U.S. Naval Aircraft and Missile Development—1983

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Introduction

The defense budget is composed of ten distinct programs. The most pertinent to this discussion are program 1, Strategic Forces; 2, General Purpose Forces; and 6, Research and Development.* Each program funds the production of systems being procured to satisfy its defined mis­sions. Within the Navy, for example,

*The others are: 0, Support of Other Nations; 3, In­telligence and Communications; 4, Airlift and Sea­lift; 5, Guard and Reserve Forces; 7, Central Supply and Maintenance; 8, Training, Medical, and Other General Personnel Activities; and 9, Administration and Associated Activities.

Northrop workers inspect assembled FIA-18 center and aft fuselage sec­tions at the company’s plant in Cali­fornia before shipping them to the prime contractor, McDonnell Douglas, in St. Louis, Missouri.

program 1 funds all production of Trident C-4 missiles and submarines, while pro­gram 2 funds the acquisition of the A-6E attack aircraft. To develop a new weapon system for any program, however, all funding is provided under program 6, Research and Development (R&D). Thus, the new Trident D-5 missile and the A-6F attack aircraft development are funded in program 6.

For fiscal year 1984, the Navy re­quested $8,181,043,000 for program 6 R&D funding of 349 distinct line items. These funds were divided into five formal categories that themselves describe the progressive stages through which a weapon system is developed. Category

6.1,    Research, funds the basic scientific and technological research that is applied to specific military problems in category

6.2,   Exploratory Development. Category

6.3,    Advanced Development, funds the formation of technologies into generic systems, while category 6.4, Engineering Development, “militarizes” 6.3 generic systems into operationally suitable sys­tems for testing and evaluation. Category 6.5 funds the test facilities that evaluate 6.4 systems.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) oversees the R&D program through the DSARC process. DSARC stands for Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council, and it is composed of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the DoD Comp­troller, the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, the cogni­zant service secretary, the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation, or their representatives. At four and some­times five milestones in the development process of technology and systems, the DSARC meets to decide the future direc­tions of the program under consideration.

This article will look at the sea ser­vices’ major aircraft and missile pro­grams that are currently in some form of development, and those that have reached production milestones. Many of these systems will be discussed below, along with significant production system up­

grades and U. S. Coast procurements that do not fall ^u4 defense acquisition process.

Attack Aircraft

Currently, the Navy and Mab¹^ operate the McDonnell Douglas^ hawk (USMC only), the Grurni' Intruder, the LTV A-7 Corsair • only), and the British Aerospace ( Siddeley)/McDonnell Douglas and -8C Harrier (USMC only) cated attack aircraft. The N* Douglas AV-8B Harrier II will e^vii replace the A-4s and AV-8A/6; fine Corps service. The dual"¹ F/A-18 strike fighter is schedule place the A-7s in the Navy’s in^veC well as the F-4s in both Marine & fighter squadrons.

On 6 December 1982, Presid¹ gan nominated, as deputy sed1 defense, Paul Thayer, chairm¹¹* board and chief executive offi^ct LTV Corporation, manufacture Navy’s A-7 attack aircraft- Thayer’s 12 year tenure, LT\ tempted to sell the Navy a nava*^1, sion of the Air Force’s F-16 to1 mid-1970’s VFAX requirement-\ had brought suit against the NaO selected the F/A-18. The suit solved in the Navy’s favor. LT' tempted unsuccessfully to sell gined A-7 to the Navy iⁿ developing the F/A-18.

Still interested in the attadj market, LTV in September 19® J acquire 70% of the outstanding ’¹ stock and convertible securities1 man Corporation, makers of ^ trader. The Grumman manag^eJ buffed LTV’s offer, and a take^ ensued. After suffering several in its takeover efforts, LTV "'^,'¹ bid for Grumman in Novembe1.¹

On 8 December 1982, shod'.

Thayer assumed his new

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DSARC approved production tack variant of the F/A-18

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Thayer considered cutting procurement of the F/A-18 from 1,366 of both fighter and attack types to 988 and then procur­ing 250 additional A-6Es for the attack mission. Secretary of the Navy Lehman strongly favored procuring all the planned F/A-18s and then developing a new variant of the Intruder, designated A-6F, to replace the A-6Es then in the fleet.

In August 1983 the conflict between Thayer and Lehman became public as a result of a stormy meeting of the Defense Resources Board, which Thayer chaired for Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinber­ger. Congress went along with Lehman’s arguments that upgrading the A-6 would produce enhanced capabilities at signifi­cantly lower costs than developing a new aircraft or modifying the F/A-18. Funds for the A-6F were appropriated in the fis­cal year 1984 budget, and Thayer agreed to cease his opposition to FY 84 funding if the Navy continued to study the alter­natives. Chances of a recurrence of the Thayer-Lehman feud over attack aircraft were effectively blunted when Thayer resigned his post in January 1984 to de­fend himself against Securities and Ex­change Commission allegations about his stock dealings.

A-6E/F: The latest version of the In­truder, the A-6E, equips five Marine Corps squadrons and a single squadron in all but one of the Navy’s carrier air wings. That one remaining wing, Com­posite Carrier Air Wing Three, embarked on board the USS John F. Kennedy (CV- 67), is testing the operational flexibility of a wing with two A-6 squadrons. Both the Navy and Marine A-6 units are equipped with only ten aircraft each, the result of a depressed production rate not keeping up with attrition. Fifteen A-6Es were delivered in 1983.

In early 1983 the Navy identified three specific categories in which it would seek improvements for the new A-6F over its predecessor:      survivability, reliability/

maintainability, and performance. Spe­cific enhancements being considered for the A-6F to achieve these improvements include vectored thrust nozzles, giving the aircraft a short takeoff and landing (STOL) capability. The Navy has been examining such an enhancement with an A-6 STOL demonstrator under the aug­mented deflector exhaust nozzle (ADEN) R&D program.

A specific enhancement that would improve the survivability of the A-6 by giving it a standoff capability is the syn­thetic aperture radar. Adoption of such a higher data rate radar for the A-6F would open possibilities for the aircraft as a platform for long-range antiair missiles. If a high-speed 150-200 nautical mile missile were mated with the A-6F, there would be no need for the aircraft itself to be supersonic to respond to incoming bombers; the missiles could do all the work. Digital avionics will undoubtedly replace the A-6E’s generation-old avion­ics suite, freeing more space for ad­vanced protection and processing sys­tems. Grumman is also looking at building the A-6F with an advanced en­gine, either an upgrade of the Pratt & Whitney J52 that is already in the A-6E, or the General Electric F404. The very real advantage of the latter is that, since it is used in the F/A-18, commonality will simplify spares storage and availability on board an aircraft carrier.

Secretary of the Navy Lehman has gone on record favoring the F404. He has also specified that the total development

Crewmen of the guided missile frigate Crommelin (FFG-37) prepare to connect an in-flight refueling line to the hoist of the Navy’s first opera­tional SH-60B LAMPS III helicopter during flight deck qualifications in December 1983.

program for the A-6F should not exceed $500 million in FY 84 dollars, and $15 million each for the flyaway cost of 30 A-6Fs per year.

