Stretching the Fleet into the 1990s

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On the opposite page, as she neared the end of her reactiva­tion period at Pascagoula, Mis­sissippi, is the battleship Iowa (BB-61), first commissioned in 1943. She and dozens of other ships being modernized are helping to build the size of the U. S. fleet toward 600 ships by stretching the usefulness of existing hulls. The drawback to the Service Life Extension Pro­gram (SLEP) and its relatives is that the dollars spent to renew old combatants cannot be used to purchase more capable new- construction ships. Ironically, the battleships are the only ships in the program for which there is no modern counterpart available. For carriers, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, amphib­ious warfare ships, and auxilia­ries, the money which might have gone toward more up-to- date vessels is being allocated to strengthen the fleet size in the immediate future. Whether this will be done at the cost of mort­gaging the longer term future remains to be seen.

The decision of the Reagan Administration to aggressively pursue an expansion in the size of the fleet to 600 ships by the end of the decade—one eventually centered around 15 carrier battle groups that would . . restore and maintain maritime superiority over the Soviets . .               —was a major departure from the policy of previous ad­

ministrations.¹ However, looking over the proposed shipbuilding re­quest for fiscal years 1985-1989 gives one only a partial picture of how this force level will be achieved. Even if Congress does approve these funding requests to build new ships, a large number of existing ships facing retirement in the late 1980s and during the 1990s will have to steam longer than planned and be upgraded to meet new threats.

Actually, the requirement to utilize existing ships as a stopgap mea­sure to compensate for erratic and often unusually low levels of new ship procurement is not new. Since the end of World War II, hundreds of ships, ranging from submarines to aircraft carriers, were modernized with new weapons, sensors, and other warfighting improvements.² During the late 1950s, the modernization programs aimed at forestalling the block obsolescence of hundreds of World War II-built ships still in commission were taking on a notably different character. Now past the midpoint of their planned service lives, many ships had steamed contin­uously since the war, including hard service during the Korean conflict, and were beginning to wear out. Under the Fleet Rehabilitation and Modernization Program (FRAM) begun in 1959, a variety of ship types, including destroyers, submarines, destroyer-type troop transports (APDs), and carriers were scheduled for major overhauls on a priority basis comparable to that of the polaris program.³ The rehabilitation work included an extensive overhaul of the hull and machinery, which gave the ships an added five to ten years of service life.

By the mid-1970s, nearly all of the World War II ships, which were then at the end of their extended service lives, were decommissioned- New shipbuilding programs needed to maintain the fleet at pre-1970 levels were not funded despite the efforts of two Chiefs of Naval Opera­tions. Early in the decade, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer advocated a level of new construction to hold the line at 850 ships; Admiral James L. Holloway III later in the 1970s tried to keep the fleet count at 600.⁴ The chief problem was that following the failure of U. S. foreign policy during the Johnson Administration and the military debacle that ensued in Vietnam, Congress had considerable doubts as to the need for such a large fleet. Another factor was that in between the tours of Moorer and

Howard W. Serig studied transporta­tion economics at New York Univer­sity, earning a B.S. degree in 1965 and an MBA in 1967. He joined the Army National Guard in 1967 and during the next six and one-half years, the various units to which he was assigned were activated to deal with the Newark and Baltimore riots as well as floods in Richmond, Virginia. Between 1967 and 1972, he was employed by the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway as a systems analyst in both Baltimore and Richmond. Since 1972, Mr. Serig has been employed by the U. S. Depart­ment of Transportation as an economist working on a variety of ocean transpor­tation projects. As a freelance photog­rapher and writer, his work has ap­peared in a number of magazines. His essay “The Iowa Class: Needed Once Again” was published in Naval Review 1982. He is now at work on a book to be titled Ship scape.

Holloway, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt had begun a delib­erate program of accelerating the retirement of older ships in order to free up operating and maintenance (O&M) funds for new ship construction—particularly those on the “low” end of the fleet mix.⁵

The yearly number of ships procured during the 1970s averaged about 15—below even the modest level of the 17 to 18 new ships needed simply to maintain the fleet of 530 ships (including Naval Reserve and Military Sealift Com­mand ships) that were in commission by the end of the decade.⁶ But the types of ships that Congress did fund were also a major concern. In line with Zumwalt’s philos­ophy, more than a third were smaller, less capable frigates designed for ocean escort missions.

While the Reagan shipbuilding program will attempt to redress the failure of previous administrations to ade­quately fund the construction of new combatants—an an­nual average of 24 new ships is requested between 1985- 1989—it also includes the largest fleet rehabilitation pro­gram since FRAM. By a recent count, 142 ships, includ­ing the largest and most expensive ships in the fleet, are slated for modernization and extension beyond their nomi­nal service lives (Table 1).

These activities will be accomplished in a variety of ways. The required service life enhancing repairs and up­grades can be made during major complex overhauls or conversions, both of which usually last more than one year. More frequently, they will be performed on a grad­ual or incremental basis as a part of regular overhauls or scheduled restricted availabilities (SRAs). With the recent adoption of the engineered operating cycle (EOC) con­cept, aimed at extending the time between overhauls for most ships from the current 3-5 years to a planned 5-10 years, these modernization activities will change. A grow­ing proportion of combat systems upgrades and ship alter­ations provided under the Navy’s ongoing Fleet Moderni­zation Program (FMP) will have to be scheduled during the short (usually two months each) intra-cycle depot maintenance periods.⁷

The number of years of additional service life that will be added to a given ship type varies depending on the utility of the ship in meeting fleet mission requirements and prospects and timing for congressional funding of new replacements. It also depends on a ship’s nominal service life, the point beyond which major repairs are expected to be required to significantly increase her service life. Al­though there is no absolute maximum age beyond which a ship could not be operated a little longer if necessary, a decision to extend service life is also likely to have an impact on fleet readiness, because maintenance require­ments and operating costs are likely to rise as older ship­board components wear out and structural elements fail-

