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In the 1960s, supersalesman Robert McNamara sold the military services a magical four-poster he said would both build them up down the road and banish all their budgeting nightmares. A quarter-century later, nearly all the magic is gone, the security blanket is frayed, the frame is creaking, and a rude awakening may be in the offing.
It was to have been a marvelous system—“a mechanism for developing a realistic program for meeting both our current and long range military requirements.” It would provide an approved plan ‘‘projected far enough into the future to ensure that all the programs are both physically and financially feasible” and avoid the pitfalls of the past where “so-called requirements bore almost no relation to the real world: . . . requirements existed on papier, often almost entirely disembodied from the actual size and nature of the procurement program.”1 So spoke Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in the 1960s. His planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS) has functioned for 20 years now. Has the system lived up to its billing? Many critics accuse the Department of Defense (DoD) of the same kind of mismanagement that PPBS was expected to eliminate. Two decades of chronic cost overruns, strategy/resource mismatches, and declining force structure have forced military leaders to ask: Are we managing for defeat?
PPBS in Brief: PPBS is the framework for making resource decisions in the Department of Defense. Through it is determined the size of U. S. forces, the rate of modernization, the level of readiness, and the quality of military life. PPBS, coupled with the equipment acquisition dec1 sion system (DSARC), determines U. S. military post01®' If PPBS fails, then the military posture will also fal
The system contains three parts: .
► Planning assesses the threat and articulates the direct1 in which DoD should head. It focuses on the period tw° nine years into the future and is summed up in the J° strategic planning document produced by the Joint Cflt of Staff through the joint strategic planning system-
► Programming designs the composition of forces by al eating funds to every DoD activity, whether a unit- ( equipment acquisition, a research and develop01 , (R&D) project, a salary, or a support function. This fv ing is identified for each of the five years of the five-y^^ defense plan (FYDP) and is constrained by how much President has allocated to DoD in his spending
► Budgeting takes the first year of the five-year pla°. j examines it in detail so that when the budget is subn° to Congress, it is as accurate and complete as P°sS'aj|, Budgeting breaks down the program into greater °e ^ refines the costs where necessary, and ensures the aC ties can be carried out within the time period stated- t
The system sounds quite rational and one would e*F jt it to be an effective tool for defense decision mak01-^ often fails, however. Further examination of each 01 jjj phases—planning, programming, and budgeting"" reveal why.
ha'is
Planning: The planning process focuses on vV needed rather than what is affordable or executable-^ ^ ous intelligence estimates, which outline the threat „ United States, are combined with a (somewhat va.£U'ieiilS tion of U. S. world goals. A set of military requh^jtr results. For example, if the United States seeks to ^ a tain access to Persian Gulf oil, and the Soviets P ft. threat with x number of divisions and y number of a* $ then the planning process generates requirements f01^ tain number of Army divisions, airlift squadrons.
new
be
ways of tackling its problems. For if a problem ean solved by creating “requirements” for more forces ote there is little incentive to search out who
Corps
icess
innovative programs of the past 20 years—preposib
.on1”*
toward defeat is enhanced because the planning civ'
shows who is to blame for any military failure ^ ian leadership. Having failed to fund what so”11!! they are to blame for the consequences. This m farfetched, but it has already happened. After tn
amphibious forces (MAF), carrier battle groups, and so on.
When this analysis is done worldwide, the “planning force” is generated. This force is much larger than existing forces and requires increases in almost everything from armored divisions to continental U. S. air defense squadrons. Although the actual numbers are classified, knowledgeable sources report that the planning force calls for 22 carrier battle groups, 25 active Army divisions, and four active MAFs.2 The gap between this planning force and the actual force is the strategy/resources mismatch— the idea that U. S. resources are inadequate to carry out all the elements of the national strategy.
The planning process is attractive because it fits the military’s view of the world. We in the military are acutely aware of how thin our nation’s defenses are. The massive increase in our military establishment, called for in the planning documents, conforms with our sense of priorities. Furthermore, because the increases are across the board, every segment within the Department of Defense can find endorsement for what it believes is vital. Thus, the Navy finds requirements for more carriers, the Marine Corps for more amphibious forces, the Army for more divisions. Everyone wins.