AV-8B: In 1974, McDonnell Douglas, which holds the American manufacturing license for the British Harrier, began de­veloping a new supercritical wing for the AV-8A that would effectively double that aircraft’s payload-radius. This wing be­came the basis for the McDonnell Doug­las AV-8B Harrier II. The new wing is 15% greater in area, 20% longer in span, can carry 75% more fuel than the old AV-8A wing, and it is constructed pre­dominantly of composites, which saves weight without losing strength. The AV-8B wing accommodates six stores stations rather than the AV-8A’s four. Other changes in the new AV-8B include an updated engine, composite construc­tion of the empennage and some fuselage sections, an elevated cockpit and canopy to improve visibility, redesigned engine intakes to improve the vertical takeoff thrust of the engine, and improved avion­ics. DSARC approved the production of the Harrier II in 1981, with plans for the eventual procurement of 336 machines for the Marine Corps. The British plan to acquire 60 basically similar Harrier GR.Mk5s for the Royal Air Force.

McDonnell Douglas flew the first of 12 pilot-production AV-8Bs on 29 August 1983. This particular aircraft was later introduced into the Fleet Marine Force during ceremonies at Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina, on 12 January 1984. The first AV-8B squad­ron is scheduled to become fully opera­tional in 1985.

AV-8C: As an interim measure pending arrival of large numbers of AV-8B Har­rier IIs, the Marine Corps is upgrading 47 of its AV-8A Harriers to improve their survivability on the modem battlefield. The converted aircraft feature lift im­provement devices developed for the AV-8B such as under-fuselage strakes, warning radar equipment in the tail and at the wingtips, a flare/chaff dispenser, improved communications gear, and an on-board oxygen generating system. The first few AV-8C conversions were per­formed by McDonnell Douglas in 1979. The Marine Corps is accomplishing the remainder of the conversions at Cherry Point, North Carolina. Thirty-six aircraft were converted through 1983, with the remainder scheduled in fiscal year 1984.

Fighter Aircraft

The Navy and Marine Corps currently employ the following aircraft in fighter or interceptor roles: the McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II, the Northrop F-5E Tiger II, the Grumman F-I4 Tomcat, and the McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet. The F-5Es in the Navy’s inventory, along with some A-4s, serve as aggressor air­craft to train Navy and Marine pilots in dissimilar air combat. The “aggressors” employ Soviet tactics to familiarize regu­lar Navy fighter squadrons with the prob­able nature of air combat against potential enemies. Secretary of the Navy Lehman announced in 1983 that he is seeking off- the-shelf replacement aircraft for the F- 5Es, and that the aircraft under consider­ation include the Northrop F-20 Tiger- shark, the General Dynamics F-16/79 Fighting Falcon, and actual Soviet air­craft purchased through a third nation such as Egypt. Lehman will likely make a decision on this procurement sometime in 1984.

The venerable F-4 Phantoms in Navy and Marine Corps service are being re­placed by the new F/A-18. The F-4 be­came operational with the Navy in 1961, and since then over 4,500 Phantoms have been delivered to the air arms of numer­ous nations. The last version built for the USN was the F-4J, which was later up­graded to the final Phantom standard, the F-4S. The upgraded F-4B, designated F-4N, and the F-4S are the two models still in service.

The F-14 and the F/A-18 are in full production. The number of each to be procured remains tied up in the question of what constitutes the composition of the ideal carrier air wing. The Navy con­ducted an evaluation in 1983 of an air wing composed of two squadrons of F-14s and two of A-6Es on board the John F. Kennedy. Late in 1984 the first “normal” air wing will deploy on the USS Constellation (CV-64); it will con­tain two squadrons of F-14s, one of A-6Es and two of F/A-18s. As more F/A- 18 squadrons stand up, they will replace both the F-4 and A-7 squadrons on USS Midway (CV-41) and USS Coral Sea (CV-43), resulting in four squadrons of F/A-18s and one of A-6Es on each ship.

F-14: The future of the Grumman F-14A Tomcat had been inexorably tied to determination of the optimum compo­sition of a carrier air wing, a quest that began shortly after John Lehman became Secretary of the Navy in 1981. Secretary Lehman removed most doubt about the F-14’s future in July 1982, however, when he recommended to the Defense Resources Board (DRB) that the F-14 be retained as the Navy’s fighter/interceptor in two squadrons on all large-deck car­riers, relegating the F/A-18 as fighter/in- terceptors only to those carriers that could not accommodate the larger Tomcats. The DRB accepted Lehman’s recommen­dation. From that point on, the question became not whether the F-14 should be upgraded to meet the threat of the 1990s, but how and when it should be improved.

In late 1981 and early 1982, the Navy, Grumman, and General Electric tested GE’s F101 derivative fighter engine (DFE) in the F-14. One tremendous ad­vantage demonstrated by the new engine was that its increased power enabled the F-14 to catapult from a carrier deck with­out employing afterburners, which saves an enormous amount of fuel. The Navy was very impressed with the performance improvements made possible by the more powerful and more efficient engines. Many identified a new engine as the sin­gle most important upgrade for the air­craft. Both General Electric and Pratt & Whitney offered the Navy higher thrust engines for the upgraded F-14; GE of-

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fered its F101DFE, redesignated FI 10 in late 1982; and Pratt & Whitney offered either an improved F100 or that engine’s bigger brother, the PW 1128. In late De­cember 1982, Pratt & Whitney delivered an improved version of its TF30 to Grumman for installation in new produc­tion F-14As. The first Tomcats with the new TF-30-P-414A engines were deliv­ered to the Navy in April 1983.

Having decided definitely to acquire future F-14s with new engines and up­graded systems, Secretary Lehman in May 1983 announced that the Navy would suspend the F-14A production line for fiscal years 1986, 1987, and 1988, reopening it in fiscal year 1989 for the newly developed F-14D. Savings from the suspended production would be used to fund the development of the upgraded Tomcat. This decision was hotly con­tested by Grumman and the New York congressional delegation, and in late July the Navy and Grumman came to an agreement to sustain limited production of F-14As until the F-14D enters the pro­duction line.

Helping Grumman’s case for keeping the F-14 line open was Lehman’s deci­sion in June to let the Air Force take the expensive lead in developing a new en­gine. In a 6 July 1983 memorandum to the Chief of Naval Operations, Lehman specified that total RDT&E for

marinazation of an Air Force selection” should not exceed $150 million.

In that memorandum, Lehman also outlined the nature of the avionics and radar upgrades he foresaw for the F-14D. In all improvement categories, Lehman stressed the need for commonality with other naval systems, reliability, and maintainability. Designs for all upgrades, including the engine, are to allow for retrofit into the F-14A. The total product improvement program is not to exceed $800 million in fiscal year 1984 dollars, with a flyaway unit cost goal for the F-14D of $30 million. The fiscal year 1985 budget submission contains the first funding for F-14D development.

F/A-18: In early October 1982 Secre­tary Lehman and McDonnell Douglas representatives were engaged in very se­rious negotiations over the cost of the fis­cal year 1982 buy of 63 F/A-18s. Lehman had at one point threatened to cancel the entire program if the flyaway price of each F/A-18 were not reduced $1.2 mil­lion to $22.5 million. On 4 October agreement was reached on that new price, and the new firm, fixed-price contract signed.

Barely one month later, the F/A-18 re­turned to the headlines. The U. S. Navy’s

Operational Test and Evaluation Force (OpTEvFor) recommended against ap­proving the F/A-18 for the attack role, citing various deficiencies. The single most critical deficiency cited was that of inadequate range. According to the Op­TEvFor tests, the F/A-18 possessed an unrefueled combat radius of only 220 nautical miles with two 1,000-pound bombs and no external tanks. This com­pared with the A-7E’s mission radius of 400 miles under identical conditions.

