Naval Reserve: To Be or Not?

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;t Guard should seek ^a ipport of peacetime ope^ra -eserve, with mobilization an. Disruption would ready heavily involved ¹ lange would open n^unlt^ es for expansion. R^eser ' :onstrained by constant y >r by the need for a dir® on training and a spe^cl would be a larger, mo setter able to meet a '■^vl ne needs.

•lishment of a Coast Guard R^ese rinting Office, 1939), P- 1-

mittee. Report 91-642 Accotnparrj it Printing Office, 1969),,P• 2^26 !, Commandant Instruction Ml iO), sections 1-3 and 1-4.

D

d, Report, 1972 (Washington,

idant Instruction 5000.2C (Wa^s^

* ■                                               • pebh¹'

lrd,” Commandant’s Bullets>

Coast Guard Reservists,” F^act ^ • Coast Guard Reservist, N°^venl

liary and Reserve Act of 1941, ffice, 1941), p. 2. ual, section 1-1.                     S-

oast Guard (Washington, D-

on, D.C.: U. S. Coast Guard, '⁹⁵⁵⁾

wer Requirements (Revised D^ece ird, 1959), p. 8.    _g,3$6

id Manpower Requirements,

62), section II-1.                         nffic^e°^

Reserve and Attempts by the              ^

elected Reserve in Disregard sed Will of Congress,” Undated * t, p. 12.

Reserve . . . ,” p. 5.

rerford College and the ^₍₀[ a reserve program admit¹¹* its have included duty a* mill­iard District, and Chief'

;rs. He has also served VMEC-622), Assistant istrict, and concurrently _s6y.

e, Gloucester City, New      _r

; Port, Philadelphia, P^enIj it Navy and Coast Guar

>y Commodore Ri( k           U. S hard E. Young, . Naval Reserve

much less than starting training from scratch. And have not given any monetary weight to experience g^al on active duty.          _ .

►Greater Flexibility of Military Options: A ^v'^a g

trained, and well-organized reserve gives flexibility military and quasi-military options. A variety of g^ra ^ tions and precautionary moves becomes available m acceptable time frame.    .

►Support of Active Duty: As reservists train for mobi tion assignments, they often provide support to ^aCtl_ca„ duty forces. For example, astute active-duty manage^ simultaneously ensure reservists are ready for mobi tion and obtain real-time assistance by employing

such positions as weekend watch billets, intelligence g^a ering and analysis, and also by having them particip^ate exercises.            ,_ve

►Extension of Useful Life of Hardware: The ^res£_ap- forces can extend the useful lives of equipment and ^vv'^e ^ ons platforms that would otherwise be abandoned or m° balled and therefore unavailable on quick notice in ^a . tional emergency. More and more equipment is ^e

; of techn⁰

d

Once upon a time, keeping World War II battlewagons in reserve was thought to be a stupid waste of time and money. Many still harbor similar thoughts about the Naval Reserve. Like the Missouri, seen being read­ied for her refit, preceding page, the Naval Reserve deserves to be an active player in the Total Force.

Should there be an organized Naval Reserve? Possible reasons for answering no to this question include three arguments. First, dollars spent on the Naval Reserve would be far better spent for increasing active- duty salaries or for procuring additional aircraft or ships. Second, the next war will be over before reserves can be effectively employed. Third, reserves cause more prob­lems than they solve. Too much active-duty energy is de­voted to training and preparing them. They are not pre­pared, are inefficient, provide little help to the active fleet, are out of step with current fleet doctrine, and so on.

The first argument raises a legitimate question. We need to measure and monitor the cost-effectiveness of the Naval Reserve. The second argument may not be valid. Anyone who plans only for a few-days war is making an assump­tion that is not founded on any historical basis. Such an assumption severely limits U. S. options. It places the nation’s defense posture in a precarious, vulnerable, and predictably fatal position.

