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Naval Reserve training fails because the reserve’s missions are too demanding for the time allotted to training. Either the missions must be changed to ones for which reservists can realistically train or the reservists must be sent back to basics to receive the training they need to heighten their readiness capability.
The clarion call has again been sounded for the Naval eserve to expand its role in providing for the de- serv' 6nSe tbc United States. Even more than its sister forc1C6S’ Navy bas tradhionally treated its reserve Unj 6S ne§iigently. Part of the problem lies in the Navy’s Illin '6 °peratinS environment. Training sailors in Peoria, or a°1S’ 'S much rnore difficult than training soldiers there anywhere else in Heartland, U.S.A.
cost Vert . ess’ under the pressure of close scrutiny by a rese C°nsc'ous Congress, the Navy is beginning to treat its CUrrrVe . rces seriously. But unless properly directed, the to fCIf lntercst in beefing up the Naval Reserve is doomed deliv* Ufe Prom lbc start- Should the Naval Reserve not vyiii fr now> complaints will resurface, and the reserve (jefee forced to play, to the detriment of this nation’s ^6 ”Se’ a reduced role in future military planning. Thus, lyinUst return to the basics. We need to refine the undertraining philosophy governing the Naval Reserves. Conj. ce training is the name of the game, we need to We \v°nt biPure °f Naval Reserve training. What do anant the Naval Reserve to do? If that question can be proerec*> then it may be possible to design a training pj m that can realize those goals. forecfUre * dlustrates the basic concept of Naval Reserve base”empl0yment- during normal operations, the “home [)Urj ls Protected by its standing forces or components. f°rce ^ per'0(fs °f rising tension, however, the standing f°rce^ aiUst deploy to the forward areas to engage hostile itary e^°re Pley can damage the home base through mil- In f,r eC<,)nom'c action. This is the simplest case. existh^y’s real world, we realize that potential threats tional nCarby anc* far from tbe home base. In the tradi- Wiu reserve model, reserve forces from the home base Navv UP^ement the standing forces where they are. The Will fn exPectcd to be everywhere already, and reservists
Todi m 3ny gapS'
fulfill tv’ unf°rtunatcly, the Naval Reserve is trained to Milit ro*e' only a few exceptions, such as the pjn„ ar>' Sealift Command or the Naval Control of Ship- ing u rgan'zat'on> the Naval Reserve is tasked with keep- enginP W'(h the latest developments in naval weaponry, VarictCering systems, tactics, and operations for a wide °pp y °f Parent commands” without being afforded the ResUnity to obtain the training it needs and deserves. trainj 6 Un'ts reporting to Navy ships may get to their active g p'a,f°rm only once a year at best. Many times, duty training (AcDuTra) periods available to a pl0,. Un'1 do not coincide with the ship’s schedule. De-
Assuming this can be done, however, we still face the more basic problem. Two weeks—the current length of many AcDuTras—is too short a period for the average reservist to keep up with the rapid changes in Navy technology, tactics, and operations. Also, the size of the Naval Reserve precludes realizing significantly improved efficiency in getting personnel to AcDuTra. The problem is, therefore, not only one of money, but of mission.
Although it is true that the knowledge a reservist gains during active duty is retained for a long time, day-to-day practice of these skills is generally not available at the Naval Reserve centers. For a young officer skilled in conning a destroyer past Point Loma, California, driving a blip across a radar screen in a shipboard simulator will never be the same. Similarly, the young reserve boatswain’s mate just off active duty will not benefit as much from tossing lines across a street as from securing them to another ship during underway replenishment. Certain skills require frequent practice, which, in turn, requires an adequate period of time. Under the current scenario of reserve employment, such time is not available.