The immediate crisis was temporarily sidestepped by the Navy and the Office of the Secretary of Defense when the latter postponed indefinitely the scheduled 30 November DSARC review of the F/A-18 in its attack role to permit the Navy to review the OpTEvFor test results more completely. The Naval Air Systems Command rebutted the OpTEvFor find­ings by citing actual operational experi­ence with the F/A-18 in the first fleet squadron, VFA-125, and earlier develop­ment testing. These test figures were 13% better than OpTEvFor’s in the former case, 22% better in the latter. Lehman used these figures and OpTEvFor’s own to defend the F/A-18 against its congres­sional critics. He stated that the F/A-18 had met or exceeded 17 of 20 prescribed performance thresholds; of the three not met, he contended none was considered to have a significant operational impact.

Lehman subsequently recommended full production of the F/A-18 to the DSARC, which concurred on 8 December 1982 and sent a report to Secretary of Defense Weinberger for approval. The rationale for this approval was summed up by Aer­ospace Daily (13 December 1982): “Sur­vivability and self-escort capability gains outweigh range and endurance losses and the need for more tanker capacity . . . .”

On 7 January 1983, the F/A-18 offi­cially entered operational service at Ma- j fine Corps Air Station El Toro, Califor- i 0 nia. Marine Fighter/Attack Squadron (VMFA)-314 received its first F/A-18s to 1 begin replacing its F-4 Phantoms. By the end of December 1982, all VMFA-314 pilots had completed transition training in the F/A-18s operated by VFA-125, the F/A-18 conversion squadron. The squad­ron was up to seven of its full comple- £ ment of 12 Hornets by the end of Febru­ary 1983.

A combination of factors in early 1983 began casting doubt on the total program procurement objective of 1,366 F/A-18 production models. Deputy Secretary Paul Thayer had assumed office in late December and was reportedly opposed to the total buy. Congress had ordered the Navy to study various alternative mixes for its carrier air wings, all of which

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would have decreased the requirements for F/A-18s. Cost overruns and range deficiencies were still unanswered ques- dons plaguing the program. And even Secretary Lehman in March admitted the Possibility that the F/A-18 might be pro­cured only to fulfill the fighter, and not 'he attack, role.

On 17 March 1983, Deputy Defense Secretary Thayer approved production of 'he F/A-18 for the attack role. At the ^same time, however, he asked the Navy 'o study the best complement of aircraft 'u perform various missions from car­riers. It would be this study that would determine the total buy of not only F/A- '8s, but also F-14s, A-6s, and all other carrier aircraft. Thayer said the total pro­curement of the F/A-18 was likely to be *°wer than 1,366.

From September to November 1983 'he Naval Air Test Center at Patuxent River, Maryland, tested an F/A-18 in shortened takeoffs using a ski-jump ramp ^as part of the Ski Jump Launch Assist Rcogram. Ramp inclination varied from S’X to nine degrees over the course of the testing. The ski jump lowered the normal held takeoff distance from 1,900 feet to °uly 750 feet using combat rated thrust.

The final crisis faced by the Hornet in 1983 centered on the readiness rating of 'he F/A-18s assigned to VFA-125, the Hornet pilot training squadron for both 'he Navy and Marine Corps. A leaked confidential telex from the Commander °f Naval Air Force Pacific Fleet to the Commander, Naval Air Systems Com­mand, complained that the mission-capa­ble rate of VFA-125’s aircraft had de­clined steadily from June to November until only one-third of the aircraft on hand could perform their missions. In actuality, according to Navy officials, by 'he time that telex was leaked to Defense ™^eek, the readiness rate had already dra­matically turned around, so that by 10 December 81 % of the Hornets were mis- ^Sl°n-capable. Transition from manufac- '^Urer to naval personnel maintenance and an increase in operational tempo that was "Utially unmatched by the spares pipeline accounted for the especially low readi- hcss rates in October and November 1983.

In calendar year 1983, 67 F/A-18s 'vere delivered to the U. S. Navy and Marine Corps, bringing the F/A-18 total 1? 118 as of 31 December. In 1984, deci-

^Sl°ns are expected on preferred carrier air

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mixes, which will determine the °^Verall numbers of F/A-18s eventually Procured. Also in 1984, the Royal Aus­trian Air Force is scheduled to receive h^e first of its contracted 75 F/A-18 pur­^chase and the first U. S. Navy and Naval

Reserve squadrons will reequip with F/A- 18s, joining the Marine Corps and the Canadian Armed Forces as Hornet opera­tors. Spain will begin receiving its deliv­eries of F/A-18s in 1986.

Electronic Aircraft

Most electronic warfare aircraft in the fleet are the most modem systems avail­able. Some, however, are getting a bit “long in the tooth.” This is especially true of the EA-3B Skywarrior, which originally entered operational service as the A3D-2Q in November 1959. EA-3Bs are the Navy’s tactical airborne signal ex­ploitation system (TASES) and collect electronic intelligence while operating from both shore bases and carriers. At one point the Navy had plans to convert surplus S-3As to the TASES role as ES- 3s, but that program was virtually still­born. As of the end of 1983, many in the Navy recognized the need for a follow-on to the EA-3B, but could not muster the s’upport to include it in the budget.

E-2C: Through 1983, the Navy had procured 143 of all versions of the Grum­man E-2 Hawkeye airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft, 84 of which were of the latest variant, the E-2C. Six E-2Cs were delivered in 1983, and plans call for six

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The Navy is concentrating on two prin­cipal areas for upgrading the E-2C: the radar and the power plant. General Elec­tric was awarded a contract in May 1983 to improve its APS-125 advanced radar processing system (ARPS) in the E-2C to provide expanded surveillance capability, longer range, better electronic counter­countermeasures, and improved opera­tion in certain geographic and electro­magnetic environments. In late 1983 the Navy issued a request for proposals from industry to develop a more powerful turboprop engine than the Allison T56-A- 425 that is currently fitted. Target date for the new engine to be flight tested is Janu­ary 1986. Allison is expected to offer its developmental T56-A-427, which claims a 24% increase in power and 13% in- (Continued on page 228)

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U. S. Naval Aircraft and Missile Development—1983

(Continued from page 109)

crease in fuel efficiency over the earlier model. Performance boosts in both areas will provide a bottom line improvement in detection range and reliability that will counter the increasing threat posed against battle groups by Soviet “Back­fire” bombers and new antiship missiles.

E-6A: The EC-130 TACAMO aircraft operated by the Navy in the strategic communications relay role were always considered to be an interim measure for ensuring communications with the Amer­ican ballistic missile submarine force. A combination of the increasing age of the EC-130 fleet, its high operational tempo, and the larger operating area of the Tri­dent submarine fleet have dictated that the Navy replace the EC-130s with new aircraft that have better speed and endur­ance. In the summer of 1982, the Navy issued a request for proposals for a TACAMO replacement, dubbed ECX. Only one company responded: Boeing, with a proposal for a Boeing 707-320E modified to incorporate the necessary electromagnetic hardening, a trailing wire antenna several miles in length, a new electrical system for the tremendous amounts of energy necessitated by the mission, and the requisite communica­tions and navigation gear.

On 3 May 1983, the Navy selected the Boeing entry for development and dubbed it the E-6A. The initial contract awarded Boeing $34 million to develop a prototype E-6A and integrate the TACAMO communications system into the airframe. The E-6A will have approx­imately 95% airframe commonality with the Air Force’s E-3A AWACS aircraft. Barring budgetary cutbacks, the Navy expects to flight test the first prototype E-6A TACAMO beginning in mid-1986, and the second in early 1987. The first two production aircraft are scheduled for 1987 delivery, with all 15 aircraft deliv­ered by 1992.

