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(HM2) in a sickbay environment performing routine duties such as giving shots and working with health records. It would be unusual, however, to expect every HM2 to be able to perform effectively in positions requiring specialized training, such as an advanced biomedical equipment technician or an x-ray technician. Because of the investment of time and money to achieve these positions and because the member is now equipped to handle a higher degree of specialization, he or she is assigned a rating series NEC.
In the event of mobilization, proper assignment of rating series NECs enhances our ability to more effectively use and manage our mobilizable assets. Depending on the sequence number of the NEC (critical nature), rating series'NECs can appear in either the primary or secondary position and more than one can be held at, a time.
Special Series NEC: These are classified as special because they are not related to any particular rating. They identify skills attained through specialized schooling, on-the-job training, or correspondence courses. Some examples are canvasser recruiters, career counselors, combatant swimmers, divers, and instructors. Special series NECs are always in the secondary position.
The fast pace of today’s technology necessitates a complete reissue of the NEC manual on a quarterly basis. Ever-
A New Role (Soviet Stand
By Lieutenant C. C. Staszak, U. S. Navy
Proposals for employment of the Naval Reserve are numerous. The challenge is to find a mission adaptable to the Naval Reserve’s unique requirements, while providing realistic training to increase reserve combat skills. Concurrently, the active force would like to integrate the reserve into its operations as much as possible to support its training and exercises. However, the results leave both parties dissatisfied. Plans are poorly integrated, and reserve forces seem to be tacked on as an afterthought.
We need to train the reserve forces while integrating them and their training into fleet operations, producing tangible benefits for all involved.
For several years, the Air Force has been operating a successful “Red Flag” program providing realistic training against simulated Soviet forces. Similarly, the Army has an operational test and evaluation force (OpTEvFor) unit at Fort Irwin using both modified and actual Soviet equipment to simulate a Warsaw
changing needs, development of sophisticated weaponry, surface and subsurface vessels, and aircraft all lead to the introduction of NECs to identify new skills. For these same reasons, as older hardware and equipment are phased out and become obsolete, so, too, are NECs deleted from the system.
Since NECs describe areas in which expertise and proficiency have been developed, it makes sense to pursue assignment of those NECs for which one may be qualified. The form used to recommend NECs for inactive duty members is Chief of Naval Reserve Form 1220/1 (NavPers 1221/1 for members on active duty). They are completed by the activity classifier and forwarded through the chain of command to either NMPC-48 (for active members) or to NRPC-42E (for inactive members). Documentation is needed to substantiate that NECs were previously held (i.e., DD214 or service record, page 4). All criteria set forth in the manual have to be met, including the proper source rating, more pay grade restrictions, and mandatory school requirements.
NECs play an important part in billet assignment, advancement, and mobilization readiness. A selection board considering a slate of chief engineman candidates, for example, would be looking at such things as rating series NECs. An EN1 coded as a diesel engine inspector or
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Pact tank regiment. Both programs have received high grades for the quality of training they provide against potential threats.
The Navy has been conducting similar successful training with aggressor fighter squadrons using F-5s and A-4s. Unfortunately, nothing comparable exists for the surface and submarine communities, neglecting more than two-thirds of the Navy. Small teams do exist which brief Soviet tactics and weapons, but no dedicated “aggressors” exist or are contemplated. Relatively small overall numbers and the high unit cost in dollars and manpower of surface and subsurface combatants, along with demanding deployment cycles, preclude dedication of scarce units to one training area or function.
The Naval Reserve has combatants which do not deploy and generally stay in one geographic area. Their primary mission is training to maintain the readiness of the reserve units assigned. These ships participate in fleet exercises and opera- an auxiliary gas turbine technician woUl stand head and shoulders above a gr°: of ENls that had no NEC skills assigP Ask a P-3 flight engineer or a first d9 diver if they earn more money by vlft of their NECs.