If the training received by reservists is insufficient for the mission they are required to perform, two possible solutions exist. Figure 2 depicts a scenario in which forces
givi
en
llnitede;ts remove a parent command from the continental fundi ^tates’ and’ given the always sorry state of reserve Sctivj^’ p impossible for the unit to meet its ship or y even if the schedule permits such a rendezvous. are ff7|Cboo's required to obtain a readiness factor of R-l trainj ^ and unavailable; the promised weekend away Scbedm >s cancelled the day before the unit’s
tati0n fC.cl departure for the training because the transpor- PfQvp 5s trough. The list goes on. One solution to im-
resi
Ve the ;P°nsiv
situation is to provide more dollars, a more
•tiunj SlVe administrative organization, and better com- ntions between reserve units and parent commands.
*edin
'Ss / October 1984
43
of the
ready to fill gaps in the active, deployed forces
Commander Kaplan, a geologist employed by Pennzoil Explorat'°n(te Production Company, earned an AB degree in geology from Lai y ^ College, Pennsylvania, and a PhD in geology from the UniveF^j,,
4
held in reserve are available to completely replace units of the standing forces, which are distributed to points of highest threat during rising tension. The movement of reserve forces to fill the vacuum left by deployed front-line forces can occur in a relatively secure environment. In any conventional scenario, the time available to mobilize the reserves can be used most efficiently by moving them to preplanned mobilization sites.
Rather than moving small units of personnel to ships and stations scattered across the seas, the majority of the reserve forces should be assigned to ships and stations readily accessible during peacetime and during general mobilization; that is, keep them in the United States. The advantages would be tremendous. In terms of training, the key ingredient in maintaining an adequate Naval Reserve, these sites would be available throughout the year. The reserve forces could use them, more or less, at their convenience—as frequently as once a month, perhaps. We should forget the WET. The mobilization site should be the monthly training site as well as the AcDuTra site. AcDuTra could be scheduled so that the ship or station is constantly manned by reserve forces. Numerous mission areas could be staffed in this manner: coastal defense of the continental United States, mine warfare defense, con
voy escort in and out of the coastal United States, an naval station maintenance. Not only does this free active naval forces for primary employment in distant, hig threat environments, but it allows our reserve forces to trained efficiently. Two-week AcDuTra periods are sut1 dent in length when combined with 11 monthly weeken drills at the mobilization site. .
There is a second solution to the problems inherent 'n the Naval Reserve training program as currently struc tured. If we must bring deployed ship and foreign-base station units up to full strength by using reserve forces, then we must increase both the length of the AcDui period and the frequency of the WET drills. Otherwise, reservists assigned to these front-line units cannot main tain their skills and readiness. The major drawback is ma > by definition, reservists are essentially civilians ready 1 step into their military role quickly. Civilian empl°yer will likely look askance at proposals to increase the let*? of reserve training periods. .
Naval Reserve training currently fails to meet its objec tives because the reserve’s missions are too demanding the time allotted to training. To solve this problem, elt the missions or the training program must be change^ Some portion of the Naval Reserve will always have to
Navy. However, that role should be diminished, and P® sonnel who participate in that mode should be given training opportunities they need to maintain their readme skills.
Providing the Naval Reserve with missions for whic can realistically train will not only increase the Naval serve’s value to the Navy, but it will also improve morale of the reserve forces and allow the active forces the Navy to respond more effectively to demands plaC upon them.
For the “One Navy” concept to achieve its g°a's’ servists must be provided with missions they can perf°r ^ Asking a reservist to keep up with the technology changes inherent in today’s Navy while he or she is e ployed in a city miles distant from the nearest ocear'tjie unfair to the individual and the Navy, especially whe11 reservist cannot adequately train for that position. make our training realistic by assigning missions to Naval Reserve that will maximize the readiness of the dividual reserve sailors serving their country.
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. He served three-and-a-half years active u engineering billets in the USS Caloosahatchee (AO-98). He has a® j7, in a variety of reserve units, including Force Area Command Sta ^ an amphibious squadron staff unit, and the Naval Reserve FF- If1" jjy. unit. He was executive officer of Shore Intermediate Maintenance ^ ity Charleston 805, and he commanded Naval Reserve Advance Functional Component B5C Lighterage Detachment. Commander . Ian currently is the commanding officer of Naval Reserve DDG-* son 1218.
.First Honorable Mention.
Reserve Forces Minicontest
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Proceedings / Octoher
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