A Relevant Reserve

 

Should there be a Naval Reserve? If so, what should it do? The debate over the Naval Reserve has been ongoing within the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, and in Congress for the past dozen years.

But the debate is now coming to a head as our national leaders are faced with the choice between “guns and but­ter.” They must focus their attention on defense, while recognizing that the federal budget is limited. The Naval Reserve should no longer be considered solely as insur­ance against a future war. There are numerous peacetime missions that can be performed by the reserve forces, thereby assisting the active forces and easing the pressure on the Navy budget. The Naval Reserve should be given these peacetime missions. The wartime mission of the Naval Reserve also needs to be reconsidered, because there is evidence that some of its functions are unrealistic or inappropriate.

The uncertainty of the nature of the next war compli­cates decisions about national defense and the role of the Naval Reserve. There may not be a long preliminary pe­riod of building tensions during which we can mobilize our industrial and human resources as we did before World War II. One school of strategic thought holds that the next war will be short—perhaps only a few weeks. If this proves true, forces that could not be available within 30 days of a mobilization would be of little use.

In considering the role of the Naval Reserve, the mis­sions and inherent operational differences separating the Navy from the Army and the Air Force should be consid­ered. Today, most operational U. S. naval forces are for­ward deployed in or near the theaters of operation in which they will fight should the next war occur. How would reserve personnel and equipment located within the United States augment these forces in time of need?

Historical Perception: In July 1983, Lawrence J. Korb, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics wrote:

‘ ‘The [National] Guard and Reserve are a defense bar­gain. In their absence, the American taxpayer would be burdened supporting a much larger active force that would be required to meet our security needs.”¹

This is true, but it tells only part of the story, reflecting a traditional view of the mission of the reserve compo­nents of the armed forces. In this view, the only mission of reserve forces is to train and prepare for mobilization. In 1972, a Proceedings article on cost-effectiveness of the Naval Reserve likened reserve forces to insurance, “the security of having a large force ready to be used when and if it is needed.”²

In this view, the reserves are the reserves and the active forces are the active forces, and never the twain shall meet—except when the reserves are training with and being trained by the active forces. In the traditional view, the Naval Reserve is nothing more than a “force in being.”

During the mid-1970s, naval and defense leaders at­tempted to find a mission for a follow-on reserve force in a short, “come as you are” war scenario. Lack of a P^er' ceived mission for the Naval Reserve led to administrate¹¹¹ efforts to almost halve the number of Selected Reserve pay billets from 102,000 to 52,000 in fiscal year 1977. Despite continuing resistance in Congress, the administration trie again in fiscal years 1978 and 1979 to achieve a reducti°ⁿ to 52,000 billets.³ Through a series of compromises, tha declining authorizations were finally stabilized at 87,0 billets in 1980.⁴

Total Force: The Reagan administration has propose . and Congress for the most part has funded, plans for^sl? nificant real growth and modernization of the arm^e forces. But unlimited funds are not available. In the corn petition for scarce resources, existing programs must constantly reevaluated to ensure the United States is buy ing the most defense possible for every dollar spent- The Naval Reserve should not be exempt from scrutiny ^ At a time when there is not enough money to pay currc expenses, how much can we afford for insurance? k^a^ dollars spent for insurance produce a current return ' well?

There are a number of ways to reap a benefit today f^r0lT1 the money spent to insure our future security. For exam pie, there are many peacetime missions for the Naval R^e serve that are overlooked or ignored when using the tra tional mobilization models. Some of these missions ^a already being recognized as ways are sought to fill g^aP^s* the capabilities of the active-duty force created by sh° ages of funds, people, or equipment.      |

When considering peacetime missions for the Na^' Reserve, many success stories come to mind; for examp¹ ' reserve antisubmarine warfare patrol squadrons flying P³ trols alongside their active-duty counterparts, or reser intelligence personnel standing watch in command cent^£ side-by-side with active sponsors.                              ,

Unfortunately, for each success, someone can usu^a ' produce a failure purporting to prove that the reserves^can not perform a peacetime role, and may not even be cap^ ble of doing anything worthwhile in war. Admittedly. •¹ negative perception of the Naval Reserve has its roots some very real shortcomings; however, negative p^erce‘, tions of the Naval Reserve are often bom of active-d¹¹ personnel’s ignorance and misunderstanding. The N³ does the least of any of the armed services to acquaint ^ active forces with the mission and organization of it* serve component. Negative perceptions are further f^ed the organizational turmoil and lack of coherent miss*⁰ ’ which have traditionally plagued the Naval Reserve.