In recent years, the Navy has assigned nominal service lives to its ships, primarily on the basis of experience with the deterioration over time in the physical condition of a vessel’s primary components, i.e., hull, ship and combat systems. From a ship engineering standpoint it is feasible to extend a ship beyond her nominal service life if the physical condition of components within these systems is found to be within reasonable tolerances for a particular ship class. The present ship nominal service lives were developed during the 1960s and were summed up in 1970 by Admiral Ralph W. Cousins, then the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, who told a congressional committee,

. . it is our experience that an age of about 30 years for surface ships, perhaps slightly less for submarines, is a reasonable maximum life expectancy for the hull, propul­sion machinery and basic installations.”⁸

Thus far, things have been going the Navy’s way. The shift toward a goal of maritime superiority and the major new funding commitment it will entail seem, for the mo­ment at least, to be acceptable to Congress. In 1982, with surprisingly little objection, Congress appropriated funds for two new nuclear powered aircraft carriers, the most significant component thus far of the record postwar ship­building and conversion (SCN) plan offered by the Reagan Administration. Yet it will take time to achieve a lasting rebuilding of the fleet—time that will span many events, many members of Congress, and a few Presidents.

If the past 40 years are any indication, the public’s sen­timents in the future regarding what portion of national resources should be set aside for defense purposes are likely to change. These sentiments will depend not only on events taking place overseas but on the overall perfor­mance of the economy and the success or failure of do­mestic social programs.⁹ Given the currently popular no­tion that high defense budgets are the primary cause of record budget deficits, the current and projected adminis­tration defense plan (estimated to cost $2 trillion over the next five years) is being viewed increasingly as a threat to the economic recovery now in progress.¹⁰ It is going to be very difficult for Congress to follow through on the cur­rent defense program, especially if the Soviets avoid caus- ^lng incidents which are likely to arouse East-West ten­sions.

Aside from possible congressional backsliding, the 600- ship Navy plan has already drawn criticism from within the administration. During his year in office, Deputy De­fense Secretary Paul Thayer (a decorated naval aviator) ^v°iced strong opposition to Secretary of the Navy John Lehman’s 600-ship fleet centered around 15 carrier battle groups. Thayer questioned the affordability of such a force, estimated by some to cost more than $100 billion by fhe end of the decade—and one that would very likely divert funds from the other services. The Deputy Secretary’s most serious misgivings were over possible vulnerability of aircraft carriers to air or cruise missile ^aKack and the high cost ($700 million per ship) to build fhe multi-mission Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class destroy­ers needed to defend the carriers.¹¹ This struck at the heart °f the Navy’s future—as seen by Lehman—and generated ^an unusually sharp and open controversy between the two that did not end until Thayer’s sudden resignation in Janu­ary of this year. Even before Thayer’s departure, Lehman, with the full support of Secretary of Defense Casper Wein­berger, had already won his bid to push ahead with signifi­cantly larger Navy budgets in the five-year defense spend­ing plan. Lehman is likely to go on winning as long as President Reagan stays in the White House. On that as­sumption, the fleet should total something just over 600 deployable battle force ships by 1989.¹²

Table 1 Service Life Extension Upgrade and Repair Programs

Number

of                                            Standard              Year

Name                     Ships Displacement Commissioned

End                                   Years

Nominal      Type of      Added to

Service Upgrade and Service Life            Repair      Life

Major New Capability to be Installed

Aircraft Carriers

\frrestal (CV-59) fⁿy Hawk (CV-63) f}^,erPrise (CVN-65)

Midway (CV-41)

^Lex‘ngton (AVT-16) Cruisers

^L°ⁿS Beach (CGN-9)

°^a"ibridge (CGN-25) ,^ruxtun (CGN-35)

Leahy (CG-16) ^elknap (CG-26)

®^a,tleships ^0XVa (BB-61)

Submarines ^lfifayette (SSBN-616) ^tthan Allen (SSBN-608)

destroyers

Carles F. Adams (DDG-2)

Amphibious Ships

y^'in (LPD-4)

,^chorage (LSD-36)

^J‘ma (LPH-2) ^Heston (LKA-116)

Auxiliary Ships

J^0sfio (TAO-143 Mispilhon (TAO-1 ^h'abula (AO-51 ^r°'eus (AS-19) ^Ur‘bachi (AE-21) yel (TAF-58)

VuT (AD-14) ^Vu'ean (_AR-₅)

niton (AS-11)

„ ,'Am (ASR-9) °'ster (ARS-38) Total

1955-59

1961-68

1961

1945-47

1943

142

1954-56

1945-46

1943-45

1944

1956-59

1955

1940-          44

1941-          44 1941-43 1943-47 1945-46

1961

1961             1967

1962-64

1964-67

1943-44

1963-67

1962

1960-64

1965-71

1969-72

1961-70

1968-70

F-14 on some; NATO Sea Sparrow NATO Sea Sparrow NATO Sea Sparrow F/A-18

FBM Missile handling equip.

Tomahawk; New Threat Upgrade New Threat Upgrade New Threat Upgrade New Threat Upgrade New Threat Upgrade

Tomahawk

12 Ships with Trident C-4 2 Drydeck Shelters

AAW Upgrades

LCAC

LCAC

AV-8B

Modernization and service life extension of large and expensive ships will comprise a significant element of the Navy’s plan to achieve that goal—and maintain it—during the 1990s. But in the rapidly changing world of naval strategy and weapons technology, it is difficult to avoid asking—is the extension of old ships is the best approach toward meeting the challenge posed by $oviet naval and air forces? The answer to that question requires a close look at which ships are being extended and how they are to be modernized; the look reveals a varied picture.

Aircraft Carriers

Inasmuch as the Navy regards aircraft carrier battle groups as its primary offensive strike capability, moderni­zation and service life extension of existing carriers are by far the most important naval shipyard activities of their type. Not only do these programs underpin the Reagan Administration’s efforts to increase the number of battle groups to 15 (to be formed around 15 deployable carriers with an additional one in long-term overhaul), but they will also have a significant impact on the construction and the extension of service life for other types of ships re­quired to support the planned force level.