EA-6B: The basic Grumman EA-6B Prowler has already experienced three electronic warfare systems upgrades since entering service in 1971: the ex­tended capabilities (EXCAP) upgrade which became operational in 1973, the improved capability, phase 1 (ICAP I) upgrade that entered service in the late 1970s, and the improved capability, phase II (ICAP II) upgrade that will ap­pear on production aircraft delivered in 1984. Each upgrade has kept the Prowler abreast of the latest threats, and adapted the aircraft to its changing role within the carrier battle group. Originally the EA-6B simply supported carrier aircraft strikes against surface or continental tar­gets; now it is becoming more and more a vital part of the battle group’s defenses as well, blinding attacking enemy aircraft.

To accommodate the multitude of roles the EA-6B must perform in the 1990s, the Navy has initiated development of a fourth improvement package. Grumman awarded a contract in late September 1983 to Litton Industries’ Amecom Divi­sion for full-scale engineering develop­ment of the advanced capabilities (ADVCAP) EW system, which Grum­man will install on future EA-6B produc­tion models and retrofit to EA-6B ICAP I aircraft. ADVCAP consists primarily of a new receiver processor group that will more efficiently and accurately classify the myriad of electronic emissions picked up by the EA-6B’s electronic surveillance equipment. ADVCAP-upgraded EA-6Bs will probably begin rolling off the Grum­man production line in the early 1990s.

Maritime PatrollSearch and Rescue Aircraft

The Navy operates two aircraft types in the maritime patrol role: the shore-based P-3 Orion, and the carrier-based S-3 Vi­king. The Coast Guard now has only two dedicated search and rescue airplanes in its fleet, the Lockheed HC-130 Hercules and the Dassault (Falcon Jet) HU-25A Falcon. The last Grumman HU-16E Al­batross amphibian was retired from the Coast Guard inventory on 10 March 1983, ending the type’s 32-year career with that service.

P-3: The Lockheed P-3 Orion has been operational with the U. S. Navy since 1962. The Navy has purchased over 500 of three major variants, P-3A, P-3B, and P-3C, most of which are still operational with the active Navy or the Naval R^e' serve. Twelve of the latest variant, the P-3C, were delivered in 1983, bringing the total deliveries of that version of the Orion to almost 230.

Since the P-3C entered service 1969, the Navy has improved its capabh' ities with two separate upgrades, Update I and II, and in August 1983 began test­ing a third improvement package, Update III, which will appear on production air­craft delivered in 1985. The key eleme^flt of Update III is the AN/UYS-1 Proteus Single Advanced Signal Processor that greatly improves the efficiency and capa­bility of sonobuoy data analysis. Produc­tion delays for the new Update III P-3& (they were originally scheduled for May 1984 delivery) may cause the Navy 10 retrofit immediately the Proteus to P Update IIs currently in the fleet so that the new capability will be deployed as soon as possible. Even though these latest P-3Cs have not yet begun to roll off th^e production line, the Navy is already p>^an' ning the P-3C Update IV program to dea with continuing Soviet submarine iu¹' provements.

Another P-3 upgrade program involve5 backfitting 25 P-3Bs with anti-surface warfare sensors and weapons. The Na^v)j evaluated the British Thome-EM1 Searchwater radar, but it turned out to he incompatible with U. S. Navy maint^e' nance procedures and to make it comp^at1' ble would have been prohibitively exp^el* sive. Lockheed will instead install Te*eJ Instruments’ APS-137V radar in all 2- P-3Bs being upgraded.

S-3: Lockheed’s S-3 Viking carried based antisubmarine warfare aircraft he came operational in February 1974. 0°.® hundred eighty seven were produced u^ntl mid-1978, at which time the product!⁰¹* line closed down and the tooling was p11 in storage. S-3s are embarked in squu° rons of ten aircraft on the USS Forrestt> (CV-59) and later classes of carriers.

In August 1981. Naval Air System® Command awarded Lockheed a contt‘*^c to upgrade the avionics and sensor p^aC ages on the S-3A. Dubbed the Weap0*¹ System Improvement Program (WSI* ■ the upgrade will provide improved aco^uS

The Coast Guard checks out its old >-13o_s for usable equipment and then g^,es them to Davis-Monthan Air Force ^ase in the desert for stripping. The big- V items stripped are the aircraft’s four _ar 9'A-7 turboprop engines. Propellers ₍j ^moved and refurbished to “zero ^e ; avionics and some minor compo- j ^{ts su}ch as valves are also removed if _th_e®°°d condition. These components are ⁿ shipped to the Lockheed production

^tle processing, better radar processing, ^uPgraded electronic support measures, a ⁿew sonobuoy telemetry receiver system, ^a standoff target classification radar sys- ^terr>, and the capability to carry the Har­Poon antiship missile. Upgraded Vikings ^will be redesignated as S-3Bs. The Navy plans to convert 160 S-3As to S-3B standard. The first S-3A was delivered to Lockheed for conversion in December *983, and a second will be delivered in 1984. Lockheed has proposed reopening ^the S-3 production line to deliver newly manufactured S-3Bs for the increased number of carriers planned under the *^eagan Administration.

HU-25A: On 5 January 1977, the U. S. Coast Guard awarded a contract to Falcon "®t Corporation, the U. S. subsidiary of ^assault-Breguet, for 41 HU-25A Guardian SAR aircraft based on Das­sault’s Mystere-Falcon twin-turbofan 'ght transport/corporate jet. Develop­ment problems caused the first aircraft to °^e delivered 31 months late, on 19 Febru­^ary 1982. Falcon Jet delivered the 41st ^and last HU-25 A on 29 December 1983.

Some developmental problems persist "mil the Guardian’s Garrett ATF 3-6-2C Jurbofan engines. Particularly vexing has ^Ccn an overheating problem around the ^Uel nozzles. Garrett has redesigned the ^c'⁾⁰ling shroud around the nozzles, and Pe new shrouds should be fitted in early ^y°4- Additional problems are being sys- cniatically addressed and fixes retrofitted

0           die Coast Guard Guardian fleet. HC-130H: The Coast Guard has oper­ated specially configured C-130 Hercules

unsport aircraft in the search and rescue ^r°te since the early 1960s. Sixteen of the ^Carliest versions have begun reaching the ^Cr|d of their useful airframe lives, but still P°ssess useful equipment. Rather than ?.P^end millions to try to extend the service ^^Ves of the oldest HC-130s, the Coast ^Uard came up with a novel idea. It pro- P°sed to save all the useful equipment . °m the old aircraft and supply it to ^°ckheed for installation on new HC-130 •frames. Using funds appropriated by _s°ⁿgress in the fiscal year 1982 defense Ppplemental, the Coast Guard ordered

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1         ^ first five new HC-130s in September

line in Marietta, Georgia, for inclusion in the new airframes. This procedure is esti­mated to save the Coast Guard some $3 million on each aircraft.

Lockheed delivered the first FY82- contracted HC-130H on 31 May 1983. The Coast Guard ordered five more in 1983 and expects them to be delivered by July 1984. A further buy of four is ex­pected for next year.

Trainer Aircraft

The Naval Air Training Command employs a mixture of turboprop and jet aircraft to train fixed-wing aviators for the fleet. All student naval aviators begin their training in the turboprop Beechcraft T-34C Mentor, which replaced the pis­ton-engined T-34B in the primary train­ing role in the late 1970s. Additional T- 34Cs are also replacing the T-28Bs and T-28Cs of the basic training part of the multi-engine pipeline. Advanced flight training in the multi-engine pipeline is conducted in the Beechcraft T-44A twin turboprop aircraft, an adaptation of the commercial King Air Model 90. The T-44As replaced Grumman S-2 and TS-2 Trackers in the advanced training role in the late 1970s.