To obtain the best present and future return on our serve insurance dollar, the Naval Reserve must prove to a capable part of our “Total Force” Navy, perform ^ tasks that not only enhance the readiness of the reset but serve as well to fulfill the current needs of the ac force.

• th^e

Models of Mobilization: Regarding mobilization. ,_s Naval Reserve can be considered in terms of two m° of behavior: the “traditional” model and the “mutual ^s^_e port” model. Both models are intended to highlight

, _K„r i?⁸⁴

missions. James G. Abert, ‘‘The Naval Reserve Should Work,” Pro-

Qeedi

^ln*^s> Feb,

thf^an'^zat'^onal goals sought by members and managers of

^c reserve.*

Pren ^traditional model, all behavior is oriented toward L_c ^arat'^on f°^r when the Naval Reserve will be mobilized, if,. , ^ln§ how to perform peacetime missions is generally Tjjj ^Vant unless the same mission is performed in war. the ^^ersP^ect'^vc tends to build a wall between members of ^rese_ry^SerVe ^^orces and members of the active forces. The role ^1St *^S P^r'^marily concerned with a future wartime t₀₍j’ yhile his active counterpart is also concerned with heirr ? P^r°h'^ems and today’s tasks, many of which may In u^Vant '^{n a war}> hut which are urgent at the moment, tasks f 6 ^mutual support model, the reservist performs do i °^{r tw}° Purposes: to prepare for mobilization, and to a_ctj_v ^e5" w°rk in support of the active forces. Thus, the t_{0 m} ^Navy benefits since the reserve forces perform tasks o_{r m} requirements that would otherwise either go unmet Vet c ^{Ke a c}I^arrn on active resources, diverting them from ^°rne other task.

Se_nt ^e ex'sting concept of mutual support does not repre- do_es^{a v}'^ahle mission for the Naval Reserve, because it Th_c k?⁰¹ recognize the ongoing aspect of mutual support, ^sis ^^eservc is called on for help on a case-by-case ex_Ce . °rking with the active forces is considered the rather than the rule, even though the support i„ almost continuous. The mission of the reserve, as Ti, ^adhional model, is to prepare for mobilization. v;_evv^e /bfTiculty with both models is that mobilization is Win • ^as a future event of significant magnitude, which ^c°iti ^,nCb^|(^^e the entire Naval Reserve as the nation be- ^a_Va| ’^nv°lved in general war. There is no role for the reserve until the nation is literally fighting for its

^he ter^ . _t

^l° t^>eaceti_rriesupport” means the use of reserve forces for their contribution ^,ruary 1980, p. 49.

life. This view is supported by experience during the Viet­nam War—when no President would mobilize the reserve components because of the undesirable political signal it might send.

Calling Up the Reserves: The assumption that the re­serves will only be called up in the event of total war no longer corresponds with reality. In a strategic study of the U. S. armed services reserve system done at The National War College, Robert L. Goldrich et al, stated:

“Almost any military action other than a minor show of force will require the mobilization of Reserve Com­ponent units and/or individuals. Threat force levels and geographical areas of potential U. S. military responsi­bility have expanded, while U. S. force levels have declined. All these factors have made initial use of the Reserves absolutely essential in U. S. war plans.”⁶

This current situation is recognized in official state­ments of Department of Defense policy. In December 1981, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Re­serve Affairs, E. J. Philbin, told the Subcommittee on Preparedness of the Senate Armed Services Committee:

“The Reserve components are not merely the backup augmentation force for Active components in time of

war, but are intrinsic elements in the deterrent posture of the Nation and an important component of our daily military operations. Reserve Forces are no longer forces in reserve. They are adjunct military forces.