During the 1970s, it became increasingly clear that the Soviet Union was embarking on a major naval shipbuild­ing program, including construction of its first carriers. The defense winddown following the Vietnam War re­duced the number of Navy front-line carriers to 13, the lowest point since the outbreak of the Korean War.¹¹ Pros­pects for a replacement construction program sufficient to rebuild carrier force levels were uncertain at best. Largely for budgetary reasons there was a growing sentiment among administration officials that land-based air power could replace a large portion of the Navy’s at-sea air force. Carrier aviation was seen increasingly in terms of small, conventionally powered carriers designed primarily to handle defensive operations by means of vertical and short takeoff (V/STOL) aircraft.

It was against this backdrop that Admiral Holloway, who had formerly been the Navy’s first OpNav project coordinator for aircraft carriers, initiated during his tenure as CNO the concept of extending the service lives of exist­ing large-deck carriers. Since a final performance evalua­tion of the V/STOL aircraft would not be known until around 1995, Holloway succeeded in convincing Defense Secretary James Schlesinger and others in the Ford Ad­ministration that a major rehabilitation of the four For- restal-class carriers (CV-59-62) should be undertaken immediately—just in case V/STOL proved to be a flop.¹⁴ “SLEP,” the Service Life Extension Program, was for­mulated in 1976 (when the Forrestal-class ships were be­tween 17 and 21 years old) and initiated in April of the following year with a decision memorandum from the CNO Executive Board. The memorandum established the parameters for a 28-month shipyard industrial effort de­signed to increase the service lives of aircraft carriers as “first line ships, capable of effectively operating desig­nated first line aircraft’’ by an additional 15 years.¹⁵

The most significant element of the program, and the one that most distinguishes it from a routine overhaul, is the extensive repair and selected replacement effort, ac­counting for more than 70% of the program’s man-days (Table 2). These repairs are designed to provide the maxi­mum service reliability of the ship and her systems to sup­port mission requirements during the extended life period.

In September 1981, as part of the Reagan Administra­tion’s efforts to increase carrier battle group strength to 15, Admiral Holloway’s successor, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, approved adding the Kitty Hawk class (CV-63­64, 66-67), plus the nuclear-powered USS Enterprise (CVN-65) to the program, thus increasing to nine the number of carriers scheduled for rehabilitation.¹⁶ Given the magnitude of the service life extension program, it is not surprising that it was influenced by politics early on. The contract for the first carrier scheduled, the Saratoga (CV-60), and at least three additional ships that would likely be awarded to the same yard was actively sought by Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock. Besides hav­ing built all the Navy’s carriers since 1961, Newport News employed the largest skilled shipyard work force in Amer­ica. However in April 1978, largely to redeem Vice Presi-

Table 2 Summary of Major SLEP Activities USS Forrestal (CV-59)

Estimated Per- Man-Days cent

!. Fleet Modernization Program Alterations:                 198,016      13

*lnstall Close-In Weapons System ^Install NATO Sea Sparrow ♦Install AN/SPS-49 Radar ♦Install Improved Weapons Handling System ♦Install Halon firefighting capability in main machinery spaces ♦Install Carrier Air Traffic Control Center and Direct Altitude Information Readout

♦Reclaim JP-5 System ^Convert Avgas tanks to weapons handling and JP-5 service

♦Upgrade firefighting capabilities

II. Life Enhancing Alterations:                               234,076 15

♦Install two additional 100,000 gallons per day evaporators ♦Install four 363-ton air conditioning plants, improved chilled water distribution system ♦Modify Pri Fly Control ♦Replace boiler blowdown piping ♦Replace aviation fueling/defueling system

III. Repairs To:                                                       1,128,329    72

♦Main engine turbines ♦Propulsion and through tank piping ♦Tanks and voids (as well as cleaning)

♦Combat systems

♦Weapons elevators and magazines ♦Blowers, feed, booster and circulating pumps

♦Underwater hull ♦Propulsion and sea valves ♦Catapult and arresting gear mechanical and structural systems ♦Auxiliary systems ♦Habitability features ♦Catapult steam piping ♦Internal communication systems ♦JP-5 system

♦Boiler and boiler controls

Total                                                                       1,560,421    100

Source: Office of Chief of Naval Operations, "Aircraft Carrier Service Life Exten­sion Program, 1983 Congressional Budget Review," U. S. Navy Washington. DC.

dent Walter Mondale’s broken 1976 campaign promise not ^to close the Frankford Arsenal, the Carter Administration Elected the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard.¹⁷

Aside from political considerations, it was a questiona­ble choice. The facility had only a limited work force and ^^ad not performed a carrier overhaul in ten years. The cost

Performing the work at Philadelphia was estimated to j"?^st the Navy $526 million—$119 million higher than the ^b|d submitted by Newport News. Just how important the ^Carrier extension program was considered to the adminis- !^ration’s political future was apparent during 1980 follow- 'ⁿE Carter’s loss to Senator Edward M. Kennedy in the

Philadelphia Mayor William Green and U. S. Vice Presi­dent Walter Mondale were on board the carrier Saratoga (CV-60) when she arrived at Philadelphia amid much hoopla in September 1980 to begin her service life exten­sion. Below, work is in progress on a weapons elevator. Bottom left, the Saratoga leaves the shipyard in February 1983 upon completion of her modernization.