The Navy conducts basic jet pipeline training in the aging Rockwell T-2C Buckeye, and advanced jet training in the McDonnell Douglas TA-4J trainer variant of the A-4 Skyhawk. The age of these aircraft forced a decision in 1979 on the development of a new trainer and training program. In mid-1979 the Navy prepared a mission element need statement for the VTXTS program (V = heavier-than-air; T = trainer; X = experimental; TS = total system). After two competitive so­licitations, in late 1981 the Navy selected the proposal of the McDonnell Douglas, British Aerospace, and Sperry Flight Simulations team to proceed with engi­neering development of the T-45 total training system.

T-45: Developments in the T-45TS program for 1983 centered on the ques­tion of “dry Hawks and wet Hawks.” Proceeding on the Navy’s original sched­ule for development of the carrier-capa­ble T-45A (“wet Hawk”), the first pro­duction aircraft would not be available for training command use until 1991. Unfortunately, the attrition rate for the Navy’s current advanced jet trainer, the TA-4J, is so high (3.8%), that the ad­vanced jet pipeline will become critically short of aircraft before wet Hawk produc­tion can begin to make up the difference. The Navy’s solution to this problem was to request a buy of 54 non-carrier-capable

T-45Bs, or “dry Hawks,” which could be ready for delivery in 1988. Two hun­dred fifty one wet Hawks would then fol­low on the McDonnell Douglas produc­tion line. A similar mix of carrier-capable T-28Cs and shore-based T-28Bs served the navy’s multi-engine pipeline well for 25 years.

Congress and the General Accounting Office both felt that the combination of the dry and wet Hawks was too expen­sive, and that the Navy could fulfill its training requirements by procuring only 282 wet Hawks. The Appropriations Committee reports of both the Senate and the House directed the Navy to restruc­ture its T-45 procurement plans so that all aircraft would be carrier-capable. As of the end of 1983, the Navy was reconsid­ering all its VTX options including: ac­celerating development of the T-45A to fulfill Congress’s wishes and Navy train­ing requirements at the same time; resub­mitting the original dry and wet Hawk program for fiscal year 1985; and aban­doning the T-45TS program altogether and starting from scratch.

Rotary-Wing Aircraft

The Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft Development Program (JVX) overshadows all other 1983 rotary­wing aircraft developments in terms of potential expense, interservice dissen­sion, organizational maneuvering, and publicity. It began the year a joint Army- Navy-Air Force 6.4 Engineering Devel­opment program and ended the year a Navy-only 6.3 Advanced Development program. Its operational potential is enor­mous for all the services, but only the Marine Corps has a pressing immediate need for it and thus cannot wait for the other services to become enthusiastic. Although eclipsed by JVX, a variety of other Navy/Marine Corps/Coast Guard helicopter programs also reached signifi­cant milestones in fiscal year 1983.

JVX: At the same time that the Marines began the lengthy process for developing a replacement for their CH-46 and CH- 53A/D transport helicopters, the Army was developing a requirement for a spe­cial electronic mission aircraft (SEMA) and the Air Force was looking for a spe­cial operations aircraft. On 30 December 1981, the Office of the Secretary of De­fense directed that the services jointly develop a single airframe, perhaps using tilt-rotor technology, to fulfill their re­quirements, and the JVX was bom. The Army was awarded primary responsibil­ity for the project, and, under its leader­ship, JVX achieved Milestone I approval

on 8 December 1982.

From the beginning, the Army had se­rious reservations about the projected costs and payload of the JVX and its ap­plicability to the SEMA mission. The original split amongst the services of the $2.3 billion price tag for development of the JVX amounted to 46% from the Army, 42% from the Navy, and 12$ from the Air Force. At the end of Decem­ber 1982, Richard DeLauer, Under Sec­retary of Defense for Research and Engi' neering, ordered the Navy to assume responsibility for JVX development and shifted the funding split to Navy, 50%» Army, 34%, and Air Force, 16%.

On 18 January 1983, Naval Air Sy^s" terns Command issued requests for pr£" liminary design proposals to 74 compa­nies and individuals. Only a team composed of Bell Helicopter Textron and Boeing Vertol submitted a proposal, however. Sikorsky, expected by most to compete, declined to participate, because it had too little tilt-rotor experience. Oⁿ 26 April, NavAirSysCom awarded an $18 million letter contract to the Bell' Boeing team for preliminary design °1 their tilt-rotor JVX. At the same time, the Navy acknowledged that it was evaluat­ing ways in which Bell and Boeing could compete against each other in the produc­tion phase of the JVX program. The schedule announced at the contract award called for preliminary design to be com­pleted in February 1985, full-scale engi­neering development from June 1985 to August 1987, development test and eval­uation from August 1987 to December 1990, initial operational capability (IOO for the Marines in 1991, and IOC for th^e other services in 1993.

In late November 1983, the Defense Resources Board decided to fund the JV^ as a Navy program, with $2.1 billion al­located through fiscal year 1989 for i|^s development. The Army and the Force were released from the joint devel­opment program, and subsequently rC' duced their purchase plans to 231 and 8" respectively. Each of the two services will pay development costs peculiar on!) to their specified variants.

AH-1J/T: The Marine Corps has bee11 flying the AH-1 gunship since it first ac cepted the single-engined AH-1G varia11 in 1969. The principal versions used b) the Marines since then have been AH-1J and AH-1T Sea Cobras, both wit*¹ twin engines to improve reliability AH-IT remains in production to continuing Marine Corps orders. By cal year 1988, plans call for all Mari'¹¹' Attack Helicopter squadrons (HMA) be composed of the latest AH-IT aircrat¹'

In the past year, plans have been ma^d

total

new-

new production run of 90. The first production SH-2F was delivered on

^to modify the AH-Is to carry the Ray- theon/Ford Aerospace AIM-9L Side- ^wmder air-to-air missile, giving both the ' and T variants defensive capability ^gainst the Soviet Mi-24 “Hind” attack ^aelicopter. In June 1983, NavAirSysCom ^als° awarded Bell a contract to integrate and qualify the General Electric T700- ^E-401 twin-engine power plant in an ^H-1T airframe for evaluation by the ^Navy in fiscal year 1984. The T700 is already in the Navy inventory as the SH- . “’s power plant, and, when acquired ^ln future AH-lTs, will provide not only additional spares commonality in the sup- P'y system, but also a 65% increase in Power over the AH-IT’s present T400 P°wer plant. The T700-equipped “H-1T + f_lrst flew on 16 November and the Marine Corps intends to Procure at least 44 examples.

SH-2F: In the early 1970s, NavAir- ysCom contracted with Kaman to con- ^^ert 20 search and rescue HH-2D ^easprites to an interim LAMPS (light ^airborne multi-purpose system) configu- ^ra,1°n for antisubmarine operations from ^misers, destroyers, and frigates. The '^rst SH-2D deployed in December 1971. uimately all 104 surviving H-2s were “Pgraded to the final LAMPS MK I con­juration, the SH-2F.

„ 'Unfortunately, insufficient numbers of **-2F aircraft exist to embark on all AMPS Mark I-configured surface ships ^at are scheduled to remain operational j. ^r°^ugh the 1990s. The Navy has there­. ^re contracted with Kaman to reopen the '2 production line, closed since 1966, ^and has placed orders for 36 more air- ^ft. Additional orders are likely, up to a

September 1983. Kaman will deliver 11 ditional production SH-2Fs in 1984. j "^esearch and development for upgrad- g the SH-2F continues, centered pri- ^aruy on improving the dynamic compo- ^nts of the aircraft’s propulsion system. C/AIH-53E: The U. S. Navy accepted I^{e ive}ry of its first production CH-53E in ^ to November 1982. Sikorsky delivered 1 '° both the Navy and Marine Corps in ®3. Navy examples will be used pri- _s.f^ri'y for vertical replenishment duties.

orsky and the Navy are now in the „ !ⁿg stages of a program designed to d gtoeer a minesweeping variant of the ^Per Stallion. Designated MH-53E, this . minesweeping helicopter will re- ^^ace the twin-engined RH-53D in Navy du • ^Sikorsky rolled out the first pro- j_ln^<T^t*^on Prototype on 14 September 1983 h . transported it to the company’s West I to Beach, Florida, test facility the fol- ^wtog month for two years of testing.

Production of the MH-53E should begin in 1986, leading to the eventual procure­ment of 57 examples.

TH-57C: The Navy has been using Bell TH-57 SeaRanger helicopters in its undergraduate pilot training syllabus since acquiring 40 TH-57As in 1968. Basically a militarized Bell Model 206A JetRanger, the TH-57A has handled the basic flight training chores while UH-1E and TH-1L “Huey” helicopters have handled advanced flight training. In 1981 the Navy opted to replace the aging Hueys with eight VFR (visual flight rules)-equipped and 89 IFR (instrument flight rules)-equipped SeaRangers, TH- 57Bs and TH-57Cs, respectively. Bell delivered the first IFR-equipped TH-57C to the Navy on 16 November 1982. Tests were completed by the end of July 1983, and the TH-57Cs are currently in opera­tion with Training Air Wing Five at NAS Whiting Field, Florida.

LAMPS Mark III/SH-60B: LAMPS III is not simply a helicopter; it is a total weapon system that integrates a surface ship and an aircraft. The surface ship ele­ment is made up of destroyers of the Spruance (DD-963) and Kidd (DDG-993) classes, Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)- class frigates, and Ticonderoga (CG-47)- class cruisers. The aircraft is the Sikorsky SH-60B Seahawk. Partially to ensure that the system concept prevailed, the U. S. Navy made IBM the prime contractor for the LAMPS III system, with Sikorsky as IBM’s subcontractor for the SH-60B air­frame. LAMPS III is the first aircraft project for which the Navy has not made the airframe manufacturer the prime sys­tem contractor, and this novel arrange­ment has been getting mixed reviews from government officials and contrac­tors alike.

The LAMPS Mark III program, and especially the SH-60B, has consistently been the target of cost-cutting efforts. Early congressional demands to cut pro­gram costs resulted in the Navy com­pressing the total buy of 204 production aircraft into four fiscal years, which drove the costs down. Annual Defense Department budget constraints and con­gressional unwillingness to go along with the Navy’s plan in 1983 caused the SH- 60B procurement to be stretched out, shooting the overall program cost back up again. In late August 1983 Naval Air Systems Command announced that it had negotiated a two-year price for 48 SH- 60Bs that was 31% below the fiscal year 1982 price.

The first operational SH-60B squadron formed in San Diego during January 1983. This Readiness and Training Squadron, HSL-41, received its first two pre-production Seahawks in May 1983. Sikorsky delivered to the Navy three pro­duction SH-60Bs from September through December 1983.

SH-60F: The Navy has assigned the designation SH-60F to a system based on the airframe and power plant of the SH- 60B, but with an entirely different weapon/sensor package. This new air­craft will eventually replace the aged SH-3H Sea Kings now operating from aircraft carriers on ASW, search and res­cue, and plane guard (“Angel”) mis­sions. Plans for the SH-60F include the installation of the latest version of the AQS-13 dipping sonar for submarine de­tection in the inner zone around the air­craft carriers.

The Navy had planned to procure all its SH-60B helicopters by the end of fiscal year 1985, and then procure the SH-60F beginning in fiscal year 1986 to keep the Sikorsky production line going without interruption. When congressional fund­ing cutbacks effectively doubled the SH- 60B’s procurement from four to eight years, development of the SH-60F also slipped. The latest schedule requires that SH-60Bs and SH-60Fs be produced at the same time. According to Vice Admiral Robert Schoultz, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air Warfare, SH-60F pro­duction could be delayed no longer be­cause the SH-3Hs they are replacing will become quite scarce by 1990. By that time the SH-3 design will be over 30 years old. The Navy has a requirement for 175 SH-60Fs. A definite production decision will follow the Navy’s opera­tional test and evaluation of an SH-60B modified as the SH-60F prototype.

HH-65A: On 14 June 1979, the Coast Guard awarded a $215 million contract for 90 short-range recovery helicopters to Aerospatiale Helicopter Corporation. Like most Coast Guard procurements, the HH-65A Dolphin uses as much off-the- shelf equipment as possible to hold down costs. It is a development of the Aerospatiale AS 365N twin turbine heli­copter, modified with U. S.-built engines and avionics that account for 60% of the cost of the aircraft.

Initial deliveries of the Dolphin to the Coast Guard were to have started in No­vember 1981. This schedule slipped six months because of engineering difficul­ties inherent to the integration of the American-built Avco-Lycoming LTS 101-750A-1 turboshafts into the French airframe. Testing of the first aircraft indi­cated modifications were necessary to compensate for weight gain and to meet performance specifications. Changes centered on enlarging the shrouded tail rotor and increasing the number of blades

Mi

^m that rotor from 11 to 13. This delayed the program another ten months. By late Aerospatiale and the Coast Guard had negotiated an additional year’s delay ^ln deliveries for Avco-Lycoming to in- ^c°rporate improvements in their LTS101 turbine to accommodate the Dolphin’s ^We>ght growth.

. In June 1983, the Coast Guard condi­tionally accepted the first HH-65A for testing and evaluation. The aircraft still Wormed below contractual specifica- t'ons unless the engines were operated at *00% power. Retrofits to the Avco-Ly- ^c°ming engines on the first 25 aircraft Produced will rectify the power problem, “tnd the 40th production aircraft will be delivered with an upgraded LTS101 tur- ^0shaft that will meet all performance ^recluirements at considerably lower Power settings. The Coast Guard antici­Pates full-scale deliveries to commence in ^early I9g4 lssiles series of ship- and submarine-launched cruise missiles is probably the most stra­tegically significant naval weapons de­velopment since the Polaris A-l 25 years ago. Six different versions of Tomahawk were under development for the Navy and Air Force by the Joint Cruise Missile Project Office (JCMPO) at the beginning of 1983: the BGM-109A Tomahawk land-attack missile with a nuclear war­head (TLAM-N), the BGM-109B Toma­hawk antiship missile (TASM), and BGM-109C Tomahawk land-attack mis­sile with a conventional warhead (TLAM-C), the BGM-109G ground launched cruise missile (GLCM), and the BGM-109H and -109L medium range air-to-surface missiles (MRASM).

As a result of marginally acceptable test results, poor quality control, sched­ule slips, and operational decertification of the nuclear-armed missile. Congress refused to grant the Navy an increase in the Tomahawk production rate for fiscal year 1983 and directed in the Defense Department continuing resolution that second-sourcing of the missile by Mc­Donnell Douglas be funded as proposed. In January 1983, the Navy announced a restructuring of the entire Tomahawk pro­gram that slipped the initial operational capability of TASM from June 1982 to September 1983 and TLAM-C from Jan­uary 1982 to September 1985.

Tomahawk flight testing resumed in March 1983, after a hiatus since Decem­ber. On the 6th a TLAM-C fired from an armored box launcher on board the USS Merrill (DD-976) crashed after flying 25 miles inland. This marked the 21st Toma­hawk failure in 89 development test flights. A successful test followed on 14 April from USS La Jolla (SSN-701), and two days later the La Jolla successfully test fired a dummy warhead TLAM-N against a target 800 miles distant. The USS New Jersey (BB-62) conducted a successful test of a TLAM-C from one of her armored box launchers on 10 May. The New Jersey later deployed to the Far East (9 June) with eight TLAM-Cs and TASMs, 24 less than her operational complement, but still the first Tomahawk deployment for the fleet.

In early May, the Navy announced it would cancel plans to backfit Tomahawk- vertical launch system tubes into 31 ex­isting Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class at­tack submarines. Plans to include VLS tubes on new-construction attack subma­rines would remain in effect, however, and the first submarine to be so config­ured would be SSN-719. The Navy cited budgetary restrictions as the reason for the change.

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first flight test of the Tomahawk anti-ship missile since a failed test in September

1982.     The missile successfully demon­strated its search, localization, and attack capability against a destroyer-sized target over a 100-nautical-mile distance. The La Jolla repeated the test successfully on 18 July, marking the seventh successful Tomahawk test in three months.

Despite test successes and JCMPO as­surances that the program restructuring effort had succeeded in solving most of Tomahawk’s problems, the Senate Armed Services Committee in its fiscal year 1984 authorization final report is­sued in early July cited cost increases, less-than-satisfactory test results, and unacceptable performance by the Navy and General Dynamics; it then cut the program by $106 million and reordered the Navy’s production priorities. In con­trast, the director of the JCMPO recom­mended to the Secretary of the Navy in August that Tomahawk production be increased from as few as four per month to as many as 12 per month in the near term and up to 15 a month by December

1983.

On 25 August 1983, the Navy an­nounced that TASM was carried on board four attack submarines: Guittaro (SSN- 665) and La Jolla (SSN-701), succes­sively Tomahawk test platforms, Boston (SSN-703) and Atlanta (SSN-712). Later, congressional testimony was re­leased that indicated all four submarines also carried TLAM-Cs. The first subma­rine apparently received its Tomahawk capability at approximately the same time as the New Jersey.

Concurrently with the resolution of problems in the TLAM and TASM pro­grams, the Navy and Air Force were be­coming more disenchanted with the BGM-109H/J MRASM program. Neither service was particularly enthusiastic about its respective version of MRASM, preferring other individual service devel­opments for the MRASM missions. In late August, the marked-up defense au­thorization bill sealed MRASM’s fate by recommending its termination. Other classified programs were recommended as replacements to perform MRASM’s missions. JCMPO issued MRASM stop- work orders to both General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas the week of 22 August.

Despite JCMPO’s recommendation for accelerated Tomahawk procurement, Secretary Lehman announced on 7 No­vember that Navy Tomahawk production would be limited to 120 per year for budgetary reasons. JCMPO still planned to maintain its competitive production policy between General Dynamics and

McDonnell Douglas, beginning in Fiscal Year 1985. The Navy’s ultimate procure­ment goal is over 4,000 missiles.

AMRAAM: Under the terms of an Au­gust 1980 memorandum of understanding with Britain, France, and Germany, the United States was assigned the responsi­bility to develop the Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM)t0 replace the AIM-7 Sparrow. AMRAAM is a joint Navy/Air Force program with the Air Force as lead service. A compel'" tive fly-off of prototype missiles between Hughes and Raytheon resulted in a De­cember 1981 award to Hughes for full- scale engineering development of theU design, designated the AIM-120A. The contract calls for production of 87 devel­opment missiles for test firings fr^ofn F-14, F-15, F-16 and F/A-18 aircraft' The first test of a full-scale development AMRAAM is scheduled for early 1984-

AMRAAM is designed to overcome the disadvantages of the aging Sparrow* which is still being procured in larg^e numbers (1,289 by the Navy in 1983)- The Sparrow’s principal disadvantage ^lS its semi-active radar guidance which re­quires the launching aircraft to keep th^e target illuminated with its own radar f°^r the missile to home. AMRAAM has 3 launch-and-leave capability, thus permit' ting a pilot to concentrate on other target and the tactical situation in general as soon as he launches the missile. Other advantages possessed by AMRAAM ove^r Sparrow include an all-weather, all'^aS' pect, look-down/shoot-down capability in an electronically hostile environment' lighter weight permitting more to be ca^r' ried (AMRAAM is roughly two-thim5 the weight of Sparrow), and greater rel*³' bility. According to Hughes Aircraft’ AMRAAM’s radar seeker is more powe^r' ful than the radars of most fighter ah craft. Navy initial operational capability for AMRAAM is expected in fiscal y^ei*^r 1989. In a separate but related Navy P^r° gram, Hughes is investigating the fu^aSl bility of adapting AMRAAM to the bas^|L point defense missile role, replacing S^e‘' Sparrow in the 1990s.

Standard Missile: The General IT namics Standard family of surfacc-t⁰"³^ missiles (SAMs) was conceived as a ^re placement for the first generation Terf^|C and Tartar SAMs that equipped the m3 jority of U. S. guided missile destroyed and cruisers in the 1960s. Standard M^lS sile 1 (SM-1) has been in product'¹’¹¹ since the mid-1960s for the U. S. N^aVT and foreign customers. The latest variaⁿ is Standard Missile 2 (SM-2), with- completed development in 1977. 6. SM-1 and SM-2 missiles are produced 1 medium range (MR) and extended ra11-¹

(ER) versions. The primary difference between the SM-1 and SM-2 versions is 'bat the latter has a mid-course inertial navigation system that doubles the SM­I's range.

. The Navy and General Dynamics make •niprovements to the missiles in produc­^tion blocks. The 1,000th SM-1 Block VI tolled off the General Dynamics assem­bly line on 21 June 1983. The major im­provement from SM-1 Block V missiles ^ls a guidance section that incorporates a new monopulse receiver and new digital guidance computer similar to those in the SM-2. The latest SM-2 missile is the “^lock II. On 18 April 1983 an SM-2 “lock II with new Thiokol Mark 70 booster fired from the USS Mahan OjDG-42) established a new altitude rec- otd in scoring a tactical kill on an incom­es target drone. Forty such SM-2 (ER) “lock II missiles are scheduled for deliv­^ery to the Navy in 1984, and full produc- 'i°ⁿ will likely follow in fiscal year 1985 after DSARC III approval.

RAM: Like AMRAAM discussed above, the RIM-116A rolling airframe uussile (RAM) is the result of a memo- 'andum of understanding signed by par- ‘O'pating NATO nations. In this case, the uited States, Denmark, and West Ger­many agreed in 1979 to develop jointly a 'gntweight, high rate of fire missile for autiship missile defense (ASMD). Gen- Ufal Dynamics Pomona Division is the ^ead contractor for development of RAM, ^av'ng been awarded a full-scale engi- ^neefing development contract for the juissile on 11 June 1979. The first test ’"volving a supersonic, low-altitude, ^Cruise missile target occurred on 28 Feb­ruary 1983 when a RAM successfully in­. ^fcepted a remotely-controlled, incom­es Vandal missile at the White Sands 'ssile Range. Additional tests will con- 'ⁿUe into 1984 when RAM will go before ^e DSARC for a production decision. Harpoon: The RGM/AGM-86 Har- °n has been in production for nine ^ars as the Navy’s standard antiship _s ^lss>le. The RGM-86 entered operational '^^ervice on board surface ships in 1977, .^tl(f the AGM-86 achieved initial opera- ^ual capability with the P-3 in 1979.

°ck I Harpoons were delivered prior to _s- Uc 1982, when the first Block IB rais­in ^c Was accepted. The primary difference fil een the two variants is the flight pro- d₎^e °f the missile’s terminal approach to ^e target. Block I missiles execute a 0^P'^up maneuver and then a diving attack l_r 'be target to ensure hits against low- ^eeboard ships. Block IB eliminates this _ai₍^neuver and attacks at sea-skimming ,_ar^ltudes to reduce the effectiveness of the ®^et’s antiship missile defense. Block

IC missiles, which have programmable terminal flight profiles and greater range than earlier versions, completed develop­mental testing in late 1982.

Tests in 1983 confirmed the opera­tional effectiveness of the Harpoon from a variety of platforms in several different tactical environments. On 23 March the New Jersey and a P-3C launched one Harpoon each in a coordinated attack exercise in the Pacific Missile Test Range off Point Mugu, California. Concluding a series of three tests, a B-52 also success­fully launched a Harpoon from 30,000 feet. U. S. Air Force plans to expand its Harpoon capability to two squadrons of B-52s by December 1984.

Maverick: Two versions of the AGM- 65 Maverick air-to-surface missile are under development or being produced for the Navy: the AGM-65E Laser Maverick for Marine Corps use and the AGM-65F Imaging Infrared (IIR) Maverick for Navy antiship use. The former completed its development testing in the summer of 1982 and entered production in fiscal year 1983 with an initial buy of 12. Fiscal year 1984 production was to increase to 165. The IIR Maverick in 1983 success­fully completed its engineering develop­ment tests with its operational flight tests due to start in February 1984. Production will likely commence in fiscal year 1985.

HARM: The AGM-88A High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) has been under development since 1972 for the Navy and Air Force as a replacement for the Shrike and Standard ARM mis­siles. On 2 December 1982, Texas Instru­ments (TI) delivered the first production HARM to the Navy, and a total of 100 were delivered in calendar year 1983. Costs on the missile escalated when it entered production, and the Navy wanted to control those costs by naming a second source that could compete with TI for production orders. The Office of the Sec­retary of Defense and the Air Force wanted simply to develop a lower-cost seeker head and compete only production of that. Such a development program would have delayed service introduction of the missile to 1990. The controversy reached the open press in late April 1983. By early October, the General Account­ing Office had entered the argument squarely on the side of the Navy’s plan to compete production of the whole missile, high-cost seeker included. Congress set aside $80 million for a second source to be named.

ASWSOWIVLA: The antisubmarine warfare stand-off weapon (ASWSOW) is under development to replace the obso­lete SubRoc (submarine rocket) on board Sturgeon (SSN-637) and later classes of

Test firing of the rolling-airframe missile (RAM) being developed under sponsorship of the Navy and West German Government.

nuclear-powered attack submarines. The Navy initiated the program in 1980 to replace both SubRoc and the surface ship-launched ASRoc (anti-submarine rocket) but decided in 1982 that the costs and schedule of developing a common system for both submarine and surface platforms were less favorable than devel­oping separate systems for each. Conse­quently, in 1983 the Navy requested funds for Boeing Aerospace to begin full- scale engineering development of the submarine-launched ASWSOW for a 1989 initial operational capability, and for a separate vertical launched version of an improved ASRoc. First candidates for incorporation of the vertical launched ASRoc (VLA) system are Spruance (DD- 963) and Ticonderoga (CG-47) class ships.

General Developments

The biggest news stories in military procurement during 1983 concerned the costs of spare parts for the myriad of weapon systems maintained by the mili­tary. The original story broke in January when an Air Force staff sergeant discov­ered that Boeing had charged the Air Force $1,118.26 for a plastic cap to fit over the leg of a folding stool in the E-3A Sentry aircraft. Numerous other such stories blossomed in the press over the ensuing months, and some rather con­spicuous abuses of parts procurement policies were uncovered. The companies involved in these isolated incidents agreed immediately to make restitution to the Department of Defense.

The problem centered not on corporate greed, for most major defense contractors have incentive programs for employees who suggest ways to save money under government contracts, but rather on the complex process of procuring spare parts itself. Often, parts suppliers to the ser­vices are not the manufacturers, but sys­tem integrators who get systems from subcontractors, who in turn get subsys-

terns from their subcontractors, who may get parts from a variety of suppliers, be­fore finally reaching the manufacturer of a particular part. At each step, handling costs and government-allotted overhead charges and approved profit percentages raise the cost of the part.

Another reason for costly spares for older systems involves reopening closed manufacturing lines to produce a few parts at grossly uneconomical rates. DoD acquisition regulations permit the cost of such start-up and then shut-down proce­dures to be passed along in the cost of the part. Most defense contractors prefer not to get into this kind of situation because of the terrible publicity which results.

In late July, Secretary Weinberger sent a memo to all service secretaries outlin­ing a ten-point program to make more efficient the way the services procure parts. The program included incentives for competitive bidding and government employees who pursue cost savings; stem disciplinary action against negligent gov­ernment employees; warnings to defense contractors on the seriousness with which DoD views the spares problem; greater authority for competition advocates in the material commands; refusals to pay un­justified price increases; accelerated re­form of basic contract procedures; steps to obtain refunds in cases of overcharg­ing; efforts to identify alternative sources of supply; continued audits and investiga­tions of spare parts procurement; and praise for the vast majority of suppliers who charge equitable prices for the spares they supply the government.

On 7 October, the Navy announced Project Boss (Buy Our Spares Smart) in response to Secretary Weinberger’s memo. The Naval Material Command allocated $13.1 million for the “break­out” of spare parts acquisition from prime contractors. Breakout is defined as either the direct purchase from the actual manufacturer of a part or equipment pre­viously purchased from a system prime contractor, or the competitive procure­ment of a part or equipment previously purchased non-competitively. In actual­ity, the Navy has been practicing break­out procedures since the early 1960s with considerable success. Once the design of a system is finalized and it enters produc­tion, the Navy routinely shifts from the prime contractor to his suppliers for the acquisition of spare parts. Project BOSS has simply emphasized this procedure, and in some cases accelerated it. Primar­ily, it has called attention to something the Navy was already doing, but for which it was not credited.

Two other events of potentially enor­mous impact on the procurement process occurred in 1983, both involving con­gressional direction. One was Congress’s decision that DoD should establish a cen­tral office for test and evaluation of ne" weapon systems. This will effectively take the T&E process out of the control of the services, and it was adamantly op­posed on that ground by the Reaga¹¹ Administration. The second congres­sional mandate involved the requiremen¹ that manufacturers warrant the system⁸ they sell to DoD. Pratt & Whitney’s vol­untary warranties on the turbofan engine* that it sold the Navy and the Air Force prompted this congressional action. The ultimate effect of both these actions be felt in 1984 and beyond, and will h^e discussed in later editions of this weapons development update.

Floyd D. Kennedy, Jr., is manager of defense mark⁵ research and Soviet studies at Ketron, Inc., Arling­ton, Virginia, and is also maritime editor and colum­nist for National Defense magazine. He contribuW* regularly to the Naval War College Review, Woo Book encyclopedia, the Proceedings, and classif^lC Navy journals. He is coauthor of two books on nth¹ tary aircraft, including Military Helicopters °f World, published by the Naval Institute Press. ^a° has contributed to two texts in naval history. tn°') notably In Peace and War: Interpretations of AM^erl can Nava! History, 1775-1984. The author is a gt^a, uate of the University of Illinois and holds a mast^er! degree in international studies from The Amen^¹¹ University. He is a commander in the Naval ReseP^c intelligence program.

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