿ'^?-ed ^{Slan cru}'^ses- Ignored is the story of the well-orga- c_e ^and well-led reserve SeaBees who wrote such a suc- Igp₀ chapter in their history during the Vietnam War. re_Se . ’ ^to°’ are the stories of the thousands of individual suppj ^sts~-aviation, surface, intelligence, medical, and for _a y. °hf*^cer and enlisted personnel—who volunteered ^rePop^{IVe Serv}'^ce during the Vietnam War. Reservists will ^hen called. Many will volunteer before they are • Ihey may not be full-time officers and sailors, but they are dedicated officers and sailors ready at moment’s notice to report for duty. All they request is the mission and the training.

If reserves are going to be ready for mobilization or ready to contribute to any other sort of active duty, they must be trained. The major responsibility for this training should be the active Navy’s. But for a number of reasons, the priorities of current operations principal among them, reserve training has too often been shunted to others. Most often, it is pushed on the reserves themselves or to those full-time active-duty reservists assigned to training and administration of reserves—the TARs—another commu­nity swathed in myth.

The TAR community, or a community very similar to it in function, is necessary to a well-organized, well-trained, and ready-to-operate Naval Reserve. The reserves of every service have some full-time personnel assigned to provide training, continuity of effort, and administration. If the Navy did not have TARs, it would have to assign regulars to do the job. The Marine Corps, the Coast Guard, and Navy SeaBees do that now. But it is expensive in terms of active personnel end strength, and it is not, regrettably, a career-enhancing assignment. There have been proposals to replace officer TARs with regulars, but such proposals have come to naught. Meanwhile, the

go to sea. Some who were recruited under those cond

tions are still serving.                                                             _lity

The TAR community is changing, however. k>u cuts for accession are high. Only top performers n ^ apply, and they are told to expect sea duty. The TA becoming more like the regular member. The only ^dl ^ ence is that his or her subspecialty is reserve manageme It bodes well for the TARs, the Naval Reserve, <m whole Navy.        , _aS

As good as the TARs may become and as dedicat ^ the reservists may be, together they can only provide limited extent the focus needed for a genuinely contn ing reserve program. The real focus must come f^r°^m _is, active Navy. First, the active Navy must define the ^ sion, the skills, and the numbers required of the rese Once that is accomplished, the active Navy gaining ^c mands must play their part.

lliai liaming, manage                                                                        —------------

ful in terms of mission. The gaining command must ^ reserve component at every opportunity. It must insi ^ performance, maintain communications, and deman ^ unit drills, weekend away training (WET), and Acf

be performed at the gaining command whenever possi Also, whenever possible, key personnel from the g^al

. .                   . .  .. ..        •.» i___ i__ 'TU’tc inV

Through cooperation among all communities, a gaining command can only benefit. TARs are becoming more like regulars every day; right, a TAR and a reservist work side by side on a P-3’s search radar. Below, a reservist and a regular wrestle with one of the NRF frigate’s jet turbine engines.

TARs do the job and do it well, in spite of the myths that surround their program.

TARs are almost universally saddled with a bad image. Regulars look askance; reserves do not trust them; and the TARs themselves are paranoid toward any non-TAR who questions their way of doing business. But these general­ized images are false. TARs fall along the normal distribu­tion curves of dedication and performance like members of any other community. The problem is that for too long, they have worked outside the mainstream of the active Navy. Consequently, they are unknown to much of the active Navy and suspected by the reserves for perceived lack of recent operational experience. Coupled with the need to administer precisely an over-bureaucratized re­serve system, misunderstandings are created. The cure is to de-bureaucratize the reserve system and to get the TARs into the fleet.

Only a few TARs do get to the fleet on regular assign­ment because of the lack of push by the active forces for them to do so. This situation has its roots in the TAR mythology and is perpetuated by inertia inherent in those who have been ashore for too long. In the officer ranks, the problem is intensified by the active Navy perception that TAR officers at sea take up billets needed for career progression by regular officers. Then, too, addition of sea duty requirements for TARs beyond those currently exist­ing in NRF ships and squadrons adds significant numbers to TAR inventory requirements. This is an expensive ad­justment. Finally, in earlier years, TARs were recruited to the program with the implication that they would seldom