Pennsylvania Democratic presidential primary. On 1 Oc­tober, 34 days before the election, Vice President Mon­dale flew aboard the Saratoga as the carrier entered the yard. Greeted by a Navy band and large contingent of reporters, the ship’s arrival was described by the Washing­ton Star as a “lavish happening with significant political overtones.” ¹⁸ As if to offer some rational explanation for the selection of Philadelphia to perform the carrier’s ser­vice life extension, Mondale told reporters, “Philadelphia was where our Navy was founded. The first colonial war­ship was outfitted here.” ¹⁹ Mondale could have also men­tioned that Virginia, with 13 fewer electoral votes than

Pennsylvania, had not voted for a Democratic presidential candidate since 1964.²⁰

In order to complete the Saratoga’s SLEP on schedule, it was necessary for the shipyard to hire immediately nearly 4,000 qualified workers. However, in the short time period alloted, this was not possible, and the shipyard was obliged to hire hundreds of unskilled job applicants and immediately begin a series of on-the-job training pro­grams. To augment the shortage of qualified shipyard workers, nearly 1,500 of the carrier’s crew members were retained on board to provide industrial support services as assigned, rehabilitate berthing spaces, and fulfill routine security and damage control contingencies in conjunction with the responsibilities assigned the shipyard com­mander. They eventually performed nearly 15% of the total work man-hours. Inasmuch as the ship was decom­missioned during the first year of the modernization pe­riod, principal responsibility for the work rested with the shipyard.

During the next 28 months—in spite of rumors suggest­ing that poor workmanship, theft, and vandalism were causing significant problems—the Navy insisted all was going well. And so it seemed. Near the completion of the SLEP period in December 1982, the Saratoga left Phila­delphia for a series of sea trials that eventually resulted in the ship successfully completing her acceptance trial and underway material inspection given by the Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey. In January 1983, the USS For- restal, the second carrier scheduled for SLEP, arrived in Philadelphia. The following month, heralded by a naval base news release proclaiming “SARATOGA’S $526 mil­lion overhaul a success” the ship departed for Mayport, Florida, to begin a period of post-shipyard availability.²¹ But, within weeks of leaving Philadelphia major problems were discovered in the ship’s steam plant. Hundreds of superheater tubes began leaking at the point where they were welded to header plates.

Between March and early November, while charges were exchanged over the quality of work performed at Philadelphia and the decision to send her there in the first place, the Saratoga was tied up at Mayport, Florida, while workers replaced and rewelded all of the 2,048 super­heater tubes in her eight boilers. The additional work cost the Navy $18 million and caused the ship to miss nearly three months of at-sea training during 1983. While super­vision of the welding process at the Philadelphia Shipyard was criticized, and 12 civilian supervisors and two naval officers were censured for poor quality control, a Navy investigation of the failures revealed that a newly ap­proved robotic welding method was also at fault. During a 6 October news conference in Philadelphia, Secretary John Lehman acknowledged that the leaks were “not solely the problems of the Philadelphia Navy Yard,” but warned the shipyard workers that the decision to assign a third and fourth carrier (i.e., Independence [CV-62] and Kitty Hawk [CV-63]) would be made on the basis of their performance on the Forrestal.²²

There is reason to believe that Lehman’s warning is being heeded. Aside from the increased attention being given to the program, a very substantial effort has been made to understand the mistakes made on the Saratoga and avoid making them on Forrestal. Furthermore, in an effort to reduce theft and vandalism, which were estimated to have cost the Navy $13 million during the Saratoga’s SLEP, the Forrestal is remaining in commission during the entire service life extension overhaul, thus providing ship’s personnel with more incentive and authority to head off problems. As an added security measure, an 8-foot- high cyclone fence has been erected around the Forrest­al’s dry dock and security increased significantly. These changes appear to have brought about positive results. On 6 February, the Navy announced that because of the satis­factory nature of the work performed thus far on the For­restal, the Independence would be assigned to the Phila­delphia yard as originally scheduled. Despite these improvements, one cannot help but wonder how the air­craft carrier Service Life Extension Program would have turned out (and how much money might have eventually been saved) if politics had not been the overriding consid­eration in yard selection.²³

The controversy over Philadelphia’s handling of the Saratoga tends to obscure a more fundamental problem with SLEP: with the exception of the Enterprise, it will not provide ships as capable as the Navy’s newer nuclear- powered carriers. In the absence of a requirement to load thousands of tons of fuel oil, the larger nuclear carriers carry 90% more JP-5 aviation fuel and 50% more ammu­nition than their oil-burning counterparts.²⁴ This increases their ability to operate independently of the supply train and is especially important in light of the current shortage of underway replenishment support ships and escorts. Another operational constraint of the four Forrestal-chss ships is that because of their relatively smaller flight decks they cannot simultaneously launch aircraft from both bow catapults while a recovery is in progress. The significance of these problems can be minimized with careful opera­tional planning but may never be fully appreciated until these ships are involved in a widespread and prolonged war at sea.

The service life extension program is not the only means to increase carrier force levels quickly. With the Navy’s decision not to request a seventh Nimitz-class car­rier (CVN-74) in the current five-year shipbuilding re­quest—due in large measure to the success of getting Con­gress to back two CVNs during 1982 and the competition for funds that another CVN might pose for the DDG-51 program—it appears likely that the next nuclear-powered carrier will be requested around 1990 and (if approved) be delivered around 1998. Assuming that the plan for 15 car­rier battle groups remains viable, this would almost guar­antee that the Navy’s oldest frontline carrier, the World War II vintage Midway (CV-41) will keep steaming be­yond her 50th birthday—an unprecedented service life for a major combatant. The ship has undergone two major modernizations during the 1950s and 1960s which accom­plished much of the work in the current SLEP package- Since 1973, she has been forward deployed to Yokosuka, Japan, where she has received regular fleet modernization

Program upgrades and necessary repairs from a shipyard force regarded as one of the most skilled and dedicated in the world. The tactical flag command center has recently been installed, and beginning this year the Midway will begin conversion to support and deploy the F/A-18 in Place of both F-4 and A-7 aircraft.

The Navy’s second oldest frontline carrier, the USS Coral Sea (CV-43), has received major overhauls and 'niprovements, although not as extensive as those made to jhe Midway,²⁵ Following her transfer to the Atlantic fleet In late 1983, the Coral Sea began an 18-month overhaul at Ihe Norfolk Naval Shipyard where she will be modified to handle the F/A-18.

Even with the upgrades and modernization received °^Ver the years, owing primarily to their relatively small ^s'^ze, the Midway and Coral Sea lack important operational ^Capabilities. Their narrower beam and lower flight deck b^eight make them more susceptible to weather restrictions

^ntionally powered carriers of the Forrestal and Kitty ^cnvk classes. But the most important limitation is cata- Compared to the more modem carriers’ four cats, ^e Midway’s two and Coral Sea’s three pose a potential P^foblem that can only be appreciated by those who have ^Seen one and even two catapults go down during a launch.

One remaining World War II carrier still plays an im­portant role in carrier force strength. Plans to decommis- ^S|°ⁿ the small training carrier Lexington (AVT-16) were

announced on several occasions during the past ten years, but each was subsequently cancelled when the Navy more fully assessed the impact of assigning her training duties to one of the limited number of front-line carriers. She will continue to receive necessary repairs and fleet moderniza­tion program upgrades and is expected to remain in the landing platform role for student aviators until 1992 when she is scheduled to be replaced by the Coral Sea.

Two additional World War II carriers were briefly con­sidered as near-term force-building options. During 1980­1981, Admiral Hayward (who was an advocate of a force level of 18 carrier battle groups) proposed reactivating the small mothballed carriers Oriskany (CV-34) and Bon- homme Richard (CV-31). However, because of the lim­ited capability of the obsolete A-7B and A-4M all-attack airwing that would have been assigned to these ships and their high reactivation and operating costs, Congress re­fused to fund them.

Congress was denied an opportunity to consider the re­activation and modernization of a much more capable ship, namely the Franklin D. Roosevelt (CV-42). “FDR,” the second ship of the larger and more modem

Midway class, was stricken and scrapped within months of her 1977 decommissioning, ostensibly because she was in poor material condition. It is more likely, however, that the Navy approved sending FDR quickly to scrap to elimi­nate any possibility that Congress might have ordered the Carter Administration to reactivate her—a decision that could have scuttled funding for a third Nimitz-class nu­clear carrier.²⁷

Battleships

It would be difficult to find a more unusual or impres­sive example of fleet modernization than the current bat­tleship reactivation program. Spurred by growing tensions in the Middle East as well as a sudden awareness of Soviet naval expansion. Congress has agreed to Reagan Adminis­tration requests to return to service at least three of the four 48,425-ton Iowa (BB-61)-class dreadnoughts commis­sioned in 1943 and 1944.

In the minds of many battleship supporters, the lowas' large size makes them ideal cruise missile platforms, and very probably on that basis more than any other Congress felt justified in funding their return to service. But equally impressive is the destructive capability of each ship’s nine 16-inch guns—weapons which are more than adequate to fill the “gun gap” which has existed in the fleet since the 1960s.²⁸

Because of the long period these ships have remained inactive, they are, in many respects, at least a generation behind the Navy’s current requirements for weapons, en­gineering systems, habitability, and pollution control. Besides cruise missiles, the extensive 18-20-month Phase I conversion overhaul equips the ships with the Vul- can/Phalanx close-in weapon system, the SLQ-32 elec­tronic warfare system, Mark 36 rapid-blooming chaff- flare system, AN/SPS-49 long-range air-search radar, and major habitability improvements.²⁹ But the most formid­able Phase I tasks involve converting the engineering plant from burning black oil to the more efficient Navy distillate fuel and installation of a sewage collection, holding, and transfer system to meet environmental requirements. Each of these tasks involves the construction and cleaning of hundreds of tanks requiring the battleships to be in dry dock for over four months. Conversion of the first two battleships has proceeded smoothly with the New Jersey recommissioned in December 1982, and the Iowa ex­pected to follow in late April of this year.

Given the length and cost of the reactivations ($326 million for the New Jersey and $385 million for the Iowa) they are considered “conversions” and paid for out of SCN (shipbuilding and conversion, Navy) appropriations. The Navy originally sold the reactivations to Congress on the basis of a two-phase modernization program. Phase I would get the ships up to current fleet standards and arm them with 32 Tomahawk and 16 Harpoon cruise missiles apiece. Phase II, which was to have been performed dur­ing the ships’ first major overhaul (after 1987), would

substantially increase their command and control facili' ties, defensive armament, and number of cruise missile launchers.

The concept of a Phase II modernization upgrade orig>' nated early in the congressional battleship debates, pri' marily to refute charges that the 40-year-old battleships were necessarily obsolete. Following congressional ap' proval of the reactivation of the New Jersey and Iowa, the Navy has played down the importance of Phase II. For one

thing, the cost of most Phase II options being considered (ranging from $350 million to $1 billion per ship) far ex­ceeds that for the Phase I work—hundreds of millions of dollars the Navy prefers to spend on new construction. OpNav completed a study of Phase II modernization in 1982 which identified eight possible options. Besides one that provided a V/STOL flight deck in place of each ship’s after turret and another that envisioned removing all of the ship’s guns, the most apparent feature was that each suc­ceeding option called for an increased number of vertical launching system missile (VLS) cells. A second objection t° Phase II was that with plans already under way to install ^LS on the new Burke-class destroyers, Ticonderoga (CG-47)-class cruisers, and Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class ^subrnarines as well as to backfit Tomahawk armored box launchers on a variety of existing surface combatants, the additional missile capability specified in most of the Phase 11 options was considered unnecessary.³⁰

In an attempt to end all speculation on the question of Phase II, Secretary Lehman wrote to Congress on 18 Oc­tober 1983 stating that for budgetary reasons, Phase II "'ould not be included in the current five-year plan. The °nly hitch was that once key members of Congress (and defense contractors located in their home districts) had been promised a Phase II battleship modernization pro­gram, they expected the Navy to move forward with plans ^to accomplish it. The House Defense Appropriations Sub­committee lost no time in threatening to withhold consid­^eration of the fiscal year 1985 full funding request for the third battleship, Missouri (BB-63) until the Navy devel- °Ped a Phase II option plan and cost estimate. On the Senate side, the battleships’ most vocal opponent, De­fense Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Ted Ste­rns, (Republican-Alaska), has requested a detailed ex­planation of the Navy’s decision.³¹ While most observers believe that the Navy should prevail in this dispute, it is ^st‘H expected that a limited number of upgrades contem­plated in the Phase II modernization package, including 19ATO Sea Sparrow missiles, overboard target acquisition Astern and Navy tactical data system, will be installed in fee battleships during their regular overhauls and sched- ^ufed restricted availabilities.

For the moment, the battleship reactivation program *}PPears to be in full swing. Respect for the destructive ^0rce of the Iowa’s 16-inch guns was reflected in the No- ^vomber 1983 decision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to keep be New j_ersey stationed off the coast of Lebanon indefi­ⁿitely because of the belief that the ship provided “. . .a Military and psychological presence essential to the safety °b U. S. Marines in Beirut.”³² Congress recently ap­proved shifting $17.4 million in Navy funds to speed up be Iowa’s recommissioning by three months so that she ^Vv'(l be available to relieve the New Jersey. Secretary Leh­man is expected to receive authority to reprogram $449.6 j?feion from the fiscal year 1985 budget to the current ^lscal year 1984 shipbuilding budget in order to get the j ^ssouri back on the original reactivation schedule, re- Uning to the fleet in early 1986. Funds are earmarked in b^£ tiscal year 1986 plan to begin reactivation of the last Mothballed battleship, Wisconsin (BB-64).³³ However, the most important question is whether this support will last. Battleship supporters in Congress have had relatively little to cheer about thus far; despite the New Jersey's brief but impressive performance off Lebanon, her use was re­strained because of the risk of causing civilian casualties. Moreover, her participation in the Lebanese situation may well be viewed by some in the context of the overall fail­ure of the Gemayel regime, a failure that U. S. military presence in the country was unable to prevent. Further­more, the lowas are still regarded as gold-plated dinosaurs by many others in Congress and are closely linked to the current efforts to rebuild military forces—an effort that some political leaders, including most Democratic presi­dential hopefuls, have denounced as unnecessary and a diversion of funds from social programs. The battleships’ future could change after the November election.

Cruisers

By virtue of its June 1975, reclassification of guided missile destroyers (DLGs) as “cruisers,” the U. S. Navy gained 20 guided missile cruisers overnight. While this was an imaginative solution to facilitate more accurate U. S.-Soviet fleet comparisons, it did nothing to bolster the already minimal number of battle group escorts.

Compared with a frigate or a destroyer, the cruiser’s larger hull size provides the needed “platform capability” to accommodate today’s heavier and more sophisticated antiair missile systems. But large size, nuclear power plants, and technological sophistication are the leading factors affecting ship costs. It was largely because of cost that Congress rejected the Navy’s proposal to build a nu­clear strike cruiser (CSGN) as well as a follow-on to the Virginia (CGN-38)-class guided missile cruiser. Congress opted instead to proceed with the smaller conventionally powered Ticonderoga-class Aegis cruiser, actually a cruiser weapon system on a Spruance (DD-963)-class de­stroyer hull.³⁴

h

The increased escort requirement for the envisioned force of 15 carrier battle groups and the current uncer­tainty over the number and rate at which the new Burke- class destroyers will be delivered has led to a decision to modernize and extend the service lives of 21 guided mis­sile cruisers commissioned between 1961 and 1967. These are the three one-of-a-kind nuclear powered cruisers Long Beach (CGN-9), Truxtun (CGN-35), and Bainbridge (CGN-25) and the 18 conventionally powered ships of the Leahy (CG-16) and Belknap (CG-26) classes. All are to be extended up to 10 years beyond their nominal 30-year ser­vice lives beginning in 1986 by allocating additional man- days of work to perform required hull, mechanical and electrical repairs during periodic regular overhauls and selected restricted availabilities. Because she was exten­sively rebuilt following her collision with the carrier John F. Kennedy (CV-67), in 1975, the Belknap has already received many of these repairs. Extending the three nu­clear powered ships will also entail refueling them during the early 1990s.

Because of the extensive rebuilding that was necessary to restore the cruiser Belknap (CG-26) after a collision and fire in late 1975, she has already received portions of the new threat upgrade that will be incorporated into her sister ships. The Belknap is shown here at the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard prior to her 1980 recommissioning.

The most important combat system improvement these ships are to receive, and the one that most clearly illus­trates the nature of the carrier battle group escort mission these cruisers perform is the new threat upgrade (NTU). NTU is comprised primarily of the SM-2 extended range (ER) surface-to-air missile system with mid-course guid­ance capability and the SPS-48E long-range three-dimen­sional radar. Under the control of the SYS-1 combat inte­gration system, the SPS-48E will provide these ships with the capability to rapidly detect, localize, and track fast- moving targets, including fast-diving cruise missiles such as the Soviet AS-4. But most important, the SM-2’s range of more than 75 nautical miles—double that for the SM-1 system now installed—will greatly enhance an upgraded cruiser’s ability to engage attacking aircraft beyond their effective cruise missile launch points.³⁵

However, while NTU will enable these ships . .to combat the majority of the threat of the 1990s,” they are not expected to be as capable in the missile defense role as Aegis-equipped cruisers and destroyers.³⁶ Nor will the Belknaps and Leahy's, have the operational flexibility of the growing number of nuclear powered carriers they must protect. And with the exception of the Long Beach, which will receive two quadruple Tomahawk armored box launchers, none of these older cruisers will have the strike capability of the CG-47s and DDG-51s which will be fit­ted with multi-mission vertical launch systems.

Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines

Until recently the 41 fleet ballistic missile submarines of the George Washington (SSBN-598), Ethan Allen (SSBN-608), and Lafayette (SSBN-616) classes, commis­sioned between 1959 and 1967 under the polaris program had been assigned a nominal service life of 20 years. It was assumed that more capable replacements would be funded by Congress beginning in the early 1970s. Efforts to develop a vastly improved missile system and quieter launch submarine (which became the Trident program) were under way within two years of the 1967 commission­ing of the last polaris submarine, the USS Will Rogers (SSBN-659). However, the high cost of the new subma­rine (estimated in 1983 to cost $1.3 billion each) led to congressional reluctance to fund the new boats at the rate requested by the Navy. Moreover, production difficulties at Electric Boat Company, the sole contractor for the Tri­dent program, resulted in a two-and-a-half-year delay in

the delivery of the first Trident submarine, the USS Ohio (SSBN-726). It became fully apparent by the late 1970s that the 31 submarines of the Lafayette class, converted between 1971 and 1976 to carry the longer range Poseidon multi-warhead (MIRV) C-3 missile, would have to con­tinue as the mainstay of the fleet ballistic submarine force for an additional ten years.³⁷

In an effort to improve the effectiveness of the Poseidon fleet, 12 of the later and quieter units of the Lafayette class were selected in 1980 for conversion to the Trident C-4 missile system which provides these boats with a heavier throw weight and increased accuracy of their MIRVs. All 31 of the Lafayette-class boats will be maintained through­out their extended service lives during scheduled inter-pa­trol repair periods and extended refit periods and each will receive one more major refueling overhaul.

In spite of their new capabilities, in terms of missile firepower and effectiveness, the 12 modernized Lafayettes do not have the throw weight, number of MIRVs, or accu­racy of the larger D-5 missile system that will go to sea in the Trident submarines of the Ohio class in the late 1980s- Further, the inability to backfit modern noise reduction equipment and systems into these 20-year-old boats means that they face a greater risk of detection than the quieter Ohio class which will eventually replace them.³⁸

Two older submarines of the Ethan Allen class, which were not considered suitable for modernization as fleet ballistic missile boats, will soon begin new careers. Based on a growing requirement to have submarines especially

suited to conduct covert special operations, the Sam Hous­ton (SSBN-609) and John Marshall (SSBN-611), were selected for conversion to amphibious transports.³⁹ Both ure now receiving major refueling overhauls designed to ‘ucrease their service lives by ten years. Compared with Ihe relatively small, conventionally powered troop trans­port submarine Graybaclc (SS-574) due to be retired dur- ^lng 1984, these former polaris boats will have a much greater operational range and will be able to carry a larger number of commandos.

As the older units of the nuclear submarine fleet have begun reaching the end of their service lives, another Problem, that of safely disposing of them, has begun to receive increased attention. Although the vast majority of radioactive material is removed from these boats when they are retired, some radioactivity remains from the irra­diation of part of the plant structure and piping systems. On 22 December 1982, the Navy published its draft envi- conceming nuclear waste disposal, it may be years before this issue is settled. Meanwhile, retired submarines will be kept in waterborne storage.

Guided Missile Destroyers

^r°nmental impact statement on nuclear submarine disposal ^ahernatives which concluded that either land burial of re­ctor components or sea disposal of the entire submarine ^ere environmentally acceptable options.³⁸ Not surpris- ^lngly, environmental groups and congressional representa- ^tlyes whose constituents were located near disposal sites, ^r®ised an immediate storm of protest over these alterna­tes, particularly those suggesting sea disposal.⁴¹ Judging the length of time needed to resolve other controversies

Despite their age, the 23 ships of the Charles F. Adams (DDG-2) class built between 1960 and 1964, are the new­est and largest class of guided missile destroyers in the fleet. Since they constitute over one half of the antiair-ca­pable destroyer force, the Navy originally planned for all 23 to receive an extensive overhaul and modernization beginning in fiscal year 1980. However, due to a substan­tial increase in the estimated cost of the program, as well as improved prospects for acquiring the more-capable Barite-class destroyers, only three ships (considered to be in the best condition) were chosen for modernization. The

program will cost in the neighborhood of $65 million per ship and result in a service life extension of five years. Modernization will take place in two sequential overhaul periods. During the first, a number of combat system im­provements will be made—most notably the installation of the Mark 13, Mod 4 weapons direction and handling sys­tem capable of launching the SM-1 MR surface-to-air mis-

sile as well as Harpoon. Approximately three years later, they will receive a significant hull, mechanical, and elec­trical upgrade, together with a sonar conversion. Moderni­zation of the Tattnall (DDG-19) was completed in Novem­ber 1982. The Goldsborough (DDG-20) and Benjamin Stoddert (DDG-22) are to be completed by July 1985.⁴² There is also consideration being given to modernizing and extending the service lives of a number of the older ; Coontz (DDG-40)-class destroyers built between 1960 and 1962. Because of their larger size (4,700 tons), these ten ships—armed with SM-1 surface-to-air missile systems— j are used interchangeably with cruisers in the carrier battle group escort role. The Mahan (DDG-38) was the systems operational evaluation ship for NTU.

For nearly a decade following the withdrawal of U. S. Marines from Vietnam, the Navy’s capability to transport Marine assault forces has steadily declined. At the begin­ning of this year, there was a total of 65 active and reserve i amphibious ships in the fleet, a substantial number of which are forward deployed over a wide area of the j world.⁴³ As a consequence, it is now impossible to amass a sizeable amphibious assault force in one area quickly- \

In an effort to increase both the size and effectiveness of amphibious warfare forces, the Reagan shipbuilding plan ! calls for a sufficient number of new ships by 1994 (princi­pally the LSD-41 and LHD-1 classes) to simultaneously lift the assault echelons of a Marine amphibious force j (37,800 troops) and Marine amphibious brigade (212,200 troops). However, given foreseeable budget constraints ■ and the fact that a majority of the current force of amphibi­ous warfare ships will reach retirement age in the 1990s, the current lift objectives cannot be achieved by these new' ships alone. They must be met in part by shifting a portion of a brigade’s combat service support elements—Marines, vehicles, and supplies—to an assault follow-on echelon which will be carried in civilian charter and civilian- manned Military Sealift Command shipping.⁴⁴

Another, and even larger part is to be met by extending the service lives of amphibious transport docks of the Aus­tin (LPD-4) class (the only ships besides carriers sched­uled to receive a formal SLEP) and increasing the lift expectancy of 17 additional amphibious ships by five years through improved maintenance programs.

I

1

Auxiliaries                                                                                            <

-                                           —-------------------- !      5

Primarily as a consequence of the relatively low priority I accorded the construction of new auxiliaries in previous shipbuilding programs, a variety of oilers, tenders and ; other fleet replenishment and support vessels—some ap' proaching their 50th birthdays—will be kept in service to • support the planned force of 15 carrier battle groups. To »     ^:

large extent, this is possible because the missions they               <

perform today have not significantly changed over time-

Additionally, the relative simplicity of their designs, for­giving nature of their machinery (e.g., 600-pound steam Plants), lack of combat systems, and generally lower tempo of operations are factors which bear favorably on their maintainability. Even so, some of these ships do not have the speed to keep up with the battle force, and with ^very little experience operating ships beyond 40 years, there is some concern that deterioration of basic structural dements such as machinery foundations could become a ^Serious problem.

Conclusion

The decision to modernize and extend the service lives °f at least 142 existing ships ranging from auxiliaries to ^aircraft carriers has been motivated in large measure by the recent change in national defense policies toward a targer, more offensive Navy centered around carrier battle groups. Given the time required to authorize and construct new ships (up to eight years in the case of a Nimitz-class carrier) it was the only alternative to achieving the Navy’s ^current goal of 600 deployable ships by 1989.

Service life extension and modernization are not new. Since World War II, hundreds of ships have been modem- j^Zed and made to steam longer to make up for the unwill- 'ngness of previous Congresses and administrations—es- Pecially during periods of economic recession—to fund an ^equate number of new warships. Previously, service life ^tension and modernization programs (most notably hRAM) were considered a cheaper and tactically equal substitute for new ship construction. That was before the Unprecedented Soviet naval expansion of the past two dec­ides which has been characterized by a significant in­^Crease not only in the size of the Soviet fleet, but also in its Merging capability to carry out offensive operations in all ⁽he oceans of the world. In this more critical and danger­ous tactical environment there are risks to making older ships steam longer since relatively few have the capabili­ty of newer ships of the same class. Oil-burning carriers ^aud cruisers do not have the endurance or flexibility of ⁿⁱ⁾clear powered ships; modernized Forrestah and Mid- ^ays lack the operational capability of larger deck car­et's; the missile firepower—in terms of types and num­bers—of older cruisers and destroyers is well below that f°r newer ships employing the vertical launch system; and ^der auxiliaries lack the speed to keep up with the battle °^rce. In the strategic area noisier Lafayette-class fleet bal- >*tic missile submarines are easier to dptect than Trident ^class boats. Moreover, in nearly all cases the extended ^ships require larger crews than their newer counterparts.

Interestingly, of the current group of ships being ex­uded, only the four World War II /ovra-class battleships i?^re without peer on the drawing board of tomorrow’s fleet, 'here is simply no affordable counterpart to these fast, ^b|ghly survivable ships which are being upgraded with ^dern missile firepower. But rather than missiles it is the ^estructive power of their 1930s vintage 16-inch guns— Capons which have been particularly suitable in every

major conflict since World War II—that makes the class unique. And while their return to service was inspired chiefly by their ability to carry large numbers of Toma­hawk cruise missiles, it is reasonable to expect that as increasing numbers of cruise missile armed submarines and surface combatants join the fleet, the battleships will be regarded primarily as gun ships. This view is supported in part by the recent decision to cancel the scheduled Phase II modernization program which would have added more cruise missiles. The only factors clouding their fu­ture are the manning cost of each battleship’s 1,555 crew members—four times the number required for a cruiser— and the perception held by some members of Congress that they are relics.

Aside from comparisons with newer ships, there are other concerns. Owing to the tendency of older structural components and systems to fail, ships retained in commis­sion beyond their nominal service lives can be expected to require more frequent attention resulting in increased own­ership costs.⁴⁵ Yet with the trend toward less frequent maintenance and yard periods, greater demands will have to be placed on crews and depot level maintenance facili­ties to keep older ships fully operational. Furthermore, unscheduled maintenance requirements beyond the capa­bilities of the depot level are likely to be greater for older ships and could have an adverse impact on fleet readiness.

Another worry is whether there will be adequate opera­tions and maintenance funding during the next decade to support the older ships. The historical record clearly indi­cates that funding for overhauls and maintenance has been one of the first accounts cut during periodic congressional cutbacks in the defense budget. But even if Congress fully supports these ships throughout their extended service lives, there is the additional concern that their higher maintenance and crew costs may draw down funding that might otherwise be available in future budgets to acquire new, more capable ships.

Just where the service life extension of a large number of older ships takes the Navy during the 1990s, after Leh­man and Reagan are gone, is another matter. Unless the current building program of 24 new ships a year is actually achieved, and maintained by their successors—which seems improbable given the erratic record of congres­sional support for defense spending—the size of the fleet will peak around the mid-1990s and begin declining again as extended ships (and those not being extended) reach the end of their service lives.

In the meantime, service life extension will have a major influence on the composition and capabilities of the new ships which are procured. Since most of these exten­sion activities are directed at ship types usually deployed with aircraft carrier battle groups, it is fairly obvious that the Navy will continue to request that a large portion of new construction funds be allocated to these types as well— thus perpetuating the concept of carrier-based air power as the Navy’s primary strike capability. While supported by the present Navy leadership, this course of action is not universally accepted. The high cost of new replacements for retiring large deck aircraft carriers, battle force escorts and their considerable support forces (not to mention air-