So why should we tinker with the DoD planning process? The answer is simple: it does not drive decisions. The results of the planning process are politely received, then shelved as the hard trade-offs of defense decision making are tackled. As the “Defense Resource Management Study” found, “The implication to the uninitiated has been that these [planning] documents formed an important foundation for the [PPBS] process. In fact, the joint documentation was generally considered irrelevant to the process.”3 Worse, planning may not only be ignored and hence have little impact, but it may harm national defense as well.
The central problem with the planning process is that it does not address the real choices the military faces. Because the planning is done in an unreal world where dollars and other resources are unlimited, it cannot discipline itself. It generates wants but not priorities. Assuming a fiscally unconstrained world for planning is like designing an airplane while assuming that gravity does not exist. The idealized environment may simplify the problem, but it fatally flaws the output.
Unconstrained planning has been defended as a goalsetting process, to give DoD a point at which to aim even if that point is beyond reach. Organizations always have vast unmet needs, and the truly important choices are those that lie between the many items desired and the few that can be obtained. Furthermore, the plans cannot even function as goals because they are so unattainable that DoD does not even begin to try to implement them. The Navy’s budget, for instance, takes no steps to move beyond 15 carrier battle groups to the 22 carrier battle group goal, and as one Pentagon sage explained, “If it ain’t funded, it ain’t.”
The planning process has also been defended on the grounds that the military’s true needs should be known. There is indeed some value in articulating to the national
leadership what their foreign policy entails. But there isa danger that the military may inadvertantly be sending 3 message of greed. DoD’s “strategy” appears to be MORE—more of everything, indiscriminately. The mu1' tary should remember the criticism it received when the additional cost of the planning force—allegedly $750 hi lion—was leaked to the press.4 Indeed, the criticism waS so great that Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger Par tially disowned the planning force, calling it the ‘ vices’ unconstrained wants.”5
If the planning process were simply ignored, then would not be very harmful. Many organizations, both 'n side and outside the defense establishment, produce p‘a and studies that are unusable. Unfortunately, the proble' is more insidious. By focusing on “multiplication” tyPe^ of plans—that is, plans that meet the threat by multiply1”; what is already being done—the military ignores istmg types,
new kinds of solutions. For instance, if the Marine has a shortfall of amphibious lift, the planning pr0< ^ “solves” this by stating a requirement to build twice,je many landing ships as are now being built. There is11 incentive to look at less desirable, but perhaps achievable alternatives, such as reducing unit embarka ^ requirements, building different kinds of ships, or u nontraditional means of amphibious lift like maritime P positioning. The same is true for the Navy and its cafl^ ,(S the Army and its heavy divisions, and the Air Force an fighters. 0 'fo
The result is a gap in creativity. Who fills this gap - ^ some extent, the services themselves fill it—but °u the planning process. Unfortunately, the services are . voidably parochial and tend to meet challenges in the ^ familiar and comfortable way. In part, the failure o planning process has given the staff of the Office 0 Secretary of Defense and outside civilians much mo . fluence because they have been free to think about de ^ ^ problems with fewer institutional restraints. Many 0
for instance—have been pushed by civilians. ^-JgsS large part of the PPBS’s creativity is supplied by °u 5 who have little experience with military problems an ^ will not be risking their lives on the front line if t*ie try goes to war. f the
The planning process is also harmful because ^ defeatist expectations it engenders. To meet eX^ofceS threats, the plans demonstrate that vastly greater js than those now available are necessary. But wha1 ^ot implied is that current and foreseeable U. S. forces ^ defend the United States. This expectation of defea for a self-fulfilling prophecy. With a ready-made Z&t losing, the U. S. readiness to admit defeat in the .:natiotl days of a future conflict might increase. This 1
:iV‘J
liki
^ development of military leadership have historically en the key factors in battlefield success. Yet, these are ScJn overlooked in the peacetime focus on PPBS and re- an ,rc^s- Planning must be the link between these elements y Pl BP S. defense program.
vjeanning cannot be done by advocates—people who 'ties ^£'r ^unct'on as maximizing the share for their activ- Suit' Otherwise planning becomes lobbying, and the re- Qif fesemBles a congressional appropriations bill—a tjiu'Staias tree with something for everyone. Planning ^oulH 3n 'ntegrative activity, not a distributive one. It s"it) ^ Comhine elements so the whole is greater than the Un n°^ t*le Parts. It should not be an exercise in dividing
► ie pie-
vjSj0e P*an must be the leader’s personal expression of his n f°r the future. The planning agency, therefore,
hostage rescue attempt failed in 1980, a number of commutators blamed inadequate funding of the military, not Poor planning or bad luck.
So how can the military plan better? Incremental change W,U not help. The organizational forces that produce distorted plans are far too pervasive to be turned around by ^drawing some reporting procedures or by changing the 0rmat of some documents. In part, it is a cultural prob- em—a mind-set toward requirements and not toward privities. In part, it is a reflection of the annual appropriation cycle which keys everything toward approval of the an- LUal appropriation. What it recognizes is something critics fve been saying for a long time—government agencies P‘an poorly.
. But the situation is certainly not hopeless. Better plants is possible.
it 11^ P*ann*n§ Process must work in a real world of limed resources and constrained options. Planners must ^ave a broad grounding in policy, requirements, and re- ources if the result is to be both realistic and militarily uable,
Ij though B must be fiscally sound, planning should not ®c°me a long-range budgeting exercise. Unlike program- remg and budgeting, planning must grapple with the non- li]S°urce elements of defense. These intangible elements unit cohesion, styles of warfare, evolution of tactics, must be central, autonomous, and linked directly to the top. If it is not, its plan will inevitably be mediocre, diluted by having too many hands laid on it.
The purpose of planning is to gain insight into what must be done today to operate successfully tomorrow. The plan must be doable, must rise above competing interests to articulate the interests of the whole, and must incorporate the vision of the leadership about the organization’s direction in an uncertain future. Planning does nothing like that today, and it is time it did.
Programming: Programming turns the fiscally unconstrained plan into a fiscally achievable five-year defense program. Because of its foundation in fiscal reality, the FYDP should be a realistic basis for making decisions, as Secretary McNamara intended.6 Unfortunately, this is not the case. The FYDP systematically distorts the view of the future, thereby leading the military to believe that the defense program will be far larger than is likely. The fiscal constraints are not very constraining but rather bend in the face of the military’s inclination to be optimistic. As a result, the military is encouraged to set in motion programs for equipment, manpower, and force structure that cannot be supported. The illusions created by the planning process are never really dispelled.
The Defense Guidance: The defense guidance (DG) is intended to bridge the gap between unconstrained planning and constrained programming. Through it, the Secretary of Defense tells the services how to structure their five-year plans. Although usually considered a planning document, it initiates the programming phase and therefore is considered part of programming. In recent years, writing the DG has become a major evolution involving all members of the DoD community and having several tiers of committees. This expansion reflects the leadership’s frustration with the Joint Chiefs of Staff planning process. To many, the DG, not the joint strategic planning document, represents the planning phase of PPBS.
Unfortunately, the DG suffers from the same ills as the other planning documents—lack of fiscal realism and lack of direction. This problem surfaced in 1980 when the DoD
Table 1 Over-optimism in Predicting DoD Funding (billions of dollars)
1976
1977
1978 1979
1980 Total
^ast
Vtu'i'g Brec*'cteB 'n the fiscal year 1976 budge!
funding
176.7
170.8
181.3
175.0
187.2 191.8
176.6 178.0
195.8 932.8
183.5 883.9
ssional budget committee action and ^'implications (5% real growth)
Jln8 Predicted in the fiscal year 1983 budget ^ n the fiscal year 1984 budget
1984 1985 1986 1987 Total
279.7 274.1 | 308.7 304.6 | 325.5 321.1 | 337.8 333.2 | 1251.7 1233.0 |
261.6 | 274.7 | 288.4 | 302.8 | 1127.5 |
1 fiscal
year 1984 dollars to remove the effects of inflation.
leadership believed it had a mandate “to do more” in defense but with less control. The increase in resources thus coincided with a deference toward DoD’s constituent parts and a move toward consensus decision making.
The DG, being drafted by committees working through consensus, reflects the combined goals of all the various DoD interest groups. As a result, justification for virtually any defense program can be found. The resource problem has become apparent as the full cost of all the espoused programs has unfolded, and the resources projected have decreased. This year’s guidance directed “greater stress on affordability.”7 Attempts have been made to identify the resource shortfall with an eye toward closing the gap.
High hopes. That’s what the Air Force had during the planning and budgeting processes for its F-llls, four of which are parked beyond an EF-111. And the Marine Corps was equally optimistic about its AV-8B Harriers, facing page, in the early PPBS guesses. But the long-range savings predicted for both aircraft have failed to materialize.
U. 8. AIR FORCE
But the committees have found it difficult to exclude 2 valid claimant, and the leadership has been unwilling t° impose a solution given its promises of decentralization and a revitalized defense across a broad front. Furthermore, because policy organizations run the process, there is less concern about resources. The result has been a lac* of clear direction and severe doubts about fisc2 executability. One Navy programmer expressed the opin' ion that the only part of the DG he heeded was the fisca guidance—the one page which allocated funding for tlje five-year period. The rest of the DG, being unexecutabe and uncoordinated, he ignored.
The Top-Line Illusion: After receiving its rather questionable guidance, the programming phase encounters a series of technical problems. The greatest of these is that 1 levels of future funding promised to DoD are unrealisN cally high. This is the result of a dilemma faced by e. administration. On the one hand, each administrate wants to fully fund the defense of this country. No PreSl dent wants to take chances with national security, his e° ^ basic responsibility. On the other hand, there is a fcder budget crisis every year. The nation has more
p,bi°Usin8. medical services, support of senior citizens, c5ri !c w°rks, unemployment insurance, defense—than it a „rUn^ with taxes the people consider bearable and with be 'jV1 national product that is never all it is expected to tealit S’ c*e*ense ‘s caught between a constrained present this u ant^ ^es're to do more. Administrations resolve Vre ma^'ng a promise that things will get better in the
promising a brighter future is a hallmark of the this r Process, and promises to DoD are no different in Pr0m.espect than those to any other constituency. This This i$e 'S exPressed as a large increase in future funding. Haiw not a cynical trick, or an insincere public relations Mo,:. er> but it is an honest expression of what every At rftrat*°n would like to do if it could.
■te. ]t °^> however, this guidance is not merely a prom- more than a commitment. It is the future. Sht fand development are done, production tooling is e ’ °rces are fielded, and manpower is recruited with ah»le fetation that those future resources will be avail- en the resources do not materialize, the defense
f n th- exPeiaence w>th forecasting the DoD top line has jSreat real growth is always forecasted, but that the Vyeaare,y unfolds as expected. The fiscal year 1976 S(flsrP,an- for instance, contained a total of $933 bil- Hzgj03 year 1984 dollars), but only $884 billion mate- lest ^.ee Table 1).
b eht js1 i,ary planners believe that the era of disappoint- b'lget lbey should note that in the fiscal year 1984 0ti (L f. years of the five-year plan have been reduced iscal year 1983 budget. The fiscal year 1985
budget indicates further reductions. How much of the FYDP resources now forecast for fiscal years 1985-1989 will actually materialize five years and two presidential campaigns into the future? This question is especially relevant when considering how atypical the current defense spending plans are in light of recent history (see Figure 1).
The Cost Illusion: Forecasting cost is always difficult, but it is a special problem for systems that do not yet exist. For instance, how does one evaluate the R&D risk of making a weapon work when the weapon exists only as an idea? It is easy to assume that progress will be smooth and, indeed, the assumption is reinforced by the difficulty in putting funding wedges into budgets for “unforeseen difficulties.” The cost history of the Captor mine demonstrates how difficult forecasting can be (see Figure 2).
Taking one year as an example, the fiscal year 1980 cost forecast in fiscal year 1976 was $130,000 (fiscal year 1984 dollars). The estimate rose to $157,000, $194,000, and $206,000 in fiscal years 1977, 1978, and 1979, respectively. The actual cost was $317,000—144% higher than the original estimate.
19X4
' N»vemb«r
Operations and support costs are also easy to underestimate. Contractors often claim that new weapons require less maintenance, fewer spare parts, and fewer personnel than existing weapons because of state-of-the-art technology, labor-saving devices like built-in test equipment, and efficient management systems. Too often, the delivered product does not live up to these forecasts, and the resources set aside for the weapon’s support are so insufficient that the weapon limps along. The low availability of F- Ills in Europe, for instance, is partly a result of over-
,unts
prices, and higher inflation. Procurement accou-- ^ the brunt of these programming failures becaus )0oK ^ power and operating costs are relatively fixed- pfC successive Navy aviation plans shows how disto
:d'°
curement plans become (see Table 2).
sold maintenance “improvements.” The F-l 1 ID avionics upgrade system breaks down 20 times more often than was expected.8
Even systems already in production are prone to underestimation because it is assumed that costs will decline significantly over time as both labor and managemen learn how to do their jobs more efficiently. The average unit cost of an AV-8B, for example, was expected to <*e cline 73% in constant dollars between fiscal years 1" ' and 1983.9 Unfortunately, actual reductions in cost hav often been limited or nonexistent. The Navy produces to few units and has too many upgrades, design modify tions, and engineering changes to provide the reqmr program stability. As a result, future units often cost mu more than expected.
The Inflation Illusion: Every administration has an inflation program, and every administration assumes program will work. Thus, forecasts typically show re tively high near-term inflation, which tapers off in long term (see Figure 3). The optimism of these foreca is apparent when compared to actual inflation. ^
These are really not forecasts at all but acts of *a ^ Until recently, unfortunately, anti-inflation programs a not worked well, and DoD has been stuck with inDa estimates that have been much too low. In 1977, f°r stance, we were estimating fiscal year 1980-1981 im*at at 4.3%. It was 12.3%. This is devastating to procure^ accounts, especially shipbuilding, because it spends lars over such a long period. Over a $10 billion ship^u.0ll ing account, a 3% annual underestimate in the in* ^ rate would underfund the account by $870 mill*011' result is equipment that costs much more than was y , grammed or budgeted. This systematic underestimat*0^ inflation induces DoD to start building more systems . it has funds to complete. Future programs assume^, earlier systems are fully funded and therefore Pr0JfcL tjofl ing even more systems. When the bill for higher in ^g[ comes due, systems must be deferred, cut, or reduce • ^ example, in 1977, 17% of the shipbuilding budge spent on funding the underestimated inflation on.^iave ously “paid for” ships, an amount which w°a‘ (cS, bought five Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class This problem has a domino effect, displacing a plans.
for3
The Adjustment Problem: As the total progra ^jy particular year approaches execution, it is continj1igher adjusted to reflect lower funding availability
What cannot be afforded in the budget is P°st^eflt the out-years, therefore projecting future proem- *‘bo'1’’ levels far higher than at present. This is called t wave” effect. ^ d^
The process of adjusting the program downW not correct the previous programming failures.
foi
plain
^ filing phases as described earlier.
guard against the top-line illusion, the Secretary of efense (SecDef) should take a large funding wedge off
I),
toP of the ^°uld be
as n ^ear—w*iere costs an<J funding levels are as clear ofth CVer w'^ I50—kut woulH grow in the future years ^ he five-year defense plan, until in the last year it would
visions to take bold action like terminating marginal Pr°grams are not usually made. Instead, decisions are hes- ltant and improvised, mainly deferring and stretching proems, in order to survive the immediate crisis. Further- ri'0re, the system continues to proclaim that the resources ^■11 be available in the future; thus, there is no incentive to hard choices. Military planners never face the impliCations of having limited resources.
How can programming be fixed? The current system’s 1Scipline must be much stronger to force hard choices ^*rly and discourage drift.
H the planning phase were stronger, the Defense Guid- nce would be unnecessary. An executable, focused plan Quid itseif be sufficient basis for the programming p ase. Therefore, the solution to the DG lies in fixing the
DoD program. This Secretary’s wedge a contingency account with no funds in the
quite large (in the $25-billion range). This wedge a'd acknowledge the uncertainty in the top line without jnIn8 less of a commitment to funding DoD. Reductions r,0e toP line would come from the SefDef’s reserve and foni the service programs, which would then be much |T*e stable.
jCc Spelling the inflation illusion is easy—forecast more areUrately. That is difficult to do, of course, since there n iuHution forecasts as there are economists, be H'ce of Management and Budget’s forecasts should perbUt aslHe in favor of the forecasts of some independent, Aitha^S even nongovernmental, forecasting organization. titlle0u8h independent organizations are also wrong at decijS’ they are, in general, less wrong. Because of their centinc- inflation rates have received little attention re- ^°D should be careful, however, lest the political pr0,, *°n horizon of a few months obscures the needs of Heramniirig’ which has a horizon of up to 12 years. l9jjgDoD forecasts inflation declining to 4.4% in C'astj ’ one °f {he most respected independent fore- ^ C08 ComPanies, forecasts inflation rising to 5.8%. s must be predicted more accurately. But the failing is only marginally susceptible to technical solutions, the greatest errors arising from the cost estimating process itself and an uncertain future. Yet how can test failures, design modifications, capability shortfalls, and model changes be budgeted before they occur? DoD must realize that for many items, costs cannot be forecast accurately. All that can be done is to take some precautions against gross errors. PPBS’s policy has historically been to err on the optimistic side to protect its programs. The incentives in the procurement system all push in this direction, and they have produced a history of underestimates. This policy must be reversed. To produce conservative forecasts and reduce the possibility of gross errors, DoD must:
► Adhere absolutely to the “taxi principle” of systems acquisition—“Know the fare before you get in.” This means no concurrent development and procurement even for the most urgent requirements.
► Assume that the future will be similar to the past. There will be no breakthroughs in cost containment.
► Be especially cautious in costing projects never done before. Fools rush in where cost estimators fear to tread.
► Include full costs. There can be no skimping on spares or support equipment in order to reduce apparent up-front costs.
► Program funding wedges for future modifications based on historical experience.
► Allow large program manager reserves to meet unexpected problems.
Budgeting: The problem with budgeting is implicit in the discussion of programming. Instead of being a detailed review for executability and pricing, budgeting is often phase two of programming. Major decisions about forces and equipment are made late in the process. Indeed, major program decisions traditionally are made late in December to reduce the budget just enough to meet funding controls when it is submitted to Congress in early January.
Assembling a budget and all the support analyses without a stable program is an exercise in frustration. With programming decisions being made so late, the budget is, in effect, rewritten over and over again. The extent of this problem is evident in the Marine Corps budget, which must be submitted in July to the Department of the Navy— before even the first program decisions are made. One can imagine how many times that budget is rewritten between
Table 2 Procurement of Navy Combat Aircraft in Successive Five-Year Plans
1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 |
78 | 110 | 156 | 214 | 294 |
|
|
|
|
| 103 | 177 | 259 | 308 | 331 |
|
|
|
|
| 119 | 173 | 229 | 257 | 254 |
|
|
|
|
| 229 | 296 | 340 | 347 | 329 |
|
|
|
|
| 209 | 242 | 277 | 276 | 302 |
|
|
|
|
| 215 | 250 | 235 | 235 |
100 | 140* | 191 | 211 | 194 |
|
|
|
|
275
%
%(c
I9&3 'barter)
I9, Reagan)
s
effects nf
01 new administration’s supplemental appropriation.
Currently reported)
--------------------------
,llRs 1 November
1984
51
the first submission in July and the final product in January. But because budgeting requires much more detail than programming, quick changes are difficult. Not only do these changes cause many hours of extra work, but they also cause errors, inconsistency, and omissions.
Ironically, because the budget is presented to Congress and the public and because it has such a near-term focus, the budget is built on the most realistic set of assumptions of all the PPBS elements. It is, therefore, the most authoritative statement on defense strategy because it alone embodies all the hard trade-offs through which U. S. strategy unfolds.
Where Do We Go from Here? Many of Secretary McNamara’s problems are still prevalent after 20 years of PPBS. Planning still has “requirements disembodied from the actual defense program,” programming does not develop a “realistic program,” and budgeting is not just “translating the various programs into the standard functional categories of the Federal budget.”
Existing resources are not adequate to do everything they are expected to do. Some compromises must be made, like buying the next best, instead of the best, or not modernizing certain activities, or scaling down certain other activities. In the short run, it will appear that we have reduced our defenses because we will have given up the illusion of an ideal tomorrow. But in the long run, we will be better off by having an “illusion-ectomy” now.
Changes are also needed to maintain, or restore, credibility with the public. For if the public does not believe the military is acting responsibly with its money, then it will never support the long-term commitment needed to sustain an adequate military posture. A long-term commitment lasts year after year, administration after administration' U. S. defense is not well served by a management system based on comfortable illusions and improvised choices- Ultimately, a failing PPBS is not an economic problem- it is a military problem. By encouraging indirection- wasted effort, and inefficiency, it produces a declining force structure, slow modernization, and curtailed read* ness. Can the United States expect to win wars with prePa rations like this?
'"Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense,” 1962, 1963, Robert S. McNai" The Essence of Security, pp. 87-97.
2See Defense Week, 14, June 1982, p. 12.
3Donald B. Rice, “Defense Resource Management Study Final Report” (WaS ton, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 21. ^
4For example, Washington Post, 8 January 1982; New York Times, 22 Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger on Cable News Network’s J" maker,” 9 January 1982, as reported in The Washington Post, 10 January 19 ’ A3.
6For more on the McNamara revolution in programming, see Theodore W. Bauer, Defense Organization and Management, the Armed Forces, 1967, pp. 177-199.
7Deputy Secretary of Defense memo, 12 August 1983.
8See Franklin C. Spinney, Defense Facts of Life, unpublished, p. 99. s\.
^aken from FYDP data as of October 1982 (Actual fiscal year 1982 budget* dent’s fiscal year 1983 budget, and proposed fiscal year 1984 budget).
Major Cancian received his BA in history from Harvard Univers'jf^., his MBA from Harvard Business School. He is currently Assistant ^ tor, National Security Program, Kennedy School of Government- ef_ vard University. Major Cancian’s reserve billet is Commanding u Weapons Company, 1st Battalion, 25th Marines.
_____________________________________ Fire Away--------------------------------------------
The Marine Reserve 2nd Tank Battalion was conducting a field problem in its heavily wooded field exercise area near the Syracuse airport.
The battalion commanding officer had instructed his officers and noncoms that he wanted to “hear those rifles,” since he was aware of the aversion of some of his troops to the onerous task of cleaning rifles dirtied by the firing of blank ammunition.
Midway through a noisy morning, 1 noticed that our sergeant was singling out one hapless private in particular and ordering him to keep firing his rifle.
After awhile, the private’s rifle became silent, which further spurred the sergeant’s verbal assaults. The private, highly preoccupied by his struggle through the bushes and brambles, endured this harangue with rising temper.
Finally, after one especially abusive tirade from the insistent sergeant, the thoroughly exasperated private, brushing another tree limb away from his scratched face, shouted, “Awfachrissake, Sarge, I’m out of ammo! You want me to yell ‘Bang, Bang’?”
Radioman First Class Alexander F. Beattie, U. S. Naval Reserve
(The Naval Institute will pay $25.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.!