>>7

From The National War College study’s findings and Assistant Secretary Philbin’s statement, it appears that re­serve components will probably be called up in a piece­meal fashion to meet specific threats and augment over­taxed forces. For example, reservists were called up during the 1983 Christmas season to serve in the USS New Jersey (BB-62) so that active-duty members of her crew could take leave during an extended deployment off the coast of Lebanon. Elements of the Naval Reserve may even be called up in situations short of war, specifically to help deter war.

A New Model: We need a new model of the reserve/ac- tive relationship and a new description of mobilization readiness from which to derive missions for the Naval Reserve. Mobilization can no longer be considered an all- or-nothing proposition. Today, reserve components must address a broad range of threat levels which run the gamut from increased tempos of peacetime operations, through various types of limited conflicts, up to a general war.

Also implicit in both The National War College study and Assistant Secretary Philbin’s statement is the reality ° scarce resources, which require wise and judicious invest ment for an optimum return . The Naval Reserve is in com petition with the regular Navy for resources. To comp^ete successfully, the reserve must identify and stress those missions for itself in which it can most cost-effective y and efficiently meet the needs of national defense.

Therefore, the Naval Reserve should be perceived as a peacetime, as well as wartime, extension of the acti^ve forces. The Naval Reserve should be assigned missi°^nS that enhance the active force’s ability to meet surge ^re quirements. It should be assigned warfighting capabili^tieS that have no peacetime counterpart. And it should be as signed missions that coincide with the traditional view the reserve, as an augmentation force. The Naval Reserve should be viewed as a “force multiplier” rather than “force augmenter.”

Mobilization Billets versus Mobilization Readit>^esS' One difficulty in assigning missions to the Naval Reserve under the mutual support model concerns the definition o mobilization billets. Each valid Selected Reserve pay b* let must be associated with a specific mobilization require ment; otherwise, the reservist performing that job shou not be paid.

In practice, however, this requirement is clearly subje^c tive; many mutual support missions offer excellent mobi zation training, such as flying ASW patrols by P-3 comb² air crews. Many other necessary missions have urge⁰ peacetime validity, but no clear validity as training mobilization. There is great reluctance on the part of¹¹¹ Naval Reserve to perform these missions, for which ment is not really appropriate, and many peacetime opP°^r tunities to support the fleet are lost for lack of mobiliz^atl° relevance.

When the Naval Reserve does assist the active fleet. ^aS when more than 100 reservists reported to the New Jers^eXj it is the Naval Reserve which picks up the tab, although^J is the active fleet that benefits. Furthermore, money sp^e” on evolutions such as the New Jersey's crew relief or dw patrol flights in the Caribbean must come from the reserf training budget.

When the Naval Reserve undertakes these tasks, reserf ists will likely be denied training duty since the funds p^r° grammed for their training have already been spent sup porting the regulars. There is no way to recognize the tru beneficiary of these mutual support activities and allo^ca the cost accordingly.⁸

In effect, designating all billets strictly in terms of ^Ifl0₍ bilization and prohibiting payment for work that is ⁿ mobilization enhancing prevent the Naval Reserve f^f0 becoming the “adjunct military force” Assistant Sec tary Philbin described in Congress.         _e

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Thus, the traditional and mutual support models igⁿ° ₀ the peacetime benefits that can be derived from employ¹”, reserve forces to perform tasks that are not strictly mop zation oriented. In fact, requiring that only mobiliz^atl related billets be paid penalizes the Naval Reserve wh» supports the regular Navy. Even though the regular N^a

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Rese^{VCS 3 Va}'^Lla^'^{e sery}i^ce, it cannot reimburse the Naval ^rve- And the Naval Reserve, in turn, must forgo some

t„ ^{r acl}'^vity for which the funds were originally allocated ¹⁰ support.        ^{6 J} eortie^ ‘^s^ⁿS Missions: For the Naval Reserve to be- sions ^an Adjunct force, it must have realistic mis- i_n (• ’ ^wlllch not only address augmentation requirements _atj ^e °f ^war, but also support important peacetime oper- don? ^{W lCrc} ^^eet is overtaxed, or where the job can be more cost-effectively by the reserve. _a,_lce ^01ust stop perceiving the Naval Reserve as insur- are t ^a"^a'^nst “big war.” We must stop thinking there and d ° ^nav'^es’ tegular and the reserve, with separate regal *^{Stinct m}issions and capabilities. The whole Navy, _Sp_e ^{ar atl(}i reserve, must be viewed as a total force with a rum of capabilities and limitations, goal ^estakbshing missions for the Total Force Navy, our _Cost_s"7.be to maximize capabilities while minimizing across h ^{C3n accom}pbshed by recognizing that t_{er D} f ^sP^ectrum of missions, some are inherently bet- f°_rces^{r or,T|}ed by active forces, and others by reserve °rr_e^S’ ^while still others are compatible with either active force ^erVe,?^omP°ⁿents. It may be useful to regard reserve ^{s as} ‘part-time” forces rather than reserve.

Cii

has ^UJ^rent Strengths and Weaknesses: The Naval Reserve a_reas ^Cla°nstrated significant capability in a number of s_Up ^W“^lch, coincidentally, are areas suitable for mutual g_enc^0rt' The successful programs include aviation, intelli- ti°_n ^ ^an£f ^{he Naval Reserve Force (NRF) ships. In addi- tSf_ay °^toese visible examples, many other functions of the Re<J ^{are caiT}ied out entirely or mostly by* the Selected Suc^Ve’ ^3S shown in Table 1.

t_eri ^Cessful Naval Reserve programs tend to be charac- c_0m^e hy strong support from the highest echelons of a_s           They have clear, meaningful missions, as well

c_essf ^toware and people to do these missions. The suc- °_ut Programs also are usually ones that can be carried ^ar the homes of the participating reservists.

^are, however, some unsuccessful Naval Reserve

programs. These seem to suffer from low visibility and lack of a clear-cut mission. They have difficulty bringing reservists and hardware together, which worsens the per­ception of the program because, for example, a sailor trained on a generic shipboard simulator is viewed as less valuable than one who has trained on specific fleet-type hardware. These unsuccessful units also provide the indi­vidual Selected Reserve augmentees who flesh out the crews of existing ships and short facilities, rather than those designed to mobilize and deploy as units. This situa­tion tends to have a negative impact on peacetime unit identification, cohesion, and morale.⁹

Considerations in Establishing Missions: Together with the strengths and weaknesses that have been identified in the Naval Reserve program, other factors must be consid­ered in establishing missions for the Naval Reserve.

In their strategic study at The National War College, Goldrich and his collaborators identified two factors that affect attitudes toward and the value of the Naval Reserve. They wrote:

“Navies have traditionally been national rather than locally-based organizations. . . . Navies, requiring massive capital investment in ships and shore facilities, and acting on behalf of the central government at sea rather than on behalf of local interests, do not have a tradition of welling up from below. A ‘Naval National Guard,’ for example, is difficult to visualize for both technical and political reasons.

“Massive and rapid mobilization has generally been, and continues to be, less important to navies than arm­ies or air forces. The size of ships limits the rapidity with which any large number of Naval Reservists can be absorbed into a peacetime force structure in a quick mobilization—the Navy must fight with the ships it has on hand.”^{10                     F}

The successful reserve programs discussed previously have overcome these two factors; the failures seem to have suffered because of them.

___________________________ 0%                                20%                    40%                    60%                    80%                   100%

Can-                                                           I                          I                          I                          I                          I                          I

KvT ^{Air Wings}                                             ######=================================

_n^a Intelligence                            #############==========================

^ ^units

Ban^tion                                               ###########################============

ailaiio_ns

Min_es

CONr ^eeps                                             ################################## = = = = =

. CS-based Logistical                           #######################################

<5 ^Cr‘Tt and Combat

and Rescue Units__________________ |_____________ I_____________ I_____________ I_____________ I_____________ I

^^J^nlReserve = = Active Navy                       Source: “A Report to the Congress on the Navy’s Total Force,” February 1984

bocf....

^In8s / October 1984

Table I Naval Reserve to Total Naval Forces

When choosing missions for the Naval Reserve, leaders must focus on those which:

►  Cost-effectively meet the needs of national defense, both in peacetime and in war

►  Can be realistically carried out within reach of the re­serve forces and reservists

►  Recognize the unique problems of forward deployment of the fleet

►  Will motivate the reserve officers and enlisted person­nel who are asked to carry them out

►  Do not create an artificial “we-they” distinction be­tween the regular and reserve personnel of the Navy

As mentioned initially, there probably will be little time to prepare for a future war; forces that cannot be available immediately at mobilization will have little value. Most of the hardware and personnel in the more successful Naval

Reserve programs can be put to use immediately. They a^r£j earmarked for missions in defense of the continents United States—such as the mine countermeasures pr°' gram. They are aviation programs—aircraft can be move about quickly. They perform labor-intensive, rather than hardware-intensive, functions—such as control of ship' ping or intelligence.

50

It is the so-called “surface” program that presents ^ problem. Large groups of personnel are not assigned ¹ specific platforms. Rather, individuals and portions of ^ serve units are intended to be augmentees for deploy'^ ships. It is questionable whether these reservists could g^e to their ships in time of war, when the vessels are alrea •' overseas and in action. These people might be used

las'

an¹

crew new ships, except that a future war will not likely long enough for the United States to do any signify shipbuilding.   .

Thus, training large numbers of reserve surface offi^ce . and enlistees in ship augmentation programs separate fr⁰‘

l9»^J

Proceedings / October

There are numerous wartime missions for the Nava Reserve Force ships—the hardware—which do not re­quire that the ships be predeployed. For example, escorts will be needed to accompany convoys on their way ^t0 reinforce Europe. Reserve personnel are assigned to these ships and train in them. Useful peacetime missions f°^r these forces can be devised as well.

Use oj^lVa Reserve Force ships does not seem a productive _SUp ^scarce resources. These personnel can do little to fni ;^{011 lae} P^eacetime regular Navy; they may not be use- ^U1_T'_hⁿ war either.

_{Use (}'^S ^^e‘ⁿ8 the case, if we acknowledge the peacetime “f_or ^tle Naval Reserve as a cost-effective, part-time _SUcc^^{e mu}h>plie^r,” then the same criteria that identify tim» m ^{U reserve} programs can also help identify peace- ^me Naval Reserve missions.

_0n^^Commend^ati°ns: Two types of recommendations

are

is

^aDnr • ----- iwu type

peop?^Pnp^{te; l}h°^se dealing with programs, and those with hecorn Y'^C^^arcl'ⁿ8 programs, the Naval Reserve should Peace ⁶ P^art'’’^me naval forces—there when needed in l_encj ,^{0r War}’ ^ar>d optimized to perform the missions that m_0st ^Cmselves best to the reserve structure and which are

_The°^St-^eIT^cct'^vely performed by part-time forces, future ^neCC* ^{Por war} i^nsurance will not disappear in the desip ’ ^ ^must’ therefore, continue to be a factor in the

be th” | .^^e Naval Reserve; however, it does not need to a_Ssj„^C ,^riVm8 force. Regardless of the specific missions hindj¹¹⁶ _].^to.^t^^e Naval Reserve, we must escape from the ti°n b n ^lm'^tat'^ons of mobilization training and mobiliza­tion ' ^£tS' hillet structure should reflect the full mis- Tota’i         funding of the Total Force Navy should be

Form^rCK^fUnding-

asset ^nC ^^ava' Reserve not to be considered a wartime ^c°ntr ft ^{mUSt c}F^an8^e various laws and regulations that bujjp⁰ j.^{le wa}y the Naval Reserve is funded, so that it can int_e„ °^{r nonm}°bilization peacetime missions. We must the _c^{fate com}mand stmcture of the Naval Reserve into ^RF°^^mand structure of the rest of the Navy—as the ■n_Ust h ^{IPS are or}8^ani^zed today. Finally, the regular Navy

Du -^Cg'^{n to} *^earn about the Naval Reserve.

Fesc/'¹¹" ^t*^le P^{ast ten} years, the personnel of the Naval R_aVa] ® have undergone considerable turbulence, while larg₆₍j '^eserve forces have been both reduced and en- p_ers ' throughout this period, dedicated and professional tn_ero ^ne have stood fast. During this same period, nu- $i°p_ai^s P^roPosals to make the Naval Reserve more profes- amo_n ^{and e}ff^ective have been put forward. Notable th_{e c} ^ ^^ese Proposals are the frequent suggestions that Fescry ^1PCnSat’^{on and} advancement structure of the Naval R_aVy u ^m°dified and made different from the regular

Th

tion b^{Se su}88^cstions tend to reinforce the we-they distinc ^lraPon ^VVeen regulars and reservists at the very time it i: Po_s ^ai« ^to erase that distinction. A Total Force is not diff_e ^{e wa}h two components which receive significantly entiy j⁰¹ compensation and which are evaluated differ- eruph. °^{r d}°*ⁿS ’be same work. Our objective must be to Whi_c^^{aSlZe and re}mf°^rce that there is only one Navy, of tn°r_ai_e^{We are a}" ^a P^art- This is key for motivation and nation >^{and ls} '^mPortant in convincing the public and our about ^{leaders that} we, active and reserve, are serious ^ren,.„ °^ne Navy for our nation’s defense and the deter-

p^e of war.

,C-^nel programs should be instituted to reinforce the ^Pu^rth ^atl°^{n   rc}8^ul^ar Navy and the Naval Reserve.

^errn°re, efforts in maintaining and upgrading the

skills and professionalism of individual naval reservists should be intensified. Currently, for example, nothing ensures that officers receive increasingly broader exposure to their specialty. More attention must be paid to reserve personnel management to guarantee that reservists have the skills they need to perform their jobs and that the per­sonnel pool contains the skills the Navy needs. Currently, personnel assignment in the Naval Reserve is a haphazard process.

The Naval Reserve has a limited future if we continue to think solely in terms of mobilization. As Assistant Secre­tary Philbin told Congress, the reserve components are “an important component of our daily military opera­tions.”¹² In the other services, mobilization as the sole basis for the reserve and National Guard has long been discredited. Almost 40% of the Army’s combat power and 65% of the Air Force’s air defense capability lie in their guard and reserve forces. A major proportion of the Army’s combat support comes from forces not in the ac­tive-duty Army. The Marine Corps relies on its reserve for 25% of its infantry and attack air power and almost 35% of its light attack aircraft and antiaircraft missile battalions.¹³

The Navy must follow suit. Otherwise, we will be con­signing ourselves to a less capable Navy than we need, and we will be giving the taxpayer less defense for his naval dollar than he deserves. Finally, we will be wasting the talents and skills of our more than 100,000 naval re­servist professionals.

'Lawrence J. Korb, “Paving the Way for Stronger Reserve Forces ’’ Defense 83 July 1983, p. 22.

²James G. Abert, “Cost-Effective Reserve Forces,” Proceedings. November 1972, p. 53.

’James Hessman, “Background for the Future of the U. S. Naval Reserve,” Pro­ceedings, May 1978, p. 156.

⁴Peter J. Lumianski, “Improving the Utilization of the Naval Reserve,” student research paper, U. S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, 1980, p. 9.

⁵Robert L. Goldrich et al, “The U. S. Reserve System: Attitudes, Perceptions, and Realities,” Strategic Study, The National War College, Washington, D.C., 1982, pp. 14-22.

⁶Goldrich et al, p. 33.

⁷Edward J. Philbin, “Statement,” U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Service, Subcommittee on Preparedness, Status of the Guard and Reserve, Hear­ings (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 10.

⁸Ted Bush, “Quirk in Military Funding Favors Regulars at Reserve’s Expense,” Navy Times, 20 February 1984.

⁹Goldrich et al, p. 20.

^,0Goldrich et al, p. 20.

"See, for example, Abert, pp. 52-61, or Douglas R. Burnett, “Naval Reserve Officer Leadership: An Institutional Failure,” Proceedings, July 1981, pp. 101 — 103.

¹²Philbin, “Statement,” p. 10.

¹³Philbin, “Statement,” pp. 3-4.

Commander Yriart received his BA in international studies from Johns Hopkins University, and he has completed studies at the College of Naval Command and Staff, U.S. Naval War College. He has participated in various Naval Reserve intelligence units, and he has been employed as a personnel management specialist for various U.S. Government agen­cies. He is currently employed in the Office of Executive Personnel, U. S. Office of Personnel Management.

------------------ Second Honorable Mention          

Reserve Forces Minicontest