The deficiencies pointed out in the third argument, if

they are indeed true, can be corrected by active-duty man agers, just as deficiencies in equipment, material, person nel, or readiness are corrected. After all, the Naval K^e serve is a part of the Navy. The Naval Reserve should no and cannot have standards apart from those set by the ac tive-duty Navy. The Naval Reserve is controlled by, man aged by, and reports to the same Chief of Naval Ope^ra tions as does the active-duty Navy.

Why should there be a Naval Reserve? There are man) reasons.

► Deterrent—Second-strike, Surge, and Replace¹⁷¹?!¹ Capability: The deterrent value of a second-strike capam ity cannot be overestimated. Much like the ability to wi stand and survive a first onslaught, the ability to 9^U ^ increase in fighting size or replace substantial first-stn casualties has an accepted deterrent value. A propcW equipped, trained, and ready Naval Reserve force P^r° vides this needed surge capability.

► Augmentation of Active-Duty Forces: A reserve, if ^of ganized and used properly, can keep many front-b weapons platforms ready and able to fight. This does n imply reserve additions or replacements would be W effective, but they may make the difference between g^e^ ting under way or not, or firing from two gun platforms one. Reserve forces permit active-duty forces to acm^e full strength quickly.

► Training Costs Amortized over Longer Period: If ¹ Navy can retain reservists with the skills and experien learned on active duty in its inventory for at least so period of time, the cost-effectiveness of that training ^aa experience increases. Also, the more current those sK'^ and experience are maintained, the faster they can be turned to current fleet standards. For example, if the N^a retains a trained pilot for five years after his release tt ^ five years or so of active duty, the training cost $600,000 can be amortized over ten years—$60,000 P year as opposed to $120,000 per year. In addition, trai°j^ costs of staying current or regaining currency are pr°b^a

96

Proceedings / October

1

replaced in our front-line fighting units because»

^logical

solete

onlv ^ecl^UlP^nient and weapons platforms might be our taini °^^tlon‘ Although there are substantial costs in main- l^it ^ ^sacb equipment and weapons platforms, even on a asset .*s, it is worth continued evaluation of these WoniH P^articularly if a substantial portion of the labor cost

_Cann ^                HI

«£ ^bave the same proportionate size and use as some c_atl l °^{taer serv}ices’ reserves. At the same time, the Navy ave a Naval Reserve that is cost-effective.

heav _r°^bso'^esccnce’ not physical erosion. In case of sole/ ^lrst.^str'ke or early losses, such technologically ob

WonlH k                                ^{11 a} auu&uuiuai puiuui

k be underwritten by using reserve: ima\^SlStance 'ⁿ Nonmilitary Crises: The      .

atuch ^^3rtS °^^{tbe coun}try, at state and local levels, with a „ .^neected response force in times of local crises, such

Ahh^{ral diSaSterS}'

°f _n . ^ou§h all services forward deploy assets in support of the*⁰¹¹³* ^security objectives, the Navy is unique because mob;?- ^remoteness of its forces at sea and because of the tain rj¹ '■ *^ts °P^erations, often for extended and uncer- nods of time. For these reasons, the Naval Reserve

If *

it b_e ^ln<^^ee<l there should be a Naval Reserve, how should b_e ^0r§^anized? I suggest the Naval Reserve of the 1990s i fy^^UCtUred in the following way:

^ould^h^”^{6 an<}^ Surface Assets: A Naval Reserve surf_ac ^lave some limited number of front-line air and Place ^{6 assets} provide second-strike, surge, and re­also e ^{Cnt ca}P^ahility. This horizontal hardware integration p_er ^sures a substantial number of trained, experienced and            ^wh° would be needed during the first days

Brjn„ °^nt^^s following mobilization—would be available, ity ihe two reserve carrier air wings into compatibil- tionai ^active-duty air wings makes economic and na- Pro ^Sec.^Ur'ty sense.