The gaining command is the active Navy organiza ^ to which a reserve unit will report upon mobilization-^ the case of commissioned reserve units—those units have their own equipment, such as ships, air sq^ua f_n-_ng SeaBees, and cargo-handling battalions—the g^al; e command will often be a fleet commander in chief or s other operational commander. In the case of augmen units—those units generally composed of trained p^e^ ^ without equipment who will bring active unit ^mann,I^_)II)' to that required at mobilization day—the gaining ^ mands are individual ships, squadrons, stations, staffs. To realize the potential payoff in terms of ^first _jflg training for both the active and reserve forces, the g*¹¹ “ command must play its part with dedication and ^v Each active Navy unit must know what its own ^resE_()e unit is doing to provide for mobilization training, § .^g. that training, manage that training, and make it ^mea^_p jts ibl⁶' linik-

command should visit the unit’s home base. This >^nV°^_ui ment is crucial to both the reserve unit and to what v the reserve unit may be to the gaining command in P j time. The attitude of a disinterested gaining ^corn _oflit cannot be overcome by the most dedicated reserve ^ Conversely, an interested and involved gaining com

■p, ^s *^{n an} outstanding reserve unit.

°f gaining commands that do make maximum use th_e ^£ ^°^{rtS anc}^ ^tal^ents of their reserve units often have _Serve^6st~^trained and most ready units. The active and re- them ^^ersonnel consider themselves partners in readying prov'rf ^VCS ^°^{r t}*^le nntt’s mission. Active-duty personnel taaint ⁶ ^^ea<d^ership and the up-to-date skills in tactics, Perie ^enance’ and administration. Reservists provide ex- (j_ut ^Ce’ talent, and supplementary manpower. Active- p|₍ l^1Crsonnel are busy readying for deployment, on de­claim ^6nt’ l^^ann'ⁿ8 f°^r maintenance or overhaul, or are in enance or overhaul. Often, they cannot part from the ect_s ^to .^° ^e job. Reservists can help. In special proj- njng ^stUches, temporary manpower support, exercise plan- th_ey\^{and m}yriad other ways, reservists can help. What (]_Urj_n ^ave done in recent months in personnel augment ty_hat⁸,^Crises’ airlift, intelligence, and planning is legion, tittle ■ ^Can *^{n t}*^ie f^uture i^s limited only by dollars, A ,^and the imagination of the active Navy, its ow °^U^ Saining command is key to the success of Ce_{Ss N}ⁿ,^reserve unit, it cannot by itself guarantee that suc- ded_i( People in the unit play critical roles. But it also takes the _r,,^{a C<}^ ^etf°^rt on the part of the reserve organization and ^rese_rv^SerVe P^roS^ram sponsor. Of these, the efforts of the gainj ⁶ P^r°g^ram sponsor are second only to those of the Sen,,, ^ ^c°mmand in ensuring the success of Naval Re­g® Programs.

si°n_C(j ^reserve unit, whether designated as a commis- sp_ecjf. ^or augmenting unit, falls within the purview of a de_put '^eti OpNav program sponsor. This sponsor is either a staff °f naval operations or a director of a major

itig ij, ^lce. The program sponsor is charged with support- eq_Uj ^{s ass}igned reserve programs with billets, dollars, and Sg ^ent' B^ecause there was cloudy and often contradic- ^Variou ^anCe S'^{ven t0} the sponsors for so many years, the ^abse_n ^{S re}serve programs had checkered support. In the So_rs ^Ce °h clear active/reserve force mix guidance, spon- Sourc^⁰¹¹*^ ^locate only a minimum of the scarce re­^es to the reserve programs. Poorly structured, poorly

manned, and poorly equipped reserve units resulted. In some cases, only the various reserve lobbies and Congress kept the programs going.

Having observed the successes of such programs as In­telligence, SeaBees, and several facets of aviation, former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, his successor, Admiral James D. Watkins, and Secretary of the Navy John Lehman realized that the quality of re­serve programs hinged on their program sponsors. Conse­quently , these leaders encouraged program sponsors to at­tend to their programs. For the first time in years, almost all reserve programs received the attention they deserved, and almost all benefitted from this attention.

Lack of proper equipment with which to train and lack of modem equipment with which to mobilize has been a nagging, frustrating, and seemingly insurmountable prob­lem within the Naval Reserve. Only recently has the Navy realized that lack of modem equipment for the reserve is an active Navy problem as well. If the reserve forces are to be trained and ready for peacetime augmentation, for crisis call-up, or for wartime mobilization, they must train with the equipment with which they must fight. Training on World War Il-vintage mockups in a drill hall does not