Many career-enhancing billets are ting out there waiting for the man woman with the right NEC skill to c<>9 along. The current NEC Manual (oa Pers 18068D) gives a numerical bre down and narrative description NECs, tells who is eligible to earn the the criteria for earning them, and the P cedures to follow for recommendingl1' assignment. Investing a few mon1^ now could lead to long-term, lasting wards down the road, not just for the dividual’s career, but for the enhan mobilization readiness of the activity11 a more viable, cohesive Naval ReS Force.
Chief Petty Officer Mead enlisted as a seaman ^ in 1966. He was then assigned to Deputy ^ mander Fleet Air Western Pacific, PhilipP*ne^f went off active duty in 1970 and pursued a banking and joined the staff of the American ^ Society. He returned to active duty in 1972 asa ^ and served with the Naval Reserve Center-^, River, Massachusetts, Attack Squadron Tw° ^ Four, and the Personnel Support Detachment’ Orleans. He is currently at the Naval Reserve nel Center as the Reserve Force Classifier rcSP°]Qtf for administering the annual enlisted personnel tionnaire program and assigning NECs to the ea Naval Reserve community.
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tions as feasible. However, tne ^ two-week duration of active duty tral ^ coincides poorly with efforts incorp1’ ing them into the battle group as p3'^ exercises frequently lasting far Some training does occur and res units sometimes are scheduled bac • . back on the ships, so the ship particip . in the entire operation, but the resu the reserve units is much like the eX>
ence of seeing the first half or last n3 a movie. If exercises are not schedu using the resources available.
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This is where the combination aggressor force concept and the Reserve enters the picture. Select^ serve force combatants could be 0 ■, nated as “aggressors.” Both the 3 . duty and reserve personnel could th (,j assigned to these ships trained in 3 ^ tactics and doctrines, and, during^ unit’s active duty training, these ^ could participate in a regular fleet ■ cise as hostile forces. A “total PaCX '
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Howev ® Procedures and U. S. tactics. Soviet °Ur tntoumg must present the f0rnJ tocfhods, not ours. As new in- f0rces10n Becomes known about Soviet “anor’ 11 sB°uld be incorporated into the gressor” force’s operations.
strover/flrSt SteP’ b°ur Naval Reserve de- on eac. ri8atcs should be designated, two
f°rce Th°aSt’ aS an "aSSressor” surface near m sB°uld be stationed in ports toserv' ^eet operating areas, and the ing s‘St; two weeks of active duty train- maj0r°U d Be scheduled to coincide with figUre^erc'ses of the active forces. Con- t° assj ese ships with special equipment or (ie„S 'n lheir new role. Do not remove the shi’6 any etiuipment which supports select S Pr'mary warfare area, but make clude j6 Editions. Some examples inlate srtalling acdve jammers to simu- s°nnej [Vl6t J^mers and spaces for per- these sh° Pract*ce deceptive tactics (since battle '^S Wou'd not be operating with a 8earcoul?Tcn installed communications install;U b much of this requirement); electro^ S'mu'ators which radiate Soviet settingnic and 8'rc control frequencies; and er, UP facilities to launch drones; n using Soviet frequencies for
communications.
Preparation, training, and enthusiasm of the personnel involved will be crucial to the entire effort. The active duty personnel on the assigned ships would be heavily involved and become experts on Soviet tactics. However, the key element is the reserve. During the year preceding active duty training, each designated reserve unit would study Soviet tactics and doctrines, form a plan, then rehearse the aggressor force “mission plan” which has been tailored for that particular exercise or operation. The substantial advance preparation time available in the course of the year should ensure an authentic, well thought out aggressor operation. Particular segments of the plan, such as deceptive radio tactics, could be thoroughly rehearsed to bring the players up to the level of their Soviet counterparts—the reservists have the advantage of speaking the same language.
Only a portion of the reserve unit would be affected. Engineering and supply departments would function as normal. Officers and those in operations (operations specialists, electronic warfare technicians, signalmen, and radiomen) would be most involved; the weapons department would have limited involvement. However, these personnel are the ones with the most to gain since their duties will likely bring them into direct contact with Soviet forces in any future conflict.
Everyone on board will be aware of the mission, including the most junior sailor. Traditionally, aggressor units have extremely high levels of morale and enthusiasm. This factor would be a valuable
side effect of such an aggressor mission.
A second part of this proposal, while slightly more drastic, has the potential to produce even more substantial benefits: establishing and equipping selected Naval Reserve units with conventional diesel/electric submarines and designating them as aggressor forces. This will be controversial in light of the Navy’s stated aim of an all-nuclear submarine force. However, establishing a small number of reserve, not active, diesel submarines offers several advantages.
First is the return of an in-house capacity to train against the nonnuclear submarine. While the U. S. Navy has determined not to produce conventional submarines, the remainder of the world has inconveniently decided to continue producing them. Therefore, any future naval conflict will likely see U. S. forces up against conventional submarines. For example, Argentina’s lone, relatively modem submarine operating during the Falklands Conflict was able to make at least three torpedo attacks against the British task force in spite of the Royal Navy’s intensive antisubmarine warfare (ASW) effort. Faulty fire control rather than ASW prevented hits. The best training is to “train like you’ll fight,” and these conventional submarines would
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U. S. Naval Reserve Force destroyers and frigates, such as the USS Gray (FF-1054), manned by V. S. Naval Reserve personnel trained to use “Soviet” operating procedures and tactics will add new realism to U. S. naval exercises.
gressors to provide all the oppc
However, sufficient numbers do eX“jp0t provide a solid core. ComRe-5 ^ preparations for the exercise shorn ^ include plans to incorporate active ^
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with patrol gunboat-sized ships. ^ option to simulate fast patrol bo3ts^(, corporation of reserve P-3s acting a> ship cruise missile launchers is 30°
The four surviving U. S. diesel subs are contemporaries of this Soviet “Foxtrot.” Saved from the scrapper’s ball and manned by reservists, one or all of the quartei could provide ultrarealistic opposition for our forces.
provide such capability. Currently, such training is only available during exercises with our allies or during the limited periods when the diminishing U. S. conventional assets are available.
As aggressors, these submarines present an unparalleled training opportunity to teach the conventional threat. Commanding officers, evaluators, sonar technicians, and others will receive a firsthand taste of the strengths and weaknesses of the conventional submarine.
As with surface units, these submarines should retain full combat capabilities with selective modifications to simulate Soviet submarines. Based near major fleet operating areas, the concept will be the same as the surface aggressors. Manning would also be similar with a core of active duty personnel augmented by reservists for operations. Both must be knowledgeable and trained in Soviet tactics and doctrines.
Exploiting their quietness, singly or in pairs, and operating in accordance with known Soviet tactics, these boats offer a unique and authentic training experience. During an exercise, both “U. S.” surface and submarine commanding officers will be operating in a more realistic environment. The commanding officer can no longer rely on passive sensors, such as the towed-array surveillance system, ship sonar, or sonar buoys, to give the warning they could when the only threat was nuclear. Instead, he must plan his tactics to allow for both the fast-moving nuclear submarine coming from any direction and the slow-moving, quiet diesel coming from the forward sector. What percentage of time should the sonar be in the active mode? How does he best use available air assets? These represent only a fraction of the new concerns inclusion of diesels raises, especially diesels using unfamiliar Soviet tactics. Yet, even though the scene becomes more complex, so is a real war at sea.
As reserve submarines operating in a training role, these subs could be considered in a special category. This might avoid much of the criticism they could otherwise receive from violating the allnuclear attack force concept.
“Relatively” simple conventional submarines do not require highly trained nuclear submariners to maintain or operate them. There is no reason why a temporary active duty and reserve crew could not safely operate such units. An additional benefit for the Navy is a pool of trained submariners in the reserves.
Obtaining the necessary submarines would be a problem. The initial number contemplated is four, two on each coast. Four diesel attack submarines remain in service, three Barbel (SS-580) and one Darter (SS-576) class. Employment as aggressor submarines is an ideal use for these in place of being mothballed. The older diesels would remain in service and be augmented with new construction. Using new submarines with state-of-the- art technology is undoubtedly the way to provide the best training. In addition, even a limited number of newly constructed submarines produces the valuable side effect of returning the U. S. shipbuilding industry to a lucrative market currently forsaken to foreign shipyards.
A small force of modem conventional submarines could quickly transition to several useful wartime roles. Small size and low noise are particularly useful for special operations similar to those conducted by the British during the Falklands Conflict. Caribbean and Central American waters are too constrained for a nuclear submarine, but more manageable in a smaller conventional submarine. The roles usually suggested for diesels as minelayers or in barrier operations are
also options. Such units, especially t as knowledgeable of the Soviets 8s ^ aggressors, would make a ready and ^ come addition to the fleet in a crisis conflict.
Working together, the surface and s surface units present a realistic eXf^jn» of the events expected before and du an actual Soviet attack. Soviet over' nj horizon targeting (OTH), comrnan control procedures, and surveil methods are only a few examples 0 simulations such a force could °®r' s
A Commander, Reserve Soviet Fo . (ComReSovFor), for each exercise be responsible for the conduct o aggressor force. In the year prece the active-duty training, ComReS0' could form, plan, organize, and rent- the mission. During the exercise, ^ ReSovFor and his staff would p^y ^ roles of a Soviet admiral and his star • additional benefit is the opportunity . the many relatively senior officer ^ enlisted reservists to function as a sta j an operation, which makes more uSj their expertise than the many reserve jobs they currently fill. eC\
If the concept is successful, the prl’J0[ could be expanded slightly. Becaus other commitments and the reserve s^. there will never be enough reserve
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xist1 forces assigned for support. This go as far as having teams visit the a ^ unit concerned a month or more dt vance to brief the officers and c
active force ships to assist as expe* s. Soviet tactics and for liaison PurP $ Variations are possible and are en ■ aged. Smaller reserve units, eqll,P
^elect'on of Naval Reserve Officers
ByCon
mmodore LeRoy Collins, Jr., U. S. Naval Reserve
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.ill0! !^e Naval Reserve, the mission Perfo n 3nCe its comhat readiness while rm>ng vital services on an ongoing
Secretary of the Navy’s written board l° ■tle President °f each selection the br;ideS some f°cuse<f guidance to (e.g °ard on many detailed subjects Passed30 adrnon't'on not to exclude that fa -er °fficers simply because of eachbo j^e se'ecl>on process allows th°u„j°a™ member to exercise individual each of:nd !°te or her convictions on Thus th *Cer S recor(f by secret ballot, the b^rd’SeCretary l^e Navy, through gui(jar * President, can convey strong Vote u*"6 °Ut cannot directly control the idernK °r Can flnd out how any board
111 her voted.
basis for the active fleet. While not as much fun as a Great Lakes cruise, such a mission is undoubtedly more beneficial from a professional standpoint. Also, through this program, the active force will receive far superior training.
Naval officers have always aspired to a “balanced career” to show adaptability and flexibility, and there are many who still believe that is the way to mold a career to maximize selection. However, the unrestricted line (URL) community is tending toward more specialization, and it is increasingly difficult for URL officers to penetrate another community without going to the “end of the line” and causing some resentments (e.g., a surfacing submariner). Accordingly, it has become increasingly important for selection board members to be tolerant of such difficulties in the Naval Reserve.
Lieutenant Staszak was graduated from Boston University and was commissioned through Aviation Officer Candidate School. He served in the USS Glover (FF-1098) as operations officer. He is currently executive officer of the USS Constitution.
To maximize board balance, Op-01 carefully chooses selection board members from Navy, active duty reserve, and Selected Reserve sources, and also from among the various warfare specialties. Subsets of the board are appointed to collateral committees which meet concurrently during the two- to three-week period to select restricted line officers.
Selection board members are counseled by Op-01 and the president not to reveal their presence on the board until the board has completed its work. Further, each board member is admonished to report any attempt to contact him or