a _mor"^ne hardware units need more than one weekend tnai_nt ■ ^and two weeks a year of active-duty training to be p_r^{3ln tbe}i^r readiness. This increased training time can irig (^ additional drills and active duty for train- ass_et_s ^CUu^^rai time. More effective use of the hardware a_more^Canbe accomplished through multi-augment crews, si_0n j, ^etf|cient active-duty/reserve crew mix, clearer mis- ^Cnt'fication, and limited but concentrated training

► C^ements-

Units ^Sm^^nt Units: Augment units that flesh out most Navy flight' ,^a °^{at an<}l ashore, must continue the strong move- th_eco^{OWard me}lding with their gaining commands. But Sessiy_e ^{mands s}tiH need to become more aware and pos- and _c ^<d their augment units to ensure they are trained Uiariei ^^{ab e} °f mobilization. Consequently, both the com- thath_a^{and tbe} augment unit will benefit. Augment units ttiands ^{6 acb}'^eve<i this critical link with their gaining coun­tess _T^enJ°y ongoing support resulting in maximum readi- ^tHel₍j_e(j ^{e lnt}elligence community is one of many that has ^aiea_SUrej^C" ^antl where productivity can be quantitatively

^■d\^Cn°^nal Area Responsibility: Those functions the (The_Se f^{eserve ca}n assist best must be strengthened. ^sUst_aj nnctions are those in which there is no significant lion j '^0rward deployment requirement until mobiliza- ’ ⁿ "'hich a small active-duty cadre can handle the

Navy’s worldwide needs short of mobilization, in which training availability is in close proximity to the location of the assets, and in which the capital investment in the assets is relatively modest.) Mine countermeasures, hospital ship augmentation, coastal and harbor defense, cargo handling, naval control of shipping, and particularly the construction battalions are some of the functional areas in which prog­ress is being made. Well-motivated reservists, many with active-duty experience, concentrating on well-defined, focused objectives, can carry a major portion of the load. The results of the current effort to determine if this pattern can be extended should be studied carefully and pursued vigorously.

^ Limited Use Second-line Assets: A continuing review of the feasibility of retaining second-line equipment and hardware for limited use by reserve forces needs to be monitored. The recommissioning of the battleships is an example of naval leaders’ foresight in retaining “second- line” equipment.

One of the important tasks of this effort should be to improve the method of establishing the criteria used in determining the size and type of hardware assets in the Naval Reserve. The criteria must weigh the expected losses, the cost, and the time needed to build new replace­ment assets against the cost and time needed to bring a reserve asset back on line. The criteria must also consider the availability of reservists to man the asset, the cost of training and maintaining the readiness of the crew, the cost of maintaining the asset in the reserve, and its useful­ness while in the reserve.

It may well be that there are other units being retired which, with the expenditure of limited funds, can be kept in a limited functional role so that in an emergency they could be recalled to use within an acceptable time frame.

For two major reasons, then, we must look long and hard at getting more use from our reserve armed forces. First, there is cost-effectiveness. It is extremely expensive to maintain a large, all-volunteer, permanent peacetime military force. For the same dollar, or less, we may be able to increase our effectiveness, our fighting capability, and our wartime size.

Second, if the U. S. military remains with the all-volun­teer concept, it may have reached maximum size without further increases in the personnel pay and benefits budget. The alternative may be to accept a smaller full-time mili­tary with increases in the size and role of its reserve forces.

The Naval Reserve, though limited in size and mission because of the Navy’s unique forward deployment effort, can and needs to be used more effectively. In this way, the reserve can be America’s partial solution to obtaining a strong and cost-effective force at sea.

Commodore Young received his bachelor of arts and juris doctor degrees from the University of Michigan. He is a practicing lawyer in Denver, Colorado. He served four years on active duty in the USS Maddox (DD- 731) and in the Bureau of Naval Personnel. He has held a number of reserve billets, including three tours as commanding officer of various units and as an instructor at the Naval War College. Commodore Young is currently assigned as Assistant Chief of Staff, Readiness and Tactics, Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet.