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Contents:
A View from the Balcony Come Back, Little Beaver Battle Orders
Willing, Able, and Ready (WAR) Escalation and Naval Strategy Flags of Inconvenience Tomorrow’s Fleet
The American Submarine 1984-2014
Learn to Say “No” to the Admiral
Fury from the Sea: Marines in Grenada
No Bastions for the Bear
Western European and NATO Navies
Understanding the Soviet Union
The Helo: Potential Ship Killer?
The Loss of HMS Coventry
Leyte Gulf Remembered
Not Ready on the Firing Line
The Coast Guard: Quo Vadis?
The Not-too Forgotten War
Shipboard Training: The Team’s the Thing
Their Slava-Class Strike Cruiser Beyond Arapaho Misdirection in Navigation?
The Reserve Is Ready
ENTER THE FORUM
We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
“A View from the Balcony”
(See C. I. Xenakis, pp. 82-85, August 1984
Proceedings)
Dr. Ray W. Coye, The University of Wyoming—Lieutenant Xenakis has provided an interesting summary of some major trends in societal value shifts and their implications for serving naval personnel. His recommendations, however, need clarification.
A reader is left unsure as to the direction these efforts should take. He states, for example, that the service must “address” and “deal with” values and beliefs in recruit training. Does this mean that individuals with “contemporary” values should be targeted for a concerted effort to change their values to a more “traditional” orientation? Or, does it mean that those individuals should be encouraged to maintain their values in the service of an “enlightened” Navy?
The discussion of “personnel habits,” or perhaps more precisely, personal habits, is of great concern. Activities like “moonlighting” and use of “non-military language” are likely to be expressions of needs which are unfulfilled by Navy life. To simply regulate them out of existence will not alleviate them.
The military cannot isolate itself from societal value changes. Policymakers must continue to view the military as an “open-system” in a state of interdependence with the society it defends.
normal bounds of luck. To begin with' we were lucky that the squadron was available and ready when Commander South Pacific needed destroyers. Lately even the nights were kind to us.
sometimes moved under a cover squalls while, at the same time,
We
of
the
enemy was fully visible under brigh skies. We were supported by the hig command. Our gunnery was good, an the hits we scored early in the g^1 helped us later, on several occasions. 0 torpedoes ran hot, straight, and true, an our torpedomen kept them in good run
Battle Orders
What’s Happening?
‘‘Come Back, Little Beaver”
(See R. C. Powers, pp. 44-49, September 1984
Proceedings)
Arleigh Burke—If I may write on behalf of the many, every man-jack of us in Destroyer Squadron (DesRon) 23 who fought together during the long-gone days of World War II greatly appreciates Captain Powers’s gracious comments about our old squadron, of which we are very proud, and what our group was able to accomplish.
The lessons of which Captain Powers writes are all important. During World War II, DesRon 23 had to learn the hard way that it is never an easy task to train forces during peacetime to be proficient in the art of operating as cohesive units in actual battle.
At the time, we knew the stakes were high and that we were lucky beyond the
sharp
and knew that in surface fights again* cruisers or destroyers, a depth setting six feet would raise havoc with enemy. We soon learned that the c°n dence we had in each other and in ° . equipment was well placed. We also great confidence in the little angels on ^ starboard yardarms, too—and they ne let us down. _s
The record of our destroyer l°s* compared to the number of destroy engaged in battle was somber, but -W nese losses were also severe. When v Ron 23 was assigned to Task Group ■ under the command of Rear Adnw Aaron S. Merrill, an old destroyer *> we were permitted to attack withou ^ ders upon sighting the enemy- Ad j Merrill knew our business well. jg- placed more faith in our ability and J . ment than most task group comman •„ could muster. The success of his gr0 p, battle might very well have been J ^ ardized by the wrongful decision o of his subordinates. Admiral Mem ^ knew that he was too busy in battle ^ constantly thinking about what n'^t stroyers could do to improve his c situation.
ning shape. Our torpedomen were
_ wonderf^,
stroyer captains, DesRon 23 was right fortunate that all of our caP_s 0{ were aggressive, knew the bus11 being captains of hard-fighting knew the talents and weaknesses o ^ejr
own ships, as well as those 0 ^4 squadron mates. These captain^ ^ which ship had superb torpedome .j. $ which ship had the best radarS’^g |0 radars worked at all, and were w*^ fjgh1 exercise their initiatives in a I1’1 ^ tl>£ when support of the other ships , squadron was necessary. Their 8 ^jlr contribution wasn’t so much tn
Without downgrading the accom, ments of any of the other wondeV»
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ingness to cooperate, as it was their skill in anticipating what they could do to be of greatest help to the group. They knew what could be done, and what could not be done.
Our crews were also extraordinary. The squadron was a mix of a few people from other ships with earlier battle experience and raw recruits, who fully appreciated the seriousness of their duties and who worked their heads off to follow the instructive guidance of the men who had been in battle before. The experienced petty officers on board our ships stressed that every sailor had to know his trade, his job, and his buddies’ jobs to the best of his ability. The men learned they had to be more skillful, more accurate, and faster than their competent enemies. Des- Ron 23 was good, and we knew we were, because we worked as hard as we could at being proficient under battle conditions.
The strong confidence which united DesRon 23 has probably been shared by many naval commanders over the centuries. Once in a while it has been lacking, and history has recorded the consequences. The basic uniting principle of teamwork is the same with air groups, carriers, and units of other types. It is an operating condition most difficult to achieve in peacetime, yet it is a worthwhile goal toward which to strive.
“Battle Orders”
(See J. M. Arrison, pp. 62-67, July 1984;
J. M. Saur, p. 22, September 1984 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander R. J. Norton U. S. Navy—Having just completed tour as combat systems officer on boar the USS John Hancock (DD-981), I rea Commander Saur’s reaction to Capta,n Arrison’s article with interest. The imp11 cation that battle orders stifle creativity and might lead to a decrease in cornba readiness is an erroneous one.
The John Hancock’s battle orders ar constantly changing and evolving to fleet changes in the ship’s capability and her tactical situation. This Proce , involves all personnel from the tactic action officers (TAOs) to the mag®21® captains whose duties are crucial to fig ing the ship. A highly rewarding b;^ product of this process has been a keen interest in tactics and a deeper un f standing of the ship’s war-fighting a ties on the part of the command’s Jutl officers. j.
Battle orders ensure that the eomma^ ing officer’s requirements for opem ^ his ship in wartime are understood by levels of the command. This re. nSi communication errors between stati^j
clarifies casualty control procedwes^^
defines a minimum posture for
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carriers can operate effectively m Mediterranean because of support t land-based air power. I submit that Aleutians offer to our naval battle grf
an even firmer base of land-based air port for the simple reason that the A tians are part of the United States, thermore, the sea space available large-scale naval operations of all t)J^
in the North Pacific is vast comp;
the
province are the Komandorski Kamchatka, and Chishima (ci*,“'T3Ssic “Kurils” by the Soviets)—all naval targets, all lacking an indu*>$$ agricultural base, and all totally ent upon air and naval communi ^ Given the enormous potentia $i> tage of the Aleutians, it appears pin8 to eight U. S. carrier battle groll^nj th£ the surface action groups built art’ f3nC£ U. S. battleships and the prepo*1 of the Marine Corps with supr amphibious shipping, would P°se. 0ft0 tal threat to all Soviet garrisons
its Pacific maritime province, p
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conditions of readiness. Rather than restricting the TAO, battle orders—when combined with aggressive training— facilitate the flow of information and allow the tactical action officer to move rapidly and exercise the flexibility, creativity, and decision-making that he must have if the ship is to fight and win in combat.
“Willing, Able, and Ready (WAR)”
(.See R. L. Lawson, H. W. Seng, pp. 74-87, October 1984 Proceedings)
Editor’s Note: The color plates for pages 81 and 83 and the photos on 87 are transposed.
“Escalation and Naval Strategy”
(See L. F. Brooks, pp 33-37, August 1984;
P. S. Schratz, pp. 25-29; October 1984 Proceedings)
William V. Kennedy—There are implied assumptions in Captain Brooks’s analysis that need to be addressed. Most important is the assumption that any war involving the United States and the Soviet Union will be a NATO war. This is not the viewpoint of the vast majority of Europeans. As expressed through their elected representatives, our European NATO partners do not intend to participate in any war, with the Soviet Union or anyone else, that does not directly threaten an attack on their homelands. A direct attack by the Soviet Union on the United States outside of Europe could trigger the NATO defense obligations, but it does not ensure that the Europeans will support some U. S. military involvement thousands of miles away.
There are at least two major areas in which war could occur between the United States and the Soviet Union in circumstances that would not touch upon the North Atlantic Treaty. The Persian Gulf is one; the Sino-Soviet frontier is the other. In both places, unopposed Soviet advances conceivably could change the world balance of power so drastically in favor of the Soviet Union that the United States would be reduced to second-class status.
The Europeans have no intention of becoming involved in a war in the Persian Gulf, no matter what the indirect consequences to them in reduction of oil supplies. The same, of course, is true of Japan. Yet it is also apparent that the United States cannot effectively oppose Soviet power in the Persian Gulf region through any aggregation of conventional forces. If we attempt to oppose the Soviets by naval theater nuclear operations, the effect on our forward-deployed carrier battle groups is almost certain to be. as Captain Brooks suggests, pretty gr'm' To suppose that the Europeans would assist China against massive Soviet aggression would be an even wilder fantasy. Yet, if the Soviets were to ga*n control of Sinkiang and Manchuria, °bj jectives well within the grasp of force8 they now have deployed, Japan would be virtually indefensible, and all the rest 0 Asia would be forced to come to term8 with Moscow, a situation plainly intoler able to the United States.
Yet, because he applies the assump tions and presumptions of a NATO * worldwide. Captain Brooks seems t(j have ruled out the principal element U. S. power by which we might constra* or halt such Soviet aggression short o nuclear holocaust.
Although he mentions the North » cific, Captain Brooks implies that ^ prospects for our carriers there are brighter than in the Norwegian Sea- * ^ paradoxically, he seems sure that
from the •oups sup- the Mediterranean. Most important, North Pacific provides the only & j approach to Soviet vital interests, sh° threatening strategic nuclear w^a!jnjon In short, the status of the Soviet ^ as a world power depends on the se ^ of Soviet garrisons in its Pacific mar^vj. province. Defeated in that area, thc^fla ets could not oppose a developing ^ s anywhere east of the Ural Moun ^ Therefore, not even the Soviet *°r^u[llfe East Germany are so "vital” to the of the Soviet Union as the f°rce^ce. risoning its Pacific maritime Pr°v 1 -^e The outguards of its Pacific m ^jj,
till!
t*r
opening the way for an attack by
Army forces aimed at the destruction of Soviet Siberian garrisons.
Because of his excessive reliance on the NATO scenarios and their underlying assumptions, Captain Brooks has missed the fact that development of our strategic potential in the North Pacific would turn the nuclear situation against the Soviets.
Because the Soviets have, or seem to have, a preponderance of conventional power in Europe and the Persian Gulf, it is the United States that must threaten nuclear war from the outset of any major emergency in those regions. Because we have the potential to assemble overwhelming naval, amphibious, and land- based air power in the North Pacific, it is the Soviets who would be forced to consider first use of nuclear weapons. Yet what would they gain from such escalation? If they use only theater weapons, the Soviets would be exposing their thin crust of coastal cities and their scattered interior settlements to devastation, creating a vacuum that China would occupy sooner or later. Do the Soviets then risk their Russian homeland to save their Siberian wilderness?
The Soviets have not shown themselves to be a collection of ayotollahs bent on self-immolation. If they knew the sequence of events described to be the certain outcome of a Soviet move to the Persian Gulf, against China, or against NATO Europe, there is every reason to believe that they would not take such an action.
“Flags of Inconvenience”
(See R. E. KaJIman and E. D. Wheeler, pp. 134136 August 1984 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Timothy C. Healy, U. S. Coast Guard— Captain Kallman and Lieutenant Wheeler have certainly perpetuated the stereotyped image of flags-of-convenience vessels as aging, uncared-for rustbuckets awaiting an accident. Tankers, in particular, are presented in this light.
This is less true today than it was only a few years ago, at least for those foreign-flag tankers calling on U. S. ports- If you ask an experienced mariner where to find the oldest vessels or the ships m the worst condition, he or she may name some of the countries listed in the article- but that mariner would also mention some of the more traditional maritime nations, including the United States- Then ask that “old salt” where the bes ships are registered—you’ll get the same listing of flags!
The issue of ship safety and fitness stan^ dards is not a one-sided argument. ItlSI’ just the country of registry; it is also t owner, the operator, the charterer, classification society, the master, and t
Crew who all share this responsibility for safety and environmental protection.
, further, the authors failed to mention ..^International Maritime Organization 30), the maritime arm of the United Ji°ns headquartered in London. The MO has produced, and enforces through s member countries, significant intema- lQnal standards. Among these are the .ntemational Convention for the Safety of 'e at Sea (SOLAS 74/78, as amended) nt> the International Convention for the Rendon of Pollution by Ships (MAR. *- ^3/78, as amended). The IMO’s In- **ional Conference on Tanker Safety re Pollution Prevention, 1978, and its ^suiting standards are virtually parallel °ur domestic law passed about the time (i.e., The Port and Tanker 3' Act, P.L. 95-474). tio Internat'onaI Maritime Organiza- arn standards are in effect worldwide, used extensively, and do provide for the enforcement of meaningful safety standards. The wide-spread use of unilateral action, as suggested by the authors, would be detrimental to this effort.
The authors describe the Coast Guard’s Foreign Tanker Boarding Program as “raising the overall safety level in tankers ... .” While there is some truth in this, it is, quite simply, overstated. Yes, some tankers that had early exposure to this program were scrapped. However, I am not aware of any that were scrapped solely because of Coast Guard boardings and inspections. But oil imports and the number of tankers calling on our ports also declined after this program started. The tanker market worldwide declined sharply as well. This allowed only the better vessels with the chance to continue to operate as they could do so without lengthy delays because of breakdowns or port state enforcement actions.
It is correctly stated that the Coast
Guard’s Foreign Tanker Boarding Program was and is effective for U. S. ports as a preventative measure against repeats of the tragic winter of 1977-78. The program continues to serve both as an example for other countries to follow and improve upon, and as a motivating force for owners to keep their vessels well cared for if they intend to trade in the United States. It was not single-handedly responsible for the clean-up of the international tanker fleet, but certainly it has been a highly influential factor.
“Tomorrow’s Fleet”
(See J. D. Alden, pp. 113-123, February 1984; S. L. Morison, p. 33, April 1984 Proceedings)
Norman Polmar—Mr. Morison criticizes Commander Alden for the way in which he lists the Navy’s ships in his description of current shipbuilding programs. Mr.
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serves, we count what are fleet
but
Planning, in one of the few pu-- breakdowns of the planned 600' fleet, has listed a goal of 20 Trident ^
“The American Submarine 1984-2014”
(See N. Polmar, pp. 194-211, May l984 Proceedings)
Robert E. Smith—The photograph ^ submarine on page 197 cannot
*«•" r,..i../crxrc-1i TF° hull 1 ^
USS Flasher (SSN-613). The
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Morison then uses a number of official documents to derive his own listing of the Navy’s active ships. However, he misses some key points: (1) Commander Alden’s counting method is that used by the Comptroller of the Navy’s staff in a document that is widely used by Congress, which is responsible for the composition of the fleet, and (2) Alden’s listing is similar to the method of counting ships used by the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations.
Mr. Morison’s method differs in several significant ways from these official ship counts. For example, the Comptroller, Secretary of the Navy, and Chief of Naval Operations list the strategic submarine support ships under strategic forces; Mr. Morison lists them under battle forces. The other sources separate the civilian-manned mobile logistic ships from those manned by active Navy; Mr. Morison does not.
Also, even though he criticized Commander Alden for some of the ship designations used in those official sources (DDR), Mr. Morison uses unofficial designations in his supposedly official list, such as AS(FBM) for strategic missile submarine tenders.
The business of counting ships is neither uniform nor exact, is subject to interpretation, and changes periodically. F°r example, the 600-plus ships proposed by Secretary of the Navy John Lehman in" elude some civilian-manned ships as wel as some ships of the Naval Reserve Force that were not previously counted. AC' cording to Secretary Lehman in testimony before the subcommittee on partment of Defense, Committee o" Appropriations, House, hearings, pad - pp. 623-624;
“There is a basic traditional method of ship counting that has general) been used as the measure of activl- forces. This has had two recef changes. One, in 1979 the [Carter^ Administration added to that con9 reserves and fleet auxiliaries. Thf8 had not been counted before. ' added about 75 ships to the tota. When the Reagan Administrate1, came in, we went back to the tf* tional way [of counting ships]- take account of the fact that we ^, now putting new ships, like the Fr frigates and [FF] 1052s into the ployers that are in the reserves ships like FRAM-2 destroyers that ^ not deployers and will not deploy part of the battle force we do count.”
The 600-plus ships do not include ^ strategic forces. Vice Admiral Carl A-
Trost, the Director of Navy Pr0fLj
ubltsh^
;Ub'
marines, six strategic support ships- ^ 606 general-purpose ships—a tot 632. These do not include the mar'ver- prepositioning ships, the SL-7 c°?jps. sions, hospital ships, aviation base s ^ or research ships, which would bn number of total active—Navy and ^ ian—fleet ships up to almost 700 Commander Alden’s errors are ^ his ship counts are as exact as ° expect in this inexact area. x
oit
■ heft-hd on the port side of submarines 01 iP
indicates that the vessel posse5^)/
BQQ-5 towed-array sonar. The ^ ^
at present does not have the BQV
pletely installed and operationa • *
(Continued on Pa^
__________________________ ; lmpor-
■ted t° Unclerstand that your boss has lim- *me, energy, and influence. Every
fitted,
‘ten
Pleted ’ every Piece of staff work com
‘‘I
®arn to Say ‘No’ to the Mmiral”
(See 0 r rv
hocegj.' °yer- PP- 12-20, September 1984
tj Ut^nant Commander John W. Ferrill, ^ Nary (Retired)—Much of Vice app..lra* Dyer’s classic article is not only Jlso?able t0 l^e military staff officer but va,_ 0 corporate staff officer in pri- I lndustry.
stafc a^'ii°n to the five “musts” for i lj °[ficers, I add the following: tant t^ 1 Wa*te time on trivia. It’s ir
Ini J
,l made of him, every problem pre-
Tv'JfUses some of these resources ble0re> try to be as selective as possi •tts-■ not waste his time on trivial mat jT 11 |s not a good economy of time the s PPily, my boss has come to extent ame consideration to me.
place as described. That is just the point. There was no reason to exclude the press. The result was not a more efficient operation; the result was that totally unnecessary questions have been raised, and totally unnecessary suspicions have been aroused.
Also, the “need for secrecy” argument does not stand up. There is plenty of precedent for including the press in secret operations. For example, no major operation took place in World War II without at least one accredited (perhaps pool) reporter present.
Not everything that appears in the press is the last word in truth, but the press is by far the best and most responsible source of information we have. What alternative does Commander Schady offer? (His implication that the U. S. press is unpatriotic does not deserve a reply.) It is more difficult to mount a military operation in a democratic society.
But since when has our military shied away from a project just because it was difficult?
“No Bastions for the Bear”
(See D. B. Rivkin, pp. 36-43, April 1984; F. J. Glaeser, p. 14, June 1984; W. J. Ruhe, pp. 1415; June 1984; R. H. Smith, pp. 14-20, July 1984; L. E. Lacouture, p. 101, August 1984;
R. O. Welander, J. D. Williams, p. 164, September 1984; J. A. Marcely, pp. 172-178, October 1984 Proceedings)
Captain Linton F. Brooks, U. S. Navy___
rJ*T from the Sea: Marines in ^re«iada”
fee M r „
Schad Byron, pp. 118-131, May 1984; S.
, ’• P- 30, August 1984 Proceedings)
■ hr
does ^lchael Bernkopf Ph.D.—How Job 'he troops were free “to do their
P 1 LJ%~' nrhvyj, i n.LS.--------------------------- i 1UW
Grepj ,0mmander Schady know that in Job pra 'he troops were free “to do their terfere°Perly without worrying about in- henCe *rom news commentators”?
Iq^now 'hat the first questions
Nd
^sk mai me ursi questions
st^bout any report are: “Who has a kp0rt 'merest? Who stands to gain if this
Ve
liieJ ls slanted in a certain direction?’
l "'as no one on Grenada in those y hou
*Ctest °Urs who did not have a vested in Mete ln reP°rting the operation a com ^access.
\1(j Presence of press representatives have provided the independent ^ds v tJlat every government activity
eeds iff " is
6tpii^' 1[ is _
^'lilarv k3rt Constitution that the
«y. v. °e subordinate to civilian author- Slian,s necessitates that an informed Sta Population must depend upon jtlon sources it considers reliable Impendent.
Militjj.n0t mean t0 imply by this that the V|ia{,news sources on Grenada were e- I’m sure that events did take
is to function properly in a free
not only axiomatic, it is an
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There’s good news and there’s bad news in David Rivkin’s essay. The good news is that he has chosen an important subject with major implications for the United States and for naval strategy. The better news is that he recognizes that the object of our strategy must be to defeat Soviet strategy. The best news of all is that he seeks to examine the subject as the Sovi-
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gets.” (Then why was the development halted?) He also says ^ the Los Angeles-class nuclear-povV attack submarines (SSNs) may he ^ dered impotent since “significant breakthroughs in ASW could be rna ^ any time.” (Of course they could be.^ what is the realistic probability they be?) Of greater concern, however, a*
si°n
inai)
change” has been recognized by a,naGn for some time as the Soviet Navy s
((
r s ov'et
Debate over the implications 0 ^ s((ii- doctrine is vital to improving D- Jtoh>s tegic thought. An analyst is ent'tV'|jg3ti°(1 own interpretation and has no o ^0 to be consistent with past conv® & wisdom. He does have an obligatl°as internally consistent. Rivkin ,s these examples show: . jg i®‘
► If the shift in Soviet strategy 1 ;7atio(l
0
th®
sponse to U. S. strategic
why
\
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• 'f if
ets see it, not as we would view n 1 lived in Moscow. ue
Unfortunately, there is consider ^ bad news to go with the good. the bad news comes in the form ot ® ous, unsubstantiated asides. Rivkin
“Yankee”-class nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) intended “primarily to attack naV/L|3
SS-N , 0 9
serious internal flaws in Rivkin s and his failure to realize that the mi • he describes as “emerging, revoluh
Rivkin argues that the Soviets ar ^ panding their SSBNs’ role and P alter their operations to protect ^ SSBNs from attack. This ‘' *jnPey S. shift” results from the “budding determination to restore its strength.” The formation of sU?!gtates sanctuaries requires that the Unit®1 ^ be capable of attacking the SSBNs selves in general war and their pr° as- forces in a regional crisis. Rj'J jl- sumes that this need is self-evide ^^ted- though both assertions can be de Such a strategy demands mor® battle groups; successful antisu -g(l warfare (ASW) requires the dest ^jjjle of protecting Soviet surface forces - ^ ^ neatly stated, this line of argum® some serious flaws.
oderniza
(announced in October 1981)- ^
there such a buildup of SSBNs 1970s? Ships take a long time to f()|e ► If SSBNs were assigned a res® sll't in 1973, as Rivkin states, why * important to protect them then ■ th® appears to be mirror imaging* e$ 3s United States treats nuclear res . job5 forces left over after the imp0 ^0 are completed, the Soviets do n° su° seems no logical reason why 1 ..yffe1’ denly more important to protec sive” forces than to protect res®
Prot ^ov'et belief that the war will be reseraeted is new, why does that make reS(;rve's less important? Logic suggests ]0rves become more important the \ If r t^le war is expected to last.
°f • . 0v'et sea-based forces are now part t0 aitlai strikes, why is it “imperative” afterack SSBNs in a general war (i.e., cCpt an intercontinental exchange). Ex- Ss£jJor their reload potential, empty in„, s don’t make particularly interest- ► ptargets.
tnally, jf there is a new shift to sea-
the j. *orccs, why has the press reported Posal°VletS as rejecting arms control pro- shlf(,st designed to encourage such a renta' n *act’ Strategic Rocket Forces c'n,‘he centerpiece of Soviet strategic Hatj 1 dy» as might be expected from a gvn °i artillerymen.
in ft e?.'f one discounts the logical flaws ford in’S assessment, his prescription Tlierea^n8 with it is open to challenge. l5.ce IS a Powerful case to be made for a War ||'ler battle group Navy; in a general eMu ae strike power of the carrier will Ho/6 *ar longer than land-based assets. str0ve!ei\ serving as a strike fleet to de- "ttcle °V*et surface ships so that U. S. c„ ‘^'Powered attack submarines can nCatioct ASW lacks credibility as a justi- fti ,n.ior battle group procurement, “kin’i
*hoi
lu8hts
essay has some sound
s°und K and some new Noughts. The has a td°ughts are that the Soviet Navy tOfj Pr°-SSBN mission which it will standi *roni bastions and that an under- Onited | ^oviet strategy is vital to the
this st ^tates- The new thoughts are that toUntrategy is just emerging and must be hi. 5 red by a heavy investment in a tounri .^trike fleet. Unfortunately, the are not new, and the new
C ideas
\
are not sound, apparent Soviet strategy of pro-
“Western European and NATO
Navies”
(See N. Friedman, pp. 35-43, March 1984;
G. G. Armstrong, p. 28, June 1984
Proceedings)
Captain Elton E. Hankins, U. S. Navy (Retired)—I was dismayed by the omission of the Turkish Navy from the country-by-country analysis of Western European and NATO navies.
I trust that this omission was unintentional. The fact that Dr. Friedman had earlier referred to the growing pressure for NATO to strengthen its conventional naval force, the major concern over Soviet amphibious warfare employed on the flanks of NATO armies in such areas as the exit from the Black Sea, and the recent difficulties being experienced by the shipbuilding industries of the Western world certainly argues for a close look at the Turkish Navy, because it is doing something positive in each of these areas.
The Turkish Navy is aware of the need to strengthen its conventional capability and has embarked on a difficult and costly improvement process. Harpoon- equipped fast patrol boats and “Type- 209” submarines are being built in Turkish Navy shipyards as fast as funds can be allocated. In addition, the Turkish Navy last year committed itself to a new construction project designed to add four frigates to its fleet. These improvements will not only help resolve the Turkish Navy’s long-standing problem of an aging destroyer fleet and assist it in fully modernizing its shipyard capability, but the program will be of economic benefit to the Federal Republic of Germany because of a contract with the West Germany firm Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft to build the first ship at the Hamburg yard of Blohm and Voss and the second ship at Kiel.
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tiQn i® SSBNs is an important considera- Sitt j( forming U. S. maritime strategy. tead • IS disconcerting .to see a widely °niy a/1'cfe imply that that strategy is M)en ^Smning to emerge, especially sUbma ■ reherences to combat stability of lhan . lnes that Rivkin cites are more
Ana]" years old-
Provjd ^Sls °f Soviet open literature can tiiljta6 'mP°rtant insights into Soviet thought. The debate between v’hiCf1 I’ fh. Stalbo and V. N. Chemavin Si|jtl ^'v*c'n draws on so heavily is important. But whatever the %i’t °-v Sbornik articles imply, they tcct (ff.'dPly a debate on whether to pro- j%ce ,^s- That debate—if it ever took
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“Understanding the Soviet Union”
(See B. D. Bruins, pp. 66-71, September 1984 Proceedings)
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The sequel could recall events covered on American radio around 1936. Events such as the Soviet Union’s unprovoked assault with her Nazi ally (17 September 1939) to divide Poland, thus, some felt, sharing blame for starting World War II and the Soviet Union’s unprovoked invasion of Finland (30 November 1939) are two examples of incidents receiving wide
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driven and open-sighted 40-mm- could never have been used success
gun
fuiiy
firing
manding officer, Lieutenant Comma' Gomez Roca, ordered the entire CI except for the bridge watch team, to , cover below the main deck. This red casualties because a second missile a demolished the bridge killing the c , manding officer, officer of the deck.
coverage. Remember the photos in Life of Finnish ski soldiers bravely standing up to the invading Soviet hordes?
Twenty-one months after their joint attack and occupation of Poland, when the Nazis turned on their Soviet ally, the Soviet Union was no poor innocent. In fact, the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union occurred on Polish territory the two had split.
So widely deplored was the Soviet Union’s unrelenting pattern of aggression that the League of Nations expelled it on 14 December 1934. Would Estonians of 1940, Hungarians of 1956, or Afghans today say the Soviet Union has changed? Dr. Bruins’s thesis is useful, that some Soviets have been led to perceive themselves as saviors, defenders, and innocent victims of invasion. Perhaps it is also useful to recall why 50 years of history leads many, including Finnish and Polish survivors, to a different perception of the Soviet Union.
“The Helo: Potential Ship Killer?”
{See J. F. McGowan, p. 138, September 1984 Proceedings)
“The Loss of HMS Coventry”
{See B. R. Lewis, pp. 141-143, September
1984 Proceedings)
Captain Carlos Enrique Zartmann, Argentine Navy (Retired)—Evidently, good stories are hard to kill, even if they are untrue. In the September issue the same story appears twice: Argentine patrol boats were sunk and destroyed by British helicopters. This is not true. This tale is spread by the hard salesmanship of British aerospace firms which think that they have an unbeatable selling argument for their helicopters and missiles. The true story should be recorded.
On 1 May 1982, the Argentine rescue tug A-9 Alferez Sobral (formerly the USS
Catawba [ATA-210]), which _w°uJrf never qualify for the denomination ^ “patrol boat,” was ordered to sear north of the Malvinas for the crew 0 downed Argentine Air Force Canbe bomber. The 40-year-old, almost wot out ship of about 700 tons displacenie^ had a top speed in her youth of not m than 12 knots. Her vintage single han
against aircraft with its gunner - ,
from a rolling and pitching deck.
May, the Alferez Sobral was spotte ^ British helicopters in foggy weather was fired upon once with a missile w
hit her funnel. Consequently, her c°
- iandel
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Six n •
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surv'6 Woundcid executive officer and the h>-rs °f the 40-odd member crew
later ' S^‘P Back t0 Port two days jar a^ter performing a small miracle of ^-control. They steered the Alferez i„a ‘ra with a jury-rigged rudder and nav- with only a boat compass, fifj. P°ssible explanation for the steadfast ^lsn belief to have “sunk one patrol rea[| and damaged another” is that they ftat twice attack the same ship and radar ^ secor|d attack the tiny ship’s raclarCcb° disappeared from Royal Navy \u(Screens. This may be because the face^ ^°^ra^s greatest reflecting sur- (,,0w"funnel and bridge—had been lead’ 3Way and the seas were choppy, hartln" British airmen to believe she
ad sunk
Of
On , e°urse, there is a great reluctance n,aybe British side to admit the facts, e because it is far more glamorous
to have “sunk one patrol boat and damaged another” with two missiles than having courageously attacked a defenseless old tug with two missiles and only disabling her. Knowing this, the “combat-proven efficiency of the Sea Skua missile” becomes somewhat tarnished, causing prospective customers to start questioning the wisdom of their purchase! On the contrary, the U. S. builder of Alferez Sobral could use the extraordinary resistance of this ship to advertise the quality of its products.
The British have even given the name of the allegedly “sunken patrol boat” as the Comodoro Somellera, a sister ship of Alferez Sobral. This is complete nonsense. and, as we say in Spanish, "Los muertos que vos matais. gozan de buena salud." (The dead which you killed are enjoying good health.) The Comodoro Somellera was never in the combat area, and she and the now repaired Alferez Sobral are back busily performing those duties in the Argentine Navy they performed before the Malvinas Crisis. The only “damage” suffered by the Comodoro Somellera is that she had been dropped from some leading naval almanacs and, is, therefore, a “ghost ship” for everybody except Argentines until this mistake is corrected. (This error— not made in Combat Fleets—has been corrected in the latest edition of Jane’s Fighting Ships.) Sad to say, the ditched pilots died because the Alferez Sobral could not carry out her mercy mission.
To set the record straight, I may also tell Lieutenant McGowan that according to the authoritative British book Air War South Atlantic by Jeffry Ethell and Alfred Price (page 40), the Argentine submarine Santa Fe was not hit by a Lynx helicopter with Sea Skua missiles but by a Wasp helicopter armed with a French AS-12 wire-guided missile. This, however, does not invalidate his point that armed helicopters can do a good job.
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quantity of small arms training 10 Navy can’t be disputed, the so1 ^ Commander Darling presents can questioned. if.
Looking at the list of personnel r 4 - t the cu'
struction battalions will ever have to a weapon at 600 or even 300 yards realistic, shipboard security forces
fobe will be
eyes'
accurately at people—not bull’s
Navy is a real problem. With the j in the use of terrorism by radica ^ and governments, the need forsa 6 be better trained in the combat ^e. small arms also increases. Thc^ ^ man-hours, and money that W ^jii' wasted in establishing another
“Leyte Gulf Remembered”
(See J. D. Ahlstrom, pp. 45-53, August 1984;
F. J. Frank, p. 25, October 1984 Proceedings)
Henry A. Pyzdrowski, Executive Director, Heritage Foundation of the USS Gambier Bay (CVE-73) and VC-10 Inc. — Thank you for the timely article by Captain Ahlstrom of Taffy One.
In the battle off Samar on 25 October 1944 in the struggle for Leyte Gulf, I was the pilot of the TBM Avenger on the catapult of the sinking escort carrier USS Gambier Bay (Taffy Three) when Captain W. V. R. Viewig was forced to make the decision to abort the launch of my readied aircraft.
On page 50 of the August 1984 issue there appears an escort carrier making smoke and a TBM on the catapult with its propellor stilled; I was in that plane. Incorrectly, the photo caption refers to the USS St. Lo (CVE-63).
Nearly eight years earlier, the same photo appeared in another article on escort carriers entitled “Cinderella Carriers” (August 1976 Proceedings). At that time I reported the miscue to a member of the Proceedings editorial staff. On his suggestion, I met with officials of the National Archives and the photo section at the Washington Navy Yard. I carried
with me photos illustrating camouflag of the Gambier Bay and satisfied ^ agencies that the photo was not of the ^ Lo. I witnessed the corrections ma e their records. I hope the U. S. Nava stitute will also record the correction-
•
6‘Not Ready on the Firing Fine
(See R. E. Darling, pp. 142-143, July J. E. Sheets, p. 160, September 1984; P- ' ^ Hanninen, W. C. Weikel, p. 172, October Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander WilHam Sweet, U. S. Navy—While the exists 4 of the problem of the poor quality ^
,luti011
ing small arms training, none but - ^ ^
i
required to be able to fire quickly
UVVU1UIV1J Ul pwpiv . 0
from 25 yards or less. The condemn1 ^£ty the long-range facilities by new s ^ standards is not a hindrance but is ® in getting the new ranges and iaC ^s- needed to meet today’s training n ^ Let’s have a program designed t0 j0n sailors for accomplishing the m jf they will be assigned: To defen f. ship in close quarters against a mined enemy. Q0fli-
The “pool of experts” that ^ mander Darling says is missing- in is available in the Marine Corps- ^ Marines’ qualification and capabt i ^ the use of small arms cannot be “lSPjaVy. and they are already a part of the (j,e There is certainly no need to rein'*' wheel to accomplish this part of me all solution. , api'
The most disheartening part of t s0|y cle is the bureaucratic approach t0 tjofl ing a fairly simple problem. The c ^ of another central office comp'et _s acronym and inspection authority j,s last thing the Navy needs to *rn^rcan ^ efficiency. The directives needed ^y issued by the type commanders ^jps-
see fit to provide security for then 0f Inspections, if necessary, can be a P^jCti the command inspection program is already in effect. . j„ the
The lack of small arms training ,se
;inV
10
if
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a ne* 50,000 that
is a
credit to her men, as it is to all otherse
Commander Fraser has mentione Coast Guard’s primary duties, bu Coast Guard has only one primary j by statute: The preservation of hie property from the ravages of the ^
se3'
- - unleSthef'
go to war, or the President directs 0 wise. Other activities come on a no interfere basis.
1V
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cracy could probably solve the problem.
Let’s put our money into weapons, ammunition, the improvement of range facilities, and temporary duty orders for Marines to do the training. Let’s get on with solving the problem, not creating new obstacles to the solution.
“The Coast Guard: Quo Vadis?”
(See R. Fraser, pp. 40-45, February 1984;
G. D. Bond, B. P. Clarke, A. Iglesias, pp. lb- 21, April 1984; T. A. Nies, O. W. Siler, pp. 24-30, May 1984; M. Adams, pp. 17-20, June 1984; R. Schweighardt, C. H. Hill, pp. 101—
104, August 1984; M. Hill, pp. 105-107, September 1984 Proceedings)
Commissioned Warrant Officer Julian Hatch, U. S. Coast Guard (Retired)— The extent of the Navy’s interest in the Coast Guard can be evaluated by taking a good look at Commander Fraser’s table, “Coast Guard Wartime Mission Assignment Summary” on page 45 of his article. The only new activities not handled by the Coast Guard during World War II are shipping control, harbor defense, and mine countermeasures. These duties are all rather static activities the Navy is probably glad to dump. (Harbor defense used to be within the jurisdiction of the Army, anyway.)
What is significant is that there are many roles the Coast Guard filled in World War II that are conspicuous because of their absence from the table. What I read in that table are greatly diminished naval expectations of the Coast Guard, a movement toward restricting the size of the Coast Guard, and the encouragement of greater self-reliance and dependence on its own resources.
No statutory requirement exists requiring the Coast Guard to constantly and unilaterally prepare for war. The Coast Guard must only maintain a readiness to transfer operational jurisdiction to the Navy in time of war. Keeping up on the
necessary paperwork, opening checking account, and stocking gallons of grey paint should meet requirement nicely. r.
The evidence that the service has p formed heroically during wartime vices when called to the defense o country. It is only natural that we everything” and address a common P ^ pose when the defense of our country stake. But the peacetime function o Coast Guard is overwhelmingly hurna tarian by statute.
the
Everything else is secondary-
I can remember some of the old ^ Guard captains at the end of Won II, when I was just a “boot,” reJ° jo(. that the war was over and looking ^ ward to getting back to their reg^ duties. They were glad to be “out ,Jf Navy.” It appears from Comrn Fraser’s article that he wants “back ^ |S Well, commander, Navy Recruit111 just down the hall. ^
To be a professional Coast Guard* ^ either officer or enlisted person, teJ part of a very noble profession, de<J to a life of high ideals. And alt ^|y those on active duty would Pr° f0r blush at the description, their l°vjje|s. their special outfit knows no P®ra j j Commander Fraser’s article inC photo of the USCGC Tamaroa (w,1’ blit 166) to illustrate a point of despa^' ^ that vessel, in fact, personif)e!’ to Guard’s dedication as well as any V could. afoH
Back in the early 1960s, the To' y0fk rolled over in dry dock in
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(Continued on page 174)
f]0od ,t'lat floating facility partially the u happened around 0200, and n,eSU seiluent flooding really made a sads: daylight, the Tamaroa was a
comr!8 t'~°Ver on ber sicle w''h ad main right rirtniCmS fl°°ded. Eventually Staten r pumPed out, and towed back to her s*and, New York, she waited in tyash°me Port, while headquarters in she Jngton deliberated her fate; after all tug ,dS Just an old World War II Navy thedart?,y Worth the repair cost. With Corr|CClS'0n t0 scraP her just about made, Henaia.n<^cr Campbell, now Captain (^tir CamPbell> U. S. Coast Guard and his crew, restored the
hour^r°a to act've duty. They worked 24 j s a day.
Fjr . l as executive officer on the USCGC •ied ^ .(^LB-393) at the time, and we
^arfiar> ''U?t across 'he P'er from the since °\t 1 ve never seen anything like it about t °ne 'be Tamarou crew was then, u Se" tbe'r sh>P out from under and Wh a'n enS'nc parts, generator parts, down ^ave you’ were carried up and 'r°ned t ,C f>'er- The yeomen literally quarte °Ut t*le service records, and the Ther^asters washed flags, and so on. her Cr amaroa lives today because of GnardCW and tbe sP*r*' °f those Coast them SlTfn- They’ll do anything asked of chgjjJj whether it be hauling garbage or capab]g srnu8glers. They’re versatile, S th 6’ and probably a little irreverent, they are not Navy—and I don’t think pjnnt to be, either.
Page ^ Commander Fraser’s graph on t(ine. ,,’ '' appears that “military prepar- Or cost the Coast Guard about $60 that m'lhon dollars a year. I believe Wou,dnaarly every Coast Guardsmen "'as ;ureathe a lot easier if this money hepartS Greedy transferred to the Navy pitard jtlen.t’ thereby allowing the Coast ^ant a ° C*'rect its attentions to the signif- It lsSPects of its reason for being. atiyone °eyond my understanding that "ted tbgCou^ believe that Congress cre- V 6 Coast Guard as an organization being rpr’ncipal concern was strictly "'aitin eady t0 g0 t0 war> and 'hat while °dd,baii •t*ley would be tossed a bag of 'he Vjg Jobs to keep them busy. If this is Stain W °f 'he military readiness pro- S’t n ^°as' Guard Headquarters, they *he m0oec*tWo stars, they need a trip to
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Professional Notes
AV-8B/LAMPS Mk-III LHD-Class Ships
By Commander G. Pat Tierney, U. S. Navy, and Colonel Myrl W. Allinder, Jr., U. S. Marine Corps
les-
The USS Wasp (LHD-1), the first of a new class of amphibious assault ships, has been fully funded in the fiscal year 1984 budget, and three more are planned for the next five years. Modeled after the Tarawa (LHA-l)-class amphibious assault ship, the LHD class has a separate, secondary mission—sea control.
The sea control mission originated in the early 1970s when then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo Zumwalt advocated the high-low mix, which included a “distributed force” of small sea control ships (SCSs). The USS Guam (LPH-9) conducted sea trials with AV-8A Sea Harriers and SH-3D Sea Kings in 1973 as an interim SCS, but little progress was made for the next eight years.
Coupled with the small carrier concept, the dream to build an all vertical short takeoff and landing aircraft (V/STOL) composite squadron grew over a decade. The commissioning of the Kiev in 1975 and the launching of HMS Invincible in 1977 fueled the concept during the times of post-Vietnam austerity. The small carrier could not—and still cannot— demonstrate a tactical superiority over the big carrier. The V/STOL carrier was looked upon as an excellent augmentation to the aircraft carrier force, but not as a replacement.
By the time the USS Nassau (LHA-4) and her 20 AV-8As returned from her first fixed-wing V/STOL test deployment in 1981, the V/STOL sea control mission had already made the conceptual jump to the Marine amphibious support ship. The relatively recent Department of Defense (DoD) acknowledgement of the need for military force mobility generated the LHX project, which later became the LHD-l-class program. Shortly thereafter, with the solidification of the 15-carrier battle group (CVBG) program, the Navy proposed to Congress a “dual path” plan for naval aviation, augmenting the CVBG with LHD-class ships in the convertible sea control mode. With t ^ sons learned from the LHD-V ^ aS. operations, the Navy could make ^ sessment of the best course for c aviation after the turn of the ceI! ^ con- The composite squadron of ma j0l| vertible mission mode was a comb1 e of AV-8B and SH-60B light multipurpose system (LAMPS) ^ helicopters. In later studies, severa^ ^ posite squadron modifications we Lj.
posed to meet scenario-dependen ^
sions, with 20 Harriers and four (jC Mk-IIIs appearing to be the most re complement. (See Figure 1) u)ti-
The idea of mixing two differed ^ mission V/STOLs on the same sea trol ship is not without precedent- 1970s, numerous theoretical stud'es ^ posed combining a Type A, or mg ot formance V/STOL, with a TyP® gfOh low-performance (helicopter) all sea system, to optimize coverage ot control missions. The studies liste
Figure 1 LHD-1 Convertible Mission—Sea Control!Strike
Topside View
cn
Aviation Shops | 386*/ |
| |
1 | — | Hangar Deck | |
et ^
Marine
warfare (ASW); antiair war-
fare ,, ";i aiuian Wiu-
djfj 'AAW), including antiship missile (ASlru/ ^SMD); antisurface warfare Wam' ■*’ 'ncluding SCS; airborne early ($T\yiS (AEW); and strike warfare \ V/cTas some of the possible missions, •ion u ■ u ^ fighter operating in conjunc- °Ped 3n helicopter was devel- °n paper more than ten years ago. todpe SoWet Union was the first nation ship an ah'V/STOL sea control-type its gj '’• much is known tactically about ’ 00-ton Kiev-class cruiser/carrier
?rab0u
Forgers” and Ka-25 “Hormone- Groups of as many as four “Hor- obse~.^.S” (ASW version) have been
36 coor<3inated tactics with her Yak- A/fis.
"Je As _______ iib>v __
°Perat-ed conducting coordinated ASW °bSe l0ns> an(i the “Forgers” have been With th^ 0perat‘ng in the antiship mode. (0TH t “Forger,” the “Hormone-B” n't version), and the Kiev's SS-N-
12
ein
•adar
etnerge^'? m'ss‘,es’ a strong potential
“P,
°rger
for coordinated “Hormone” targeting, followed by vectored strikes or multiple SS-N-
1) i~ ' »uiKes or multiple ss-in- and ^^’hes, depending on the range
fanher British Invincible class steamed Water r lato previously uncharted tactical Wi^ h ^ developing wartime tactics craft (|Cr.^ea King and Sea Harrier air- tiall afi°g the Falklands Conflict. Ini- !”issio 6 Sea Kings were assigned ASW igOat ns’ and the Sea Harriers were des- Search 3S combat air Patrol (CAP), sea Pon tpreconnaissance, and close-air sup- <tti ^v^S) missions. However, lack of •hee . aircraft seriously handicapped )UjCKilre War effort. Two Sea Kings were fhotn^p^eipped with modified Nimrod On a .“■'dl Search water radars. Mounted insta|| °°m on one s'de of the helo, the {ach ntl0n worked well. In the future, iddiop nt'sh V/STOL carrier will carry ^a ||n°Us AEW Sea Kings. The British radar arr‘er carried the Ferranti Blue Fox caaSe a modified Lynx radar), but be- Bri,is.° sPace and dollar limitations, the Vand version of the AV-8B ^ na,ely will not carry any radar. •rQrp r'enced air observers operating f,>r ye e backseat of the Sea King have, A$\y ars> been successful at controlling •ijl to°Perations. There is ample poten- ^arch 6xPand that capability, with the 'varfar 'Vater radar and other electronic Ap\y 6 Cclu'Pment, to include controlling tr$ jn ailSsions or controlling Sea Harri- l Arn °r 'ASGW missions.
[■•IDs’ ibious warfare remains the new
far Primary mission. The ships are a He
ii °Pter flight
k*e neC!-?r *n meeting the Navy’s immedi-
b&]jr d for amnhihimiQ hpnvu lift cinH
,vu f°r amphibious heavy lift and chl)yPter flight deck space. The spe- c°nfigured well deck can house
three air-cushioned landing craft (LCACs) and has the potential to provide intermediate-level support for many more. The ship has the impressive capability of being able to support airborne and seaborne ship-to-shore movement across an estimated 70% of the world’s shorelines and to do it from beyond observation from shore. This ability has direct applications for sea control operations which may have to precede the amphibious assault mission. The definition of sea control employment for the LHD has not been defined any more specifically than “scenario dependent.”
Mission convertibility is being built into the LHD class. Fifteen to 30 days in-port time may be required for mission turnaround.
In any high- or medium-threat environment, the amphibious assault must be preceded by action to achieve local sea and air superiority, which usually implies the carrier air umbrella. An amphibious task force en route to an amphibious landing under the air umbrella may well require one or more LHD-class ships in the sea control convertible mode. The primary mission of sea control en route to the amphibious objective area (AOA) shifts toward amphibious warfare upon arrival inside the AOA, the amount of the shift depending on the severity of the threat. Cargo and troop carrying may be restricted because of the sea control requirements. However, the LHD can still use her LCACs for ship-to-shore movement, and her AV-8Bs can still provide CAS for the amphibious assault.
Because of her long-range amphibious capability, the LHD will probably be stationed in or near the sea echelon, perhaps well over the horizon. The LHD may serve another role of close protection for the sea echelon and/or may be assigned support of a subsidiary landing at another location within the AOA.
Threats in this scenario consist of: submarine-launched torpedoes or missiles; surface-launched missiles, torpedoes, naval gunfire, or even Kamikaze small surface craft in or near shore areas; aircraft-launched missiles, bombs, rockets, or strafing from high-speed fighter or attack aircraft, and Kamikaze suicide attacks from light or medium aircraft; and even tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs). The enemy use of TNWs will initiate immediate strategic reevaluation of the entire mission. However, the presence of the TNW threat may well require much greater ship separation, complicating amphibious task force defense plans and emphasizing the need for more airborne protection.
A review of the capabilities of the
AV-8B and the LAMPS Mk-III is itemized in Table I. Only systems and capabilities with potential for coordinated operations are included. The LAMPS Mk-III system consists of more than just an SH-60B aircraft; there are more than 7,000 pounds of shipboard acoustic, electronic support measures (ESM), and radar enhancement and display equipment on the other end of the data link that all belong to the Mk-III system. The Mk-III aircraft is an integrated extension of ship’s sensors and weapon systems, which is particularly useful for acoustic, ESM, and radar analysis as well as command, control, and communications (C3) flexibility. However, the Mk-III is also designed to operate independently, below the radar horizon, in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), and without data link or air controllers.
The AV-8B has no data link. In all missions, the Harrier is directed by one of the following: the supporting arms control center (SACC), the tactical air operations center (TAOC), the A AW command module of the carrier combat information center, the AAWC, the ASUWC, or the forward air control party (FACP) operating ashore. These controlling units will employ all ship and ground sensors available. If operated like other fleet air assets, the AV-8B will be assigned to subordinate ship air controllers for one- on-one control.
Controlling a coordinated Sea Harrier/ Mk-III mission from on board ship is virgin territory. Theoretically, for sea control, ASW missions will be initiated by the ASWC, ASUW missions by the ASUWC, and AAW missions by the AAWC. For STW or amphibious warfare, the SACC or TAOC performs most air direction functions. Actual air control for any of the sea control or power projection missions is usually assigned to a home ship or forward ship in the screen. The key criterion for coordinated operations is to have the same ship designated to control both aircraft.
If an Mk-III data link ship is not available, or if a high state of electro-magnetic radiation control (EmCon) is desired, Harrier control could be shifted to the Mk-III directly for any of the sea control missions. E-2 Hawkeye aircraft control is also an option, primarily for AAW support, though ASUW coordination is sometimes available, depending on the E-2’s workload.
Basic control or shifting control for the LHD composite squadron will not easily fit into the classic molds of carrier or individual LAMPS operations. More work is needed in this area. New command and control procedures will have to be
IttM,
ln8s / November 1984
Just as the Marine Corps’ missions complement the Navy’s, the capabilities of the AV-8B Sea Harriers, facing page, meld well with those of the LAMPS Mk-Ill to add a new dimension to sea control from the LHD-ls.
worked out before the LHD sea control plan is finalized.
Mission Tactics Approaching the AO A: An LHD with a Harrier/Mk-III composite squadron and some other on-board amphibious assets, moving in company with an amphibious task force, may be a good escort in open ocean. In this stage of the scenario, threats could consist of submarines, other naval combatants, or long- range Soviet naval air aircraft (“Badgers,” “Backfires,” or “Bears”). Basic ASW would be performed individually by the Mk-Ill either from on deck or on airborne alert.
A towed-array small combatant to provide an initial means of detection could act as an ASW/ASUW sensor or trigger for an Mk-III/Harrier surface subsurface surveillance coordination (SSSC) effort. Often towed array verification flights are needed to make early distinction between surface and subsurface contacts. With an Mk-III SSSC/radar/EW picket-type station 40 to 70 nautical miles ahead of the group at an optimum surface search altitude of about 3,000 to 5,000 feet, radar and ESM could be linked back to the task group and married to the acoustic picture. This could be done continuously 24 hours a day, with five to six aircraft, and for about 72 hours with four Mk-IIIs.
If the ASW threat appears light and there is not much surface traffic, or if potential datums are relatively close, the
a so"'
Mk-III can, while at altitude, 1*
obuoy pattern over a suspected da can then continue its SSSC m’ss'0^ resI ing some data and processing 1 vgj|- until there is more resolution on the by able data at datum. However, ju, uncba the threat, it might be prudent to la
Table I Capabilities of the AV-8B and the LAMPS Mk-III SH-60B
AV-8B
LAMPS Mk-III SH-60B
Speed:
Max Operational Range: Endurance:
Mission Equipment:
.91 Mach
250 nm. (700 ft. take-off run)
1 hr. low alt. SSC mission
3.5 hrs. at high alt., max. endurance
AYK-14 mission computers ASH-130 inertial navigation ALR-67 EW equipment with radar warning receiver
ALQ-164 Self-protection, jamming/deception (pod)
150 kts.
100 nm.
4.0 hrs.
APS-124 radar 160 nm., 150m" target 360° scan
APX-76A IFF interrogator ALQ-142 ESM receiver . .(ai gf
ARQ-44 Two-way undirectional, dtp ^ data link. Capable of acoustic or r and ESM data flow plus secure v° (Link is unique to Mk-III) j
AYK-14 (two) Acoustic analyzing a detection set
Weapons:
Air-to-air missiles Most types of bombs Rocket launchers
Flare chaff and sonobuoy dispensers Mk-84 30.-mm gun pods Several other types of weapons
Mk-46 Torpedoes Sonobuoys Chaff, flares
P°on
ft; abi H
iuncheH u “ 0 ” ----------
• u Harpoon from an LHD escort.
•art a ---- 1- - " turn 1*11
CaPab’| SUperior standoff surface attack Sea If'll^' ff°th the Sea Harrier and the iori?oawk can provide accurate over-the
targeting data for a surface-
la
lf i
tion !'l0ve on top of datum for localiza- t°ntinncl Prosecution. The AV-8B can ^ttroi*6 t0 conduct SSSC under ship blinpL or a second Mk-III could be
In '
^ °nly are three-way ESM fixes vect0rse’ but immediate AV-8B intercept Ip |0w t-an be determined and executed, tier r , feat environments, the Sea Har-
-um nat’ if desired, the task group can jfiipbo 'n a high state of EmCon, with no igh f3r^ radar, high frequency, or ultralint UenCy emissions- The Mk-III k is undirectional and difficult to
>ai
can W'n^ flight. The Sea Harrier descere^ch distant areas more quickly, and 6n t0 make visual identifications, n,0 ®Ven drop sonobuoys from a winging dispenser, to be monitored by
tw0 A,?ea Harrier might normally carry ceptio M'9L missiles, an ALQ 164 de- an(]. n electronic countermeasures pod ca| mW,° ^k-89 gun pods for a 125-nauti- I|] 1 e range ASUW mission. The Mk- friend S'n^ 'ts ra<far ar|d identification can v °r f°e system interrogator, °nte.ct0r fhe Sea Harrier to a target or the d lne. ol bearing. If the Harrier had iisjnata I'nk’ a shipboard air controller, Ay.Lj Mk-III radar, could vector the
live advantage of this prospec-
forCQ°0rd'nated approach would allow Verjfj nt|nuous surface surveillance, rapid “weeH^ti0n °* surface contacts, and early and c, out” °f genuine subsurface If' r'ace threats (See Figure 2).
Sea j.Surface contact proves hostile, the than ti*rr'er W'P *n a better position cans ® Mk-III to evade or attack. Be- Sea |,° (he radar link from the Mk-III, a vecior,a7'fr back-up air strike could be
j o tiv/i v-cti I y liai-
craff aUch a weapon would give this air-
b
U
X
:l
--.j/wu uuui an L,nu tbLUll.
cnust iyc threat is subsurface, the Mk-III th- -ked to assist the first or help with -entia,n Mk-III ESM picket station, po- I^ed -t lreat emitters are initially ana- the aircraft, but much more so- boar<j at®d processing takes place on Esjq shlP- Coupled with an SLC-32 'ty. i^.'talyzer, cross fixes are a probabil- borr,e 1 _ both Mk-III and Sea Harrier air-
Lept (r,. De ln the deck-launched inter- ^k-|jj fib ready five mode with the %s airborne. In high-threat environS air °ne 0r more AV-8B surface com- ‘"rb°rn(fatrol (SUCAP) may need to be
fbe k-
^"istk advantage of this type of air
detect if not directly between the ship and helo. The APS-124 radar, though primarily a surface search radar, does have some air search capability. It transmits in the X band like some air search radars but lacks the power for long-range air detection. According to some radar operators, it can pick up jet aircraft but could probably not pick up a sea-skimming missile close enough for effective detection. It has some overland resolution. More testing needs to be done, and it has been suggested by some engineers that some tuning could possibly improve its potential.
As a low-altitude ASUW/AAW trigger for the Sea Harrier, the APS-124, 360° coverage gives the task group continuous protection from all possible threat axes. Because the radar is mounted below the helo, it has limited altitude coverage. At 80 nautical miles, it could theoretically see a 30 square meter target. The Mk-III maximum altitude is about 12,000 feet.
High-altitude missiles, bombers, or fighters could only be detected by their electronic emissions, and SUCAP vectoring would have to be done after detection by other surface or air radars. Though AAW CAP or air intercept has been demonstrated as a Sea Harrier mission, operating from a DLI or in a SUCAP mode would limit its fighter intercept potential. Maintaining a CAP station as augmentation to the carrier air plan remains an option if needed, but the primary AV-8B disadvantages for air intercepts are lack of radar and the need for clear air mass and broadcast control intercept (BCI) for AIM-9L firing. High-altitude AAW will prove difficult and is a mission better left to the E-2 and F-14.
Antiship missile defense (ASMD), technically a subset of AAW, is a secondary mission of the Mk-III. The mission is reactive and requires the helo to be closer to the ship being protected and lower in altitude than for the ESM and SSSC missions. If the helo is also providing chaff protection, its picket station is within a couple of miles of the ship. The AV-8B
may also be assigned an ASMD chaff protection mission for the amphibious task force ships.
Although the ALQ-142 and associated ship support equipment provide the targeted ship warning, a better solution to the problem would be to counterattack the missile-launching platform. If the threat is an incoming surface-to-surface missile, a Sea Harrier strike should be launched or stationed along the threat axis, ready to strike the missile platform using ESM vector data from the Mk-III and/or from ALQ-142 data linked and crossfixed on a capable escort.
Exact altitudes and distance positions of the Mk-III and Sea Harrier would be a function of the launch platform (nuclear- powered attack submarine, missile, ship, or bomber), and the associated missile flight profiles. For example, the sea- skimming Exocet fired from a low-altitude aircraft would require the Sea Harriers to be relatively low (less than 1,000 feet) about 30-40 miles from the target. The Mk-III should be about 500 feet and about three miles out from the target; it should also be offset from the threat axis to pick up the terminal homer and remain outside the missile engagement zone. In the Falklands Conflict, Argentine Super Etendards came in at mast-head height and fired their Exocet missiles from 2028 miles out.
ship1
nautical miles from the controlling
AEW/ESM missions for the Mk-lH ^ mote high-altitude and long-range plCL
... . ■ . ___ Minute W1
With tight management, the Sea
Hart1'
;\vin?
sion
offi^
to meet a changing threat. The
,ld
from the target with the AV-8Bs *n
■ ')-6u1
with1
mode and, closer in, perhaps 40-60j^jp
side the AOA.
wi11 ,vi
widely, depending on distance inV°.-
The strike mission profile
Early detection, platform fixing, and counterstrike will demand absolute air and surface coordination in a span of seconds. The best solution to the missile problem is to stop the launch platform before it fires.
Mission Tactics Within the AOA: As the task force enters the AOA, the LHD’s mission in this scenario would start to evolve. Within about 600 nautical miles, an Mk-III/AV-8B 24-hour SUCAP needs to be fully established to protect against the undirectional, Kamikaze-style air attack. Within about 300 to 400 nautical miles, high-performance fighter and attack aircraft pose a potential threat, increasing the need for more AAW vigilance, even though ASW and ASUW threats may not have abated. While carrier aircraft perform the AAW mission with considerable expertise, if the enemy is capable of coming in “on the deck” en masse, plus attacking at high altitude, then the Harriers will have a contribution to make.
During visual meteorological conditions, the Sea Harrier, with its vectored thrust and tight turning radius, should be able to intercept well at low altitude where aircraft are restricted to lower maximum speeds.
It might be feasible to set up a “vertical defense in depth” defense plan where the carrier maintains a continuous outer zone high altitude CAP for AAW defense, and the LHD covers the inner or middle zone SUCAP for low-altitude AAW and ASUW.
Though this might be mixing missions, the primary concern is total threat coverage. The Sea Harrier and the Mk-Ill can still use their best abilities to cover from the surface to 10,000 feet, whatever the threat in that area. The threat could be low-altitude air attack or missile boat attack, or perhaps both.
The LHD has the potential to set up two to three SUCAP stations in a high- threat environment for a short period of time. This should relieve the carrier of some surface fighting duties and allow her to focus more of her weapon systems on the high-altitude AAW war.
If the high-altitude threat is manageable, then the E-2 could detect and track the low flyer farther out in the outer zone. In this case, it might be better for the E-2 to vector the AV-8Bs. The Mk-III could then shift from an AAW to an ESM, ASUW, or ASW mission, depending on how the threat was perceived. The Mk-III could be set up in a radar/AEW picket station to link all its incoming data, permitting shipbome air controllers to monitor the AV-8Bs that much better. If the air battle intensifies, ships or Mk-IIIs could take over control again without delay. The Mk-III station might be best situated
at 5,000 to 10,000 feet and about 50'f
icke*
stations and are easiest to coordinate the Sea Harrier. Classic ASMD P1^ stations require low altitude Mk-IB o relatively close to the ship that is " defended.
ers and the Mk-IIIs could act as s ^ systems, to be moved about in mlS_ ^ and physical location to meet threa defensive weaknesses as necessary- ^ fensive or offensive air plans shou flexible and account for mission cha ..
a ciic.gn.g uiu-o,. * l01),
tactical command and his staff “ 0 have a bag of tactical LHD air P'anLer- they can reach into whenever they 0 mine a new threat. ^
Mission Tactics Close to the , 0{ head: Within about 150 nautical m1 the beachhead, enemy coastal H^H boats may pose a threat. With then ■ ,v radar signatures and disproportio ^
large offensive punch, these craft c one of the most difficult threa. j,ts counter. Twenty-four hour SSSC jjj may be necessary. Again, the ^ 3
with its 360° surface scan coupled ^ DLI or airborne Sea Harrier S ^ would give good coverage. As an e jp pie, the SS-N-9 on the “Nanuchk^ patrol combatant has a range of 21,0 nautical miles. This threat requ*re jjes Mk-III to be at least 60-80 nautica pjj
tical miles out from the target, borne SUCAP. gii\j
The Sea Harriers must simultane ^ prepare for their power projection sion: strike warfare and close air sup ^ As the battle against the land beg>n ^el)t Sea Harrier would most likely aU-^ of the carrier aircraft, U. S. Air F° . 0ut' other allied air assets operating ft0
-ary
ive1
type of ordnance, weather, enemy sition, and several other factors- AV-8B strike capability has been ^ mated at three sorties per aircra '[0iid day, or 378 500-pound bombs (9 .^jl- per day, assuming 90% aircraft ava parity. The LHD sea control converse ^ vides for storage of ordnance type aircraft. . thc
During the amphibious ass®* ’ pri' CAS mission becomes the mary mission. Again, complemen carrier air wing, the 20 or so Sea n 0jr on board the LHD can make a maj ^ t|iC tribution to the ground war. On
b|hhead is established and a V/STOL '^AV ^eet by 500 feet) is in place, tbe . could move ashore to support ljC)w‘^ar'ne amphibious force (MAF). 0tlheVer- some Harriers may be needed defe°ard 'he LHD for self-defense or for °f the amP^1ibi°us task force. The iw 'n this phase of the scenario would or Ap“e wi>h its ASW, ASUW, ASMD, S 'W defense of the ATF.
Sam)3 farrier air control during the as- ^iulrl 3Se t^lc amphibious operation most likely be handled by the lh0lJ , and TOAC on another ship. Al- trjng ou'side the realm of normal doc- sUch l lC ^^-III may be able to perform radarSUpPort missions as forward SACC or controller, or C3 link be- icont and other fixed-wing or hel-
llld^er assets. With the Mk-III, low-alti- do^ Coir,bat operations can be monitored the i,0t0 tlle deck when the SACC is over °.riZon from some or all beachhead dava| l0tls- The Mk-III, in addition to H). Sunfire spotting in low-threat envi- c°or,n's. may be in the best position to <nate beachhead search and rescue
"%rn‘>a>t0nx: Operator, director, and Sor tra'n'ng may be one of the Oper . 'mitations of coordinated mission Sea |j'0ns- For example, Royal Navy ka carr'er pilots are all experts now in ntr°l tactics, but what of the U. S.
Marine Corps pilots who are trained in close-air support and strike warfare? Will the Marines ever get the opportunity to develop an expertise in OTH-T or AEW threat assessment in an open-ocean arena? The sea control mission might best be limited to choke points, AO As, or key shore waters if the answer is no.
LAMPS crews are capable of all the missions described. But they are doing well if they can just perform ASW well. More training always seems to be part of the answer. But with or without the LHD mission, the LAMPS Mk-III community needs to look at putting fleet experienced naval flight officers in operator’s seats. Located either in the copilot/airbome tactical officer seat or tactical action control officer seat in combat, naval flight officers offer the technical level of expertise, devoid of day-to-day aviator concerns, that could give this system a big boost in tactical capability.
Getting coordinated training for Navy and Marine squadrons prior to deployments may prove to be an overwhelming burden on the administrative chain of command, if new communications links are not set up well in advance of desired training dates.
The real training obstacle may lie in the curse of modem fleet technology. The multi-dimensional, multi-mission sophistication of the AV-8B, LAMPS, and the
LHD is so complex that when integrated with steep individual learning curves, and high turnover rates, human comprehension may be the critical inhibiting factor.
Perhaps the most difficult obstacle will be attitudes. Helicopters and jets working together have no history (except in the British and Soviet navies), and, to many minds, this is a reason to reject the concept. If the composite squadron of AV- 8Bs and SH-60Bs are not integrated at the people-to-people level, individual as well as coordinated operations will not have a chance.
Commander Tierney has twice served as a LAMPS officer-in-charge with HSL-33 and HSL-34. He also has served in the USS Koelsch (FF-1049), USS Spru- ance (DD-963), and USS Lockwood (FF-1064). He holds a master’s degree in ASW systems technology and is currently attending the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. He is the author of the Professional Note “LAMPS III: Bluewater Technology, Backwater Tactics" which appeared in the June 1984 Proceedings.
Colonel Allinder received a master's degree in operations research from the Naval Postgraduate School and has served in numerous staff assignments. He was designated a fighter pilot in 1960 and served with a number of Marine fighter squadrons. He served two combat tours in Vietnam. He was the commanding officer of MABS-31, VMFA-122, and VMFA-251. He was the Assistant Chief of Staff (Amphibious Instruction), Quantico. He was a Fellow, Strategic Studies Group, at the Naval War College, 1982-83, and is now an instructor there in naval operations.
father, or Not
' ---------------- - --
eutenant Commander Thomas Q. Donaldson V, U. S. Navy
f December 1944, Admiral Wil- *ey (g3lsey’s flagship, the USS NewJer- l»i|esaB'62), passed within 30 nautical \ 'he center of a typhoon which an.s''*ng the Philippine Sea. Esti- higjj w'nds of 115 knots and extremely VTS resul'ed in the loss of 790 men, pCstr°yers> and 146 aircraft from U*0ll0rce 33. Assault operations on
V s, Were temporarily suspended while rePairs underwent extensive structural
APrd 1983, a three-carrier,
V battle force operated in the \j.. est Pacific and was affected by \ *?g extra-tropical low pressure sys- "f55, a,ch produced storm force winds atioIls ,n°ts and 18-foot seas. Flight oper- ^stfj 0r at least one carrier were under V0 ^ visibility conditions more than \C( 'he time. Several ships suffered
V and equipment damage, and all Ved operations were adversely af-
V during Fleet Exercise (FleetEx)
Vice Admiral William Lawrence said: “It was clear from the outset that the environment would have a profound effect on the outcome of FleetEx 83-1.”
The average sailor who experienced high seas in December 1944 or April 1983 did not particularly care if the atmospheric forcing of the seas was termed barotropic or baroclinic. Fleet meteorologists in 1944 did and geophysics officers of today do, however, because understanding the atmospheric physics and dynamics which produce such seas is inherent to the ability to forecast system movement and intensities which may affect fleet operation.
Admiral Halsey’s nemesis was a typhoon, which is dynamically described as barotropic. Barotropic implies there is no warm or cold air advection (horizontal movement of a mass of air that causes changes in temperature). A typhoon, or hurricane, can best be described as an enormous heat engine driven by the release of energy via the process of condensation. As low pressure draws in warm, tropical air to a central location in the lower atmosphere, it must rise vertically to the anticyclonic outflow located above it. The moist air rises, cools, and releases energy (heat) by way of a condensation process, producing enormous amounts of precipitation. The vertical column of air warms and becomes less dense, thus reducing the sea-level pressure. As the sea- level pressure lowers, a larger pressure gradient is created which, in turn, draws more tropical air into the typhoon’s “eye." The resulting pressure gradient produces hurricane force winds and associated high seas.
%li
The five conditions considered favorable for typhoon development are a sea- surface temperature of 26° centigrade or greater, a developing or existing surface low-pressure center, upper-level divergence, little or no vertical wind shear, and location of the system at least 5° north or south of the equator. Other characteristics associated with a typhoon are a
This tank landing ship is battling with a formidable opponent that should be as closely monitored as any Soviet submarine or cruiser—an angry sea.
Major Storm Tracks Affecting FleetEx 83-1 Units, 4-17 April 1983
Q Attu
BERING SEA
been 1,200 nautical miles, imply111^ it was likely that a storm would a gj.). Battle Force units during FleetEx Figure 1 depicts the storm tracks j did affect the units. Although 1 ^8
jid
lack of frontal boundaries (since only one air mass is usually involved) and the presence of the upper-level anticyclone situated directly above the low-pressure center.
FleetEx 83-1 was the largest Pacific Ocean naval exercise since the 1940s. Primarily designed as an antisubmarine warfare exercise, it involved U. S. Navy, U. S. Air Force, and Canadian armed forces. The weather systems that affected FleetEx units are described as baroclinic which means the variables of pressure and temperature intersect (there is warm or cold air advection). Baroclinic systems then do involve frontal boundaries which separate different air masses. Usually, cold air displaces warmer, and the less- dense air lowers the system’s center of gravity. Enormous amounts of potential energy are converted into the kinetic energy of the resultant winds. Support aloft for these extra-tropical systems is usually a positive swirling advection associated with an upper-level trough approaching the surface low-pressure center from the west.
The primary environmental impact on FleetEx units resulted from heavy weather (sustained winds greater than 30 knots and/or seas greater than 12 feet) associated with the baroclinic storms transiting north of the exercise area. Preexercise environmental support stated that the 1982-83 winter had been an active one, producing an average of five storm or gale areas per month since December 1982. More important, the average maximum 30-knot wind radius had
nearly 900 nautical miles from the force units, storm-force winds an foot seas enveloped the battle 8r07^rjtli> A second phenomenon associate i the transiting storms which dis operations was gale-force wind ^ duced by the tight pressure S caused by the juxtaposition of the ^
ing storms and the quasi-stationar/
pressure center near 35N, 170E- , cjpg Of the three heavy weather pr° [(ijf mechanisms mentioned (typhoons- jj. siting storms, and tight pressure ents), forecasting typhoon movern p. intensity is, by far, the most di ^.jV3l The forecasting errors of the $ Oceanography Command Cente’ ^ Typhoon Warning Center, Guam- significant tropical cyclones in west Pacific during 1982 were 1 * ^ ^0' cal miles for a 24-hour forecast. 2 . tical miles for a 48-hour forecast
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Accurately forecasting tight P 3jyS>s gradients is difficult because the ® required is doubled. Both the h'S low-pressure system movements must be taken into a ^ requiring an accurate synoptic sea , j$ ysis. Forecasting extratropical sy gf 3 markedly easier, primarily beca better understanding of the physi^g\o$ dynamics of extratropical rnete
puter
model is termed Navy Operational
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wave height by summing up the
^'mproved forecasting aids, ne Navy’s current atmospheric com
p, *« ^ _____
(NOr* ^'mospheric Prediction System uJtjAPS). It computes the atmospheric e|satl°ns of state and motion at nine lev- „ 'n ^e atmosphere and runs every 12 a.,/!.’ Providing forecasts of up to two
Thve days;
Uiot1 ? Navy’s ocean wave prediction Xjt .e' is the Spectral Ocean Wave e • The model computes the signifi15 Cfra* wave energy in 12 directions and '•tod rUencies at each 8r'dpoint. The Held ’S "driven” by the NOGAPS wind rjaodS. ^rough a primary boundary layer •act r ^nown as Global Surface Con- Layer Interface.
pre ..e Vertical ocean thermal structure is 0 «‘ed with the use of the Thermal an Prediction System (TOPS) and 'Eotc*^ Ocean Thermal Structure •Pod 1 mo^els- TOPS is a predictive '"od6 Wdde POTS is strictly an analysis the Coupled together, they represent ttireaVy s CUITent ocean thermal struc- Prediction capability, an essential
input to the many acoustic models.
The link among computer models, forecasting aids, and fleet environmental support is the geophysics team composed of geophysics officers and aerographer mates. They blend the models’ strengths and capabilities, sound meteorological/ oceanographic principles, and fleet experience to support fleet operations from mine warfare to carrier flight operations. The Naval Oceanography Command currently comprises 396 geophysics officers and has its main operational centers at Norfolk, Pearl Harbor, Guam, and Rota, Spain, with headquarters in Mississippi. Modeling research and applications are conducted at the Naval Environmental Prediction Research Facility and the Fleet Numerical Oceanography Center which are colocated at Monterey, California. Sea billets are primarily on the carrier, battleship, and amphibious assault ship platforms as well as ocean survey ships. The Defense Mapping Agency, Naval Oceanography Office, and the Naval Observatory are also under Commander, Naval Oceanography Command.
Not much has changed since December 1944 concerning the subject of heavy weather effects on naval operations. Notwithstanding her close encounter with a typhoon in 1944, the New Jersey was rechristened on her first deployment with 40-knot winds and 18-foot seas associated with Typhoon Vera in July 1983. Naval operations of any kind must consider the environment in the planning stages, since a rapidly developing system leaves no time for adequate preparation. The September 1983 typhoon Forrest dropped 99 millibars in 12 hours, while transiting the Philippine Sea, resulting in sustained winds of 150 knots with gusts up to 180 knots. Then, as now, the mission’s success may often depend on weather, or not.
Commander Donaldson was graduated from the
U. S. Naval Academy with a bachelor of science degree in oceanography. He served in the USS Claude
V. Ricketts (DDG-5) as Main Propulsion Assistant before attending the Naval Postgraduate School. He was stationed at the Naval Oceanography Command Center on Guam and is currently an instructor at the Antisubmarine Warfare Training Center, Norfolk.
^Combat: A Soviet View
By " --------------------------------
lehtenant Colonel Lawrence G. Karch, U. S. Marine Corps
arideVeral articles on air combat theory cWrCt'CS ^ave aPPeared *n recent un- SoVj1 'ed periodicals published in the
■ issue of the Soviet Air Force’s
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'at. there appears to be little, if any-
V)Vj periodicals puDiisnea in ti teresj Union. The articles of greatest i t0ltib deve*°P Soviet principles of air N). and discuss the usefulness of CiUpj ane (section) and single-fighter %es.0yment. One might reasonably an ul0n the veracity of a tactics article in s°cie.C ,asstfied Soviet journal given that artjC[y s closed, secretive nature. Some N> 6f do contain a sentence or phrase or c°lild Perfunctory propaganda; articles •ionsalso contain half-truths, distor- ’ 3nd fabrications designed to mis- 0r Intentionally misinform.
Pub[j ^ever’ most articles are apparently ed unclassified journals so as to S^tWide dissemination within the 9ty |g Union. For example, in the Janu- %7. magazine, Aviatsiyai I Kos- fonr V!‘ka (Aviation and Cosmonautics), do'vn^n°nths after the highly criticized °f a South Korean airliner by a nircraft, a high-ranking Soviet Air cajj general gave a summary of rules %Spa® w'th aircraft intruding into Soviet
CoiHb~UnC*ass*^ed Soviet articles on
thing, of specific military intelligence value. Instead, Soviet authors use examples from World War II and information published in the foreign press (e.g., Aviation Week and Space Technology) to illustrate their ideas. When no such examples are available, a Soviet author might merely state his proposition as an established fact and then associate it with Soviet participation in World War II. For example, when an established Soviet authority on air warfare says that “excessive interference by ground control can fetter pilot initiative” and that this fact was taken into consideration in a particularly successful World War II action, he is probably making a veiled statement about a present-day problem.
One lengthy article by Colonel V. Babich and Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Kis- lyakov (“The Development of the Principles of Air Combat,” Aviatsiyai / Kos- monavtika, May-August 1981) develops four principles of air combat: aggressiveness, surprise, firepower and maneuver, and perfection of tactics. The passages on aggressiveness—or combat assertiveness, as the Soviets also call it—are fairly similar to what one might find in a U. S. publication on air combat. The authors state the basic facts that, by design, fighter aircraft must attack using “swift movement with powerful fire forward” instead of simply attempting to defend and that “the best defensive move is to fly toward the attacking enemy and not to move away.”
Nowhere in the article is there mention of “non-aggressive” tactics such as disengagement maneuvers, not even in the section on aggressiveness. Therefore, at least in an unclassified forum, a Soviet fighter pilot is left to conclude that once engaged in air combat, he is decisively engaged. This implication is reinforced with the statement, “In air combat a white flag cannot be raised.”
One unusual passage in the section on aggressiveness is the cryptic statement, “In the U. S. Air Force the capability of group commanders to skillfully lead in battle is viewed as a talent, and pilots who demonstrate abilities in this area are recommended for promotion.” Is this a call for the Soviet Air Force to weigh tactical proficiency in air combat more heavily in selections for promotion? Whatever the hidden meaning, if any, the authors are quick to add, “It is emphasized that only a few have proven to be skillful tacticians in practice.”
To achieve surprise, Babich and Kis-
lyakov cover most of the standard cautions, including: 1) “Keep between the sun and the enemy,” 2) “At dusk and dawn stay in the shadows,” 3) “Don’t go into haze since you can be clearly seen from above but you yourself can’t see much,” and 4) “Don’t look for the enemy nearby but in the distance ..." (perhaps a reference to the tendency for eyes to focus at short range when searching along a monotonous, uninterrupted horizon).
The authors also place great emphasis on communications security and deception to achieve surprise. An example is given of German ground stations in World War II intercepting Soviet fighter aircraft communications and then passing the information on to German fighters with subsequent disastrous results for the Soviets. One Soviet flight leader is quoted as telling his wingman, “. . . read my thoughts and I will guess yours. No unnecessary words in the air! Tell me only what is absolutely necessary, clearly and concisely”—good advice in any air force.
TASG rnOM SOVFOTO
Deception covers a multitude of actions, such as diversionary attacks, “traps” by several fighter groups operating in concert, communications jamming, “spurious radar targets,” terrain masking, and exploitive attacks. A World War II example is given of a diversionary attack by Soviet aircraft on an enemy fighter base to flush German fighters;
they then waited until the Germans were low on fuel before staging a larger second attack that resulted in many enemy aircraft being shot down.
The authors are also concerned about fighter aircraft radar emissions spoiling the element of surprise. Babich and Kis- lyakov state that ‘ ‘equipping fighters with long-range, high-powered radars has certain disadvantages” because such emissions “can be detected much farther off.” To achieve surprise, the authors suggest that fighter aircraft radars be used “only during closure” so as to arrive at short range and force a defensive maneuver on an enemy. The authors note rather zestfully that “the close air engagement has laws of its own.”
Including aircraft maneuverability in the combination of firepower and maneuver is an important analytical procedure in the authors’ view of air combat. They believe that a balance must exist between firepower and maneuverability. Increases in firepower can compensate for a deficiency of maneuverability and vice versa; however, there are limits to this interchangeability. Importance is attached to forcing an enemy to fight where Soviet aircraft are optimized. Combined formations of different types of fighters echeloned at different altitudes are also components in the total firepower-maneuverability equation of air combat.
Maneuvering in the vertical plane to gain a rear hemisphere firing position is
desirable because it carries a high Pr°^ bility of success. Vertical maneuvers be easily combined with aPProaC(jar which are flown under enemy ^ screens or which use the sun. Babie Kislyakov mention often that history ^ three-quarters of all aircraft destroye , air combat were downed by unobse attackers. They go even further, ass® that 80% to 85% of unobserved suited from vertical maneuvers and 15% to 20% were achieved through neuvers in the horizontal plane.
Enemy employment of long'*’ radar-guided missiles (e.g., Sparrows) is to be overcome by * aircraft closing in” while enemy a'^oC\ maintain “the radar beam on the until the missile hits the target.” An® jj article (Colonel V. Dolbnya, “The ^ in Air Combat,” Zarubezhnoye oye Obozrenie, Foreign Military R®vt. May 1982) addresses this subject by ing that the time of flight of Sparro^^ siles will allow Soviet fighters to ^ within missile launch range. Als0, ^ “the complexity of locking on t0
- j Hiscd1*1*,
because of “insufficient radar uraftt°
nation’ ’ will allow some Soviet ad fire radar-guided missiles of t^ielfcjjnesS These articles indicate a Soviet reafarlge> to absorb some losses from *°n^. er aif' radar-guided missiles to place 0s, craft in advantageous firing poS1 Babich and Kislyakov do not SP
ca]]v .
ranmer>tion the use of Soviet long- bj( ’ radar-guided missiles in air com- 'le 0ttler authors in Aviatsiya I Cauj onavtiko do. This is probably be- th0ll i0| authors’ particular beliefs 0rhis' cou'^ also be a purposeful 1 , 'on. The authors are apparently
ls perceived to be superior in
eretlt“ > then successive attacks from dif- 'he j^mrections against a single part of
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more to Bablich and Kislyakov
'Ust good training to execute current £11. Perfection of tactics also in- le “perpetual improvement of atte ’ The authors remind readers that
Ughf .
F.]^e'ght fighter advocates (e.g., erppj as they assert that “the tactic of si|eH °^In8 a long range, all-aspect mis- Oniyac^ 's no longer recognized as the He 1r°m's'ng tactic.” They add, “It is "ianeVeC* l^at unt'l the fighter transfers Win Uverability to the missile, the pilot H]/101ablfi to detect, automatically &ea(’and identify an aerial target at a anCe ,aistance, [thus] maintaining a bal- toijjb Ct,Ween maneuver and fire in aerial TV1’ .
Iypes authors indicate that different 'v(len °i attacks might be considered Craft attac'king a formation of enemy air- w°ul An attack from a single direction re$trj “e employed against a broad target ^ett)Ctcd in its ability to maneuver. If an H • formation is extended in depth, Hc,Slmu|taneous attacks from different 'he |(|°ns against two different parts of c%rmation are recommended. If the haljy rrnat'on may be the answer. Fi- eXists’ 'fohe threat of an enemy attack also Hd h a*ternatmg attacks are recom- e3ch , so Soviet fighters can cover
Cer-
Hn princiP'e °f perfection of tactics
Ho
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H e,aipts °f pilots to sit in a new aircraft Ml) j "T'n8 old tactical baggage aboard lhe y.Var>ably be in vain.” Air combat in 'ef 'etnam and Middle Eastern wars is revje^a to often and is seen as requiring a and an update of current Soviet tactics. The authors say that change in Soviet air combat tactics must come because “[Western] pilots’ intellect, initiative and creativity have given rise to new tactics” with which the Soviet Union must keep apace.
A topic which has produced considerable discussion among readers of Aviat- siya I Kosmonavtika is the use of single fighters in air combat instead of two-ship (section) formations. In his article “Pair or Singleton?” (Aviatsiya 1 Kosmonavtika, November 1981), Colonel V. Belyayev has called for a critical examination of the “pair” as the basic tactical unit in air combat and says that, in most situations, a single modern fighter is preferable. He believes that the increased probability of enemy destruction with a pair of modem fighter aircraft is not much greater than a single fighter and that the pair suffers severe disadvantages.
Belyayev states that the wingman can no longer protect his flight leader in air combat, especially from long-range missile attack. He says that the flight leader finds it difficult today to control his wingman “because of the significant missile launch ranges, combat formation spread, and the considerable airspace within which air combat takes place.” On the other hand, he states that “the modem single fighter is far from defenseless” and notes that single fighter employment at night and in clouds is now the norm. Also, he says that “the pair splits more and more frequently into single aircraft during air combat, as confirmed by experience in recent local wars” (i. e., Vietnam and the Middle East).
The author tempers his single-fighter proposition, however, by concluding, “This does not at all mean that a single fighter . . . would be designated for every mission. It all depends on the conditions created by the combat situation.” He then says that “pilots flying modem aircraft and war veterans should state
The Soviet pilots, facing page, conceivably could relax after their flight by thumbing through aviation magazines in which they might read about aggressive flying tactics and arguments for and against flying in pairs— as the MiG-23 “Floggers” do here.
their opinion in this journal” (apparently a signal to readers that public discussion of this topic is permitted).
Most of the comment and discussion in response to Belyayev’s article was negative. Many, but not all readers, agreed that single fighters are best for night and all-weather missions. A variety of reasons were given for continuing with the pair as the basic tactical unit in air combat techniques.
First, readers generally did not agree that the probability of target destruction was greater with two fighters operating independently than with a pair. Most considered the pair’s effectiveness to be greater than the sum of the individual effectiveness of two fighters.
Second, many stated that control of ground-controlled interception (GCI) would be more difficult with singlefighter operations than with pairs. Flying in pairs “increases the operating capacity of ground control centers” (Colonel Yu. Vetrov, “The Pair is the Primary Tactical Unit,” Aviatsiya / Kosmonavtika, June 1982) was a typical response. Soviet fighter pilots are concerned about putting more stress on the existing ground-air link. In his article “Interceptors Operate at Night,” (Krly 'ya Rodiny [Wings of the Motherland], January 1980), Lieutenant Colonel Ye. Chumakov points out that one Soviet fighter pilot (a squadron commander) was commended for reaching “an agreement with the GCI controller that the latter would not distract him with excessively frequent information and would only communicate the most essential information.”
Third, Vetrov pointed out that “modem air combat has a clearly pronounced group nature.” Whether Soviet fighter aircraft fly in singles or in pairs, the enemy would surely attack in significant numbers. A pair of fighters would be able to inflict greater destruction than a single fighter.
Finally, Vetrov asserted in his article that flying in pairs “raise[s] the crew’s psychological stability, especially when flying over enemy territory. The feeling of having a comrade nearby makes it possible to engage in air combat boldly and decisively.”
Readers agreed that maintaining integrity in air combat is a difficult problem
lnRs / November 1984
for the pair, but manageable. They generally think that it is permissible for pilots in a pair temporarily to lose visual contact with each other. Major S. Murav’yev states in his article “Shield and Sword” (Aviatsiya I Kosmonavtika, July 1982) that a partial remedy to the problem “requires that aircrews completely master piloting techniques and the use of missiles and cannons during complex individual and formation maneuvers” (i.e., more and better air combat training).
Clearly, there are proponents in the
Soviet Union for change in air combat tactics. These Soviet tacticians have been greatly influenced by air combat in Vietnam and the Middle East and by progress made in the technology of long-range, all-aspect missiles. They generally espouse tactics requiring more individual initiative in the air and less control from the ground. In contrast to these calls for a liberalization of air combat tactics is the pervasive Soviet totalitarianism.
Can the Soviet Union move toward a more Western-style system of air combat
tactics? Will ideological constraints^ vent substantive change? The future[0be of Soviet air combat tactics remains ^ seen, but Kremlin decision rna*cerSfflatic likely be heavily influenced by Pra|r|jof considerations in the high-stakes wo
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MSC—Who?
By Captain T. W. Glickman, U. S. Navy
I am always amazed at how little Navy personnel know about the Military Sealift Command (MSC). Typical responses to, “Tell me what you know about MSC” range from, “They’re the old men making big bucks running Navy ships” to “those 40-hour-a-week sailors who now hold most of the junior officer commands.” Enlisted detailers are pushing assignments in MSC Military Departments and the maritime prepositioned ships, but when they are asked for details regarding the assignments, they have been known to say, “Ask someone in MSC”—quite a commentary for an important part of the Navy that sports eight hashmarks and is well on the way to adding the ninth.
MSC is one of the Navy’s four operating forces; its mission is to provide the sealift capability to deploy and sustain U. S. forces worldwide. This mission entails five responsibilities: providing contingency and mobilization sealift, providing peacetime logistical sealift, developing plans and capability for emergency expansion, operating the Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force (NFAF), and providing and operating special transportation ships—a euphemism for scientific support operations.
The size of MSC’s Controlled Fleet, composed of the Nucleus and Contract fleets, varies depending upon mission requirements, with the greatest variations in force levels appearing in the Contract Fleet.
The SS Keystone State was a C-9 containership before being converted to a crane ship which can unload containerships in primitive ports or while under way, thereby increasing the Military Sealift Command’s widening capabilities.
As a rule of thumb, those ships with USNS (United States Naval Ship) preceding the name belong to the Nucleus Fleet, while those with the more common prefixes (i.e., SS, M/V, and GTS [gas turbine ship]) indicate Contract Fleet vessels. The Nucleus Fleet is composed of government-owned and -operated ships; government-owned and contractor-operated vessels; and, on occasion, contractor-operated chartered ships. On the other hand, the Contract Fleet is composed of contracted ships with Merchant Marine crews.
Those ships that are government operated are crewed by civilian marine personnel (CivMarPers). They possess Coast Guard-issued Merchant Marine officer licenses or seaman’s documents and are federal-exempted civil service employ
ees. This essentially means they
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af-
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fecting civil service employees ^ As a function of law, Title F*ve’ j hen
CivMarPers are accorded rights
the
efits similar to those established '°lc U. S. Merchant Marine, the most^ exception being an upper limit p. pay as established by the federal P •^ajc The CivMarPers community !scjudes up of a wealth of experience. Itin .„re
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people who have been sailing v,( than 40 years; this group also P ^pt the Navy’s best underway repRn1.^ tefl (UnRep) experience—mariners in
or more years in the business, se ships that frequently conduct
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size firnents (MilDepts) which range in SoI'oni four to more than 20 Navy per- shi"e! assigned to MSC. Other MSC Den*- 3Ve commissioned units. The Mil-
ari(j s Provide military communications iHj Serve as tactical advisors to the ship’s tv er (commanding officer). Small Mil- ii, ,s are headed by a chief petty officer- in |j a^8e (CPOIC) while the larger ones (Olcv eP S^PS have an officer-in-charge - >< usually an 11IX lieutenant (junior
MarpUnRePs per year. In addition, Civ- ers are at sea in hydrographic and [,ai|ano8raphic ships, cable layers, fleet ran lstIC missile support ships, missile- instrumentation ships, fleet tugs (j0nOrni'n8 towing and salvage opera, and will soon be in ocean surveil-
U Ships-
°st of the NFAF ships have military
ljes"dor a lieutenant. The responsibili- full 0 '■he OICs and CPOICs cover the tiVesPectrum of operational, administrates ’ ma'ntenance, training, and human atio fCe management, routinely spread <8 a *arger group of officers and st|jD Pe(ty officers in commissioned
f°rm pThe OICs have Article 15’ Uni' lc ” Code of Military Justice, authority.
dentaot think of any other afloat indepen-
u'y assignment for a junior officer
or chief petty officer that presents the challenges, responsibilities, and accountability that these MilDept leaders bear on a daily basis.
Most Nucleus Fleet ships are assigned to an administrative commander (Commander, Military Sealift Command Atlantic or Pacific). The ships and MilDepts also have home ports which are not necessarily the same geographic locations. It does not make much difference as at least half of the ships rarely see their home ports. Also, it is not uncommon for ships to “swing” from one fleet area to the other for short or prolonged (one year or more) periods without the benefit of a home port change. Another unique feature of MSC ships is that their employment appears to be driven by the old adage, “Sailors belong on ships and ships belong at sea.” There are no predeployment preparation for overseas movement periods or post-deployment leave and upkeep periods, which means MSC ships enjoy an operational tempo of 80% or better. This accounts, in part, for the provisions of SecNavInst 4650.19A and OpNavInst 4600.1c descriptions of one- year arduous sea-duty tours for active- duty naval personnel.
The commercial fleet carries Department of Defense cargo worldwide, supports the strategic petroleum reserve program, near-term prepositioned forces, and will soon support the Fast Support Ship and Maritime Prepositioned Ship programs. Commercial fleet ships are routinely employed in military operations and exercises (e.g., Team Spirit, Reforger, and Urgent Fury).
The MSC is actively engaged with the Joint Deployment Agency, other transportation operating agencies, the Maritime Administration, and the maritime industry—ship operators, ship construction and repair organizations, and maritime unions—in planning and refining plans to support mobilization strategic sealift requirements. The MSC even moves household effects, privately owned vehicles, merchandise for Navy exchanges, and, on rare occasions, permanent change-of-station passengers.
Captain Glickman was graduated from the University of Southern California and attended the Naval Postgraduate School and the Army War College. His sea duty has included serving in destroyers and amphibious ships and with afloat staffs. He commanded the USS Rigel (AF-58) and USS Kilauea (AE-26). He served on the Military Sealift Command staff. He is currently commanding officer of the Military Sealift Command Office, Norfolk.
^^sing the Mine Warfare Gap
By » . ' ----------------------------------------------------
leutenant Colonel Mel R. Jones, U. S. Army (Retired)
ve]0'nes f°r use against ships were de- c5rlv and emPl°yed successfully as Cen(| as the 16th century. Yet, until re- histo .’ exccpt for the Soviet Navy, this trjesflc tesson seemed lost on other coun- deluding the United States.
5ree Soviets’ naval mine warfare forces to none in both strategic and CoUn.a Use of naval mines and mine Gre ^sasures. If either Argentina or ity Britain had half the Soviet capabil- >Hg rrn'ne laying, sweeping, ordestroy- fli’ e outcome of the Falklands Con- I() 'ght weP have been quite different, ^ample, the 650 killed and 1,300 ^ve l ed on the Argentine side could tiHcS’ ten a srr|aller number if the Argen- Nlq dad had the capability to mine ifiitja?ad Sound and Teal Inlet where the >$h n. “fttish landing occurred. The Bfit- sWCeaVa( forces had no creditable mine- SliC|)p,n§ capability on scene to counter V ,T'°ve. Royal Navy contingency htinesCaded t°r converting trawlers to ft)js.V’eePers where and when needed, ter 0fad state of affairs was more a mat- *egjc j’hortsightedness on the part of straP anners than any high-level disdain
for specialized mine warfare forces.
Since 1972, the Royal Navy had been conducting mine countermeasure trials with hovercraft. But these air-cushioned vessels were limited in both range and time on station, making them unsuitable for deployment in the Falklands, 8,000 miles from home.
The British are not the only ones with a naval force on the short side of the minesweeper gap. With more than 5,000 miles of coastline and nearly 20 strategic ports serving vital commercial and military roles, the continental United States is particularly vulnerable to mine warfare. But the current force of 21 aging U. S. minesweepers is capable of keeping only two of these ports open.
Recognizing the existing minesweeper gap between the United States and the Soviet Union—21 versus 375 vessels— the U. S. Navy has called on Congress for funding and on private industry for developing a new generation of mine warfare forces.
The situation was summed up earlier this year in Navy testimony before Congress. Vice Admiral Robert L. Walters,
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, told members of the House Subcommittee on Seapower:
“For many years the mine warfare forces of the U. S. Navy fell prey to higher priority programs. Not until fiscal year 1982 did we request the first new MCM [mine countermeasure vessel]. Since that time, four more MCM-1 class ships have been appropriated, as well as the first of a new class of coastal minesweeper/hunter the MSH-1.”
Also in his testimony, Admiral Walters said that U. S. mine warfare forces “are on the road to recovery.” But he reminded congressmen:
• • • [W]e have only three active minesweepers [MSOs] and 18 in the Naval Reserve Force. The capability of these MSO’s to ensure port breakout is tenuous at best, and we must move rapidly to build the acceptable risk force of 14 MCM’s and 17 MSH’s. Despite the fact that these are the most sophisticated and capable
The new classes of minesweeper hunter vessels (below) and mine countermeasure ships (right), which will work together in clearing mined ports, represent the first real attempt in years for our meager mine warfare forces to close the gap with the Soviets’ large mine warfare fleet.
To operate a helicopter continually 0 (j) long time span requires backup suPvoUrs allow rotating machines every two or so. Consequently, the cost of °P tions is significantly higher than wi ditional minesweeper designs. ^ Similarly, hydrofoil-type vesse.Sn„jn incapable of long-term station-keep1 all types of seas. Such problems a(e jS ily handled by the MCM, w ^oVy-
equipped with a 350-horsepower #
thruster and two low-speed pr°Pu' motors. c3n
In rough seas, the bowthruste <s push water perpendicular to the . je axis in either direction, while the v , pitch propellers going fore and at_ uj)i- bine to keep the ship stationary- 0f
MARINETTE MARINE
mine countermeasure ships ever built, this total of 3.1 ships is a bare minimum and will dictate sequential clearance of U. S. ports and approaches, as well as heavy reliance on our allies to maintain clearance in their own waters.”
Marinette Marine Corporation and Peterson Shipbuilding have received contracts to build five Avenger (MCM-11- class ships appropriated by Congress through fiscal year 1984. Two of these MCMs are currently under construction. There are also plans to build 17 vessels of the new MSH class, which the Navy intends to obtain over a multi-year procurement cycle.
The 14 MCMs called for by Admiral Walters arc 1,240-ton, 224-foot wooden vessels designed to permit the breakout of U. S. forces from ports in the continental United States and then to accompany deploying forces overseas and conduct mine clearance operations in-theater. Recent events in Nicaragua’s harbors and the mining in the Persian Gulf point to the need for such vessels that can be used at home and also accompany amphibious operations abroad.
To augment the MCM in the breakout clearance of ports, the U. S. Navy will rely heavily on its new coastal MSH. The MSH’s primary tasks are to locate, classify, sweep, or otherwise neutralize bottom or moored, acoustic, magnetic, or contact mines in harbors and coastal waters. Contingency tasks include collecting hydrographic, oceanographic, and navigational data, as well as conducting underwater search operations.
Because they are designed for deepwater minesweeping, both the wooden MCM and the glass-reinforced plastic (GRP) hulled MSH can transit the Atlantic and Pacific oceans if the need arises. However, the MCM’s primary mission is to sweep coastal waters out to the 100- fathom mark, while the 162-foot, 600-ton MSH works the inlets, harbors, and bays. Airborne and hydrofoil-type mine-clearing operations fall short of the MCM’s and MSH’s capabilities for endurance and cost-effectiveness once on station.
The MCM and MSH can both go out, sweep through a minefield, and stay out until all the mines are cleared, if need be.
zation is essential during employ111 ^ a small submarine which goes ou fl[1 the minesweeper to cut the cah moored mines. oIji5
The submarine’s commands ^>5 from the ship and are relative to the position. In order to keep some te _ ship among the stationary mine, tn ^ ing submarine, and the ship, it >s <7S^ence- that the ship remain a point of ret® ^ Unlike her larger MCM sister s v MSH has no need for a bowthrus ^ |( other appendages that hang off the r is better suited to inland coastal Y^. tions such as those around the peake Bay and Norfolk harbor are a Equipped with the reliable and - ^ Voith-Schneider propulser syste ’^ut MSH can steer in any direction ^ propellers and rudders and can y^jth pitch to suit various sea conditi°nS, jr0m a hull and superstructure fabricate ^ monocoque GRP, the latest state ^ s<r art propulsion systems, and the h1 gy, phisticated minesweeping tech ^ tj,e these vessels meet or exceed a following requirements:
► Low magnetic and acoustic un signature
► Low hull-induced pressure wa p ah"
► Superior shock resistance of
equipment . gepi
► Course-keeping and station-
capabilities a|
► Rapid deployment and retr minesweeper/hunter equipment paS
The experience Marinette N*ar
^CVi aS f°ll°w_ship builder for the bee ’ Particularly in its use of GRP, has G^p aPPl'ed to the MSH. Although the He Mniater'a* sheathing which protects the wooden hull is different from
^jJn°noc°que GRP specified for the als j ’ th12 method of applying the materi- ■j,S essentially the same, of reduce costs and speed up delivery ese vessels, Marinette has constructed a $7.1-million ship-erection facility dedicated solely to mine warfare vessels. It contains 69,700 square feet of space in which two MCMs can be produced simultaneously in two environmentally controlled bays. Although designed primarily for the construction of wooden MCMs, the new facility is adaptable to steel or fiberglass construction as well.
Instead of the traditional scaffolding, this new mine countermeasures vessel is being built in new facilities with mezzanines which enable workers to reach any point on the ship under construction.
While the Navy’s requirements call for production of four MSH-class vessels per year, Marinette Marine has the capability to turn out five ships because of the efficiency of the GRP hull design combined with the firm’s low-cost approach to the Navy’s performance requirements.
Dependable, cost-effective, and rapidly produced vessels also hold the key for the United States and its allies in the next decade. To narrow the minesweeper gap requires more than recalling the lessons learned from history, or, more recently, from the Falklands Conflict.
Colonel Jones’s military service includes two tours in Vietnam and an assignment as speech writer and press aide for senior Department of Defense officials. He is a regular contributor to military publications on defense-related topics. He was vice president of a Wisconsin public relations firm, providing consultant services to a variety of defense contractors, before becoming president of Jones, Brown, and Martin, a public relations firm in Waukesha, Wisconsin.
Law of War:
By o'" --------------
0,°nel James H. Jeffries III, U. S. Marine
Fact and Fiction
Corps Reserve
a visit with my two Marine other °ne a Pr'vate first class and the ti(,na first lieutenant who had been sta- Cont. ln Beirut—both assured me it was caJary to the law of war to use the .50- Cr machine gun against personnel. 6 November 1983, The New York are * 1(Bernard Weinraub, “100 Bodies C^-Vmed Found Near Training Miff’ ,Pa8e 1) reported, in connection tile a dispatch from Grenada concerning Np anacling and blindfolding by U. S. fier[|.S °f former Deputy Prime Minister liri Coard and General Hudson Aus- PrjSQat ‘he 1949 Geneva Convention on tiiffjacrs of War (POWs) forbade handily ^ an(l permitted blindfolding S, °nly while transporting them q ®l1 militarily sensitive areas.
%, December 1983, The Washington kijje 'David B. Attaway, “8 Marines 911 all ^ter D- S. Raid,” page 1) quoted •haj, .L®at‘on hy a Marine Corps spokes- •he , ,at among the weapons used against tl)23>?r'nes >was ‘he Soviet-made 'iai(j [sic] antiaircraft gun, which he %(• as banned by the Geneva war con- Qnas for use against ground forces.” B December 1983, during his na-
L .
'hlRs / November 1984
tionally televised news conference, President Ronald Reagan was asked whether downed Navy flier Lieutenant Robert O. Goodman was a Syrian hostage or a POW. The President replied in substance that he knew of no declared war with Syria and, therefore, the Geneva Conventions did not apply.
The common thread in all these pronouncements about current, real-world law-of-war issues is that they are all dead wrong. The President’s remark was wrong. If the application of the Geneva Conventions, or any other portion of the law of war, depended upon the existence of a declared war, the United States would have been outside the confines and protections of the law of war in every armed conflict since World War II.
Formal declarations of war are probably a relic of the past and, in any event, are irrelevant to the application of the law of war. Article Two of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, an article common to all four 1949 treaties, provides that “the . . . Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the . . . Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.” (Emphasis added.) Syria ratified the 1949 Geneva Conventions on 11 February 1953, as did the United States on 8 February 1955. Lebanon, Israel, France, Italy, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union are also signatories. Thus, all the sovereign players in Lebanon are parties to the POW treaty.
The only remaining question is whether the situation in Lebanon is an armed conflict. In international law, the words “armed conflict” have no special or legalistic meaning. If organized military forces are trading live rounds, the situation, for purposes of the Geneva Conventions, is an armed conflict. More serious than the President’s legal slip, however, is the perhaps understandable but wrong political reflex of denying the POW characterization because the connotation appears to admit to the existence of a war. Immediately after the Grenada operation, the administration first described the operation as an invasion and then quickly withdrew that characterization. Some in the chain of command initially were reluctant to label the Grenadan
ammunition, are dual-purpose
,uch
weapon has ever been suCC£S*atii banned under the law of war. In *ts
of a concededly lethal and
The myth of the .50-caliber in
0e
iris'11'
been , funcl
tin"
and Cuban captives “prisoners of war,” a potentially inflammatory legal situation which was quickly corrected by Pentagon international law experts.
The denomination of a captive as a POW is a juridically neutral fact which carries no other ramifications than to afford the highest protective status available to a victim of armed conflict. To deny a captive rightful status as a POW would be a war crime. Thus, during the early moments of the Grenada invasion, political sensitivity and ignorance of the law of war almost got in the way of recognition of lawful POW status with potentially serious consequences. Conversely, the same instinct to deny Goodman POW status would, if actually capable of changing him into a “hostage,” have removed him from the highest protected status to a category with no defined legal rights. Until his repatriation on 3 January 1984, Goodman was most assuredly a POW and not a hostage.
With regard to the Marine spokesman in Beirut who is reported to have accused the Moslem or Druse attackers of a war crime in using a 23-mm. antiaircraft weapon against U. S. Marines, he has perhaps received the same misinformation given my sons about the .50-caliber
Freed and expressing his thanks for efforts on his behalf, it no longer mattered to Lieutenant Goodman whether he had been a POW or, as President Reagan said, a hostage. It does matter to every other serviceman.
machine gun (from formal instruction at recruit training and the Basic School). First, there are no weapons restrictions contained in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, only restrictions on attacking certain targets, such as civilian objects, POWs, the sick, wounded, and shipwrecked, but, unfortunately, not including combat-equipped U. S. Marines.
Restrictions on the means and methods of attacking combatants are found in certain sources of the law of war such as articles 22 and 23 of the Regulations to the 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land: “The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited . . . it is especially forbidden ... to employ poison or poisoned weapons . . . [or] to employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering. ...” Other of these restrictions include the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 grammes Weight; the 1899 Hague Declaration 3 Governing Expanding [Dumdum] Bullets; the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare; and the 1981 United Nations Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.
Leaving aside the fact that the contending parties in Lebanon are not parties to
some or all of these treaties, and side ^ ping the difficult question of wce some or all of these treaties are evi ^ of customary international law an , binding in any event on every natl°!l:tjoi' faction), there is no clear-cut pr°n' ^ 0f in international law against the y such weapons against personnel- such machine guns and rapid-fire ca^ve including those using high-exP s
\V6<*r
intended for use against soft targets ._ as vehicles, landing craft, aircrat copters, bunkered positions, an^.am0ie- When used in the antipersonnel -fe they are generally employed as ar
weapons. and
Even if there were agreemen s there is not—among nations or e^ that such weapons cause greater su g{ than, for example, artillery, 130111 ^ (,e- napalm, the inability to distinguia ^ tween area denial fire in which M als are inadvertently hit and the ujets tional targeting of individual * .je. would make such a rule impraC Significantly, no effective and ®
cation of the 1925 Geneva Gas uSe the United States only foreswore
gun restriction is particularly sl!I^ ^tii in light of its occasional use 1 Korea and Vietnam as an effective^_s|)ot weapon in the sandbagged sin*Lrata mode. Some targets met their ma ^ j distance so far from the weap°n missed shot would not have been froi" The current confusion may c°r^,jtli ^ the explosive spotter round used [rr old reliable 106-mm. recoilless n tentional use of such a spotter n fie gal, but that would have been a ^ -■ of the misuse of an aiming system ^ tl exploding bullet, not the caliber p platform firing it. The round cou chambered in the standard 0
gun' U chac*1'11!
The final question regards s $
and blindfolding prisoners. To Par ^ f Lord Horatio Nelson, no Marine ^ 5s too far wrong who follows the Ji, of handling POWs: seize, silencej ‘[0 tl>e segregate, safeguard, and spec rear. It can be seen immediately tna ling and blindfolding facilitate four and perhaps five of the six -,s’pfjsO^ the 1949 Geneva Convention °n ers of War, POWs may not be m ^ P tortured; abused; mistreated; eXPj0 df avoidable combat risks; forced t° ^ if gerous work or work which
jatj y s war effort; be exposed to humil- pUnn,0r ridicule; be exposed to collective •hem- 6nt; *lave rePrisals taken against nied' °r denied food, shelter, and Gen'Ca* attent'on- There is absolutely no S(Jcj)Cva Convention prohibition against ckli reas°nable security measures as sha- ^ ,n8 and blindfolding unless done for or l mProper purpose such as to degrade ipi Umiliate the prisoner. Even this latter Criir)°ndUCt wou'ri rate low on the war ft>e/ySCaIe' ^erc >s no suggestion in fold eH’ York Times article that the blind- tban3ad shackles were for reasons other 'tiDn sens'hle military security of two aC)-n riant prisoners. The New York Times 0v>iedged as much in a correction run on 10 December 1983, page 25; “Article 46 [of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War] says merely that the transfer of prisoners ‘shall always be effected humanely’ and that ‘the conditions of transfer shall in no case be prejudicial to their health.’” The press never notes in these affairs that it is frequently for the benefit of their cameras and commentators that POWs are paraded about and put on exhibit.
Naval officers with a professional interest in the law of war—and all professionals should be interested—should be aware that the Training Division of Headquarters Marine Corps conducts four one- week law-of-war courses each year at the
Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island; the Command and Staff College, Quantico, Virginia; and West Coast locations. The course is specifically addressed to combat arms officers and judge advocates and quotas are periodically allotted to all major commands. The course is taught by Marine reservists with significant international law expertise.
Colonel Jeffries received a bachelor of arts degree and a law degree from the University of Kentucky. A practicing attorney and an infantry officer in the reserves, he is the executive officer of the Headquarters Marine Corps Reserve Augmentation Unit (Training Department) assigned responsibility for the Marine Corps Law of War program.
Mission
Combat Rescue: the Forsaken
By ------------------------------
eutenant Commander Kerry Sullivan, U. S. Navy
Policii
ay- The
<es of the services are in sad dis-
.
Rea®Stifying before Congress recently, statedAdmiral Paul T. Gillcrist (Op-50)
The National, Department of De- ^nse> Joint Chiefs of Staff and Navy jc*rectives on Search and Rescue poly ' • • state: First, that each military f^aiponcnt 0f the Department of Dense is responsible for providing res- 0 e capabilities in support of its own Petitions; Secondly, and more spe- •cally, that rescue operations in Pport of a naval task force are the sPonsibility of the task force comber. Also, and equally applicable cu ae Navy, is the JCS policy that res- 0 e operations in support [of] tactical Petitions in a battle area are the spe- lc responsibility of the tactical c°mrnander. ’ ’1 £
^arcl!15 ot lhe arguments for a combat & iVi anri rescue capability are:
\ ^ °ra'e of the aircrews I 5eUrn of critical manpower assets ^ O' intelligence to the enemy •akp. ect'on of Americans against being \ ^hostage
eratirfater cflance of special warfare op- V jS* capability P
Seaanced rescue capability for war at
>H *»»»« rescue is an essential function ^a c^°ri °f the greater Navy missions of <n'ro> and power projection. The capab<|tl rema'ns then, do we have the HoUse"riy t0 perform combat rescue? The °n l Armed Services Committee report ••lis Su?nngs held during April 1983 on clie Jcct stated: “The survival and res- committee found evidence of a disjointed, uncoordinated, neglected and totally unsatisfactory level of effort among and within the services.”2 Looking at the history of this mission provides insight into how this state of affairs came about.
Navy combat search and rescue (CSAR) has been considered by most naval historians as “. . . one of the few bright spots of the Vietnam War.”3 Vice Admiral Malcolm Cagle wrote that, “One of the truly great success stories of TF 77 operations in the Gulf of Tonkin is the development . . . of a combat Search and Rescue (SAR) capability. . . ,”4The heroism the helicopter crews displayed was exemplary. One of those cited by Admiral Cagle for his heroism was Medal of Honor recipient then-Lieutenant C. E. Lassen. After his retirement. Commander Lassen provided another perspective: “The Navy’s experience with Combat SAR in North Vietnam was a classic example of ‘how not to do it,’ we were totally unprepared, untrained, and with few assets. As a consequence, the TacAir and helicopter community paid dearly.”5 A CSAR force had to be built from scratch in 1965. In April of that year, combat attrition necessitated creating SAR stations using plane guard helicopters (UH-2A/Bs) on destroyers. By November 1965, SH-3A antisubmarine warfare (ASW) helicopters assigned to the carrier were stripped of their primary mission equipment and were also assigned to the CSAR mission. The H-2 helicopters were not provided with armor, self-sealing tanks, camouflage, an adequate engine, or a new machine gun until eight months after their introduction as CSAR aircraft. The SH-3 helicopters were not upgraded for this mission until a similar delay occurred.
Despite the peacetime success of these utility aircraft, aircrew recovery rates were low when enemy opposition was encountered. Success rates were calculated as 97% with no threat, 82% with a small arms threat, 60% against small arms and light antiaircraft weapons, and a 6% recovery rate within heavy antiaircraft artillery range. Rescues were not attempted against surface-to-air missile (SAM) threats. Another study noted that 321 Navy airmen were downed in North Vietnam or close to the shore. Of these, 169 were able to reach the ground alive, yet only one in six was rescued before being killed or captured. For the 27 Navy CSAR rescues made in North Vietnam, the Navy lost 19 aircraft and 15 SAR personnel. Clearly, ASW and utility helicopters flown by heroic but unskilled crews could not adequately perform the mission.
The concept that any helicopter and crew could conduct CSAR was abandoned. A special helicopter squadron, HC-7, was formed solely for the CSAR mission. HC-7 rescued more than 150 pilots from the combat zone without losing a crew to enemy action. Success came from mission specialization and standardized tactics. The November 1970 rescue attempt made on the Son Tay prisoner of war camp demonstrated this concept s viability. Air Force helicopters were successfully used without loss in a night raid only 23 miles from Hanoi. Such was not the case in the rescue attempt of the SS Mayaguez.
A joint force of Marine ground troops
-U-S'
Navy two-carrier battle group wo'
iuld *
ploy with about 10% of that number^ ASW helicopters on board our caf1^ today remain airborne for rescue P^
benefit of advance training or the sp equipment necessary for success.
and Air Force helicopters assaulted the island of Koh Tang on the morning of 15 May 1975. The assault force did not have the advance planning and intelligence available to the Son Tay raiders. The threat consisted of intensive small arms fire. Three helicopters were lost within ten minutes. Of the 14 helicopters that participated in the assault and subsequent evacuation, three were destroyed and ten were damaged. Significantly, the HH-53 crews, who were trained in CSAR, were twice as successful as the logistical CH-53 helicopter crews.
By 1975, all of the Navy’s CSAR assets, which consisted of the same aging H-3s, were transferred to the reserves to what is now HC-9. The significant submarine threat and growing sophistication of the ASW mission took priority, and CSAR was removed from the helicopter antisubmarine squadrons’ mission requirements. This prohibited CSAR training and equipment. Tactics and new equipment were still being developed by the Air Force, the Marines, and HC-9.
The general force decline since the Vietnam War has severely reduced a number of critical assets. The many priorities for our limited budget did not include a dedicated CSAR capability for the regular Navy. The Air Force and, to a lesser extent, HC-9, retain the only CSAR capability today. The regular Navy is without the ability to perform this mission. According to Commander Lassen, “The Navy is less prepared now for SAR than at the outbreak of Vietnam.”6
The important roles that helicopters played during the Falklands Conflict bear some significance for CSAR in modem naval warfare. The two carriers and the nine other classes of destroyers and frigates in the task force all operated helicopters, many doubling their normal complement. Three of these uses for the helicopter are relevant to the U. S. Navy’s CSAR mission.
After the loss of the helicopters on board the containership Atlantic Conveyor, a squadron of ASW Sea Kings (designated by the United States as H-3s) was converted to support the land campaign. This squadron was issued night vision goggles; their crews became proficient in using these after only a few hours of training. They were able to fly in total darkness 20 feet above the sea and insert teams ashore, a viable tactic for CSAR helicopters. The British could afford to use these ASW helicopters for a different mission despite the serious submarine threat because their carriers operated three times as many H-3-type aircraft as a U. S. carrier does. Covert operations preserved these unprotected helicopters.
The British Army Gazelle helicopter was designed for reconnaissance and command-and-communication missions. Its lack of offensive armament in a country devoid of natural cover made it vulnerable to ground fire. Efforts are now under way in Great Britain to enhance its battlefield survivability.
Finally, we should draw a lesson from the importance of helicopter SAR to the British task force. The rapid helicopter response to HMS Ardent, which had received two 1,000-pound bomb hits aft, rescued about 200 men from the fire and the water before other vessels could rive. After the loss of HMS Sheffield Ardent, the task force commander, j-■ ^ Admiral Sandy Woodward, held H Coventry back from a better Sea ' missile employment position to keep within rescue range. When the C°vi' was hit the next day, every available h copter was vectored to her position- ** ^ copters saved 283 crewmen, and only , men were lost. The task force cons'5 of about 150 helicopters. A similar poses whenever flight operations are ducted. They are the logical choice f] SAR or medical evacuation (Med*1 missions. In nearly every continge ' including the Gulf of Sidra and Gren ,i_ conducted by the U. S. Navy, ASW . copters are ordered to prepare for re ^ operations. The possibility of hostile , exists, whether ashore or at sea. Un ^ nately, these crews are not provide
' One0!
res£l1
the lessons of the Iranian hostage ‘ ,<
attempt was that it is easier to train in a new aircraft than for a new na'5 In the interest of self-preserva j. some helicopter squadrons have ^ oped their own contingency plans,ca . for the use of flak jackets and smallaI ,j. This creates a readiness dilemma f°r Ji copter units. Although not an asS1^,inP mission which would authorize tra } and equipment procurement, CSA ^ likely mission, nonetheless. Also,
The Army's Blackhawk helicopters, facing page, or the Air Force’s Night- hawks are viable options to boost the Navy’s sagging combat search and rescue capability until the JVX follow- on to the XV-15, left, is available.
it.
Tw0 f
Vavy. factors have further degraded the • t0rce posture to conduct CSAR.
f,rst is fh ~ il> tuiiuuei aortic.
S|rcw. ® loss of the CSAR experienced eritiCai ‘ mrough attrition. Second is the There as”0rtfall of helicopter assets.
,.tllc Plans to close down current Hi bea°lities ashore. Further, SH-3s
Vo7s3 defense-in-depth concept that an|iaircr f6Veral SAM systems as well as t reat artillery (AAA). Helicopters
rern • llc*y Helicopter:
°Pes ofain below the operational enve
^inerf.................
------------- uiv vipwauviiiai C.HVC-
most of the SAM systems, but
q ° ' ’ 1T1/i illlVJ UU1CI1MVC C1CC-
Untermeasures. Implied with this
js ' in ever)601 lhat t0 PrePare for the mission •isle of Ka meager way may increase the
V'e,nani w8 tasked t0 Perform il- The
Pilots h i ar s^owed us that helicopter «isSj"a“,the “right stuff” for the CSAR Hen • Ut lhey could not be successful Hich ,8'V?n the “wrong stuff” with (0 do i‘ at,d the reilu’red on more carrier decks, are barely enough for the ASW barely i,now- Acquisition programs have As ce§Un to alleviate these shortfalls, ■'ns instability has declined, the threat Ve'0PedeaSeCk "The Soviet Union has de- "y t0 ®ases the helicopter’s vulnerabil- . A. To successfully rescue ^ir^ a,rcrews in this environment re- tn°t at tact*cs and equipment. We HCo0,d to lose the same number of ^ learn'tkat we d'd in Vietnam before Theed b°w to perform SAR.
Undetect °St benericia' tactic is to remain l*'nslc th^ Using techniques which ""(1 „,h helicopter behind hills, trees, is one way to remain %her ' Flyin§ at n'ght or in bad '°Pter; ^ould further conceal the heli- I niriin’ Jhis tactic requires extensive S by and Practice. It is taught regu- !\ne c S °ther services’ including the k eaCs0rpS’ wh‘ch. however, does not \y AR mission requirement for the
^ beability t0 surv*ve once detected %tSj j enhanced by several improve- H^ y friing armor, suppressive fire, ?Pendah}0”8 weaP°ns, chaff and other sj es; reduced helicopter infrared i neUvatUre and reflectivity; evasive r°hic cer,n8 (EVM); and defensive elec
mission concept is the inability to conduct a traditional search.
The survivors’ position must be known in advance, and the search and rescue satellite and survivor avionics system are new technologies which should permit accurate locating information. A greater reliance upon and coordination with the various services’ survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) programs is essential. Time to rescue will always be critical.
Operational requirements (ORs) for new CSAR aircraft have been forwarded to the Chief of Naval Operations. These proposals were aimed at an H-60 airframe, but they were absorbed into the joint advanced vertical lift aircraft (JVX) program. The predicted initial operational capability (IOC) of JVX for CSAR is not until 1993 at the earliest. In June 1983, Vice Admiral Thomas J. Kilcline, then-Commander, Naval Air Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, forwarded a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations proposing that training programs and prepositioned CSAR equipment be provided on board aircraft carriers. He also requested that the SAR model manager develop realistic contingency programs and a viable tactical doctrine. Although he supported the JVX for the long term, he also recommended additional airframes such as the H-60 for the mid-term. Another request for specific CSAR assets was made by the Commander, Battle Force Sixth Fleet (CTF-60), in support of the U. S. Multi-National Peacekeeping Force in Lebanon.
The JVX is the joint services operational requirement based on the XV-15 technology. JVX has had some of the usual joint development problems, but no one doubts that it should be developed. The most urgent requirement for JVX lies with the Marine Corps. The Army is out of the program, and the Air Force is minimally supporting it for its special operations mission. Air Force CSAR needs will be met with the planned purchase of 243 HH-60D Nighthawks with an expected IOC of 1987. The JVX has an IOC of 1991 to replace the aging CH-46 Ma-
rine Corps helicopters. Navy needs for CSAR will follow those of the Marines. Neither the Air Force nor HC-9 is confident that JVX will be the best CSAR vehicle. It is the decade between now and then that is the major concern of fleet units. We cannot afford to wait that long for a viable CSAR capability.
It has been suggested, although not by the reserves, that HC-9’s nine HH-3As be positioned on board our deployed carriers. This poses the problems of ensuring trained crews are available to fly them and eliminating the Navy’s only repository of CSAR expertise. A more gradual shift of these assets to the active fleet is more practical, but there is a problem with the aircraft. These Vietnam veterans have high ground fire vulnerability; inadequate speed, maneuverability, range, and firepower; large weapon sensor signatures; no survivor detection capabilities; poor low-altitude navigational abilities and limited instrument flight capability close to the earth. They are above maximum gross weight when in a mission configuration. Nevertheless they are the best aircraft in the Navy inventory today for the CSAR mission.
There have been a number of proposals for commercial helicopters such as the Hughes 500. However, the equipment essential for CSAR will not fit in these smaller airframes—not every helicopter can be a CSAR vehicle.
The most viable alternative has been the proposal for the Marinized HH-60. A joint effort incorporating the Air Force’s HH-60D Nighthawk system into an SH- 60D Seahawk airframe could give the Navy a real capability in a few years. If, for instance, the Navy procured the SH- 60F as a replacement for its SH-3Hs it could have six ASW aircraft and two CSAR aircraft on each carrier without taking any additional deck space Even the addition of Army UH-60 Blackhawks has merit for the interim, but normal procurement delays aside, aircraft buys which compete with the JVX program are not being viewed favorably by the Navy The problem of what to do now for this, mission still has to be addressed. Our helicopters are inadequate both in numbers and capability. However, some degree of combat rescue capability can be provided through special equipment and training.
eo<
Commander Sullivan was a Naval Resef^ 0f Training Corps graduate of the UniversO^
Mexico in 1971 and earned his wings in
A trade-off must be made with the current mission requirements of these limited assets and the CSAR mission. Most important, firm guidance must be provided from higher authority to realistically define the participation of current Navy helicopters in combat rescue, removing the burden from the tactical commander (and the helicopter crews) to attempt high-risk rescues. It would not be a restriction of our capabilities, it would be an honest recognition of our already severely limited ability.
Specific steps can be taken in a number of areas now. First, we should identify what aircraft we intend to use for CSAR in the immediate future. There are no adequate numbers or reserves for any of our fleet helicopters. The choice will involve a trade-off. Although the H-46 is probably the best airframe choice, it is not consistently available to the battle group. Light airborne multipurpose system aircraft have inadequate cabin space to be worthwhile and are already committed to multiple missions. The SH-3 on board the carriers is large enough, and it has commonality with the HC-9 aircraft. If necessary, it can be deployed on SAR destroyers with Spruance (DD-963), Kidd (DDG-993), or Ticonderoga (CG- 47)-class hulls. At least one aircraft per helicopter antisubmarine squadron should be identified for the CSAR mission.
Second, one to two complete crews should be selected to fly the CSAR aircraft. Although they could fly ASW missions as part of qualified crews, they should not be required to be ASW mission qualified. The aircrew for the CSAR mission should contain a minimum of two qualified rescue swimmers augmented with additional rescue swimmers, hospital corpsmen, Marine aircrewmen trained in air-to-ground weapons, and/or SEALS.
Third, the training of this special crew would be vital to its success. The pilots should attend the Marine Corps Air Weapons and Tactics School flying their own squadron or HC-9 aircraft. A vigorous ongoing training program would have to follow to ensure proficiency. The bulk of this training should be done ashore under the tutelage of HC-9 personnel.
Fourth, careful management of equipment essential to CSAR against performance penalties would be required. Reductions in ASW capability would be partially offset by increased mission capabilities in electronic warfare and over- the-horizon targeting.
Finally, the policy guidance for the use of a CSAR SH-3 should establish the criteria necessary for mission launch. If, for example, each of the following criterion could not be met, the mission should not be authorized:
► The pilot must be alive, uncaptured, located, and authenticated
► A specially qualified crew and aircraft must be available
► There must be adequate threat intelligence available
► Entry, pick-up, and egress routes must be planned
► The planned routes can be flown and navigated under the forecasted conditions
► Local air superiority can be maintained
► The threat can be neutralized throughout the planned flight
► Adequate aircraft endurance exists plus a 45-minute reserve
Navy tactical commanders are responsible for rescue operations of their own forces. This requirement is based on policy decisions, service directives, an. ^ cessity. To abandon our own pe°P.^j. distress is contrary to American Pn j pies and naval tradition. We have » from many historical examples that^.^ bat rescue requires mission sPeC1 u;p- tion, prior training, and adequate 0f ment. The Navy is less capab conducting CSAR today than in the V It is time for serious action. In t*’e^for the Navy has spent millions of don ^ safety and survival equipment. It u° ^sS. tie good for an aviator to eject .sUClT,etit fully and survive in a hostile envir°n if he has no chance for recovery-
'Rear Admiral Paul T. Gillcrist, "Statement-^.,, Congress, House, Committee on Armed ft- Subcommittee on Readiness, Survival, ‘ l sistance and Escape (SERE) and Combat St ^ S- Rescue (CSAR), Hearing (Washington. Government Printing Office, 1983). j Sd'
2U. S. Congress, House, Committee on A pii- vices, Subcommittee on Readiness, Sur'i' sion. Resistance and Escape (SERE) at\ ijjngtd1. Search and Rescue (CSAR), Hearing (W‘iS ^g3l- DC: U. S. Government Printing Office' pp.158-160.
3Peter B. Mersky and Norman Polmar, The ,
War in Vietnam (Annapolis, MD: Nautical a tion Publishing Co., 1981), p. 120. c0tce^ 4Vice Admiral Malcolm W. Cagle, "Tas (ft? in Action Off Vietnam,” U. S. Naval l,is,‘
ceedings. May 1972, p. 89. . __ ^P***
5Commander C. E. Lassen, “Combat 8 ^
and Future,” Wings of Cold, Fall 1982, P- 6Lassen, p. 21.
- and
combat support (HC). From 1981 to 1983. ^^si^ Navy’s search and rescue model manager ^ H for the standardization of training and pr0^ee is currently attending the Naval War Co c
Our Amphibious Navy
By Lieutenant Commander Thomas P. Gallagher, U. S. Navy
iX'
come to mind.
After five major exercises in places as diverse as Hawaii and Somalia, Marine Amphibious Ready Group “A” (ARG A), under the Commander Amphibious Squadron One and carrying the diverse elements of the 31st Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU), was in an extremely high state of readiness when it joined the Multi-National Peacekeeping Forces off Lebanon in September 1983. These Marines were ready for any contingency. Or were they?
Our often professionally maligned amphibious forces, the “gator freighters,” are the victims of an unspoken (sometimes outspoken) snobbery from the Navy’s high-tech branches. To paraphrase the old slander against the teaching profession, it is sometimes said that, “Those who can, do; those who can’t, go amphibs.” There is, however, a major flaw in this line of thinking. Just as teaching is an important and demanding profession with a far-reaching impact on all aspects of society, so too is life in the amphibious Navy an important and demanding profession.
The Navy-Marine team is an increasingly visible tool for our foreign policy and has a significant impact on highly visible aspects of that foreign policy. Many examples are found everyday in the
press. Lebanon and Grenada
The Navy-Marine team often ' f the implement of our nation s u(1jcr policy throughout this centuO'’ ^on1” many guises and many adminis ^ and there is every reason t0.eX^6 suC’ role to continue. Yet, despite ejo^ cesses, near-successes, and. lessons learned, that amphibion ^ value is still not understood by e the C^5 would so readily use it. Nor are rent routine amphibious warfare e^ 0ften pertinent to the mission that is assigned to the amphibious f°rC \flot At infrequent intervals sine
y
thj , wl“ u*ai require sucn a rorce. tj, otherwise is to ignore the reality the wom ,bat ttle United States plays in anV ad r • t0day- 11 ‘s not possible under Ministration that the U. S. position
Under ’ tbe U- S. Marine Corps has come Wheth a(tac^ ^rom those who question tend 11 sbou*d even exist. Critics con- ogy a* fecent developments in technol- rriade 1 War^‘ghting techniques have c°nte Marine Corps obsolete. Yet, Win , t0 our national optimism, there ^>minWays be Lebanons> Grenadas, °Urnaf1Can ^ePuhhcs, and other tests of To thini?"3.1 wil1 that recluire such a force. °fth, ' '
in world affairs would change so much that we would never send our armed forces into combat short of all-out war.
There is then a question of how best to respond militarily to a crisis. Ideally, the answer is largely dependent upon the particular situation. But in a world of fastbreaking developments, the best prepared existing response is the highly trained and disciplined, flexible, and mobile amphibious force. When the ships of ARG A sailed into the Mediterranean, they were ready. Their presence was a major policy statement by the United States. The magnitude of the decision to bring our ARG A into the Mediterranean can be best understood in the context of other events and deployments then taking place.
When Korean Airlines Flight 007 was ruthlessly shot down, the Marines of the 31st MAU were part of the only embarked Marine unit in the world at that time. The U. S. practice of keeping two sets of Marines afloat and responsive had already been altered with the decision to keep the 24th MAU ashore and the ships of Amphibious Squadron Eight tied down in support of operations at the Beirut air-
°OfiPS
U. S. NAVY (DOUGLAS TESNER)
Although Marines are trained for their amphibious warfare mission, it is becoming more common for them to operate in an urban setting under hostile conditions, such as these Marines of the 24th MAU in Beirut in September 1983.
port. Now, despite developing events the designated response team in the Pacific was being committed to support the situation in Beirut. The 2,000 Marines of the 31st MAU could make little difference militarily to the effort then under way in Lebanon. They were not being sent there to “take on Syria” as some speculators thought. The United States was not at any time politically or militarily prepared to take on Syria or its Lebanese surrogates with ground forces using the assets at hand. ARG A was a symbol of u. s. intentions, fulfilling the
Mahanian principle of naval presence.
As events unfolded, the Navy-Marine team’s flexibility was tested and not found wanting. The degree of flexibility was not demonstrated solely by the integration of Pacific and Atlantic commands in an explosive and unpredictable situation—which served as a thorough and successful test of the “One Navy” concept—but also by the remaining ships of Amphibious Squadron One and the quickly embarked 35th MAU. Steaming from Okinawa in response to ARG A contingency operations and possible events in Korea, the newly formed ARG B covered the Pacific flank.
As recent history has amply demonstrated, the crisis, situation, conflict, or incident is going to be a “come-as-you- are” affair requiring timely, effective action by the on-scene commander using assets he has brought with him. Such was the case for ARG A and such was the case for Amphibious Squadron Four and the 22nd MAU in Grenada, and such has been and will be the case for many years. The commander is probably going to have to operate in an urban setting under hostile or at least semi-hostile conditions. The mission will be to protect and possibly to extract U. S. and other Western nations’ citizens from a rapidly deteriorating situation where the host government cannot or will not assert control to protect our countrymen. The situation will be tense operationally and politically, and there will be implied or explicit terrorist threats. _
Recognizing that-our nation’s amphibious forces are in the forefront of foreign policy, have our training methods and operating doctrines adapted to support the mission and prepared the commander on the scene to meet the challenge? To say, as some do, that our amphibious forces are still conducting World War II exercises is to oversimplify the problem. Our forces are not rehearsing for a World War II island-hopping campaign. Technology, especially the development of the helicopter, has caused a change in tactics. There is, however, something of a World War II mentality at work in our exercises, despite the fact that our available assets preclude putting together a large-scale invasion force.
Exercises conducted by U. S. forces alone, or in conjunction with other foreign services, inevitably take place in rural, isolated areas with sandy beaches and convenient helicopter pads. It is rare to have an aircraft carrier as more than a theoretical participant in the exercise. Naval gunfire support is usually simulated, often with simulated ships. Exercises covering the evacuation of civilians
are held, but again they fit a scenario largely managed through the use of “simulated” assets in isolated areas. The average frigate or destroyer will go several years without operating with an amphibious force. Yet every exercise scenario includes the premise that we will have well-coordinated carrier battle group support for any amphibious operation, ensuring air superiority and adequate naval gunfire support.
On a deployment, the amphibious task force typically operates entirely on its own with the nearest carrier or antisubmarine warfare (ASW) frigate hundreds or even thousands of miles away. Our forces in their exercise invasions of uninhabited jungle have never had to deal with the threat of car bombs or sniper fire from a civilian-occupied apartment building. The primary control ships anchored just off the beach have never had to deal with the threat of suicidal underwater swimmers or an explosive-laden speedboat emerging from a flotilla of refugee craft. Nor has anyone dealt with the problem of detecting terrorist suicide planes coming off the beach from the civilian airfield. Each of these threats will be increasingly encountered as our amphibious forces carry out the national interest.
How do we shift our training from the rice fields of Thailand to the realities of life in Beirut, St. Georges, or Santo Domingo? The first step is to reorient our thinking and define the mission. To have a Rapid Deployment Force or an elite anti-terrorist group is not the only answer to combating terrorism or irrational national acts, nor are such forces the only ones which will be faced by this “new” threat. Increasingly, the “regular,” much-maligned amphibious force is on the scene and being used. Increasingly, those amphibious forces are being stretched to the limit.
For a long time, the training exercises so skillfully carried out by our regularly deployed forces have not been appropriate to the assigned tasking of developing crises. Our current exercises do not lack value, for much is gained from a logistical standpoint in learning to deal with the inertia of moving large numbers of men and equipment ashore and back again; nor has planning in various policy-level commands avoided the realities of world events. But the man on the scene is not fully prepared to meet his assignment. We must revitalize our thinking and outlook with respect to our afloat amphibious ready groups. They have amply proved their worth. It is time that we provide our forces, down to the individual sailor and Marine, the realistic training
that they need to cope with the pr°' «ur nation has asked them to unde Our forces will need to be flexible
,blen»s
willing to change effectively as the nario unfolds. The 2nd Marine Divl* ^ has begun to hold extensive training this sort under the concept of the of maneuver warfare. This style
doctrine
of
ncorF
ing needs to be expanded and it>c rated into the training for the entire ^ phibious task force in the integrated free-play exercises that ac^ tuate and emphasize the unexpected-
scenario and training should take account that any operation likely
involved in an urban area. The emP
should be on a quick insertion
ofM<:
tN
to establish a perimeter to allow orderly control and evacuation ot . ians. Once the stated mission is ach'^j all military personnel should be rem ^ The manpower and equipment 0st deployed amphibious forces are0f
suited to just such a short-term
type1
operation.
Should the President decide tne permission has changed and that a mor ^ manent presence is needed ashore, ^ the forces to be used should chaP well. The value of the amphibious ^ force would then lie in securme^ beach, airfield, or helicopter a zone that would provide for the mot e manent assets of the Army and Air
It is fortuitous that the ships
----------------------------- 22oo
phibious Squadron Four with th.!nv f
* * 11 y *
MAU embarked were coincident® ^ route to Lebanon and in position ^
ceed in a timely fashion to Grenada- well would that operation have
>o0e
g1
9 As ^
without Navy and Marine assets- ^y pable as the Army and Air Force ar ’ j0nS are not as well suited to such 0Pcr^S(, <jl in forward areas. The increased ^ 0{
....
training exercises such as the Brig*1
multiple services by the Joint C Staff requires increased joint gjaf training exercises such as the Brig ^ir series and emphasizes the need *° dardization of operating ProC among U. S. forces. ^ tl>c
Our amphibious forces are front-lines of our national polity' .s oUf are professional and motivated. duty to ensure that they receive tt>e^g \t tion and training that they des®^ order to meet the missions for wm will be called.
the
Commander Gallagher was graduated fr° . in'
Academy in 1973 and holds a master s jjt- h
temational relations from Miami Unive^' j jucin an extensive at-sea
operational backgrou^j a„ s1^
ing a tour as the operations officer on » ' jg, phibious warfare ship. He recently a' the Naval Academy.
ibef 1